Keywords: Matsya Nyaya, Modern War Fighting, Realpolitik, Air Power, Operation Absolute Resolve

Matsya Nyaya: The Big Fish Will Swallow the Small Fish

The concept of ‘Matsya Nyaya’, translated as the ‘Law of the Fish’, where the big fish devours small fish, was articulated in the Arthashastra by Chanakya (Kautilya) during the Mauryan period around the 4^th to 2^nd Century BCE. It remains one of the most profound contributions to Indian political thought and understanding of great power politics, world order and anarchy. Matsya Nyaya describes a condition of anarchy, in which hard power alone determines survival. In such situations, the powerful will prey on the weak unless they are restrained by a capable and legitimate authority. During the Cold War, the balance of power ensured order; however, post the breakup of the USSR in 1991, hegemony and unipolarity have resulted in an absence of control mechanisms, later giving rise to anarchy. What Chanakya wrote back then still resonates strongly with modern geopolitics, where idealism and realism have given way to hard-hitting ‘Realpolitik’, a pragmatic and interest-driven approach to world affairs.

In today’s world, power has become diffused, interests have become transactional, and behaviour has become opportunistic. While classical Realism has always theorised power, Realpolitik practices it unabashedly without any concern for stability and moral legitimacy. It is only concerned with outcomes, advantages, and available leverages. Another interesting feature of Realpolitik is selective morality, where norms are applied when convenient and ignored when considered to be costly. The transition to Realpolitik has been hastened because of the arrival of China and the resurgence of Russia, along with the USA, on the global stage. All three have displayed similar patterns of behaviour whenever core interests have been involved. This further emphasises the fact that while a bipolar world is inherently stable, a unipolar world is transitory in nature, and a multi-polar world creates a state of anarchy where Realpolitik, hard power and pragmatic, interest-driven competitions rule the roost.

In such a world, the rise of middle powers further complicates the issue because they tend to practice strategic pragmatism, joining the Realpolitik bandwagon when convenient. The world is a canvas visible to all, and each player wants their own colour to be splattered on it. Modern Realpolitik extends way beyond pure hard power, where supply chains, energy security, data, and finance have now become instruments of coercion. Sanctions, tariffs, technological denial, and export controls have become means to achieve ends. In such a world, nations may confuse rhetoric for reality, thereby risking strategic irrelevance and, therefore, as Chanakya had said, in an anarchical world, the big fish will swallow the small fish.

Calipso Venezolano

On February 20, 2025, the Trump administration formally designated eight Latin American crime organisations as foreign terrorist organisations, a label normally reserved for hardline terror outfits like Al-Qaeda that use violence for political ends and not for profit-focused crime rings.[1] On August 19, 2025, the US Military deployed three guided-missile destroyers off Venezuela and added another three amphibious assault ships, including other support vessels carrying about 6,000 soldiers.[2] In September, the USA sent F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico, and a submarine equipped with cruise missiles was deployed. On September 2, 2025, the USA carried out its first strike against a drug-carrying vessel that departed Venezuela, killing all 11 people on board, and a short video clip was also posted on social media.[3] This was followed by another strike on an alleged drug boat, killing three people. Both the strikes were carried out without justification, and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, a top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the US Military was not “empowered to hunt down suspected criminals and kill them without trial.”[4] On September 19, 2025, a third strike on another alleged drug-laden vessel was carried out by the US military, drawing criticism from various factions and individuals. From October to December 2025, in excess of 25 strikes on boats were carried out by the US military, drawing ire from all factions, including the US Congress. On December 10, 2025, the US seized an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast carrying about two million barrels of heavy crude, and the Venezuelan government called it “a blatant theft and an act of international piracy.”[5] On December 16, President Trump ordered a blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers going into and out of Venezuela and pledged that the military buildup would continue till Venezuela returned to the US oil, land, and assets, the legitimacy of the claim being questioned by all. The President also alleged that Venezuela had been using its oil to sponsor and fund terrorism and drug trafficking. On December 30, 2025, the CIA carried out a drone strike at a docking area believed to have been used by Venezuelan drug cartels.[6] The strike was the first to be carried out on mainland Venezuela. The USA thereafter imposed sanctions on four Venezuelan oil companies and designated another four additional tankers as ‘blocked property’ which were trying to evade US sanctions. On January 01, 2026, during an interview on television, President Nicolas Maduro said that Venezuela was open to negotiating an agreement with the USA to combat drug trafficking. He also distinctly mentioned that the USA was trying to force regime change in Venezuela and also gain access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

On January 03, 2026, the USA launched Operation Absolute Resolve with air strikes across Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. This was followed by the insertion of Special Forces using helicopters with an aim to capture the President of Venezuela. President Maduro and his wife, Flores Maduro, were captured by this crack force and flown out of the country and eventually to New York. President Maduro was accused of leading “a corrupt and illegitimate government which, for decades, had leveraged government power to protect and promote illegal activity, including drug trafficking.”[7] President Maduro and Flores Maduro have meanwhile pleaded not guilty.

Democracy, Drugs, and Air Power: Operation Absolute Resolve

The capture of a sitting President of a sovereign state has never been seen before in recent history. The only probable exception could be the surrender of Manuel Noriega, the de facto leader of Panama, to the US Armed Forces in January 1990. In a rules-based world order, this operation has been able to bring to the fore the stark reality of Realpolitik where self-interest and a pragmatic outlook ‘trumps’ global law and order. The operation also put all caution to the wind with blatant disregard for sovereignty and international order. Leaving legality and ethics aside, the operation has demonstrated the importance of hard power and brought out the effectiveness of joint planning and integrated application of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in the planning and conduct of Multi Domain Operations (MDO). Ranging from precision strikes on fast-moving boats, conduct of a dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD) missions to the insertion of special forces to capture President Maduro from a densely populated urban terrain, the primacy of air power has also been amply demonstrated. The operation was preceded by months of cyber operations, signals intelligence, pattern-of-life analysis and the unprecedented integration of US Cyber Command and Space Command into kinetic military action.[8] From intelligence gathering by the CIA (August 2025 onwards), the multi-domain pressure campaign between September and December 2025, culminating in the final assault and extraction of the President, the operation is a classic example of how modern combat is likely to take shape.[9] Increasingly, Air Power is being extensively used for the conduct of operations across the entire spectrum of war. From shaping the battlefield, establishing control of air, conducting kinetic and non-kinetic action, achieving the laid down end state and finally restoration of peace, air power has been seen to be an instrument of choice. Characteristics of air power like flexibility, mobility, concentration of forces, offensive action, responsiveness and the resultant shock effect are facets that are essential for the conduct of modern wars and have been seen to be decisive.

The Indian Conundrum

Op-Sindoor conducted by the Indian Armed Forces brought out certain important lessons in the Indian context, and Operation Absolute Resolve has only highlighted them.[10] An important takeaway from such operations and the two major conflicts going on in the world (Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas) is that the entire force structure of a nation cannot be equipped and trained to carry out MDO due to financial and technological constraints. Operation Absolute Resolve did not exercise any specific Combatant Command/Theatre Command. It was an amalgamation of forces from various individual commands, equipped and trained for specialised application in multi-domain scenarios. The forces employed were from the US Cyber Command, US Space Command, CIA, Delta Force, and Special Operations Aviation Regiment, US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Air Force. India must learn relevant lessons from such conflicts, especially when it is looking at modernising its own force structures. Neither does India have very deep pockets for creating huge and ambling Theatre Commands, nor does it have the luxury of decades of procrastination and debate to embark on paradigm changes in war fighting. What India does have is tactically sound armed forces capable of delivering effective firepower where it counts. The problem is integration and joint planning. The creation of an apex, all-encompassing Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) should be the starting point for all reforms in the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) of India.[11]

Organising a Joint Task Force (JTF), similar to Operation Absolute Resolve, drawn from all relevant arms, support services and ancillaries would essentially be the responsibility of the JFHQ. A classical Theatre Command will never have the wherewithal to independently undertake such missions. The need of the hour is to develop a flexible force structure designed to be highly ‘intelligentised and informatised’ and act as force multipliers, augmenting conventional forces.[12] In an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, flexible options to the national leadership must be available in order to successfully prosecute conventional, asymmetric, hybrid or multi-domain operations. Unless all elements of CNP sit together and strategise, the desired outcomes will not be met, and therefore, it is time that India also adopts a more pragmatic and Realpolitik outlook to how future wars would be fought.

Parting Shots

The 21^st Century has seen air power emerge as a uniquely compatible instrument because it is flexible, coercive and adaptive. Realpolitik demands shaping outcomes and simultaneously minimising exposure. Op-Sindoor has also demonstrated the large space available for the conduct of full-spectrum operations under a nuclear overhang. Future wars are likely to be aerospace-centric, with cyber playing a key role. Modern forces will need to coerce without conquering, signal without committing and more importantly, punish without occupying. As the world transforms from a unipolar to a multi-polar world, air power will not just support Realpolitik but increasingly redefine grand strategy because soft power can never replace hard power, and the world recognises and respects it. Matsya Nyaya remains the silent grammar of geopolitics. Norms may attempt to soften its expression, but power determines its outcome and the big fish will always swallow the small fish!

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Notes:

[1] Ben Finley, Konstantin Toropin, Regina Garcia Cano, “A timeline of U.S. military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture,” PBS News, January 03, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-u-s-military-escalation-against-venezuela-leading-to-maduros-capture.   Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[2] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[3] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[4] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[5] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[6] Ibid. Accessed on January0 6, 2026.

[7] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[8] “Operation Absolute Resolve: A Deep Dive into the Cyber, OSINT, and Intelligence Operations Behind Maduro’s Capture,” Breached Company, January 06, 2026, https://breached.company/operation-absolute-resolve-a-deep-dive-into-the-cyber-osint-and-intelligence-operations-behind-maduros-capture/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[9] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[10]  VP Naik, “India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence, Para on Problem Statement,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, November 29, 2025, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[11] VP Naik, “Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands-Redux,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, September 27, 2025, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-theatre-commands-redux/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[12] VP Naik, n. 10.

The post Calipso Venezolano Vertical Coercion: Democracy, Drugs, and Air Power appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Air Power, USAF, PLAAF, Fighter Jet, Military Power, Modernisation of PLAAF

When the United States Air Force (USAF) Captain Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager flew his Bell X-1 Glamorous Glennis faster than the speed of sound ^[1] (Mach 1) on October 14, 1947, it put the US ahead of the rest of the world in a race to the moon. Fifteen years later, it also opened a new frontier for rivalry between the US and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) during the Cold War. The countries tried to match fighter-for-fighter to upend others as the most superior air force in the world.

Slowly, Moscow lost the edge, and the USAF became the most dominating air power in the world. It became the first air force in the world to fly 5th-generation stealth aircraft and the only air force to fly two types of 5th-generation fighter jets – namely F-22 Raptors and F-35 Lightning II. The supremacy is now being challenged by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Soon, the PLAAF is likely to beat the USAF to become the first air force in the world to fly  6th-generation fighter jet.

So far, the world has been concerned with the PLA Navy’s feverish modernisation pace, and the advancement by the PLAAF has been dismissed as the force playing catchup with the US. But the watchers of the PLAAF did not expect the force to have a 6th-generation fighter before the USAF, as they underestimated China’s capability to produce new aircraft designs. And Beijing has been churning out one new aircraft design every 10-15 years.

The 2024 edition of the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military power ^[2] underscored how the PLAAF has expanded the capabilities of its unmanned aerial systems (UAS). It conceded that they are now comparable to USAF systems. It also noted the strides that the Chinese have made with air-to-air missiles, electronic warfare, bombers, and fifth-generation fighters, but it said that the PLAAF was still playing catch-up with the USAF in terms of combat capabilities.

The complacency could prove detrimental to the USAF’s air power dominance as Chinese 6^th generation fighter jet development is flying ahead with alarming speed. Numerically, the Chinese Air Force, along with the Navy, fields the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and the third-largest in the world, with over 3,150 crewed aircraft—not including trainers or drones. More than 2,400 of these are combat aircraft, and the majority of them—around 1,300—are now fourth-generation, according the report.^[3]

The modernisation of PLAAF is driven by China’s ambition to project power beyond the first chain of islands, including Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, which China sees as the first line of defence. The “second island chain” in the Western Pacific runs from south-eastern Japan to Guam and south to Indonesia. This would supplant the US as the dominating military power in the region.

In present times, the three major state threats faced by the US – the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are in the US INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility. Of these three countries, China is the only one with the will and wherewithal to disrupt the international order.

China is modernising its air force, keeping in mind the strategic role air power has played in recent conflicts. President Xi Jinping has set a target for the PLAAF to achieve modernisation as a strategic force by 2035.^[4]

F-47 Vs J-36 – The Flight to Induction

The concurrent emergence of the Chinese J-36 and the American F-47 reflects the heightened rivalry between China and the US to dominate the Indo-Pacific. Beijing is increasingly looking to project its power beyond the first island chain and challenge American influence in the Pacific. The J-36 is pivotal to this strategy.

After images of China’s 6th-generation fighter jet , 2025prototypes went viral, the US finally awarded the contract for the US Air Force’s first 6th-generation fighter jet. Instead of going with Lockheed Martin, the US government announced on March 21, 2025 to go with Boeing. ^[5] Recently, the outgoing US Air Force Chief of Staff General David W. Allvin announced that the first F-47 Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter will be ready to fly by 2028^[6]. The F-47 is key to the US maintaining its air dominance as F-22 Raptors near the end of their operational lifespan.

Keeping an eye on the rapid strides taken by the Chinese Air Force modernisation, the new timeline suggests urgency on the part of the USAF. During his keynote address at the annual Air, Space and Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Md. (south of Washington), Allin said: “We got to go fast.” “I got to tell you, team, it’s almost 2026. The team is committed to get the first one flying in 2028. … We’re ready to go fast. We have to go fast,” he added.^[7]

Despite moving up the timeline for the first airframe of the F-47, it is 3-4 years behind the Chinese 6th-generation fighter jet J-36 and the other prototype J-XDS (also referred to as J-50 sometimes). Both Chinese aircraft have been recently spotted at a secretive airbase with a massive runway in northwestern China. ^[8] This suggests that the aircraft has entered its testing phase, and the massive infrastructure that Beijing is building up at the test base indicates its commitment to challenge US’s air dominance.

The US has obliquely tried to debunk the advantage the Chinese 6th-generation aircraft development programme has over the American programme. A press release by the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on March 21, 2025, revealed that Boeing and Lockheed Martin designed two X-planes as “risk reduction for the NGAD Platform. These aircraft first flew in 2019 and 2022, logging several hundred hours each.”

Unlike the US, which has kept the prototypes under wraps, China has parked its two prototypes out in the open despite knowing that the site is regularly imaged by satellites. The new images of the J-36 point towards commendable design evolution of the aircraft. The second iteration of the J-36 suggests new structural changes over the first. The two new images from November 24, 2025, show new inlets, main landing gear and two-dimensional thrust vectoring across its bank of three engines.^[9]

The J-36 stealth fighter developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation has a tailless, twin-engine design and is a very large tactical aircraft comparable to US strategic bombers in terms of size.^[10] It has a unique side-by-side cockpit configuration, indicative of a two-crew mission management. This could help the aircraft play the role of an airborne command and control node for both manned and unmanned aircraft that can execute missions beyond the first island chain. The design of J-36 indicates a departure of fighter jets from the classic role of dogfighting to optimise air assets by coordinating manned and unmanned systems.

If the timeline of the 5th-generation J-20 ‘Mighty Dragon’ from a technology demonstrator to induction into service is any indicator, the PLAAF will get J-36 years ahead of when the USAF will get the F-47.

Will PLAAF’s technological leapfrogging with J-36 counter USAF’s numerical advantage?

Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance reports for 2007 and 2025, the total number of PLAAF fighters, multirole fighters, and ground-attack aircraft shrank from 2,453 in 2007 to 2,065 in 2025. The air forces across the globe have experienced this decline as they move from less expensive second- and third-generation fighters to more expensive but more capable fourth-generation aircraft.^[11]

This development can be analysed from the framework^[12] presented by Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam in 2007 after analysing PLAAF’s modernisation. Instead of predicting the right size of the PLAAF’s and its force structure, it gives five perspectives that will shape China’s decisions about the PLAAF’s future force structure. The authors contended that the perception of the international environment, including a crisis over Taiwan or a conflict with the US, and budget constraints will have a major influence on PLAAF’s modernisation.

Their analytic framework focused on potential changes in PLAAF roles and missions, domestic versus foreign procurement, low-tech versus high-tech systems and combat versus support aircraft. A 2019 defence white paper published by China indicated the transition of the PLAAF’s missions from territorial air defense to “offensive and defensive operations.”^[13] The technological capability of the PLAAF is fast approaching the standards of the US Air Force.

The reduction in the number of fighter jets and the advent of futuristic and technologically advanced aircraft is driving the PLAAF’s modernisation. And soon it will have the advantage of 6th-generation fighter jet. The modernisation of the fighter jet fleet is supported by the development of its bomber and air-to-air refueller aircraft fleet. ^[14]

The J-36 can help China leapfrog as a technologically advanced air force. Soon, the PLAAF is going to be the largest air force in the world, and that too equipped with the world’s first 6th-generation fighter jet. The critics often highlight that the development of the 6th-generation fighter jets should be evolutionary. But, China’s J-36 development stems from the belief that deploying disruptive technology is necessary to neutralise the numerical advantage the US might possess aerially. It is investing in radical innovation that will reshape future conflicts.

At the same time, China is ramping up the production of J-20 fighters. As per reports, it has already built 300 units of the aircraft, and slowly it is switching to Chinese-made engines to power these fighters.

The production rate has increased from 30 to 100 aircraft annually, and conservative estimates suggest that the PLAAF’s J-20 fleet could surpass 1000 aircraft by 2030. ^[15] China intends to have nearly 1,500 by 2035. With five production lines, China is capable of producing a new aircraft every eight days. In comparison, USAF has over 180 F-22s and 630 F-35s. There are plans to acquire 1800 more. Despite entering production two decades before the J-20s, the American F-35 has a low production rate of 140 aircraft per year. ^[16]

Implications of PLAAF’s Capability Boost

China is boosting its anti-access/area-denial capabilities with stealth fighter jets, advanced long-range missiles, and a rapidly growing blue-water navy. Air dominance will help it offset the geographic constraints of the First Island Chain, thereby challenging the US military in the Western Pacific.

China’s hegemony over Asia is one of the biggest threats to the US position in the international system. Supplanting the US military as the dominant force in the region will have implications for regional disputes and will also impact other regional actors such as India. The leapfrogging aerial technology will help China to project power beyond its borders and send signals to countries across the globe.

While J-35 has a carrier-based variant, most of the Chinese fighter jets are land-based. But with Beijing converting its Y-20 “Chubby Girl” transport aircraft to refuellers, the range of its fighter jets is bound to get doubled, threatening the US’ military positions.^[17]

The Y-20, officially called “Kunpeng” after a mythical Chinese bird and nicknamed “Chubby Girl” for its appearance, has superior endurance and air-refueling capability that will increase the range of PLAAF fighter jets much beyond the first island chain, a string of islands encumbering the seas around China. ^[18] Y-20 is the largest military aircraft currently in production after Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster III stopped production in 2015.

In this scenario, the US has no other option but to rely on its allies helping the US to establish air superiority quickly. It can just hope that its 5th-generation US Navy fighter jets and aircraft of allied forces will be able to subdue the PLA Navy and the Air Force in the air.

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Notes:

^[1]  Bob van der Linden, “Chuck Yeager Broke the Sound Barrier in the Bell X-1,” National Air and Space Museum, October 13, 2022, Chuck Yeager Broke the Sound Barrier in the Bell X-1 | National Air and Space Museum. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

^[2] Department of Defense, Government of the United States of America “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024 (Annual Report to Congress),” December 18, 2024. Accessed on November 20, 2025.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Huang Panyue, “PLA Air Force plans expansion into space to modernize capability,” China Daily, November 13, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9342733.html; Li Wei, “PLA Air Force progresses on road to become world-class,” China Military Online, November 11, 2020, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9934462.html. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

^[5] Ritu Sharma, “F-47 NGAD: Two Big Firms Compete To Power US’ 6th-Gen Combat Jet; Who Will Win The ‘Lucrative’ Deal?,” The EurAsian Times, March 30, 2025, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/jet-f-47-who-will-win-the-lucrative-deal/ . Accessed on November 27, 2025.

^[6] Chris Gordon, “Allvin: First F-47 Sixth-Gen Fighter Already Being Built, Expected to Fly in 2028,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, September 22, 2025, Allvin: First F-47 Fighter Being Built, Expected to Fly in 2028. Accessed on November 27, 2025.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Joseph Trevithick, “China’s New Tailless Stealth Fighters Both Appear at Secretive Test Base,” The War Zone, November 4, 2025, China’s New Tailless Stealth Fighters Both Appear At Secretive Test Base. Accessed on November 27, 2025.

^[9] Tyler Rogoway, “China’s J-36 Tailless Stealth Jet’s New Thrust Vectoring Nozzles Seen From Behind,” The War Zone, November 24, 2025, China’s J-36 Tailless Stealth Jet’s New Thrust Vectoring Nozzles Seen From Behind. Accessed on November 27, 2025.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance, Vol. 112, No. 1, March 2012, pp. 205–302, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2012.663215 ; and “Chapter Five: Asia,” The Military Balance, Vol.125, No. 1, February 2025, pp.206, 208, 218, 230, 231, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2025.2445477. Accessed on November 08, 2025.

^[12] Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” Asia Policy, Vol. 1, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 377–436.

^[13] Lu Hui, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” Xinhua Net, July 24, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. Accessed on November 08, 2025.

^[14] Lauren Edson and Phillip Saunders, “Rightsizing the PLA Air Force: Revisiting an Analytic Framework,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol.118, No. 3, July 15, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4244397/rightsizing-the-pla-air-force-revisiting-an-analytic-framework/. Accessed on November 08, 2025.

^[15] Jack Buckby, “We Know Why The Air Force Fears China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon Stealth Fighter,” National Security Journal, August 12, 2025, We Know Why the Air Force Fears China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon Stealth Fighter – National Security Journal. Accessed on December 09, 2025.

^[16]  “China’s Air Force surges J-20 Stealth Fighter Acquisitions to 120+ Annually: USAF Receiving Just 48 F-35s,” Military Watch Magazine, July 20, 2023,  China’s Air Force Surges J-20 Stealth Fighter Acquisitions to 120+ Annually: USAF Receiving Just 48 F-35s.  Accessed on December 09, 2025.

^[17] Ritu Sharma, “‘An Aircraft US Fears’: China’s Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ Gets New Engine; PLAAF Gears up for Intercon Missions,” December 3, 2023, ‘An Aircraft US Fears’: China’s Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ Gets New Engine; PLAAF Gears Up For Intercon Missions. Accessed on December 09, 2025.

^[18] Ibid.

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Keywords: Air Power, Proof, Operation Sindoor, Narrative, Strategic Communication

Introduction

It is said in Judiciary circles that Justice must not only be done, but also seem to be done. This article aims to draw a similar analogy to the employment of Air Power, especially in the backdrop of Operation Sindoor. The highest echelons of the Indian Air Force (IAF) repeatedly acknowledged that during the 2019 Balakot air strike, there was insufficient visual proof to demonstrate its success.[1][2] In stark contrast, an ample number of videos/photographs have been provided to the electronic/digital media to validate the likely extent of damage caused by the successful strikes by the Indian Armed Forces during Operation Sindoor.[3] This suggests fundamental implications for doctrines prescribing the employment of Air Power moving forward.

Analysis

Traditionally, the analysis of strike damage formed part of the broader sequence of battle damage assessment (BDA) that feeds into subsequent mission planning.[4] It has been a vital mission-planning tool for decision-makers, especially in the military, revealing the extent of damage to the target and the need for additional waves of attack to neutralise its operational capabilities. However, it had never attained the stature of a prerequisite for proving the success of an operation. The times have changed drastically from when acknowledging damage was considered part of the military ethos.

This phenomenon has become even more acute, given the lengths to which nations and civilisations go to control the strategic narrative. While the latest technologies have brought greater visibility through satellite and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) inputs, they have also enabled digital media to spread like wildfire. The case of “Doosra banda”[5] reeks of motivated social media campaigns to engineer a narrative directed at a domestic media and fallible international audience that is keener on what comes first than on what is correct.[6] In this environment, how is the employment of Air Power affected? It gets affected in a multitude of  ways: –

(a)       Operational Choices:        It is beginning to fundamentally influence target selection. The Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), Air Marshal Narmdeshwar Tiwari, reflected on how the armed forces narrowed down to selecting nine targets out of many identified during strike preparation.[7] This suggests that some evidential priorities were factored into target selection, leading to the selection of targets on whom damage could be unambiguously documented. Traditionally, targets have been chosen solely on operational considerations, such as the concentration of terrorist training infrastructure and their headquarters. Parallel arrangements were made to plan BDA missions to obtain the requisite assessment. Increasingly, these missions are likely to provide documentary evidence of the damage to the international and national media. As far as Operation Sindoor is concerned, the targets specifically for IAF were the terror headquarters at Muridke and Bahawalpur, a good 30 km and 100 km inside Pakistan territory, respectively.[8] Targeting these sites offered the dual advantage of military strategic value and demonstrable visual proof of damage against legitimate targets, satisfying military requirements for both strategic value and proof generation. The contrast with Balakot is instructive for all to see.

Choice of Weapon has evolved beyond the traditional criteria of lethality, precision and cost-effectiveness. The VCAS, while displaying live strike footage, demonstrated how the use of weapons with integrated sensor packages enabled real-time documentation.[9] Another manifestation of this aspect is the inclusion of unmanned systems specifically for strike documentation, beyond those mandated by BDA considerations. Moving forward, this is likely to affect the entire procurement process, force structuring, mission planning, and execution.

(b)       Phase and Timing of Campaign:           The proof-driven employment structure must be considered in the context of the campaign’s phase. Since it had to be a surprise strike with a limited window for targeting, every weapon had to deliver what it meant to. More than that, every weapon hit should be comprehensively proved to have made an impact. The same cannot be said of campaigns elsewhere, such as in Ukraine and Gaza. However, for such short and swift conflicts with limited objectives on the part of at least one of the belligerents, the need to factor in provability, especially in Air Power employment, needs to be considered.

(c)       Strategic Communication Architecture:          Despite the efforts of the Indian armed forces, this aspect still requires further institutional refinement. As observed during engagements spanning the last two decades[10], the Indian follow-up to a military action has been nuanced, relying on accurate data collection and formal public communication through media briefings. This reflects how a civilised nation behaves; however, what has changed recently is the promulgation and consumption of social media outlets. The IAF, on its part, has made considerable efforts to release strike videos, pre- and post-satellite images, and detailed damage assessments for public consumption.[11] This is not to say that the Indian system is ineffective, but there is room for improvement, especially regarding institutionalised mechanisms for narrative management. Cognitive warfare demands systemic integration of communication into operational design.[12] The enemy, meanwhile, is openly demonstrating how it managed the narrative in its favour during the conflict.[13]

To manage a coordinated, effective, and timely follow-up, it is imperative to institutionalise communication procedures and systems.[14] Training and simulations can only thrive in a system mandated and designed to support them. It would require a flow of aural, visual, and digital information to vantage points that can further decide and regulate its flow to the requisite avenues. This would improve the efficiency and viability of communication; otherwise, it is likely to grow stale and appear to be a manufactured response to enemy propaganda.

(d)       Operational Viability:         The most significant factor affecting a military planner is the operational viability of undertaking such an operation. While it does affect the employment of Air Power in ways it never has till now, provability must not come at the cost of operational effectiveness. The damage caused by long-range surface-to-air weapons has been unprecedented.[15] As noted earlier, this would require subtle changes and inclusions at the procurement stage, while balancing economic considerations. Training would need to align with these weapons and their respective procedures. The most crucial aspect planners need to understand clearly is that this is another factor to be managed and must in no way offset operational effectiveness. Especially as AI-enabled and autonomous weapons rise, it is prudent to maintain positive visual feedback to address legal and ethical concerns. A calculated percentage of weapons with such capabilities would need to be factored in, especially given the likelihood of short, swift conflicts in the neighbourhood. This remains true for India, considering the nuclear dimension unlikely to yield a protracted contest.

Conclusion

The burden of proof has now transcended the realm of BDA and is now an essential consideration for Air Power employment. Operation Sindoor thus highlights a larger paradigm shift in military doctrine, suggesting provability as a crucial operational parameter in the modern information environment. Thomas Schelling describes communication as an essential aspect of deterrence along with capability and intent.[16] The same is true of military actions today, as communications come out into full public glare. For this to remain relevant, it would need timely, authentic visual proof to support the narrative.

In this regard, Operation Sindoor demonstrated the systematic integration of proof generation into operational structures, including target prioritisation, weapon choices, campaign phasing, visible escalation control, optimal communication mechanisms, and limited social media engineering. Moving forward, it would require a revisit to institutionalise this aspect into military planning, which would demand modifications to procurement procedures, training curricula, and operational procedures. Procurement would require a deeper analysis to arrive at the optimal percentage of such weapons and equipment. Communication systems for a ready flow of information with inbuilt regulatory provisions need to be conceived and operationalised at the earliest. A broader introspection would be required to integrate communication mechanisms into operational structures. Training and Simulation would need to follow up.

It has been repeatedly stated that Sindoor has laid to rest the ghost of Balakot, but what remains a concern is perception management, especially in the age of social media. The enduring lesson remains that in contemporary conflict, perception shapes reality and damage as an operational objective must not only be done but also seem to be done.

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Notes:

[1] “Ghost of Balakot’ laid to rest: Air Force chief on why videos of Operation Sindoor mattered” Times of India, August 9, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ghost-of-balakot-laid-to-rest-air-force-chief-on-why-videos-of-operation-sindoor-matter-watch/articleshow/123204862.cms. Accessed on November 21 2025.

[2] Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), “Three Years After Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory”, Stimson, February 28, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/three-years-after-balakot-reckoning-with-two-claims-of-victory/, Accessed on November 21 2025.

[3] “Op Sindoor | Very Easy to Start a War…,”, NDTV Defence Summit video footage, August 29, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yeh1UR-jJ4w, Accessed on November 21 2025.

[4] “Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States of America, January 31, 2013, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Targeting_20130131.pdf. Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[5] “3 Years of Balakot Airstrike: Exclusive Eyewitness Account”, Indian Defense News, February 23, 2022; https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/02/3-years-of-balakot-airstrike-exclusive.html, Accessed on November 21, 2025, Pakistan initially acknowledged capturing two pilots via a DG ISPR briefing, but quickly retracted.

[6] Ibid

[7] “Less than 50 weapons to end conflict’: IAF on Op Sindoor”, Times of India, August 30, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/less-than-50-weapons-to-end-conflict-iaf-on-op-sindoor-details-why-pak-asked-for-ceasefire/articleshow/123600869.cms, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[8] “Vice Air Chief Reveals Details Of Op Sindoor, Shows New Footage”, ABP Live, August 30, 2025, http://news.abplive.com/news/india/within-48-hours-vice-air-chief-reveals-details-of-op-sindoor-shows-new-footage-1797466, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[9] NDTV, n. 3.

[10] For historical context on India’s evolving military response patterns, see Ministry of Defence press releases “2016 Uri surgical strikes”, Press Information Bureau, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151242, “2019 Balakot airstrike”, Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl%2F31090%2FStatement+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+26+February+2019+on+the+Strike+on+JeM+training+camp+at+Balakot, and “2025 Operation Sindoor,” Press Information Bureau https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2149356, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[11] ABP Live, n. 8.

[12] Christoph Deppe, Gary S. Schaal, NATO Allied Command Transformation, “Cognitive warfare: a conceptual analysis,” Frontiers, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/big-data/articles/10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129/full, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[13] “The Current Life with Information Minister Attaullah Tarar”, The Current, YouTube, June 7, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcFvH9GPSkY . Minister Tarar describes the room as “where we won the narrative war from.”, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[14] “Commander’s Handbook – Strategic Communication,” US Joint Forces Command, United States of America, DTIC, October 27, 2009, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA544861.pdf;
“Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, AJP-3.9,” 2021, NATO, November, 2021 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/618e7da28fa8f5037ffaa03f/AJP-3.9_EDB_V1_E.pdf, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[15] “‘Could look deep inside’: IAF chief reveals ‘longest kill’ during Op Sindoor; shares losses suffered by Pak” Times of India, October 3, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/4-5-f-16s-destroyed-iaf-chief-on-what-turned-tables-in-op-sindoor-calls-pak-narrative-manohar-kahaniya/articleshow/124285354.cms, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[16] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 34-47. Schelling argues that deterrence requires three elements: capability, intent, and credible communication.

The post Burden of Proof: Latest Dynamic in Air Power Employment Calculus appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Bayraktar TB2, Shahed-136, First-Person View (FPV) drones, Kamikaze Drones, Loitering Munitions, Air Power, Lancet Drone, Electronic warfare.

Introduction: War in the Drone Age

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the world anticipated that tanks, fighter planes, and guns would come to characterise the battlefield. Instead, ‘Drone’, a new actor, moved into the limelight. Within months, the skies of Eastern Europe became a battlefield not for bold pilots, but for quiet, unmanned devices that could observe, attack, and go where manned aircraft could not.

From Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2s obliterating Russian air defences and even sinking the Moskva warship, to Russia launching waves of Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drones to cripple Ukrainian infrastructure, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become much more than support tools; they are now game-changing weapons. They attack deep within enemy lines without putting their pilots at risk, target artillery with precision, and reveal enemy movements in real-time.

This war has demonstrated a profound change; air superiority no longer requires expensive fighter planes or gallant pilots. Rather, cheap, small, and stubborn drones are rewriting the very definition of air power. What was science fiction not so long ago is now a matter-of-fact aspect of war, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the most unambiguous indication yet that the era of the drone has officially started.

Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 and Russia’s Shahed-136 and Lancet Drones: A Game-Changer

One of the most recognised drones of the conflict is the Bayraktar TB2, manufactured in Türkiye and used by Ukraine.[1] The Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone can fly for up to 27 hours, has a ceiling of approximately 25,000 feet, and can carry laser-guided missile weapons. At the outset of the war, the TB2s were instrumental in the destruction of Russian air defence systems and Russian convoys.[2] They even sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva.[3] The TB2 also provided real-time targeting data for artillery strikes. As the conflict continued and as Russia improved its air defences, the TB2 shifted from conducting attacks to fulfilling the role of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).[4]

Russia has employed Iranian-manufactured Shahed-136 drones, which they refer to as Geran-2, a type of “kamikaze drone” designed to fly into a target and explode.[5] The Shahed-136 is relatively cheap and can be launched in swarms. Russia is using them for strikes on everything from power stations to military facilities to cities. Often, Russian forces send them at night to overwhelm air defences. In this way, the Shahed-136 has taken the place of long-range bomber missions by aircraft, which would be much more expensive to use and riskier to send on distant missions.

The Lancet drone by Russians is a precision-guided loitering munition which is utilised to destroy tanks, artillery pieces, and radar stations. Lancet was used in the wake of a Shahed attack to hit targets that survived the first wave. The Lancet has undertaken missions that would have been carried out by Su-25 ground-attack aircraft or an attack helicopter. Although these assets are now often forced to operate from greater distances because of the threat of portable air-defence systems.[6]

Commercial UAVs on the Frontline

Both Russia and Ukraine heavily utilise First-Person View (FPV) drones, which are often adapted from commercial drones.[7] These are small, fast, and manually piloted using a live camera feed, allowing operators to guide them with extreme precision. FPV drones are perfect for trench warfare and urban fighting. They are inexpensive, hard to shoot down, and ideal for missions.

Commercial drones, such as the DJI Mavic series and Matrice series, have also become a standard tool on the battlefield.[8] On the front line, drones are used for artillery spotting, reconnaissance and even light bombing by attaching small explosives. In some cases, these drones have replaced scout helicopters and observation planes. They are inexpensive, readily available, and simple for soldiers to use and operate. A front-line unit can unpack, launch, and fly a drone in just minutes, providing them with instantaneous situational awareness.

Shift from Manned Aircraft to Drones

Why this shift from manned aircraft to drones? Safety is the most obvious factor. If one is shot down, the loss is a machine, not a human life.[9] Price is yet another significant factor. Although a new fighter plane will cost an enormous amount of money, a drone can be constructed and piloted for a fraction of that price.[10] Another benefit is endurance; most drones can remain aloft much longer than manned planes, as pilots get tired and run out of fuel are the only limitations for them.[11] The mere ability of drones to provide real-time video and images means that they can deliver precision strikes or guide artillery fire to the precise location.[12] And since they have no human aboard, they can be launched into deep-defended territory where a manned aircraft would stand little chance of survival.

Vulnerabilities of using Drones

However, drones have certain disadvantages. Even after using fewer munitions, their speed is invariably slower.[13] Many of them are also susceptible to adverse weather conditions.[14] Electronic warfare also poses a significant threat. Signals can be jammed or hacked, or they can crash.[15] There will be obstacles in coordinating airspace for simultaneous use by drones and manned aircraft, as avoiding collisions beyond visual line-of-sight will rely on sensing and control systems with advanced capabilities. And finally, there are ethical questions. Drones can often be deployed with ease and inexpensive redundancy, which leads to questions of whether this would cause the military and others to lower the threshold to use lethal force.[16] Civilian casualties created by the use of drone strikes are still a hotly contested public debate, as is the potential for autonomous targeting against humans without human intervention. The availability of drones in the open market creates a risk to national security if technologically advanced UAVs are obtained by non-state actors and used in coordinated attacks.[17]

Key Lessons for India from the Drone Era

India must respond to the drone era with strategic and intelligent adaptation rather than mindlessly copying others. Accelerated investment in domestic counter-drone technologies is the first step. For example, the D4 system, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), neutralises small UAVs by combining hard-kill options, such as lasers or kinetic interceptors, with soft-kill techniques, like jamming.[18] In addition to government initiatives, private companies are also developing innovative projects. For example, Bhargavastra, a micro-missile solution for swarm drones, demonstrates that India can lead the world in specialised counter-UAS technology.[19]

Second, India must implement a layered air defence system, combining drones, electronic warfare, radars, and missile systems at various ranges.[20] Experience from the Ukrainian employment of drones for artillery ranging and precision targeting emphasises the need for training in networked, joint operations where drones are not only used for reconnaissance but also for fire control, intelligence gathering, and logistics support.[21]

Third, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict revealed fundamental supply-chain risks. To prevent similar threats, India needs to minimise import dependence by creating local ecosystems for vital components, such as sensors, chips, payloads, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) software.[22]

Lastly, India should ready itself against the emerging threat of low-cost commercial drones being used atrociously by non-state actors, especially in the border regions, and safeguard civilian infrastructure as well.[23]

Essentially, the most critical takeaway for India is to shift from a reactive to an anticipatory posture: build indigenous counter-UAS capabilities, integrate them into multi-layered defences, reinforce domestic supply chains, and actively confront asymmetric drone threats across all domains.

Way Forward: The New Face of Air Power

Although there are challenges, the war in Ukraine has shown that drones are not merely backup systems anymore; they are now part of military strategy and capable of taking over missions formerly attended by belligerents with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. In Ukraine, drones have been used to identify targets for artillery fire, adjust artillery rounds to targets, engage direct strikes against targets, and induce psychological effects on enemy forces by always ensuring they know they are being monitored.[24] For Russia, drones allow long-range attacks deep into Ukrainian territory without risking pilots or expensive aircraft. This represents a profound shift in how drones are applied in modern warfare.

In the future, the experiences of this war are likely to influence military planning globally. Military forces will allocate more resources to drone manufacturing, pilot training, and anti-drone systems.[25] The ratio between human-crewed and unmanned systems will continue to evolve, with unmanned planes increasingly handling perilous and routine assignments.[26] Though manned aircraft will not become extinct, they do retain an edge in speed, payload, and specific mission types. Their domain will diminish in wars where the airspace is contested, and the threats are real. The ethics, strategy, and technology surrounding this transformation will haunt us for decades to come, but one thing is sure: the age of the drone has arrived.

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Notes:-

[1] Gary Mortimer, “The History and Effectiveness of the Bayraktar TB2 Drone in Ukraine,” sUAS News, June 2023, https://www.suasnews.com/2023/06/the-history-and-effectiveness-of-the-bayraktar-tb2-drone-in-ukraine/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[2] “The Bayraktar TB2 and the Role of Affordable UCAVs in Modern Warfare,” Army Technology, March 17, 2022, https://www.army-technology.com/analyst-comment/bayraktar-tb2-modern-warfare/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[3] Valius Venckūnas, “Bayraktar Drone Used to ‘Distract’ Russian Flagship in Missile Attack: Reports,” Aero Time, April 14, 2022, https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/30757-reports-indicate-that-bayraktar-helped-to-attack-moskva. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[4] Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Are the Once-Vaunted Bayraktar Drones Losing Their Shine in Ukraine?” Defense News, October 31, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/10/31/are-the-once-vaunted-bayraktar-drones-losing-their-shine-in-ukraine/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[5] “Exclusive: Russia Develops New Drone‑Warfare Tactics with Unveiling of Truck-Mounted Geran‑2 Loitering Munition Launcher,” Army Recognition, April 18, 2025, https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/defence-security-industry-technology/exclusive-russia-develops-new-drone-warfare-tactics-with-unveiling-of-truck-mounted-geran-2-loitering-munition-launcher. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[6] Ingvild Bode and Tom F.A. Watts, “Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability: Autonomy in Weapon Systems and Challenges to Human Control,” Center for War Studies, May 2023, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371351342_Loitering_Munitions_and_Unpredictability_Autonomy_in_Weapon_Systems_and_Challenges_to_Human_Control. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[7] Ahmad Ibrahim, “Employment of FPV Drones in Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons and Future Outlook,” Modern Diplomacy, December 14, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/14/employment-of-fpv-drones-in-russia-ukraine-war-lessons-and-future-outlook/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[8] David Hambling, “DJI Consumer Drones Are Still Russian Soldiers’ Favorite,” Forbes, March 10, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/03/10/dji-consumer-drones-are-still-russian-soldiers-favorite/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[9] Joseph Noronha, “UCAV: Airborne Without a Pilot,” Indian Defence Review, October 5, 2013, https://indiandefencereview.com/ucav-airborne-without-a-pilot/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[10] Muhammad Saleem, Furqan Syed, and Aun Muslim Zaidi, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” (Bachelor’s thesis, National University of Science and Technology, 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337559508_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[11] David Axe, “Refueling Gear Makes Navy’s Next Drone Even Deadlier,” Wired, November 4, 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/11/navy-killer-drone-refuel/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[12] Rajneesh Singh, “Drones for Surveillance to Strikes: Assessing the Impact through the Lens of Russia–Ukraine War,” Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 24, 2024, https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/Drones-for-Surveillance-to-Strikes-RSingh-241024. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[13] Harrison Miller, “Fighter Jets vs. Elon Musk: What U.S. Military Drones Mean for Defense Stocks,” Investor’s Business Daily, March 28, 2025, https://www.investors.com/news/fighter-jets-elon-musk-us-military-drones-defense-stocks/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[14] Maja Kucharczyk, Chris Hugenholtz, Mozhou Gao, Paul Nesbit, Thomas Barchyn, and Thomas Fox, “The Weather’s Effects on Commercial Drones May Hinder Their Widespread Use,” The Conversation, June 20, 2021, https://theconversation.com/the-weathers-effects-on-commercial-drones-may-hinder-their-widespread-use-162581. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[15] Tereza Pultarova, “How Ukraine’s Killer Drones Are Beating Russian Jamming,” IEEE Spectrum, June 2, 2025, https://spectrum.ieee.org/ukraine-killer-drones. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[16] Chris Cole, “Drones’ Lower Threshold of Lethal Force’ Academic Study Finds,” True Publica, February 15, 2016, https://truepublica.org.uk/united-kingdom/drones-lower-threshold-lethal-force-academic-study-finds/. Accessed on  October 16, 2025.

[17] Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell, “Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age,” Center for a New American Security, September 10, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-the-swarm. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[18] “Anti-Drone System,” Bharat Electronics Limited,  https://bel-india.in/product/anti-drone-system/. Accessed on  October 16, 2025.

[19] “What Is Bhargavastra? India’s Indigenous System to Counter Drone Swarms,” Hindustan Times, May 14, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/all-about-bhargavastra-indias-indigenous-system-to-counter-swarm-drones-threat-101747224636058.html. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[20] “Indian Army Discusses Future Air Defence and Counter-Drone Strategy,” India Strategic, March 2, 2025, https://www.indiastrategic.in/indian-army-discusses-future-air-defence-and-counter-drone-strategy. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[21] Rakesh Sharma, “The Ukraine-Russia War: Military Lessons for India,” NatStrat, April 26, 2024, https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/ukraine-russia-war-military-lessons-and-legacies-for-india-133.html. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[22] Twinkle Sharma, “Russia–Ukraine Drone Warfare: Strategic Lessons for India,” Defence Research and Studies, August 11, 2025, https://dras.in/russia-ukraine-drone-warfare-strategic-lessons-for-india/. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[23] Vivek Gopal, “Developing an Effective Anti-Drone System for India’s Armed Forces,” ORF Issue Brief No. 370 (Observer Research Foundation, June 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/developing-an-effective-anti-drone-system-for-indias-armed-forces-68001. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[24] Stacie L. Pettyjohn, “Drones Are Transforming the Battlefield in Ukraine, but in an Evolutionary Fashion,” War on the Rocks, March 5, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-are-transforming-the-battlefield-in-ukraine-but-in-an-evolutionary-fashion/. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[25] “Surge in Global Defense Budgets Having Significant Impact on the Global Military UAS Drone Market,” GlobeNewswire, April 10, 2025, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/04/10/3059427/0/en/Surge-In-Global-Defense-Budgets-Having-Significant-Impact-On-The-Global-Military-UAS-Drone-Market.html. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[26] Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Army Plans Massive Increase in Its Use of Drones,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/us-army-drones-shift-20cc5753. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

The post Utilisation of Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War: Shift from Manned Aircraft to Drones appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: VUCA world, Leadership, Modern Warfare, Air Power, OODA Loop, Deterrence

“True leadership lies in building systems that outlast uncertainty.”

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd)

Introduction

On October 08, 2025, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) turns 93 years young, it stands at a defining juncture in its institutional evolution and development into a modern, future-ready, and strategic air force with power projection capabilities across continents. The past nine decades have seen the Indian Air Force (IAF) grow from a fledgling force to a force to reckon with, the fourth-largest air force in the world, and a professional outfit capable of taking on the myriad challenges that come its way in the 21^st Century. From combat in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the jungles of Burma (World War II), from pioneering feats of courage and valour to save Srinagar to landing at the highest airfield in the world and from targeting bunkers in Kargil to carrying out stand-off precision attacks from own side of the International Boundary (IB) during Op-Sindoor, air power has always been the first responder, IAF an instrument of choice and a force capable of delivering decisive firepower when and where it counts.

The contemporary security environment is significantly different from what IAF has seen over the past nine decades and is characterised by increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). The VUCA environment presents its own unique set of challenges and opportunities for IAF and air power. India’s strategic environment is volatile, marked by uncertainty in the multi-polar world, complexity in modern warfare and ambiguity created by hybrid threats. While technology, information and doctrines matter, the ability to interpret, analyse, predict outcomes and take timely decisions largely depends on sound leadership; therefore, leadership will remain the decisive variable in this VUCA world. The paper aims to understand the intricacies of a VUCA world from an air power perspective and analyse leadership challenges that must be addressed for success in future wars.

Air Power in a VUCA World

Volatility classically refers to the speed and amount of change. Uncertainty denotes unpredictability of events and outcomes. Complexity implies a non-linear, interwoven geo-political landscape where events seemingly unrelated to one another create direct, indirect, or cascading effects on one another, and ambiguity highlights the decision dilemmas that are likely to arise due to prevailing uncertainty and opacity. As a technologically driven, decision-sensitive force, air power is largely affected by the interplay of the elements in a VUCA world. Technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) have significantly changed the way air power is being applied. Unmanned systems, such as drones, quadcopters, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), are altering the battlefield landscape, creating unique conditions not previously experienced. Hypersonic weapons and the use of space have exacerbated the quagmire and information has become weaponised to such an extent that narratives are deciding who the victor is and who is vanquished. In such an ambiguous and uncertain environment, it is not easy to arrive at decisions; therefore, there is a direct impact on the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, which is the cornerstone of air power application, posing unique challenges for leadership.

For India, the VUCA framework is a strategic reality, primarily due to a revisionist and uncertain China and an unpredictable Pakistan, which creates a significant amount of entropy. This high degree of disorder and randomness has been further compounded by America’s newfound love for Pakistan and apparent animosity with India. The Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflicts have shown the world that in today’s multipolar, intensely divided world, no one is willing to take a step back, resulting in highly destructive and long-drawn conflicts. On the other hand, Op-Sindoor has shown that conflicts could also be very short and intense, especially if one’s military and political objectives are clearly outlined. The conflict termination criteria are well articulated. The bottom line is that there is perpetual disruption. Amidst that disruption, air power must learn to retain its centrality and provide speed, precision and flexibility to mitigate volatility and uncertainty.

Yom Kippur Moments

On October 6, 1973, the Arab alliance of Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish holy day of atonement. The attack resulted in heavy casualties and equipment loss in both the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The surprise factor was very high as the Israelis did not expect anything to happen, especially on a holy day like Yom Kippur. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a coordinated attack on Israel on Shemini Atzeret, a Jewish holiday. Many Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers were on leave, and Israel was focused primarily on its Northern borders rather than the Gaza Strip. The assault began at around 0630 AM with a barrage of over 2200 rockets launched into Israel in just 20 minutes.[1] The barrage of rockets reportedly overwhelmed the Iron Dome system. As this was happening, at least 1,500 militants of Hamas infiltrated Israel at dozens of points using the land, sea and air mediums (para gliders). They caused a large number of Israeli casualties. About 1,200 people were killed in the assault, which included many civilians. [2] If one were to analyse the two attacks, a conclusion that can be drawn is that both attacks took place on a holiday, surprise was a key element, and it was a failure of intelligence. Most importantly, the Israelis were not prepared for it.

The VUCA world is similar. Amidst all the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, are we as a nation adequately prepared for a ‘Yom Kippur Moment’? Kargil, Pahalgam, Galwan, and Pulwama are some of India’s intelligence failures that have led to India’s Yom Kippur moments. Are we prepared for a multi-domain attack simultaneously targeting not only our military installations but also our critical civilian infrastructure? Are we ready for an unconventional attack using weapons and equipment that we have not thought of, like the use of paragliders by Hamas? Is our intelligence apparatus examining the right markers for such an event to unfold? When analysing intelligence data, are we correlating inputs in different domains, or are we still looking in silos? Do we have the wherewithal to response to surprise attacks on multiple fronts and in multiple domains? If the answer to any of these questions is no, then it is time to start introspecting. As a nation, we need to be prepared for our ‘Yom Kippur Moment’ without waiting for it to happen and then reacting.

Managing the VUCA World: Paradigm Shifts

Doctrinally, volatility requires a paradigm shift from conventional planning to adaptive and associative planning. Technology must be leveraged to simulate unpredictable scenarios and uncontrolled escalation, testing the agility of our Command and Control (C2) structures and readiness postures. Gone are the days of lethargic large-scale mobilisation of the armed forces and 30-day war packs. Volatility does not only mean disruption and interruption, but it is also a counter-strategy and must therefore become a part of our planning assumptions.

In a volatile world, uncertainty is inevitable; therefore, the way events unfold cannot be second-guessed when they start unfolding. To stay one step ahead, we must harness technology such as Generative AI and big data analysis to explore nuanced possibilities that can then be war-gamed. While using the full potential of Generative AI is still some years away, we must make a start now. Deterrence will suffer when events and outcomes are unpredictable. Yom Kippur Moments can be avoided by harnessing technology to bring credibility and intent to our deterrence capability.

Modern warfare is inherently complex, primarily due to its multi-domain nature. The land, sea, and air domains have now become interlinked with cyber and space domains; information has become a weapon and operations in one domain inevitably affect operations in other domains. We must learn to manage complexity through doctrines, realistic training, education, and integration of systems to create a system of systems that can undertake multi-domain operations.

Ambiguity affects information and perception, and it cannot be removed from modern conflict. Decision dilemmas arising from ambiguity will increasingly determine the outcome of a war. The side that has the fewest decision dilemmas will have the upper hand. A shorter OODA loop may not be the only solution, because in modern conflict, multiple OODA loops will interact with each other. There will be an overload of information, and the ability to sift through volumes of data to arrive at meaningful deductions will eventually become more important than a shorter OODA loop.

The bottom line is that there is a need to re-evaluate our doctrines, operating procedures, response mechanisms, intelligence apparatus and capability development plans, which would cater to warfighting in a VUCA world.

Leadership Challenges

Military leadership, primarily characterised by hierarchy, close control, and strict, enforceable discipline, faces an existential threat when confronted with a VUCA world. Attributes like tradition, centralised control and strict adherence to precedent can impede agility in an environment where change is constant. The essence of leadership in the future will lie in the ability to sense, decide and act faster than changes in the operational environment.

Outdated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), tactics and techniques will become serious hurdles. For example, switching off the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) during rejoin and within airfield control zones due to inadvertent activation of the Counter Measures Dispensing System (CMDS) may prove dangerous during a ‘No War, no Peace (NWNP)’ scenario, as the enemy may have weapons which can target their own aircraft at launch and during recovery for landing. It is essential to remember that India is constantly in an NWNP scenario. Similarly, just because a particular tactical action worked in an earlier situation does not mean it will work in the future as well. Smart enemies will not do what you expect them to., In a VUCA environment, the most essential task confronting leaders is to figure out what the enemy is likely to do and accordingly update SOPs, tactics, and techniques.

Technological volatility must be addressed by technologically fluent leadership. Leaders who cannot fully comprehend the capabilities of systems placed under their command risk irrelevance. Professional competence, continuous education and cross-domain exposure are essential for effective C2 in modern warfare.

Uncertainty, unlike volatility, stems from the unpredictability of events and outcomes and therefore poses a direct challenge to a leader’s confidence in available information and the reliability of established assumptions. Making sound decisions amid imperfect knowledge will hence become essential. The more variables there are, the greater the uncertainty, and given the nature of air operations, this will only increase with increased fog of war. Leaders must therefore learn to interpret evolving patterns rather than expect the normal to take place. Pre-set plans may not work in uncertain situations, and flexibility, adaptability, and the ability to think beyond one’s own domain will go a long way. This would require institutional changes, such as training in a VUCA environment, introducing uncertainty into routine activities, and creating entropy in seemingly mundane tasks. Disruptive training, which fosters cognitive flexibility and encourages out-of-the-box solutions, will help develop future leaders. Disruptive training is not training at odd hours; that is just a tiny part of it. Disruptive training is training by disrupting routine patterns and the usual way of doing things. For example, in combat scenarios, there may be a situation that allows landing only in tail winds. How many times do our trainees practice this? Answers to questions beginning with ‘What if?’ are essential to deal with combat planning and execution in a VUCA world. A leader must be able to picture multiple ‘What ifs?’ to create effective and doable plans. They must also be war-gamed to arrive at tangible and implementable courses of action. Adversaries of the future will try to outthink their opponents at every stage, making it a significant leadership challenge.

When faced with complexity, effective leadership must view modern military operations as interconnected occurrences rather than isolated missions. For example, when Blue Land launches its Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions, the entire Red Land would undertake Air Defence (AD) missions, and the pattern would reverse when Red Land launches its OCA forces. In reality, OCA and AD will co-occur in multiple domains and spread across the entire front. There is a need to revamp our training regimen to align with operations in a VUCA world. Leaders of tomorrow must change their mindset and reimagine training paradigms to make them more realistic and contemporary. Operations in an environment of denial are far more complicated than those undertaken when all systems are functioning properly. To be able to do that, leaders of tomorrow should have been trained in such environments. Capability development plans must address the challenges inherent to operating in such environments. For example, what if GPS is made unavailable in the next war? How are we going to undertake stand-off precision attacks? Do we have an alternative system? Are our aircraft and weapon systems equipped with alternative technology? Most Western surface-to-air weapon systems rely on a GPS fix to initialise. What happens if that GPS fix is not available? Another major issue facing us is the so-called peace-time attitude. Most personnel in service may not see combat throughout their careers. But, when it actually happens, our peace-time training needs to take over and aid in dealing with the arising uncertainties and complexities. While we would be expected to adopt war-time procedures, peacetime procedures would largely prevail because they would have become a habit and second nature. Our training during peace -time needs to be “train in peace as you fight in war,’ or as close to war fighting as possible and feasible, only then will they become second nature. By having two separate sets of procedures, we are adding to the already existing complexity of the situation. Examples of this situation include the carriage of personal arms during peace-time training missions, the use of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) during take-off and rejoin, night operations with minimal lighting, no radio telephony (R/T) missions, and simultaneous activation of ground defence and air defence measures at a base.  These are some institutional challenges that future leaders must address as soon as possible.

Ambiguity cannot be eliminated, but can definitely be out-thought and out-led. Multi-domain warfare, hybrid warfare, and information warfare are three types of warfare adding to the ambiguity quotient. In ambiguous environments, leaders are likely to face ethical dilemmas, decision paralysis, shifting rules of engagement and large-scale information distortion. The first casualty of ambiguity is effective communication. If a leader is unable to communicate effectively with their subordinates, orders may be misinterpreted, leading to total disarray. Training in an environment of denial, redundancy in communication and clarity of thought are a few tools modern leaders must develop to remain relevant in ambiguous situations.

Conclusion

As IAF approaches its centenary in 2032, leadership will determine whether it remains a reactive force or evolves into a proactive aerospace power. IAF@100 will demand leaders who can effectively navigate a VUCA world. Leadership is an institutional competency and not just a personal trait. The IAF must nurture younger generations in a VUCA environment, because sound and effective leadership will remain the IAF’s greatest weapon system, far more enduring than aircraft and way more resilient than technology. Leadership in a VUCA world is not about predicting the future, but rather about preparing for it. We must institutionalise adaptability through doctrine, training, education and culture. The future demands leaders who can handle volatility with alacrity, uncertainty with flexibility, complexity with equanimity and ambiguity with dexterity.

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Notes

[1] Encyclopaedia Britannica, “History and Society, Israel-Hamas War,”  October 04, 2025,  https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War. Accessed on October 04, 2025.

[2] Ibid. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

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