Keywords: India, BrahMos, South China Sea

India is poised to strengthen its position in the global Defence market by delivering BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines, signifying a significant advancement in bilateral defence collaboration. The deal, valued at US $374.96 million and agreed upon in January 2022,[1] highlights India’s aspirations as an emerging Defence exporter. According to sources within the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, three civilian freightliners departed for Manila on April 18, 2024, accompanied by an Indian Air Force (IAF) C-17 Globemaster.[2] This arrangement underscores the multifaceted logistical approach employed in this operation, integrating both civilian and military transportation. Such cooperation underscores the strategic and operational significance of the missile delivery.

This development carries significant weight, especially amidst the ongoing maritime tensions in the West Philippine Sea, where the Philippines has been dealing with maritime challenges from China. The delivery of BrahMos missiles is anticipated to greatly enhance the Philippines’ naval strength, serving as a strong deterrent in the region.

China’s Increasing Pressure on Philippines

China continues its persistent endeavor to assert control over the South China Sea, relying on its disputed ‘historical claims’ (which were discredited by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016) and the ambiguous ten-dash line.[3] These efforts involve constructing artificial islands on coral reefs and employing legal maneuvers, particularly through the China Coast Guard, as well as utilising grey zone tactics by leveraging its significant maritime militia to pressure other claimants in the region.[4]

Ayunyin Shoal, also known as Second Thomas Shoal, is a location in the South China Sea where Filipino service men are stationed. On March 5, Chinese coast guard ships clashed with a Philippine patrol vessel and used water cannons against another boat carrying an admiral from the Philippines and supplies. Manila, which refers to the region as the West Philippines Sea, has been opposing China’s ten-dash line claim, which asserts Chinese sovereignty over significant sections of the sea, including numerous land features.[5]

China’s recent moves aimed at preventing the Philippines from resupplying its marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal represent a dramatic increase in the country’s use of force and aggression. The information at hand indicates that China intends to evacuate the Philippine marines, and recent months have seen a noticeable increase in the urgency of achieving this objective.

Beijing skilled at coordinating joint operations utilising People’s Liberation Army Navy ships, Chinese coast guard ships, and maritime militia boats that pose as fishing boats. When harassing Philippine warships, the PLA Navy’s ‘Gray hulls’ usually stay in the background while the fishing boats and ‘white hulls’ take centre stage.[6] China can apply military pressure using this tactic while staying just short of going all-out war. While Beijing has previously attempted to disrupt Manila’s resupply efforts, the recent actions represent a qualitative shift in China’s behavior, resembling intensified grey zone operations.

Strategic Implications for South China Sea

By acquiring supersonic cruise missiles, which the Philippine Marines Coastal Defence Regiment would employ, the country hopes to strengthen its coastal defence capabilities. The agreement includes logistical support and operator training. The main goal of this project is to protect the country’s territorial claims in the disputed West Philippine Sea, often known as the South China Sea.[7]

The BrahMos is an unmatched weapon in the field of present-day missile technology. It’s incredible Mach 3 speed is sustained throughout its trajectory, giving adversaries a much shorter window of opportunity to respond. The BrahMos can travel 300 kilometres in five minutes, which is a very fast reaction time when compared to other sophisticated missile systems. Although the BrahMos missile in the Philippine arsenal currently has a 290-kilometre range, its operational reach may be increased through possible integration with large naval vessels. When installed on the nation’s warships, some analysts even predict that this combination might boost the missile’s range to almost 450-500 kilometres.[8]

Moreover, the deliberate placement of these missiles among the Philippine islands accomplishes two goals: it creates a responsive staging area to deal with any future attacks on the country’s islands and serves as an effective deterrence. However, the BrahMos missile pact represents a strategic alignment in a geopolitical landscape that is evolving quickly, not just a defence purchase. Partnerships like the one between India and the Philippines, as evidenced by accords like the BrahMos deal, are crucial for bilateral relations as well as the stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific region, given China’s assertive posture in the region.[9]

Southeast Asian claimant nations feel more and more exposed as a result of China’s accelerated development of its military might. As a result, they are attempting to reach out to like-minded nations like India in order to deepen bilateral ties, especially in the defence sector. The Philippines is making an effort to broaden the scope of its primary armaments suppliers and look into export destinations other than the US and South Korea. India is responding to China’s naval incursions in the Indo-Pacific and its incursions on the disputed land frontier with India by implementing ‘proactive defence diplomacy’.[10] This agreement will undoubtedly impact the relationship between the Philippines and China, as well as that between India and ASEAN.

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Notes:

[1] Press Trust of India, “India Delivers first batch of BrahMos missiles to Philippines”, April 19, 2024, https://www.ptinews.com/story/national/india-delivers-first-batch-of-brahmos-missiles-to-philippines/1441066.  Accessed on April 20, 2024.

[2] Amrita Nayak Dutta, “Amid South China Sea tension, India delivers BrahMos to Philippines”, The Indian Express, April 20, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/amid-south-china-sea-tension-india-delivers-brahmos-to-philippines-9280401/. Accessed on April 20, 2024.

[3] Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Maritime Claims of the Indo-Pacific, https://amti.csis.org/maritime-claims-map/. Accessed on April 20, 2024.

[4] Hoang Do, “How to Help ASEAN Address South China Sea ‘Gray Zone’ Challenges”, United States Institute of Peace, September 25, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/09/how-help-asean-address-south-china-sea-gray-zone-challenges. Accessed on April 21, 2024.

[5] Gaurav Sen, “China’s Grey Zone Activities in Philippine Waters and India’s Stand”, CAPS, December 19, 2023, https://capssindia.org/chinas-grey-zone-activities-in-philippine-waters-and-indias-stand/. Accessed on April 21, 2024.

[6] Ines Arco Escriche, “Winning without fighting: China’s Grey Zone Strategies in East Asia”, CIBOD, September 2022. https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/cidob_report/n_8/winning_without_fighting_china_s_grey_zone_strategies_in_east_asia. Accessed on April 19, 2024.

[7] Eric Nielson C. Javier, “The BrahMos missile system and the Philippines quest for deterrence”, The Strategist, February 17, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-brahmos-missile-system-and-the-philippines-quest-for-deterrence/. Accessed on?

[8] Usman Haider, “How the Extended Range BrahMos Changes the India-Pakistan Deterrence Equation”, The Diplomat, November 07, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/how-the-extended-range-brahmos-changes-the-india-pakistan-deterrence-equation/#:~:text=The%20testing%20commenced%20with%20the,290%20kilometers%2C%20according%20to%20Janes. Accessed on April 19, 2024.

[9] Premesha Saha, “How India’s BrahMos deal is not just about Philippines but gives a stronger message to the region”, Observer Research Foundation, February 12, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/how-indias-brahmos-deal-is-not-just-about-philippines. Accessed on April 20, 2024.

[10] Araudra Singh, India’s Growing Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, The Diplomat, July 27, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/indias-growing-defense-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia/. Accessed on April 20, 2024.

The post India delivers BrahMos to Philippines: What does it mean for South China Sea appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Civil-Military Fusion, Civil-Military Relations, Higher Defence Organisation, Defence Industry, Jointness

Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) is the optimisation of the use of civil and military resources to achieve national objectives.[1] It involves crafting strategies that promote collaboration between the civil and military domains to ensure seamless integration and operationalisation of talent and resources available in both sectors. CMF aims to enhance national security by leveraging the strengths of the military, civilian industry, scientific community, and academia in a synergistic manner. Sharing knowledge, expertise, and technology will facilitate the development of advanced capabilities and solutions to address threats of the present as well as the future.

The concept of CMF comes from China, where the terminology was used to describe comprehensive civil-military coordination to reinforce China’s ambitions of becoming an economic, technological, and military superpower.[2] The Chinese military, known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is often viewed as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. This makes the PLA’s relationship with the government vastly different from that of the Indian Armed Forces. There is a greater distance between the civil and military in India that needs to be reconciled in a manner suitable to the distinct political and economic realities of our country. This article discusses the critical determinants of harnessing the potential of CMF in the Indian context.

Improving Civil-Military Relations

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is a complementary concept to CMF. Healthy CMR is essential for a successful CMF strategy, as it ensures communication between the political leaders of a country and its military officer class. Without strong CMR, efforts to implement CMF strategies may encounter resistance, inefficiencies, or misalignments with national policies and democratic values.

India’s colonial legacy and the occurrence of military coups around the world after its independence created a high degree of suspicion towards the military. This led to exaggerated control over the military in the years following independence, which prevented effective engagement between the two parties.

Unlike the Western context, where most CMR studies are based, India faces unique challenges, such as the central role of bureaucracy. Since independence, the responsibility for military security has been largely abdicated by politicians, which has led to the politico-military relationship in the Indian context becoming a politico-bureaucratic-military relationship. A series of institutional reforms, including the creation of attached offices and definitions under the Allocation of Business and Transaction of Business Rules, led to bureaucratic control rather than ministerial control over the military. The issue in the current arrangement lies in the fact that bureaucrats are generalists who specialise in procedure. They must remain enablers and executors of policy decisions because they do not have the expertise or accountability that justifies control over decision-making. The gap this has created between politicians and the military resulted in an ‘absent dialogue,[3] where the political and military leadership differed on critical national security goals. For example, between 2003–2007, the government was promoting peace with Pakistan, while the army was practising contrary doctrines like Cold Start.[4]

The establishment of the Department of Military Affairs was a tectonic shift in CMR in India. Loosening civilian control and forging a direct politico-military line of communication in the form of the Chief of Defence Staff has elevated the military’s role in the Higher Defence Organisation. This was a vital step in strengthening CMR, and the effort must be sustained to establish an effective CMF.

Bridging Civil-Military Knowledge Gaps

Despite the closer civil-military interface, the enduring challenge in communication is the lack of civilian knowledge about military affairs. Political leaders need to be well-informed in order to match military capabilities with political goals. Such dialogues are most effective in countries with integrated defence ministries and adequate civilian expertise. However, India’s generalist bureaucracy, which shuttles between departments, does not facilitate the development of sectoral expertise. Experts like Anit Mukherjee have argued that this form of civilian control had a pernicious impact on military effectiveness as civilians were not qualified to assist, challenge, and engage the military in a dialogue.[5] There has also been a historic lack of civilian involvement in operational matters as a result of the experience of the 1960s and 1970s. Operational non-engagement is not optimal in the present landscape, especially for nuclear issues where the political leadership alone can authorise the use of nuclear weapons.[6]

The knowledge gap also exists on the military side. Another issue in CMR that hinders CMF is that military leaders often fall short of correctly appreciating political nuances.[7] CMR, with the intention of preserving democracy, requires the military to remain apolitical. Samuel Huntington theorised a strict separation between the domains, stating that professionalism in the armed forces will prevent it from being involved in politics.[8] However, this does not mean that the military must isolate itself from politics, especially in the context of Indian strategic culture where the army has never threatened the civilian establishment. Officers must not play a part in politics while serving, but it is necessary for them to understand politics in order to be effective.

Correcting the imbalance on both sides would require both an overhaul of military education and the creation of a cadre of civilian defence experts,[9] perhaps in the form of an Indian Military Service, to integrate both sides of the CMF equation.

Recognising the Role of Personalities

Apart from institutions, personalities play a significant role in determining the quality of CMR and CMF. Even in the absence of institutional frameworks, individual relationships, such as that between former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswamy Sundararajan, can significantly influence the outcomes of civil-military cooperation. The opposite could be said about personalities like former Minister of Defence V.K. Krishna Menon, who was incredibly powerful at the cost of the military voice. These personal dynamics can either foster or hinder a conducive environment for collaboration and mutual understanding, underscoring the importance of leadership in bridging the civil-military divide. Strong leadership with clear goals can be a key determinant of success for ambitious plans like CMF.

Collaboration between the Military and Industry

Apart from CMR, it is vital for CMF to collapse the walls between the military and industry. Modern warfare has seen a growth in the salience of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), net-centric capabilities, artificial intelligence, drones, and other disruptive technologies.[10] With grey zone warfare, the frontiers of war have also been evolving, and in avenues like cyber and space, it is not possible to distinguish between civilian and military spaces. Expertise in these frontier technologies also, if not predominantly, lies in civilian spheres. As 4^th Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies become the basis for future military capabilities, it is crucial that militaries exploit these technologies through CMF to remain militarily competitive with adversaries.[11]

As the world’s largest arms importer,[12] one of India’s biggest vulnerabilities is its reliance on foreign countries for critical defence technology and equipment. CMF is more likely to be successful when countries are actively engaged in military modernisation.[13] This push in India is a result of cognisance of its strategic circumstances. For instance, India is strategically diversifying to reduce reliance on Russian arms amidst tensions with Pakistan and China.[14] Initiatives like Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence production are a push for a degree of self-reliance in which India’s foreign dependence does not expose it to the potential risks of manipulation and disruptions due to monopolistic supply.[15] India has introduced numerous initiatives to propel the growth of private players and defence start-ups, but persistent challenges such as navigating procurement processes and securing funding will need to be resolved in order to unlock the potential of the private sector in fulfilling military requirements.[16]

Achieving such strategic autonomy also requires close collaboration between the military and industry. The recently established Army Design Bureau has been bridging the gap through several initiatives, such as the creation of Army Cells in Indian Institutes of Technology and conducting Forward Area Tours that familiarise the industry with unique environments in which military equipment needs to operate.[17] Increasing transparency in military functioning is imperative to allow for the infusion of talent and innovation from academia, industries, technologists, and other domain experts.

Promoting Jointness and Integration

Although the concept of CMF focuses on the external outreach of the military, it is crucial to promote internal jointness and integration between the three services. The forthcoming theaterisation of the Indian Armed Forces will be a big step towards enhancing synergy. Theaterisation would streamline decision-making and optimise resource allocation, enabling agility in military policy and operations. Theaterisation underpins the strategic goals of CMF by fostering a cohesive structure with which civilian institutions can collaborate. Apart from broader questions, such as the form that Indian theaterisation must take, finer details, such as differences in rank structures, promotions, and culture, also need to be ironed out. Presently, competition and discord between the services have led to only issues that form the lowest common denominator getting presented to the government. There needs to be greater harmonisation to leverage the full spectrum of military capabilities and ensure that strategic decisions reflect comprehensive defence interests rather than sectional perspectives.

Creating Long-Term Strategic Planning and Vision

CMF calls for the complex process of integrating stakeholders with differing goals, cultures, and operating frameworks. Planning is vital to manage this complexity and enable collaboration across sectors. It ensures efficient resource allocation through the prioritisation of projects that align with strategic needs. In an era of rapid technological advancement, stakeholders need to be able to anticipate future capabilities to adapt or integrate advancements effectively. Further, the dual-use nature of frontier technologies demands responsible leveraging and clarity on ethical considerations.

A National Security Strategy that lays out a common set of guiding principles for cooperation would be invaluable in aligning the interests and targets of all the stakeholders involved in CMF. It would also be an opportunity to explicitly define our present and future security challenges, thus creating foresight for improved long-term strategic planning.

Conclusion

CMF is a long and challenging process that transcends mere technological advancement. It is about creating an integrated ecosystem that harnesses the collective capabilities, innovations, and resources of the entire nation towards achieving its security objectives. The success of CMF is mainly dependent on jointness and integration within the military, between the military and decision-makers (political leaders), and between the military and innovators (industry and academia). Facilitating this integration is contingent on a host of dynamic factors such as CMR, personalities, policy frameworks, institutional structures, and political will. However, most importantly, CMF requires a cultural shift towards greater trust, openness, and collaboration across all sectors involved. This shift is fundamental to breaking down the barriers that have divided defence and civilian spheres since British colonisation. Ultimately, the essence of CMF lies not just in pooling resources but in cultivating a cross-pollinating ecosystem of ideas, technology, and expertise between the civil and military domains.

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Notes:

[1]  Colonel Saumya Ghatak, “Civil Military Fusion for National Security,” Journal of the United Service Institution of India, vol. CLIII, no. 632, 2023, https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Civil-Military-Fusion-for-National-Security.html. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[2] Audrey Fritz, “China’s Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2019, https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-evolving-conception-civil-military-collaboration. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[3] Anit Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Military in India, (Oxford University Press, 2019).

[4] Manoj Joshi and Sameer Patil, “Civil-military relations in Independent India,” Observer Research Foundation, August 15, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/civil-military-relations-in-independent-india. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[5] Anit Mukherjee, “Towards control and effectiveness: The Ministry of Defence and civil-military relations in India,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 45, no. 6-7, 2022, pp. 820-842, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2118115. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[6] Joshi and Patil, n. 4.

[7] Prakash Menon, “India’s civil-military fusion order of the day but not at the cost of military identity,” The Print,                       December 27, 2022, https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-civil-military-fusion-order-of-the-day-but-not-at-the-cost-of-military-identity/1283309/. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[8] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019).

[9] Mukherjee, n. 5, pp. 820-842.

[10] Sujan Chinoy, “Civil-military fusion for Atmanirbhar Bharat,” Observer Research Foundation, December 31, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/civil-military-fusion-for-atmanirbhar-bharat. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[11] Mercy Kuo, “Military-Civil Fusion: China, the US, and Beyond,” The Diplomat, August 21, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/military-civil-fusion-china-the-us-and-beyond/. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[12] “India remains world’s largest arms importer, Russia its top supplier,” The Economic Times, March 12, 2024, https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-remains-worlds-top-arms-importer-sipri-report/articleshow/108399377.cms#:~:text=India%20continues%20to%20hold%20the,vulnerability%20in%20its%20defense%20procurement.  Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[13] Opcit Kuo, n. 11.

[14] “Amid rising defense imports, India slashes procurement from Russia to less than half, a first since 1960s,”                    The Economic Times, March 12, 2024, https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/amid-rising-defense-imports-india-halves-buying-from-russia-to-less-than-half-a-first-since-1960s/articleshow/108434211.cms. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[15] Chinoy, n. 10.

[16] Rahul Bhatia, “Defense Start-ups and India’s Quest for Self-Reliance,” Carnegie India, September 05, 2023, https://carnegieindia.org/2023/09/05/defense-start-ups-and-india-s-quest-for-self-reliance-pub-90474. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

[17] Kamal Shah, “Indian Army’s Transformation Year Opens Doors For Domestic Defence Manufacturers,” India Aerospace and Defence Bulletin, September 1, 2023, https://www.iadb.in/2023/09/01/indian-armys-transformation-year-opens-doors-for-domestic-defence-manufacturers/. Accessed on March 25, 2024.

The post Critical Determinants of Civil-Military Fusion in India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Civil Military Relation and Fusion, Determinants, Civilian Control, Strategic Culture, Political stability

Military and civilian relations have been prevalent from the times humans settled down in civilisations and waged wars for civilisational survival. These two bodies are integral parts of any nation, civilisation or tribe and have interdependence irrespective of their divergent roles. It is important to define the civilian body in a Civil-Military conundrum. The civilian is anything non-military that is involved in the administrative and political functions of the state. In definite terms, these include the political entities and the bureaucrats. Johana Mendelson Forman and Claude Welch define Civil-Military Relations (CMR) as:

“Civil Military relations refer broadly to interactions between armed forces as institutions and the sectors of the society in which they are embedded. Most commonly, civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of the country.”[1]

Samuel Huntington defines CMR at two levels. At the power level, it is the power of the officer corps relative to the civilian groups within the society. On the ideological level, it is the compatibility of professional military ethics with the political ideologies prevailing in the society.[2]

Through all the definitions, a few points that characterise civil-military relations emerge: First, it is the relations between military and civilian bodies at a higher level of society (officer’s corps and governing organs of the civilians, as per Huntington). Second, there is power and ideology involved. This is where the CMR definition leads to ‘civilian control’ of the military, which Huntington writes, “the role of the military in society has been frequently discussed in terms of civilian control.”[3] Gp Capt Rajesh Chaudhary argues that the definition of CMR has been laid down by Western construct, although he agrees the key ingredient of CMR continues to be civilian control over military forces.

Relation and Fusion

If CMR has a pessimistic shade, with the wresting of control as the objective, one might question why this concept warrants attention or study, especially from the military side. The study of CMR is essential to protect our sovereignty and ensure robust national security. Any challenge to a nation’s sovereignty and security is addressed by the national powers in which the military and politics have key roles. To ensure that the nation is not weakened, it is essential that CMR be studied, structured, refined, and implemented. No nation in the world can exist without a relationship between the military and government, as they work together towards a nation’s existence, growth and security. Gp Capt Chaudhary mentions the harmony that existed between the military and society from the Vedic era onwards.[4] The great Gupta Empire, which hallmarks the golden age of Indian history, had effective civil-military liaison. The ruler had his military department, but along with it, he had diplomats- the minister of war and peace, known as the “Mahasandhivigrahika”, and the finance minister, known as the “Ranabhandagaradhikarna”, who ably supported the military in pursuit of the empire’s expansion and glory. In the colonial era, the British had a setup of Governors and Commanders-in-Chief, which effectively ruled India for 300 years (with relatively minimal conflict between them). In China, the relationship between the government, bureaucrats and the military has been prevalent since the Shang/Zhou era. The bureaucrats and military relations in ancient China had strains because of literacy and class differences, but the relations were instrumental in stretching the empire till the 20^th century. In the modern world, where democracy is the primary ideology of governance, the military cannot wish away civilian control.

It is paradoxical that the military, which is supposed to preserve a government, is feared by the same government. Peter D Feaver puts it as: “The very institution created to protect the polity becomes a threat to the polity.” The study of CMR is even more important for the military because ‘sensible civilian control’ and ‘strong military power’ can together team up to ensure good governance, accelerated national growth, improved stability and robust national security. Through the study of CMR, military leaders can bring trust and efficiency in their dealings while continuing to improve the strength of the military towards the nation’s security. The relations, when intertwined, become interdependent and more productive. This is called ‘Fusion’. The idea of CMR needs to be graduated to Civil-Military Fusion. The concept of Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) denotes the convergence of military and civilian resources and systems for maximising a nation’s ability to express its comprehensive national power both during war and peacetime.[5]

This brings the problem statement:

What are the key critical determinants of civil-military fusion, and how can they be applied in the Indian context?

Fusion has a wide array of subjects under it. This paper will restrict itself to fusion leading to the transformation of CMR.

Types of Civilian Controls

Civilian control over the army, justified as a necessary requirement for stability and good governance, is broadly classified into ‘Subjective civilian control’ and ‘Objective civilian control.’[6] In subjective control, the civilian group(s) enjoy complete power and the military power is minimised. Military professionalism reaches its nadir in such control. Subjective control has been identified with the maximisation of the power of particular government institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms. In objective control, the objective is to maximise military professionalism. The political power is distributed between the military and polity to enhance military professionalism. For instance, India, after independence, saw subjective civilian control until reforms started after lessons from 1962 and the Kargil War. Israel has had good objective control since its independence.

Any type of control can only be effective when it dictates (controls) ‘power’. Power exists in two forms: formal authority and informal influence.[7] Civilian control is about increasing the power of civilian bodies and reducing the authority and influence of their military counterparts. Having defined CMR/CMF, analysing types of CMR and civilian control is imperative to identify its determinants.

Determinants of CMR/CMF in the Indian Context

The determinants of Civil-Military relations are multifaceted and influenced by many factors. Some of these factors, with their implications on the Indian context, are as follows:

Political Ideology

The political ideology of the nation characterises its pro/anti-military stance. Political ideology is a set of values and attitudes oriented around the problems of the state.[8] Huntington describes four ideologies, namely, Liberalism, Marxism, Fascism and Conservatism and examines how the civil-military relations intertwine in each. The military function is most professional under the conservatism ideology. India is a democracy, and its political ideologies affect the military shift between right, left and centre depending upon the government in power. India, unlike the US, doesn’t have very clearly defined and sharply alienated ideologies. Rather, all political ideologies undergo a shift/melee and adapt to a new format—for example, Neoliberalism and neo-conservatism.

Political Stability

Political stability establishes an environment where national powers are not under stress and work in great cohesion towards the nation’s cause. After Independence, India had a relatively better-oriented and stable government than Pakistan. The CMR in Pakistan deteriorated and reached a point when the military had to take over.[9] Conversely, India saw increasing civilian control, which put some compromises on military professionalism. Thus, Political stability is the bedrock on which CMR can function.

Higher Defence Organisation (HDO)

The institutions of HDO play an important role in defining the CMR. In India, after independence, the HDO was adapted from the colonial setup. It was amended to increase civilian control and minimise military influence. The post of Commander in Chief was abolished, and military chiefs were made chiefs of staff and brought down in protocol subservient to politburo. This weakened the military professionalism and its ability to advise the government on security matters. The debacle of 1962 is the result of this degraded CMR and ill-executed HDO setup. In the US, the Goldwater Nichols Act was needed to reform the HDO to strengthen military decision-making and professionalism. After the implementation of the results of the Kargil Review Committee, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) were created. This has helped defence services to have more presence in government dealings and improved military decision-making. Effective CMF requires strong institutional capacity with mechanisms for interagency coordination and collaboration.

Cultural Differences between the two Verticals

Civil and military have their own unique cultures even while working towards a common goal. In medieval China, the bureaucrats considered the military to be semiliterate or illiterate and kept them away from positions of power. The military farmer conscript of the Weisuo and the Fubing system shaped their beliefs. In India, the government, after Independence, continued to be fearful of military power and drew analogies   to the coup and military takeovers in Pakistan, Syria and Africa to prepare a coup-proofing mechanism. With the increasing gap between military society and the civil dimension, this mistrust is going to increase, and this needs to be bridged with active engagement, creating institutions, increasing jointmanship, interoperability and intermixing the cultural nuances.

Geo-Political Environment and National Security

The need for national security is a key determinant towards CMR. National security is the overarching thing that should be paramount and the top most priority for every organisation. Studying the national security environment would be helpful in understanding the challenges therein, and expectations from CMR can be defined in clearer terms. In recent times, China’s belligerence has revived positive interaction between Indian civil and military structures. All elements of national power, which includes politics, bureaucracy and the military, are working harmoniously together to counter the dragon. Similarly, geo-political issues like terrorism, the increase of religious fundamentalism and the multi-polarity of the world can reshape the civil-military understandings and improve future coordination and collaboration.

Political Will and Leadership

Political leadership can steer a healthy civil-military relationship. PM Modi, in his second term, implemented the posts of CDS and DMA, thus bringing the military and government closer. Likewise, he has put focus on geo-political affairs and strengthened the role of Ministry of External Affairs. All the powers of the military, finance, foreign affairs have worked together towards fast-track defence procurements of Rafale fighter aircraft, solve the Galwan crisis, conduct anti-terrorism surgical and air strikes, evacuate civilians from war-torn regions, etc.

Strategic Culture

India has a rich history of 7000 years in which empires have flourished, exemplifying good and effective civil-military relations. The civilisational continuity, the culture of dharma, ethics, and righteousness puts the Indian military on a high moral pedestal in the worldview. However, in warfare, our culture also talks about kutayudhha (diplomacy), strength, dominance, and aggression. We have the literature of Arthashastra, Vedas, Upanishads, Nitishastra, and epics like Mahabharata and Ramayana, which gives an invaluable peek into statecraft and policy making. Using our strategic culture to formulate an efficient and effective civil-military relationship can be explored.

Way Ahead

Based on India’s own history, ethos and strategic culture, India must create its own unique edifices to achieve integration and civil-military fusion. Common vision and convergence of tasks/action between civil and military will help in achieving national goals. A strong political leadership prioritising CMF as a national security imperative and clear legal and policy frameworks defining roles, responsibilities and authorities of civilian and military actors would help in achieving good CMF. It is recommended to create strong institutions to facilitate interagency coordination/collaboration, improve HDO, and ensure CMF efforts in advanced technology like AI, cyber, and space. Cultural differences should be alleviated, and mutual understanding and respect should be institutionalised through policies. A bottom-up approach for better CMR is recommended. The strategic culture of our nation’s rich 7000 years of history should be kept in the picture while formulating policies for CMR and not ape Western module. The civil and military are two powerhouses where effective CMF can enhance India’s security postures and help address emerging, dynamic threats in furtherance of national objectives.

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Notes:

[1] Welch, Johana Mendelson Forman and Claude, “Civil Military relations: USAID’s role,” Centre of Democracy and Governance, Washington DC, 1998, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacc887.pdf. https://www.idsa.in/event/Panel-Discussion-on-Civil-Military-Fusion-in-India. Accessed on April 02, 2024.

[2] S. Huntington, The soldier and the state (London: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[3] S. Huntington, The soldier and the state (London: Harvard University Press, 1957), p 80.

[4] Gp Capt R. Chaudhary, Transforming India’s external security using ancient strategic culture (New Delhi: KW Publisher, 2021), p 28.

[5] C. D. Kumar, “Panel discussion on civil mitary fusion in inida,” in Manohar parrikar Institute of defence studies and analyses, 2022.  https://www.idsa.in/event/Panel-Discussion-on-Civil-Military-Fusion-in-India. Accessed on April 02, 2024

[6] S. Huntington, The soldier and the state (London: Harvard University Press, 1957), Pp. 80-97.

[7] S. Huntington, The soldier and the state (London: Harvard University Press, 1957), Pp 86-90.

[8] S. Huntington, The soldier and the state (London: Harvard University Press, 1957), p 90.

[9] Samuel I. Wilkinson, Army and Nation (Ranikhet: Permanent Black publisher, 2015).

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Keywords: Airpower, Vayu Shakti, Gagan Shakti, Tarang Shakti

Having finished Vayu Shakti earlier in February and Tarang Shakti, which is set for later in the year, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is now beginning ‘Gagan Shakti’, the second of the trio of exercises planned for this year. It is time to take stock of what these exercises involve. Gagan Shakti is a complex exercise that began, as scheduled, on April 1, 2024, and will continue round the clock, seven days a week, for the next 10 days. Vayu Shakti demonstrated the capabilities of the Indian Air Force to deliver firepower with precision, concentrated in time and space, over a defined area and pre-selected targets.

As part of the exercise, extensive planning and execution of activities across the country have been carried out to simulate the emergence of threats that might result from a conflict involving two fronts. During Exercise ‘Gagan Shakti-2024’, the IAF will mobilise all of its bases and equipment throughout the country. All of the key features of airpower, including precision, mass, flexibility, responsiveness, speed, versatility, and reach, are expected to be tested by this exercise, presenting a challenge for all stakeholders. The Indian Army will provide logistics assistance for the massive exercise. This support will facilitate a comprehensive pan-India movement of around 10,000 Indian Air Force personnel and ammunition. The purpose of this movement is to validate the aspects of the Indian Air Force’s Operational Rail Mobilisation Plan (ORMP). [1]

The latest edition of the IAF doctrine, released in 2022 and including several significant additions compared to the earlier version, will be put to the test during the exercise. One of the most critical aspects of the new doctrine is the connection between air power as a national instrument of military power and national security strategy in order to accomplish national aims and objectives in the context of the current geopolitical environment and technical difficulties.

In light of the fact that the IAF has been grappling with a shortage of assets in terms of fighter aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), it is of the utmost importance that the IAF makes smart use of precious assets while maintaining centralised command and control. In the current environment of operations across multiple domains, it is a fact that neither the Army, Navy, nor the IAF can achieve victory on its own in the direction of the accomplishment of political objectives. Consequently, this is magnificently encapsulated in the conclusion of the IAF doctrine, which states that “the establishment of robust joint structures to enable right sizing, joint training and operations, while maintaining service specific core competencies”[2] is the recommended course of action. In a significant way, the upcoming Gagan Shakti exercise intends to accomplish all of these things and more with the active involvement of the Indian Army and the Indian Navy. The Indian Army has already begun to take action by aiding the Indian Air Force units in mobilising for the exercise in cooperation with the Indian Railways. Moreover, the Indian Navy will also be deploying its vessels for the purpose of the exercise.

When it comes to employing force by any service, whether by itself or in conjunction with other forces, doctrinal precepts serve as a guide and control strategy. However, it is training and operational employment that ultimately produce the desired results. Because of this, military professionals must undergo training that is realistic or very close to real operational scenarios. This enables them to refine their skills and acquire invaluable knowledge regarding the employment of force. It is anticipated that the Rafale fighter aircraft and Prachand helicopters, in addition to the S-400 air defence system, will be operated for the very first time during the current iteration of the Gagan Shakti exercise. During the exercise, the entire IAF, along with all of its operational bases, would be activated. The exercise aimed to test the IAF’s readiness to carry out intense operations encompassing a wide range of operations, including counter-air, air defence, counter-surface force, electronic warfare, long-range strikes, and rapid deployment of forces from one theatre to another. Additionally, to test the various contingencies that could occur, operations would be carried out from civil airfields, and landings would be made from designated sections of national highways spread across the country.

Exercise Tarang Shakti, which is scheduled to take place in August 2024, is going to be the most extensive multilateral exercise that has ever been carried out in India. It is anticipated that aircraft from the Air Forces of Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, the United States of America, and Germany will take part in the war game. Additionally, the German Air Chief is planning to fly into the country in a fighter aircraft personally. Participants are expected to come from about twelve different nations. This exercise will improve military cooperation and interoperability and highlight India as a nation that must be taken seriously. India now possesses the fourth-largest air force in the world, and this exercise will showcase India as a formidable competitor. The IAF participated in exercises abroad in the past year, in addition to other air forces from friendly foreign countries coming into India. This was one of the most significant events that took place. This pattern indicates that the IAF is becoming more widely acknowledged as a professional force, as well as the significance of the country as an emerging power in the area. The purpose of these exercises is to give a platform for various air forces to engage in the exchange of knowledge, the sharing of best practices, the accomplishment of joint training, and the formation of personal relationships, all of which serve as vital intangibles in the process of developing synergy during joint operations. These cooperation and multilateral exercises foster military diplomacy and go a long way towards guaranteeing regional security and stability by sending a strong message to any government with hostile and hegemonic intentions. India is the only regional air force that has participated in multilateral exercises on such a large scale.

With the completion of Vayu Shakti, the IAF is actively conducting an exercise, Gagan Shakti, on a national pan-air force level. The objective of Gaganshakti-2024 is to conduct an evaluation of integrated war-fighting techniques and tactics within the context of the Indian Army and the Indian Navy together. The last time an exercise of this magnitude was carried out was in 2018, when the IAF launched more than 11,000 sorties in preparation for a scenario involving two fronts.[3] Since then, a lot of things have changed, including recent purchases made by the IAF, the current security situation in the region, which includes a border standoff with China that has been going on for the past four years, and the requirement to practise and train in a setting that is nearly as realistic as possible. Tarang Shakti is a multilateral air force exercise that will take place later this year, and the Indian Air Force is looking forward to participating in it, as well as preparing and directing it. The IAF is committed to leaving no stone unturned in its pursuit of national security, always striving to reach new heights and achieve glory in consonance with its motto of ‘touching the sky with glory.’

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Notes:

[1] “IAF’s 10-Day Mega Exercise ‘Gagan Shakti’ Set To Begin”, The DD News, April 1, 2024, https://ddnews.gov .in/en/iafs-10-day-mega-exercise-gagan-shakti-set-to-begin/. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

[2] “Preparing For The Future: A Road Map”, Doctrine 0f the Indian Air Force, Chapter:7, Page:84, 2022, https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf#:~:text=Establishment%20of%20robus t%20joint%20structures%20to%20enable,and%20operations%20while%20maintaining%20service%20specific%20core. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

[3] Huma Siddiqui, “Gaganshakti 2024: India’s Show of Strength and Preparedness”, The Financial Times, March 26, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-gaganshakti-2024-indias-show-of-strength-and-preparedness-3437354/. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Near Space, High Altitude Platforms, Airspace, Sovereignty

The recent shooting down of a Chinese high-altitude balloon that drifted over the US airspace has brought the spotlight on the region of the upper atmosphere, which is relatively underutilised. As aerospace technology develops, air-planes are flying higher, while at the same time, satellites are exploiting the lower orbital regions. Effectively, the previously underutilised region of the vertical dimension, which lies sandwiched between the atmosphere and orbital space, is shrinking and has now become a much-desired zone for the armed forces. This region, which lies between 20 to 100 kilometres, is commonly referred to as the ‘Near-Space’ region.[1] While space law experts disagree with the use of this term, this region is an emerging battlefield, and terming it ‘near-space’ accrues some benefits for the military.

Why do we want to be in near-space? Is it to achieve specific goals or enhance our capabilities? This exploitation of near-space cannot be viewed in isolation. Significant capabilities have already been established that enable armed forces to operate through the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region. Near-space can augment and support military applications like surveillance and reconnaissance, communication, and many other applications. Capabilities developed in near-space will have to be integrated with those of LEO and the airspace region. Long-range weapons, such as missiles, have always transited through this region. With other aerial platforms now entering near-space, what are the likely complications that emerge, and how are they to be dealt with?

Although the term ‘Near-Space’ is an American jargon, the potential for near-space platforms to provide some of the same capabilities as space-based platforms, at much lower costs and with greater flexibility and persistence, is reason enough to consider the near-space region for military effects. This would contribute to an operationally responsive space capability.

Lighter-than-air vehicles operating in near-space could provide the capabilities that are demanded by the armed forces, albeit with the added advantage of having the liberty of going into enemy airspace without being detected. Communications, network relays, and Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities could be effectively achieved through near-space. These lighter-than-air vehicles could include balloons, airships, high-altitude drones, etc. The key advantages lie in the persistent loitering ability and survivability of these platforms while escaping detection in covert missions.

Despite the overwhelming benefits of the military exploitation of near-space, some key issues remain unaddressed, as mentioned below:

    (a)    Demarcation and sovereignty of the near-space region.

    (b)    Traffic management and collision avoidance.

    (c)    Integration of airspace and space.

Demarcation and Sovereignty of the Near-Space Region

As regards the extent of sovereign airspace and the near-space region, two fundamental questions arise. Firstly, why is near-space region being called so when it is not space? Secondly, why is the demarcation between airspace and space set at 100 km? Neither of these practices is internationally accepted; rather, they have emerged out of convenience to escape the sovereignty issue with airspace for operating high-altitude platforms beyond the limits of geographical boundaries. In fact, near-space is not space, even though it is being termed as such. If we stop thinking of near-space as space, many issues on regulations will be resolved.

Near-space is not technically space. It is the upper atmosphere. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation, also called the  Chicago Convention of 1944, states that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.[2] The extent of airspace in the vertical dimension is an undefined quantity in legal terms. Hence, it is an accepted norm that airspace would extend up to the limits of space, as nothing exists between airspace and space. Therefore, near-space is the unused upper atmosphere or the airspace where aeroplanes cannot fly owing to the rare density of air. This is an unregulated airspace and can be used by military aeroplanes only.

The boundary between airspace and space is deemed to be the upper limit of airspace or the lower limit of space. However, the existing regulations and treaties are silent on this crucial definition of where space begins. The Kármán line at 100 km is the most commonly accepted demarcation between airspace and space, though the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) favours a boundary at 80 km altitude.[3] This understanding of the demarcation between airspace and space has vast implications for airspace regulations as well as space regulations.

It is not science but law that has to decide on where space begins. While many theories have been propounded on this subject, some practical approaches need to be considered. One such approach is to limit airspace up to the highest altitude that can support flight. The second is to have the lowest orbital altitude as the beginning of space. However, there are many indispensable factors that suggest the need to have a buffer zone between airspace and space. Firstly, orbiting is possible only above 160 km, but practical orbits with sufficient orbital life of satellites would be possible only above 200-250 km. Also, the upper atmosphere will increasingly be used as future technologies would support high-altitude aviation. Any traffic transiting between airspace and space, either after launch or on re-entry, would have to pass through the entire range of aviation flight bands. Hence, having a buffer zone between 50 km to 150 km is essential to de-conflict and restrict aviation to lower altitudes (below 50 km). This will also make the implementation of airspace and space regulations a less daunting task.

Sovereignty of airspace is a necessity for Air Defence, but it cannot extend up to the undefined limit of space. The Chicago Convention, as well as the Outer Space Treaties, need a relook, as the effects of undefined limits impact the regulatory processes for Insurance, taxation laws, arbitration, as well as command and control for military activities in this region.

Traffic Management

The near-space region poses a very complex situation for traffic management. This is because the traffic being mentioned is not aircraft, but high-altitude platforms (near-space vehicles), transiting traffic like space launch vehicles going into space and spacecraft returning from space, reusable launch vehicles, responsive and flexible launch systems, and space planes which could be operating in the near-space and lower orbital regions. The situation is complex because these altitude bands in the upper atmosphere will be utilised for military purposes on dual-use platforms. Most missions will be covert, which hinders the identification and deconfliction process. Also, the outbound and inbound traffic to space is set to increase in the coming years, and we may see simultaneous space transportation activities from multiple places around the globe. Adding to the surveillance nightmare is the presence of stratospheric balloons and the relative ease with which they can be launched and recovered, even by amateurs. The regulatory framework and operating rules for this kind of activity in the near-space region are yet to evolve. Moreover, large surveillance gaps exist, not only in the geographical extent of radar coverage but also in the vertical extent. Near-space awareness is going to become as critical for safe operations as space situational awareness.

Integration of Airspace and Space

The atmosphere, where airspace exists, and space are two distinct mediums with diverse physical properties. It is not possible to have a regulatory coherence between two substantially different mediums. This is perhaps the reason for having a different set of regulations and laws for airspace and space. It is a flaw to apply the laws governing space activities to the near-space region.

It is, therefore, practically impossible to integrate airspace with space without riders. To consider an integration of both these mediums, one must look at the operational imperatives necessitating such an integration. The immediate necessity is to have operational continuity in surveillance, tracking and engagement for objects transiting from the sub-orbital regions into the upper atmosphere for air defence and missile defence. Integration is also required to have continuity for the deconfliction of traffic in this region to prevent collisions. Therefore, while an Air Force may find an operational convenience in gaining continuity, the same is not the case with civilian use of airspace and space.

Hence, the orbital space is beyond reach, and we only need to consider the integration of the sub-orbital space with the upper atmosphere, which is being called near-space. This needs to be addressed at an organisational and operational level. Effectively, we are saying that airspace already exists up to the limits of space defined by the Kármán line. We need to expand our understanding and utilisation of airspace. For operational continuity, sub-orbital space should be integrated with the airspace and managed by the same entity as airspace.

Conclusion

The upper atmosphere is fast emerging as a vital resource for military applications. Advancements in aerospace technologies are enabling the exploitation of the unused portion of the airspace, which is the upper atmosphere. This region is being termed as ‘near-space’, even though it is not a known region of space. Such a nomenclature of the upper atmosphere has implications for the sovereignty of airspace, which is deemed to exist up to the commonly accepted demarcation between airspace and space. In reality, near-space does not exist. The unutilised upper atmosphere is, in effect, a sovereign airspace till the geographical limits of a State and international airspace beyond the sovereign limits.

The use of the upper atmosphere is beneficial for military applications, which are being derived through satellite services. High-altitude platforms provide most of the benefits of satellites, with the added advantage of providing persistence as they do not orbit. However, the use of high-altitude platforms in this region has several implications in terms of the safety of traffic transiting through the upper atmosphere and the inadequacy of regulations governing the use of near-space.

Misidentifications can lead to hostile situations, resulting in conflicts. Most high-altitude platforms are dual-use systems, hence civilian assets are also under threat of military action. Amongst the many challenges of operating in the upper atmosphere is the issue of inadequate surveillance, which makes it ideal for covert military operations but also creates a nightmare for traffic management.

There is an urgent need to evolve norms of behaviour for the so-called near-space region. It is also a critical juncture to define the limits of airspace and space. A buffer zone between airspace and space with distinct operating rules would rule out any misunderstandings in interpretation.

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Notes:

[1] Hampton Stephens, ‘Near-Space’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, July 01, 2005, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0705near/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force’s%20operating%20domain,spacecraft%20orbits%2022%2C000%20miles%20up. Accessed on March 31, 2024.

[2] International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Convention on International Civil Aviation – Doc 7300’, https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx. Accessed on January 20, 2024.

[3] “Karman line”, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/science/Karman-line. Accessed on March 30, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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