Keywords: Pakistan, NSP, Security, Economy, NSA.

Pakistan’s federal cabinet approved the countries first-ever National Security Policy (NSP) on 28^th December. The same was announced by the National Security Adviser (NSA) Moeed Yusuf^[1]. Just a day earlier, the NSP had been approved by the National Security Committee, after years of deliberations. It is supposedly a comprehensive, citizen-centric, policy and was applauded by the Pakistan establishment as a historic achievement. The document draws out a five-year plan between now and 2026. It will act as a guidance for nation’s foreign, defence and economic policies and overall decision-making. The economic security is considered the core. There are guidelines for various sectors. The achievement of economic security, in turn, will help achieve the national security objectives.

National Security Policy Evolves

National Security Committee is Pakistan’s top security coordination and decision-making body. It is headed by the Prime Minister. The meeting to clear the NSP was reportedly attended by federal ministers for foreign affairs, defence, information and broadcasting, interior, finance and human rights, the national security adviser, services chiefs, and some other key officials.

In an Army dominated country, the NSA was quick to acknowledge, and thank, the military leadership, and others, for supporting the exercise through valuable inputs and suggestions. He also thanked Prime Minister Imran Khan for leadership and guidance. The policy currently remains closed-door, and is for access by key functionaries of the Pakistan government only. An open-to-public version, perhaps an abridged one, would be released in due course. Meanwhile, the military spokesman confirmed the Army’s stamp of approval, and said that the armed forces would fully cooperate and participate in achieving the vision and path enumerated in the policy.

The policy had taken seven years to evolve and was reportedly based on inputs and discussions with people from various walks of life and strata. It is supposed to have factored the changing times, and implementation will be monitored at the highest level on regular basis.[2]

 Pakistan’s Economic Challenges– a Policy Driver  

As per World Bank report^[3], Pakistan’s economy is currently under serious stress. The consumer price inflation is still at nearly 9 percent. Food prices are sky-rocketing, and disproportionately affecting the poor. And, even at 7.0 percent, the interest rates effectively give a negative return to the ordinary saver. Pakistan Rupee is nearing the all-time low of 180 to a US Dollar. Foreign direct investment has been decreasing, and the country is surviving mostly on remittances. Foreign exchange reserves at US$18.7 billion are just equivalent to 3.4 months of total imports. As of October 2021, Pakistan remains of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey-list^[4] for not acting sufficiently to investigate and prosecute senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terror groups involved in terror financing.

Pakistan’s Security Concerns

Pakistan is simultaneously facing many security challenges. After U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the security situation on Pakistan’s Western border has become very complex. No country has “recognised” the Taliban as Afghanistan’s new government since it took power in August 2021^[5]. The flow of drugs and illicit arms are the immediate worry. Pakistan is facing internal strife and very active separatist movements. Many internationally recognised terrorists and extremist groups are seeking political concessions, and the government has had to bend to accommodate them. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) that was meant to devise and implement a counter-terrorism strategy, had become defunct and victim to turf-wars and sectional pulls and pressures. Pakistan’s relations with India continue to be strained. Clearly Pakistan is facing multiple national security challenges.

Pakistan Military On-board

The NSP is also meant to gives hope to the otherwise demoralised public. Centrality of economic issues is an important feature as the military power and the standards of living, and in turn, national security flow from there. A critical aspect will be human resource development which will be crucial for economic development. It is also hoped that the policy would improve coordination between various agencies and stake holders. More importantly it is meant to overtly signal that Pakistan military is willing to work towards nation building under the purported civil lead. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Maj Gen Babar Iftikhar said that the policy was an important milestone in strengthening Pakistan’s national security.

It encompasses both traditional and non-traditional internal and external security threats, challenges and opportunities. NSP will be an umbrella document to guide formulation policies and approach for other sectors. The document also suggests a cautious foreign approach to avoid getting pulled into global geostrategic alignments that are still evolving. The NSP is expected to be dynamic enough and will be subjected to annual reviews that will allow to factor changing regional and global environment.

Human Prosperity Linkage

The policy that has been drafted by the National Security Division, tries to generate formal linkages among human prosperity and safety, and nation’s economic and military security. Views of several federal institutions and all the provisional governments were reportedly ascertained through repeated discussions. The figures released by the NSA suggested that over 600 academics, analysts, civil society members and students had been consulted to make the policy all inclusive. The policy also takes into account Pakistan’s cultural and ethnic diversity and brings in policy framework to promote cohesion. The Policy is also meant to give direction to social and legal approach which are both critical for security. Of course, the basic tenants of Islam will remain the basis of all decisions. Many in Pakistan were happy that in a complex country like theirs, where it is fairly difficult to devise policies, they were finally able to release the NSP with reasonable broad consensus. The draft policy had earlier been shared with the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, but the opposition parties had boycotted the same.

The policy has been cleared by the cabinet. The document will now have to be tabled in both Houses of parliament. The real challenge would be the threadbare debate and discussion among a fractured polity. Legislators and political parties may find some provisions that could curb opposition or dissent. Senators belonging to the Opposition parties in Pakistan have already begun protests over the government’s decision to bypass the Parliament in the making of the NSP^[6]. Will the Army arrange to get the opposition on-board?

Impact and Implications for India

The policy hints at peace with other countries, especially in the neighbourhood. Strategic establishment in India would need to look at the policy with a fine-tooth comb. How will the policy impact Pakistan’s approach to India is an open-ended subject. Would the economic pressures and primacy in the policy make Pakistan review its trade policy towards India and take advantage of better economic dynamics? Will they be able to make a distinction between geo-politics and geo-economics? The policy is unlikely to bring any change in Pakistan’s active support to cross-border terrorism and position on Kashmir.  Surely all this and more would need to be understood and assessed.

India’s National Security Strategy

India too has not had a clearly articulated and defined National Security Strategy (NSS). Many governments had ventured to define the same, but apparently not sufficient push had been given to it. A fresh move had been initiated by the Modi government. A Defence Planning Committee^[7] (DPC) was created in April 2018 under the chairmanship of the National Security Adviser (NSA). Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff, the three Service Chiefs, and expenditure secretary were the members. The Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) was the member-secretary. In the initial meeting, the broad mandate was discussed.

The mandate^[8] of DPC was to look at the entire gambit of defence planning, including national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, and operational directives and associated requirements, relevant strategic and security-related doctrines, defence acquisition and infrastructure development plans, including the 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), defence technology and development of the Indian defence industry and global technological advancement. In addition, the DPC had been asked to prepare the National Security Strategy^[9] (NSS) and the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Perhaps the future operational directives of the Defence Minister would have emerged from the doctrine and strategy worked out by the committee. It would also evolve the roadmap to build defence manufacturing eco-system^[10]. Four sub-committees were formed for covering policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy and defence manufacturing ecosystem.

India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat too was making a fledgling attempt to evolve military aspects of the NSS and was trying to take further, with upgrades, the 2007 draft NSS prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff, that had not been approved by the Cabinet Committee of Security. The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020^[11] does make reference to the “National Security Strategy/Guidelines, as and when promulgated. It is imperative that India have its own all-encompassing National Security Strategy.

Notes

[1] ‘Historic achievement’: NSA announces cabinet’s approval of Pakistan’s first National Security Policy, Dawn News, December 28, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1666294 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[2] Pakistan Economic update and outlook, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview#1 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[3] Pakistan Economic update and outlook, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview#1 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[4] Rezaul H Laskar, FATF retains Pak on its ‘grey list’, Hindustan Times, October 22, 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/fatf-retains-pak-on-its-grey-list-101634841990164.html Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[5] Ben Saul, “Recognition” and the Taliban’s International Legal Status, International Centre for Counter Terrorism, December 15, 2021. https://icct.nl/publication/recognition-talibans-international-legal-status/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[6] Sentinel Digital Desk, Pakistan Opposition protests government bypassing Parliament on security policy, The Sentinel, December 30, 2021.  https://www.sentinelassam.com/international/pakistan-opposition-protests-government-bypassing-parliament-on-security-policy-570447  Accessed on 31 December 2021.

[7] Laxman Kumar Behera, Creation of Defence Planning Committee: A Step towards Credible Defence Preparedness, Manohar Parikkar-IDSA, April 19, 2018, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/creation-of-defence-planning-committee-lkbehera-190418 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Manoj Joshi, Scraping the bottom of the barrel: Budgets, organisation and leadership in the Indian defence system, ORF, August 22, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/research/43496-scraping-the-bottom-of-the-barrel-budgets-organisation-and-leadership-in-the-indian-defence-system/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[10] Shishir Gupta, India to create super-committee for defence planning, Hindustan Times, Apr 19, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-create-super-committee-for-defence-planning/story-PQSPeTpZ8Xm2QKjINXzxnK.html Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[11] Laxman Kumar Behera, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020: Imperatives for Further Reforms, ORF, February 04, 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/defence-acquisition-procedure-2020-imperatives-for-further-reforms/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

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India Must Fine Tune A Range Of Options To Respond To Pakistani Terror Strikes

StratNews Global, The Gist, Dr Manpreet Sethi in conversation with Surya Gangadharan, 22 December 2021

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The Tribune,Tuesday, 21 December 2021

Dr Shalini Chawla, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Stdues

The India-Pakistan relationship has gone through phases of intense hostility and tensions, and the two nuclear-armed neighbours have fought four conventional wars and dealt with the challenges of the threat of nuclear weapons (in their respective ways). While the bilateral relationship has been strained for most years, the terror attack on January 2, 2016, on the Pathankot Air Force Station led to the complete suspension of diplomatic dialogue. India’s decision to revoke Article 370 on August 5, 2019 came as a complete surprise for Pakistan, and since then, there have been a series of strong reactions/actions focusing on targeting India on the international front, attracting global attention and seeking mediation on Kashmir.

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Thursday, 08 December 2021

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Keywords: China’s Nuclear Strategy, Stability-Instability Paradox, Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation, Hypersonic missile.

In both Washington and Beijing, a consensus seems to be emerging over why China is building up its nuclear arsenal. Analysts agree on the general argument that China intends to develop survivable and assured second-strike nuclear capability, pushing the US into a state of mutual nuclear vulnerability, thus enhancing deterrence stability. While technically it is a positive development, some western analysts argue that nuclear stability and reduced risk of nuclear blackmail might encourage China to challenge the US and its allies conventionally. Thus, increasing the risk of a conventional great power war, possibly over Taiwan. However, any such conventional war, irrespective of its origin and intention of the warring states, involves the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. This article analyses China’s nuclear build-up from the perspective of escalation risk and underlines why a conventional conflict cannot with certainty be segregated from nuclear confrontation.

Recent Developments

It is well known that China is expanding, diversifying, and modernising its nuclear forces. An array of media reports indicated that China carried out a hypersonic missile test in July that circumnavigated the globe before hitting its target[1], demonstrating PRC’s ability to incorporate a hypersonic glider into a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)— “a nuclear-weapons delivery system that places warheads into low-earth orbit prior to de-orbiting them on to their targets”.[2] Earlier, commercial satellite imagery has shown that China is building hundreds of missile silos that would add over 200 new silos to the Chinese arsenal.[3] China is reportedly constructing new submarines and modernising its air-based deterrent. Pentagon projects that China’s nuclear build-up might enable it “to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027” and at least 1000 warheads by 2030.[4] Recent developments in China’s nuclear force posture has raised questions about its objectives and emerging nuclear strategy.

China’s Quest for Survivability and Assured Second Strike Capability

China’s nuclear doctrine of no-first-use preordains it towards an assured retaliation strategy.[5] For the strategic deterrence to be credible and effective, China must survive the first blow and launch a massive retaliatory strike with the remaining strategic forces. However, the advanced US counterforce capabilities (both conventional and strategic) and sophisticated missile defences have long been a concern for China due to its small nuclear force.

The large-scale construction of geographically scattered silos, plausibly at a higher state of readiness, would boost China’s capability to retaliate against nuclear attack and “would leave China better equipped to deter any nuclear attack its adversaries might be tempted to initiate”.[6] The recent hypersonic missile tests signal China’s capability to penetrate US missile defences. They demonstrate that even if US pre-emptive first strike was to eliminate a majority of China’s strategic forces, it would still have the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the US homeland without worrying about missiles defences.

In essence, China’s nuclear modernisation efforts enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces and boost its capability to launch a retaliatory second strike. This strengthens mutual nuclear vulnerability, the fundamental principle of nuclear deterrence. Thus, recent developments in China’s nuclear force posture are stabilising, at least from the perspective of deterrence theory and from China’s perspective.

China’s Nuclear Build-up and Stability-Instability Paradox

Some western experts have argued that stability at the nuclear level might instigate instability at the conventional level.[7] With its modernising conventional force and declining US conventional advantage in the East and the South China Sea, China would be more confident to challenge the United States and its allies conventionally to further Chinese rejuvenation by integrating Taiwan with mainland China. Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge expressed the underlying concern in an analysis on Foreign Affairs. They argue that “by limiting the vulnerability and increasing the numbers of its nuclear forces, Chinese strategists may grow more confident that the Chinese military can challenge the United States or its allies conventionally, with little fear that the United States would resort to nuclear escalation.”[8]

The concept underpinning the above concern is the stability-instability paradox. The central argument is that nuclear and conventional military balance interact in a manner such that the stability at the strategic balance of terror lowers the stability at the conventional level of violence and vice-versa.[9] In other words, nuclear stability creates conventional instability, and conventional stability creates nuclear instability. While the concept was introduced in the initial decades of the Cold War by Glenn Snyder and has been extendedly employed to explain the dynamics of India-Pakistan nuclear and sub-conventional military balance[10], it erroneously assumes that conventional and nuclear conflicts could be hermetically separated from each other, omitting the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.

Appreciating the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation

The danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation was highlighted by Barry Posen in his seminal work titled Inadvertent Escalation.[11] He argued that since great powers closely identify their security with the maintenance of survivable strategic deterrence, any unintended conventional operation that might threaten strategic forces, nuclear command and control assets, or early warning systems might lead to a nuclear escalation. The risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation is further amplified by military organisations’ offensive inclinations and the difficulty distinguishing between offensive and defensive operations during the crisis (worsened by the security dilemma).

The possibility of employing strategic weapons in the event of “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks… on US or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” was highlighted by the 2018 US nuclear posture review.[12] The risk of inadvertent escalation in a non-nuclear operation is catalysed by the entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear systems (dual-use nature of C3I assets and missile delivery systems).[13] The increasing dependence of C3I assets and strategic forces on the digital communication system has created new vulnerabilities and has increased the risk of inadvertent escalation.[14]

From the perspective of deterrence stability, inadvertent escalation can have both positive and negative consequences. For instance, the risk of nuclear escalation might deter the determined CPC from starting a conventional war over Taiwan since US conventional intervention on behalf of Taiwan can escalate into nuclear warfighting. On the other hand, it could also encourage China to start a conventional campaign, possibly to integrate Taiwan, thinking that the risk of inadvertent escalation would deter the United States from conventionally interfering on behalf of Taiwan in the first place, thus paving the way for unhindered Chinese occupation of the island territory. Which side the dice of inadvertent escalation would roll depend on the Chinese determination to integrate Taiwan, US commitment towards the security and survival of Taiwan, and effective signalling by both actors towards their desired goals and obligations.

Nonetheless, the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level is real. Any conventional war between the US and China, irrespective of the origin and intention of the warring states, involves the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. Strategists and policymakers should fully appreciate the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation to strengthen nuclear deterrence and avoid the catastrophic consequences of fighting a nuclear war.

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Notes

[1] Demetri Sevastopulo, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile”, Financial Times, October 17, 2021,  https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. Accessed on October 19, 2021.

[2] Timothy Wright, “Is China gliding toward a FOBS capability?” International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 22, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/10/is-china-gliding-toward-a-fobs-capability. Accessed on October 25, 2021.

[3] Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 new missile silos in its western desert, analysts say”, The Washington Post, June 30, 2021,https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021/06/30_story.html. Accessed on July 4, 2021; Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field”, Federation of American Scientists, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/. Accessed on August 17, 2021; Rod Lee, “PLA Likely Begins Construction of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Silo Site near Hanggin Banner”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, August 12, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2729781/pla-likely-begins-construction-of-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-silo-si/. Accessed on August 20, 2021.

[4] US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021”, p. 92, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on November 8, 2021.

[5] M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure”, International Security, vol. 35, no. 2 (2010), pp. 48–87, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/35/2/48/11999/China-s-Search-for-Assured-Retaliation. Accessed on October 11, 2021.

[6] Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?”, The Washington Post, November 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-is-growing-what-does-that-mean-us-china-relations/. Accessed on November 21, 2021.

[7] Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why China Wants More and Better Nukes”, Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-11-19/why-china-wants-more-and-better-nukes. Accessed on November 21, 2021. For a similar explanation, see, for example, Vipin Narang’s Twitter thread available at: https://twitter.com/NarangVipin/status/1451019849820422150; “Nuclear Pieces on the Asia Chessboard: US, China, and Extended Deterrence”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 25, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-pieces-asia-chessboard-us-china-and-extended-deterrence. Accessed on November 9, 2021; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?”, The Washington Post, November 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-is-growing-what-does-that-mean-us-china-relations/. Accessed on November 21, 2021. Tong Zhao, “Why Is China Building Up Its Nuclear Arsenal?”, The New York Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/opinion/we-need-to-pay-attention-to-chinas-nuclear-build-up.html. Accessed on November 30, 2021.

[8] Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why China Wants More and Better Nukes”, Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-11-19/why-china-wants-more-and-better-nukes. Accessed on November 21, 2021.

[9] The concept was introduced initially in Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror”, in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power, (San Francisco: Chandler). For a general understanding of the concept, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “What Stability-Instability Paradox? Subnational Conflicts and the Nuclear Risk in South Asia”, South Asian Strategic Study Unit, Research Paper No. 4 (2006), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/2004.pdf. Accessed on April 11, 2021.

[10] Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia”, Stimson Center, January 1, 2005, https://www.stimson.org/2005/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia/. Accessed on April 20, 2021.

[11] Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991); Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’S Northern Flank”, International Security, vol. 7, no. 2 (1982), pp. 28-54.

[12] US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018”, p. 20, February 2, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. Accessed on October 17, 2021.

[13] James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement”, International Security, vol. 43, no. 1 (2018), pp. 56-99, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec. Accessed on July 20, 2021.

[14] James M. Acton, “Cyber Warfare and Inadvertent Escalation”, Daedalus, vol. 149, Issue 2 (2020), at https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/149/2/133/27317/Cyber-Warfare-amp-Inadvertent-Escalation. Accessed on July 24, 2021.

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India TV News Desk, Monday, 19 November 2021

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Uttar Pradesh’s Mahoba and Jhansi districts on Friday and launched multiple development projects. The Prime Minister inaugurated multiple projects in Mahoba and then visited Jhansi to dedicate to the nation multiple initiatives of the Defence sector at ‘Rashtra Raksha Samparpan Parv’, which commenced here on November 17 as part of ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahaotsav’ celebrations. 

To give a thrust to Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector, the Prime Minister formally handed over indigenously designed and developed equipment to Armed forces Service Chiefs. These include handing over of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) designed and developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) to Chief of the Air Staff; drones/UAVs designed and developed by Indian startups to Chief of the Army Staff; and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) designed and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) manufactured Advanced Electronic Warfare suite for naval ships to the Chief of Naval Staff.

The LCH incorporates advanced technologies and stealth features for effective combat roles. The deployment of Indian UAVs by Indian Armed Forces is also a proof of the growing maturity of the Indian drone industry ecosystem. 

The Advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) System ‘Shakti’ has been designed and developed by Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) Hyderabad a laboratory of DRDO for Capital Warships of the Indian Navy for the interception, detection, classification, identification and jamming of conventional and modern Radars. The Shakti EW system will provide an electronic layer of defence against modern radars and anti-ship missiles to ensure electronic dominance and survivability in the maritime battlefield. 

This system will replace the earlier generation EW Systems of the Indian Navy, the Ministry of Defence said in a statement. The system has been integrated with the wideband Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) for the defence of Indian Navy Ships against missile attacks. The ESM of the system helps in finding accurate direction and interception of modern radars. The system has a built-in radar fingerprinting and data recording replay feature for post-mission analysis.

First Shakti system has been installed on-board INS Visakhapatnam and is being installed on-board Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, INS Vikrant. Twelve Shakti Systems are under production at Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) supported by more than fifty MSMEs at a total cost of Rs 1805 crores. These systems are scheduled to be installed on-board capital warships under production, including P-15B, P-17A and Talwar class follow-on ships. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh congratulated DRDO, Indian Navy and Industry Partners for the development of the Shakti EW System.

PM also launched the National Cadet Corps (NCC) Alumni Association and become first member of the association. The PM also inaugurated the National programme of simulation training for NCC cadets with the aim to scale up simulation training facilities for all the three wings of NCC. 

Modi also dedicated to the nation augmented reality powered electronic kiosks at the National War Memorial, New Delhi which will enable visitors to pay floral homage to martyrs through the simple click of the button

The Prime Minister also inaugurated Atal Ekta Park in Jhansi. Named after former Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the park has been built at a cost of over Rs 11 crore, and is spread across an area of about 40,000 square metres. It will also house a library, as well as a statue of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The statue has been built by the renowned sculptor Ram Sutar, the man behind the Statue of Unity.

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Author: Col Sushil Kumar Tanwar
Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

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