Keywords: SSN, Non-proliferation, South Korea, Nuclear

A rare news item on nuclear non-proliferation has emerged from South Korea (ROK) regarding its nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), an ambition which the country has been working towards for many years and has seen considerable debate both within and outside of South Korea. This article analyses this new development in South Korea vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation concerns.

The Announcement

On July 28, 2026, it was reported that South Korea is moving ahead to “prohibit nuclear fuel intended to power submarines from being diverted to nuclear weapons.” The announcement was made by the Ministry of National Defence, which  stated that “The ministry is establishing the legal and institutional foundation needed to ensure the stable implementation of the nuclear-powered submarine program.” The announcement comes at a time of an ongoing debate in the country with regard to the future of its nuclear weapon programme. The possible intent of this could be to silence the voices raising proliferation concerns. The bill, if it becomes a law, would become South Korea’s first explicit statutory prohibition on using nuclear material for the development, production, or possession of nuclear weapons.

SSNs in the South Korean Defence Strategy

On May 26, 2026, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defence released what is known as the ‘Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea Nuclear-Powered Submarine.’ Under the programme, the country plans to launch its first submarine in the mid-2030s. The plan comes on the heels of the United States (US) support for South Korea’s decision to build nuclear-powered attack submarines. Over the years, the changing dynamics of threats posed by its neighbours, particularly by North Korea, have led South Korea to seek SSNs. The threat from North Korea has become more potent once it unveiled its new nuclear-powered submarine in December 2025.

The Basic Plan is also important to South Korea’s Offensive Military Doctrine, which it outlined in the 2022 defence white paper. It is colloquially known as the ‘three-axis system.’ This comprises the development of the SSNs, the so-called ‘kill-chain platform,’ which could undertake preemptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. The same intention was referred to by Korea’s Ministry of Defence when it unveiled the plans to build the SSNs, as it stated, “the submarines will provide extended endurance for tracking North Korean naval activity, and also form part of an underwater “kill chain” capable of supporting precision strike operations in the event of conflict.

Two other important factors have led to the announcement of the SSNs. The first relates to the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) programme. As AUKUS has allowed Australia to build a closer relationship with the US, the Basic Plan will help South Korea build a similar relationship with the US. The second reason is more domestic in nature, as South Korea has been witnessing a renewed public debate regarding the production of nuclear weapons: an SSN programme can help “present a valid alternative to nuclear armaments.”

Why the Announcement is Important

Under the Basic Plan, South Korea seeks to build the Jang Bogo-N class of SSNs, which will utilise low-enriched uranium fuel, which would be less than 20 per cent enriched uranium-235. This poses less of a proliferation risk. One might recall that on January 11, 2023, the then South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol sparked a major controversy by suggesting that South Korea might acquire nuclear weapons “if North Korean threats [become] more serious.” One may interpret the former President’s statement as a political gimmick, but public opinion data over the years has shown growing support for South Korea’s nuclear option. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, which has been conducting public opinion surveys in South Korea since 2010, has recorded “76.2 percent of South Koreans now [2025] favour developing an independent nuclear arsenal.” In fact, since 2010, public opinion regarding indigenous development of nuclear weapons has never gone below 54.8 per cent.

Source: Image compiled by the author from South Koreans and their neighbours 2025, https://www.asaninst.org/data/file/s3_4_2_eng/f15af67c43af11afd7a990dc4f32fd2b_ClhtB9a5_9eca2136ce8acf9c485de1d452d2d82fd7e2abdc.pdf.

In order to effectively communicate that South Korea does not seek to build sovereign strategic deterrence capabilities, Cho Hyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, in an opinion piece published on April 01, 2026, categorically stated that “From a security perspective, nuclear armament [of South Korea] would introduce uncertainty, not strength.” The foreign affairs minister further made it clear that the arrangements under the extended deterrence posture with the US are currently the best deterrence posture for South Korea and pursuing a path towards nuclearisation would “trigger a chain reaction of proliferation in the region, ultimately undermining the Republic of Korea’s security interests.”

With regard to its SSNs and proliferation concerns, South Korea’s submarine plan has ensured working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to “establish a safeguards system applicable to nuclear-powered submarines in cooperation.” In this context, the June 08, 2026 statement by the IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi noted that South Korea’s commitments towards “fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations,” and “[South Korea’s] intention to work with the Agency on safety, security and safeguards measures applicable to nuclear-powered submarines.” More importantly, South Korea ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in 2004, which gives the IAEA expanded access and short-notice inspections. Since under the Basic Plan, South Korea seeks to use low-enriched uranium procured from the US, a nuclear cooperation provision was discussed during Presidents Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung’s summit in Gyeongju in November 2025. Given that the Trump-Lee summit in November 2025 did not clarify the provisions under which the US would help South Korea procure low-enriched uranium and subsequently help avoid proliferation concerns, the July 28, 2026 announcement fills this gap by allaying the proliferation concerns.

Given that South Korea seeks to develop at least three nuclear-powered submarines displacing about 8,000 metric tons each, with the lead vessel planned to be launched by the mid-2030s, provisions on fuel supply and concerns about fuel diversion are legitimate questions. However, with the legislation announced by South Korea, it has tried to address these concerns.

Meanwhile, there is another angle which might not allow South Korea to pursue a nuclear-weapon programme. The bilateral 123 Agreement signed between the US and South Korea supports the ROK’s civil enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing initiatives for peaceful purposes, but it is contingent on South Korea’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments. In terms of nuclear power generation, South Korea ranks fifth in the world and has capabilities in the construction, operation, and export of nuclear power plants. Any divergence from power generation to a proliferation path would bring sanctions on South Korea, and as stated by President Lee Jae Myung on December 02, 2025, “the South Korean economy could not withstand such sanctions; and that no South Korean citizen would want to live like North Koreans.”

The nuclear world order is witnessing too many upheavals rarely witnessed since the dawn of the nuclear age. The war between the Russian Federation, a nuclear weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member and Ukraine, a non-nuclear weapon NPT member state, is yet to find a negotiated resolution. The war in West Asia involves one NPT founding member (the US), one NPT member and non-nuclear weapon state (Iran), and one nuclear weapon state outside of the NPT (Israel). Understanding these dynamics is essential for meaningful dialogue. Simultaneously, the US has recently signed a deal with Saudi Arabia, an NPT member, to provide American nuclear reactors and perhaps also the right to enrich uranium. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on the other hand, is looking for an expansion of its nuclear capabilities by examining the options to position American nuclear capabilities across Europe, particularly in Poland, Finland, and Lithuania. In South-East Asia, as China continues to modernise and increase its nuclear capabilities, a debate in Japan is going on about what role nuclear weapons can play in the country’s defence. Amid all these concerns, the news from South Korea certainly provides a bit of relief for proliferation pessimists and appears to align with South Korea’s agenda for “peace first.”

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Keywords: RevCon, Nuclear Testing, Article VI, NPT

The 11^th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ended without adopting a final statement on May 22, 2026. This particular conclusion of the Review Conference was not a surprise. Given the way the nuclear world order has been evolving over the past couple of years, any hope for substantive dialogue on the risks and shared responsibility for arms control from the nuclear-armed countries, including the N-5, is a stretch. However, not everything is as gloomy as it may look. The RevCon managed to convey the views of the majority of non-nuclear-armed countries on NPT obligations. This article highlights the major disagreements between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed NPT parties, as well as the concerns raised.

The Ghost of Nuclear Testing is Back

During the RevCon, questions regarding nuclear testing were raised repeatedly. Right at the beginning, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres, stated that the issue related to “Nuclear testing is back on the table.” Further, statements from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) also noted that the threat arises from the “retreat from long-standing commitments to nuclear testing moratoria.” The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stated on record that they have a “deep concern over recent public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing.” The European Union led the call for upholding and strengthening the norm against nuclear testing. The President of the Seventh Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction also expressed concern about “public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing.” A similar concern was raised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which maintained its collective opposition to nuclear testing. Similarly, the African Group also raised the concern about “resum[ing] nuclear weapon testing and affirm[ed] that testing of nuclear weapons undermines the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).” The Parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the Pacific Islands Forum, which consists of the countries affected by nuclear testing, expressed concern about nuclear testing.

For the N-5, the issue of nuclear testing did not resonate equally across the board. The United States (US), which has been vocal about nuclear testing, did not raise any point regarding the risks associated with the resumption of nuclear testing. The Russian Federation, against whom allegations of nuclear testing have been made by the US and which has also de-ratified the CTBT, maintained its commitment towards its declared moratorium on nuclear testing. China did not make any remarks about nuclear testing. Its national report presented before the start of the RevCon stated that it has “all along abided by its moratorium on nuclear testing and has not engaged in any activity contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.” The UK stated that it seeks “maintaining… voluntary moratorium on conducting nuclear test explosions.” France reaffirmed its stance in favour of maintaining moratoriums on nuclear testing.

Arms Control: A Distant, Uncertain Future

The 11^th Review Conference happened at a time when there are no bilateral arms-control mechanisms between the NPT’s nuclear-armed countries. With the demise of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) treaty earlier this year, no guardrails are now in place. The failure of the RevCon showcased the lack of concern among the N-5 regarding arms control or Article VI of the NPT. During the Conference, the N-5 effectively shifted attention to geopolitical developments and described their commitments under Article VI as conditional. This is a classic egg-and-chicken paradox that they play. Russia stated that “To return to the path of disarmament, it will first be necessary for all nuclear-weapon states to abandon policies aimed at undermining the fundamental interests of other parties and the principle of equal and indivisible security, as well as to demonstrate readiness for equal and comprehensive work on reducing conflict potential, with emphasis on eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions and taking into account all relevant key factors in their interconnection.”[1] France took the same view and justified deterrence by shedding light on the deteriorating strategic environment. The UK made references to Russia’s novel nuclear systems, Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) continued effort towards nuclear weapon development and China’s rapid rise in nuclear numbers. It categorically stated that “We [the UK] have and will continue to take the steps necessary to maintain our deterrence capability.” China took refuge in words like ‘hegemonism’, ‘power politics’, and ‘unilateralism’, and  put the ball in the US court  by stating that “the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in nuclear disarmament.”[2] The US, surprisingly enough, was the only nuclear-weapon state which did not mention the current geopolitical development to justify its own ongoing nuclear modernisation. It rather accused China of nuclear expansion and the conduct of the alleged yield-producing nuclear tests. The USA reiterated its willingness to establish a multilateral strategic stability and arms control mechanism with Russia and China. But it did not mention how it seeks to fulfil its obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

Clearly, the RevCon failed to bring the so-called N-5 to commit to Article VI of the NPT. Rather, the whole process was hijacked by concerns about North Korea’s nuclear development, China’s nuclear expansion, and French forward deterrence. More importantly, Iran’s nuclear status became a bone of contention with the Russia-Ukraine war also taking centre stage on many occasions.

Under these circumstances, the clearest set of recommendations came from the ‘Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative’ (NPDI). This initiative was put forward by 12 non-nuclear-armed states to strengthen their three pillars. This article has drawn on two points from the initiative to explain the overall disarmament agenda.

• • The NPDI, while calling for the need for disarmament, stressed the need for doctrinal reviews to reduce the role and operational status of nuclear weapons.

  • It placed emphasis on transparency and accountability by calling upon all States Parties to commit to regular, standardised reporting on their implementation of NPT obligations across all three pillars. It emphasised that reporting should go beyond general descriptions and include substantive and, where appropriate, comparable information.

Along the same lines, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which consisted of six non-nuclear-armed NPT countries, reminded the N-5 countries of their commitment to Article VI, including the 2010 Action Plan, to which all State Parties had committed.

The Draft Outcome Document: A Sneak Peek at Today’s Global Nuclear (Dis)Order

While the 11^th RevCon failed to produce a consensus document, a similar outcome was observed at the previous two Conferences. As with the 2020 RevCon, a Draft Final Document emerged from this conference, too. A comparison of both the documents, Draft Final Document (2020) and Draft Outcome Document (2026), gives a good sense of how the global nuclear order is emerging and what the states parties to the NPT think about it. The following table compares the progress, or lack thereof, of the two documents.

The above comparison reveals a mixed trajectory of continuity, selective progress, and notable omissions within the NPT disarmament discourse. Both documents converge on the acknowledgement of the catastrophic risks posed by nuclear weapons and reiterate the long-standing principle that a ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’ Similarly, there remains a shared concern regarding the inadequate implementation of Article VI obligations and the broader stagnation of nuclear disarmament efforts.

However, the 2026 document failed to express explicit criticism of nuclear arsenals and modernisation trends towards broader, less confrontational language centred on risk reduction and a gradual diminishing role of nuclear weapons. Several critical issues emphasised in 2022 — including the growth and modernisation of nuclear arsenals, the implications of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, transparency, references to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion, and the implementation of Action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference — were either diluted or missing in the 2026 draft. Rather, the 2026 draft introduced stronger apprehensions regarding the dangers of renewed nuclear explosive testing and the risk of a new arms race, reflecting contemporary anxieties. Overall, the comparison demonstrates that while the normative commitment to nuclear disarmament remains intact, progress toward concrete disarmament measures remains limited.

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Notes:-

[1] The original document was uploaded in Russian language. The author has taken help of ChatGPT to translate the document.

[2] The original document was uploaded in Chinese language. The author has taken the help of ChatGPT to translate the document.

The post Beyond Deadlock: Understanding the 11th NPT Review Conference appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Aridhaman, SSBN, No-First-Use, Survivability, Credible Minimum Deterrence

Aridhaman (S4)

On April 03, 2026, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh posted a message on the social media platform X, stating, “It’s not words but power, ‘Aridhaman’!” The message from India’s Defence Minister was as cryptic as India’s SSBN programme. India’s journey towards nuclear submarines dates back to the late 1970s, when it quietly launched a programme code-named Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV), resulting in the launch of the Arihant SSBN programme on July 20, 2009, and its induction on August 26, 2016. India commissioned its second SSBN, INS Arighaat, on August 29, 2024. The latest entrant in the SSBN line is INS Aridhaman. In terms of nuclear capabilities, the following table gives an overview of the three SSBNs.

India’s SSBN Programme

Source: Compiled by Author

India has periodically tested its sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) to cross-check the system’s readiness. Since 2016, India has tested the K-4 SLBM 16 times and the K-15 five times. While K-15 entered service in 2018, K-4 has yet to be operationalised in the existing SLBM fleet. With the existing sea-based assets, India effectively carries a nuclear deterrence posture against Pakistan. However, when it comes to China, a more potent and challenging adversary, India still requires more platforms and systems for deterrence.

China Challenge and Ensuring Survival

China certainly has a lead against India in the nuclear domain. China has made an unprecedented growth in its nuclear modernisation, and this has, of course, raised a lot of concern around the globe. Ever since the discovery of its missile silos, China has not shied away from showing the world its nuclear platforms both in intent and physically. China also understands the vulnerability of land-based platforms, especially of the silo-based missiles. And this is one of the reasons why its sea-based capability has witnessed a remarkable jump. For China, nuclear numbers did not matter for a very long time. However, this notion has changed since the early 2010s. Not only has its nuclear warhead seen a multi-fold increase, now standing at approximately 600, but its delivery platform has also seen a remarkable growth. To fulfil its deterrence strategy, which is premised on the threat of causing unacceptable damage under the No-First-Use (NFU) doctrine, China has followed one of the classic principles of nuclear deterrence: survivability. Sea-based deterrence is the current hallmark of survivability because of the assured retaliation option. The sea leg of the Chinese nuclear triad currently employs the Julang 2 (JL-2), a second-generation SLBM with a range of over 7,000 km. China has also recently begun to replace the JL-2s with JL-3s. The JL-3s have an estimated range of about 10,000 km.

For India, the current SLBM fleet is not an absolute answer to China’s development in the same domain. Over the years, India and China have managed to resolve their issues without bringing nuclear weapons as a flash card. In fact, India’s approach towards nuclear weapons is not based on numbers or warheads or parity of platforms. India has also rejected the concept of nuclear warfighting. This rejection, in a way, has helped India to overcome the problem of numbers or parity. As Kenneth Waltz once iterated, “Forces designed for war-fighting have to be compared with each other. Forces designed for war-deterring need not be compared. The question is not whether one country has less than another, but whether it can do unacceptable damage to another….” For India, the critical question remains how to imagine and implement its Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) without getting drawn into the spiral of numbers. To this end, India’s 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) remains a key pillar of its nuclear thinking. The 1999 DND, while explaining what constitutes a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, stated that “This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.” To this end, India has ensured it keeps a close eye on how technological development is reshaping its nuclear neighbourhood. In this domain, Aridhaman induction brings a crucial development for India, ensuring survivability and an assured second-strike capability simultaneously. There is another important aspect that Aridhaman may help India fulfil in the future: a continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD) posture. To maintain a CASD, India requires at least four SSBNs. The CASD posture ensures that survivability and second-strike capability remain unaffected during a heightened crisis. In 2018, India already achieved the capability to conduct a deterrent patrol with its INS Arihant SSBN.

The Road Ahead

On August 17, 1999, India, following its declaration as a nuclear-weapon state with its nuclear weapons testing in May 1998, introduced a DND. This doctrine delineated the country’s approach to nuclear policy and strategy. Objective 2.3 of the 1999 draft report clearly stated that “India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” The Objective 2.6 (A) also articulated how India would pursue its deterrence requirements and stated that it was required to maintain “Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces.” Furthermore, objective 3 hinted at how India was going to fulfil its credible minimum deterrence posture and referred that India’s nuclear forces “…will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile and land-based missiles and sea-based assets.” Less than three years after the release of the 1999 draft report, India issued another core set of guidelines on January 04, 2003, more commonly referred to as India’s official nuclear doctrine. The first subpoint under point 2 of the 2003 guidelines referred to “Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.” However, it is one thing to say that India was aiming to build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent, which is a humongous task, and it’s another to fulfil that aim. Nonetheless, since 2003, India has made slow but steady progress towards the CMD posture via a nuclear triad. The latest entrant in this march towards fulfilling the nuclear triad requirement is the newly commissioned third nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), Aridhaman (S4).

India’s commission of the third SSBN is not a small feat by any means. India is only the 6^th country to have such a capability. As an NFU-oriented nuclear-weapon state, it is imperative for India to focus on survival and assured second-strike capability. However, merely acquiring SSBNs does not help fulfil the national security task. While a sea-based deterrent is the crown jewel of assured retaliation, the assurance component requires adequate communication channels and infrastructure. An NFU state such as India requires the best command-and-control platforms. Undersea, where detection must be avoided at any cost, communication becomes challenging. For SSBNs to make sure that they remain undetected, they have to remain submerged between 60 and 100 metres deep, and carry communication through Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) and Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio waves. Currently, India operates just one VLF station in the state of Tamil Nadu. However, in 2024, the Defence Minister of India laid the foundation stone for the Navy’s second VLF station in the state of Telangana. Besides communication, the command of SSBNs is also a task India is new to. Unlike the two other legs of the triad, the land and air, the sea-based leg requires delegation of authority to launch nuclear weapons. Till now, India has maintained that its nuclear weapons remain in a de-mated position. However, with a CASD posture, India would need to keep some of its weapons at least in a pre-mating position, if not completely mated. The issue here is space inside the submarine, not the commander’s or the political class’s intent. The induction of Aridhaman is certainly a show of intent, as India is now moving in its nuclear domain. With three SSBNs now inducted and a few more to come in the years ahead, India is certainly making sure that its NFU doctrine does not come under pressure through any nuclear blackmail or as has been stated, “India’s nuclear doctrine frees itself of the compulsion of immediate retaliation and bases deterrence instead on the certainty of retaliation that would be punitive in nature.”

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Author: Dr Javed Alam, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies & Mr Prahlad Kumar Singh, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: Nuclear Testing, Decoupling, CTBT, US, China

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