Keywords: SUPARCO, PRSS-1, Pakistan Space Programme, Space Vision 2047

Introduction

“The Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission” (SUPARCO) is the national space agency of Pakistan. It was formed in 1961 as a research committee, under the leadership of two Nobel laureates, Abdus Salam and Ishrat Usmani. It was promoted to a federal independent commission in 1981.[1]  SUPARCO is based in Karachi. It is responsible for running the National Space Program, handling Pakistan’s space activities under the National Command Authority (NCA), and managing its satellite communications and atmospheric research.[2]

Significance of SUPARCO for Pakistan

SUPARCO plays a vital role for Pakistan as it contributes to the social, economic, scientific, and strategic development of Pakistan. In view of its strategic objectives, it is important to understand its functions, advantages, and challenges. SUPARCO operates Earth observation and remote sensing satellites, which include the “Pakistan Remote Sensing System (PRSS-1),” and the domestically developed “Pakistan Technology Evaluation Satellite (PakTES-1A).”[3]  These satellites assist in precision agriculture, monitor glacial melt, aid in managing interprovincial water disputes, and support disaster response efforts related to floods and heavy rainfall.[4] SUPARCO’s satellites also facilitate monitoring and assessment of risk-related issues along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

SUPARCO oversees the “Space Programme 2040,” launched in 2011. NCA approved it to accomplish Pakistan’s long-term roadmap for strategic objectives. It was renamed “Space Vision 2047,” which aims to launch geostationary and low Earth orbit satellites.[5] The first Pakistani astronaut is scheduled to travel to the Tiangong Space Station on the Shenzhou 24 mission in late 2026. Through an agreement between Pakistan and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), Pakistani astronauts are receiving advanced training.[6]

In October 2025, Pakistan launched its first hyperspectral imaging satellite, HS-1, from China. This development is likely to enhance Pakistan’s capability in the monitoring and mapping of the environment and natural resources.[7]

Why SUPARCO is in the News?

After almost 60 years of sluggish progress in the space domain, SUPARCO has launched six satellites in just 16 months. This recent surge is not gradual, but rather abrupt, when compared to the number of satellites launched during the past sixty years since the foundation of SUPARCO.

This is not a future scenario that we are facing but a scenario that has happened before. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan had tapped into the surveillance void between India and China by accessing the Chinese intelligence reports related to Indian deployments. This would have otherwise remained unknown.

The key change, since then, is related to the ownership model. China has already offered surveillance during crisis times to Pakistan in the past. China is now assisting Pakistan in creating its own autonomous surveillance system that can be integrated into the Chinese network and work on its own in real-time. For crisis stability, a distinction is important for sustaining operations. ‘Third-party control of surveillance’ means that the capability can be pulled at any time; while ‘sovereign control of surveillance’ means it is under the control of the nation, with the required degree of autonomy.[8]

Strengths and Weaknesses of SUPARCO

SUPARCO began operations with the launch of the Rehbar-I sounding rocket in 1962, making Pakistan the fourth Asian country to go into space. SUPARCO’s functioning has suffered for a long time due to a number of institutional challenges. A few of them are.[9]

(a)    Funding Challenges: SUPARCO is struggling with funding issues, and this has been impacting its operations as well as the progress of various projects. In 2023, for instance, the budget allocation was approximately USD 24 million only for SUPARCO, whereas the budgets for the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in India, China, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were approximately more than USD 1.9 billion, USD 20 billion and USD 79 billion, respectively.[10]

(b)    Administrative Challenges: Additionally, SUPARCO has faced many administrative or political hurdles. In the 1980s and even today, political uncertainty, the changing focus of the government and the growing emphasis on missile and nuclear programmes pushed many top scientists from the space programme into missile and nuclear programmes under the control of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL).

(c)    Planning Gaps: Out of the available 1,800 geostationary orbital slots, 573 slots have been used by satellites, as reported on January 02, 2026.[11] The other slots that feed the main markets have already been filled by countries and private companies for their satellite operations. Satellites are being developed and awaiting deployment for these positions.[12] The failure to meet deadlines and commit adequate funds to build Pakistani satellites caused the loss of critical geostationary orbital slots, like 38°E and 41°E, during the 1990s.[13] Those 38°E and 41°E longitudes are significant as some of the limited fibre-connected regions are the most conflict-prone parts of the world. Countries are given the allotted slots on a ‘first come, first served’ basis by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Once a nation doesn’t send a satellite into its assigned slot in the allotted time, it could lose the right to that slot. This drop in position can impact the country’s ability to provide sovereign satellite services in its own space and potentially threaten the country’s sovereignty and/or position relative to other countries or companies. For Pakistan, this was complicated by the bureaucracy, which made it difficult to progress due to a shortage of financial resources and a major “technological denial” of essential equipment, which severely impacted Pakistan’s ability to keep pace with the ITU’s tight schedule to deploy.[14]

Disruption of the 38°E longitude would result in the loss of communications for more than 15 countries. A recent series of conflicts in the Middle East has always been accompanied by the employment of cyber-attacks and jamming against these two longitudes. The inability to plan forced Pakistan to look for external assistance.

(d)    Operational Gaps: The second experimental satellite (Badr-B), which was launched by SUPRACO in the year 2001, was lost in deep space after twenty years, due to communication failures in its operation, despite a five-year designed life. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have any indigenous satellite launch vehicles (SLVs). As a result, it has to rely heavily on other countries, particularly China, for the launching of its satellites.

The Pakistan Space Programme is in dire need to fill these gaps in its operations since it does not have plans for the procurement of corresponding resources and limited know-how.

Implications for Indian Strategic Objectives

The recent expansion of SUPARCO’s capabilities, with the support and assistance of China, has significant implications for Indian defence and space strategies, thereby raising strategic importance.

In the military standoff between India and Pakistan, in May 2025 Pakistani forces tried to tailor military operations in real time with the help of inputs from Chinese satellites. But this could not degrade Indian operations. Now Pakistan is trying to bridge the capacity gaps. Pakistan has fused its satellite intelligence capabilities with Link-17 and other terrestrial communication technologies. Relevant slots are critical for national telecommunications, television broadcasting and crucial military communications for a nation like Pakistan. This may not constrain Pakistan’s capabilities in the long run, but warns India to take necessary steps to manage the ill effects of such developments.[15]

The development of Pakistan’s space-based capabilities will provide Pakistan more bandwidth to counter Indian military capabilities. Pakistan is trying to develop a “full-spectrum” deterrent approach. China’s excellence in space technology and the BeiDou satellite navigation system have improved the high precision of targeting weapons systems, such as Shaheen-III and Babur cruise missiles. China is actively cooperating with SUPARCO, including help for the launch of Pakistan’s HS-1 Satellite and astronaut training. From a strategic perspective, the alliance also creates further challenges for India in space and the cyber sphere.

Conclusion

The satellite constellation of Pakistan is relatively small and has both civilian and military applications. SUPRACO is making efforts to enhance space-based capabilities with Chinese launch facilities, design help and real-time data sharing in times of crisis. Operation Sindoor was very much supported by real-time satellite support. Before the next battle, India’s challenge is not to catch up with Pakistan’s satellite program, but to make its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities state-of-the-art, faster and more resilient. India is on the edge of a turning point. Space continues to be militarised, and massive investments are being made in their offensive and counter-space capabilities.

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Notes:-

[1] “Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO),” GlobalSecurity.org, August 18, 2018,  https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/pakistan/agency.htm. Accessed on June 20, 2026.

[2] “Pakistan-Space-and-Upper-Evolution-and-Prospects,” Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSAR), 2026,  https://issra.pk/pub/insight/2023/Pakistan-Space-and-Upper-Evolution-and-Prospects/Pakistan-Space-and-Upper-Evolution-and-Prospects.html. Accessed on June 22, 2026.

[3]“The History of Pakistan’s Space Program,” New Space Economy, July 25, 2025,  https://newspaceeconomy.ca/2025/07/25/the-history-of-pakistans-space-program/. Accessed on June 20, 2026.

[4] Umar Rathore, “Can Pakistan Make Its Space Program Great Again?,” The Diplomat, May 08, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/can-pakistan-make-its-space-program-great-again/. Accessed on June 30, 2026.

[5] New Space Economy, n. 3.

[6] Rathore, n. 4.

[7] “Pakistan launches China-backed 6 Earth-observation satellites in 16 months, now watching Indian territory,” The Business Today, June 10, 2026, https://www.businesstoday.in/science/story/pakistan-launches-china-backed-6-earth-observation-satellites-in-16-months-now-watching-indian-territory-535970-2026-06-10. Accessed on June 30, 2026.

[8] Prakhar Gupta, “Behind Pakistan’s Spy Satellites: A Structure Built for Speed and Precision in the Next War Against India,” Swarajya, June 12, 2026, https://swarajyamag.com/defence/behind-pakistans-spy-satellites-a-structure-built-for-speed-and-precision-in-the-next-war-against-india. Accessed on June 15, 2026.

[9] ISSRA, n. 2.

[10] “Government Space Budgets by Country,” Orbital Radar, July 05, 2026, https://orbitalradar.com/space-economy/government-space-budgets. Accessed on July 06, 2026.

[11] “List of Satellites in Geostationary Orbit: satellites updated 2 Jan 2026,” Satellite Signals, January 21, 2026, https://www.satsig.net/sslist.htm. Accessed on June 30, 2026.

[12]  Isabella Richards, “All nations deserve access to inhabit Earth’s orbit,” Space Connects, May 16, 2022, https://www.spaceconnectonline.com.au/satellites/5443-feature-all-nations-deserve-access-to-inhabit-earth-s-orbit. Accessed on June 30, 2026.

[13] Siddiqui, Salman, “Lagging behind: 2040 – Pakistan’s space odyssey,” The Tribune Express, August 01, 2012,http://tribune.com.pk/story/415738/lagging-behind-2040-pakistans-space-oddyssey/. Accessed on July 03, 2026.

[14] Iulia-Diana Galeriu, “Paper satellites” and the free use of outer space,” GlobalLex, January/February 2015, https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Paper_satellites_free_use_outer_space.html. Accessed on July 03, 2026.

[15] Ibid.

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Keywords: IRST, Passive Sensors, EO/IR

Introduction

On the night of 19-20 March 2026, the Iranian Air Defence system, using an infrared search-and-track (IRST) based system, was able to track and engage a United States (US). F-35A Lightning stealth jet in a combat mission over Iran. The jet was damaged but managed to recover at a regional US airbase. This was the first time a fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft had ever been damaged in combat by an Iranian Air Defence System, and it is proof that stealth jets can be detected by electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensor systems.[1]

What Happened?

An F‑35A, hit by Iranian air‑defence fire, made an emergency landing on a US-controlled airfield in the Middle East, with the pilot reported as being safe though the report mentioned some shrapnel wounds and that he was in stable condition.[2] Iranian and affiliated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) media published the thermal imaging video of the F‑35 within the range of an infrared sensor, and then a missile closing in on the plane and exploding.[3]

Iran deployed passive infrared‑guided or electro‑optical/IR air‑defence systems, such as upgraded short‑range point‑defence or anti‑drone missiles like “Product 358” or other 358/359‑series systems, which operate on heat signatures rather than radar, allowing them to track the F‑35 despite its low radar signature.[4]

 Techniques and Tactics

The footage also suggests the range was less, maybe a few kilometres, meaning either the F‑35 was low flying, or temporarily in the “infrared kill envelope” of ground-based IR (Infra-Red) guided systems. The IRST-style approach is important because stealth fighters are intended to outsmart radar, but they still emit detectable IR signatures from engine heat skin friction. Iran’s claimed success would represent a move towards multi‑sensor (particularly IR and electro‑optical) threat environments for Western stealth platforms.

The US Central Command spokesman, Navy Captain Tim Hawkins said the incident is being investigated. The F‑35 suffered damage and made an emergency landing during the period of March 19 to 20, but hasn’t made a public statement about the type of weapon that damaged it or if it was solely the IRST’s fault.[5] Independent analysts remind that the evidence is still incomplete and Iran’s claim of a “world first” strike on an F-35 is considered “credible, at least partially successful.[6]

Key Iranian infrared and electro-optical detection and short-range heat-seeking systems are the Misagh-2, Majid, and Herz-9. The Majid air defence system, officially designated AD-08, is an Iranian short-range, low-altitude surface-to-air missile system for point defence against low-flying aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters and unmanned systems. The missile is 156 millimetres in diameter, 2,670 millimetres in length, weighs about 75 kilograms. It features a passive imaging infrared homing seeker and a proximity fuse, meaning it does not emit radar waves that would warn the targeted aircraft. Detection is performed by electro-optical and infrared sensors out to 15 kilometres, and can be integrated with external radar, such as the Kashef-99 phased-array system, to extend the tracking range to 12 to 30 kilometres and enable simultaneous tracking of multiple targets.[7]

Nevertheless, this marks the first time that Iran’s military has hit one of the USD100 million aircraft since the US. and Israel launched their attack on Iran on February 28, 2026.[8]

IRST Systems

Ground-based IRST systems are special types of electro-optical sensors that are used to detect and track the thermal signature of an aerial target – like an aircraft, helicopter, or cruise missile – without emitting electromagnetic radiation. Ground-based IRST systems are passive and provide high-resolution air defence and situational awareness capabilities without transmitting active radio-frequency pulses, which can be detected or jammed by adversaries.

The use of IRST systems in military systems has grown in recent times, as they are used to counter low-observable (stealth) aircraft and to provide a redundant tracking layer in electronic warfare environments. These systems employ state-of-the-art infrared focal plane arrays to survey the horizon or specific sectors and calculate target coordinates using complex image processing and atmospheric modelling. Although airborne platforms have traditionally been the focus of IRST development, integration into ground-based air defence (GBAD) networks is now a priority for countries seeking to augment their look-up capabilities in response to incoming threats.

The IRST technology has been adopted by multiple countries, with some countries developing their own solutions and others integrating the technology into national security.

France: The Safran Electronics & Defence portfolio, including the Vampire series (e.g. Vampire NG and EONS-NG), is tailored for naval and ground-based surveillance applications, offering long-range detection of both aerial and surface targets.

Netherlands: Thales Nederland manufactures the Sirius IRST system, which is a passive, 360-degree situational awareness system that integrates into land-based defence architectures.

The United States (US): The US military has a number of electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) systems for ground-based defence in use, such as the AN/AAQ-32 IFTS and specialised versions of the Mark 46/20 Mod 1. Most of these systems are part of point defence installations to augment radar-based missile defence installations.

Many modern air defence batteries are based on distributed aperture principles—a number of infrared sensors are interconnected to provide comprehensive spherical coverage. This approach is comparable to the technology utilised in the AN/AAQ-37 system used on the F-35, but is applied in a stationary or mobile ground installation.

Indian IRST Environment

The IRST technology is primarily being developed on airborne platforms of the Indian Air Force. There is a gap in the Indian air defence architecture in terms of dedicated ground-based IRST units to meet the changing requirements of air defence. The strategic potential of IRST systems may be exploited in their ability to detect targets that are hard to track with radar, including stealth aircraft and those using electronic countermeasures. IRST can improve situational awareness and complement the existing robust air defence layer.

The introduction of IRST could bolster India’s air defence capabilities, complementing existing sensors of multi-layered systems such as the S-400, Akash, SPYDER, and Barak 8, to achieve critical air defence objectives, especially in detecting stealth threats and low-signature targets. Currently, target acquisition and fire control on these platforms are based mainly on active and passive radar arrays, like the Rajendra 3D radar or the EL/M-2084 MMR.[9]

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), under the ‘Make in India’ programme, inked a contract to co-develop and co-produce a long-range dual-band IRST for Su-30 MKI under the MAKE-II procedure of Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020.[10]

The Rafale is equipped with the ‘Optronique Secteur Frontal’ (OSF), also known as ‘Front Sector Optronics’. It is integrated into the airframe’s nose to give the plane a high-resolution, passive, long-range capability to detect. According to well-known aviation literature, the OSF is meant to be a “stealthy” sensor that allows the pilot to detect, track, and identify aerial objects without emitting radiation.[11] The Su-30 MKI employs the ‘Optical Locator System’ (OLS) -30 (or similar variations within the Flanker family), a spherical, ball-mounted IRST sensor situated away from the cockpit centerline.[12]

Implications

IRST systems follow the physics of infrared propagation through the atmosphere. Ground-based systems are sometimes integrated with meteorological sensors. This helps in adaptation of the detection thresholds based on the moisture, dust and cloud content. Passive ground-based sensors are one of the few methods for tracking stealth and/or low radar cross-section (RCS) flying platforms.

The aircraft was not completely destroyed, and the pilot was not injured, but the incident has sparked a worldwide discussion about the survivability of stealth platforms against passive infrared guidance systems, and that the low radar cross-section of the F-35 does not mean it is immune to heat-seeking missiles at close ranges.

The targeting of F-35 would trigger the military equipment designers and developers, and air defence observers to work to balance the technical asymmetry between stealth and air defence, as the threat seems to never end. Secondly, short-range systems designed for point defence can still make a difference in operational events in contested airspace.

Conclusion

Stealth does not mean being invisible but reducing the aircraft’s signature across multiple spectrums – RCS, visual, acoustic and IR/ thermal. In all the spectrums, as passive IR/EO sensors can detect heat without alerting radar-based warnings, which allows “silent” detection and short-range engagements. The survivability of modern air warfare is not just about aircraft technology; it’s also about the density, mobility and integration of opposing air defence networks. Strike Survivability remains under threat; emerging technologies need to address this limitation.

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 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

Notes:-

[1] Alcott Weiin and Seong Hyeon Choi, “Iran detected and damaged a US F-35 stealth jet in combat. Chinese experts map out how,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3347383/iran-detected-and-damaged-us-f-35-stealth-jet-combat-chinese-experts-map-out-how?utm. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[2] “US F-35 Stealth Jet Hit: How Iran’s Infrared Systems May have struck the ‘Ghost of the Skies,” Times of India, March 20, 2026,  https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/international/us-f-35-stealth-jet-shot-how-irans-infrared-systems-may-have-struck-the-ghost-of-the-skies/articleshow/129697195.cms. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

[3] Liang Rui and Liu Xuanzun, “Iran says it hit an F-35; Chinese expert analyzes how Iran could have struck it using infrared detection, breaking US stealth myth,” Global Times, March 22, 2026, https://www.globaltimes .cn/page/202603/1357330.shtml. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[4] “Which Iranian Air Defense System Targeted F-35 and Why russia Was Clearly Involved,” Defense Express, March 20, 2026, https://en.defence-ua.com/news/which_iranian_air_defense_system_targeted_f_35_and_why_ russia_was_ clearly_involved-17891.html. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[5] Chris Gordon and Stephen Losey, “USAF F-35 Lands After Taking Fire Over Iran; Pilot Stable,” March 19, 2026, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/f-35a-lands-after-taking-fire-over-iran-pilot-stable/. Accessed on April 02, 2026.

[6] Priyanka Shankar, “Has Iran brought down an ‘unkillable’ US F-35 jet?” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2026,  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/23/has-iran-brought-down-an-unkillable-us-f-35-jet. Accessed on April 07, 2026.

[7] “Iran’s Majid Missile Damages U.S. F-35 in Combat — Heat-Seeking SAM Raises Global Alarm Over Stealth Fighter Vulnerability in Middle East War,” Defence Security Asia, March 21, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/iran-majid-missile-f35-hit-stealth-fighter-us-iran-air-defense-2026/. Accessed on April 09, 2026.

[8] “US F-35 hit by suspected Iranian fire, forced to make emergency landing,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3347217/us-f-35-hit-suspected-iranian-fire-forced-make-emergency-landing?module=inline&pgtype=article. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[9] Sheershoo Deb, “Full List of India’s Air Defence Systems,” Defence XP, August 23, 2020, https://www.defencexp.com/full-list-of-indian-air-defence-systems/. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[10] “HAL and BEL to co-develop IRST system for Su-30 MKI,” The Business Standard, April 26, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-cm/hal-and-bel-to-co-develop-irst-system-for-su-30-mki-122042600747_1.html. Accessed on April 09, 2026.

[11] Ian Parker, “Resourceful Rafale,” Aviation Tech Today, September 01, 2000,  https://www.aviationtoday.com/ 2000/09/01/resourceful-rafale/. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

[12] “Sukhoi (Su) – 30 MKI of Indian Air Force,” Indra Stra, August 31, 2015, https://www.indrastra.com/2015/ 08/ANALYSIS-Sukhoi-Su-30-MKI-of-IAF.html. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

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