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	<title>Akash Godbole, Author at CAPSS India</title>
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		<title>RUNNING THE EXERCISE: Conducting an Apex-level National Security Exercise</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/running-the-exercise-conducting-an-apex-level-national-security-exercise/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Akash Godbole]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 15:35:05 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Gp Capt Akash Godbole, Senior Fellow, CAPSS Keywords: National Security Exercise, Wargaming, Crisis Management, Strategic Policy Group, National Crisis Management Committee, Non-Government Elements, Resilience, India Introduction The first part of this argument, ‘Before The Next Crisis,’ argued for a biennial national security exercise. It set out why India needs such an exercise, what it [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/running-the-exercise-conducting-an-apex-level-national-security-exercise/">RUNNING THE EXERCISE: Conducting an Apex-level National Security Exercise</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author: Gp Capt Akash Godbole, Senior Fellow, CAPSS</strong></h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords: </strong>National Security Exercise, Wargaming, Crisis Management, Strategic Policy Group, National Crisis Management Committee, Non-Government Elements, Resilience, India</h4>
<h1><strong>Introduction</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The first part of this argument, ‘<span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/">Before The Next Crisis</a></span>,’ argued for a biennial national security exercise. It set out why India needs such an exercise, what it would gain, and why it needs nothing more than a directive from the <em>Raksha Mantri</em> (RM) to begin. This paper proposes how to conduct it.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">In brief, the proposal centres on one unannounced, plausible conflict scenario drawn from the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) threat assessment. It is played at three levels: service, ministerial and apex. Non-government elements, such as industry, academia, and field experts, participate from the outset. This being a security exercise, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is proposed to lead the design and conduct. The NSCS convenes, and the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog brings participants from beyond government. A Red cell acts as the adversary, with full freedom to win. A response cell stands in for the apex leadership and refers the decisions that matter to the principals. The exercise tests resilience as much as coordination. The follow-up is part of the exercise, with fixed timelines for making good the shortfalls.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Lessons from Abroad</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Several nations have exercised their entire government and national resources, not just their armed forces. India need not copy any of their frameworks. However, a few lessons are worth emulating. The United States (US) <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://nbr.org/publication/the-indispensable-role-of-exercises-in-national-preparedness/">Nifty Nugget exercise of 1978</a></span> exposed deep mobilisation gaps, but its value lasted only as long as it was repeated. <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/proud-prophet/">Proud Prophet</a></span>, in 1983, showed that a strategy fails when it ignores the adversary’s perception, and let the principals decide through stand-ins. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://english.mapn.ro/cpresa/973_NATO-CRISIS-MANAGEMENT-EXERCISE">crisis exercises</a></span> have let a member represent its apex council through a cell. Israel’s <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/israeli-war-games-stoke-border-tension-1.96714">Turning Point</a></span> ended in a cabinet decision, but its public profile drew diplomatic reactions across the border. Sweden learnt that <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/northern-composure-initial-observations-swedens-total-defence-2020-exercise">people play honestly only when lessons target issues</a>,</span> not personalities. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Cygnus found the gaps but failed to close them, and the UK has since worked towards a <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/uk-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report-progress-update-july-2026/pages/8/">fixed reporting schedule</a></span>. China rehearses its critical sectors in peacetime, yet its navy found<span style="color: #0000ff;"> <a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/pla-navys-blue-team-center-games-war">its own Red cell mirroring Blue</a></span>. The paper applies each lesson through an Indian structure that already exists.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Existing Mechanism</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Much of what the exercise needs already exists. The services wargame their war plans through multiple contingencies as a matter of routine. Each service also runs its own academia and industry outreach: the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/army-design-bureau-launched-gen-dalbir-singh-suhag">Army Design Bureau</a></span> (ADB), the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://indiannavy.nic.in/node/26775">Naval Innovation and Indigenisation Organisation</a></span> (NIIO) and the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2026/03/iaf-launches-dad-to-spearhead.html">Directorate of Aerospace Design</a></span> (DAD). The NSCS runs <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://businessworld.in/article/bharat-national-cyber-security-exercise-focuses-on-elevating-india%E2%80%99s-cybersecurity-preparedness-496144">Bharat NCX</a></span>, a national cyber exercise with a red-on-blue track and over 200 security chiefs from government and industry. The Strategic Policy Group (SPG), chaired by the National Security Advisor (NSA), is the government’s <span style="color: #0000ff;">‘<a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.onmanorama.com/news/india/2018/10/09/nsa-replaces-cabinet-secretary-as-spg-chief.html">principal mechanism for inter-ministerial coordination</a></span>’, and its members include the service chiefs, the Cabinet Secretary, key secretaries and NITI Aayog. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC), under the Cabinet Secretary, <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2045/1/A200553.pdf">coordinates the national response to disasters</a>.</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">These pieces already exist in some form or the other. However, they have never been played together. Table 1 shows how each can be used.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Table 1: Existing Structures and Their Roles</strong></h1>
<table width="699">
<thead>
<tr>
<td width="180">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Existing structure</strong></h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="200">
<h4><strong>Present Mandate</strong></h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="319">
<h4><strong>Envisaged Role</strong></h4>
</td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>Raksha Mantri</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Constitutional responsibility for national defence</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Initiates each iteration; receives the report</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>COSC</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Joint planning; service wargames</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Design lead and conduct; runs the service level</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>ADB, NIIO, DAD and the Department of Defence Production</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Link the services with defence industry, DPSUs, start-ups and academia</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Bring the defence ecosystem into the wargame fold</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>NSCS</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Runs Bharat NCX; supports the NSA</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Convenes the ministerial level; supports the White cell</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>Strategic Policy Group</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Inter-ministerial coordination under the NSA</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Its members, or their nominees, form the ministerial level</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>National Crisis Management Committee</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>National crisis response under the Cabinet Secretary</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Plays when the trigger is civil; tests the hand-over to the security apparatus</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>NSA and Cabinet Secretary</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Brief the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Nominate the response cell; brief the principals</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>Defence and national intelligence agencies</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Assess adversary intent and capability</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Provide the standing core of the Red cell</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="180">
<h4>NITI Aayog</h4>
</td>
<td width="200">
<h4>Works with industry, academia and the states</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4>Brings in other non-government elements at the ministerial level</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="180">
<h4>National Defence College</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="200">
<h4>Trains senior officers and officials</h4>
</td>
<td width="319">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Provides observers and carries the lessons into courses</h4>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Rules of Engagement</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As in any wargame, rules of engagement must be laid out at the outset. These draw on the lessons above. Gaps are marked against institutions, not individuals. The Red cell must be adequately empowered to give the exercise realism. The White cell’s rulings are not contested during play. The conditions for an honest output are set out next.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Precedence</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A military headquarters cannot summon secretaries of other ministries to play. That is why the COSC leads the design, but the NSCS convenes the ministerial level. The SPG sits above both.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Political Risk and Signalling</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">In the public domain, perception matters. Any publicised failure for a ministry would have political repercussions for the minister in charge. At the same time, adversary perception must be catered for, with two nuclear-armed neighbours. The apex must decide without being seen to play, and the exercise should be quiet by design.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Secrecy and Time</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Findings must be classified. Cygnus shows what classification does without a scheduled follow-up. Secrecy is acceptable. Silence is not. Senior officials would not be expected to spare long for such an exercise. Hence, the conduct must cater to their schedule.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Conduct</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Lead and Cadence</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The three levels remain as in Part 1: service, ministerial and CCS. The RM initiates the process, the COSC leads on design and conduct, and the NSCS convenes the ministerial level. The service design bodies and the Department of Defence Production bring in the defence industry, and NITI Aayog brings in other non-government elements. The plan should be one full iteration biennially, set by a standing CCS decision. No fresh legislation is required.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Three Levels, One Scenario</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">All three levels play the same scenario on one common timeline, and injects, the developments released to force a decision, cut across them. The service level plays for about ten days. The ministerial level joins in Phase Two, in concentrated sessions. Participation is decided by the scenario, <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/">not by representation</a></span>. The apex level sits only at the end, for executive decision-making. Figure 1 shows the arrangement.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Figure 1: Three Levels, One Scenario</strong></h1>
<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-19510" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1.jpg" alt="" width="1759" height="1193" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1.jpg 1759w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-300x203.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-1024x695.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-768x521.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-1536x1042.jpg 1536w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-619x420.jpg 619w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-150x102.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-696x472.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-1068x724.jpg 1068w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-1-600x407.jpg 600w" sizes="(max-width: 1759px) 100vw, 1759px" /></p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Diplomatic, cyber, or information actions take their cue from military action. Liaison officers from the Ministries of External Affairs (MEA), Home Affairs (MHA), Electronics and IT (MeitY) with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), Information and Broadcasting (I&amp;B) and others the scenario demands sit with the service level. They log when their ministry would have been cued and annotate what it would have done and how long it would have taken. That log becomes the exercise brief for the ministerial level. The service level shows when the cue comes. The ministerial level shows whether anyone answers it.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Non-government elements join at both levels. At the service level, the ADB, NIIO, and DAD, along with the Department of Defence Production (DDP), bring in the defence industry, defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs), start-ups, and academic labs. At the ministerial level, NITI Aayog brings in critical infrastructure operators and field experts. China compels its firms to rehearse. India will have to do it by consent and contract. Firms play only the parts relevant to their sector, under non-disclosure terms. Each side sees only its own plans. That keeps the play honest. The classified report is ‘Eyes Only’ for the decision-makers.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Composition of the Cells</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Each cell has one responsibility, and one nominating authority. Table 2 sets it out.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Table 2: Composition of the Cells</strong></h1>
<table width="699">
<thead>
<tr>
<td width="110">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Cell</strong></h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="243">
<h4><strong>Drawn from</strong></h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="120">
<h4><strong>Nominated by</strong></h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="226">
<h4><strong>Role</strong></h4>
</td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>White cell</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Exercise director from the armed forces, joined by an NSCS co-director from Phase Two; military wargaming staff; NSCS staff; specialists in law, economics, cyber and transport for adjudication</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>NSA and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Writes the scenario, runs the timeline, releases injects, adjudicates</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Blue cell: service level</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Operations and planning staff of the Service HQs; Department of Military Affairs; staff of the commands the scenario engages</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>COSC</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Plays the military response</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Liaison officers: service level</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Joint secretary or director-level officers from MEA, MHA, MeitY (with CERT-In and NCIIPC), I&amp;B and others the scenario demands</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>Their ministries, through the NSCS</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Log each cue, the action it calls for and the time it would take</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Defence industry: service level</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Representatives of DPSUs, private defence firms, start-ups and academic labs, through ADB, NIIO and DAD; officials of the DDP</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>Service HQs and the DDP</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Assess whether industry can support the service plan, and how fast</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Blue cell: ministerial level</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>SPG members or their nominees, at secretary or additional secretary rank, from the ministries the scenario touches; the NCMC when the trigger is civil</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>NSA, through the Cabinet Secretary</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Plays the government’s response, in the roles they hold</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Non-government elements: ministerial level</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Senior executives of critical infrastructure operators (telecom, ports, power, logistics, data centres); domain academics; field experts and retired practitioners; all vetted and under non-disclosure terms</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>NITI Aayog, vetted by the NSCS</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Assess what they can do towards the plan’s assumptions, and how quickly</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Response cell</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>Senior officials from the NSCS and the Cabinet Secretariat who know the principals’ thinking</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>NSA and Cabinet Secretary</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Stands in for the CCS; refers the decisions that matter to the principals</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="110">
<h4>Red cell</h4>
</td>
<td width="243">
<h4>A standing core from the defence and national intelligence agencies with adversary expertise; retired practitioners; vetted China and Pakistan specialists; cyber and information-warfare specialists</h4>
</td>
<td width="120">
<h4>CDS and NSA</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4>Plays the adversary as the adversary would; free to win</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="110">
<h4>Observers</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="243">
<h4>A few faculty from the National Defence College and leading defence think tanks</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="120">
<h4>Exercise director</h4>
</td>
<td width="226">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Watch and record; notes go to the Hot Debrief</h4>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Red cell keeps its standing core between iterations. An adversary assembled afresh from people who most often sit with Blue would respond like Blue itself. The Chinese Navy observed the same, as its Red cell drifted into mirror-imaging.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>The Scenario</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Part 1 located the problem in compressed timelines. Recent conflicts have been protracted, but the first 72 hours still set the terms for what follows. The scenario must test every assumption that bears on that window. The White cell checks the assumptions that individual plans rest on, at least three months before the conduct. The trigger for a conflict may not be kinetic. The scenario should test a non-kinetic trigger as readily as a kinetic one. The Red cell must read India as Beijing or Rawalpindi would, not as New Delhi assumes it will.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>How It Plays Out</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Take a hypothetical scenario, for illustration. In Phase One, the service level plays a clash on the northern border. The same morning, malware shuts down traffic control on a major railway zone. This creates problems for Army mobilisation. The MeitY liaison officer logs the hour CERT-In would have been cued. The MEA officer logs the hour a demarche would have gone. A defence industry representative is asked how fast spares can be surged by road instead. Everything goes into the log.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">In Phase Two, the ministerial level plays the same scenario. On Day one, the NCMC responds to the contingency, treating it as a technical fault. By evening, the Red cell adds a surge of disinformation linking the outage to the military. Who would coordinate with the NCMC once its technical fault turns out to be an act of war? Military movement stalls even on Day two. A data centre operator is asked whether the backup control system can run on its servers. The operator answers that it would take two days. The plan had assumed four hours. Day three, the attribution is still unclear. MEA wants to wait. The services want to signal. The question goes to the response cell, which refers it to the principals.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This brings the decision session to one concrete question. Who would be responsible for railway cyber defence once the crisis becomes a security threat? Three gaps are noted in the register: when the NCMC hands over to the security apparatus, whether the backup control assumption holds, and what legal cover a private data centre needs. Each gap is given an owner and a deadline.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Resilience</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Coordination addresses decision-making authority, communication protocols, and timelines. Resilience examines the system’s operational sustainability when part of it is targeted. The White cell must induce contingencies that take out a node, a port, a data centre, or a rail junction, and measure the capacity lost, the workaround found, and the time to recover. A bridge is not proven by walking across it on a fine day. It is proven by loading it until it creaks.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>The Apex Level</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The apex level follows the delegated model set out in Part 1. A response cell stands in for the CCS and refers the decisions that matter to the principals, out of sight. The NSA or the Cabinet Secretary distils the findings into a brief and response options. The Prime Minister takes part in person <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/">only in major iterations</a></span>. Ministers are not seen to play, and the exercise does not collapse if one is called away. Play closes with a decision session. At least one decision is taken in the room: a resource, a directive or an owner.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>The Schedule and the Gap Register</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The report may record that a decision waited nine hours between two ministries. It must not name the officer. A Hot Debrief, an informal review while memory is fresh, follows on the last day. Within 90 days, a classified report goes to the RM and the NSA, and within 180 days an action plan names the ministry responsible for each gap. The Cabinet Secretary, who already <a href="https://www.onmanorama.com/news/india/2018/10/09/nsa-replaces-cabinet-secretary-as-spg-chief.html"><span style="color: #0000ff;">coordinates the implementation of SPG decisions</span></a>, monitors it. A sanitised lessons note goes to the training institutes and planning staff, so that the learning reaches the next set of players.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Every gap enters a register with an owner, an action and a deadline. Officials rotate. The register does not. Like an aircraft’s logbook, every snag is entered, someone signs for it, and the next crew reads it before flight. The next exercise opens by checking the last one’s gaps. Figure 2 shows the cycle.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Figure 2: The Schedule and the Gap Register</strong></h1>
<p><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-19511" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2.jpg" alt="" width="1315" height="1138" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2.jpg 1315w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-300x260.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-1024x886.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-768x665.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-485x420.jpg 485w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-150x130.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-696x602.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-1068x924.jpg 1068w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-534x462.jpg 534w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pic-2-600x519.jpg 600w" sizes="(max-width: 1315px) 100vw, 1315px" /><strong><em>The Legal Question</em></strong></p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">One gap can be clearly stated at the outset. India’s wartime requisition powers have come only with active conflict. The laws established in 1962 <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2009/223/223_2009_33_1501_24857_Judgement_24-Nov-2020.pdf">lapsed in 1968</a></span>. Similarly, those established in 1971 <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/bareacts/requisitioningacquisition/26.php">expired in 1977</a></span>. Partial provisions still exist, such as telecom under the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/20101">Telecommunications Act, 2023</a></span>, and disaster response under the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2045/1/A200553.pdf">Disaster Management Act, 2005</a></span>. Every point where a player says “we would need legal cover for that” finds a place in the register. Over a few iterations, that becomes a clear brief for the Ministry of Law.</h4>
<h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h1>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The real value of any exercise lies in the follow-up actions. No exercise of this nature should be judged by the scale of its conduct; it must lead to decisions that close the identified gaps. The exercise would gain its true value if it changes how those involved prepare.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This framework does not propose any statutory change or new institution. It merely envisages existing mechanisms to play once every two years against a specified timeline. If the second iteration finds fewer gaps than the first, then it suggests that progress has been made. If it doesn’t show progress, the register would show the reason why. Either way, it is imperative to exercise and identify the gaps before the next crisis.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">****</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</strong></em></p>
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<p style="overflow-wrap: break-word; text-align: left;"><strong><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/CAPSS_EV_AG_22_10_26.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CLICK HERE FOR PDF</a></strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/running-the-exercise-conducting-an-apex-level-national-security-exercise/">RUNNING THE EXERCISE: Conducting an Apex-level National Security Exercise</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Before The Next Crisis: The Case for Apex-Level National Security Exercises in India</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Akash Godbole]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 13:09:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=19315</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Gp Capt Akash Godbole, Senior Fellow, CAPSS Keywords: National Security, Civil-Military Coordination, Apex-Level Decision-Making, Cabinet Committee on Security, Raksha Mantri, Whole-of-Nation Approach, India Introduction Modern conflicts have compressed decision timelines. This can expose institutional gaps before anyone has time to close them. The Galwan clash of June 2020 escalated from a patrol-level incident to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/">Before The Next Crisis: The Case for Apex-Level National Security Exercises in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author: Gp Capt Akash Godbole, </strong><strong>Senior Fellow, CAPSS</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords:</strong> National Security, Civil-Military Coordination, Apex-Level Decision-Making, Cabinet Committee on Security, Raksha Mantri, Whole-of-Nation Approach, India</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Modern conflicts have compressed decision timelines. This can expose institutional gaps before anyone has time to close them. The Galwan clash of June 2020 escalated from a patrol-level incident to a bilateral military standoff within hours. Operation <em>Sindoor</em> saw simultaneous action across military, diplomatic, information, and narrative domains. The window for action was so narrow that there was hardly any time for inter-ministerial consultation. These events have indicated that India’s instruments of national power can operate in isolation, but have never been required to work in coordination, especially under pressure. No mechanism exists to rehearse that coordination before a crisis demands it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">This article proposes a biennial national security exercise akin to a wargame. It is proposed to be structured in three sequential stages: the service level, the ministerial level, and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) level. Conducting this exercise requires no legislation, no new institution, and no reorganisation of mandates. The <em>Raksha Mantri</em> (RM) will initiate the exercise, and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) will execute it. It is to be conducted confidentially, so that frank institutional assessment carries no political risk.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>The Structural Gap</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India’s higher defence architecture has been substantially reformed since the Kargil conflict. The creation of the CDS,<a id="fnref1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> the Department of Military Affairs, the Defence Intelligence Agency, and ongoing theaterisation efforts have all improved coordination within the military system. However, the problem these reforms do not address is the one that matters most in a modern contingency—simultaneity. Modern warfare requires precise alignment of diplomatic signalling, information management, cyber response, industrial mobilisation, and economic measures with military action towards a common strategic objective.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The Government of India’s Allocation of Business (AoB) Rules assign each domain to a separate ministry. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) handles diplomacy; the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) covers internal security; the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is responsible for external security; the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) handles information and cyber. It is an administrative design for peacetime governance. In a crisis, however, this system produces a sequential response when the situation demands a convergent one. Each ministry responds within its mandate. The cross-domain consequences are handled separately, and mostly later.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The Doklam standoff (2017) illustrated this precisely. Diplomatic and military options were managed largely in parallel, with informal coordination that was dependent on individuals rather than institutional mechanisms.<a id="fnref2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn2"><sup>2</sup></a> The CCS sits at the apex of the system and holds responsibility for major security decisions.<a id="fnref3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn3"><sup>3</sup></a> Below the CCS, however, no standing institution exists with the authority to integrate all instruments of national power into a single campaign design, in peacetime or in war.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">There is a further gap. Currently, no legal framework can accommodate private-sector capabilities like technology firms, logistics companies, and communications infrastructure in a crisis response. Their participation in any contingency would be improvised. A structured exercise is the only mechanism that can identify, in advance, what is needed and on what terms. India’s armed forces test their operational plans through rigorous exercises. The question is how the national response architecture, which encompasses far more than the military, can be subjected to the same discipline and scrutiny.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>How is this different?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The integration problems identified above are not newly discovered. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC)<a id="fnref4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn4"><sup>4</sup></a> in 2000 identified intelligence coordination failures that triggered a Group of Ministers (GoM) review. That review recommended sweeping reforms, including creating the CDS. The CCS formally accepted the GoM report in May 2001, but held the CDS recommendation specifically in abeyance, pending cross-party consultations that were never concluded. The recommendation remained deferred for eighteen years, through multiple governments. The Naresh Chandra Task Force revisited civil-military integration at the apex level in 2012. Its recommendations have largely remained on paper. Every major change requires a legal arrangement, budget support, and political backing across multiple governments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">This proposal requires none of that. It just requires an RM directive and a CDS mandate. It works within the existing institutional framework. Its value is not only the preparedness it builds, but also the body of evidence it creates. It would stress-test the national response architecture and highlight potential breakdowns. Hence, it would justify any structural reform as politically inevitable rather than theoretically desirable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Stakeholder Engagement</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The exercise’s success is dependent upon each institution’s understanding of what it gains and not merely what it contributes. The following makes the case for each stakeholder directly.</p>
<ol type="a">
<li>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>The Raksha Mantri:</strong></em> The RM bears constitutional responsibility for national defence. In a modern contingency, that responsibility extends well beyond operational control of the armed forces. Actions in diplomacy, economy, industrial mobilisation, and information operations all affect conflict outcomes. The RM is ultimately accountable for these outcomes, yet none of these factors is under the MoD’s direct authority. A national security exercise, initiated by the RM and debriefed to the RM, is a management audit of national security preparedness that no other instrument currently provides. It gives the RM an honest, pre-crisis assessment of whether the institutional apparatus can perform under pressure. It is to be conducted as a closed-door, confidential engagement. This would allow stakeholders to actively engage without reservations. The chain of authority established above gives the exercise institutional weight. This way, it would not remain just a staff-level activity.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong> The Chief of Defence Staff:</strong></em> The exercise directly serves the CDS’s mandate for jointness in training and inter-service coordination. A simulation that reveals where civilian support in fields of cyber, logistics, information management, and industrial supply is unavailable or uncoordinated is precisely the evidence needed to make a credible, documented case for structural investment. Exercise findings become the authoritative basis for capability requirements, displacing planning assumptions that can currently be contested in budget negotiations without a factual counter. The CDS executes the exercise on the RM’s mandate, building on existing joint training and inter-service coordination responsibilities.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>Civilian Ministries:</strong></em> Any civilian ministry would protect its institutional autonomy. An exercise that has the potential to expose interdepartmental gaps in coordination would threaten that autonomy. Three points make participation in their interest. First, the exercise is confidential, and findings are not publicly released. Second, any gaps observed during the exercise can be filled before an actual crisis. Third, the exercise provides them a forum to raise all performance constraints on record. That is a constructive outcome for any institution with serious responsibilities.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>The Prime Minister’s Office:</strong></em> CCS participation does not translate to the Prime Minister’s (PM) mandatory attendance. The standard format is the delegated model. The National Security Advisor (NSA) or Cabinet Secretary distil exercise findings into a brief and a set of response options for the PM’s review. The PM may participate directly in major planned iterations, when the evidence base warrants apex engagement. The CCS is not being asked to conduct warfighting. It is being asked to verify that its national security response decision can actually be implemented. It is a question of decision quality, not an operational one.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>A Phased Approach</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The exercise is structured in three phases. Each phase’s lessons are incorporated as settings for the next phase.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Table 1: Phased Exercise Structure and Whole-of-Nation Gains</strong></p>
<div style="width: 100%; overflow-x: auto; -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch;">
<table style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100%; min-width: 480px;">
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 19%;" />
<col style="width: 37%;" />
<col style="width: 43%;" /> </colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Phase</strong></th>
<th style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Action</strong></th>
<th style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Outcomes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Phase One</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">CDS chairs service-level exercise with limited inter-ministry representation. NSCS provides intelligence environment. No new institution required.</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">First documented assessment of where national response capacity actually resides vs. where it is assumed. Cross-domain response database created. Immediate command-authority and communication gaps identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Years 1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Establishing the Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Phase Two</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">RM formally mandates the exercise. NSCS-chaired ministerial tabletop added as the second tier. Civilian ministry participation determined by the scenario, not by representation.</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">First tested operating procedure for the initial 72 hours of a contingency. Civilian mobilisation protocols established. Interdepartmental friction documented and addressable before a crisis exposes it.</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Years 3–4</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Building the Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Phase Three</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">Full three-stage exercise operationalised. NSA/Cabinet Secretary briefs PM. Direct CCS participation reserved for major biennial iterations at RM’s initiative.</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;" rowspan="3">Tested national response capacity across all instruments of power. Response database becomes foundation for AI-assisted decision-support calibrated to India’s own institutional experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Year 5 Onwards</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td style="border: 1px solid #cccccc; padding: 8px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Apex Integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Source</strong>: Author’s Conceptualisation</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The history of Indian defence reform suggests that exercises without consequences become performances. The following mechanisms give this exercise institutional weight:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>(a)</strong> <strong>Exercise Reports</strong>: A timeline would be set for submitting an immediate exercise report to the RM and the NSA. This ensures that this report does not get buried under bureaucratic cholesterol. Additionally, with them reviewing these reports, the follow-up action would be firm and lasting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>(b) Budget</strong>: The body of evidence that this exercise generates provides respective ministries with a better card during budget negotiation. This gives ministries a direct incentive to engage seriously. The gaps they identify become their claims; gaps exposed by the exercise become their liabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>(c) Cadre</strong>: Cadre review and revision can serve as an institutional mechanism for linking senior participation in national security exercises to the professional assessment cycle. This mechanism already exists within the military and can be extended to civilian ministry executives through the RM’s office without statutory change.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>(d) Repetition</strong>: It is expected that successive iterations would transform this exercise into a sought-after event. It would become an organisational culture to identify gaps in a controlled environment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">An exercise conducted every two years, with formal oversight, would become part of the national security calendar. Over successive iterations, the institutional culture would shift accordingly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">One further distinction matters. This proposal will not be deferred as the CDS recommendation was, because it does not require the same kind of political consensus. The CDS required a Cabinet decision on a new post, cross-party consultation, and inter-service agreement. An RM directive for a biennial exercise requires none of these. It is an executive decision within the RM’s existing authority.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India does not lack national power. It lacks a tested architecture for deploying that power in a coordinated manner at the pace modern conflict demands. Phase One can be initiated within eighteen months of an RM directive, using existing infrastructure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The proposal here is not a reform. It is an exercise. The institutional learning accumulated through each cycle will eventually produce the kind of structural reform recommended since Kargil but never adequately implemented. This is not because the recommendations were wrong, but because no body of evidence was compelling enough to override institutional inertia. This exercise creates that body of evidence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">None of this is going to be simple. It would require sustained political commitment and disciplined follow-up action to bring about institutional change. The cost of that commitment is low relative to what it produces. The cost of discovering coordination failures during an actual crisis, at the pace Galwan or Operation <em>Sindoor</em> demonstrated, is considerably higher.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</strong></em></p>
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<p style="text-align: center; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/apex-level-national-security-exercises-india-akash-godbole.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CLICK HERE FOR PDF</a></strong></p>
<h3><em><strong>Note</strong></em><br />
The exercise design is addressed in a separate document intended for the exercise planners. It would cover aspects related to scenario, rules of engagement, phases, participants and their roles, debrief, and follow-up. The present article confines itself to the institutional case for the exercise and the governance architecture within which it operates.</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Notes:-</strong></p>
<aside id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document" role="doc-endnotes">
<hr />
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<li id="fn1" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India, Ministry of Defence. “Cabinet Approves Creation of the Post of Chief of Defence Staff.” Press Information Bureau, December 24, 2019. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1597425" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1597425</a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">A. K. Bardalai, “Doklam and the Indo-China Boundary,” <em>Journal of Defence Studies</em> 12, no. 1 (January–March 2018): 5–13. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/doklam-and-the-indo-china-boundary" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/doklam-and-the-indo-china-boundary</a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India. Cabinet Secretariat. “Composition of the Cabinet Committee on Security.” May 27, 2009. Accessed July 31, 2026. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/cabinetcommittees/english/1_Upload_3218.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/cabinetcommittees/english/1_Upload_3218.pdf</a>, p. 1.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Kargil Review Committee. <em>From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report</em>. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000. The GoM report is formally titled: Government of India. <em>Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers on National Security</em>. New Delhi: Government of India, February 26, 2001. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf</a>.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/before-the-next-crisis-the-case-for-apex-level-national-security-exercises-in-india/">Before The Next Crisis: The Case for Apex-Level National Security Exercises in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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