Keywords:Deep Space, AUKUS, Space Situational Awareness

The Battle of Britain in 1943 showcased how the technology of RADAR turned the course of the battle in favour of Britain. The effective and innovative radar arrangement in a chain ensured the detection of ingressing aircraft at all levels, including the ultra-low level. The detection inputs from all radars were connected to a networked system called the “Dowding System,” which further managed the ‘detection to shooter’ cycle. Drawing an analogy with the Dowding System, a similar idea is realised in the space domain nearly 80 years later. The idea of Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) has been at the forefront of technological discussion in recent years. Its initial successful technology demonstration (DARC-TD) was carried out in 2017.

Space and Deep Space

Before delving into the deep space radar capability, the primary differentiation between ‘space’ and ‘deep space’ needs to be put into perspective. These terms generally refer to different regions within the broader context of the universe or celestial objects. The distinction is somewhat relative and depends on the context in which the terms are being used.

‘Space’ is a general term used to describe the vast, seemingly infinite expanse beyond Earth’s atmosphere. It includes the regions near Earth, such as low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), and geostationary orbit (GEO). These regions are relatively close to Earth. Meanwhile, ‘Deep Space’ typically refers to regions of outer space that are significantly farther away from Earth. The exact boundary where space is considered ‘deep space’ can vary contextually, but it often includes regions beyond Earth’s immediate vicinity, such as the outer solar system, the interplanetary medium, and the areas between stars in a galaxy.

What is DARC?                               

Taking a significant military step, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have signed an agreement to develop a deep space radar capable of monitoring objects in geosynchronous orbit. This agreement is part of a trilateral initiative that will last for 22 years.

Satellites operate in this region, situated at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km above the Earth’s surface and among the most distant regions. It is interesting to note that every spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit always hovers over the same region of the Earth. This is accomplished by synchronising the duration of its orbit with the rate at which our planet rotates once in relation to the stars in the background.[1]

The proposed surveillance system for this space region is known as the “Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability” (DARC). Present ground-based optical systems are constrained by inclement weather and daylight, but DARC is capable of delivering global monitoring that transcends these constraints. DARC claims enhanced sensitivity, improved accuracy, increased capacity, and more agile tracking capabilities compared to existing radar systems capable of monitoring objects in GEO. Additionally, the capability will be employed to safeguard critical services that are dependent on satellites and space-based communication, such as television and mobile phones, which are integral components of modern life.[2] DARC intends to enhance the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) by integrating an additional sensor into GEO, augmenting its capacity and capability to monitor deep space objects.[3]

DARC will empower the AUKUS nations to maintain a robust posture in the space domain against Russia and China, in addition to bolstering their security partnership. As an integral component of effective Space Domain Awareness (SDA), this agreement will expedite the detection and identification of emerging threats in space and facilitate the identification process.[4] SDA is the capability of space object tracking, identification, and characterisation. Responsible space operations rely on this fundamental principle, whether in response to routine or hostile activities.

Location of Radars

By the end of the decade, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia will reportedly host and operate the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC), a cutting-edge ground-based radar system. The defence chiefs of these three nations convened at the Defence Innovation Unit headquarters in Silicon Valley on December 1 to formalise several new agreements as part of the AUKUS agreement’s “Pillar II,” which focuses on developing advanced military technologies. This move boosted the DARC initiative and other cooperation between the three nations. The joint statement reveals that many of the AUKUS-related advanced capability activities are classified. However, the DARC initiative remains unclassified.[5]

The United States desires to install a massive new radar system in the UK to track objects in outer space. Additional locations to be considered are Texas and Western Australia. Each site would house 10 to 15 parabolic antennae (large satellite dishes) for tracking and four to six for transmitting, covering an area of about 1 square kilometre. It will be able to detect a football-sized object from a distance of 36,000 km.[6]

Space scientists[7] opine that it is almost mandatory to have the sites scattered around the world for effective coverage. The countries are “optimally positioned” geographically for the DARC system being developed by Northrop Grumman. It is expected that “geographically spacing around all these radars and telescopes, linking them all together, sharing data between them, will provide a much better network than any country can do by itself.”[8] The first site of the chain of telescopes and radars is anticipated to become operational in 2026.

Implications for AUKUS

It would not be incorrect to say that the next war could be won or lost in space. The frequency of China’s space activities, including efforts to establish a space station, is increasing in tandem with the nation’s growing space launch capabilities. However, China has been especially alarmed by the US plan to construct DARC. It is worth noting that China reacted sharply to the DARC programme earlier in 2021, stating that “It is a significant escalation that has the potential to further change the direction of global military competition.”[9]

The AUKUS nations have logically justified the need for DARC for Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) from the space threats. Following the ratification of the agreement, the head of Space Forces Indo-Pacific, Brigadier General Anthony Mastalir, stated, “Whatever happens, it is imperative that a new radar system be deployed there without delay, given the escalating Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific.” Additionally, he emphasised that the mere possession of such capabilities “does not mean it is wrong. But if you look at our efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, you quickly run into a situation where our ends, and what we see in terms of behaviour coming from China, their ends do not necessarily align.”[10]

It is evident that deterring China and Russia and preparing to win a war are undoubtedly the primary objectives of the United States and its allies in developing DARC. Obtaining hegemony in space is considerably more challenging for the United States than attaining it independently on land and at sea. The ability of the United States to unilaterally occupy and seal off outer space from China and Russia is unattainable. Hence, it is prudent to assume a leadership role in space situational awareness (SSA) by implementing DARC. It will solidify the belief among its allies that it controls everything through hegemony, strengthen their support, and force reluctant nations and forces to submit to it even more.[11]

The United States, in particular, anticipates that China will be deprived of the benefit provided by space in order to finalise the kill chain essential for executing long-range precision strikes against air and maritime targets. The US Forces are firm in the opinion that it has to have the ability to deny China the military advantage through space domain as a potential adversary.[12]

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Notes:

[1] Brett Tingley, “US Space Force plans global radar to ‘identify emerging threats’ in distant Earth orbit,” Space.com, December 08, 2023, https://www.space.com/space-force-deep-space-radar-capability-emerging-threats. Accessed on December 25, 2023.

[2] United States Space Force, “US, UK, Australia announce trilateral Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability initiative,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, December 2, 2023. https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3604036/us-uk-australia-announce-trilateral-deep-space-advanced-radar-capability-initia/. Accessed on December 25, 2023.

[3] “Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability – DARC”, globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/darc.htm. Accessed on December 22, 2023.

[4] Op. Cit.Brett Tingley,

 [5] Chris Gordon, “US, UK, Australia Agree to New Space Tracking System: What It Means, When It’s Coming,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, December 8, 2023. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-uk-australia-agree-new-space-tracking-system/. Accessed on December 11, 2023.

[6] Op Cit. DARC, globalsecurity.org

[7] Brian Weeden, https://swfound.org/about-us/our-team/dr-brian-weeden/, Secure World Foundation, Accessed on December 24, 2023.

 [8] Ibid.

 [9] Op Cit. DARC, globalsecurity.org

 [10] Colin Clark “Absolutely critical’ to get DARC space situational system to Australia: Space Forces Indo-Pacific head,” Breaking Defense, April 07, 2023. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/absolutely-critical-to-get-darc-space-situational-system-to-australia-space-forces-indo-pacific-head/. Accessed on December 25, 2023.

[11] Op Cit. DARC, globalsecurity.org

[12] Op. Cit.Colin Clark,

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Keywords: AI, India, and GPAI Summit

After the Bletchley Park AI meeting in the UK, the recently concluded Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) summit held on 12-14 December marked another landmark event in the AI summit’s busy schedule. The summit culminated with the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration. This AI meet was instrumental in elevating India’s stature in the global conversations on AI, simultaneously contributing a different perspective and sharing and connecting India’s AI ecosystem with international discussions, linking global with the local. Amidst these developments, it becomes crucial to understand India’s AI approach domestically and globally.

Domestic Drivers: Growth, Governance, and Development

Under its motto of AI for All, India has focused on AI applications to promote governance, social development, and inclusive growth. India’s objective is to improve the lives of citizens, driven by a ‘risk-based, user-harm’ approach—preferring limited regulations to protect user interests. Integrating AI across diverse sectors—such as agriculture, education, health care, infrastructure, smart cities, and transportation—aims to resolve various issues.^[1] Generative AI refers to AI algorithms that are used to create audio, code, text, and images. This is another AI-enabled capability where India wants to build capacity through public-private partnerships. This holds enormous potential for India in the healthcare, language, education, and IT sectors.

India sees AI as a ‘Kinetic enabler’ in its fast-growing and ‘expanding digital economy, growth, and governance.’^[2] The domestic approach towards AI is establishing standards with limited regulation to avoid misuse while not restricting its growth. This is directed to harness AI’s potential for economic growth, social development, digital inclusion, and national security. A recent report released by IndiaAI—a Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology initiative, projected that India will benefit up to US $ 400-500 billion by 2025 and US $967 billion by 2035 from AI adoption.^[3] In addition, AI employs around 416,000 professionals, with a growth rate of about 20-25 percent.^[] To realise its full potential, many developments and initiatives have been introduced in the last few years under the National Program of AI (NPAI), which aims to ‘foster inclusion, innovation, and adoption for social impact’.^[5] The government’s initiatives like Future Skills PRIME, AI for Youth, Centers for Excellence (CoEs), and Responsible AI for Social Empowerment (RAISE) are focused on creating an ecosystem that supports up-skilling/re-skilling and providing economic incentives.^[6] In this year’s Union Budget, India announced three CoEs for AI, and the aim is to increase it to almost 20-30 CoEs in the coming years in partnership with industry and academia.^[7] The objective is to build on India’s advantages, including its topmost position in skill penetration and third place in high-quality, rich AI publications.^[8] On the hardware front, India also plans to extend incentives for manufacturing AI chips under its Semiconductor Mission.^[9] In a meeting with Nvidia^[10] and Intel CEO^[11], the Indian Prime Minister discussed the potential of AI development, Research, and Innovation in India. Domestically, India has adopted a broader whole-of-state approach in the AI race, divided into two ecosystems of AI innovation: one led by the government through a whole-of-government approach and another led by Industries, startups, and academia.

Reaching out to the Globe: Stepping into the role of Norm Shaper

Globally, India has aimed to establish a foundational AI framework based on ‘legal and accountability guardrails.’ This framework takes into account AI’s ubiquitous nature. India’s AI approach here is concerned with ethics and the risks involved. The framework builds on a middle-path approach between innovation and risks associated with AI systems, which was visible in practice at the GPAI summit. The New Delhi declaration adopted at GPAI emphasised the need to leverage AI’s positive use, such as for social development and reiteration for inclusivity.^[12] In addition, it highlighted India’s concerns about sustainability, inclusion, ethics, and democratic values. Quite conversely, the declaration adopted by Bletchley focused on highlighting AI risks. This shows two opposite perspectives.

In addition, India has used the AI forums to voice the global south’s concerns regarding problems arising from emerging technology applications, like lack of inclusivity and accessibility. Other issues include algorithm biases, digital accessibility, misinformation, and disinformation. In its quest to create global consensus, India has prioritised a multi-stakeholder approach, highlighting the importance of working with industries, academia, startups, and epistemic communities across diverse sectors in AI decision and policy-making. It aims to engage with countries on emerging technologies like AI, establishing a New, Emerging, and Strategic Technologies (NEST) Division at MEA.^[13] By the end of the year, G7 is expected to form a comprehensive framework on AI, working with GPAI, International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to pursue extensive policy discussions.^[14] India is expected to play a critical role at next year’s summits.

Way forward

Although there has been remarkable progress in India focusing on pushing AI to the centre stage in policy and practice, many steps remain to be taken. Going forward, the government must collaborate closely with the industry to understand, identify, mitigate, and resolve the threats emerging in AI development driven by its ‘risk-based’ approach. To address this problem, there needs to be a one-point contact that can work with the AI ecosystem to develop dynamic best practices, risk assessment, and accountability framework to promote a secure and safe adoption of AI technology at scale. A multi-stakeholder approach is the need of the hour that works with startups, academia, big tech, and legal think tanks under a whole-of-system approach. Secondly, India must continue being the voice of a balanced perspective on the global stage, becoming a ‘norm shaper’ rather than a ‘norm-taker,’ protecting its interests and voicing concerns of the global south. It must work closely with developing countries’ governments and industries. Holding an AI summit with developing countries would be a welcome step where issues of ethics and development can be discussed. All these steps undertaken at domestic and international levels will likely help India elevate its position at the AI centre stage, emerging as one of the important AI stakeholders in the world, standing alongside the US, China, Japan, the UK, and the EU.

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Notes:

^[1] Nishant Malhotra, “National Artificial Intelligence Mission, Invest India,” February 5, 2019, https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/national-artificial-intelligence-mission. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[2] Ministry of Electronics and IT, “Minister Rajeev Chandrasekhar addresses 1st Plenary session of ‘AI Safety Summit 2023’ in the UK on Wednesday,” PIB, November 1, 2023 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1973893. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[3] Ministry of Electronics and IT, “Generative Artificial Intelligence,” PIB, February 3, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1896016. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[4] Gyanendra Keshri, “AI: Upskilling key to mitigate job loss risks,” Deccan Herald, December 16, 2023, https://www.deccanherald.com/business/ai-upskilling-key-to-mitigate-job-loss-risks-2813762#:~:text=AI%20was%20discussed%20just%20as,chains%20and%20disrupting%20shopfloor%20operations. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[5]  INDIAai, “The National Programme on AI (NPAI),” https://indiaai.gov.in/national-ai. Accessed on 17 December 2023.

^[6] Ministry of Electronics and IT, “Artificial Intelligence,” PIB, March 30, 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1811372. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[7]  Ashutosh Mishra, MeitY to support development of AI chips under national programme, Business Standard, October 12, 2023, https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/meity-to-support-development-of-ai-chips-under-a-national-programme-123101301065_1.html. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[8] Jacob Koshy, “India ranks third in research on artificial intelligence,” The Hindu, January 18, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/india-ranks-third-in-research-on-artificial-intelligence/article26030596.ece#:~:text=India%20ranks%20third%20in%20the,and%20co%2Dfounder%20of%20Infosys. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Brian Caufiled, “Nvidia CEO Meets with India Prime Minister Narendra Modi,” Nvidia, September 4, 2023, https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/modi-huang-india/. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[11] Nidhi Singal, “Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger meets PM Modi, discusses tech,” Business Today, April 7, 2022, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/corporate/story/intel-ceo-pat-gelsinger-meets-pm-modi-discusses-tech-328932-2022-04-07. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[12]  Soumyarendra Barik, “Innovation or safety? How Delhi declaration found middle path between promotion and regulation of AI,” Indian Express, December 15, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-sci-tech/delhi-declaration-gpai-regulation-ai-explained-9067865/#:~:text=The%20New%20Delhi%20declaration%20has,to%20be%20taken%20into%20consideration. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[13]  Sagganik Guru, Government of India MEA establishes “New, Emerging and Strategic Technologies (NEST) Division”, Cyber Secure India, January 3, 2020, https://cybersecureindia.in/government-india-establishes-new-emerging-strategic-technologies-nest/. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

^[14] Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI), “G7 Ministers Reaffirm Commitment to Advancing Generative AI Policy Through Multilateral Collaboration, including GPAI,” September 7, 2023, https://gpai.ai. Accessed on December 17, 2023.

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Keywords: Pakistan 2024 Elections, Nawaz Sharif, Imran Khan, Cipher Case, Pakistan Military

Amidst persisting uncertainty and rumours of potential delay of the elections, the Pakistan Election Commission has agreed to hold elections on February 8, 2024. The political crisis in Pakistan is unfolding complex dynamics of a dysfunctional state which accommodates interesting contradictions. While Pakistan has consistently proclaimed itself as a democratic state, the will of the people rarely reflects in regime choices and domestic policies impacting the common man. History suggests continual political crises in Pakistan have invariably strengthened the military and its ability to control critical decision-making, besides its pervasive expansion in the economic domain resulting in substantive pecuniary dividends for the military lobby.

The political turmoil started in Pakistan last year in 2022 with apparent strains between Imran Khan and the military. It was followed by Imran Khan’s dramatic exit from the PM office in a no-confidence vote, a series of jalsas/rallies by Khan protruding his immense popularity (despite his incompetence in governance and inability to control economic decline), deep polarisation of the society and state institutions (including the military), and finally, the May 9th violence which was termed as a ‘black day’ by the army. This paved way for the military to take complete control of the crisis with subsequent repressive steps which resulted in further crippling of democratic process in Pakistan.

Imran Khan, who remains the most popular leader, is behind bars and is facing close to 180 legal cases. Khan and former Foreign Affairs Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi are being held for violating the Official Secrets Act under the Cipher case. Khan and his aide Qureshi have been charged with inappropriately handling the cipher (diplomatic cable) sent by the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Asad Majeed Khan, regarding a meeting with the State Department officials early last year. Both the PTI leaders are accused of making the secret cable public. It appears that the cipher case has strong potential to completely isolate Imran Khan & company from the 2024 elections. Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI) stands disintegrated after the military-led crackdown that followed the May 9th violence. A significant number of the party loyalists have exited the party and joined the newly formed party, Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party (IPP), led by former PTI leader and sugar baron, Jahangir Khan Tareen. Imran will be kept out of the political scene and his fragmented party holds negligible ability to perform in the upcoming elections. In an attempt to campaign amidst the ban and restrictions, Imran Khan recently used artificial intelligence (AI) in conducting a virtual rally. The use of AI has been PTI’s strength which allowed it to expand its young fan base.

Nawaz Sharif is back from London with a tacit nod from the military establishment. He is being viewed as the best choice for the establishment at this point in time and is expected to revive the popularity of his party Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N). It appears that the military establishment believes that Nawaz has the charisma to fetch popular support in Punjab province. There is indeed an underlying expectation that Nawaz Sharif will help in stabilising the economy. Nawaz’s closeness and the convivial relationship with the Gulf states could potentially fetch much-desired financial investment and economic assistance for Pakistan’s ailing economy which is likely to remain dependent on external assistance for a good time.

In this interestingly complex political space, new alliances are being stitched together and the PML-N is working hard to expand its support base. In Punjab, Nawaz’s most significant political rival Imran Khan’s PTI stands stranded and appears less threatening. The Jamait Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) has agreed with Nawaz’s party for seat adjustment and close collaboration in Punjab. Apart from this, the two parties have also reportedly agreed on seat adjustments in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

 In an interesting but not unforeseen move, an alliance has been formed between PML-N and the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan (MQM-P) in Sindh, and more specifically, in the provincial capital of Karachi. PML-N appears confident of giving a strong opposition to PPP in Sindh with the cooperation from MQM-P and Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA).

In Balochistan, where electables play a critical role in elections, Nawaz Sharif visited Quetta on the invitation of Sardars of Balochistan. PML-N is expecting the support of over 20 electables in Balochistan. While the political stage is being set for PNL-N’s victory in the upcoming elections with the establishment’s approbations, PPP appears frustrated and has been complaining that it is not getting a level playing field.

The Pakistan military’s powers have been expanded after May 9th and the much debated and controversial amendments- The Army Amendment Act and the Official Secrets Act, grant unquestionable powers to the military. The ruling of the Supreme Court, allowing the trial of civilians by military courts, will further tighten the state’s control on the political landscape and its ability to coerce anti-state voices or behaviour.

While the political environment in Pakistan paves the way for another dent in the democratic process, the military is working towards fetching foreign investments and reviving critical strategic relationships. The newly formed Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), has given the military an additional institutionalised role (along with the civilian leadership) in the decision-making related to facilitating fast-track foreign investment without hurdles of bureaucratic delays.

General Asim Munir’s recent visit to the United States in December has generated debate on the dynamics of the US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s relations with Washington have been critical in defining the contours of its foreign policy. The current phase of bilateral relations is focused more on non-traditional security threats. However, Pakistan has been keen to revive the security dynamics in the relationship which serves the strategic objectives of the generals in Pakistan.

With the military’s expanded powers and the state using draconian measures to curb anti-state/establishment voices, the credibility of the 2024 elections remains questionable and it’s once again a full circle for Pakistan where the selected leader is likely to be elected in a military-dictated electoral exercise.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: IAF, Joint Military Exercise, Multilateral exercise, USCENTCOM, Egypt

A contingent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) took part in Exercise BRIGHT STAR-23, a biennial multilateral tri-service exercise from August 27 to September 16, 2023, at Cairo (West) Air Base in Egypt.[1] The IAF took part in Ex BRIGHT STAR-23 for the first time along with contingents from the US, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and Qatar. Five MiG-29 (UPG) Upgraded Air defence fighters, two IL-78 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA), two C-130 J Hercules strategic airlift aircraft, and two C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft formed the formidable contingent of the IAF. Participants in the exercise also included members of the IAF’s Garud Special Forces.[2] In a breakthrough of its kind, as a result of a joint effort of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD), the three arms of Indian military were invited to take part in Exercise Bright Star 2023, which has been the biggest tri-service exercise ever. The exercise, steered by the United States Central Command (US CENTCOM) and hosted by the Egyptian Army, involved 34 nations from around the world, including the US, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and Qatar in addition to India and the host nation, Egypt. It was orchestrated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for the first time.

Building Stronger Diplomatic Ties

India and Egypt have a unique relationship and close collaboration in the defence sector. In the 1960s, the two countries had worked together to develop aero-engines and aircraft, and Indian pilots were engaged in training Egyptian pilots.[3] The recent trips by the Air chiefs of both nations, Indian Defence Minister and Prime Minister, according to the Ministry of Defence, further cemented the two civilisations’ bond. Additionally, the two nations have improved their cooperative training by holding regular military drills. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi visited India on a state visit in January this year and was the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations. Later in June, on a personal invitation of President Sisi, Prime Minister Modi visited Egypt for a number of bilateral meetings and certain significant engagements. Undoubtedly, defence cooperation was one of the key elements of the bilateral engagements. The consistent efforts and outreach towards Egypt paved the way for an invitation to the IAF, Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Army (IA) for a Tri-service participation in this mega exercise. This year, the 37-nation joint tri-service exercise Bright Star-23 has emerged as a lighthouse in the field of international military cooperation, and the IAF has added another chapter to its ongoing efforts of augmenting international diplomacy.

The Participation and Gains for the IAF

A strong contingent of 550 personnel was mobilised by India, which clearly signalled the strategic importance that India accorded to the event. The 23 Jat Battalion of IA provided 137 soldiers, while IN sent its formidable INS Sumedh along with the requisite manpower. The IAF had the largest participation with 11 aircraft (fighters and transport), pilots and requisite ground crew. The IAF contingent had the unique opportunity to be part of a large-scale multinational exercise involving the massive logistical movement of troops, equipment, maintenance, housing and other complicated aspects of planning and execution. In addition to drone displays, robotic explosive ordnance detonation, airborne operations, and combined armed live fire drills, the IAF crew also took part in air-to-air refuelling exercise of Egyptian Rafael aircraft by IAF FRA IL-78.[4]

The participating nations were divided into two categories: observers and participants, where the IAF was part of the ‘active’ participant nations. The cooperating nations engaged in live fire, vehicle manoeuvring, and even aircraft refuelling drills. These exercises transcended all linguistic, cultural, religious, and state boundaries, even though they occasionally required a linguist to translate. The application of medical procedures in a combat zone was one such instance. Large-scale medical evacuation under combat conditions was a very useful lesson that the IAF crew learnt during their participation. The IAF crew demonstrated their training capabilities in adeptly handling situational response under fire, tactical field care, and casualty evacuation.

Way Forward

The focus on international cooperation and interoperability acts as a model for participating nations with similar values. These kinds of cooperative projects can strengthen defence ties while also promoting understanding between various forces. This exercise was a powerful confirmation of the idea that strong international alliances are essential for preserving peace and prosperity in an uncertain world. In addition to strengthening defence cooperation, Bright Star 23 gave the Indian Armed Forces a rare chance to exchange best practices and learn strategic lessons with other armed forces. The IAF gained valuable professional experience from the Exercise. The IAF must take the lead and continue participating in such major exercises, enhancing not only its own training value but also serving as a leading force for military diplomacy.

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Notes:

[1] Ministry of Defence, “PARTICIPATION OF INDIAN AIR FORCE IN EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR-23 AT CAIRO AIR BASE, EGYPT,” PIB, August 27, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1952602. Accessed on December 12, 2023.

[2] “Indian armed forces participating in multi-nation tri-service military Exercise Bright Star 2023”, India News Network, August 28, 2023 at https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/20230828/indian-armed-forces-participating-in-multi-nation-tri-service-military-exercise-bright-star-2023. Accessed on December 12, 2023.

[3] ibid

[4] “Exercise Bright Star-23: Indian Air Force refuels Egyptian Rafale fighter,” Times of India, September 13, 2023 at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/exercise-bright-star-23-indian-air-force-refuels-egyptian-rafale-fighters/articleshow/103603060.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on December 18, 2023.

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Keywords: COP28, Climate Change, Nuclear energy

As 2023 drew to a close, the world’s vulnerability to climate catastrophe was well recognised at the World Climate Action Summit. The 28^th Conference of the Parties to the U.N Framework Convention on Climate Change known as COP28 was held in Dubai, UAE in the first two weeks of December. The conference saw significant announcements by countries to adopt low-carbon technologies and sustainable sources of energy to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius.
A UN report shows that the world must cut greenhouse gas emissions by 45 per cent to avoid global catastrophe.[1] There is no way that this intense and rapid decarbonisation and transition away from fossil fuel can be achieved without a massive increase in nuclear power globally.[2] This year COP28 has attempted bold movements towards accelerating the deployment of nuclear energy production to combat climate change. This resulted in the inclusion of nuclear energy in global stocktake, a final document that assessed the parameters for achieving the 2015 Paris Agreement objectives and identified shortcomings.[3]

Significant decisions on Nuclear Energy in COP28

• • On December 1, 2023, an important declaration was signed where USA and 21 other countries pledged to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050, from 2020 levels, to achieve net zero carbon emissions. This declaration was a major step taken by nations to put nuclear power at the centre of the transition to clean energy. The countries from 4 continents include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Canada (world’s second-largest uranium producer), France (the global leader in nuclear energy), United Kingdom, and Japan.[4] According to an International Energy Agency (IEA) report, to achieve net-zero emission by 2050, nuclear power capacity needs to increase from 417 gigawatts in 2020 to more than 900 gigawatts in 2050, which is more than double.[5] The declaration also invites international financial institutions to encourage lending policies for nuclear energy. However, multilateral banks, including the World Bank, have declined to finance nuclear projects by claiming a lack of relevant expertise.[6] This negatively affects the interests of developing countries.

  • On December 2, 2023, in a landmark move, the U.S. collaborated with the International Fusion Energy Partnership Strategy to expedite the development of commercial fusion energy, tackling key challenges in research, demonstration, and regulatory frameworks.[7]S. Climate Envoy John Kerry said in the announcement, “Although the development of fusion technology is set to revolutionise global efforts to achieve net-zero but careful thought and thoughtful policy is going to be critical to navigate this”.[8] If successfully harnessed, fusion could be a game-changer in energy production, delivering an affordable and environment-friendly alternative to existing power sources, leaving behind no carbon footprint or radioactive baggage.

  • Ongoing innovations in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) possess the potential to play an important role in energy systems by providing on-grid baseload electricity and commercial viability. During the COP28 summit, the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the U.S. Department of State announced a suite of financial tools to support SMR deployments to help reach net-zero goal. The announcement included large investment in collective enrichment and conversion capacity across Canada, Japan, France and the UK. This group is known as Sapporo 5.[9]Moreover, French President Emmanuel Macron, in his address at COP28, emphasised the need to “support the growth of nuclear infrastructure in emerging countries who are willing to invest in SMRs as a reliable alternative and for strategic autonomy.” This can be seen in the light of the announcement made a week ago by the European commissioner for Single Market about the creation of a new European Alliance on SMRs in the coming year 2024.[10]

  • The report “A Global Playbook for Nuclear Energy Development in Embarking Countries: Six Dimensions for Success,” was launched by the EFI Foundation, Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), Clean Air Task Force (CATF), and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) at COP28. This report presented a roadmap of responsible, sustainable, and robust nuclear energy deployment to guide countries in leveraging nuclear power for a clean energy future and expanding capacity to meet national needs unique to their circumstances.[11] It delivers a comprehensive strategy for nuclear deployment without compromising on non-proliferation standards and nuclear security standards.[12] This report would be helpful in providing encouragement to the countries which are planning for new nuclear procurement, expansion of nuclear energy and policy reforms to bolster nuclear cooperation.

  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opened the Atoms4Climate pavilion with the aim of spreading awareness about the benefits of nuclear technology and its compatibility in addressing the climate crisis. COP28 presidency and IAEA co-hosted this ministerial event which was supported by the countries which are integrating nuclear as a key pillar in the journey towards net zero.[13] IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that “achieving a fair and enabling investment environment for new nuclear projects remains an uphill battle. We are not at a level playing field, yet, when it comes to financing nuclear projects.”[14] Nuclear power is a capital-intensive sector which needs the support of government and International Financial Institutions (IFI) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDB). Moreover, the creation of the new International Bank for Nuclear Infrastructure (IBNI) was proposed for nuclear financing to bring support for an increased role of nuclear power and energy security, which would be significant in global nuclear scaling and achieving 2050 Net Zero targets.[15]

  • COP28 focused on scaling up the involvement of companies and investors to invest in clean technologies, harnessing climate finance opportunities and contributing to system change by adopting climate friendly behaviours. One such step of private sector involvement was witnessed when “Bill Gates’ nuclear reactor company TerraPower and a state-owned firm of UAE, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to study the potential development of advanced reactors in the Gulf state and outside” according to the statement carried out in the signing ceremony. This step will enhance the transition as they would be working to reduce emissions not only in their own countries but also in other countries involved. Additionally, ENEC signed an MoU with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy for future investment in SMR technology development.[16] These deals pave the way to harness the potential nuclear technologies that will contribute to a sustainable energy future.

  • IAEA announced a Nuclear Energy Summit for the next year in March in Brussels. Leaders from around the world will assemble to highlight nuclear energy’s role in reducing carbon footprints, ensuring reliable power, and unlocking economic potential.[17] 

In order to achieve the proposed nuclear capacity, the nuclear industry needs stronger and committed policies. Affordable financing is a must. Licensing and regulatory processes need to be streamlined for expanding supply chains and human resources.[18] The COP28 meeting witnessed the real progress of nuclear power in the global climate and energy debate. However, the implementation stage will face several challenges, including policy formation, financial support, supply of raw material, safety and security. Placing all bets on nuclear power would turn into a complete solution only through actions on global and domestic levels together. The coming years look promising for curtailing global carbon footprint, but that can only be achieved by embracing nuclear power along with other clean sources of energy.

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Notes:

[1] United Nations Environment Programme, “Emission Gap Report 2022,” October 23, 2023, https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[2] International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Energy Makes History as Final COP28 Agreements Calls for Faster Deployment,” December 13, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/nuclear-energy-makes-history-as-final-cop28-agreement-calls-for-faster-deployment. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[3] Ibid

[4] Spencer Kimball, “U.S. leads coalition to triple nuclear power by 2050 in efforts to address climate change,” CNBC, December 4, 2023. Accessed on December 7, 2023.

[5] International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/42b23c45-78bc-4482-b0f9-eb826ae2da3d/WorldEnergyOutlook2023.pdf. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[6] Juzel Lloyd, “How Multilateral Banks Are Holding Back the Developing World,” The Breakthrough Institute, October 6, 2023, https://thebreakthrough.org/blog/how-multilateral-banks-are-holding-back-the-developing-world#:~:text=By%20blocking%20funding%20for%20nuclear,off%20low%2Demissions%20economic%20development&text=Developing%20countries%20are%20forging%20their,the%20benefits%20of%20nuclear%20energy. Accessed December 10, 2023.

[7] Hogan Lovells, “Significant nuclear fission and fusion announcements coming out of COP28,” JD SUPRA, December 5, 2023, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/significant-nuclear-fission-and-fusion-8075795/. Accessed on December 7 2023

[8] “At COP28, John Kerry Unveils Nuclear Fusion Strategy as a Source of Clean Energy,” U.S. News, December 5, 2023, https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2023-12-05/us-unveils-global-strategy-to-commercialize-fusion-as-source-of-clean-energy-during-cop28. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[9] “US takes steps to jump start overseas SMR deployment,” World Nuclear News, December 7, 2023, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-takes-steps-to-jump-start-overseas-SMR-deployme. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[10] Theo Bourgery-Gonse, “Marcon at COP28: ‘Nuclear Energy is Back,” Euractiv, December 4, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/macron-at-cop28-nuclear-energy-is-back/. Accessed on December 5, 2023.

[11] Clean Air Task Force, “New global playbook for nuclear energy outlines pathways to scale up new projects,” December 4, 2023, https://www.catf.us/2023/12/new-global-playbook-nuclear-energy-outlines-pathways-scale-new-projects/. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[12] Nuclear Threat Initiative, “New global playbook for nuclear energy outlines pathways to scale up new projects,” December 4, 2023, https://www.nti.org/news/new-global-playbook-for-nuclear-energy-outlines-pathways-to-scale-up-new-projects/. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[13] COP28, “ATOMS4NETZERO,” December 5, 2023, https://www.cop28.com/en/schedule/atoms4netzero. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

[14]  International Atomic Energy Agency, “Net Zero “Needs Nuclear Power,” IAEA Says in Landmark Statement Backed by Dozens of Countries at COP28,” December 1, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/net-zero-needs-nuclear-power-iaea-says-in-landmark-statement-backed-by-dozens-of-countries-at-cop28. Accessed on December 5, 2023.

[15]  International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Financing – Creation of IBNI is critical for Global Nuclear Scaling and 2050 Net Zero,” December 9, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/topics/climate-change/the-iaea-and-cop/cop28/nuclear-financing-creation-of-international-bank-for-nuclear-infrastructure-ibni. Accessed on December10, 2023.

[16]  Julian Nabil, “COP28: UAE, Bill Gates’ Nuclear Firm Sign Deal To Study Development Of Advanced Reactors,” Forbes Middle East, December 4, 2023, https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/industry/energy/uae-inks-deal-with-bill-gates-nuclear-company-terrapower-on-advanced-reactor. Accessed on December 5, 2023.

[17] International Atomic Energy Agency, “COP28: Leaders Announce Nuclear Energy Summit for 2024,” December 2, 2023. Accessed on December 5, 2023.

[18] “Nuclear to shine at COP28”, World Nuclear News, November 29, 2023, https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Nuclear-to-shine-at-COP28,-says-Bilbao-y-Leon. Accessed on December 5, 2023.

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Author: Abhishek Sharma, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
20 December 2023

Keywords: Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), Cyberattacks, and India.

The post Conflict, Cyber-Attack, and Critical Information Infrastructure: Tracing Trends and the Lessons for India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Grey Zone Strategies, South China Sea, China, Philippine

China is seeing an increase in international backlash following allegations that its coast guard deployed water guns against a Philippine boat near Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea^[1]. Analysts believe that the incident may escalate an already tense situation and spur the involvement of the US and its allies. The incident took place on December 10, 2023 when a considerably small vessel of the Philippine tried to deliver supplies to a garrison near Second Thomas Shoal, a South China Sea feature, situated in Philippine exclusive economic zone but claimed by China as its sovereign territory known as Renai reef.

The Long-Standing Dispute in South China Sea

Historically, the South China Sea (SCS) has remained a source of contention between Manila and Beijing. The Chinese government asserts “indisputable sovereignty” over practically the entire 1.3 million square mile of SCS, in addition to the majority of its islands, including those that are hundreds of miles off the Chinese mainland.^[2] This comprises the Spratlys, referred to as the Nanshas in Beijing, a collection of 100 tiny islands and reefs disputed by the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan in whole or partial.^[3] The Philippines, on the other hand, refers to that region as the West Philippine Sea. It purposefully established a military transport ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, staffed by Filipino marines, on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 in order to assert its claim to the territory.^[4]

The UN Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague upheld Philippine’s assertions in 2016, ruling that China lacks legal basis for claiming historical ownership over the majority of the SCS. Beijing since then has ignored the ruling and continues to assert its presence in the SCS by indulging itself in ‘grey zone activities’ and erecting infrastructure on disputed islands. The nine-dash line has been utilised by the Chinese Communist Party in the past to represent its SCS claims. The West Philippine Sea, over 90% of which China claims maritime sovereignty, was divided into nine dashes. Ten dashes are now visible on China’s standard map from 2023.^[5]

What are Grey Zone Activities employed by China

The precise meaning and understanding of what defines grey-zone activity continues to be unclear. Such disruptive measures often fall outside the threshold of armed conflict and might not be deemed acts of war, yet they accomplish the goal of establishing influence over a region.^[6] For instance, in the years leading up to and following the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) decision in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China used a variety of maritime grey-zone techniques to further its objectives in the SCS. These measures involve constructing artificial islands and military facilities in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, using its maritime militia to chase Filipino fishermen away from their conventional fishing grounds, and disrupting replenishment missions with military-grade lasers and water cannons.

In this scenario, classifying operations as grey zone activity permits offenders to take advantage of amorphousness and uncertainty to achieve their objectives.^[7] While there has been considerable global interest on the subject as grey-zone actions are not entirely unnoticed, the fact that many similar methods are grouped together under the umbrella term ‘grey zone’ makes it difficult to identify viable countermeasures. Although China does not use the term ‘grey zone’ to characterise its strategy, its use of these methods in the SCS leads to regional instability and undermines the laws that regulate maritime space. Such actions are referred to in China as “maritime rights protection” or “peacetime use of military forces.”^[8] Whatever nomenclature is employed, it is evident that these military tactics serve as a cover for China’s aggressive attempt to control the whole West Philippine Sea.

Grey Zone Activities in Philippine Waters

Chinese forceful practices in the Philippines’ maritime area are capable of being classified into two categories: militarised or non-militarised. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militias engage in military activities that range from shadowing and swarming to overtly risky operations.^[9] Non-militarised techniques, on the other hand, make use of official diplomatic approaches and information exploitation. In the case of the West Philippine Sea, China has used both forms of coercive means to further its goals.

A June 2019 event along Recto Bank in which a Chinese warship sank a Philippine fishing boat and stranded the 22 Filipino fishermen who were struggling for their lives in the surrounding waters is a prime instance of China’s oppressive militaristic activities in the West Philippine Sea.^[10] A Vietnamese fishing trawler later rescued all of the Filipino fishermen on board. Another instance is a case that occurred in February 2023 near the coast of Ayungin Shoal, also known as Second Thomas Shoal, in which a CCG warship pointed a military-grade laser light at a Philippine Coast Guard frigate on a normal resupply operation for the Philippine Navy.^[11] Another CCG warship used water cannons and dangerous obstructing actions in early August 2023, delaying a rotation and replenishment mission.

Swarming is the act of moving in huge groups in order to frighten other vessels. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), for example, detected at least 48 fishing boats around Reed Bank in July 2023. In early September 2023, the AFP Western Command initiated aircraft surveillance that discovered Chinese fishing vessels around Recto Bank, as well as five Chinese vessels in Escoda Shoal and a pair in Baragatan Bank.^[12]

In addition to the use of armed, political, and diplomatic measures, Chinese repressive activities are reinforced by propaganda efforts that are ingrained in domestic discourses. For instance, a persistent storyline on Philippine social media asserts that the CCG is a civilian organisation, negating the need to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in order to counteract CCG-led operations in the West Philippine Sea. According to the narrative, China is saving the Philippines by not deploying the Chinese Navy, which might have required the Philippine Navy to respond.

India’s Stand on South China Sea Dispute

India is unwilling to get involved in matters that have no immediate impact on it and is not a party to any regional disputes in SCS. India, though, indulges itself in regional stability talks and maintains defence and security relations with regional nations. Despite all this, New Delhi is nonetheless realistic about the consequences of its meddling in the waterways to the east of Malacca.

India’s primary maritime objectives are in the Indian Ocean, where China has not yet reached a tipping point with its growing presence. India would undoubtedly be forced to react over a larger area, perhaps even in the SCS, if China started to intrude in India’s vital space in the Andaman Sea. Meanwhile India is unlikely to change its security stance in the coastal regions east of Malacca until then.

India’s priorities in the Western Pacific are mostly economic, with rising trade across the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and oil holdings off the shores of Vietnam. New Delhi is aware of its limited ability to exert consistent influence in the SCS. India purely intends to send China a message that it will not interfere in the neighbouring littorals as long as Beijing respects its limits in the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas. This is why India occasionally issues joint statements with friendly Association of South East Nations countries referring maritime standards in Southeast Asia.

India should focus on creating a long-term strategy for handling China’s challenge in the Indo-Pacific. Increasing maritime awareness among the Quad nations could be a solution. To keep an eye out for any suspicious activity by Chinese ships, India should make use of its vast information network, which is spread across the Indian Ocean and contains data from the Fusion Centre and space-based marine monitoring.

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Notes:

(1) Neil Jerome Morales, “Philippines condemns China’s actions in South China Sea against fishing vessels,” December 9, 2023. Philippines condemns China’s actions in South China Sea against fishing vessels (msn.com)

(2) STOREY, I. J., “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21(1), pp. 95–118, April 1999, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798443. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(3) Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(4) Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Philippines Island Tracker. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/philippines/. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(5) Colin Clark, “New Chinese 10 Dash Line Map Sparks Furor across Indo-Pacific: Vietnam, India, Philippines, Malaysia,” Breaking Defense, September 1, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/09/new-chinese-10-dash-map-sparks-furor-across-indo-pacific-vietnam-india-philippines-malaysia/. Accessed on December 09, 2023.

(6) Gaurav Sen, “China’s gradual stride for grey zone activities in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India, financial express,” Financial Express, November 9, 2023, https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-chinas-gradual-stride-for-grey-zone-activities-in-the-indian-ocean-implications-on-india-3302988/#. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(7) ORF special Report, “Deciphering Grey-Zone Operations in Maritime Asia,” ORF, August 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ORF_SpecialReport_71_Grey-Zone_3N.pdf. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(8) Peter Layton, “Responding to China’s Unending Grey-Zone Prodding,” Rusi, August 11, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/responding-chinas-unending-grey-zone-prodding. Accessed on December 09, 2023.

(9) Darek Grossman, “China’s Gray-Zone Tactics show the U.S.-Philippine Alliance is working,” The War on the Rocks, The Rand Blog, November 7, 2023, Chinas-gray-zone-tactics-show-the-u-s-philippine-alliance-is-working. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(10) Renato Cruz De Castro, “The June 9 Reed Bank Incident : Chinese grey zone operations in action?,” BusinessWorld, July 2, 2019, https://www.bworldonline.com/editors-picks/2019/07/02/240129/the-june-9-reed-bank-incident-chinese-gray-zone-operation-in-action/. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(11) Renato Cruz De Castro, “The August 5 Ayungin Shoal Incident: Confronting Chinese grey zone ops in West Philippine Sea”, PhilStar Global, August 19, 2023. https://www.philstar.com/news-commentary/2023/08/19/2289851/august-5-ayungin-shoal-incident-confronting-chinese-grey-zone-ops-west-philippine-sea. Accessed on December 10, 2023.

(12) Alan Robles and Raissa Robles, “South China Sea: Is Philippines risking a ‘major naval war’ with its alliance building to counter Beijing?” South China Morning Post, November 26, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3242762/south-china-sea-philippines-risking-major-naval-war-its-alliance-building-counter-beijing. Accessed on December 09, 2023.

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Author: Anuttama Banerji, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center, United States
15 December 2023

Keywords: Defence, Militarisation, Aerospace, Security, India, United States.

The post Militarisation of Indian Space Sector: A Growing Necessity appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Javed Alam, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
12 December 2023

Keywords: Strategic Posture Commission, US, Threat Environment.

The post The 2023 America’s Strategic Posture Report: An Assessment appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: China’s Near Space Command, Hypersonic Weapons, India-China Airpower Dynamics

China has recently formed its fifth command, Near-Space Command, under the Central Military Commission, alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[1] The Near-Space Command will be responsible for ‘defending the country against attacks that utilise the lower boundary of space at altitudes between 20 and 100 kilometres—higher than most airliners but lower than the heights achieved by Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) (Figure-1). The Near-Space Command will use solar-powered drones, robotics, and spy balloons for high-latitude surveillance and intelligence gathering. China had already sent a high-altitude balloon to the US territory in February this year for surveillance, only to have it shot down by the US authorities before entering the US airspace near North Carolina.[2] The US has accused China of sending spy balloons multiple times to the US bases in Guam and Hawaii in the Pacific.[3]

Figure 1: An illustration of the trajectories of ballistic and Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) and Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM)

Besides, the Near-Space Command will have full control of China’s hypersonic weapons, including those in the inventory of the other four branches of the military during the war.[4] Moving through the near-space medium where the air is thin, “hypersonic weapons are extremely difficult to detect and counter given the weapons’ speed and manoeuvrability, low flight paths and unpredictable trajectories” [5]. Reports suggest that it can take down the US Air Force’s latest stealth bomber, the B-21 Rider.[6]

The near-space combat force is in the evolutionary process of development, and “relevant units are not yet mature, and combat operations have not been standardised,” and also “the understanding of near-space combat command needs to be deepened,” said the researchers from the National University of Defence Technology, who provided information about the new command to the South China Moring Post.[7] China might use the near-space medium extensively for military applications as it is an unchartered territory and there is less competition by other major military powers so far. In fact, China seeks to exploit unused domains for military applications that provide it a lead in power rivalry. China is the first country to develop Anti-satellite Missiles (ASAT) and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV). Beijing has identified space and cyber domains as the new territory to establish its dominance in the early part of this century, when the US has reduced its efforts to seek military dominance in all domains in the unipolar era.

Putting hypersonic weapons with the Near-Space Command is a strategic move by the PLA. During the first flight test of the hypersonic vehicle in July 2021, the vehicle encountered a technical problem: a plasma bubble formed around the hull of the vehicle for at least ten minutes due to friction with the air. This caused a communication blackout during the re-entry stage, as the vehicle was travelling beyond Mach 5 or hypersonic speed.[8] The ten minutes communication gap between the vehicle and the command centre meant that the hypersonic vehicle was approaching its potential target without any control whatsoever.

On the other hand, China has conceptualised hypersonic weapons as ‘a double-edged sword – designed to hit a target anywhere on Earth with unstoppable speed and manoeuvring capabilities’. It is the new ‘fist’ weapon in China’s inventory to gain decisive advantages on the battlefield over its superior enemy. It can also be used for pre-emptive strikes against US military assets in East Asia and the Pacific.

China, in February this year, tested a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) equipped with an HGV called DF-27, which can fly as far as Hawaii from China, and China also wants to develop hypersonic cruise missiles.[9] However, the plasma bubble or ‘black barrier’ prevents control of the manoeuvring capabilities of the hypersonic weapons, potentially defeating the objectives of the weapon. To overcome the ‘black barrier’, China had sought to develop 6G technology based on electromagnetic waves for communication, but the program is moving slowly due to stringent restrictions by the US on China’s access to critical technologies and components to be used for PLA’s military program.[10] It remains unclear whether the weapon can be controlled from the ground-based command system, indicating uncertainty about whether China has overcome the ‘black barrier’ problem.

China considers hypersonic weapons as the first-strike weapon on enemy targets. It can create havoc on the enemy’s command and control systems as well as the launching sites of highly secured weapons. The US military strategy against China is premised on a pre-emptive strike on China’s command and control facilities established along the east coast of China from allied territories, especially Japan. Such an attack would cripple the PLA’s counterattack capabilities, including the second strike options. On the other hand, military operations in the near-space area could help the PLA gather early information about the pre-emptive strike from Japan so China can target the launching sites with hypersonic weapons, thus preventing damage by the US’ pre-emptive attack on China.

As the hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than ICBMs, the existing missile defence systems of the US and allies cannot track the weapon. Instead, to counter the adversarial impact of China’s hypersonic weapons in the western Pacific, the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) has contracted worth US $20 million each to Raytheon Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., and Northrop Grumman Corp. to develop prototypes of the anti-hypersonic interceptor to destroy the hypersonic projectile in the unpowered glide phase of its trajectory.[11] Besides, the US looks to enhance tracking capabilities with new forms of infrared sensing technology as well as improving the existing space, ground and sea-based radars.[12] Currently, hypersonic missiles can be tracked only at the terminal phase- the latter part of the missile’s flight path- by Aegis missile defence-equipped destroyers. Moreover, the US Space Force and the Missile Defense Agency are co-developing hypersonic ballistic tracking from space and expect that space-sensor satellites will demonstrate tracking and targeting to support hypersonic engagements.[13] In August this year, Japan and the US agreed to jointly develop “an interceptor missile to counter hypersonic warheads being developed by China, Russia, and North Korea.”[14]

Indeed, the PLA’s creation of Near-Space Command is a natural culmination of exploiting the unused territory for military contest in a great power rivalry. The ‘Sputnik moment’ of 1957 shattered the US confidence in advanced technology over its rival former Soviet Union. After that, the Pentagon pumped massive amounts of money into universities and research institutions for research and development in advanced military technology and its manifold applications, including space. The US launched Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), popularly known as the ‘Star Wars’ program, in the early 1980s, with a varied estimated cost from US $100 billion to US $1trillion to create space-based defence shield against incoming ballistic missiles.[15] However, the US reportedly spent only less than one per cent of the projected cost, but it forced the Soviet Union to begin talks on arms limitation treaties that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Implications and Options for India

The Near-Space Command will give a strategic advantage to China over India in the Himalayas. The border terrain is mostly at high altitude, and China’s major air bases and command and control centres close to India’s northern border are also at a high altitude from the sea level, for instance, Hotan air base-1424 meters, Lanzhou air base -1600 meters, Gargunsa air base-4350 meters, Kashgar airport- 1380 meters, and Lhasa Airport 3600 metres. On the other hand, India’s major forward airbases are on the low altitude plain areas, so China’s ground-based radars under the Western Theatre Command cannot detect incoming Indian aircraft to strike. Also, India has a comparative advantage over China in air operations in the border areas because Indian Air Force’s (IAF) fighter aircraft can carry more payload than the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operating from high-altitude terrain. These are the major challenges for the PLA in military operations against India.

Now, with high-altitude surveillance through drones and balloons, the Near-Space Command can enhance China’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, thus getting early warning information about the operations of the IAF. Also, China can easily target India’s air infrastructure established in low-altitude areas with hypersonic weapons. India’s Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system or the Russian-made S-400 anti-ballistic missile defence system cannot detect moving objects in the near-space domain. In this regard, India should think about joining the US-Japan collaboration for developing anti-hypersonic interceptors to deter China’s pre-emptive attack with hypersonic weapons against India.

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Notes:

[1]  Stephen Chen, “Fifth force: is China adding hypersonic ‘near-space command’ to its military for ‘precise and merciless’ attacks?,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3241059/fifth-force-china-adding-hypersonic-near-space-command-its-military-precise-and-merciless-attacks.  Accessed on December 1, 2023

[2] “China says will safeguard interests” over balloon shootdown,” The Indian Express, February 7, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-safeguard-interests-balloon-shootdown-8429681/. Accessed on December 2, 2023

[3] Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, “Chinese spy balloon gathered intelligence from sensitive U.S. military sites, despite U.S. efforts to block it,” NBC News, April 3, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-spy-balloon-collected-intelligence-us-military-bases-rcna77155. Accessed on December 3, 2023?

[4] Joe Saballa, “China Launches Fifth Military Force – ‘Near-Space Command,’” The Defence Post, November 23, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/11/23/china-near-space-command/?expand_article=1. Accessed on December 1, 2023

[5] David Vergun, “General Says Countering Hypersonic Weapons Is Imperative,” US Department of Defence, May 10, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3391322/general-says-countering-hypersonic-weapons-is-imperative/. Accessed on December 4, 2023

[6] “China’s hypersonic missiles could take down US Air Force’s new B-21 Raider: Study,” The Times of India, November 27, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-could-take-down-us-air-forces-new-b-21-raider-study/articleshow/105531581.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on December 6, 2023

[7] Stephen Chen, no. 1.

[8] Brandon J. Weichert, “China beating the US in military technology,” The Sunday Guardian, February 19, 2022, https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/china-beating-us-military-technology. Accessed on December 6, 2023

[9] Josh Rogin, “The most shocking intel leak reveals new Chinese military advances,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/13/china-hypersonic-missile-intelligence-leak/.  Accessed on December 6, 2023

[10] Brandon J. Weichert, “China beating the US in military technology” no.6

[11] Michael T. Klare, “Pentagon Awards Anti-Hypersonic Missile Contracts,” Arms Control Association, January/February 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-01/news/pentagon-awards-anti-hypersonic-missile-contracts. Accessed on December 6, 2023

[12] David Vergun, no. 3

[13] Ibid.

[14] “U.S., Japan to develop hypersonic missile interceptor – Yomiuri,” Reuters, August 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-japan-develop-hypersonic-missile-interceptor-yomiuri-2023-08-. Accessed on December 5, 2023

13/#:~:text=TOKYO%2C%20Aug%2013%20(Reuters),Yomiuri%20newspaper%20said%20on%20Sunday. Accessed on December 6, 2023

[15] Robert D Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900, Oxford University press, New York, 2002

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