Keywords: UAS, LUCAS, Epic Fury. MQ-9, Shahed-136

Introduction

Operation ‘Epic Fury’ was initiated by the United States (US) Central Command (CENTCOM) on February 28, 2026, at 1:15 am Eastern Time (ET) under the orders of the President of the United States. The US and Israel resorted to striking targets to destroy the security apparatus of the Iranian regime, focusing on those that presented an imminent threat. The targets included the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), command and control centres, air defence systems of Iran, missile and drone launchers, and military airfields.^[1]

CENTCOM recently deployed the LUCAS (Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) platforms, which belong to a one-way attack drone squadron, to West Asia to enhance regional security and deterrence index. At an event in early July 2025 at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense (~War) Pete Hegseth officially unveiled the LUCAS and dubbed it the American response to the Shahed-136. The philosophy of design was evident in matching Shahed’s price, surpassing its capabilities, and constructing it within a timeframe short enough to enable mass production.^[2]

The Machine

LUCAS, in the wider military context, can be considered a game-changer in Western air doctrine. It was invented by SpektreWorks, an Arizona-based company, and expedited by CENTCOM for mass production. Although displayed in July 2025, it was deployed for combat early in 2026.

LUCAS is a straight reverse-engineering of the Shahed-136 kamikaze drone of Iran. SpektreWorks was able to seize a damaged Shahed airframe, reassemble it using American electronics and guidance systems, and create a platform that excels in several important aspects over the original. The outcome is an enhanced category of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) having autonomous AI flight controls, GPS-denied inertial flight and swarm coordination.[3]

It takes off either in trucks or on rails propelled by rockets, with no runway requirements. It costs a fraction of an MQ-9 Reaper, at USD 35,000 per unit, which can be in the tens of millions of airframes, depending on configuration. The drone is also compatible with the Multi-Domain Unmanned Systems Communications (MUSIC), a mesh network that enables it to serve as a communications relay node in a GPS-jammed or signal-degraded environment. It is that two-function ability, strike assets, and communication node, which makes LUCAS not just a kamikaze design, but a class above. Its development signifies the conclusion of the “exquisite era” of warfare, in which costly reusable resources (such as the MQ-9) are currently being complemented by the so-called mass of cheap (low-cost) to bypass advanced air defences.

The Importance of the LUCAS

The primary aspect of the LUCAS is that it is a ‘Script-Flipper’: over the years, the US has spent millions of dollars on high-end interceptors (such as the Patriot or the SM-2) to intercept low-end Iranian Shahed drones, which cost only USD 30,000. LUCAS enables the US and its allies to fight an attritable war, compelling the enemy into experiencing the same unequal economic predicament. The other salient aspects are:

(a)     Mass Saturation.  It allows hundreds of units to be deployed at the same time (swarming) to saturate enemy radars.

(b)   Strategic Deterrence.  It offers a long-range strike capability, which is politically and financially disposable, and which reduces the threshold of retaliatory strikes.

Technical Specifications

The LUCAS is a westernised variant of the delta-wing Shahed-136, but with much more advanced internal electronics. It is a Kamikaze, i.e., one-way attack (OWA) drone, 10 ft long and an eight-metre wingspan. It is a loitering munition.

The drone has a Carburetted Internal Combustion (Piston) Engine of 215 cc. It has a maximum speed of over 100 kts and a cruise speed of approximately 74 kts. It can loiter at a point for six hours. It is capable of travelling up to 800 km (approximately 500 miles). It may carry a payload (warhead) capacity of 18 kg. It may be a modular warhead. It is a Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) fusion (hardened) Artificial Intelligence (AI) Vision-based object recognition platform.^[4]

Cost Analysis

The LUCAS is made to be very cost-effective to allow procurement in large volumes. Although the Unit Cost is estimated at the present at USD 35,000, the Pentagon, in its Drone Dominance campaign, is working to bring it down to between USD 5,000 and USD 10,000 by means of mass production (going to 300,000 units by the end of 2026).

Table 1: Comparison: Shahed-136 vs. LUCAS vs. MQ-9

Operational Capabilities Observed During Operation Epic Fury

The first use of LUCAS drones in a contested environment was in February 2026 during Operation Epic Fury. These platforms were deployed by the US to attack targets linked to the IRGC.

(a)     Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).  Iranian surface-to-air missiles were suppressed by LUCAS swarms to expose the location of the batteries to further high-end strikes.

(b)        Tactical Strikes.  They were able to attack drone production facilities and command and control hubs.

(c)     Psychological Effect. The application of reverse-engineered design showed a kind of ‘technological mockery’ which was effective in countering the opponent’s asymmetrical superiority.

Limitations

Although the LUCAS platforms have accomplished the assigned missions, they have a few limitations. They are appended below:

(a)        Poor Survivability. It is easily shot down by even primitive anti-aircraft guns (e.g. Gepard or SHORAD systems) due to its low speed and inability to be stealthy.

(b)       Limited Payload. The 18 kg warhead is not powerful enough to attack hardened bunkers. It is most useful against soft targets such as radar systems, fuel depots, and parked aircraft.

(c)        Meteorological Challenges. Small and piston-powered engines and light airframes are more vulnerable to inclement weather, high winds and icing, which adversely impact the LUCAS operations, compared to the larger platforms such as the MQ-9.

(d)        Logistical Footprint. The logistical support of a mass of 300,000 drones would pose transportational challenges. This demands a huge reorganisation of military logistics, storage and training.

Conclusion

LUCAS fulfilled its stated objectives by providing an affordable, easily deployable solution in large quantities and demonstrating significant effectiveness in disabling Iranian air defences and other military infrastructure. The introduction of LUCAS prompted a shift in the US military strategy from precision strikes to large-scale saturation attacks. CENTCOM attributed a substantial reduction in Iranian drone operations post the deployment of LUCAS.

These drone designs require continuous enhancement to evade air defence systems, which are becoming increasingly robust with the help of emerging technologies.

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Notes:-

^[1] Mike Stone, David Jeans and Joey Roulette, “US debuts suicide drone in Iran after fast-tracked Pentagon procurement,” Reuters, March 03, 2026,  https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-debuts-suicide-drone-iran-after-fast-tracked-pentagon-procurement-2026-03-03/. Accessed on March 12, 2026.

^[2] Ibid.

[3] Jay Hilotin, “Shahed and LUCAS: The different drones explained”, Gulf News, March 06, 2026,

https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/which-suicide-drone-is-better-shahed-vs-lucas-what-you-need-to-know-1.500465180. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

^[4] Robert Sailo, “FLM 136 Drone USA,” Army Recognition, March 30, 2026, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/flm-136-drone-usa/. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

[5] “Shahed-136 / Geran-2”, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/shahed-136.htm. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

[6] “MQ-9 Reaper”, Air Force, January 2025, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/ mq-9-reaper/. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

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Keywords:Air Power, MDO, C⁵ISR, Joint Doctrine, IAF

Introduction

The character of warfare has fundamentally changed, with simultaneous contestation across land, sea, air, space, cyber, and cognitive domains demanding a new paradigm for military operations. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) has emerged as the doctrinal response to this reality, in which integrated effects across domains overwhelm adversaries faster than they can react. For India, facing simultaneous continental and maritime threats, compressed decision cycles, and aggressive grey zone coercion, the ability to orchestrate military and non-military instruments as a coherent whole will determine strategic outcomes.

India’s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations (2025) formalises this shift, calling for synchronised employment of forces and national capabilities to achieve decisive advantage. Yet doctrinal ambition must be matched by practical implementation, and herein lies the critical question: which service can lead this transformation? This article argues that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is uniquely positioned as the lead enabler of Indian MDO, providing the cross-domain Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), networks, long-range precision strikes and paving the path for C⁵ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), the backbone essential for joint success. Far from being merely a supporting arm, the IAF’s vertical reach, speed, and connectivity make it the natural integrator of tri-service kill webs and joint operations in India’s vast battlespace.

Concept of Multi-Domain Operations and Indian Joint Doctrine

The idea of MDO emerged from recognition that contemporary conflicts unfold simultaneously across mutually interacting domains, where effects in one domain rapidly cascade into others. Western militaries initially developed MDO concepts to overcome anti-access/area-denial environments through tightly integrated operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, but recent wars have shown that the information and cognitive domains are equally contested and decisive. For India, with its simultaneous continental and maritime challenges, a compressed battlespace, and a dense information environment, MDO offers a framework to orchestrate military and non-military instruments of national power as a coherent whole rather than as segregated, service-centric campaigns.^[1]

 In doctrinal terms, MDO seeks to break down rigid domain silos and replace them with cross-domain “kill webs” that can rapidly generate, sequence, and sustain effects against an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities. Looking at evolving capabilities, it can be said that air power is inherently multi-domain because it can “create effects in all domains” from kinetic strikes and air superiority to enabling maritime surveillance, land manoeuvre, cyber operations, and information campaigns. The goal of MDO is not merely the co-existence of multiple domains but their deliberate integration so that actions in one domain are designed from the outset to create leverage in others.^[2] This logic translates well to the Indian context, where air- and space-enabled ISR, precision strike by IAF and integrated networks can act as cross-domain enablers for both the Army and Navy in tightly contested theatres.

India’s formal articulation of MDO came with the Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations, promulgated by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and released by the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri in August 2025. This doctrine defines MDO as the “coordinated, integrated and synchronised employment of military forces and non-military national capabilities across Land, Sea, Air, Space, Cyber and Cognitive domains” to achieve national security objectives. The doctrine grounds MDO in a Whole-of-Nation Approach (WONA), explicitly bringing together diplomatic, informational, economic, technological, and industrial levers alongside the armed forces, recognising that future wars will be “contested in multiple domains, both physical and virtual, simultaneously and continuously.” It situates MDO within India’s specific threat environment of two-front challenges, grey zone coercion and rapid technological change and argues that traditional sequential, domain-segregated campaigns will not suffice.^[3]

There are several doctrinal pillars visible after taking reference from the new doctrine. First, it is joint force integration, calling for seamless synergy between the three services through common planning, shared situational awareness and interoperable Command and Control (C²) systems. Second, it stresses cross-domain integration, wherein actions in one domain are planned specifically to generate complementary effects in others, for instance, using cyber and electronic warfare to create windows of opportunity for air, land and maritime forces. Third, the doctrine highlights Civil–Military Fusion (CMF) and partnerships with Indian industry, startups and academia to harness Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data analytics, autonomy, space-based assets and resilient communications as foundational enablers of MDO.^[4] Finally, it recognises the importance of allied and partner cooperation, particularly in information sharing and domain awareness, without compromising India’s strategic autonomy.

Commentators have pointed out that Indian thinking on MDO has been shaped not only by foreign doctrinal debates but also by empirical observation of recent conflicts. One observation is that wars such as those in Ukraine and the West Asia have demonstrated how tightly integrated employment of long-range fires, drones, electronic warfare, cyber-attacks and information operations can rapidly degrade an opponent’s combat potential, logistics and national will. These conflicts underscore the premium on resilient C², dispersed force posture, survivable networks and the ability to fight under conditions of severe electromagnetic and cyber disruption. These are also core themes embedded in India’s MDO doctrine.^[5] A study on Operation Absolute Resolve describes contemporary conflict as “explicit multi-domain warfare,” in which airpower, Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber, precision strike and information operations were synchronised to “digitally conquer the sky” and impose paralysis on the adversary’s system of systems. These assessments strengthen the doctrinal case for India to pursue MDO as the central organising concept for its future force.^[6]

At the same time, Indian professional and academic writings caution that doctrine alone cannot deliver MDO without parallel progress in organisational structures, capabilities and training. We must understand that while India has taken important steps, such as creating the Defence Cyber Agency, Defence Space Agency, and Defence Intelligence Agency, significant gaps remain in joint C² architecture, tri-service communications, common operating pictures, and shared data standards.^[7] It is also important to point out the absence of real-time, interoperable tri-service C² systems due to incomplete integration of the Indian Air Force’s networks with those of the Army and Navy, as well as limitations in indigenous space-based ISR and navigation capabilities. Presently, the Army’s Akashteer network system and Navy’s Trigun network system have been integrated at the root level with IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System), and work is in progress to make it more robust. Together, these assessments suggest that MDO, as defined in doctrine, is aspirational unless underpinned by structural reforms, investment in enabling technologies and sustained joint training.^[8]

Within this evolving doctrinal and analytical landscape, the Indian Air Force appears not merely as one of the services adapting to MDO but as a natural lead enabler of multi-domain combat power. The IAF, on the path of transformation, has become central to providing the cutting edge for future joint operations, and it must build operational capability across air, land, sea, space and cyber domains. Strengthening cyber capabilities, securing data and communications, and achieving multi-domain integration through robust networks, sensors, and decision-support tools are the way forward.^[9] The recent doctrine and associated studies together imply that any practical realisation of MDO will depend heavily on the IAF’s ability to integrate ISR, precision strikes, space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into joint kill webs. The next section, therefore, examines in detail how the IAF can function as the lead enabler of Multi-Domain Operations and what this implies for force development and joint integration with the Army and Navy.

Indian Air Force as Lead Enabler of Multi-Domain Operations

The Indian Air Force is uniquely positioned to function as the lead enabler of MDO because its core capabilities directly influence all physical and virtual domains of conflict. Air and space-enabled ISR, mobility with responsiveness, long-range precision strike capability, electronic warfare and networked air defence form the backbone of any credible joint force’s ability to sense, decide and act faster than the adversary. In the Indian context, where the theatre of operations varies from mountainous land borders to far-flung maritime territories, the IAF’s reach, speed, and access to the vertical dimension make it the natural cross-domain integrator.

The IAF can be the decisive spearhead of future joint operations, provided it undergoes a phased transformation across infrastructure, logistics, human resources, technology and indigenisation. This time-sensitive transformation must be organised into short-, mid-, and long-term phases, beginning with strengthening joint operational doctrines, bridging capability gaps, and inducting new technologies and systems to meet contemporary needs. Crucially, the need to embed jointness and multi-domain integration into every aspect of IAF development, from C² architecture and data networks to training and innovation ecosystems, must be addressed.^[10]

From a conceptual standpoint, air power historians provide a powerful theoretical basis for viewing air forces as a natural connector of MDOs. It is opined that air power is fundamentally multi-domain because, from kinetic strikes and air dominance to enabling ops of other services, it is a key strength of all air forces. The task of air forces is not limited to delivering fires but also to orchestrating a web of sensors, shooters, and decision-makers that allows joint forces to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity.^[11] Applying this logic to India suggests that the IAF’s sensor and communication networks, and its ability to rapidly project power, make it the logical core around which integrated multi-domain kill webs and joint C⁵ISR should be built. The deviation from conventional C⁴ISR is recommended because ‘Cyber’ has become an intricate part of all combat operations, so that sometimes it precedes all other kinds of planning and then remains enmeshed.

Operational experience of the IAF also reinforces this conceptual argument. It is known that Operation Sindoor, as a joint operation, was “led by air power” that delivered a calibrated but increasingly intense response to Pakistani actions. The integration of IAF and Indian Army air defence systems produced an “impregnable defence” against standoff weapons, drones and missiles, demonstrating India’s ability to integrate legacy and modern AD systems into a seamless architecture. All the future responses to state-sponsored terror are likely to be “fiercer,” and the strategy of deterrence by punishment requires the IAF and other services to jointly plan responses of much larger scope and in multiple domains simultaneously. This operation itself illustrates how IAF-led operations, when underpinned by integrated C² and air defence networks, can serve as practical precursors to more fully developed MDO constructs.^[12]

All recent conflicts have underscored the successful outcomes achieved when airpower, ISR, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations are synchronised effectively. These lessons are directly relevant to the IAF’s enabler role. The Venezuela operation was an example of mature multi-domain warfare, in which air defence networks collapsed quickly when not backed by resilient power, robust networks and disciplined doctrine. Future wars will begin in the electromagnetic spectrum long before missiles fly, and that intelligence preparation now exceeds all other priorities. It draws the lesson that India must build a genuinely integrated C⁵ISR architecture and achieve cyber and electromagnetic spectrum dominance.^[13] For the IAF, these lessons translate into specific enabler responsibilities: leading the design of resilient joint networks, providing ISR and targeting data to all services, and ensuring that air and space-based capabilities are fully integrated into tri-service plans and theatre commands.

India’s MDO blueprint must be built by combining armed forces, industry, academia and government agencies. The establishment of cyber and space agencies, the push for indigenous technologies, and the emphasis on civil–military fusion are intended to generate capabilities that can be knitted together into an integrated MDO framework. The capabilities like space-based ISR, AI-enabled decision support, resilient communications and integrated air defence are precisely those that the IAF is best placed to operate and integrate on behalf of the joint forces. This reinforces the view that the IAF must be at the heart of operationalising India’s MDO blueprint.^[14]

At the same time, professional military scholarship has underlined that the IAF’s enabler role will remain constrained unless persistent structural and capability gaps are addressed. Service-specific orders and legacy systems still inhibit the seamless flow of data and the rapid, cross-domain decision-making that MDO requires. For the IAF, this implies that becoming the lead enabler of MDO will demand not only modernisation of platforms and sensors, but also deep integration of its networks and doctrines with those of the Army and Navy, and active participation in designing joint C² structures and theatre commands.^[15]

The joint doctrine calls for integrated planning, shared situational awareness and collaborative execution across services and ministries, underpinned by modern C⁵ISR and information-centric operations. In this framework, the IAF is not simply one more contributor but a key provider of domain awareness, precision engagement and rapid mobility that can knit the joint force together in real time. IAF’s transformation into a “future ready force” is inseparable from India’s broader transition to genuine Multi-Domain Operator, and that its role as lead enabler may be formally recognised and resourced in future joint doctrine, force planning and theatreisation efforts.^[16]

Conclusion

The Indian Air Force stands at the threshold of becoming the decisive lead enabler of Multi Domain Operations in India’s evolving joint force structure, leveraging its unique capabilities in ISR, precision strike, space, cyber and networked C² to integrate the Army, Navy and tri-service agencies into coherent kill webs. As demonstrated through doctrinal analysis, operational precedents like Operation Sindoor, and lessons from global conflicts, the IAF’s vertical reach and cross-domain effects position it not as a supporting service but as the central nervous system of future joint operations. Realising these potential demands accelerated efforts towards robust interoperable networks, and civil-military fusion to bridge persistent gaps in tri-service integration, ensuring that India’s Armed Forces can deliver decisive effects across all domains simultaneously. By formally recognising and resourcing the IAF’s enabler role in doctrine, procurement and training, India can operationalise its 2025 Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations and build a genuinely future-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing national interests in an era of compressed decision cycles and multi-domain contestation.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

Notes:-

^[1] AB Shivane, “Operation Absolute Resolve and the Future of Warfare: Military Lessons for India,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MPIDSA), February 13, 2026, https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/operation-absolute-resolve-and-the-future-of-warfare-military-lessons-for-india. Accessed on April 01, 2026.

^[2] János Csengeri, “Some Elements of Multi-Domain Operations Regarding Air Power,” International Scientific JournalSecurity & Future, vol. 6, issue. 1, 2022, p. 12, https://stumejournals.com/journals/confsec/2022/1/11.full.pdf. Accessed on April 01, 2026.

^[3] Manish Kumar, “Fostering Joint Warfighting: India’s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations,” MPIDSA Commentary, March 03, 2026, p. 2, https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Commentary-Mr-Manish-Kumar-03-March-2026.pdf. Accessed on April 01, 2026.

^[4] PP Singh, “India’s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations: A Whole-of-Nation Framework,” United Service Institution Journal, September 12, 2025, p. 4, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/file_68c3c9dd2b33e.pdf. Accessed on April 02, 2026.

^[5] Ankit Abbott, “Multi-Domain Operations Air Force as the Central Node,” MPIDSA Journal of Defence Studies, February 2025, p. 134,  https://www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/07-jds-19-2-2025-Ankit-Abbott.pdf. Accessed on April 02, 2026.

^[6] Shivane, n. 1.

^[7] Dushyant Singh, “Multi-Domain Warfare: Are we Geared for it?” USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2024, p. 10, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_Jan_March_2024_Revised.pdf. Accessed on April 02, 2026.

^[8] Abbott, n. 5, p.136

^[9] Vikas Kalyani, “Cutting Edge for Future Joint Operations: A Transformed Indian Air Force,” USI Journal, Oct-Dec 2025, p. 735, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_2025_Oct-De_15.pdf. Accessed on Apr 03, 2026.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Csengeri, n. 2, p.14

^[12] RGK Kapoor, “Indian Air Force – Post Operation Sindoor,” SP’s Aviation, issue: 09, 2025, https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=3795&h=Indian-Air-Force-Post-Operation-Sindoor. Accessed on April 03, 2026.

^[13] Shivane, n. 1.

^[14] MS Mokha, “Indian Military’s Multi-Domain Warfare Blueprint Unfolds,” Bharat Shakti, April 03, 2026, https://bharatshakti.in/indian-militarys-multi-domain-warfare-blueprint-unfolds/. Accessed on April 04, 2026.

^[15]  Singh, n. 7, p.11

^[16] Singh, n. 4, p.5

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Keywords: IAF, Fighter Jets, War, Missiles, BrahMos, aircraft, Operation Sindoor, S-400

Introduction

The Indian Armed Forces are undergoing one of the most significant reforms in their history – theatreisation,^[1] wherein the resources of the three forces will be consolidated under three unified commands. This has sparked debates over resource allocations among the three services – army, navy, and air force, particularly regarding the role of crewed fighter jets in the Indian Air Force (IAF).

The recent wars, including the Ukraine-Russia War and the US-Israel-Iran conflagration, have seen the efficacy of low-cost, high-impact technologies like the drone and long-range missiles. During Operation Sindoor, one of the most successful platforms has been the Russian-origin S-400 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and drones.^[2] Against this backdrop, many Indian Army veterans argue that long-range vectors can achieve similar results without risking pilots.

This argument comes at a critical juncture, as the IAF, at a historic low in its fighter jet strength, is undertaking a massive modernisation drive with the purchase of 114 multi-role French Rafale fighter jets. This much-overdue modernisation will require a major cash infusion, which raises the question of whether the IAF would be better off investing in more long-range missiles, as one of the Generals argued, “Why risk aircraft when missiles can do the same job?” He added that BrahMos, whether ground-launched or aircraft-launched, has the same effect.[3]

Against this backdrop, this article seeks to weigh whether crewed fighter jets will remain central to the IAF’s future warfare strategy or whether advancements in missile and drone technology will render them obsolete.

Evolution of Air Power in the Indian Sub-continent

The IAF is the youngest of the three Indian Armed Forces and has been deployed in all the wars that India fought against Pakistan after independence. In 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999, air force assets were deployed to varying degrees. In the 1962 war against China, air power was not utilised in an offensive role; it was one of the wars in which India had to bear the ignominy of defeat.[4]

The last time India deployed its fighters offensively in enemy territory was in the 1971 war against Pakistan, where it “drove home the fury of war to the people of Pakistan,” and derailed Pakistan’s military strategy in East Pakistan.[5]

For a long time, the Indian strategic experts held the view that the utilisation of the IAF assets could lead to escalation and hence refrained from deploying them in limited conflicts. All that changed in 2019, when Jaish-e-Mohammad’s (JeM) terror attack targeted a convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 security personnel. The IAF’s Mirage-2000s carried out the punitive strikes against terrorist training camps in Balakot, Pakistan.[6] It was the first time since 1971 that Indian fighter jets breached Pakistan’s airspace to conduct strike missions and return to their bases.

Balakot strikes created a strategic shift as India demonstrated that air power could be used to carry out limited, conventional warfare between two nuclear powers. Air power, in fact, was considered to be a preferred tool for swift, precise, and deep strikes, replacing ground operations that can be riskier.

How Operation Sindoor Unfolded

On April 22, 2025, terrorists armed with guns killed 26 people in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. After taking a slew of diplomatic measures, India launched air strikes against nine terror sites on the intervening night of May 6-7. Nine terror sites–Bahawalpur, Muridke, Gulpur, Bhimber, Chak Amru, Bagh, Kotli, Sialkot, and Muzaffarabad–were struck. [7]

Out of these two, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) Markaz Taiba in Muridke and JeM’s Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah in Bahawalpur were taken out by the IAF, and the remaining seven targets were hit by the Indian Army’s artillery. The IAF’s fighters did not cross the Line of Control (LoC), but took out the two targets with precision weapons with no visible collateral damage, as shown in the satellite images. The strikes were carried out at 1:05 am on May 7.[8]

Within minutes of the strikes, at least 125 fighter jets from both sides were airborne at standoff ranges. The battlespace was constantly monitored by the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) nodes.[9] The nodes continuously received inputs from multiple radars, civil aviation sensors, observation posts, and its Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft. After processing the multiple inputs, it communicated a common picture of the battle space to the fighter jets, surface-to-air missile units, and counter-drone systems. [10]

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had fielded a mix of Chinese fighter jets -J-10 CE and Joint Fighter JF-17s. The PAF fired several PL-15, the new-generation Chinese Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles with a range of around 200 kilometres. The long-range missile is said to have damaged IAF fighter jets, a fact accepted by the IAF without going into specifics.[11]

Following this, the IAF’s fighter jets moved away from the “kill zone” of the Pakistani missiles and multi-layered air defence system comprising of Russian-built S-400, Israeli-designed Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MRSAM), made-in-India Akash, Israeli Spyder, Russian Pechora and L-70 guns; were deployed to neutralise aerial threats emanating from Pakistan. It was on the night of May 7 that the IAF fired its first S-400 missile, forcing the PAF fighter jets to fly low and remain outside the S-400’s kill envelope.

On the intervening night of May 8-9, the PAF tried to saturate the Indian air defence by attacking air bases along the Line of Control (LoC). The attacks were not about deep penetration but about probing Indian air defence positions and gaps. India responded by taking out PAF’s radar and surface-to-air missile sites and creating blind spots, which could later be exploited by Indian fighter jets. [12]

On the night of May 9, the PAF threw everything it had to target the Adampur airbase, the home of S-400 missiles. From drones to CM-400 missiles launched by PAF’s fighters were pointed at the frontline air bases. The S-400 took out many of the high-speed vectors, including the land attack missile CM-400.[13]

IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal AP Singh later asserted that the S-400 system was responsible for downing 4-5 aerial platforms of the PAF, including a SAAB Erieye 2000 and JF-17.[14]

After its air defence systems did the ground work, between 2:00 and 5:00 am on 10 May, IAF strike packages comprising Rafales and Sukhoi-30MKIs turned the firepower against Pakistan’s key military installations, including Nur Khan airbase in Chaklala, Rahawali, Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan air base, Sukkur, Murid, and Naya Chor. The Sukhois were armed with air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, proving that the indigenous integration had come of age.[15]

Five hours later, the IAF’s long-range standoff weapon supersonic cruise missile BrahMos was used to hit Sargodha, Bholari, and Jacobabad.

Reductionism has been used to treat developments during Operation Sindoor as proof that fighter jets are no longer relevant on the battlefield and that the same effect can be achieved with missiles.

Why India Needs Its Fighter Jet Fleet

Missiles infrastructure

Before seeking to emulate Iran’s formidable response to the United States (US), one should keep in mind that a country of the size of India would require at least 400 to 500 hardened missile launch bases. At present, the total number of air bases is around 40 to 50. The sheer infrastructure required to rely completely on missiles would punch a big hole in the IAF’s capital budget.

A study^[16] by the RAND think tank compared the cost of penetrating bombers and expendable missiles over 30 years. The study indicated that if a country fights a war in which cruise missiles require no more ISR support than bombers for 20 days or more over the next 30 years, penetrating stealth bombers would cost less than expendable missiles for similar missions.

The study, conducted for the US Air Force, also pointed out that relying on one-time use missiles could have its own risks. According to Project Air Force’s findings, if the US has a limited stockpile of missiles, it would not be able to continue the conflict once those stocks are depleted. And it would just encourage the adversary to ride out the American attacks.^[17]

Air Launched Missiles

A ground-launched missile utilises a heavy booster to accelerate to supersonic speed, and during the coast phase, the propellant carries it to the target. The same missile can be launched from a fighter jet without this booster. The fighter jet can accelerate to supersonic speeds using kerosene-fed multi-use engines and then launch this missile.

For short- to medium-range missiles, this lack of a booster or lesser propellant can offer a higher warhead weight, up to the fighter-carriage limit, obviously. Air-launched missiles, therefore, can be smaller, lighter, deadlier, cheaper, and easier to manufacture. This entails a higher production rate for the same cost, a game-changing factor in protracted wars.

A fighter jet can do a Lo-Lo-Lo profile, evading an adversary’s radars and then launch a low-flying cruise missile. With the initial speed push given by the fighter jet, the air-launched missile can have the same range as a ground-launched ballistic missile. A ground-launched missile, however, has to go up in the atmosphere to achieve the same range and will be picked up by the enemy’s radar when it goes ballistic.

Air-launched missiles are smaller in size, and their movements on the ground are relatively easy to conceal compared to large ground-launched variants. A missile can be road- or rail-mobile, but the movement of large trucks entering and leaving a missile base can be tracked through human intelligence (HUMINT) or electronic intelligence (ELINT). The Fighter Jets can take off from a base deep in the country, fly a totally random pattern below enemy radars and can attack from multiple angles. It is difficult for the adversary to track all the fighter jets in our territory.

The pilot can carry out strikes deep in the enemy territory without entering the enemy’s air defence range. The same missiles can be used to hit maritime targets or ground targets.

The case in point is the supersonic BrahMos. Its integration with a long-range fighter jet has expanded its “engagement zone.” The air-launched BrahMos has a range of 290 to 450 kilometres, and when launched from the Su-30MKI, it extends the aircraft’s operational radius to about 3,000 km.

Multi-Role Fighters

A multi-role fighter aircraft can do both air defence and strike missions by just changing its weapon package. Missiles are designed for a particular role and cannot do multi-role. A surface-to-air missile cannot conduct a ground attack, and vice versa.

The Missiles can perform only one role–strike. But besides strike missions, the fighter jets ensure air superiority; perform close air support (CAS) roles; carry out Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD); conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); and can take part in Electronic Warfare (EW).

If the cost-benefit analysis is taken care of, the most compelling argument in favour of a fighter jet is its dynamic decision capability. A missile once fired cannot be diverted to another target or recalled. A fighter jet has the advantage of changing the target midway, if so required. It keeps a man in the kill chain loop.

Flexibility of Fighter Jets

Ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles are best suited to take out stationary high-value targets like runways, radar sites, fuel depots or command centres. These missiles carry a single warhead (generally 450-500 kg) and have a circular error probability of 10-100 metres.

But to take out moving targets, or time-sensitive targets like terrorist hideouts in urban areas where chances of collateral damage are greater, high-precision air-launched munitions with a CEP of less than 5 metres are better suited. The Su-30MKIs are equipped with SPICE 2000/1000 bombs that are smart and precise. They achieve a CEP of less than 3 metres.

The Rafales are equipped with French-made SCALP (Storm Shadow) missiles with a range of approximately 560 km and a 450 kg bunker-penetrating warhead. As the Indian government is showing more resolve to not let any terror attacks go unpunished, the SCALP will wreak havoc against terrorist infrastructures should any such opportunity arise in the future.

Also, a fighter jet can carry multiple such weapons in a single sortie, altering its payloads mid-flight.

Missiles and Fighter Teaming

The other major issue is that it is difficult for a ground-based centre to maintain a data link with a ground-to-ground missile after launching. A fighter aircraft can, however, continue to remain data-linked with a missile even in a GPS-denied environment owing to its altitude. Its data link can be networked with ground-based launchers. High-speed data links can ensure the sharing of targets.

The advent of datalink has also opened up avenues for fighter and Surface-to-Air missiles to engage targets together. For instance, the Russian Air Force has data-linked its Su-35 fighter jets with the S-400 units, which helps the two to share targets. The Su-35s act as airborne sensor nodes and can directly forward targets to the S-400, overcoming the limitations of ground-based radars.^[18]

The Man-Unmanned teaming and swarm drones are definitely going to be part of future warfare. Taking out a cheap drone with an expensive missile can be a costly proposition, whereas a fighter jet in the air can ascertain which is the brain in the swarm of drones and can either take it out itself or pass on the target to the SAMs on the ground.

As of now, the missiles cannot talk to the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or satellites. The fighter jet can be the missing link in the equation and help improve a force’s situational awareness.

On the 3^rd or 4^th day of war, when the IAF has achieved air superiority, a fighter jet can carry out a strike mission deep in the enemy territory and drop a one-ton or two-ton warhead on the target, completely decimating it. Packing this kind of firepower in a missile would make it as heavy as ground-based Agni missiles.

Conclusion

The debate over finding cost-effective weapons is as old as the military itself. While it is imperative that taxpayers’ money is spent judiciously, the goal of the armed forces is not creating the most favourable balance sheet, but to create a military that can commiserate with India’s national security priorities.

For a country with limited resources, exorbitant costs can be prohibitive. The IAF cannot make a binary choice between the fighter jets and the long-range missiles. It needs to strike a balance between the two options, as offensive air power and air defence will remain important pillars of air power in the future.

Operation Sindoor demonstrated how India can use fighter jets, missiles and drones in tandem to achieve national objectives of inflicting cost on the sponsors of terrorists while tightly controlling the escalation.

In terms of absolute cost, expendable missiles might be cheaper than a fighter jet, but they lack flexibility, human-in-the-loop adaptability and the power of political signalling. In network-centric warfare, the fighters can act as airborne sensor nodes, linking the AWACS with SAMs and drones.

Building a missile stockpile capable of sustaining a long-drawn-out, high-intensity war would require years. Even major powers like the US don’t have an infinite stockpile. In 2022, the US was producing about 500-600 missiles per year. In a few weeks of high-intensity war, several hundred can be used.

Operation Sindoor lasted just 88 hours. However, the picture could have been different had it been carried out for a longer duration. India would have required a potent fighter jet fleet to quarterback a missile stockpile.

The Fighter Aircraft Market, valued at USD 29.11 billion in 2024, is expected to grow 4.1 per cent annually from 2026 to 2033, achieving USD 41.25 billion by 2033. This is despite advances in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The global trend is that air forces are transitioning to 5th-generation fighter jets, prioritising stealth and multi-role.[19]

Lessons can also be drawn from the major powers–the US is investing billions in 6th-generation fighters while carrying out massive procurement of long-range missiles and drones; Russia has learned to survive in the face of strong air defence by linking its fighter jets with SAMs, and China is mass-producing 5th-generation fighters at a rate that has made countries in the region anxious. The bottom line is that none of the major powers is abandoning fighter jets; these war jets are gearing up into hybrid platforms for future warfare.

India should also resolve its dilemma and move forward with a hybrid doctrine. Missiles and drones will provide cost-effective strike capabilities, but fighter jets will be indispensable for strategic deterrence, escalation control, and, above all, political signaling. Crewed Fighter jets are an important instrument for air control.

There will be a time when the crewed fighter jets will fly into the sunset, but that day is not today. If the IAF has to draw lessons from the major powers, the time calls for a hybrid doctrine rather than missile dominance. Invest in multi-role fighter jets and build a credible rocket force.

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Notes:-

^[1] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Theaterisation proposal to be shared with defence ministry in a week or so – CDS Anil Chauhan,” The Print, April 09, 2026, https://theprint.in/defence/theaterisation-proposal-to-be-shared-with-defence-ministry-in-a-week-or-so-cds-gen-anil-chauhan/2901010/. Accessed on April 19, 2026. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

^[2] Poorva Joshi, “IAF’s S-400 shot down 5 Pakistani fighter jets during Operation Sindoor: Air Chief Marshal AP Singh,” Hindustan Times, August 09, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/iafs-s-400-shot-down-5-pakistani-fighter-jets-during-operation-sindoor-air-chief-marshal-ap-singh-101754724209442.html. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[3] Ronit Bisht, “Evaluating Ops Sindoor: Why Standoff Precision Missiles Should Replace High-Risk Manned Fighter Missions, Explains Retired Lt. General,” Defence.In, April 17, 2026, https://defence.in/threads/evaluating-ops-sindoor-why-standoff-precision-missiles-should-replace-high-risk-manned-fighter-missions-explains-retired-lt-general.17492/. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[4] Jasjit Singh, “The Indian Air Force in Wars,” Air Power Review, vol. 14, issue. 3, November 2011, https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/apr-vol14-iss3-5-pdf/. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[5] Diptendu Choudhury, “IAF’s Revised Doctrine 2022: An Overview,” Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), February 07, 2023, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/february/07/iafs-revised-doctrine-2022-an-overview. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[6] Harsh V. Pant, “Throwing down the gauntlet: Balakot Air Strikes,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), February 27, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/throwing-down-the-gauntlet-balakot-air-strikes-48595. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Transcript of Special Briefing on Operation Sindoor,” May 07, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/39474/Transcript+of+Special+Briefing+on+OPERATION+SINDOOR+May+07+2025. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[8] Vishnu Som, The Sky Warriors (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2026), pp. 41-47.

[9] Dinaker Peri, “Military Lessons from Operation Sindoor,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 06, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/military-lessons-from-operation-sindoor. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[10] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Operation SINDOOR: The Rise of Aatmanirbhar Innovation in National Security,” May 14, 2025, https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/may/doc2025514554901.pdf. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[11] Som, n.8.

[12] Ritu Sharma, “S-400 Triumphs! How India Foiled Pakistan’s Ferocious Attack on India’s 2^nd Biggest Airbase at Adampur: Ground Report,” The EurAsian Times, May 15, 2025, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/adampur-air-base-how-india-foiled-pakistans/. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[13] Som, n.8.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Hely Desai, Bashir Ali Abbas, Sidharth Raimedhi, “Operation Sindoor – A Timeline,” Council for Strategic and Defense Research, May 2025, https://csdronline.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/CSDR_May-2025_OpSindoor-.pdf. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

^[16] Thomas Hamilton, “Comparing the Cost of Penetrating Bombers to Expendable Missiles over Thirty Years: An Initial Look,” RAND Publications, August 2010, file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/RAND_WR778.pdf. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Justin Bronk, “The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats,” Royal United Services Institute, January 8, 2026, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/evolution-russian-and-chinese-air-power-threats. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

[19] Sudeep Pednekar, “Global Fighter Aircraft Market Size, Growth Trends & Forecast 2026-2034, 7^th Edition 2026,” Verified Market Report, 2026, https://www.verifiedmarketreports.com/product/fighter-aircraft-market/#:~:text=The%20rising%20emphasis%20on%20unmanned%20aerial%20vehicles,enhancing%20operational%20efficiency%20and%20reducing%20pilot%20risk. Accessed on April 19, 2026.

The post Beyond the Kill Zone: Why Fighter Jets Still Matter for India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Military History, Inter-service rivalry, Theatre Command, Air Force

Introduction

The war in West Asia has triggered an interesting set of debates in the Indian military.  Veterans from each service have been highlighting the irrelevance of the other services on social media, in TV debates, and in print media. Some have argued that the surface navy is irrelevant, especially the aircraft carriers. Others have opined that manned aircraft are irrelevant and suggested moving to an independent drone and rocket force. Some have questioned the utility of massive ground forces in modern battles, especially tanks and armoured formations. The civilian audience is amused by why the services are fighting amongst themselves in the media when they should ideally be fighting the enemy. While it may appear to be something new and unique to India, it is absolutely common behaviour worldwide. In fact, some past debates have been much fiercer. This article revisits one such debate from the 1920s to show how little things have changed over a century and what lessons can be drawn from these inter-service rivalries.

Origin of Twentieth Century Inter-Service Rivalries: Birth of the RAF

The German air raids on London in 1917 were a turning point in inter-service relations. While millions had died on the Front since 1914, it didn’t matter as much to the politicians as the air strikes on the capital of the mighty British Empire. This was beyond the policymakers’ imagination. Immediately, the British Prime Minister George Lloyd constituted the Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air Raids with General Jan Smuts as its head. Its mandate was to examine how to defend Britain from air raids and how air operations and their supporting structures should be organised.

This Committee recommended the creation of an Air Ministry and an Independent Air Service at par with the Army and the Navy. The committee concluded by stating that, “Air supremacy in the long run will become as important a factor in the defence of the empire as sea supremacy.” This laid the foundation for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918. A key argument that justified the creation of an independent air force is reproduced here:

Smuts Committee Arguments as to Why the Air Force Should be an Independent Force

The Royal Air Force was created as the world’s first independent air force, on April 01, 1918, introducing the youngest and most energetic player in inter-service rivalries. The RAF was created by merging the assets and personnel from the air arms and was granted equal status with the Army and the Navy. This naturally caused resentment, as the services essentially viewed it as an elevation of their own support arms to equal combatant status. However, they had no choice but to comply since it was a political decision by the Cabinet.

Every Man for Himself: Survival in the Decade of Fiscal Austerity – 1920s

The timing of the creation of the RAF couldn’t have been worse. The First World War ended within a few months of the creation of the RAF, and the defence budget immediately dried up. As part of post-war demobilisation, there were massive cuts in manpower and material. All institutions created during the war were put under review, and several were threatened with closure. To avoid the axe, each ministry/service often questioned the rationale for the existence of the other while justifying its own relevance.

The Cabinet, on its part, suspended all new warship building until the effectiveness of submarines and aircraft could be assessed through a detailed study. The Army vehemently argued for retaining its manpower in the infantry despite new forms of warfare such as aircraft and tanks, but was overruled by the political authority.

The RAF got a lease of hope when Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard conceived the idea of ‘Air Substitution’- a policy of using aircraft to police colonies without deploying the British Army regulars on the ground. This was both economical and politically preferred, but it challenged the Army’s role in colonial control, leading to a reduction in manpower.

Cabinet Note on The Separate Existence of the Royal Air Force and the Air Ministry Scheme of Expansion for Home Defence, July 1923

Meanwhile, both the Army and the Navy took the extreme step when they moved the case to abolish the independent RAF.

Cabinet Note on The Separate Existence of the Royal Air Force and the Air Ministry

Role of Political Leadership in Inter-Service Rivalries

Had the military been allowed to decide for themselves, there is a very strong possibility that the independent RAF would have been abolished there and then based on consensus. Here, politicians like Winston Churchill played a major role. One must remember that it was on their initiative that the independent air force was created, not through the military’s efforts. Therefore, while all this intense rivalry amongst the services was on, the Cabinet set up a committee on the Amalgamation of Services Common to the Navy, Army and Air Force on February 17, 1922. This was to identify areas of duplication and bring in economy by amalgamating wherever feasible. All branches except Defence Estates were supposed to be examined. It had already been decided to manage the defence land centrally. This committee had a diverse set of members drawn from the civilian and the military, with the following mandate:

Terms of Reference for the Committee on Amalgamation of Services

It is very interesting to compare what the committee instinctively thought and what the actual data finally revealed. The initial thoughts, based on the arguments put forth by each service, gave the impression of enormous duplication/triplication, and a huge scope for rationalisation. However, the results at the end of the study by experts revealed quite the opposite. Contrary to popular belief, not much duplication/triplication actually existed.

The committee finally recommended only amalgamating Work Services and setting a committee to further examine the medical services. Today, there is a common MES (Military Engineering Services) and a commonly administered medical arm for all three services- an outcome that could be traced to this committee a hundred years ago.

So, Why Discuss This 100-Year-Old Case Now?

History has plenty of lessons to offer those who seek to benefit from it. The terms of reference of the Amalgamation Committee in 1926 and the Department of Military Affairs’ mandate towards optimisation are very similar. Both these initiatives tried to achieve economic benefit by aggregating the service demands or organisations. This 1926 committee laid the initial foundations of the joint services that the Indian Armed Forces subsequently inherited post-independence. A hundred years later, in 2026, it remains the same time-tested structure, with common Defence Estates, MES, and medical services across the Indian Armed Forces. Yet, this committee has not been referred to in any debate/talk so far. This is possibly due to a lack of academic rigour and enquiry into the history.

A reading of this 1926 report would also have revealed how operationally ineffective several peacetime jointness ideas are. Take the case of joint logistics. Ships need to be loaded at ports before they sail, air forces need frequent replenishment from fixed bases due to the tempo of air operations, and the Army needed prior positioning in places as the war progressed. During wartime, these places weren’t usually co-located. The report cited the practical difficulties in achieving common technical equipment, as each service had a unique role and therefore unique equipment. This difficulty was in an era when equipment wasn’t so technically complex. Today, the problem is much more severe. An anonymous user on social media platform X compiled images from the official social media handles of the Indian Army and concluded that the Infantry alone operates 29 small arms across 10 calibers from 16 countries. Thus, even single-arm logistics is a nightmare during operations. Why have lessons from history not been considered?

Similarly, instead of looking to theatre commands in the United States, China, or Russia for inspiration, it would be better to refer to India’s own history. The Second World War was fought with China-Burma-India as a single theatre under a single commander, Admiral Louis Mountbatten. If the communication capabilities of that era could facilitate command and control over this expanse of geography and millions of personnel, there is no reason why, in 2026, command and control cannot be exercised by a single India Theatre Command for the whole of India.

1943-44 Map of China-Burma-India Theatre Source: The National Archives, US

These are just two instances in which the past can guide present reforms. There are many more. Churchill once said, “The further backward you can look the further forward you are likely to see.” In the ongoing reforms in India, whether it is a deliberate action to ignore the lessons of the past, since the outcomes do not support the current course of action, or plain ignorance, remains unknown. In the author’s opinion, thorough research of own history and analysis are essential before any policy change. This is as a matter of national interest and needs attention.

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Keywords: Operation Sindoor, NATO, Cyber, Cognitive Warfare, Vision 2047

“The purpose of warfare is not to fight; it is to achieve a political objective. If you can achieve this objective without kinetic conflict, so much the better.”

                   Prof Nora Bensahel[1]

Introduction

On March 10, 2026, India’s Ministry of Defence released Defence Forces Vision 2047: A Roadmap for a Future-Ready Indian Military. The document outlines reforms, capability enhancements, and structural changes to make the Indian military future-ready. This document envisages, among other initiatives, the setting up of a Cognitive Warfare Action Force.[2] The concept of cognitive warfare capability is a novel inclusion.

Inclusion of Cognitive Warfare may have its genesis in the war of narratives that erupted during and in the wake of Operation Sindoor. The Pakistani narratives overshadowed the Indian stories, leading to the downplaying of the total dominance achieved by the Indian military. In today’s post-truth world, strong narratives catch attention and evoke emotions, shaping public opinion. Appealing narratives, even if based on misinformation and untruth, still manage to catch attention. Facts by themselves carry no story. The story or narrative emerges when facts are woven into a thread to reflect an opinion. Selective inclusion of facts can craft stories that align with the beliefs and emotions of a target constituency. In such a scenario, retaining public support and garnering support of allies requires strong capabilities in crafting and sustaining dominant narratives and discrediting those that are contrary. There is thus a need to craft narratives that advance one’s opinions and challenge and discredit opposing narratives spread by adversaries.

Cognitive Warfare and Narrative Shaping

Narratives are becoming increasingly influential in international relations. A nation’s hard power comprises its capabilities in the military, economic, and social domains. On the other hand, narratives are a powerful tool of a nation’s soft power and shape other states’ perception of its actions and events. Narratives are used to gain influence and may be used as a weapon against rivals and enemies. They facilitate good relations and, if used inappropriately, derail dialogue. The United States (US) and the West are prime examples of narrative weaponisation through news and media control. During the initial days of the Ukraine-Russia War, news and opinions emerging from Russia were blocked, and a one-sided narrative of the war was projected to the world, casting Russia as the villain of the piece.

The Indian focus on cognitive warfare in the Vision 2047 is therefore very timely. Cognitive warfare involves creating compelling narratives that resonate with people, influencing local public opinion and shaping the opinions of target audiences. Cognitive warfare has come to the fore even in the USA, with Frank Hoffman (credited with popularising the term Hybrid Warfare) stressing the need for the US military to actively appreciate its importance.

Understanding Cognitive Warfare

But what is cognitive warfare? Cognitive warfare is a non-kinetic means of supporting the achievement of the nation’s security objectives. It attempts to influence the decision-making of the adversary’s leadership and the opinion of its population. According to Frank Hoffman, it is the application of targeted and tailored messages and nonviolent methods against civilian and military decision-makers, or the general population of a target state, to gain a positional advantage in the cognitive domain or to achieve desired political, military, and informational outcomes. [3]

 As per the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), cognitive warfare aims to affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing or disrupting individual and group cognition.[4] According to the Defence Forces Vision 2047, cognitive warfare identifies the human mind as a key battlefield. With its three key enablers of cyber, psychological, and information operations, it poses a critical security challenge. Focused disinformation exploits societal, cultural, religious, and economic fault lines to sow disorder and chaos, and to weaken nations from within. [5]

While the term may appear to be of recent origin, a peek into history would reveal that this mode of warfare has a long history. Many would recollect that in the Eastern theatre during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Indian forces were advancing towards Dacca. Around December 13, 1971, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Sam Manekshaw sent a stern, direct message to Pakistani forces in East Pakistan to surrender or face annihilation. He declared, “You surrender, or we wipe you out.” In return for surrender, he promised treatment according to the Geneva Convention and protection from attacks by Mukti Bahini and agitated Bangladeshis. This message, to a large extent, influenced the Pakistani forces’ decision to surrender.[6] The messaging from General Manekshaw may well be considered as cognitive warfare, shaping the enemy’s decision to align with the Indian military’s objective.

A more recent example of this kind of warfare is China’s attempts over decades to create a mindset among the Taiwanese population to accept reunion with the mainland. On average, Taiwan is flooded with up to 2,400 pieces of disinformation from the mainland daily. Most of these attempts aim to induce people to elect a leadership that is favourable towards reuniting with the mainland. These attempts have yet to yield the desired results for China.[7]

This kind of warfare has therefore been with us for some time. In recent times, however, new technologies have enhanced the efficacy of communication by an order of magnitude. Gone is the earlier model: a large number of posts, millions of fake accounts, and battalions of bots pushing content across the media. Now the measure is not the volume of posts but algorithms and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven storytelling. These changes have transformed cognitive warfare into a viable means of manipulating public opinion, influencing the decision-making of target countries.

Cognitive Warfare and Other Non-Kinetic Tools

Cognitive warfare, as per the Defence Forces Vision, employs psychological warfare and cyber and information operations as enablers. In any case, cognitive and psychological warfare both aim to target the adversary’s mind and thinking and are thus similar. Considering that cognitive warfare depends on crafting and spreading narratives, the action group would need to control the necessary cyber and information resources to launch its messages. The proposal for setting up the cyber command and centralisation of cyber operations may restrict the scope of the cognitive action force. Similar interference may occur in information operations as well. A solution may lie in an omnibus non-kinetic action force that combines cognitive action force, cyber, and information operations. This will improve functional efficiency, avoid coordination issues and prevent each function from operating in silos.

The other aspect is that cognitive and other non-kinetic forms of warfare differ substantially between military and civilian applications. Cognitive warfare, when employed by the military, may aim to exploit opportunities for deception or target the will and morale of enemy forces in specific operational contexts, with results expected in the near-term. When used against the adversary’s population or civilian leadership, the objectives would be to change behaviour or alter the thinking on certain contentious issues, such as China’s attempts to influence the Taiwanese population to reunite with the mainland. The means and processes would differ between the military and the civilian applications. In civilian applications, the time frames extend to years or decades, as seen in China’s attempts to influence Taiwan. Influencing people presupposes knowledge of their culture, behaviour, and beliefs. This would require expertise generally residing with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and academicians. Though the Defence Forces Vision 2047 appears to include even civilian applications that relate to sowing disorder among the population, such initiatives are best left to other professionals. It would be better for the military to focus on employing non-kinetic forms of warfare to further their plans rather than assuming responsibility for other facets, such as influencing the adversary’s political leadership or population.

Political Warfare

The coining of cognitive warfare and its inclusion in military parlance reminds one of the eminent military analyst, Colin S. Gray’s term ‘presentism’.[8] He described it as a tendency of each generation to view the problems it faces as unique, something not encountered earlier, disregarding historical continuities. A much better approach to cognitive or non-kinetic warfare was articulated long ago during the Cold War period by George F Kennan, an eminent American diplomat famous for his “Long Telegram.”  He called all these non-kinetic means “Political Warfare.” He defined it as applying Carl von Clausewitz’s doctrine in peacetime. Political warfare, as per him, was the employment of all means at a nation’s command short of war, to achieve national objectives.[9]

Cognitive, information, psychological, and cyber operations, which overlap in scope and are often employed together, need to be discussed in the language of political warfare, which refers to the employment of non-kinetic methods in peacetime. It would also obviate the need to look at each of these categories in isolation, leading to operating in silos, duplicating effort, or interfering with each other’s functioning.

Since the use of these tools differs between military and civilian purposes, each is best managed by a different agency. In the Indian context, the civilian part of “Political Warfare” may be managed by the National Security Advisor’s (NSA’s) secretariat, while the military aspects of “Non-Kinetic Warfare” are undertaken by individual Services and coordinated by the Integrated Defence Staff Headquarters (HQ, IDS), which may also liaise with the NSA’s secretariat for improved military-civil coordination.

Limitations of Cognitive Warfare

Even as the military contemplates creating a Cognitive Warfare Action Force, there is a need to understand the major limitations of cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare results in dissension and harassment within the target country’s military or in confusion in decision-making. However, the disruptions and inconvenience are unlikely to be so severe as to force opponents to yield to unpalatable demands. Such non-kinetic tools are weak, slow to produce outcomes, and their impact is nebulous, making them unlikely to coerce an opponent or tilt the balance of power. Unlike force or violence, cognitive warfare does not threaten death and destruction and thus cannot bring about finality in a confrontation. It is therefore best employed in conjunction with other domains such as land, sea, air, and space. Cognitive operations can be employed in peace and before the commencement of military operations to dent enemy morale and interfere with decision-making by feeding disinformation and sowing discord. During war, all domains can be integrated to overwhelm the adversary.

Another major limitation of cognitive warfare, or of crafting dominant narratives, is their long-term efficacy. Any narrative in the long-term will need to align with reality. In this regard, the Ukraine-Russia War may be illustrative. In the early stages of the war, major global news agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press (AP), and Agence France-Presse (AFP) banned the broadcast of Russian news. As a result, only a one-sided perspective from the West was shared worldwide. Videos such as “Ghost of Kyiv,” which depicted a Ukrainian MiG-29 shooting down innumerable Russian fighters, went viral. The video turned out to be false. Over time, everyone realised the video was fabricated. Even today, news emerging from this war continues to be one-sided, showcasing Ukrainian heroism and resistance. However, all these narratives cannot hide the fact that Russia is today in occupation of over 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory, with Ukraine unable to recapture it. Narrative shaping sounds very good and enthrals followers for some time. But ultimately, reality cannot be brushed aside.

The cliché, “shaping the narrative is as important as shaping the battlefield,” remains what it is: a cliché. Stories ultimately have to yield to reality. Pakistani narratives about air superiority during Op Sindoor initially dominated social media. However, the bull horns have quietened over time when countered with facts. Reality emerged when Western think tanks accepted Indian dominance and commended the exceptionally crafted and controlled punitive strategy. Reality over time doused the flames of false narratives.

Conclusion

The Indian military’s focus on cognitive warfare is timely and appropriate. Enhancing narrative crafting and dissemination skills is necessary in today’s socially connected, wired world. Narrative dominance does bring dividends in the form of improved domestic and foreign support. The methodology of implementing this concept, however, needs more thought. Considering the overlap in scope and similarity of objectives, it would be desirable to bring all non-kinetic tools under unified control. This would enable better coordination and integrated employment. The military should focus only on military applications with immediate, measurable outcomes. The civilian applications, which are long-term and nebulous in their impact, are best undertaken by an agency within the NSA. IDS could enable coordination between the military and civilian applications.

Cognitive warfare is appealing because of its promise to achieve security interests without resorting to force. But it must be understood that, while it may appear formidable, it cannot ensure decisive outcomes. Projecting it as an effective tool to preclude war and violence is, therefore, somewhat of an exaggeration. Such exaggeration would be harmless were it not for the fact that it relates to the serious business of war and a country’s survival. Cognitive warfare and other kinetic tools are best visualised as options for political warfare: employing Clausewitz’s doctrine in peacetime. In war, these may be employed in an integrated multi-domain operation. Any overestimation of the efficacy of this particular tool may distort the overall strategy during wartime, jeopardising the chances of victory. In peacetime, such thinking may lead to the allocation of resources to bolster capabilities in cognitive operations, reducing those for kinetic warfare. The results can prove disastrous when expectations are belied. Prudence and perspicacity demand that cognitive warfare should not be considered as a substitute for force or violence. These tools are best employed to support military operations in wartime and to further diplomatic interests in peacetime. When considering non-kinetic tools, it is best to keep in mind Hannah Arendt’s advice that “The chief reason warfare is still with us is … the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene.”[10].

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Notes:-

[1]  Cybèle C. Greenberg, “Could Cyberwar Make the World Safer?”  New York Times, August 22, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/22/opinion/cyberwar-world-safety.html. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[2] Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Government of India, “Defence Forces Vision 2047,” 2026, https://ids.nic.in/landing_page?id=TVRJek5EVTJOemd4TWpNME5UWTNPREV5TXpRMU5qYzRNVEl6Tkc4ZHZiVENEVGdtNU9lMnMtbnpmVTc2WHZv&type=Home%20Page. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[3] Frank Hoffman, Assessing “Cognitive Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, November 14, 2025,  https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/14/assessing-cognitive-warfare/. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[6] “Cognitive Warfare: Strengthening and Defending the Mind,” North Atlantic Trade Organisation, April 5, 2023 https://www.act.nato.int/article/cognitive-warfare-strengthening-and-defending-the-mind/. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[5] IDS, n. 2.

[6] Rustam, “Vijay Diwas – ‘You surrender or we wipe you out’: When Sam Manekshaw threatened Pak in 1971 Bangladesh liberation war,” WION, December 15, 2020, https://www.wionews.com/photos/vijay-diwas-you-surrender-or-we-wipe-you-out-when-sam-manekshaw-threatened-pak-in-1971-bangladesh-liberation-war-349940. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[7]  Matthew Becerra, “The Battle for Reality: Chinese Disinformation in Taiwan,” Geopolitical Monitor, August 24, 2022, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-battle-for-reality-chinese-disinformation-in-taiwan/; and Tzu-Chieh Hung and Tzu-Wei Hung, “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars,” Journal of Global Security Studies, vol. 7, issue. 4, December 2022, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/7/4/ogac016/6647447?login=false. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[8]  Chris Tuck, “Hybrid War: The Perfect Enemy,” Defence in Depth, April 25, 2017, https://defenceindepth.co/2017/04/25/hybrid-war-the-perfect-enemy/. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[9] George F. Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” Wilson Centre Digital Archive, April 30, 1948, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/george-f-kennan-inauguration-organized-political-warfare. Accessed on April 16, 2026.

[10]  Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1970), p. 5.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post Appraising Cognitive Warfare for Vision 2047 appeared first on CAPSS India.

A high-intensity war erupted in Western Asia between 28 February and 7 April 2026, before leading to a ceasefire that may only be a brief pause before the resumption of hostilities. This 38-day war was primarily an air campaign: the Israelis and Americans deployed around five hundred tactical combat aircraft, supported by a wide array of force multipliers such as aerial refuelling tankers, electronic warfare aircraft, and airborne early warning and command platforms. Dozens of reconnaissance and strike drones, a vast intelligence apparatus, communications systems, and cyber warfare capabilities—including a satellite ecosystem with unique capabilities—along with long-range precision strike capabilities from naval and land-based systems, completed this operational setup.

Operating most often from bases or ships located far from Iran’s borders, the Americans, according to their own statements, had struck more than 13,000 targets by 6 April 2026, conducting more than 13,000 combat sorties.[1] As of 1 April, Israeli aircrews had struck 4,000 targets and dropped 16,000 munitions on Iran. More than 2,000 separate aerial refuelings were required to enable their fighters to operate over Iran, approximately 1,500 kilometres from their home bases.[2] These figures attest to a very high-intensity campaign following a classical methodology aimed first at decapitating the enemy’s command structure, then targeting its defences, offensive capabilities, and finally the infrastructure needed to regenerate them.

For their part, the Iranians resisted as best they could despite the overwhelming superiority of the coalition forces and the considerable damage sustained. Their air defences notably succeeded in damaging at least three coalition combat aircraft (a F-15, a F-35, and two F-18), shooting down three others (an F-15E and two A-10s), as well as 30 large reconnaissance and combat drones (11 Hermes 900, 4 Heron TP, 13 MQ-9 Reaper, and 2 Wing Loong II).[3] In addition, between 28 February and 7 April 2026, Iranian forces launched at least 2,300 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 6’500 attack drones in counter-force strikes—targeting military objectives—and counter-value strikes, aimed at economic, civilian, or symbolic infrastructure in order to inflict maximum cost on their adversaries.[4] They managed to maintain a relatively steady firing rate from 9 March 2026 onward, with an average of about one hundred munitions launched per day, achieving several notable military successes along the way, such as the destruction on the ground of an E-3 airborne early warning and command aircraft, as well as several radars essential for intercepting ballistic missiles.

At this stage, although still little is known about the exact conduct and course of these operations, their observation already allows for some lessons to be drawn that are applicable to Switzerland and its security policy.

Centrality of cyber

The Israeli-American offensive was not only kinetic: it also involved a multitude of cyberattacks, highlighting the critical importance of secure and hardened communications infrastructures. It was also preceded by numerous information and influence operations, which nevertheless did not achieve their objective, namely a popular uprising. These elements encourage the Confederation to continue and intensify the efforts already undertaken in this area within the framework of its security policy.

The importance of civil protection

The fact that Israel recorded only 21 civilian deaths after enduring 479 waves of Iranian attacks is due not only to the effectiveness of its missile defences, but also to a highly developed civil protection infrastructure. It is indeed unrealistic to assume that all enemy munitions can be intercepted. This infrastructure notably includes protected rooms in newer buildings, a large number of public shelters, as well as an alert system enabling the population to be informed in real time. This confirms the crucial role of civil protection in Switzerland, which must be funded accordingly.

Worrisome capability gaps

The assessment is worrying regarding Switzerland’s ability to face a long-range air campaign. The modernisation of its integrated air operation command and coordination system has been delayed, while no system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles is currently in service. Due to repeated delays in the delivery of Patriot systems and the slow decision-making processes in Switzerland to find a substitute, this capability gap is likely to persist.[5] In contrast, the order of five medium-range IRIS-T systems should help meet another major requirement.[6] However, the segment of decentralised air defence systems, designed to intercept low-cost munitions fired in large numbers—particularly long-range attack drones—remains neglected, even though addressing it would require modernising and expanding the existing anti-air artillery inventory or acquiring new dedicated systems.

Extended ranges

The campaign also highlights the limitations of Switzerland’s small fighter fleet, nowadays based around 30 aging F/A-18 C/D. Operations in the Persian Gulf showed that the first line of defence against long-range strikes rests on fighter aircraft, which can intercept part of the enemy munitions (attack drones, cruise missiles) before they reach the engagement envelope of air defence systems. For a small air force, this requires aircraft capable of sustaining repeated missions while carrying a significant number of air-to-air missiles. On the offensive side, the campaign underscores the need for very long-range air-to-ground munitions, allowing targets to be struck without entering adversary defence bubbles. Switzerland currently lacks such capabilities entirely. It must therefore acquire long-range precision strike capabilities, whether ground-based or air-based, adapted to contemporary engagement distances, otherwise it will only be able to absorb attacks without being able to disrupt them.

Stockpiles and attrition

After Ukraine, this third Gulf war confirms the importance of maintaining substantial ammunition stockpiles, essential for sustaining a conflict over time, given that several months or even years can pass between the order and delivery of sophisticated munitions. This issue is even more critical as such munitions—long-range air-to-ground missiles, missile interceptors, or air-to-air missiles—are very expensive. There is a temptation to reduce quantities in order to acquire more weapon systems, at the risk of severely limiting their usefulness due to a lack of available ammunition. This reasoning also applies to reconnaissance drones, which, given their high attrition in combat, must be considered consumables.

The value of hardened infrastructure

The Iranians succeeded in preserving most of their missile arsenal, as well as a large part of their drones and combat aircraft, thanks to deeply buried underground facilities, largely protected against American penetrating munitions. Carved into mountainsides, these installations recall the caverns built in Switzerland during the Cold War. This observation supports maintaining and refurbishing existing fortified infrastructure.

Dispersion and mobility as imperatives

The Iranians also dispersed and concealed their assets, making extensive use of decoys and frequently changing their positions. In contrast, the Americans suffered several losses due to their tendency not to relocate their air defence batteries. In the Swiss context, this confirms the relevance of efforts aimed at operating flexibly from dispersed bases, as well as the need to acquire weapon systems that are easily deployable and compatible with rudimentary infrastructure.

Issues related to the F-35 procurement

These lessons also raise questions about the ongoing acquisition of the F-35 to replace the Hornet. While it has proven effective as a spearhead of the coalition operations thanks to its stealth and advanced information-gathering and exploitation capabilities, its availability rate remains lower than that of other aircraft, and its operation depends on a substantial support infrastructure. Moreover, its design prioritises stealth at the expense of payload capacity. These factors, combined with the known challenges of the programme, suggest that—short of a politically difficult cancellation of the order, already reduced from 36 to 30 aircraft—it could be further reduced to a single squadron of about a dozen aircraft, in favour of a mixed fleet including aircraft better suited to sustained high-intensity operations, such as the Gripen E or the Rafale.

The end of air supremacy as a given

Since the early 1990s, it has been widely assumed that Western armed forces would operate with air superiority, or even air supremacy. This third Gulf war, like the conflict in Ukraine, demonstrates that it is now possible to conduct asymmetric air campaigns based on relatively inexpensive long-range precision munitions. This challenges many doctrinal fundamentals and requires relearning how to operate in an environment where the air threat is omnipresent.

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Notes:-

[1] United Stated Central Command, “Operation Epic Fury Fact Sheet, April 6, 2026” & “Operation Epic Fury Fact Sheet, April 1, 2026”

[2] IDF communique via Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian @manniefabian, X account, April 1 2026.

[3] Elmustek substack account, Operation Epic Fury-Documenting Equipment Losses during the 2026 Israel/USA – Iran war, consulted April 21 2026. Completed by author own’s monitoring based on various US media communiques.

[4] « Iran Missile and Drone Attacks : Full List of Targets and Number Launched” Faytuks Network Intelligence, April 20 2026.

[5] Andy Müller and Dominik Meier, «Swiss face further delay in delivery of US defence system.” Swissinfo.ch, March 5, 2026.

[6] Armasuisse, « DSA MP : le contrat d’acquisition en coopération pour la défense sol-air de moyen portée est signé », 22 juillet 2025.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS ]  & CHPM)

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Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Su-57, Rafale, Atmanirbharta, Union Budget 2026, Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft

Introduction

The world has entered a more volatile phase. From the prolonged Russia-Ukraine War to emerging political tensions involving the United States (US). This environment has led to increased defence budgets globally, and India is expected to follow suit. The United States recently proposed a significant budget, targeting nearly USD 1.5 trillion by 2027, which is approximately 50 per cent higher than previous projections.[1] As global political tensions continue to escalate, governments are prioritising their defence spending to address these challenges.

The Union Budget 2026-27, presented by the Finance Minister of India, Nirmala Sitharaman, on February 01, 2026, has placed importance on increasing India’s defence spending.[2] This reinforces the twin imperatives of Atmanirbharta: modernisation and innovation. Compared with last year’s budget allocation of approximately INR 6.81 lakh crore, there was a sharp 15 per cent increase this year, according to the detailed report released by the Indian government. The current allocation to the defence spending stands at INR 7.85 lakh crore. Of this, the largest share is in revenue expenditure (INR 5.5 lakh crore), and a little goes to capital outlay (INR 2.19 lakh crore) and pensions (INR 1.7 lakh crore).[3] This number is not just about size. It has signalled a shift in mindset – from reactive defence to long-term preparation. However, the question is ‘Why Now?’

Strategic Imperatives

There is undoubtedly a strategic context behind India’s increase in defence spending. Recently, India has faced heightened tensions with Pakistan, especially following Operation Sindoor in 2025.  The Union Budget for 2026, which followed Operation Sindoor, reflected the need for enhanced operational readiness in light of this brief conflict. Concurrently, Pakistan has raised its defence spending by 20 per cent, despite facing economic constraints.

On the other hand, India’s geographical position compels it to focus on protecting its national security, with China remaining the major strategic challenge. China’s military is much larger and far better funded than India’s (more than three times as much). The Line of Actual Control (LAC) requires 24×7 surveillance, mobility, air defence, and rapid deployment infrastructure. The contested neighbourhood continues to explain why India needs to strengthen its defence infrastructure. Modernising the old and ageing military equipment has become a necessity today rather than a choice.

The idea of a “twin threat” and a “two-front war” remains the ever-present threat.[4] The existential nightmare is primarily the silent creeping aggression along the vast LAC. The examples of the Galwan Valley bloodbath, new military outposts, land grabbing, and its arrogant dismissal of Indian sovereignty are indeed a part of the larger playbook to crush India’s rise. With Pakistan acting as Beijing’s attack dog, it is keeping India’s war room lit 24×7.

It is perhaps a moment of systemic geopolitical rupture, one that brings a wider global conflict knocking at the door. The fuse is lit in Beijing, with assistance in Islamabad. Imagining the worst-case scenario – what will be the case if India ever enters a full-scale two-front war with China and Pakistan? Pakistan will step in if there is a full-scale Indo-China conflict. However, if there is ever a full-scale invasion between India and Pakistan, it is still doubtful whether China will enter or not. Either case requires strategic rebalancing and even lessons from history. In the 1965 Indo-Pak war, India had made sure that its borders with China were secured first before it shifted all its focus to Pakistan.

Building Future-Ready Air Power Capabilities

While a full-scale war between the two nuclear neighbours is not desirable and unlikely, India is still well placed to pin down the Pakistan Air Force and dominate the skies. The bigger problem is China, as it feverishly modernises its nuclear forces and the fighter aircraft fleet. India must address the fighter jet crisis first. The current fighter squadron strength is 31, and it must be around 42 or more. After the MIG-21 retirement last year, the IAF is down to 29 squadrons already.[5]

The planned solutions indicate expansion of Rafale fighter jets and Su-57 fighter jets, which are the two parallel paths being contemplated for India’s future fighter fleet. A large-scale expansion of the Rafale fleet through indigenous manufacturing, and perhaps the renewed technical talks with Russia on the fifth-generation Su-57.[6] Why is it a parallel path and not a competitive one? India is not viewing the Rafale and the Su-57 as competing or mutually exclusive choices. Instead, each addresses a distinct operational requirement in India’s evolving air combat doctrine. Precisely, the Rafale induction means near-term force density with reliability.[7] Integrating Su-57 fighter jets into the IAF will be about capability exploration and technology absorption. On the other hand, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme would bring long-term sovereignty.

The defence ministry plans to procure 114 Rafale fighter jets – the largest-ever procurement that India has undertaken, if cleared. Manufacturing will initially be around 30 per cent indigenous and later increase to 60 per cent. Since there are already 36 aircraft inducted by the Indian Air Force (IAF), 26 Rafale-M jets ordered by the navy, and it plans to induct 12 to 18 more aircraft in fly-away condition, the total would reach around 176. Why the push?

Rafale reportedly played a significant role during Operation Sindoor, particularly against advanced Chinese air-to-air missiles using the Spectra electronic warfare suite.[8] Rafale is a 4.5-generation, twin-engine, delta-wing multirole fighter aircraft with an extended combat radius. It has a maximum speed of Mach 1.8 at high altitude and Mach 1.1 at low altitude. It features an advanced avionics suite and the SPECTRA electronic survival system, incorporating a Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), a Laser Warning Receiver (LWR), a Missile Approach Warning (MAW), a phased-array jammer, and a decoy dispenser.[9] The programme will not only be a replacement for the ageing MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircraft, but primarily play select roles of the Mirage 2000s as they undergo phased upgrades to extend the service life. Integrating Rafales with a wide array of Indian weapons, such as Astra and BrahMos, will be crucial to harnessing the aircraft’s full potential.[10] It will be a win-win for India and France altogether.

Running in parallel is Russia’s constant pitch for the Su-57 – a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, after years of dormancy following India’s exit from the earlier Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme. It is a highly maneuverable fighter aircraft with Integrated Modular Avionics Combat Systems that uses fibre-optic channels. The radar suite comprises the N036-1-01 X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) embedded in the forward fuselage cheeks to improve angular coverage and an additional L-band array positioned along the leading edges.[11] The aircraft is equipped with a comprehensive electro-optical suite comprising an Infrared Search And Track (IRST) system, Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM), ultraviolet-based missile approach warning sensors, and a thermal imaging system to support low altitude operations and landing, in addition to a dedicated navigation and targeting pod.[12] It can employ defensive aids such as flares, radar decoys, and single-use programmable Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) transmitters.[13] However, some questions remain regarding the platform’s production scale, sensor fusion maturity, and combat validation.

In the Dubai Air Show 2025, Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec, underlined the long-standing defence partnership between the two countries.[14] Additionally, a major Russian state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, offered “technology transfer” and “technological learning of a few generation technologies, including engines, optics, AESA radar, Artificial Intelligence (AI) elements, low signature technologies and modern air weapons.”[15] The maximum use of the Indian industry and the Indian systems signals the attempts from Moscow to re-enter India’s fighter ecosystem, to majorly contribute to its future combat readiness. Assistance from Moscow, even in India’s indigenous AMCA programme, has effectively positioned the Su-57 as a technological bridge.

Earlier this week, the United States blew its trumpet and the warnings of sanctions over the countries which acquire Russian Su-57 fighter jets, waved over the globe. The US has warned that it could impose sanctions under its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on countries that acquire Russian Su-57 fighter jets, citing concerns over deepening defence ties with Moscow. This is particularly in the case of Algeria’s confirmed purchase of twelve Su-57s. How will India be impacted once it finalises its deal with Russia? If India were sanctioned, it could affect its broader defence relationship with the US, mainly revolving around the General Electric (GE) Jet Engine for the Tejas Programme, MQ-9B Drones, and Apache helicopters, ultimately minimising US exports to the sanctioned recipients. Turkey was removed from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme after it was hit with sanctions by the US under Section 231 for purchasing Russian S-400 air defence systems.[16]

At the same time, this does not necessarily mean it will expand to India, as such deals have historically been subject to preferential treatment for India. For instance, India bought five regiments of S-400 air defence systems from Russia in 2018, and around the same time, Turkey bought a single regiment of the same. Consequently, Ankara was slapped with CAATSA Sanctions; however, no such penalties were imposed on New Delhi.

In 2022, the Indian-American Congressman Ro Khanna introduced a stand-alone bill in the US House of Representatives that gave India waivers from the punitive CAATSA sanctions.[17] Under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), the US sanctions many dealings with Iran’s economy. However, the US granted a waiver for the Chabahar port, allowing India to participate in its development and operations without facing US penalties, given India’s role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and regional activities.[18] This waiver has now been revoked by the Americans, and India has been told to end its operations at the Chabahar port.

However, the geopolitical context and the waivers granted were directly related. It had evolved amid US-China rivalry, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and growing scrutiny of defence technology transfers, narrowing Washington’s margin for flexibility. The historical incidents that worked in favour of India do not mean they will always do so. Trump still imposed hefty tariffs on India when it bought Russian oil. Every move by India should be cautious in terms of the Su-57 agreement, as New Delhi is awaiting many crucial defence platforms, such as MQ-9B drones, Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, Apache helicopters, Stryker Combat Vehicles, etc. It primarily depends on the US for the continued production of its indigenous Tejas fighter jets. CAATSA can jeopardise the entire programme of Tejas deliveries to the IAF, for which GE will supply the engines.

The discussions on the fifth-generation aircraft remain open; it seems that India is still prioritising Rafale fighter jets for near-term induction. The budget 2026 cycle will play a crucial role in determining and shaping the trajectory of the future Indian fighter fleet – most likely it will be a combination of LCA Mk1A, an expanded Rafale fleet, the indigenous AMCA after 2035, and the upgraded versions of Su-30 Mk1. The fighter fleet debate is less about the aircraft choice and more about managing risks across time. How India proceeds with the deals in hand, only the future will tell.

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Notes:-

[1] Costas Pitas and Andrea Shalal, “Trump calls for $1.5 trillion military budget in 2027, up from $901 bln in 2026,” Reuters, January 08, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-us-military-budget-2027-should-be-15-trillion-2026-01-07/. Accessed on March 06, 2026.

[2] J Paul, “Analyzing India’s Defence Allocation in Budget 2026-27: Modernization in the Shadow of Operation Sindoor,” Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), February 03, 2026, https://www.cppr.in/archives/analysing-india-defence-budget-2026-27-post-operation-sindoor. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[3] Ibid

[4]  Jaibans Singh, “Two-Front Security Challenge: Preparedness and possibilities for India,” Organiser, May 22, 2025, https://organiser.org/2025/05/22/293526/bharat/two-front-security-challenge-preparedness-and-possibilities-for-india/. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[5] Dinakar Peri, “The race for fighters: the IAF’s dilemma,” The Hindu, January 02, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-race-for-fighters-the-iafs-dilemma/article69049922.ece. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[6] “India Approves 114 French Rafale Fighter Jets to Counter China-Pakistan Threats,” Global Defence News,  February 15, 2026, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/india-approves-114-french-rafale-fighter-jets-to-counter-china-pakistan-threats. Accessed on March 03, 2026.

[7] Sheikh Akhter, “The Rafale Deal Explained: Technology, Myths, and Sovereignty,” Defence XP, January 19, 2026, https://www.defencexp.com/the-rafale-deal-explained-technology-myths-and-sovereignty/. Accessed on March 03, 2026.

[8] Rahul Bedi, “Operation Sindoor Highlights That It’s Time for the Indian Air Force to Make Key Procurements,” The Wire, May 14, 2025, https://thewire.in/security/indian-air-force-operation-sindoor-fighter-missile. Accessed on February 07, 2026.

[9] Anil Chopra, “Make in India Rafale,” Air Power Asia, January 31, 2026, https://airpowerasia.com/2026/01/31/make-in-india-rafale/. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[10] “India Set for Mega Defence Leap: 114 Rafale Fighter Jets and Six Advanced AIP Submarines to Reshape Indo-Pacific Power Balance,” Defence Security Asia, January 10, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/india-114-rafale-fighter-jets-project-75i-submarines-defence-modernisation/#google_vignette. Accessed on February 10, 2026.

[11] Justin Bronk, “Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends,” Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Report 3-20,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 2020, https://static.rusi.org/russian_and_chinese_combat_air_trends_whr_final_web_version.pdf. Accessed on March 06, 2026.

[12] “The Su-57’s N036 “Byelka” radar: cutting-edge multi-target tracking,” War Wings Daily, August 06, 2025, https://warwingsdaily.com/the-su-57s-n036-byelka-radar-cutting-edge-multi-target-tracking/. Accessed on March 04, 2026.

[13] Anil Chopra, “Can Russian Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon’ be an Interim Fifth-Generation Aircraft for India,” Air Power Asia, February 08, 2025, https://airpowerasia.com/2026/01/25/can-russian-sukhoi-su-57-felon-be-an-interim-fifth-generation-aircraft-for-india/. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[14] “India’s defence demands “Completely Acceptable,” Russia says as it offers Su-57 tech transfer,” Economic Times, November 20, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-defence-demands-completely-acceptable-russia-says-as-it-offers-su-57-tech-transfer/articleshow/125457253.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[15] Moumita Mukherjee, “Russia Ready to Offer Unrestricted Su-57 Technology Transfer, Says All Indian Demands Are ‘Acceptable’,” Republic World, November 19, 2025, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ready-to-offer-unrestricted-su-57-technology-transfer-says-all-indian-demands-are-acceptable. Accessed on February 10, 2026.

[16] Nitin J Ticku, “Trouble for Su-57! U.S. Warns of CAATSA Sanctions Over Russian Stealth Jets; Will India Get Impacted Like Algeria?” Eurasia Times, February 06, 2026, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/su-57-u-s-threatens-caatsa-sanctions-over-russian-stealth-jets-will-india-get-impacted-like-algeria/. Accessed on February 12, 2026.

[17] Office of Congressman Ro Khanna, United States of America, “Indian-American Congressman Ro Khanna introduces bill in US House for CAATSA waiver to India,” September 07, 2022, https://khanna.house.gov/media/in-the-news/indian-american-congressman-ro-khanna-introduces-bill-us-house-caatsa-waiver-india. Accessed on February 08, 2026.

[18] Namita Barthwal, “Sanctions, the Taliban, and an Iranian Port: The Uncertain Future of India’s Kabul Route,” The Diplomat, November 07, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/sanctions-the-taliban-and-an-iranian-port-the-uncertain-future-of-indias-kabul-route/. Accessed on February 10, 2026.

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Keywords: Democracy, Partnerships, Deterrence, Strategic Credibility, Alliances

Introduction

The oldest democracy in the world, the United States of America (USA), has always styled itself as the harbinger of peace, stability, and the rule of law, undertaking the onerous task of ensuring a rules-based international order. US democratic values have been deeply anchored in constitutional checks and balances, credible and effective institutions and the rule of law. Despite that, military actions in Venezuela and Iran in 2026 expose an interesting and stark paradox, wherein a system that was designed to prevent executive overreach proved to be unable and unwilling to restrain the unilateral war-waging spree of President Trump and his administration. This failure heralds far-reaching consequences well beyond Capitol Hill, shaking the USA’s alliances, undermining deterrence guarantees, and casting a very long shadow over potential crises in the East and South China Seas.

This article seeks to examine how a democracy as old as the USA failed to safeguard itself from the idiosyncrasies of an incumbent President. It also explores the fracturing of long-lasting alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the destabilisation of global energy supplies, and more importantly, the erosion of strategic credibility as the world’s lone superpower. Furthermore, the article seeks to understand the geopolitical ramifications of these actions by contrasting their complexities, juxtaposing the West Asian imbroglio with the East and South China Seas.

The Breakdown of Constitutional Restraint

At the very heart of the American constitutional system lies a deliberate allocation of power to declare war and associated activities. While Section 8 of Article I of the US Constitution empowers Congress to declare war, Section 2 of Article II designates the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of America.[1] The writing is very clear; no single individual could drag the country into a state of war. Yet, the current year has seen this balance waver. Operation Absolute Resolve, launched in January 2026, was widely considered illegal and carried out without congressional authorisation. The operation was seen not only as a violation of American domestic constitutional norms but also as a significant violation of International Law. On similar lines, Operation Epic Fury in February 2026 was also carried out without formal authorisation, and attempts by Congress to invoke the War Powers Resolution (WPR) failed in both chambers.[2] The WPR has regularly been ignored by various Presidents (Republicans and Democrats alike), and the resolution has never been decisively enforced by the American judiciary. The ensuing result was not just executive assertiveness but also institutional paralysis in the oldest democratic nation in the world. The cumulative effect was the President’s ability to declare war, unconstrained by institutional measures, and simultaneously to discredit the Constitution and the Congress. What follows is pure anarchy in a democratic set-up.

Normalising Unilateral Aggression

Analysing the opening salvos in both operations reveals some common threads. In both cases, initiation of war or the use of force conveniently bypassed legislative approval. The President and his administration tried to legally justify actions post facto, which was contested. International norms and law were blatantly disregarded, and apex domestic institutions, including the Supreme Court, proved reactive and not preventive. This reflects the fragility of the system and brings out large chasms in an otherwise robust system.

The Collapse of Extended Deterrence

Ever since the end of the Second World War, US alliances have always rested on a simple bargain. A guarantee of security in exchange for basing rights, alignment, technological support, and strategic dependence. Collective defence and extended deterrence capability, specifically in Europe, West Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, are now increasingly being questioned by allies and partners and deeply analysed by rivals. Structural fragility and defiance of the rules-based order are now questioning the very basis of the alliance formation. Trump’s Greenland rhetoric deeply undermines Article 5 of NATO, and if that is a sign of what is coming, many other US allies and partners need to start worrying.

The Three Critical Failures

Analyses of the two conflicts of 2026 have revealed some important facets of the security guarantee provided by the US, and the writing on the wall is becoming clearer. The two operations have revealed three critical failures of the US-led system.

(a)       Credibility Deficit.   Given that President Donald Trump has started acting unilaterally, disregarding domestic and international regulations and violating international norms, commitments made by the US now have an inherent credibility deficit. Allies and partners will no longer ask what the US can do; they would rather ask what this President can do. This is a direct reflection of an autocratic or an authoritative style of functioning rather than a democratic set-up guided by directive principles enshrined in the constitution.

(b)       Increased Risks to Allies and Partners.  Countries that have been hosting US bases now face retaliatory strikes from enemies of America. The war in West Asia reflects how all West Asian nations have been drawn into it without any decision-making authority. The countries have now got entangled in their own web, which was designed to provide them with comprehensive security.

(c)       Moral and Legal Erosion.  Traditionally, America has justified its global role by way of adhering to international law and ensuring democratic accountability. Both these have now eroded, and as a result, alliances have lost not only their normative legitimacy but also their military utility.

The broader conclusion on strategic deterrence and security guarantee is that the umbrella has not just weakened but been conceptually broken. It no longer guarantees security; it exports uncertainty.

Taiwan: A Crisis Reframed

The developments in West Asia will have profound implications for Taiwan. The traditional assumption is that Taiwan’s strategic security relies heavily on US military deterrence, forward deployment, basing of elements of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and a credible US commitment to defence in the event of Chinese aggression. Post-Operation Epic Fury, there is therefore a need to reassess such a strategic security framework.

(a)       Credibility is Now Contingent.   If US intervention largely depends on Presidential discretion rather than on an institutional commitment, deterrence would become very unpredictable, and adversaries would want to test the red lines. A situation like this could also alter the regional balance of power, as allies may resort to hedging because back-ups and security guarantees will always be required. Regional actors may, as a result, diversify security partnerships and focus on strategic autonomy.

(b)       The Chinese Strategic Interpretation.   From Beijing’s perspective, two very relevant lessons emerge. Firstly, the Americans may act unilaterally and irrationally, which would translate into effective deterrence by the US because Beijing will not be able to anticipate Washington’s thought process. The other lesson that emerges is that the American system lacks internal cohesion and support. This, therefore, presents an opportunity for China to capitalise. The emerging strategic ambiguity is systemic, and therefore, the red lines would have to be recalibrated.

(c)       Increased Escalation Risk.   The geopolitical situation around Taiwan is unique. The main competitor is a peer with credible nuclear capability and the wherewithal to target mainland USA. The region also has many players in the fray, and an impulsive unilateral action may lead to regional entanglement. In such a fragile environment, the escalation ladder is likely to become compressed, and the situation may quickly spiral out of control.

(d)       Efficacy of Overseas Operations Against an Equal Adversary.  Operations in West Asia have clearly indicated the pitfalls of conducting operations far from one’s own territory. While overseas bases ensure continuous presence, they do not ensure logistics sustenance in a high-tempo conflict. As supplies diminish, supply chains become unusually long, making them more vulnerable to disruption. The presence of a peer adversary in the region further complicates the matter.

(e)       Relevance of Choke Points.   Another interesting facet that emerges is that the world’s most advanced and powerful Navy was unable to control transit in the Strait of Hormuz. What emerges is that extra-regional powers may not be able to secure vital choke points and straits, and littorals will play an important role. Controlling the Straits of Malacca, Ombai-Wetar, and Lombok may therefore be an interesting strategy on paper, but physically achieving and maintaining control may not be possible. Navies, the world over , will need to recalibrate their strategies because the oft-touted goal of developing the capability to control the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) may not be viable in a severely contested maritime environment.

Key Takeaways

(a)       Institutions Matter Much More than Intentions.   In the modern era, deterrence is not just about capability; it has more to do with credibility. While intentions are subjective and often hidden, institutions provide the much-needed assurance, facilitate cooperation, and hold states accountable.

(b)     Executive Dominance Undermines Stability.  When war-making authority concentrates in one individual, predictability collapses. If that happens, the global system shifts from a state of manageable risk to assured uncertainty. Long-established norms, institutions and diplomatic rules break down, increasing the likelihood of strategic miscalculations.

(c)       Alliances Require Trust, Not Just Power.   Whilst power (military strength and material capabilities) provides the foundation for an alliance’s utility, trust (reliable and non-detrimental behaviour) remains vital for long-term sustenance. In times of uncertainty, trust permits alliances to function without making the parties vulnerable.

(d)       Norms are Strategic Assets.   While short-term benefits may accrue by violating laid-down norms, the long-term strategic position may erode. Norms provide strategic legitimacy, which is essential in forging ties and developing partnerships.

(e)       The Taiwan Imbroglio.  Developments in West Asia and the ensuing conflict underscore a pertinent fact: Taiwan is not just a military problem. It is a credibility test of the American system, and, given what has happened in West Asia, the concept of collaborative defence may need a revisit.

Conclusion

Collaborative defence, anchored in alliances and partnerships, has the potential to multiply capability, distribute risks and reinforce legitimacy. Deterrence becomes a shared venture, thereby raising the threshold for aggression. On the other hand, unilateral wars like the ones being waged by President Trump and his administration erode institutional credibility, strain alliances, and generate long-term instability, which outweighs any short-term gains that might have accrued. One thing is clear: cooperative security architectures underpin credible deterrence. Nations that invest in trust and shared strategic objectives are better positioned to prevent conflict, provided that they avoid strategic overreach and isolation. Any perceived hesitation, fragmentation among allies, or gaps between declared policy and action will shape Beijing’s assessment of how Washington might respond in a crisis involving Taiwan, especially during President Trump’s tenure.

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Notes:-

[1] Constitution Annotated, Analysis and Interpretation of the US Constitution, United States of America, “Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 1,”https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/; Constitution Annotated, Analysis and Interpretation of the US Constitution, United States of America, “Constitution of the United States, Article II,” https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

[2] Scott Wong, Kyle Stewart and Frank Thorp V, “Republicans block effort to halt Trump’s war with Iran after ‘civilisation’ threat,” NBC News, April 09, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/republicans-block-effort-halt-trumps-war-iran-civilization-threat-rcna267345. Accessed on April 12, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Keywords: Air Power, Gulf War, Mass Precision, Doctrine, Evolution

Introduction

Air power’s strategic potential remains constrained not by technological limits, but by doctrinal inertia rooted in the 1991 Gulf War paradigm. Modern capabilities of air power, such as persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tracking, mass precision effects, and real-time logistics observation, enable decisive air campaigns that can either terminate conflict or soften the way to it. Military history warns that such technological-doctrinal mismatches persist until battlefield reversals compel reassessment, underscoring the urgent need to shorten the doctrinal lag by rethinking at the pace of technological evolution.

The Obsolescence of Gulf War Doctrine in Modern Conflict

The targeting philosophy that defined Operation Desert Storm in 1991 represented a paradigm shift in military affairs. The integrated air campaign designed to systematically degrade Iraqi command and control, destroy air defences, eliminate Scud missile batteries and achieve air superiority before committing ground forces, reflected a particular strategic logic: air power existed to enable ground operations, not to replace them. This doctrine, refined through subsequent interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, has become the default framework through which military planners evaluate the utility of air power.^[1] Yet as geopolitical tensions between the United States (US) and Iran escalate, this inherited wisdom demands rigorous reassessment. The assumption that air power alone cannot achieve strategic objectives is increasingly a statement about outdated doctrine rather than inherent limitations of the medium.

The Ground Force Assumption

The conventional wisdom that wars cannot be won from the air rests on a historically grounded but doctrinally static premise. Critics of air-centric strategy correctly observe that air power struggles to hold terrain, control populations, and destroy the diffuse organisational networks that sustain insurgent and conventional adversaries alike. These limitations are real. However, the critics conflate the limitations of historical air power with those of air power as such, a category error that obscures transformative developments in reconnaissance, precision strike, and persistent surveillance that have fundamentally altered the equation.

The ground-centric view of victory emerged from conflicts in which air power operated with significant constraints: limited sensor reach, weapons with finite persistence, communications architectures that could not process battlefield information at machine speed and adversary forces that could disperse, conceal and regenerate faster than targeting cycles could eliminate them. These conditions no longer describe the operational environment that advanced air forces can create.^[2]

The ISR Revolution

The transformation of ISR represents perhaps the most consequential shift in the air power equation. Modern ISR systems, such as satellite constellations, high-altitude unmanned platforms, networked sensor grids, and artificial intelligence-enhanced data fusion, have created an unprecedented capacity for persistent awareness of adversary activities across vast geographic expanses.^[3] While Cold War and Gulf War-era planners worried about “area denial” and the fog of war, advanced ISR has fundamentally compressed the sensor-to-shooter timeline and expanded coverage to continental proportions.

The implications for targeting philosophy are profound. Traditional air campaigns focused on achieving localised effects against high-value, relatively static targets: airfields, command centres, radar installations and industrial facilities. Modern air power can now maintain continuous tracking of mobile targets, observe adversary logistics in near-real time,^[4] and identify patterns of operation that reveal intentions before they materialise into action. This is not merely an incremental improvement in targeting accuracy; it represents a qualitative shift toward what some strategists term “omniscient awareness” of the battlespace.

Mass Precision: A Contradiction Resolved

The phrase “mass precision” may appear oxymoronic to those trained on twentieth-century military theory, which held that precision and mass were inversely related. Precision weapons were few, expensive, and required ideal conditions; massed fires were inaccurate, indiscriminate, and politically costly due to concerns about collateral damage. This dichotomy no longer holds.

Contemporary precision-guided munitions can be delivered at scale. The economics of precision strikes have been transformed by advances in guidance technology, manufacturing efficiency, and networked targeting, which allow multiple platforms to engage multiple targets with a high probability of effect. The operational concept of “mass precision” now describes the simultaneous or near-simultaneous application of precision effects across a wide area, overwhelming adversary decision cycles and generating cascading system failures across their operational architecture.^[5]

When combined with advanced ISR, mass precision enables a targeting philosophy that operates not on individual high-value nodes but on the connective tissue of adversary systems: logistics convoys, maintenance facilities, communications relays, fuel depots and the human networks that sustain military operations. The objective shifts from destroying enemy forces to degrading enemy capacity and making the adversary’s military apparatus inoperable rather than eliminating it piece by piece.

Persistence and the Elimination of Regeneration

One of the core limitations of historical air power was the adversary’s capacity to regenerate losses. Air campaigns could destroy factories, but industry could relocate. Planners could eliminate tank battalions, but reserves could be mobilised. The temporality of air power operated on a different scale than the adversary’s ability to recover, adapt and reconstitute.

Modern air power, particularly when using unmanned systems and long-endurance platforms extensively, introduces a new variable: persistence. Persistent presence over the battlespace, maintained not by rotating crews through exhausting sorties but by platforms that can loiter for days or weeks, fundamentally alters the regeneration calculus. When a logistics convoy destroyed today is followed by continuous observation that prevents its replacement tomorrow, when maintenance facilities are struck before repair efforts can be brought in, and when leadership is engaged before coordination can be re-established, the adversary’s organisational capacity to recover erodes not gradually but systematically.^[6]

This is the conceptual foundation for what some military theorists now call “time-sensitive targeting at operational scale,” as in the sustained, intelligent application of precision strike against the operational rhythms of adversary forces, degrading their capacity faster than they can adapt or regenerate.^[7]

Doctrinal Re-imagination

The practical obstacle to realising this transformation is not technological but organisational and intellectual. Military institutions, including the United States Air Force, have inherited doctrinal frameworks, career promotion patterns, and operational concepts that privilege the Gulf War model. Joint force integration still treats air power as a supporting arm^[8] rather than a potentially decisive instrument in its own right. Acquisition programmes prioritise platforms and systems designed for the previous era’s conflicts. Training and education emphasise tactics optimised for scenarios that no longer exist.

Rethinking the application of force requires addressing these institutional dimensions. It requires developing operational concepts for air power used independently of ground operations and concepts that account for political constraints on collateral damage, the specific vulnerabilities of twenty-first-century adversaries, and the integration of cyber, electronic warfare, and space capabilities into a coherent operational design.

The Iran scenario illustrates these challenges. An Iranian adversary presents a complex target set: distributed leadership, resilient command networks, tunnel systems, mobile missile launchers, and a population whose attitudes toward military operations are not uniform. Traditional air power doctrine would prescribe a campaign of degrading these targets in preparation for a ground invasion that may never come. But a reimagined approach might instead focus on systematically isolating Iranian military capacity from its support structures by targeting energy infrastructure, financial networks, supply chains, and the technological inputs that sustain military capability, while maintaining persistent observation to prevent adaptation and reconstitution.

Conclusion: The Imperative of Doctrinal Evolution

The proposition that air power alone cannot win wars is an empirical claim about historical experience, not a theoretical law. It reflects what air power has done under particular doctrinal, technological, and political constraints, but not what it could do under conditions of transformed ISR, mass precision, persistent presence, and reimagined operational concepts.

Military history demonstrates that periods of technological transformation are often followed by periods of doctrinal lag, during which institutions cling to inherited frameworks until strategic failure forces reassessment.^[9] The current tensions between the United States and Iran, and the broader challenge of deterring or defeating adversaries across the spectrum of conflict, provide the strategic impetus for that reassessment.

The future of force application through the medium of air will not resemble the Gulf War. It will be characterised by distributed, networked operations; by precision effects delivered at scale and speed; by a persistent presence that denies the adversary the time and space to adapt; and by targeting philosophies that aim at system degradation rather than force attrition. The intellectual challenge is to develop these concepts, to resource them appropriately and to overcome the institutional inertia that privileges the familiar over the effective.

Air power has always been the medium of the future. The question is whether today’s air forces will seize that future or remain trapped in the targeting philosophy of thirty-five years ago.

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Notes:-

[1] Robbin Laird, “Shaping the Future of Airpower: Integration, Innovation and Institutional Transformation,” Defence.info,    February 10, 2026,  https://defense.info/air-power-dynamics/2026/02/shaping-the-future-of-airpower-integration-innovation-andinstitutionaltransformation/#:~:text=Collaborative%20Combat%20Aircraft:%20From%20Concept,development%20and%20future%20requirement%20refinement. Accessed on March 19, 2026.

[2] Douglas H. Fehrmann, “Air Power Doctrine and the Strategic Label,” Naval War College, June 13, 1997, p.11, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA325175.pdf. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

[3] Tim Robinson, “Can air power deter the next war?,” Airspace Power, October 2024, https://airspacepower.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GASCC-report-Oct-2024-AEROSPACE-compressed.pdf. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

[4] United States Air Force, United States of America, “Strategic Attack, Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-02,” August 04, 2025, p.17, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-02/AFDP_3-02_Strategic_Attack.pdf. Accessed on March 21, 2026.

[5] Nadia Schadlow, “The Three D’s Of Mass: Decentralization, Democratization and Deliverability,” Hoover Institute, February 25, 2026, https://www.hoover.org/research/three-ds-mass-decentralization-democratization-and-deliverability. Accessed on March 21, 2026.

[6] Adrien Gorremans, Jean-Christophe Noël, “The Future of Air Superiority: Command of the Air in High Intensity Warfare”, Focus Stratégique, no. 122, January 2025, p.25, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/ifri_gorremans_future_air_superiority_2025.pdf.  Accessed on March 22, 2026.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Timothy Gann, Decision from the Sky: Airpower as a Decisive Instrument of National Power, US Army War College, April 15, 1997, p.19, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA326954.pdf. Accessed on March 22, 2026.

[9] I. B. Holley Jr, “Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship,” Air University, August 2004, p.6, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA427735.pdf. Accessed on March 22, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post Rethinking Air Power: Precision, Persistence and the Future of Force Application appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Critical Infrastructure, Iran War, Data Centres, Small Modular Reactors, Security

Introduction

In response to the joint attacks by the United States (US) and Israel, codenamed ‘Operation Epic Fury’ and ‘Operation Roaring Lion’ respectively, which began on February 28, 2026, Iran retaliated with ‘Operation True Promise IV’, attacking multiple targets in the Gulf, including American data centres in the area. On March 02, 2026, Amazon Web Services (AWS) stated that two of its data centres in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and one in Bahrain sustained physical damage from a drone strike carried out by Iran, resulting in a temporary disruption of its services.[1]

In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres, and the President of the UN Security Council (UNSC), James Kariuki, Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi informed that Tehran considered “all bases, facilities, and assets of hostile forces (US and Israel) in the region legitimate military targets.”[2] Traditionally, the physical and energy infrastructure, such as refineries, bridges, ports, airports, and industrial zones, has been a target in military conflicts. However, as the definition of critical infrastructure has widened to include digital infrastructure, Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), and undersea cables, data centres have emerged as new targets in the ongoing conflict.

Although this is the first time that a US data centre is at the receiving end of a drone and missile attack anywhere in the world, it is unlikely to be the last. Modern warfare is fated to see an increase in such attacks during conflicts for several reasons. First, causing damage to the digital infrastructure is not expensive. In the event of an attack on data centres, a country need not fire a missile or any high-value projectile; a cheap drone can suffice. Since building a data centre requires an investment of millions of dollars, it is an ideal target for attackers.

Second, in the hyperconnected digital world, the consequences of such an attack can be widespread, allowing attackers to demonstrate their power globally and disrupting the investment environment in the area where the data centre is situated. Third, international law[3] prohibits making civilian objects, that do not contribute to a military action, targets of attack or reprisals. However, data centres can run unrelated sectors, such as medical, banking, and military, simultaneously. Thus, the attacker may consider a data centre a legitimate target even on the suspicion that it serves the enemy’s military purpose.

While companies ensure the physical security of data centres against crimes such as theft and trespassing by installing barbed wire fences and video surveillance, among other measures, few have considered their security against missile or drone threats during conflicts.[4] A few data centres in countries such as the United Kingdom (UK),[5] Sweden,[6] and China are housed underground, in bunkers, or in caves.[7] However, the decision to build data centres underground is more an individual decision by owners than a policy of a sovereign state.

Lessons for India

The recent budget for the financial year 2026-27 has introduced long-term tax exemptions lasting until 2047 for foreign cloud service companies that use Indian data centres, aiming to position India as a destination for the emerging data centre ecosystem. According to the Economic Survey 2025–26, India currently has a data centre capacity of 1.2 GW, which is projected to increase more than threefold to approximately 4 GW by 2030.[8] Therefore, in the coming years, India is expected to witness the proliferation of data centres.

Along with the data centres, India should also consider the upcoming Small Modular Reactor (SMR) industry, which the government has decided to incentivise under the Nuclear Energy Mission (NEM), and through enactment of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, to meet the substantial energy demand of the data centre ecosystem. Thus, the potential external threats to India’s critical infrastructure necessitate meticulous planning and implementation of security measures.

During Operation Sindoor, the country has seen swarms of drones getting neutralised over the Indian airspace.[9] One Pakistani missile was intercepted over Sirsa, Haryana.[10] Unfortunately, India has to take into account threats emanating from both the Western and Northern neighbours, as well as from non-state actors. Therefore, the country must consider the possibility of a drone or missile attack targeting the critical infrastructure and take preventive measures to secure it.

Building critical infrastructure underground might be one way to protect it from physical attacks during a conflict. However, doing so will have severe cost implications. In the case of data centres, instead of placing all of them underground, authorities can assess their national security significance and build only the most critical data centres underground.

In the case of SMRs, public sentiment, along with cost implications, also needs to be taken into account. Already, Indian public perception of nuclear energy is unfavourable, according to the National Institute for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog Report on SMRs,[11] and any attack on the SMRs could negatively affect public sentiment towards nuclear energy, even if there is no radiological fallout.

Some private SMR entities, such as Deep Fission[12] and NuScale Power,[13] are already developing designs in which reactors are built underground. It would be prudent for policymakers to examine such models and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of underground reactors, given the likelihood of proliferation of the SMR ecosystem in the foreseeable future.

For over-the-ground critical infrastructure, the government may consider allotting land parcels specifically for their construction. Such clusters will be easy to protect against contingencies by deploying defensive measures.

Since attacks on critical infrastructure during conflicts are not new, the country must adopt appropriate measures to protect emerging critical assets, such as data centres and SMRs, during emergencies. Low-cost attacks on critical infrastructure are appealing targets for attackers because they harm public opinion as well as investment confidence. Therefore, it is advisable to learn from other conflicts and prepare for future contingencies.

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Notes:-

[1] Shubham Kalia, Aditya Soni and Mrinmay Dey, “Amazon Cloud Unit’s Data Centres in UAE, Bahrain Damaged in Drone Strikes,” Reuters, March 02, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/amazon-cloud-unit-flags-issues-bahrain-uae-data-centers-amid-iran-strikes-2026-03-02/. Accessed on February 22, 2026.

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Iran, “Iran Requests UN Action Against Israeli and U.S. Aggression,” March 01, 2026, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/783913. Accessed on February 22, 2026.

[3] “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),” United Nations Human Rights, United Nations, June 08, 1977, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-additional-geneva-conventions-12-august-1949-and. Accessed on February 22, 2026.

[4] Christopher S. Chivvis and Sam Winter-Levy, “The Gulf is Not the Place to Build the World’s AI Infrastructure,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/22/data-center-ai-middle-east/. Accessed on February 22, 2026.

[5] Matthew Gooding, “Inside the Data Centre Built to Withstand a Nuclear Blast,” Data Centre Dynamics, December 12, 2025, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/inside-the-data-center-built-to-withstand-a-nuclear-blast/. Accessed on February 27, 2026.

[6] Dan Swinhoe, “Sweden’s Bahnof Drops Plans for Stockholm Data Centre to Focus on Gothenburg Bunker Facility,” Data Centre Dynamics, October 01, 2025, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/swedens-bahnof-drops-plans-for-stockholm-data-center-to-focus-on-gothenburg-bunker-facility/. Accessed on February 22, 2026.

[7] Viola Zhou, “Iranian drone strikes at Amazon sites raise alarms over protecting data centres,” Rest of World, March 04, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/iran-amazon-data-center-strikes/. Accessed on February 24, 2026.

[8] Ministry of Finance, Government of India, “Economic Survey 2025-26,” January 2026, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/echapter.pdf. Accessed on February 24, 2026.

[9] Manjeet Negi, “500 Pak Drones Targeted 24 Cities for 210 Minutes: Army Sources on May 8 Attack,” India Today, May 09, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-pakistan-attack-drones-targeted-cities-jk-punjab-rajasthan-gujarat-3-hours-on-may-8-operation-sindoor-2722241-2025-05-09?utm_source. Accessed on February 24, 2026.

[10] “Pak Missile Intercepted in Sirsa on Night Before Ceasefire,” Hindustan Times, May 11, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/pak-missile-intercepted-in-sirsa-on-night-before-ceasefire-101746903682797.html. Accessed on February 24, 2026.

[11] National Institute of Transforming India (NITI) Aayog, Government of India, “A Report on The Role of Small Modular Reactors in The Energy Transition,” May 2023, https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-05/The-Role-of-Small-Modular-Reactors-in-the-Energy-Transition-05162023.pdf. Accessed on February 24, 2026.

[12] “Deep Fission Begins Drilling First Data Acquisition Well,” World Nuclear News, March 11, 2026, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/deep-fission-begins-drilling-first-data-acquisition-well. Accessed on February 26, 2026.

[13] The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States of America, “NRC Approves Standard Design for NuScale US460 Small Modular Reactor,” May 29, 2025, https://www.nrc.gov/cdn/doc-collection-news/2025/25-033.pdf. Accessed on March 02, 2026.

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