Keywords: Op-Sindoor, Fifth-Generation Fighters, Networks, UAVs, Rocket Force

Introduction

Operation Sindoor was more than a military confrontation for Pakistan. It was a force-structure diagnostic. The May 2025 conflict showed that the India-Pakistan equation has been permanently altered. The manoeuvring space between sub-conventional and nuclear conflict has suddenly expanded, giving both sides additional kinetic options. Precision strike, long-range air-to-air missiles, integrated air defence (AD), electronic warfare (EW), unmanned systems, persistent surveillance and networked command-and-control (C2) have become essential cogs in the war-making machinery. While platforms remain important, their effectiveness increasingly depends on how well they integrate into a larger system. Pakistan appears to have drawn its own conclusions.

           Post Op Sindoor, Pakistan’s response has been characterised by a noticeable acceleration in defence expenditure, an expansion of its conventional missile architecture, renewed emphasis on air power, interest in fifth-generation fighters and airborne early warning, greater incorporation of unmanned systems, and the creation of a dedicated Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC). Alongside this military response has emerged a new strategic layer comprising deeper defence, industrial and security ties with China and Türkiye, and, importantly, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.[1] The result is not simply a larger and more modern Pakistani military. It is the beginning of an entirely different military architecture. The critical question for India, therefore, is not what Pakistan is buying, but what military system it is trying to build.

The Force-Structure Diagnostic: 88 Hours of Introspection

           During Op Sindoor, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had a reasonably sophisticated air-defence and air-combat architecture. The PAF possessed J-10CE fighters, JF-17s, F-16s, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, ground-based air-defence systems (HQ-9, HQ-16) and Chinese-origin long-range air-to-air missiles. Yet the conflict highlighted a fundamental problem. Pakistan could contest the air domain, but contesting it is not the same as controlling it. Its dependence on a relatively small number of high-value platforms meant that attrition, stand-off engagement and the degradation of sensors or command networks could have disproportionate effects. While Pakistan attempted to generate mass through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and small drones, they were more of a nuisance value than being tactically effective. The conflict has thus reinforced several imperatives for Pakistan: –

• The need for greater stand-off ranges.

• Larger inventories of precision weapons.

• Increased number of fighters and sensors.

• More effective Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) strike options.

• A more resilient and networked air defence (AD).

• Persistent unmanned surveillance and effective strike capability.

• An independent conventional deep-strike capability.

• Greater redundancy in command and control (C2).

• Better integration of sensors, shooters, electronic warfare and decision-making.

The answer emerging from Islamabad is increasingly a system-of-systems approach. The fighter is no longer being viewed in isolation. The fighter, missile, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, UAVs, ground-based AD systems, electronic-warfare assets, sensors, and C2 networks are becoming components of a larger operational architecture. This is the most important aspect of Pakistan’s post-Sindoor modernisation.

Crunching the Numbers

           Evidence suggests Pakistan has consistently increased the resources available for this transformation. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Pakistan’s military expenditure has increased by 11 per cent in 2025 to USD 11.9 billion.[2] SIPRI also notes that the increase was partly linked to new aircraft and missile orders from China following the May 2025 conflict, along with payments for earlier procurement programmes.[3] The Pakistani budget provides an even more revealing indicator. For the Financial Year (FY) 2025–26, Pakistan increased its defence allocation to PKR 2.55 trillion, a 20.2 per cent increase over the preceding year’s PKR 2.122 trillion.[4] Of this, PKR 663.1 billion was allocated for physical assets—arms and equipment—a rise of approximately 21 per cent.[5] During the current FY, the increase has become more apparent. Pakistan’s FY2026–27 defence allocation rose to approximately PKR 3.01 trillion, while the allocation for physical assets increased from PKR 663.1 billion to PKR 925.8 billion, a 39.6 per cent increase.[6] Notably, the allocation towards physical assets has risen sharply over the past three years. However, SIPRI data should be interpreted carefully because its figures are calendar-year estimates and do not isolate expenditure before and after May 2025. Pakistan’s fiscal-year budgets are therefore a better indicator of the immediate post-Op Sindoor response.

The Shopping Cart

Pakistan’s shopping cart (Table 1) is fairly interesting and reveals a clear pattern. Pakistan’s focus is not just on numbers but on contemporary and futuristic technology.

Table 1

Source: Data collected by the author from various sources.

The table also highlights an important analytical distinction. Not everything appearing after Op-Sindoor was necessarily purchased because of the conflict, and several programmes predate it. However, what has changed after May 2025 is the pace of induction and integration, including rapid operationalisation of some systems.

PAF and its Transformation

PAF remains the principal instrument of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence. PAF is attempting to convert lessons from Op-Sindoor into a more integrated, networked and technologically advanced air force. The immediate emphasis appears to be on layers consisting of the Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) missiles, next-generation fighters, additional long-range precision strike options, UAVs and new strategic alliances.

(a)           PL-15/15E BVR Missile. The PL-15E gives PAF the ‘long-stick’ advantage. The strategic consequence of possessing a ‘long-stick’ is significant. A credible ‘long-stick’ capability can force an adversary to operate farther from defended airspace, constrain its tactics, increase its dependencies on stand-off weapons and supporting assets, and impose psychological pressure and create decision dilemmas. Thus, in modern BVR combat, “who can shoot further” is only the starting point. The real advantage belongs to the force that can create and exploit a larger effective engagement envelope while denying the adversary the same opportunity.

            The J-10CE has already become an important component of the PAF’s air-combat architecture. Equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and PL-15E missiles, and integrated with AEW&C and other ground-based sensors, it poses a significant threat in the aerial domain. In addition, the PAF has publicly displayed JF-17 Block III aircraft carrying the Chinese PL-15. This also gives the PAF a significant boost with respect to mass and numbers. The real capability therefore lies not in the J-10CE or JF-17 individually, but in the combined architecture of AEW&C, ground sensors, AESA radar, datalink, EW, PL-15, and distributed C2. This is precisely why India’s response cannot be confined to fighter-versus-fighter comparisons.

(b)        The Shenyang J-35: A Qualitative Ambition and a Game Changer. In June 2025, immediately after Op-Sindoor, Pakistan announced that China had offered them forty J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters together with KJ-500 AEW&C and HQ-19 AD systems.[7] The significance of the J-35 lies less in the aircraft in isolation and more in what it may potentially add to the PAF’s existing capabilities. Its stealth features, AESA radar, BVR missiles, conformal weapons carriage, advanced EW suite, and data-linking capability, coupled with the increased numbers of JF-17 Block 3 and J-10CE, could provide Pakistan with a qualitatively different aerial combat architecture. For India, this represents a significant change in the geometry of the air battle. While delivery timelines, quantities, and operationalisation are still some time away, it would serve India well to put on the thinking hat and develop tangible mitigation measures. India’s main problem is that the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) remains on the drawing board, and there is no sign of any other fifth-generation aircraft being acquired by India. The J-35 therefore provides India with a useful forcing function. The question is no longer whether India can eventually build a fifth-generation fighter aircraft; it is whether it can build and operationalise one quickly enough to preserve its qualitative airpower advantage. Acquiring fifth-generation fighter aircraft must become a time-bound national imperative for India to shape the air battles of the future rather than merely react to them.

(c)        The Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC).  Perhaps the most consequential Pakistani development is not the fighter force. It is the emergence of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC). Pakistan announced the creation of the ARFC in August 2025, describing it as a force intended to enhance conventional warfare capabilities.[8] Pakistan’s missile forces have historically been heavily associated with strategic deterrence. Creating a dedicated conventional rocket force begins to separate strategic deterrence from conventional precision fires. The Fatah family is central to this development.

           While Fatah-II was inducted into the Pakistan Army in 2024 and has a stated range of 400 km, it is not a post-Sindoor acquisition. But the subsequent creation of the ARFC and its training activity gives the system a new operational context. What makes the situation more interesting is the development of Fatah-IV. Pakistan unveiled the missile in August 2025 and later confirmed it in a September 2025 training launch.[9] With a stated range of 750 km, it is described as terrain-hugging and intended to provide greater reach, lethality and survivability to Pakistan’s conventional missile force.

           The significance lies less in the individual missile than in the institutional architecture. The ARFC gives Pakistan the ability to develop a dedicated conventional deep-fire chain independent of fighter availability. That complicates Indian air operations because Pakistan can potentially impose costs through multiple vectors like aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, ballistic missiles/rockets, and loitering Munitions (LMs). This is precisely what a system-of-systems approach seeks to achieve: multiple shooters presenting multiple dilemmas against a target system.

(d)        UAVs: From Nuisance Value to Credible Options.  The other major lesson of contemporary warfare is that mass matters. Expensive combat aircraft are increasingly being augmented by comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems for surveillance, targeting, deception, electronic warfare and strike. Pakistan has been incorporating Turkish UAV technology into its force structure, while its broader relationship with Türkiye provides access to one of the world’s fastest-growing military-UAS ecosystems.

           The strategic attraction is obvious: UAVs provide persistent surveillance, battle damage assessment, decoy and deception effects, electronic warfare capability, stand-off weapon delivery, saturation and finally attritable mass. For Pakistan, which faces a substantial resource asymmetry with India, the economics are compelling. Instead of trying to match India’s expensive platforms one-for-one, Pakistan can build mass at the lower end of the cost spectrum while concentrating sophisticated capabilities at the high end. That is a rational asymmetric response, and China and Türkiye are central to its realisation.

           The most significant development, however, is not a weapon system or the acquisition of modern technology. It is the emerging political-security architecture involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. On August 07, 2026, the three countries signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.[10] The agreement stipulates that an armed attack against one signatory would be regarded as an attack against all, a commitment Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described as technically equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5.[11] While the alliance may not classically read as anti-India, the wider Indian strategic community will need to consider its implications.

           So, what does Pakistan gain from this alliance? Pakistan gains tremendous strategic and financial depth, increases its diplomatic clout and significantly expands defence-industrial cooperation. Saudi Arabia brings financial resources and geopolitical influence; Türkiye brings a sophisticated and increasingly autonomous defence industry, and Pakistan brings a large standing military, nuclear deterrence, missile technology and an established defence-industrial base. The three countries have agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years. The inaugural Strategic Political and Defence Committee has also begun work, with interoperability, defence capability and joint production among the areas of discussion.[12] For Pakistan, this is potentially much more than diplomatic symbolism. It provides a framework within which military cooperation can evolve into industrial cooperation, common training, interoperability and potentially shared capabilities. A key takeaway from this could be what happened in the 1960s-1980s, when the Arab nations geographically and politically tried to isolate Israel. The MJDA could just be a similar attempt to isolate India geographically, especially if Bangladesh also joins the alliance.

Parting Shots

           Pakistan’s shopping spree does not fundamentally alter the strategic balance with India. The economic asymmetry remains substantial. SIPRI estimates India’s 2025 military expenditure at USD 92.1 billion, almost eight times Pakistan’s USD 11.9 billion.[13] India therefore does not need to match Pakistan platform for platform. What India needs is to understand the emerging architecture because the real danger lies in underestimating a smaller force that is becoming more integrated. Acquisition of the Shenyang J-35 is one independent problem. J-35s, J-10CEs and numerous JF-17 Block IIIs, networked, data-linked, and supported by force multipliers like AEW&Cs, are a totally different problem. Similarly, operationalising the Fatah-IV is an independent problem, but the entire ARFC operating in unison with airborne elements is a different problem altogether. The emerging paradigm is not based on numbers and technology. It is about systems and, therefore, the Indian response has to be equally systemic.

           Pakistan’s post-Sindoor modernisation is no longer simply an India–Pakistan arms race. Its military capabilities are increasingly embedded in a wider network involving China, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, creating a strategic environment that extends from the Gulf and Arabian Sea to the Himalayas and the Indo-Pacific. China remains the backbone. SIPRI records that China supplied 80 per cent of Pakistan’s major arms imports during 2021–25.[14] More importantly, Chinese fighters, AEW&C aircraft, missiles, air defence, UAVs and C2 systems are creating an increasingly integrated architecture. India must therefore contend with Chinese-origin capabilities on both its Northern and Western fronts. While the geography remains separate, the technology increasingly is not.

           Another important dimension is the emerging Pakistan–Türkiye–Saudi axis. The Makkah defence agreement should not be overstated as a NATO equivalent, but its collective-defence provision and emerging institutional mechanisms are significant. Saudi Arabia brings financial and geopolitical weight; Türkiye brings a growing defence-industrial ecosystem; Pakistan brings military capability and nuclear deterrence. The concern is less a formal alliance than strategic convergence, making Pakistan less vulnerable to isolation. The key question is whether Pakistan has the appetite to make good on the agreement’s provisions.

           New Delhi should not view Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Pakistan as a zero-sum proposition. Riyadh has substantial interests in India, especially energy, investment, trade and maritime security. The Gulf is increasingly practising multi-alignment, and India must do the same, while paying greater strategic attention to Türkiye’s growing defence relationship with Pakistan. The military response cannot be another procurement race. India’s advantage lies in its economic scale, technological base, space capability, industrial potential and expanding strategic partnerships.

           The strategic geography is also changing. India must increasingly view the Gulf–Arabian Sea–Pakistan–Himalayan–Indo-Pacific continuum as an interconnected security environment, even while retaining the ability to fight geographically distinct contingencies. Pakistan is attempting to compensate for its resource disadvantage through integration, precision, mass and external partnerships. India is trying to split its forces into multiple entities. While India has far greater resources, the challenge is ensuring they translate into military advantage. The real question is whether India has the urgency, because time is no longer an ally.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS]

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Notes:

[1] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence as Middle East Turmoil Escalates,” Reuters, August 07, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-turkey-pakistan-sign-joint-defence-deal-amid-regional-turmoil-2026-08-07/. Accessed on September 03, 2026.

[2] Xiao Liang, et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2026, p. 2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/2604_milex_2025.pdf. Accessed on September 02, 2026.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] “Pakistan Ramps Up Defence Spending by 20 percent after India Conflict,” Al Jazeera, June 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/10/pakistan-ramps-up-defence-spending-by-20-percent-after-india-conflict. Accessed on September 02, 2026.

[5] Jon Grevatt & Haridass Sankar, “Pakistan Announces Defence Budget Increase,” Janes, June 12, 2025, https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/industry/pakistan-announces-defence-budget-increase. Accessed on September 01, 2026.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Akhil Kadidal, “Pakistan Announces Chinese J-35 Aircraft Offer,” Janes, June 09, 2025,  https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/air/pakistan-announces-chinese-j-35-aircraft-offer. Accessed on September 03, 2026.

[8] Tahir Azad, “Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force: Strategic Leap or Burdened Gamble,” Small Wars Journal, December 12, 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/22/pakistans-army-rocket-force/. Accessed on September 03, 2026.

[9] Sohini Mandal, “Pakistan Conducts Fatah-IV Training Launch,” Janes, May 15, 2026, https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/defence/pakistan-conducts-fatah-iv-training-launch. Accessed on September 02, 2026.

[10] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, n. 1.

[11] “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Defence Pact Technically Same as NATO’s Article 5, Turkish Minister Says,” Reuters, August 09, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/turkey-pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-pact-technically-same-natos-article-5-2026-08-08/. Accessed on September 04, 2026.

[12] Nuri Aydin, Tugba Altun and Merve Berker, “1^st Committee Meeting Under Mecca Joint Defense Agreement Begins in Istanbul,” Anadolu Ajansi, August 31, 2026,  https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/1st-committee-meeting-under-mecca-joint-defense-agreement-begins-in-istanbul/4042472. Accessed on September 04, 2026.

[13] Liang, et.al., n. 2.

[14] “Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 Percent as European Demand Soars,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 09, 2026, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-arms-flows-jump-nearly-10-cent-european-demand-soars. Accessed on September 05, 2026.

The post Pakistan’s Shopping Spree: New Weapons, New Allies and New Risks appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Maritime Domain Awareness, Multi-Domain Awareness, Indian Ocean Region, Decision Dominance.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a fulcrum of global trade, technological competition, and the projection of military and economic power. Its security environment is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive, with developments in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the Western Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal interacting. At the same time, the character of maritime competition is changing. Activities at sea are increasingly enabled, shaped or constrained by capabilities in the air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, while information operations and strategic narratives influence perceptions and decision-making before a conventional maritime threat becomes visible.

This changing environment does not diminish the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). On the contrary, MDA remains an indispensable foundation for understanding activity at sea. The challenge is that a maritime picture, however comprehensive, cannot by itself explain the forces, networks, intentions, and enabling activities that produce events in the maritime domain. The operational problem, therefore, is not to replace MDA, but to place it within a wider framework of Multi-Domain Awareness (MuDA).

For India, this transition is particularly relevant. India sits astride the principal sea lines of communication (SLOCs) linking West Asia, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and its economic and strategic interests are deeply connected to the ocean. India’s growing network of maritime partnerships, island diplomacy, surveillance systems, and information-sharing arrangements provides a strong base for the next step: an Indian Ocean Region Multi-Domain Awareness (IOR-MuDA) architecture that fuses information across domains and converts it into decision dominance.

Maritime Domain Awareness: The Foundation

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) defines Maritime Domain Awareness as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy, or the marine environment. The IMO identifies three key components: Maritime Situational Awareness, Maritime Threat Awareness, and Maritime Response Awareness. Together, these provide the foundation for gathering information, identifying potential threats and understanding the resources available to respond.[1]

In operational terms, MDA supports the detection and tracking of surface and subsurface vessels, monitoring of merchant and fishing traffic, identification of suspicious activity, protection of SLOCs, coastal surveillance, port security, and preparedness for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and casualty evacuation. It also provides the information base for cooperation among navies, coast guards, maritime law-enforcement agencies, commercial actors and regional partners.

For India, MDA has become a central pillar of maritime security. Coastal radar networks, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, white-shipping information exchanges and the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) have progressively expanded the country’s ability to build and share a maritime picture. India’s engagement with Indian Ocean littorals has also extended the geographic reach of this effort through information sharing, coordinated patrols, capacity building, hydrographic cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

This regional approach aligns with the evolution of India’s maritime policy from Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to MAHASAGAR—Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions. Recent Indian Navy initiatives such as Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) SAGAR illustrate the emphasis on partnerships, interoperability, information sharing and collective maritime security.[2] Island countries and territories are especially important to this architecture. Their geographic location along major SLOCs and near strategic maritime spaces can contribute to surveillance, logistics, search and rescue and wider regional resilience. India’s engagement with island partners therefore has both security and developmental dimensions.

The upgrading of the airstrip on Agalega in Mauritius illustrates this strategic interdependence. Beyond improving connectivity and supporting search-and-rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities, the facility expands India’s operational outreach in the Western Indian Ocean. India has similarly supported Seychelles’ maritime security capabilities, while infrastructure and military developments in India’s own Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands strengthen its ability to monitor and operate across the wider Indian Ocean.

The Limits of Maritime Domain Awareness

The success of MDA can create an unintended analytical trap where the maritime picture appears complete even when it captures only the visible manifestation of a wider activity. A vessel may be detected at sea, but the surveillance track alone may not reveal why it is there, what supported its movement, what information enabled it, or what other-domain activity preceded it. As maritime competition becomes increasingly networked, these questions become as important as the vessel’s location and identity.

The principal limitation of domain-specific awareness mechanisms is therefore not a lack of sensors, but the separation of the information they generate. A maritime sensor may detect anomalous behaviour; an air sensor may observe supporting activity; a satellite may reveal temporal changes; a cyber-monitoring system may identify network activity; and an electromagnetic sensor may detect unusual emissions. If these observations remain within separate organisational or technological silos, the decision-maker receives several partial pictures rather than one coherent explanation.

• • Domain Confinement: MDA is designed primarily to understand activity associated with the maritime domain. It can therefore miss enabling or preparatory activity occurring elsewhere.

  • Reactive Bias: Traditional surveillance often begins when an object becomes observable in the monitored domain. This can compress warning time when the actual preparation has occurred earlier in another domain.

  • Siloed Information: Data held by different military services, government agencies and partner organisations may not be available in a common, interoperable architecture.

  • Different Temporal and Spatial Pictures: Satellites, aircraft, ships, cyber systems and electromagnetic sensors observe the environment at different times, scales, and levels of fidelity. Without fusion, correlation is difficult.

  • Intent Remains Elusive: Tracking an object provides location and behaviour, but understanding intent may require information about communications, logistics, military preparation, political signalling, and information activity.

  • Data Overload Without Sufficient Fusion: The expansion of sensors and commercially available information can produce more data than decision-makers can meaningfully process. More collection does not automatically produce better awareness.

  • Fragmented Response: Awareness that is not connected to decision authorities and response resources can create a common picture without a shared understanding of what to do.

These limitations do not make MDA obsolete; rather, they establish its boundary. MDA remains the maritime layer of a larger operational picture. The requirement is to fuse that layer with the information from other domains to create a composite operating picture (COP).

From MDA to Multi-Domain Awareness (MuDA)

The Indian Ocean’s evolving security environment therefore calls for a transition from Maritime Domain Awareness to Multi-Domain Awareness. MuDA should be understood not as a new sensor programme or yet another typically military jargon, but as an approach to understanding the operational environment as an interconnected system.

At its core, MuDA integrates awareness across six principal operational domains: land, maritime, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic. Information and cognitive effects are important cross-cutting dimensions because they connect and influence several of these domains. The objective is not simply to display more information on a larger screen. It is to correlate apparently separate observations so decision-makers can understand relationships, identify patterns, assess intent, and make timely, correct decisions.

MDA is therefore best understood as a subset of MuDA. The two concepts are complementary, not mutually exclusive. MDA provides the detailed maritime picture required for safe navigation, security, and maritime operations. MuDA places that picture in context by asking what is happening in other domains, how those activities interact, and what they imply for the maritime environment.

What Multi-Domain Awareness Adds

MuDA changes the analytical sequence from detection to correlation and anticipation. Instead of waiting for an activity to become visible at sea and then seeking an explanation, a multi-domain architecture can identify indicators across domains and build an assessment before the maritime manifestation occurs.

Consider the deployment of a Chinese carrier strike group (CSG) into the Indian Ocean. From an MDA perspective, the immediate requirement is to detect, classify and track the group once it enters the region. A MuDA approach would examine the broader chain of activity: space-based surveillance and satellite-enabled communications and navigation; electromagnetic activity associated with radars, communications and electronic warfare; cyber activity against relevant networks; air movements and long-range Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); logistics and port activity; undersea infrastructure and seabed conditions; and information or diplomatic signalling. The carrier group is then understood not as an isolated maritime event but as one component of a larger operational system.

The cognitive and information dimensions are equally important. Strategic narratives, influence campaigns, diplomatic signalling, and disinformation can shape perceptions and constrain decision-making well before kinetic activity becomes apparent. These effects may not be captured by a maritime surveillance system, yet they can materially influence the strategic environment in which maritime forces operate. MuDA therefore seeks to move awareness from simple visibility towards understanding. It enables multiple streams of information to be correlated into a Common Operating Picture, while analytics and artificial intelligence can help identify anomalies, relationships, and patterns. The human decision-maker remains central; technology should reduce cognitive burden and improve the speed and quality of decisions rather than substitute for judgement.

Components of Multi-Domain Awareness

A practical MuDA architecture for the Indian Ocean should integrate information from the six principal domains while maintaining the ability to incorporate cross-cutting information.

• • Land Domain: Military infrastructure, ports, logistics nodes, airfields, missile and sensor sites, transport networks, and other land-based activity that can enable maritime operations.

  • Maritime Domain: Surface combatants, submarines, merchant shipping, fishing fleets, offshore installations, coastal activity, and maritime traffic patterns.

  • Air Domain: Combat aircraft, AEW&C platforms, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, high-altitude ISR platforms, and long-range aviation.

  • Space Domain: ISR satellites, navigation systems, satellite communications, commercial constellations, space situational awareness, and counterspace activity.

  • Cyber Domain: Network intrusions, port and logistics systems, shipping-management networks, financial infrastructure, and other digital systems supporting maritime activity.

  • Electromagnetic Domain: Radar and communications emissions, Communication Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), electronic warfare (EW) signatures, spectrum mapping and navigation interference.

Two further dimensions cut across these domains. The information and cognitive dimension includes influence operations, strategic narratives, social-media manipulation, diplomatic signalling and disinformation. The subsea dimension includes fibre-optic cables, energy pipelines, autonomous underwater vehicles, seabed sensors, and other critical underwater infrastructure. Treating these as connected layers prevents the operational picture from becoming artificially divided along organisational boundaries.

MuDA’s true value therefore lies in complete fusion. A satellite image, radar track, Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmission, cyber alert, and electromagnetic emission may be ambiguous on their own. Correlated in time and geography, however, they may reveal a pattern. This is where data becomes awareness, and awareness becomes an overwhelming decision advantage. Modern Technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data handling can further enable faster data sifting and present purified information to decision-making bodies.

Why MuDA Matters for India and the Indian Ocean

India’s dependence on the sea makes the quality of its maritime and wider domain awareness a national-security imperative. Recent Government of India sources put the share of India’s trade handled through maritime routes at about 90–95 per cent by volume, underscoring the centrality of maritime connectivity to the national economy.[3] The country’s location between the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in the west and the Strait of Malacca in the east further reinforces the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and its principal chokepoints.

The security challenge is also changing. Piracy, illegal and unregulated fishing, contraband smuggling, and other non-traditional threats increasingly exploit technology, commercial connectivity and information networks. Unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber tools and influence operations can be employed alongside conventional maritime activity. Consequently, warning indicators of a maritime problem may first appear in another domain.

China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean illustrates why this broader approach is necessary. The growth of the PLA Navy’s deployments is accompanied by developments in long-range aviation, satellite and navigation systems, cyber capabilities, information operations and dual-use infrastructure. Research by the China Aerospace Studies Institute has highlighted Chinese ambitions for resilient, integrated systems capable of linking space, air, sea, and ground assets.[4] China’s survey and research-vessel fleet is another example of activity that can have implications beyond conventional maritime surveillance. Research into bathymetry, hydrography and the marine environment can support scientific purposes while also generating information relevant to submarine navigation, anti-submarine warfare and undersea infrastructure monitoring. CSIS’s Hidden Reach project has documented the extensive scale and dual-use character of Chinese research-vessel activity in the Indian Ocean.[5]

The operational consequence is the emergence of multiple, simultaneous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loops. Actions in space, cyber, electromagnetic, air, land and maritime domains may unfold at different speeds, yet influence one another. The challenge is therefore not only to observe more, but to correlate these activities quickly enough to preserve decision advantage. India’s parliamentary scrutiny of the changing naval balance in the Indian Ocean reinforces the need for proactive measures.[6]

Enabling an Indian Ocean MuDA Architecture

India is well placed to lead the development of an Indian Ocean Multi-Domain Awareness (IOR MuDA) architecture. It already possesses substantial maritime surveillance capabilities, space assets, airborne ISR, information-fusion mechanisms, island infrastructure and a growing network of regional partnerships. The next step is to connect these capabilities through a common information architecture and a shared operational philosophy. An IOR MuDA architecture should integrate space-based surveillance, airborne ISR, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, coastal radar chains, underwater sensor networks, cyber monitoring, electromagnetic-spectrum awareness, information-operations monitoring and AI-enabled data fusion. It should also incorporate relevant commercial and open-source data where appropriate, subject to security, reliability and legal considerations.

The central objective should be a Common Operating Picture that is more than a visual display. It should provide a common data environment in which information from the Indian Navy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Coast Guard and relevant national agencies can be correlated, assessed and disseminated according to the needs of different decision-makers. The existing institutional ecosystem provides building blocks for such an architecture. These include the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) Centre, Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and other national security and disaster-management agencies. The objective should not be to abolish specialised centres, but to make them interoperable and able to contribute to a shared decision-support ecosystem.

Regional partnerships are equally important. India’s island diplomacy, information-sharing arrangements and maritime-security partnerships can extend the sensor and response network beyond national territory. The aim should be to build trusted, secure and interoperable information pathways with willing Indian Ocean partners, while protecting sensitive sources and methods. Finally, MuDA should be developed as a decision-support concept rather than merely a technology project. Common standards, data governance, classification rules, interoperability, trained analysts, cross-domain liaison and institutional ownership are as important as sensors and computing power. The ultimate measure of success should be whether the system gives commanders and policymakers more time, better context and greater confidence to decide.

Parting Shots

MDA has transformed maritime security by making vessel movements, threats, and maritime activity more visible. India has invested substantially in this capability and has extended it through partnerships, information sharing, surveillance networks and regional institutions. Therefore, the focus should be on strengthening that foundation, not discarding it.

The next challenge is to recognise that maritime events increasingly reflect activity occurring across multiple domains. A ship’s movement may be enabled by space-based systems, supported by cyber and electromagnetic activity, facilitated by logistics and supply chains, provided air cover by aerial assets and accompanied by information operations. A purely maritime picture can therefore, at best, identify the object but cannot fully explain the operation.

MuDA offers a conceptual and operational bridge between these fragments. By integrating land, maritime, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic awareness, and by incorporating the information and cognitive dimensions as cross-cutting layers, it can provide a more persistent, context-rich and predictive understanding of the Indian Ocean security environment.

For India, the objective should be clear: move from knowing what is happening at sea to understanding what is happening across the region that may affect all other domains. The transition from MDA to MuDA is therefore not a change in terminology. It shifts from domain-specific visibility to integrated operational understanding and, more importantly, from reaction to anticipation.

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Authors Biography

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

 Notes:-

[1]“Maritime Domain Awareness,” International Maritime Organization, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/maritime-domain-awareness.aspx. Accessed on August 16, 2026.

[2] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiatives of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME),” March 24, 2025,  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491&reg=48&lang=2, Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[3] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Maritime India:  From Vision 2030 to Amrit Kaal 2047,” October 26, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2182563&reg=48&lang=2, Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[4] Meia Nouwens, “China’s Dual-Use Space Sector Goes Global,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 17, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-china/2025/07/chinas-dual-use-space-sector-goes-global/.  Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[5] Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Surveying the Seas: China’s Dual-Use Research Operations in the Indian Ocean,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 10, 2024,  https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-indian-ocean-research-vessels/. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[6] “India Must Remain Proactive in Countering Combined Naval Threat from China, Pakistan: Parliamentary Panel,” The Hindu, August 12, 2025,  https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-must-remain-proactive-in-countering-combined-naval-threat-from-china-pakistan-parliamentary-panel/article69922708.ece. Accessed on August 16, 2026.

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Keywords: Democracy, Partnerships, Deterrence, Strategic Credibility, Alliances

Introduction

The oldest democracy in the world, the United States of America (USA), has always styled itself as the harbinger of peace, stability, and the rule of law, undertaking the onerous task of ensuring a rules-based international order. US democratic values have been deeply anchored in constitutional checks and balances, credible and effective institutions and the rule of law. Despite that, military actions in Venezuela and Iran in 2026 expose an interesting and stark paradox, wherein a system that was designed to prevent executive overreach proved to be unable and unwilling to restrain the unilateral war-waging spree of President Trump and his administration. This failure heralds far-reaching consequences well beyond Capitol Hill, shaking the USA’s alliances, undermining deterrence guarantees, and casting a very long shadow over potential crises in the East and South China Seas.

This article seeks to examine how a democracy as old as the USA failed to safeguard itself from the idiosyncrasies of an incumbent President. It also explores the fracturing of long-lasting alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the destabilisation of global energy supplies, and more importantly, the erosion of strategic credibility as the world’s lone superpower. Furthermore, the article seeks to understand the geopolitical ramifications of these actions by contrasting their complexities, juxtaposing the West Asian imbroglio with the East and South China Seas.

The Breakdown of Constitutional Restraint

At the very heart of the American constitutional system lies a deliberate allocation of power to declare war and associated activities. While Section 8 of Article I of the US Constitution empowers Congress to declare war, Section 2 of Article II designates the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of America.[1] The writing is very clear; no single individual could drag the country into a state of war. Yet, the current year has seen this balance waver. Operation Absolute Resolve, launched in January 2026, was widely considered illegal and carried out without congressional authorisation. The operation was seen not only as a violation of American domestic constitutional norms but also as a significant violation of International Law. On similar lines, Operation Epic Fury in February 2026 was also carried out without formal authorisation, and attempts by Congress to invoke the War Powers Resolution (WPR) failed in both chambers.[2] The WPR has regularly been ignored by various Presidents (Republicans and Democrats alike), and the resolution has never been decisively enforced by the American judiciary. The ensuing result was not just executive assertiveness but also institutional paralysis in the oldest democratic nation in the world. The cumulative effect was the President’s ability to declare war, unconstrained by institutional measures, and simultaneously to discredit the Constitution and the Congress. What follows is pure anarchy in a democratic set-up.

Normalising Unilateral Aggression

Analysing the opening salvos in both operations reveals some common threads. In both cases, initiation of war or the use of force conveniently bypassed legislative approval. The President and his administration tried to legally justify actions post facto, which was contested. International norms and law were blatantly disregarded, and apex domestic institutions, including the Supreme Court, proved reactive and not preventive. This reflects the fragility of the system and brings out large chasms in an otherwise robust system.

The Collapse of Extended Deterrence

Ever since the end of the Second World War, US alliances have always rested on a simple bargain. A guarantee of security in exchange for basing rights, alignment, technological support, and strategic dependence. Collective defence and extended deterrence capability, specifically in Europe, West Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, are now increasingly being questioned by allies and partners and deeply analysed by rivals. Structural fragility and defiance of the rules-based order are now questioning the very basis of the alliance formation. Trump’s Greenland rhetoric deeply undermines Article 5 of NATO, and if that is a sign of what is coming, many other US allies and partners need to start worrying.

The Three Critical Failures

Analyses of the two conflicts of 2026 have revealed some important facets of the security guarantee provided by the US, and the writing on the wall is becoming clearer. The two operations have revealed three critical failures of the US-led system.

(a)       Credibility Deficit.   Given that President Donald Trump has started acting unilaterally, disregarding domestic and international regulations and violating international norms, commitments made by the US now have an inherent credibility deficit. Allies and partners will no longer ask what the US can do; they would rather ask what this President can do. This is a direct reflection of an autocratic or an authoritative style of functioning rather than a democratic set-up guided by directive principles enshrined in the constitution.

(b)       Increased Risks to Allies and Partners.  Countries that have been hosting US bases now face retaliatory strikes from enemies of America. The war in West Asia reflects how all West Asian nations have been drawn into it without any decision-making authority. The countries have now got entangled in their own web, which was designed to provide them with comprehensive security.

(c)       Moral and Legal Erosion.  Traditionally, America has justified its global role by way of adhering to international law and ensuring democratic accountability. Both these have now eroded, and as a result, alliances have lost not only their normative legitimacy but also their military utility.

The broader conclusion on strategic deterrence and security guarantee is that the umbrella has not just weakened but been conceptually broken. It no longer guarantees security; it exports uncertainty.

Taiwan: A Crisis Reframed

The developments in West Asia will have profound implications for Taiwan. The traditional assumption is that Taiwan’s strategic security relies heavily on US military deterrence, forward deployment, basing of elements of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and a credible US commitment to defence in the event of Chinese aggression. Post-Operation Epic Fury, there is therefore a need to reassess such a strategic security framework.

(a)       Credibility is Now Contingent.   If US intervention largely depends on Presidential discretion rather than on an institutional commitment, deterrence would become very unpredictable, and adversaries would want to test the red lines. A situation like this could also alter the regional balance of power, as allies may resort to hedging because back-ups and security guarantees will always be required. Regional actors may, as a result, diversify security partnerships and focus on strategic autonomy.

(b)       The Chinese Strategic Interpretation.   From Beijing’s perspective, two very relevant lessons emerge. Firstly, the Americans may act unilaterally and irrationally, which would translate into effective deterrence by the US because Beijing will not be able to anticipate Washington’s thought process. The other lesson that emerges is that the American system lacks internal cohesion and support. This, therefore, presents an opportunity for China to capitalise. The emerging strategic ambiguity is systemic, and therefore, the red lines would have to be recalibrated.

(c)       Increased Escalation Risk.   The geopolitical situation around Taiwan is unique. The main competitor is a peer with credible nuclear capability and the wherewithal to target mainland USA. The region also has many players in the fray, and an impulsive unilateral action may lead to regional entanglement. In such a fragile environment, the escalation ladder is likely to become compressed, and the situation may quickly spiral out of control.

(d)       Efficacy of Overseas Operations Against an Equal Adversary.  Operations in West Asia have clearly indicated the pitfalls of conducting operations far from one’s own territory. While overseas bases ensure continuous presence, they do not ensure logistics sustenance in a high-tempo conflict. As supplies diminish, supply chains become unusually long, making them more vulnerable to disruption. The presence of a peer adversary in the region further complicates the matter.

(e)       Relevance of Choke Points.   Another interesting facet that emerges is that the world’s most advanced and powerful Navy was unable to control transit in the Strait of Hormuz. What emerges is that extra-regional powers may not be able to secure vital choke points and straits, and littorals will play an important role. Controlling the Straits of Malacca, Ombai-Wetar, and Lombok may therefore be an interesting strategy on paper, but physically achieving and maintaining control may not be possible. Navies, the world over , will need to recalibrate their strategies because the oft-touted goal of developing the capability to control the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) may not be viable in a severely contested maritime environment.

Key Takeaways

(a)       Institutions Matter Much More than Intentions.   In the modern era, deterrence is not just about capability; it has more to do with credibility. While intentions are subjective and often hidden, institutions provide the much-needed assurance, facilitate cooperation, and hold states accountable.

(b)     Executive Dominance Undermines Stability.  When war-making authority concentrates in one individual, predictability collapses. If that happens, the global system shifts from a state of manageable risk to assured uncertainty. Long-established norms, institutions and diplomatic rules break down, increasing the likelihood of strategic miscalculations.

(c)       Alliances Require Trust, Not Just Power.   Whilst power (military strength and material capabilities) provides the foundation for an alliance’s utility, trust (reliable and non-detrimental behaviour) remains vital for long-term sustenance. In times of uncertainty, trust permits alliances to function without making the parties vulnerable.

(d)       Norms are Strategic Assets.   While short-term benefits may accrue by violating laid-down norms, the long-term strategic position may erode. Norms provide strategic legitimacy, which is essential in forging ties and developing partnerships.

(e)       The Taiwan Imbroglio.  Developments in West Asia and the ensuing conflict underscore a pertinent fact: Taiwan is not just a military problem. It is a credibility test of the American system, and, given what has happened in West Asia, the concept of collaborative defence may need a revisit.

Conclusion

Collaborative defence, anchored in alliances and partnerships, has the potential to multiply capability, distribute risks and reinforce legitimacy. Deterrence becomes a shared venture, thereby raising the threshold for aggression. On the other hand, unilateral wars like the ones being waged by President Trump and his administration erode institutional credibility, strain alliances, and generate long-term instability, which outweighs any short-term gains that might have accrued. One thing is clear: cooperative security architectures underpin credible deterrence. Nations that invest in trust and shared strategic objectives are better positioned to prevent conflict, provided that they avoid strategic overreach and isolation. Any perceived hesitation, fragmentation among allies, or gaps between declared policy and action will shape Beijing’s assessment of how Washington might respond in a crisis involving Taiwan, especially during President Trump’s tenure.

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Notes:-

[1] Constitution Annotated, Analysis and Interpretation of the US Constitution, United States of America, “Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 1,”https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/; Constitution Annotated, Analysis and Interpretation of the US Constitution, United States of America, “Constitution of the United States, Article II,” https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

[2] Scott Wong, Kyle Stewart and Frank Thorp V, “Republicans block effort to halt Trump’s war with Iran after ‘civilisation’ threat,” NBC News, April 09, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/republicans-block-effort-halt-trumps-war-iran-civilization-threat-rcna267345. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Keywords: One Nation-One Theatre, Strategic Coherence, Whole-of-Nation Approach, Modern Warfighting, Theatre Commands

In continuation of a series of articles on Higher Defence reforms, this article sheds light on the need for India-specific structures for modern war fighting. The first article was about whether Theatre Commands were required or not. Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands – To Be or Not to Be (published in CAPSS Journal, Defence and Diplomacy, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/7-VP-Naik.pdf. The second article primarily explained the differences between Theatres and fronts and brought out the employment philosophy of the India Air Force. Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands Redux (Published on CAPSS website, In Focus, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-theatre-commands-redux/). The third article carried out a joint AI and human analysis of the need for reforms and what was wrong with the way India plans to fight, and articulated a problem statement. The fourth article recommended possible structures for the reforms and brought out certain lacunae at the apex level. India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/ published as an Expert View article on CAPSS’ website. The fifth article brought out certain facts about modern war fighting and how the theatre construct was already an old concept. Air Power Musings: When Structure Lags Strategy, The Theatre Command Fallacy, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-when-structure-lags-strategy-the-theatre-command-fallacy. The aim of the series was to build a coherent argument towards higher defence reforms in India and bring out possible actionable options in the national security construct.

Introduction

India’s unique geostrategic problem of having two contiguous adversaries, who may act simultaneously, makes the threat manifest as a single entity on multiple fronts. The emerging geopolitical landscape in Myanmar and Bangladesh also merits strategic considerations, however, does it mean that India will need to create additional theatres to cater for Bangladesh and Myanmar?

The problem lies not in the number of threats, which would vary, but in how to handle the manifesting threat. The Iran imbroglio has further reinforced the need for a unified command. The United States (US) and Israeli forces operate under their own, independent commands, where plans are made and executed. However, for the ongoing Iran operation, in spite of being a joint operation, there have been instances of bombing by Israel which the Americans were not aware of.[1] This brings out the need for unity of command to ensure integrated execution of operations. The Iranians, on the other hand, have a single unified command structure; however, execution is decentralised and left to the 31 autonomous provincial commands without any systemic coherence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh (the Islamic Republic of Iran Army) are two parallel and independent armed entities of Iran operating within the same geography and with their own forces. The Artesh has its integral Army, Navy, Air Force and Air Defence (AD) Force, while the IRGC has its own Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force (missiles and drones), Quds Force (supporting the axis of resistance and associated militia) and the Basij Organisation (Information Warfare). These are two forces fighting independently and without strategic guidance.

India is uniquely placed because its threats are geographically contiguous and strategically intertwined. China’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) independently deals with India. Pakistan does not have a separate Theatre Command (TC) to handle contingencies in its West and East. However, the Indian thought process, seemingly in the final stages of reforms, is still looking at the creation of TCs to enhance war-fighting capability. While there is no denying the fact that reforms are required in India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO), the solutions being discussed appear to be in a desperate search for a problem. This article argues that the threat faced by India is singular in nature and could manifest either simultaneously or sequentially, forcing India to fight a two-front war within the same battle-space continuum. Thus, dividing the country into TCs based on a happy compromise of threat and geography risks fragmenting strategic planning for what is essentially one strategic problem.

Creating Artificial Boundaries

The concept of Theatres originated before the Second World War, when forces had to be allocated and operated on separate continental fronts and across vast oceans. Geography forced these structures because that was what was required in those times. In India, we are trying to force geography, and that can prove detrimental in the long run. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are contiguous and operationally connected, having a direct impact on each other. If dealt with by separate theatres, strategic prioritisation will become a major problem and be contested. A single national TC construct preserves the principle of Unity of Command and permits decentralised execution. More on that later. Thus, the need of the hour is to use geography to one’s advantage rather than making it an excuse for fragmenting forces. We should not create artificial boundaries and further complicate the issue.

Two Front Contingency

India is one contiguous Theatre of War. Contingencies may arise with any of its neighbours, and each would constitute a separate front. We should not confuse Theatres of War with fronts and Theatres of Operations. Therefore, the opening of a front does not require an independent force structure to be activated. Additionally, India cannot assume that conflicts with either China or Pakistan will remain geographically isolated. Threats could very rapidly become national conflicts rather than remaining regional campaigns. This further reinforces the need for a single, integrated operational theatre of war.

Multi Domain Operations (MDO) involving land, sea, air, space, and cyber forces will require synchronisation and will be carried out across the entire country simultaneously, because MDO transcend conventional domain-specific war-fighting. If cyber, space and information campaigns are all pervasive and scarce resources like force multipliers remain centrally controlled, why then should war fighting become fragmented? Fragmenting would only create parallel systems, undermining effective Command and Control (C2). A single theatre construct would instead better align with modern warfare, enabling a system-of-systems approach to war-fighting.

Theatre Commands are a purely military reform, and rather than addressing the elephant in the room and appreciating the situation, India is trying to situate the appreciation. Modern war fighting will not purely be a military construct. Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas and US-Israel versus Iran show that national resilience, resolve, and most importantly, capability will differentiate between the victor and the vanquished. It is easy to say that the armed forces need to be reformed, but very difficult to say that the problems are systemic and at the apex level. To develop a comprehensive capability, reforms in HDO must first take place at the highest level.

India’s Legacy HDO: The Need for Apex-Level Joint Planning

India’s current C2 architecture is a legacy inheritance still being retained. What India needs is force-reconfiguration rather than force restructuring because the problem is not about how we fight, it is about how we plan. In India’s past wars, when have the Army and the Navy been used to gain control of the air? Traditionally, the Air Force has been providing air support and shaping the battlefield for the Army and Navy; however, have the land forces ever been used to take on air force tasks like radar busting, artillery and rocket fires on airfields, and destruction of C2 nodes by their special forces? Control of the air is a prerequisite for advancing the land offensive and must be achieved jointly. Op Sindoor, the Ukraine-Russia war and the US-Israel war with Iran have shown the importance of gaining requisite control of air for the furtherance of all operations. Therefore, gaining and retaining control of the air becomes a national imperative to be achieved jointly, requiring centralised planning. Two or three independent theatres are not likely to achieve strategic coherence because their operational imperatives would significantly differ.

MDO requires a ‘Whole-of-Nation’ approach to war-fighting, and that ‘whole’ cannot further be broken down into western theatre, northern theatre or a maritime theatre. Selection and Maintenance of Aim is one of the most enduring Principles of War. Having multiple aims at the grand strategic or the military strategic level will go against the principle. Russia did not adhere to it in the early days of the war, and the result is there for everyone to see. In addition, modern weapons have trans-geography reach. What if an adversary’s weapon hits a target in a different Theatre Command which has not been activated? Will that theatre now respond, or will only the theatre that is supposed to deal with that particular threat respond to the event? For example, in a conflict with Pakistan, Vishakapatnam is targeted, so who will respond to it and how? The unfolding problems are myriad, and the cascading effects will be counterproductive. These issues complicate effective decision-making and further add to the confusion, and in MDO, if decision-making is compromised, the battle will be lost. To take the argument further, Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks on critical infrastructure will happen across the nation and call for a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic responses. Space, the ultimate high ground, does not distinguish between theatres, and more importantly, India’s adversaries also consider India one theatre of operations. Then Why should India not respond as one integrated entity?

Realigning Operational Regional Commands

If planning needs to be done centrally at the apex level, the same is also true at the operational level of execution. The Indian Army has seven regional Commands; the Navy has three, and the Air Force has seven. A total of 17 Commands are spread across the entire country. If India were to operate as one integrated command, the existing regional commands would need to be merged and, more importantly, co-located, keeping geography and threats in mind. Strategic guidance must lead to operational coherence; therefore, we need to change the process of execution of kinetic operations at the operational level, and that is what is meant by force reconfiguration. This can be done by creating Joint Forces Commands (JFC) based on geography, which would exercise C2 at the operational level. Merger of regional commands would enable unity of command and permit decentralised execution. These JFCs would remain operationally subordinate to a single national Theatre and an associated Joint Forces Head Quarters (JFHQ) in order to remain strategically coherent.[2]

In 2016, China realigned its forces from seven Military Regions to five Theatre Commands, each dealing with a specific threat. China’s threat landscape differs from that of India because it has geographically dispersed threats and a mix of continental as well as maritime domains. The Central Theatre Command (CTC) of China defends Beijing and acts as a strategic reserve for other commands. India’s strategic landscape is more concentrated and geographically contiguous, making a single integrated theatre construct more suitable.

The Single Point Advice of Matters Military

Establishing the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and creating the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) is a step in the right direction. The issue causing dissonance is that war fighting and Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) functions have been merged, thereby creating additional reform hurdles. Clearly mandated Allocation of Business (AoB) rules by the Government of India must thus become the first reform. Subject Matter Experts must be able to render ‘single point advice’ to the Government of India (GoI) on all matters related to the armed forces. This advice is single-point and not necessarily single-person. A single person makes the chain linear and susceptible to disruptions, and the same has been seen during Op-Epic Fury, where the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran adversely affected its apex decision-making ability.

With increased offensive capability to address strategic Centres of Gravity (CoG), targeting leadership across all levels has now become fair game. In the present construct, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is an efficient organisation, functionally effective and brings about strategic coherence. The single point advice, therefore, must be a collegiate function by the CDS and the three Service Chiefs (experts in their respective domains). War fighting and RTS functions, both must remain the mandate of COSC, performed by the JFHQ (war fighting) and HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) for RTS functions headed by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff and Secretary to the Chairman COSC (CISC) heading the DMA.

The Future of Warfare

In modern wars, kill chains have evolved into kill webs. There are no independent operations ,and cyber and space are overarching capabilities capable of affecting all other domains. These form the bedrock of Multi-Domain Operations and are therefore not just the mandate of the armed forces. A national ‘nervous system’ is therefore the best way forward. The ability of a nation to demonstrate and adopt a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach will prove decisive in the future. The vision document, ‘The Defence Forces Vision 2047: A Roadmap for a Future-ready Indian Military’, unveiled by the Honourable Raksha Mantri (RM) on March 10, 2026, also speaks of the need for integrating military strength with diplomatic, technological and economic power to ensure national security. [iii] The writing on the wall is clear; it is not just about the armed forces. The armed forces are an important cog in the wheel of a nation, but they are not the only cog. All cogs need to work together to strengthen and support the wheel and serve their own distinct purposes. The armed forces function best when C2 is simple, clear and unified. The soldier on the battlefield, the sailor in a submarine and the pilot in the cockpit of an aircraft require clarity of instruction to enable correct tactical actions. A One Nation-One Theatre approach would align India’s strategy with geography, reduce bureaucratic lethargy, enhance jointness and most importantly, translate synergy into a coherent strategy for integrated operations.

India’s security challenges demand a fundamental rethink of the existing C2 structures. We must embrace our geopolitical landscape and geographical context to adopt a framework specifically tailored to India’s strategic reality. Given the possibility of simultaneous pressure from both China and Pakistan, multiple theatres will only fragment war-fighting capability. A One Nation-One Theatre architecture, supported by streamlined regional commands and an integrated network for MDO, would enable India to reduce the teeth-to-tail ratio, preserve national character and strengthen national response in arising contingencies.

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Notes:

[1] “White House Sent ‘WTF’ Message to Israel After Iran Oil Field Strike: US Report,” NDTV, March 09, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-israel-war-us-wtf-message-israel-attacks-iran-oil-fields-oil-prices-rise-brent-crude-price-today-11188848, Accessed on March 11, 2026.

[2] VP Naik, “India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), November 29, 2025, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/. Accessed on March 11, 2026.

[3] Surendra Singh, “Rajnath Singh Unveils Vision Document to build Future-Ready Military Force,” The Times of India, March 11, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/rajnath-singh-unveils-vision-document-to-build-future-ready-military-force/articleshow/129420609.cms, Accessed on March 11, 2026.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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