Keywords: China and the Bay of Bengal, Pacific Islands, Airpower in the Indo-Pacific.

Even as the global community pays attention to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, China has been continuing its expansionist propensity, this time to the Pacific islands and possibly next to the Eastern Indian Ocean, including the Bay of Bengal, to create a maritime periphery around the South China Sea (SCS). China is working to establish regional hegemony in the SCS, with aspirations for broader influence and control of the Indian and Pacific Oceans – the far seas. The SCS is a virtual lake, part of China’s near-seas and active defence strategy, surrounded by a Southeast Asian archipelago, and the choke points between the islands are crucial to China’s sea lanes of communication as well as its naval strategy. Expanding naval influence outside Southeast Asia and establishing a maritime periphery would serve to protect trade routes, undeterred access to the choke points from the open ocean, and also allow easy passage of naval ships for far-seas operations.

         On April 19, 2022, China announced it had signed a framework agreement on security cooperation with the Solomon Islands,^[1] part of the Pacific Islands, which includes Fiji and Papua New Guinea, a first-of-its-kind arrangement with a Pacific island state that could pave the way for expanding overseas Chinese naval influence well beyond the SCS. The Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, says the deal does not include plans for a Chinese military base,^[2] while China will assist the Solomons to “strengthen capacity building in safeguarding its own security”.^[3] However, a draft proposal leaked in March indicated China could “make ship visits to carry out logistical replenishment in and have stopover and transition in the Solomon Islands,” with Chinese forces to be used “to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in the Solomon Islands.”^[4]

          The deal, however, raised concern both in Canberra and in Washington that China could get a military foothold in the South Pacific, threatening Australian and US interests in the region. Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, has categorically stated that “a Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands would be a ‘red line’ for his government,” and he is coordinating with the U.S. as well as with the Prime Minister Sogavare to “avoid a naval base in the Solomon Islands”.^[5] The Solomon Islands lie about 2,000 kilometres (1,242 miles) off Australia’s east coast and sit on a key shipping route linking Australia, New Zealand, Asia, and the U.S.

       The Pacific states have received millions of dollars of Chinese BRI investments on various projects,^[6] and courtesy of Beijing’s ‘helping’ hand, the Solomon Islands severed its ties with Taiwan in 2019. Beijing’s overture to the Solomons has come on top of a failed commitment by Canberra. In 2016, Australia had agreed to set up a USD 1.5 billion infrastructure fund after two years but could not honour its promise so far. China’s expanding maritime influence beyond its traditional sphere of influence in the East and the South China Seas would open a new tussle between China and the US and its allies which will have wider ramifications in the larger Indo-Pacific.

SCS: A ‘fortified’ Chinese Lake and its Vulnerabilities

China’s consolidation of the SCS is almost certain not because of its ability to establish a full spectrum sea control in the SCS but because none of the regional countries nor the US wants to escalate the tension by provoking China. China has set up hangars for fighter aircraft, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and communication facilities on the artificial islands it created in the Spratly Islands groups.^[7]

         That suggests China can defend the SCS, but projecting power beyond the SCS region would be difficult for China, given the naval strength of the Quad members. The Quad members from the region – India, Australia, and Japan are enhancing their capabilities, while the US remains the predominant naval power in the region. The US strategy is to contain Chinese naval power past the boundaries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.^[8] Sustained US naval operations around Southeast Asia can cut off Chinese supply routes and aid, inflicting severe damage to Chinese power projection and making the country more or less locked inside the “first island chain”.[9]

           In this regard, getting a military foothold in the Pacific islands is important for China as it is looking to prevent the US from accessing the near seas, thus getting undeterred passage of commercial and naval ships through the choke points to the open ocean. From the artificial islands created in the southern part of the SCS, China can target the US base at Darwin and many parts of Australia, only with DF26D anti-ship missiles or with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) and air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM) from H6 Bombers (Figure 1 & 2). A ‘dual use’ port with berthing facilities for the Chinese Navy ships in the Solomons would help partially mitigate China’s concern about the US threat to its interests.   

Figure 1: PLAAF’s combat radius from current airbases in the SCS

Figure 2: PLA Power Projection from the SCS

A maritime influence in both the South Pacific and the Eastern Indian Ocean (including the Bay of Bengal) would help overcome the US’ threat to China’s power projection strategy. Beijing has been enhancing its military capabilities in the western part of the SCS, aiming to get a strategic hold on the Malacca Strait and further into the East Indian Ocean. It has attempted to revamp a Cambodian naval base in Ream, built by the US in Sihanouk province in the Gulf of Thailand, and an old Dara Sakor airbase, 40 km away from the Ream base. The Wall Street Journal in July 2019 revealed a secret agreement between China and Cambodia granting the Chinese Navy access to the base, rejecting the US offer to repair the base, creating anxiety about the Chinese larger game plan for power projection.^[10] Though both countries have rejected the report, China has stepped up the construction activities at both the locations, including a massive 3,400-metre airstrip at Dara Sakor, which would be able to accommodate many of the aircraft operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF),^[11] and new buildings and a road, along with dredging activities for creating a deep port for berthing larger military ships, at Ream Naval Base^[12]. From the Cambodian facilities, China can project power in the East Indian Ocean and will get air cover up to the west of the Andaman and Nicobar islands (Figure: 3).

Figure 3: PLAAF’s Air cover with J-16 from Dara Sakor

Options for India

The Bay of Bengal is fast becoming a key area of economic and strategic component of the Indo-Pacific. China’s trade routes and naval access to the Indian Ocean are going through the chokepoints associated with the region. India should utilise China’s vulnerabilities in the region, such as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, and alter them to India’s advantage. India has to strengthen its military infrastructure to counter China, independent where India is capable of facing the Chinese threat individually (Atmanirbhar), and assist regional countries to strengthen their capabilities. Similarly, India has to conduct more military exercises in the region to signal our strength and status, demonstrating the capability to deter an expansionist China. India has to strengthen its cooperation with the Bay of Bengal littoral countries and enhance diplomatic, economic, and peaceful military engagements with them. Also, India can initiate military exercises with the countries of the Bay of Bengal, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Conclusion

To counter China, India has to devise an A2AD strategy centred on the Eastern Indian Ocean, comprising internal and external balancing tactics. The Bay of Bengal is India’s area of influence where India should focus on strengthening its own capabilities, which includes strengthening the Eastern Air Command (EAC) at Shillong and fortification of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) at Port Blair. While out of the southern part of the Eastern Indian Ocean, a coordinated strategy with Australia and the US would help prevent Chinese maritime influence in the region.

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NOTES:

[1] Ananth Krishnan, “China, Solomon Islands sign landmark security pact”, The Hindu, April 19, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-solomon-islands-sign-landmark-security-pact/article65335863.ece, accessed on April 24, 2022.

[2] “China signs security agreement with the Solomon Islands”, DW.com, April 19, 2002, https://www.dw.com/en/china-signs-security-agreement-with-solomon-islands/a-61510592 , accessed on April 24, 2022.

[3] Krishnan, n. 1

[4] Ruth Pollard, Bloomberg, “The West forgot about the Pacific Islands. China didn’t”, The Japan Times, April, 20, 2002, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/04/20/commentary/world-commentary/west-forgets-pacific-islands/ , accessed on April 22, 2022.

[5] Georgia Hitch, “Scott Morrison says Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands would be ‘red line’ for Australia, US”, ABC News, April 24, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-24/scott-morrison-china-naval-base-solomon-islands-red-line/101011710 , accessed on April 25, 2022.

[6] National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Success stories of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands”, People´s Republic of China, July 27, 2021, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/news/mediarusources/202107/t20210727_1291826.html, accessed on April 26, 2022.

[7] Feng Zhang, “China’s long March at sea: explaining Beijing’s South China sea strategy, 2009–2016”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 33, No. 2:1-31.

[8] Daniel E. Ward, “Going to War with China? Dust off Corbett”, Proceedings, US Naval Institute, January 2020, p.56-60.

[9] Ibid

[10] Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network”, The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482, accessed on April 27, 2022.

[11] Drake Long, “Cambodia, China and the Dara Sakor Problem”, The Diplomat, October 21, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/cambodia-china-and-the-dara-sakor-problem/ , accessed on April 28, 2022.

[12] CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China Continues to Transform Ream Naval Base”, October 12, 2021, https://amti.csis.org/changes-underway-at-cambodias-ream-naval-base/. Accessed on April 28, 2022.

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Keywords:Russian Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Brinkmanship, Nuclear Coercion, Balance of Resolve, Russia-Ukraine Crisis

A month ago, Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine under a veiled nuclear threat. A week into the operation, Russia publicly announced a nuclear alert and conducted nuclear drills, likely intended to deter western intervention in the crisis. Scholars and politicians have called the Russian nuclear threats a bluff and argued that nuclear use would be mutual suicide. However, the balance of resolve in Russia’s favour has provided it with a coercive bargaining advantage. Russian nuclear brinkmanship demonstrates that rational state actors might be unwilling to launch a nuclear attack intentionally but quite willing to risk one and exploit the favourable balance of resolve and the risk-taking ability for coercive bargaining advantage in a crisis.

Russian Nuclear Policy

In June 2020, Russia released an unprecedented document, Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.[1] It was the first-ever document in Russia’s history giving out the finer details of the Russian nuclear strategy and the concept of nuclear deterrence.

         The document outlines that the Russian state policy on “nuclear deterrence is defensive by nature”. Russia would maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter potential adversaries from waging aggression against Russian territory or its allies and guarantee national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The decree further states that Russia considers nuclear weapons “exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure.”

         The document clarifies that the Russian concept of nuclear deterrence is that of deterrence by punishment instead of deterrence by denial: “Nuclear deterrence is aimed to provide comprehension by a potential adversary of the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or its allies”. Also, unlike the 2014 military doctrine and the previous documents, which talk about predetermined or tailored damage in retaliation, the recent decree promises to inflict “unacceptable damage” in response to an attack by a potential adversary.

         Some observers argued that the reference to the defensive nature of nuclear deterrence in the Basic Principles of State Policy, “inevitability of retaliation”, and “guaranteed unacceptable damage” puts an end to conjecture about the offensive underpinning— a situation when Russia launches aggression and uses the threat of going nuclear to prevent western (US and NATO) intervention—of the Russian nuclear strategy.[2] However, this is what summarises the Russian nuclear playbook in Ukraine.

Nuclear deterrence, coercion and compellence

Putin’s nuclear signalling in the Ukrainian operation is likely intended as a shield to keep the West out of Russia’s special operation.[3] On the day Russia launched the “special military operation” to demilitarise and ‘de-nazify’ Ukraine, President Putin threatened the potential interfering parties with consequences unforeseen in history, a veiled threat of nuclear catastrophe.[4] Three days later, Putin put the Russian nuclear forces on ‘special combat duty.’[5] A week into the invasion, on March 1, Russia put its nuclear warships and mobile missile launchers on high alert and conducted drills to operate nuclear forces in stormy circumstances. The Russian message to the world is clear: ‘we will do our thing and you will stay out of it ― or else…’[6]

       While President Biden has persistently declined to intervene in Ukraine, Russian nuclear threats are directed to deter further western support for Ukraine via weapons and arms transfers.[7] They are also intended to compel the western powers to withdraw provocative sanctions and end indirect western support to Ukrainian military forces.[8] The signal is also intended to coerce Ukrainians to capitulate to Russian demands, especially to give up the intention of joining NATO and to recognise Lugansk and Donetsk as independent sovereign states.[9] Thus, Russia has instrumentalised the “fear of nuclear war to make others bow to its ambitions.”[10]

     The Russian tactics of employing nuclear weapons for deterrence, compellence, and coercion in a conventional conflict is a part of the nuclear playbook of great powers but not something specified or stipulated by the recent Russian nuclear decree. The analysis reveals the incoherence between Russian nuclear policy and practice and demonstrates that Russian nuclear weapons are not exclusively reserved for retaliation but also to facilitate the invasion of foreign territories.   

Balance of Resolve and Nuclear Brinkmanship

Pertaining to the mutually assured destruction (MAD) regime between the United States and Russia, it can be argued that the Russian threats of nuclear use in a local conflict are not credible and any use of nuclear weapons might result in all-out nuclear warfare with an unprecedented catastrophe. In other words, Russian nuclear threats can be considered a bluff and it would not use nuclear weapons in the ongoing conflict. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently expressed this sentiment in an interview with the German newspaper Die Zeit. He said that he thinks “that the threat of nuclear war is a bluff” and that the use of nuclear weapons “means the end for all sides, not just for the person using them.” While the argument might sound theoretically correct, it might not play out precisely in a crisis.[11]

      The Russian political stakes in the ongoing conflict outweigh those of the Americans and the West.[12] The eastward expansion of NATO, the admission of Ukraine into NATO, and the hostile nature of Ukraine towards Russia and its expanding conventional-military capabilities threaten Russian security and core interests.[13] For concerns regarding national interest, allies’ security, and status and prestige, the United States might find it pertinent to intervene on behalf of Ukraine and force Russia to back down; however, not at the risk of a nuclear disaster. The higher Russian political stakes increase the Russian resolve to threaten nuclear weapons use, increase its risk-taking ability, and reduce its expected cost of the war. Although the balance of nuclear forces—numerical parity of strategic warheads between Russia and the US—and the prospect of mutually assured destruction render the Russian nuclear threats less credible and irrational because any nuclear exchange would threaten even Russia’s destruction, the balance of resolve in favour of Russia provides it with a coercive bargaining advantage, if not credibility for nuclear-use.[14]

         The underlying logic of nuclear risk-taking and coercive bargaining is not new and is explained by the nuclear brinkmanship theory.[15] It argues that while a rational state actor might be unwilling to launch a nuclear attack intentionally, they would be quite willing to risk one. Thomas Schelling called the prospect of credibly threatening a nuclear attack “a threat that leaves something to chance.” Indeed, Matthew Kroenig argues that “the nuclear revolution can be understood as a transformation of international politics from a competition in military capabilities to a competition in risk taking.”[16]

         As the world sleepwalks towards a new great power rivalry, the salience of nuclear signalling in a conventional crisis might increase and the competition in nuclear risk-taking may become a feature of the international security landscape.

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NOTES

[1] Russian Federation, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”, June 8, 2020, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/?lang=en. Accessed on October 8, 2021.

[2] Nikolai Sokov, “Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy”, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, June 3, 2020, https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/. Accessed on October 20, 2021. 

[3] Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Understanding Putin’s Nuclear Decision-Making”, War on the Rocks, March 22, 2022,  https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/understanding-putins-nuclear-decision-making/. Accessed on March 26, 2022; Caitlin Talmadge, “The Ukraine crisis is now a nuclear crisis”, The Washington Post, February 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/27/ukraine-crisis-is-now-nuclear-crisis/. Accessed on February 28, 2022; Abhishek Saxena, “Russia-Ukraine Crisis From A Nuclear Prism”, Centre for Air Power Studies, March 4, 2022, https://capssindia.org/russia-ukraine-crisis-from-a-nuclear-prism/. Accessed on April 4, 2022.

[4] Russian Federation, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, February 24, 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1800154/. Accessed on February 24, 2022.

[5] “Putin orders “special service regime” in Russia’s deterrence force”, TASS, February 27, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1412575. Accessed on February 28, 2022.

[6] Gustav Gressel, “Signal and noise: What Russia’s nuclear threat means for Europe”, European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/signal-and-noise-what-russias-nuclear-threat-means-for-europe/. Accessed on March 10, 2022.

[7] Nahal Tossi, “The line Biden won’t cross on Ukraine”, Politico, February 23, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/biden-troops-russia-ukraine-00011049. Accessed on February 26, 2022; Andrew Roth, “Biden says he won’t send US troops to Ukraine to deter Russian threat”, The Guardian, December 8, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/08/russia-talks-of-rapid-ukraine-discussions-after-biden-putin-summit. Accessed on December 9, 2021.

[8] Heather Williams, “Putin is a Nuclear Bully”, RUSI, March 1, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/putin-nuclear-bully. Accessed on March 9, 2022.

[9] Olga Oliker, “Putin’s Nuclear Bluff”, Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-11/putins-nuclear-bluff. Accessed on March 11, 2022; Russian Federation, “Signing of documents recognising Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics”, February 21, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67829. Accessed on February 22, 2022.

[10] Gressel, n. 6.

[11] Max Thornberry, “Zelensky says Putin’s nuclear threats are a ‘bluff’”, Washington Examiner, March 10, 2022, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/zelensky-says-putins-nuclear-threats-are-a-bluff. Accessed on March 14, 2022.

[12] Matthew Harries, “Putin’s Brutal War Shows the Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence”, Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/22/ukraine-putin-russia-nuclear/. Accessed on March 22, 2022. 

[13] Russian Federation, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, February 21, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828. Accessed on February 22, 2022.

[14] Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes”, International Organisation, vol. 67, no. 1 (2013), pp. 141-171, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282155. Accessed on September 29, 2021.

[15] Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power”, International Organisation, vol. 69, no. 3 (2015), pp. 589-626, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24758314. Accessed on September 9, 2021.

[16] Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 20, Available online at https://1lib.in/book/3418087/ccbbbb. Accessed on November 11, 2021.

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Author: Group Captain Vijay Shankar Rana, Senior Fellow, CAPS
18 April 2022

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Air Power, Russian Air Strategy, NATO.

The post Air Power in the Russia-Ukraine War appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Nuclear, Russia-Ukraine, brinkmanship, retaliation, security.

Russia-Ukraine conflict is close to completing two months. During this period, President Putin has resorted to unambiguous and explicit nuclear signalling. In fact, even before Russia started the military operation against Ukraine, Putin oversaw elaborate nuclear exercises on February 19, 2022. Then, on just the fourth day of the invasion, he announced that he was raising nuclear alert levels by imposing a ‘special regime of combat duty’. There have been reports of the deployment of nuclear submarines from the Northern Fleet. Indeed, the Russian attempt has been to repeatedly draw attention to the nuclear capability and status of the country and to the likelihood of “consequences you have never seen in history” in case of outside intervention into the conflict.

         Such statements and actions appear to be in keeping with Russia’s stated nuclear doctrine. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the US/NATO from stepping into or expanding the conflict in ways that Russia does not desire, such as the imposition of no-fly zones, etc. India has had experience of such nuclear brinkmanship in its own crises with Pakistan, where, in order to deter a conventional response from India, Islamabad showed a propensity to hype the threat of nuclear escalation early in a crisis. These nuclear noises are meant to deter India as well as get the international community scared enough to want to quickly intervene and restrain Indian retaliatory action in response to provocations.

         Russia, too, has been signalling an escalate-to-de-escalate strategy along similar lines, backed by its 1900 ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons, to underline its own resolve and to get the West to back down. The greater risk from such strategies of brinkmanship that rely on heightened alert levels is that of inadvertent nuclear escalation. This is exacerbated by the presence of a vicious disinformation campaign and a thick fog of war. Therefore, the possibility of nuclear use due to misperception, miscalculation, or even unauthorised action poses a real danger.

         The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict will have implications for both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, irrespective of how this conflict is resolved. The impact on both nuclear dimensions will be based on how perceptions on two issues shape up in the coming months and years: a) on the perceived value of nuclear weapons; b) on the acceptability threshold of nuclear risks.

         On the first issue of the political utility of nuclear weapons, seeing Russian behaviour, a view is gaining popularity that countries with nuclear weapons can act with impunity, especially against non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). This view will prompt NNWS to re-evaluate their own security imperatives, especially where they face hostile nuclear weapon possessors. It is not surprising that some voices in Japan and South Korea have begun to argue in favour of possessing their own nuclear weapons. Nuclear sharing under NATO or the American nuclear umbrella is likely to assume a new significance. There is a strong likelihood that voices in favour of the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the five countries in Europe will be muted. More, in fact, may want to acquire them. It may be recalled that Belarus has already amended its constitution after a referendum on February 27, 2022, to allow Russia to station its weapons on its soil.

         Therefore, the conflict and Russia’s behaviour will erode the sense of security of the NNWS, including their faith in negative security assurances, where these have been grudgingly provided by the NWS. Concerns to this effect will be heard at the NPT RevCon now scheduled for August 2022, and this divide between the two kinds of states will only grow. How this is handled will influence the future course of nuclear non-proliferation.

            The second issue of how nations perceive the risks of nuclear weapons will have implications for nuclear disarmament. The Cuban missile crisis that happened 60 years ago made both sides realise what it was like to be on the edge of a nuclear precipice. Both drew back suitably chastened, and it triggered a shared understanding of nuclear risks, leading to a shared desire to establish strategic stability. Will a similar realisation dawn once again?

        This appears less likely in 2022 given the current reality where different nuclear weapon possessors evaluate the utility of nuclear risks differently. In any case, unlike the bipolar situation in 1962, the present nuclear landscape is dotted with many states possessing nuclear weapons, each demonstrating a different nuclear risk sensibility. Countries like Russia, China, and Pakistan think risks are good for nuclear deterrence. Therefore, they do not hesitate to follow strategies that raise the dangers of entanglement of conventional and nuclear realms. In the absence of a common desire to address the risks of nuclear weapons, the world may move away from nuclear disarmament as nations accept a willingness to live with the nuclear risks.

         The ongoing conflict has resulted in unimaginable suffering caused by the loss of hundreds and displacement of millions of human lives. Another major casualty from the international security point of view has been the joint statement by the P-5 that they announced in January this year. The sense of optimism this had generated through a collective expression of the belief that nuclear war cannot be won and should not be fought has fast dissipated.

           The risk of nuclear war remains in the air. In these circumstances, it is inevitable that the prospects of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament will face turbulent times ahead.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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The post Nuclear Security Vol 16, No. 12 appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: India, Russia, Foreign relations

On March 31, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited India amidst the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. In a meeting with his Indian counterpart, Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar, Lavrov emphasised mutual respect and the search for a balance of interests between Delhi and Moscow. He further stressed on developing a ‘special privileged strategic partnership’ as one of the main priorities of Russia’s foreign policy.[1] Both Foreign Ministers discussed a diverse range of topics for cooperation amidst the ongoing tension in Ukraine. Negotiations were conducted on topics related to activities of Russia-India-China, currencies for financial transactions, energy trade, and military-technical cooperation.[2]

           On Ukraine, India has not yet criticized Russia and abstained from voting in the United Nations.[3] New Delhi’s stand on the issue has drawn diverse reactions from countries around the globe. For instance, on one hand, India’s position has not been appreciated by its Western allies, mainly the United States. The U.S. Deputy NSA has warned India of ‘consequences’ for conducting deals in local currency with Moscow or trying to bypass U.S. sanctions.[4] Likewise, the White House reiterated when Jen Psaki said, “every country should abide by the sanctions that we (the U.S.) have announced and that we’re implementing around the world.”[5] On the other hand, Russia appreciated India’s position when Lavrov said, “… India’s foreign policy is characterised by independence… its own legitimate interest.”[6]

           Western countries need to realize that India’s foreign policy is purely steered by its national interest, as stated clearly by Dr. Jaishankar when he said, “India’s foreign policy decisions are made in ‘national interest’ and guided by our thinking, our view, our interest…”[7] So, it is immature and impetuous on the part of the U.S. when it creates a narrative like “… if China breaches the Line of Actual Control…”[8] to influence or intimidate the Indian policy-making process. As New Delhi is well aware of its interests at the regional and international level, Washington has no right to embroil the former in fulfilling its own goals against Moscow. As India is prepared with a ‘two-front’ war scenario, any kind of assurance for possible assistance from the United States concerning China remains ambiguous. Further, in the event any of tension with China in the future, India would like Russia to stay neutral, and deal with the issue bilaterally without any external influence.

Significance of India for Russia

Many experts confined their analysis to selected areas of Indo-Russian bilateral cooperation during Lavrov’s visit to India. They highlighted hotly debated topics such as oil and gas imports, purchasing defence hardware, and concern over the payment mechanism system. Undoubtedly, these areas are a major component of Indo-Russian cooperation, but this time Lavrov’s visit after Russia’s ‘special operation’ in Ukraine is not merely a regular exchange.

            Through Lavrov’s visit to China and India, Russia wants to relay to the West that it is not isolated, and shares bonhomie with the world’s second-largest economy, and the world’s largest democracy. For nearly two decades, Western governments viewed Russia as an authoritarian state under Putin’s administration. Therefore, in a way, India’s neutrality helps Moscow to highlight the fact that all democracies do not share the same view on Russia. At the same time, as a setback for the West, India’s stand nullifies Americans’ effort to create a unified voice of democracies under Washington’s leadership. With the U.S. and its allies in Europe targeting President Putin as an authoritarian, getting closer to the world’s largest democracy dilutes the image of Russia that the U.S. is trying to paint.

            Second, India fits into Moscow’s notion of a multipolar world order. As a part of its foreign policy, the notion of a multipolar international system occupies a significant position for Russia which is evident in its Foreign Policy Concept of 2016. Moscow believes that a multipolar world order can be created only when other powerful countries for instance India (along with China, and Brazil) counters unipolarity. Russia sees multilateralism as a route to multipolarity, and it is apparent in Russia’s promotion of multilateral organizations in Eurasia, as observed by Prof. Rajan.[9] As India is a partner country in BRICS, SCO, and both countries are currently working on FTA with the Eurasian Economic Union, the former’s participation is of utmost priority for Russia.

           Amidst Western criticism and their ongoing endeavour to isolate Russia, the significance of India has increased more than ever. With Lavrov’s visit, the significance of India for Russia can be seen in two ways – first, strengthening political cooperation; and second, strengthening latter’s commitment for a multipolar world order.

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NOTES

[1] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks during talks with Minister of External Affairs of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, New Delhi, April, 2022,” https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/vizity-ministra/1807492/. Accessed on April 05, 2022.

[2] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s answers to media questions following talks with Minister of External Affairs of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, New Delhi, April 1, 2022,” https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/vizity-ministra/1807582/. Accessed on April 05, 2022.

[3] “Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov arrives in India amid Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine,” The Indian Express, March 31, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-in-india-moscow-invasion-ukraine-7846709/. Accessed on April 05, 2022.

[4] Suhasini Haider, “U.S. Deputy NSA cautions India against trade deals with Russia,” The Hindu, April 01, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-deputy-nsa-daleep-singh-cautions-india-against-trade-deals-with-russia/article65277933.ece. Accessed on April 06, 2022.

[5] Sriram Lakshman, “India shouldn’t raise Russian purchases,” The Hindu, April 06, 2022, Accessed on April 06, 2022.

[6] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s answers to media questions following talks with Minister of External Affairs of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, New Delhi, April 01, 2022,” https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/vizity-ministra/1807582/. Accessed on April 05, 2022.

[7]“EAM Jaishankar lists 6 principles behind India’s response to Ukraine crisis,” The Mint, March 24, 2022, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/eam-jaishankar-lists-6-principles-behind-india-s-response-to-ukraine-crisis-read-here-11648136359738.html. Accessed on April 06, 2022.

[8] Pia Krishnankutty, “Daleep Singh, US Dy NSA who warned India on Russia ties, is a political inheritor &MIT grad,” The Print, April 02, 2022,  https://theprint.in/diplomacy/daleep-singh-us-dy-nsa-who-warned-india-on-russia-ties-is-a-political-inheritor-mit-grad/898700/. Accessed on April 06, 2022.

[9] Rajan Kumar, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: An Overview of 25 Years of Transition,” International Studies, 2018, Vol. 53 (3-4): pp. 218-19.

The post Lavrov’s visit to India: Understanding India’s Significance for Russia appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Aditya Shankar Hazarika, Copy Editor, CAPS
07 April 2022

Keywords: Turkish drones, Bayraktar, Ukraine crisis, UAVs, defence industry.

The post Turkey’s Defence Industry’s Flight to Success: Bayraktar appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, China, War, Embargo

It’s been more than a month since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Russia might have expected an easy win, but Moscow encountered massive and unexpected resistance from the Ukrainians. Russian advances were quick in the southern parts of Ukraine, but they could not maintain their pace because of Ukraine’s air defences. Defence initiatives were further supplemented with the supply of anti-tank missiles and drones by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Europe. The urban terrain has also been lucrative for the defenders, as the defence can skilfully utilise the roads, railway lines, and metro systems.[1]

       The prevailing situation suggests the persistence of a hostile condition, which will indeed adversely affect the economy of Russia and other dependent economies. Russia considers itself to be a ‘fortress economy’, but the effects of the sanctions from 2014 disregard its claim, as the import expenditure on non-food consumption has merely been reduced by four per cent since 2014.[2] The other sanctions and indirect measures imposed on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine may further exacerbate its economic conditions.

Sanctions on Russia

Firstly, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe have imposed a ban on the export of all military goods, including ‘dual use’ goods.[3] This will surely aggravate the supply-demand issue in Russia’s manufacturing sector. Secondly, Russia has been denied the use of the air space of the US, the UK, Europe, and Canada.[4] The UK even banned private charted flights of Russia. Thirdly, Europe and the UK have banned the export of luxury goods to Russia, including levying a 35% tax on luxury imports from Russia. Fourthly, western countries have started to take initiatives to reduce energy dependency on Russia as the US has imposed a complete ban on oil and gas imports from Russia;[5] Germany has suspended the development of the NORD Stream 2 gas pipeline; and Europe is planning to be self-reliant on its energy needs by 2030.[6]

        Further, western countries (particularly the US) are also using indirect measures such as freezing the Russian central bank’s assets to stop it from using its $630 billion in foreign reserves. Seven banks in Russia (VTB Bank, Bank Otkritie, Novikom bank, Promsvyaz bank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcom bank, and VEB) have been cut off from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system,[7] and America has removed Sberbank and VTB from its financial system. These impositions may compromise the transfer of payment in the energy exchange. The other indirect measures include action taken by companies such as Coca Cola, McDonald’s, and Starbucks that have suspended[8] their operations in Russia. In contrast, Nestle[9] is merely continuing with the essential food supplies. These measures also include targeting Russian individuals and business leaders, known as ‘Russian oligarchs’[10], by freezing their assets. For instance, assets belonging to Russian President Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have been frozen in the US, the UK, Canada, and EU.

Potential Implications of Sanctions

Russia’s half of the federal budget depends on revenue from exporting commodities such as crude oil, natural gas, and other petroleum products. The major part (63 per cent) of the shipment from Russia comprises energy products while metals and chemicals amount to 10 and 7.4 per cent, respectively.[11] This also includes 5 per cent of agricultural products, which is critical for ensuring food security in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa.[12] Russia’s contribution to the global demands for chemicals and minerals used in agriculture is 13 per cent.[13] A slight shift in the supply chain of fertilisers may deteriorate the food security concerns of many states in the long term.

             Russia will also face enormous difficulties in procuring supplies, from war machinery to microchips, as the freezing of its foreign assets has spiked its inflation rate to 14 per cent.[14] Similarly, the announcement of BP plc (formerly known as British Petroleum Company) to sell its 20 per cent stake in a Russian oil company, Rosneft, was taken as a setback in Russia, compelling it to prohibit foreign companies from selling their Russian assets, considering such decisions to be the result of political pressure. These developments made Biden remark[15] that Russia won’t be able to import 50 per cent of the hi-tech equipment it needs.

         Further, the weakening of the economy and exclusion from the western market may compel Moscow to find new markets or rekindle existing relationships. Russia has received $35 billion worth of aid form China between 2000 to 2017[16], while the trade between both the economies has increased 35.9 percent form 2019-20, spiking to $146.9 bn in 2020-21.[17] The exclusion of Russia from the international payment system is likely to increase its dependency on China’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)[18], the Chinese alternative to the SWIFT system, which intends to facilitate international payment transfers in the Yuan.[19]

 Russia’s Response to the Sanctions

Russia has responded to the sanctions by banning the export of goods associated with telecommunications, agriculture, forest equipment, and electrical use. It has also banned the export of goods manufactured in Russia but owned by foreign companies. This was followed by prohibiting foreign ships from using Russian ports. In response to the companies quitting the Russian market, Moscow has brought legislation that nationalises their property. To balance the trade deficit with western countries, Russia is also looking for new trade opportunities.

         As far as India is concerned, Russia has been one of the biggest arms suppliers. Presently, it supplies 49% of India’s arms demand, and it is ready to trade of the S400 missile defence system that will give India a strategic edge against China and Pakistan. Therefore, India’s neutral and independent stand corroborates its larger political and economic interests.[20] However, the overall trade with Russia is far less than with the US. In 2021, the India-US trade was worth $113.6 billion. This comprised of $73billions in exports to the US and imports of $40 billion from the US. The imports from Russia were $6.9 billion, and the exports to Russia from India were $3.3 billion.

       It would be a little early to speculate on the far-reaching outcomes of the sanctions on Russia, but unquestionably, Europe’s reassessment of its energy dependency on Russia, followed by sanctions from Western countries, suggests Russia’s political and economic isolation. It is yet to be seen how Russia will ensure the success of its political and diplomatic manoeuvres against the isolationist approach of the western countries.

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NOTES

[1] “Briefing: the war in Ukraine”, The Economist, March 5, 2022, p.17.

[2] “EU Unveils Plan to Reduce Russia Energy Dependency”, DW, March 8, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-unveils-plan-to-reduce-russia-energy-dependency/a-61047997. Accessed on March 22, 2022.

[3] GOV.UK , “Export Controls: Dual-Use Items, Software and Technology, Goods for Torture and Radioactive Sources”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/export-controls-dual-use-items-software-and-technology-goods-for-torture-and-radioactive-source. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[4] David Shepardson, Jamie Freed, and Foo Yun Chee, “U.S. Follows Canada, Europe on Russian Aircraft Ban”, Reuters, March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/airspace-closures-after-ukraine-invasion-stretch-global-supply-chains-2022-03-01. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[5] “War in Ukraine: West Hits Russia with Oil Bans and Gas Curbs”, BBC News, March 9, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-60666251. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[6] “Nord Stream 2: How Does the Pipeline Fit into the Ukraine-Russia Crisis?”, BBC News, February 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60131520. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[7] Jorge Liboreiro, “These Are the 7 Russian Banks Banned from SWIFT – and the Two Exempted”, Euro news, March 7, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/02/these-are-the-7-russian-banks-banned-from-swift-and-the-two-exempted. Accessed on March 23, 2022.

[8] Michael Race, and Lucy Hooker, “Which Companies Are Pulling out of Russia?”, BBC News, March 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60571133. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[9] “Nestle Pulls KitKat and Nesquik out of Russia”, BBC News, March 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60850209. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[10] Alex Therrien, “Ukraine Conflict: UK Sanctions Target Russian Banks and Oligarchs”, BBC News, February 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-60515626. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[11] “Russia Exports”, Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports. Accessed on March 23, 2022.

[12] “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Exacerbates Hunger in Middle East, North Africa”, Human Rights Watch, March 21 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/21/russias-invasion-ukraine-exacerbates-hunger-middle-east-north-africa. Accessed on March 23, 2022.

[13] Nikola Mikovic, “ Russia’s actions are threatening global food security”, Times Now, March 21, 2022, https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/russias-actions-are-threatening-global-food-security-article-90344757. Accessed on March 22, 2022.

[14] Annabelle Liang, “Russia’s Cost of Living Soars by More than 14%”, BBC News, March 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60856873. Accessed on March 27, 2022.

[15] “Remarks by President Biden Announcing U.S. Ban on Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coa”, The White House, March, 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/08/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-u-s-ban-on-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/. Accessed on March 30, 2022.

[16] Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Russia Is the Biggest Recipient of Chinese Foreign Aid”, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2017, https://www.aiddata.org/in-the-news/foreign-policy-russia-is-the-biggest-recipient-of-chinese-foreign-aid. Accessed on March 22, 2022.

[17] “Factbox: China-Russia Trade Has Surged as Countries Grow Closer”, Reuters, March 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/china-russia-trade-has-surged-countries-grow-closer-2022-03-01/. Accessed on March 30, 2022.

[18] “Explained: How Russia Has Been Preparing for a SWIFT Ban since”, The Times of India, February 28, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/explained-how-russia-has-been-preparing-for-a-swift-ban-since-2014/articleshow/89905395.cms. Accessed on March 22, 2022.

[19] “Will china help Russia?”, The Economist, March 12, 2022, p.10.

[20] “India Russia and west: Abstemious to a fault”, The Economist, March 12, 2022, p.47.

The post Western Wrath on Russia: Sanctions and its Impact appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Simran Walia, Research Associate, CAPS
01 April 2022

Keywords: Japan, India, Space Cooperation, ISRO, JAXA

The post Evolving Dynamics of Space Cooperation between India and Japan appeared first on CAPSS India.