Keywords: Artemis Accords, Moon Agreement, Ratification, Exploration, Exploitation, Benefits

On October 13, 2024, Estonia became the 45th nation to sign the Artemis Accords. Although Estonia does not have a space agency, it is onboard the Artemis accords. So is the case with many other non-spacefaring nations. Exactly four years ago, on October 13, 2020, the much-known Artemis Accords were signed by eight nations, namely Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) driven, US-led initiative claiming to be supporting the “commitments of the Artemis Accords and efforts by the signatories to advance implementation of these principles support the safe and sustainable exploration of space.”[1] Within two months since Estonia signed it, Cyprus, Chile, Denmark, Panama, Austria and Thailand have joined the movement, adding the quorum to 51 countries as of December 16, 2024.[2]

Some argue that it is a poorly drafted treaty as it has many contradictions with the core treaties on space law. This may be so for those who have taken the Accords at face value. A careful reading between the lines reveals that the Artemis Accords is one of the most thoughtful, intelligent, and cleverly written documents under the garb of benign commitment to all outer space treaties for peaceful purposes, except for the Moon Agreement of 1979.

The growing influence and importance of the Artemis Accords is evident from the global support it has garnered. Within just four years of its inception, 51 countries, including India, have made political commitments with the US and signed the Accords. In contrast, the Moon Agreement, which has been in existence for 45 years, has only been ratified by 18 countries. The recent decision of Saudi Arabia to join Artemis and withdraw from the Moon Agreement in January 2023, reducing the count to 17, further underscores the Accords’ global appeal.

Why is it that the Artemis Accords, which lays down the “Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes”, has been gaining so much traction in contrast to the Moon Agreement, which was exclusively designed for peaceful purposes? It is interesting to note that Australia is the only country that is party to both instruments. However, practically no spacefaring nation has ratified the Moon agreement yet. France and India, the only spacefaring nations that are signatories, have shown no indications that they will ever ratify the agreement.

So, let us analyse what additional benefits the Artemis Accords offer to the world, which has largely aligned itself with the US-led programme. It has 13 articles that have managed to gain global support. In fact, it brings to mind the bipolar world of the Cold War era.

This legally non-binding document has given ‘due regard’ to various space treaties and does not contradict them. Wherever it has tended to deviate from the benign thoughts and viewpoints, such as on ‘appropriation’ and ‘jurisdiction’, the argument or provisions have appeared to be succinctly justified under the noble thoughts of ‘Space Heritage’ and ‘deconfliction of space activities’, showcasing it to conform to the Outer Space treaty and related agreements. So far, this narrative has worked well in favour of the US, and it is continuously attracting both spacefaring and non-spacefaring countries to join it.

This Accords demonstrates its potential as a disruptor in space law and exploration. It represents a departure from conventional space treaties by advocating for collaboration, particularly with private enterprises, in lunar exploration and resource extraction. It has transitioned to bilateral and coalition-based political commitments rather than the traditionally consensus-based approach in space governance.

The main stated objective of the Artemis Accords is to foster peaceful and collaborative exploration of space, including the Moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids. However, this initiative also lays the foundation for resource exploitation. Section 11 clearly outlines the establishment of ‘safety zones’ around designated operational sites to prevent interference. This permits the creation of exclusive zones, a principle that is more aligned with resource exploitation than with pure exploration. This framework allows nations to pursue their national interests, granting them a first-mover advantage, especially in the emerging lunar economy.

The Artemis Accords, through its fundamental objectivity regarding space exploration, is carefully facilitating the prospects for exploitation, extraction, and, indirectly, the possibility of weaponisation. The growing establishment of ‘safety zones’ around extraction sites may inadvertently promote the militarisation of space by designating areas that could be secured or fortified under the pretext of safeguarding national investments.

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) asserts that space is a ‘global common’ and that resources cannot be nationally appropriated. However, the Artemis Accords reinterpret this to allow the extraction and utilisation of space resources by both corporations and states. In conjunction with the Accords’ framework, these measures provide legitimacy to extraction activities, thereby incentivising  governmental and non-governmental entities to enhance their extraction capabilities as an essential part of lunar and celestial initiatives.

As states and companies enhance their investments and dependence on resources from space, the importance of controlling those assets further escalates. The historical deployment of military assets by countries to safeguard terrestrial resource claims suggests that the expansion into extraterrestrial mining could prompt nations to establish defensive or protective measures for their operations. Such actions would fundamentally contradict the principles of core space laws, including the Outer Space Treaty.

The geopolitical, or rather astropolitical scenario in space is becoming more competitive than collaborative, as nations such as China and Russia launch alternative space initiatives, such as the Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). The Artemis Accords establish a framework that has the potential to evolve into a paradigm in which economic endeavours in space are protected by security measures, potentially resulting in the militarisation of space, like the historical conflicts over resources and land on Earth.

Despite these perceived lacunae, the Artemis Accords has gained more traction than expected. The reason is the benefit of exploration and exploitation, especially for the non-spacefaring nations without investing much into it. On the other hand, for spacefaring nations, apart from the benefits, the technological collaboration and knowledge gained is a low-hanging fruit to be part of the political commitment.

The major difference between the Moon Agreement and the Artemis Accords is in the intent of space exploration. Article 4 of the Moon Treaty of 1979 envisions an idealistic scene for space as ‘the province of all mankind’. The elegantly phrased and idealistic article encourages the peaceful exploration of space, cooperation, and an even and fair distribution of resources in space. It aims to keep the Moon and the heavenly bodies free from strife, exploitation, or dominance. The article intends that the great resources and opportunities afforded in the near future by space be for the benefit of humanity and not for the benefit of a few elites.

However, the same principles that make Article 4 so noble and visionary have also hindered the Moon Treaty’s broader appeal and ratification. The ‘equitable sharing’ and ‘common heritage’ requirements of Article 4 imply a level of perceived control and redistribution that many countries, particularly those with significant space investments, find restrictive and contrary to their national interests. The prospect of pooling space resources into an international framework and sharing benefits is generally seen to infringe on national sovereignty and enterprise. Space powers have been arguing this framework would limit their autonomy and the potential returns on their significant investments in space exploration and technology.

The Moon Agreement calls for the Moon and its resources to be used for the benefit of all humanity. In contrast, the Artemis Accords represent a competing framework more suited to technological capabilities and economic interests. So effectively, the Moon Agreement gives no extra benefit to the spacefaring nations for investing in the capabilities required to reach the Moon, explore, extract and return to Earth under the noble thought of the ‘benefit to mankind or humanity’. This is the main reason why only 17 nations ratified the Moon Agreement, marking the absence of major space players like the US, Russia, China and India.

Another reason for the global appeal of the Accords is that the US wants countries to get along so that it can effectively undermine the Moon Agreement through standard practice. It is often stated that if one wishes to avoid adhering to a law, one should consider changing it. The Artemis Accords are effectively achieving the same objective. Given that the Moon Agreement is perceived as non-beneficial and has yet to be ratified by major players, it is prudent to establish a mechanism based on customary law through state practice and acceptance. In International Law, Customary International Law (CIL) serves as a significant mechanism to effectuate actions that may not align with the existing legal framework.

CIL serves as a solution that arises when states consistently adhere to a specific practice driven by a sense of legal obligation. Through the collaboration of various nations in adopting the Artemis Accords, the US has the potential to create standardised practices regarding resource utilisation and safe zones on the Moon, thereby progressively integrating these norms into customary law. As of December 2024, 51 countries have signed on, and each nation that adheres to these protocols reinforces the foundation for these practices to evolve into widely accepted norms, extending beyond the signatories of the Accords.

Excluding Russia and China, all nations engaged in space exploration, such as Japan, the UK, Canada, the UAE, and India, have joined the accords. This collective action helps the United States advance a legal framework that normalises resource extraction. As time progresses, should a sufficient number of nations embrace and implement these principles, it reinforces the assertion that resource extraction and safety zones are in harmony with established norms, thereby evolving into a new space law framework that circumvents the conventional ratification process via the United Nations.

One significant step that is often ignored in the niceties of Artemis Accords is the US national space legislation called ‘US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 2015’. This national act marked a watershed moment in space law, as its intent, bold language and clear vision lay the path for the call to reform outdated space treaties. It also promoted space commercialisation and the inclusion of private players effectively. Introducing terms such as “allies in space”, “commercial exploration and recovery”, “entitled to space resources including to possess, own, transport, use and sell” was never the narrative of core space treaties before. Though the Act was highly criticised, it compelled countries to wear a thinking hat and as a result, many countries have developed their national space laws along similar lines. As of now, the US’s only rival in space is China, which, in association with Russia, is on a similar spree with the ILRS programme. As of December 2024, the ILRS has been able to garner the support of 13 countries, including Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Belarus. Interestingly, Thailand is one country that is a signatory to both the Artemis Accords and ILRS, reflecting complex global Astro-politics to come in the future.[3]

To conclude, India, as a responsible country with a credible diplomatic standing on the global stage, made a strategic decision after four years of careful consideration to join the Artemis Accords. This move underscores India’s commitment to global space cooperation and its interest in participating in lunar exploration missions. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords is not just a formality but also a clear indication of its intention to engage in technological and scientific collaboration, aligning with its ambition to become a significant contributor to outer space by 2047. By joining the accords, India is favourably positioned to collaborate with other nations, including the United States, in future missions to the Moon, sharing knowledge and expertise while contributing to the broader goals of advancing scientific research, technological development, and expanding humanity’s presence in space. It wouldn’t be surprising if India, with its effective and result-oriented pluralistic approach, partners with China and Russia in their ILRS programme in the future for the collective benefit of humankind.

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[1] “The Artemis Accords: Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future in Space,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords/, accessed on October 23, 2024.

[2] “The Artemis Accords: Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future in Space,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/signatories-02.pdf?emrc=451d5f, accessed on December 20, 2024.

[3] “Lunar Space Cooperation Initiatives.” Secure World Foundation, https://swfound.org/lunar-space-cooperation-initiatives/, accessed on December 20, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: South Asia, President Trump, Regional Security, India-USA Relations

A most consequential transition of guard will take place in just about a month from now. On 20 January 2025, Donald Trump will take over the baton from Joe Biden to become the 47^th president of the USA. This will be more than just a matter of domestic significance for the USA since the president of the most powerful country matters to the rest of the world too. This time the interest in the change of the occupant of the White House is more than usual owing to the nature of Donald Trump and the experience with him as president. His slogan then was America First and he showed little concern for issues of international security. On matters related to climate change, he was a denier and chose to withdraw the US from the Paris agreement. On several bilateral arms control agreements with Russia too he opted for the same course. He also did not hesitate in taking steps even if these upset many relationships, including with American allies and partners.

Given this experience of his last term as president, it is not surprising that every nation is busy evaluating what it may face from the new US administration. Interestingly, most articles on the subject are using the word ‘brace’ with respect to how countries will have to deal with the new old occupant of the White House.  Nearly all agree that Trump will be unpredictable throughout his four years and will maintain a transactional approach to issues and nations. How will he deal with South Asia?

In South Asia, the relationship of most consequence to Trump will be that with India.  Fortunately, the fundamentals of India’s relationship with the USA are strong. Both have convergent security concerns, especially from an assertive and aggressive China. These are expected to keep President Trump suitably engaged in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, it may be recalled that some of the elements of institutionalization of US-India ties took place under the previous Trump administration. Today, the bilateral relationship is built on the bedrock of 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, India’s status as a Major Defense Partner, four foundational agreements, and arrangements that enable real-time intelligence sharing in the Indo-Pacific. President Trump is unlikely to disturb these.

Of course, there is apprehension that the economic relations might be rocked if President Trump decides to raise tariffs. But, the overall American interest in India is unlikely to faze given its market size and value, as also the position, reach and influence of the Indian diaspora in the US. To add to this is the relatively good relations between President Trump and PM Modi. Both seem to know how to deal with one another. They are on terms good enough and understand the other’s relevance and importance enough to manage a cordial working relationship.

As regards Pakistan, Trump did not have a pleasant relationship with the country in the last term, and there is little reason for him to want to invest too much time, attention or resources to building that relationship. For now, the strategic location of Pakistan that has always been of importance for Washington appears to be of little salience. Moreover, Pakistan’s close relations with China could be an irritant for the Trump administration. Unless, in a masterstroke, as it happened in 1971, Pakistan is able to get China to deliver something to Trump that matters to him. Pakistan could increase its relevance for the Trump administration if, for example, it could persuade China, on behalf of USA, to join it on the table for arms control. Keen as Islamabad is to mend its relations with Washington, it will have to look for ways to catch positive attention of the Trump administration.

Amongst the other South Asian nations, most likely Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives would be of more interest to the new administration, especially from the security from China point of view. In the past too, these were seen as important for their potential for offering logistics in case of military operations against China. The same logic will operate even now. But, it is likely that Trump will let India take the lead on economic and security connections within the region.

Issues of indirect impact on the region

The manner in which the incoming Trump administration handles three issues could have positive or negative implications for the region. The first of these would be whether President Trump is able to achieve his expressed desire of finding a resolution for the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Any progress on this front will be good for India since US involvement in Europe distracts it from handling the China threat. It also tends to push Moscow closer to Beijing and strengthens the likelihood of an alliance between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

Secondly, any initiative that President Trump may take for a fresh re-engagement with DPRK that may enable securing a freeze on further nuclear and missile capability build-up under international inspections, would help address the risk of illicit proliferation of nuclear material, equipment or technology to non-state or other state actors.  This is a security concern for South Asia which is infested with terror organisations and religious fundamentalism besides expanding nuclear power programmes.

Lastly, if Trump could somehow bring China into some sort of nuclear arms control, either bilaterally with USA or at a more multilateral level, it would be a benign development for India and the region since it would avert the risk of a nuclear arms race, and its accompanying dangers.

South Asia needs to find its own coherence

It is likely that Trump will treat South Asia much like as he did in the past. Each nation in the region will try to find its own equation with the new administration.  Memories of his behaviour in the last administration will help nations be better prepared to handle his mercurial tendencies. President Trump, meanwhile, can be expected to judge the relevance of each country for its economic and security value.

The president of USA is always an important figure for all regions of the world. But for a region like South Asia which is so united by geography, history, culture and common regional and global concerns such as those of climate change and terrorism, it would be best to find its own regional coherence. Irrespective of their ties with the US, South Asian countries must build their own relationships and linkages to benefit the peoples of their region.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Iran, Manned aircraft, Israel Air Strike, Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen

Since the late 1990s, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a constantly expanding ‘shadow conflict’ for political and military supremacy in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s self-ordained role as the defender of the Shiite community has manifested in power projection through its proxies in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Gaza (Hamas), Yemen (Houthis) and Iraq (Badr). Iran has focused on gradually building up its influence and power projection in the Levant by providing support to its proxies and constantly harassing Israel with their attacks. Israel, on the other hand, has countered Iranian power-projection efforts by sabotaging Iranian capability developments through cyber-attacks and destroying the Iranian proxies through a combination of air, ground and sea-borne operations at regular intervals.

Sequence of Events

The latest Israel-Hamas Conflict has now been raging for more than one year (since October 07, 2023) and has resulted in Israel fighting on multiple fronts: with Hamas in Gaza, with Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the Houthis in Yemen, with the Iranian backed and funded forces in Syria, with Badr organisation in Iraq. Additionally, Israel has also had to withstand a direct confrontation with Iran for the first time ever with a couple of Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks. On October 07, 2023, Hamas totally surprised the Israelis with a highly coordinated, savage and lethal attack on southern Israeli cities and military bases. In this attack, Hamas looted and killed approximately 1,200 Israeli soldiers and civilians. Hamas also took approximately 250 Israeli hostages, of whom approximately 100 are still in Hamas captivity. Israel responded by declaring war on Hamas and launching a massive air and ground offensive into Gaza, which has still not been able to achieve its planned objectives of neutralising Hamas and freeing the hostages.

To express solidarity with Hamas, the Iranian-backed proxies—the Houthis in Yemen —have carried out several attacks on merchant ships linked to Israel and Western nations in the Red Sea, significantly impacting the international maritime trade between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. Also, Hezbollah from Lebanon has been continuously firing rockets at cities in northern Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, forcing Israeli citizens to take refuge in bunkers. On April 01, 2024, an Israeli air strike on the Iranian Consulate in the Syrian capital, Damascus, resulted in the death of several Iranian officers including an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, Brig Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi and his deputy.^[1] Iran retaliated approximately two weeks later with a coordinated barrage of approximately 120 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles and 170 drones on April 13, 2024, which resulted in minor damage to Nevatim Air Base.^[2] This was the first time that the Iranians had involved themselves and had fired missiles from Iranian territory into Israel. Israel retaliated with a limited drone and missile attack on Iran on April 18, 2024, which resulted in the destruction of an air defence radar site near an Iranian airbase in Isfahan province. However, the Israelis did not publicly acknowledge this attack. This direct exchange of fire between Iran and Israel in April 2024, the first of its kind, was a clear escalatory step in the Middle East conflict and served as a portent of the worsening situation and expansion of the conflict.

On July 31, 2024, Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, was assassinated in Teheran while attending the inauguration of the newly elected Iranian President, Masood Pezeshkian. Iran and Hamas attributed the assassination to the Israelis, which occurred just hours after Israel had targeted a top Hezbollah commander in Beirut. Subsequently, on September 17 and 18, 2024, the Israelis turned their attention to Hezbollah in Lebanon and succeeded in targeting Hezbollah operatives by carrying out multiple explosions of their handheld communication devices (pagers and walkie-talkie sets), which resulted in the death of at least 32 personnel and injuries to approximately 3,500 Hezbollah operatives. On September 23, 2024, Israel launched more than 650 air strikes on Lebanon and achieved significant successes against the Hezbollah operatives. On September 27, 2024, the Israelis were also successful in killing the Hezbollah commander, Hassan Nasrallah and other senior commanders of Hezbollah in a coordinated air strike using 85 “bunker buster” bombs on the Hezbollah underground headquarters in Beirut. The Israelis also launched a ground operation into southern Lebanon with the aim of destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and their forces that had been continuously targeting Israeli cities in northern Israel since the October 07, 2023, Hamas attack. On October 01, 2024, the Iranians retaliated by firing approximately 180 ballistic missiles, including hypersonic missiles, at military bases in Israel in response to Israeli assassinations of top Hamas, Hezbollah and IRGC leaders, causing only minimal damage and a few injuries. This was the second direct Iranian attack on the Israelis and represented another step on the escalatory ladder. The Israeli air strike on military targets in Iran on October 26, 2024, was in retaliation to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on October 01, 2024.

Operation Days of Repentance

Israel’s avowed and much-awaited retaliation to the Iranian ballistic missile barrage on October 01, 2024, came in the form of three successive packages of aerial strikes in the early morning hours of October 26, 2024, called the ‘Operation Days of Repentance’. This was the first time that Israel acknowledged directly striking Iran, bringing the ‘shadow conflict’ out in the open and crossing another threshold in the escalatory ladder. More than 100 Israeli aircraft consisting of F-35 stealth fighters, F-16 multirole fighters and F-15 fighter bombers, along with aerial refuelling tankers, surveillance and command-and-control aircraft, utilised precise intelligence to carry out coordinated precision strikes in three waves of 25 to 35 aircraft each.^[3] Certain drones were also used as part of the packages. The aircraft flew approximately 1,000 miles on each side, taking a tactical route through Syria and Iraq to target 20 odd dispersed Iranian military sites in key IRGC centres of gravity around Tehran, Esfahan, Shiraz and Karaj.^[4] All the Israeli aircraft landed back safely in Israel without any damages. It is alleged that the Israeli aircraft did not enter Iranian air space and launched their precision long-range weapons from Iraqi air space. Most probably, the weapons that were used were the ‘Rampage’ long-range, supersonic air-to-ground precision strike missile and the ‘Rocks’ next-generation extended stand-off air-to-surface missile.

Claims and Counterclaims

The Israelis claim to have struck Iranian air defences, missile and drone production facilities in central and western Iran. In order to prevent further escalation, the Israelis purposefully avoided attacking the Iranian oil refining or production facilities or the Iranian nuclear facilities. After the air strikes, the Israelis stated that their response was strictly aimed at proportionality and deterrence, not escalation. The Russian air defence S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at the Abadan oil refinery and the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex were targeted by the Israelis. The missile development and drone facilities operated by the IRGC at Khojir and Parchin (in and around Tehran) were also struck and the missile testing facility at Shahroud was also targeted.

Lebanon The Israelis claim that these attacks have significantly impaired Iran’s ability to mass produce missiles as they have struck at least 12 planetary mixers used for making solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles. The targets at Parchin also included facilities which were previously being used for Iran’s research into nuclear weapons development before it was suspended. The Israeli precise targeting of the Iranian most capable air defence assets like the S-300 in the first wave cleared the way for the subsequent two waves to target specific Iranian strategic sites. The Iranians, however, deny the claims of the Israelis, stating that the attacks were successfully countered and that there was only “limited damage” at certain locations. They also confirmed that four soldiers and one civilian had died in the air strikes. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, initially gave a measured response, saying the strikes should “neither be exaggerated nor downplayed”. However, subsequently, the Iranian state media released a video of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s statement, which said, ‘The enemies, whether the Zionist regime or the United States of America, will definitely receive a crushing response to what they are doing to Iran and the Iranian nation and to the resistance front’. The Iranian foreign ministry described the Israeli attack as a violation of international law and emphasised that Iran reserved the right to defend itself and respond to the Israeli aggression in a manner of its choosing. If Iran decides to respond to the Israeli air strikes, it would signal another threshold in the escalatory ladder, and in all probability, the response would be another concentrated barrage of surface-to-surface missiles and drones to saturate the Israeli air defence systems rather than a coordinated fighter strike.

Lessons learnt

The Israeli air strikes on October 26, 2024, have reasserted the Israeli Air Force’s air superiority and power projection capabilities in the Middle East. The claimed successes of the Israeli Air Force—the direct targeting of the IRGC facilities in Iranian territory and exposing the vulnerabilities of the Iranian air defence system—reemphasise their professionalism and offensive capabilities. Through these air strikes, the Israelis have also cautioned the Iranians that any further aggression would invite additional strikes, if required, on strategic Iranian targets and could incur a crippling cost on Iranian military, economic and nuclear capabilities. The Israeli attack on only military targets clearly indicated a desire to prevent further escalation. This is because the Israelis want to remain focused on further degradation and elimination of the Iranian proxies: Hamas and Hezbollah. The Israelis feel that any further escalation with Iran would only undermine their ability to further decimate Hezbollah and Hamas.

The ‘Operation Days of Repentance’ was the most serious and extensive aerial operation inside Iran since the Iran-Iraq War, which ended in 1988. The air strikes totally exposed the vulnerabilities of the Iranian air defence system, which the Israelis targeted in the first wave of the air strikes. The Israelis thereafter had full freedom of operation for nearly four-hour-long three strike packages over Iran. The air strikes also emphatically conveyed the message that attacks against Iranian oil refineries, production sites, or even against Iranian nuclear facilities could be executed with similar success in future.

The air strikes also resolutely[5] reinforced the primacy of the fighter aircraft as an offensive instrument of precision targeting and power projection. The fairly widespread successes of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), loitering munitions, First-Person View (FPV) drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas conflict had many defence experts prophesying the death knell of manned fighters and an expeditious induction of UAS and ballistic missiles into all air forces. The Israeli air strikes of October 26, 2024, have proven that fighters are, without doubt, the most suited aerial platforms for carrying out coordinated strikes on multiple targets. The resounding lesson that emerges is that UAS would be best for complementing manned aircraft, rather than replacing them in future air campaigns.

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Notes:

^[1] Dr Haid Haid, “The strike on Iran’s consulate in Syria could be the spark that ignites the Middle East,” Chatham House, July 12, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/strike-irans-consulate-syria-could-be-spark-ignites-middle-east. Accessed on November 01, 2024.

^[2] “Iran attacks Israel with over 300 drones, missiles: What you need to know,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/14/iran-attacks-israel-with-over-300-drones-missiles-what-you-need-to-know. Accessed on November 02, 2024.

^[3] Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu Ozcelik, “Operation Days of Repentance: The Impact of Israel’s Strikes on Iran”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 28, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/operation-days-repentance-impact-israels-strikes-iran#:~:text=Operation%20Days%20of%20Repentance%3A%20The%20Impact%20of%20Israel’s%20Strikes%20on%20Iran,-Matthew%20Savill%20and&text=Israel’s%20recent%20strikes%20on%20Iran’s,of%20its%20regional%20deterrence%20strategy.  Accessed on 02 November, 2024.

^[4] Jonathan Ruhe, “Israel’s Iran Strike Threads a Tight Strategic Needle,” JINSA, October 27, 2024, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/israels-iran-strike-threads-a-tight-strategic-needle/. Accessed on November 03, 2024.

[5] Jon Gambrell, “Iran’s supreme leader threatens Israel and US with ‘a crushing response’ over Israeli attack”, AP, November 03, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/iran-khamenei-israel-hamas-lebanon-war-30385c3a17d1fca9415eb37db86dc9c5. Accessed on November 04, 2024.

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Keywords: exercise-shiksha-tarang-shakti-fifth-generation-aircraft-viksit-bharat2047

The first phase of the largest-ever multilateral air combat exercise, Exercise (Ex) Tarang Shakti, concluded at Air Force Station Sulur on August 14, 2024, showcasing professional acumen, camaraderie and military diplomacy at its best. The high-profile and professionally enriching first phase culminated with a one-of-a-kind flying formation. The formation was flown by the Chiefs of Air Staff of the French, German, Spanish and Indian Air Force (IAF), which is a testament to leading from the front in the best of military traditions. The German and French air force chiefs, Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz and General Stephane Mille, flew in the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1 (Tejas). The Spanish and Indian Air Force chiefs, Air General Francisco Braco Carbo and Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari flew in the Su-30.

Faith in Self Reliance

Exercise Tarang Shakti also showcased the need for Self-reliance in military aviation, which has been a learning lesson not only from the recent Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas crises but also since World Wars I and II. India, in general, and IAF in particular, has shown immense faith in the versatile indigenous Tejas aircraft. Throughout the missions in the exercise, LCA’s serviceability and operational performance have been praiseworthy while executing various missions along with more illustrious, battle-proven and widely flown fighter jets of Air Forces of advanced nations. The favourable and positive comparison has tremendously boosted the morale of the technicians, scientists and the air warriors of the IAF. To the extent that the IAF Chief stated, “LCA being the smallest fighter aircraft in the drills, showed size does not matter. The aircraft proved its capabilities in realistic combat settings as part of both ‘blue force’ (friendly) and ‘red force’ (hostile).”[1]

Though LCA Mk I Tejas is the talk of the town, it is worth noting that nearly all Indigenous platforms like Prachand attack helicopter, Netra Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) and Akash Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) prominently participated throughout the exercise in various missions of Large Force Engagement (LFE). As part of interoperability, MiG-29K fighters of the Indian Navy also joined the first phase, promoting jointness.

The aim of such multi-national exercises is not only to collaborate and corroborate various Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP), and professional skills but also to gauge the potential and efficacy of equipment in furtherance of desired warfare capability. The exposure in this exercise proves that the Tejas is the epitome of Indian success in the self-reliance campaign. It is certain that along with Su30 and Rafale, Tejas will now be used more often in air combat drills both within and outside the country. International Defence Aviation Exposition 2024 – IDAX 2024[2] organised at the airbase showcased the Defence Research Development Organisation’s (DRDO) effort to boost the defence industry within the country and with foreign companies.

Challenges in Self-Reliance

While the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) endorsed the capabilities of the LCA Mk-1, he also expressed concern, stating, “If we had adequate numbers of LCA Mk-1As, the aircraft would have taken part in Tarang Shakti.”[3] Similar concerns were also flagged by the current Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS) recently in a seminar organised by the Centre for Air Power Studies. A question mark hangs over Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) ability to meet the delivery timeline of the 83 LCA Mk-1As on order. IAF will have to wait longer for the first aircraft that was supposed to be delivered by the end of February 2024. The deadlines have been revised twice, from February to August and then to November 2024. As has been the experience, it is doubtful it will be delivered even in 2025. This inordinate delay occurred despite the final operational configuration (FOC) version being cleared in 2018. Even the first fleet of 40 Tejas aircraft has not been met to date. The research and production agencies need to realise that the repetitive delay will cost the nation dearly. The sooner we realise this, the better it is. It will be foolhardy to wait for an adverse situation to happen and then speed up the production process. At this slow pace, the IAF will not have the first lot of 83 aircraft by 2029, let alone another 97 aircraft. The delay in the supply of GE-404 engines is making the situation further grim. Four significant issues that always hinder meeting deadlines are the lack of indigenously manufactured high-performance jet engines, slow design and development process, lack of domestic aerospace support ecosystem and stringent certification procedures.

Takeaways

This exercise highlights three major lessons that must be acknowledged within the IAF and the government machinery at the highest level. The media reports and coverage may help showcase the strength of air power yet again. Still, the IAF needs to put forth its requirements more assertively to garner national efforts and ensure it is optimally, qualitatively and quantitatively equipped to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty.

Shiksha to Shakti

It was sixty-one years ago that the Indian Air Force conducted its inaugural multinational air force exercise, Exercise ‘Shiksha’. The wargame, which included the USA, UK, and Australian air forces, was developed in response to the 1962 India-China War and reflects a strong commitment to enhancing preparedness for potential future conflicts. In the first fifteen years of its existence in Independent India, the IAF struggled to build up its inventory, tactics, techniques, and procedures, especially in the offensive roles undertaken by the fighter aircraft. Also, the IAF had to address the issues of inadequate radar coverage, poor communications in remote areas, and limited experience in mountain warfare.[4] IAF had to evolve effective Air Defence procedures and capabilities, including an Air Defence ground radar network, control and reporting systems, aircraft on Operations Ready Platform, etc., which later proved to be crucial in subsequent wars.

Nearly six decades later, the IAF has the ability to conduct a strategically significant mega air force exercise, ‘Tarang Shakti’, involving around 30 countries across the globe. There is a marked difference between 1963 and 2024: while Ex Shiksha (Learning/Education) was focused on learning, educating and evolving, Ex’ Tarang Shakti’ (Wave-like Strength) aims to practice and showcase strength, reflecting the learning accumulated over these decades. Today, IAF conducts this exercise from a position of strength and confidence as one of the pre-eminent air powers in the region. The armed forces, and the IAF in particular, play a vital and effective role in the geopolitical and geo-economic sphere of influence, aligned with the country’s vision of Viksit Bharat@2047. This exercise is an apt example of air power diplomacy through air operations and industry engagements, highlighting the IAF’s global influence and strong international ties.

Qualitative Upgradation

Phase I of Ex Tarang Shakti demonstrated quality interceptions, engagements and a variety of air operations required in the contemporary contested and congested battlespace. The participation of advanced fourth-generation aircraft, supported by the latest avionics, and the training of global air warriors reaffirm that one has to be ahead of the latest technology at all times. Only then can one achieve optimum situational awareness and battlefield transparency, leading to faster and more assured deliverables. Participation of foreign aircraft F-16, F-18, Typhoon, Rafale, etc., along with Indian inventory of aircraft, Surface to Air Guided Weapons (SAGW), Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), etc., improved the combat experience.

At the same time, it serves as a stark reminder that having only a few of the latest top-of-the-line aircraft with better avionics and qualitative output is insufficient in the Indian context, especially in the integrated theatre environment and the vast borders. The entire mission planning and execution is a network-centric process, with IACCS being the lynchpin of the success of quality missions. It is imperative that the IAF’s best practices be further strengthened and bolstered with equally capable aircraft, missiles, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and network connectivity throughout the battlespace and Tactical Battle Area (TBA). ‘The need for advanced technology is not just a necessity but a strategic imperative for the IAF’s continued success.’

Since its launch, China’s fifth-generation, state-of-the-art stealth aircraft, the J-20, has advanced remarkably, producing about 250 aircraft, of which more than 200 are presently in active service. Production rates have risen from 30 to 100 aircraft annually, and by 2030, the PLAAF may have more than 800 J-20s in its fleet. This would present a serious strategic challenge as it might outnumber the IAF’s whole fighter jet fleet.[5]

Conversely, Pakistan has expressed interest in the Chinese Shenyang FC-31 and Turkish KAAN, which are comparable to the US Lockheed F-35. India’s security calculations would be further complicated by Pakistan’s potential acquisition of either of these stealth fighters, so the IAF would need to respond decisively and swiftly. Given the potential for conflict with both China and Pakistan, India faces a multi-front challenge that calls for it to maintain an extremely competent and adaptable air force that is well-armed to thwart any misadventures by adversaries.

Quantitative Upgradation

Exercise Tarang Shakti demonstrated that today’s and tomorrow’s warfare cannot be fought with yesterday’s equipment. Still, it also reinforced that the quantity of assets, whether in the air or on the ground, is equally essential to orchestrate all kinds of air operations as per your choice of time and place. Over the past decade, the conventional threat emanating from China has garnered more traction than Pakistan. Incidents like Doklam, Galwan, etc., are among the skirmishes that further cement this narrative. However, the traditional rivalry from Pakistan, conventional and otherwise, must not lose sight of military preparedness. The vast, sparsely manned front on both sides of peninsular India, being the most extensive, has added to the difficulty for the armed forces in monitoring the vast oceans and the highly important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), especially for the IAF. Therefore, it is imperative that the quantitative upgradation of the IAF is critical and must be met as soon as possible. It is also clear that it cannot be solely met under the Atmanirbhar Bharat campaign. India and the IAF, in particular, cannot keep extending the timelines for the prototypes to fructify and further wait for mass production. The IAF needs to firm up the immediate and short-term deadlines of 2027 and 2031 to finally be fully equipped with respectable array of aircraft, radars, enablers, missiles, network-centric systems and space capabilities by its centenary in 2032. The IAF’s alignment with the Viksit Bharat@2047 deadline and completing its assets by then may not be on the right track, as there is still a long way to go. Also, the procurement of assets may face multiple hindrances and be marred with internal and external political scenarios, which is difficult to guess at this stage. Therefore, sticking to immediate and short-term deadlines is the need of the hour, and the whole-of- nation/government approach is the only way to meet the ends.

Statistically analysed, the IAF is currently operating with a significantly lesser number of fighter squadrons than those recommended for a two-front war. It currently has only 30 combat squadrons and barely countable enablers like tankers, AEW&C and orchestrator Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The massive shortfall of nearly 250 fighter aircraft becomes even more concerning when considering China’s PLA Air Force (PLAAF), which fields approximately 1,700 combat aircraft, including over 800 fourth- and fifth-generation platforms like the J-20. Meanwhile, with assistance from China, Pakistan has also modernised its fleet to include over 400 combat aircraft, including JF-17s and J-10C fighters. PAF has recently added its ninth aircraft to the AEW&C fleet, which tilts battle transparency in its favour. In contrast, the IAF’s depleting strength is aggravated by the impending phase-out of legacy aircraft such as the MiG-21 and Jaguar, which will further reduce its operational squadrons. While the inadequacy of numbers can be overcome by professional acumen, tactics, procedure, etc., the extent to which this would be effective in a war-like scenario is anybody’s guess.

The IAF’s current combat strength lacks the depth required to counter simultaneous threats on both fronts and in the peninsular India. To bridge this gap, the IAF requires the induction of at least 12-15 additional squadrons which is not possible with the indigenous route alone; thus, government-to-government acquisition is a must by 2031 to ensure a mix of both. HAL is likely to supply not more than 7-8 squadrons of LCA Mk1A and LCA Mk2 by 2031. Beyond these, IAF also needs to have a 5^th-gen fighters to counter adversaries, both of whom would have a 5^th-gen aircraft fleet by then. Force multipliers like Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA), AEW&C, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) and orchestrators like AWACS are essential to ensure sustained air operations. Quantitative upgrades supported by strategic acquisitions are vital for the IAF to maintain air parity, provide effective deterrence, and ensure a credible defence posture against the combined threats posed by China and Pakistan. The need for a credible defence posture cannot be overstated in the face of such formidable adversaries.

Conclusion

The IAF has come a long way, from its first multinational Exercise, Shiksha, in 1963 to Exercise Tarang Shakti in 2024. IAF has successfully demonstrated its operational and combat capabilities to domestic audience, adversaries, and the global community. Conducting such a multinational exercise is also a test bench for the senior military leadership of the three Services to acknowledge the need for quality and quantity in the envisaged integrated environment. It also sends a firm message that Air Power diplomacy is one of the most effective, fastest and far-reaching consequential modes of military diplomacy empowering national objectives. It would not be incorrect to state that ‘Quantity alone cannot overcome quality, and effective quality cannot be maintained without adequate quantity.’ Hence, it is a constant reminder for the concerned to review the procurement roadmap of the IAF for the country.

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Notes:

[1] Rahul Singh, “LCA proved its mettle in Tarang Shakti drills, says IAF chief”, Hindustan Times, August 13, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lca-proved-its-mettle-in-tarang-shakti-drills-says-iaf-chief-101723547971515.html. Accessed on August 16, 2024.

[2] “Ex Tarang Shakti showcases India’s military capabilities and defence ties with participating nations”, All India Radio, August 13, 2024, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/ex-tarang-shakti-showcases-indias-military-capabilities-and-defence-ties-with-participating-nations/. Accessed on August 16, 2024.

[3] Singh, n.1.

[4] Anchit Gupta and Angad Singh, “Diffidence to Strength: Multinational Air Exercises in Indian skies”, #IAFHistory, August 3, 2024, https://iafhistory.in/2024/08/03/diffidence-to-strength-multinational-air-exercises-in-indian-skies/. Accessed on August 16, 2024.

[5] Karan Sharma, “The J-20 Challenge: Can India Bridge the Fighter Jet Gap With China?” The Diplomat, June 18, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/the-j-20-challenge-can-india-bridge-the-fighter-jet-gap-with-china/. Accessed on August 19, 2024.

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Keywords: Airpower, Vayu Shakti, Gagan Shakti, Tarang Shakti

Having finished Vayu Shakti earlier in February and Tarang Shakti, which is set for later in the year, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is now beginning ‘Gagan Shakti’, the second of the trio of exercises planned for this year. It is time to take stock of what these exercises involve. Gagan Shakti is a complex exercise that began, as scheduled, on April 1, 2024, and will continue round the clock, seven days a week, for the next 10 days. Vayu Shakti demonstrated the capabilities of the Indian Air Force to deliver firepower with precision, concentrated in time and space, over a defined area and pre-selected targets.

As part of the exercise, extensive planning and execution of activities across the country have been carried out to simulate the emergence of threats that might result from a conflict involving two fronts. During Exercise ‘Gagan Shakti-2024’, the IAF will mobilise all of its bases and equipment throughout the country. All of the key features of airpower, including precision, mass, flexibility, responsiveness, speed, versatility, and reach, are expected to be tested by this exercise, presenting a challenge for all stakeholders. The Indian Army will provide logistics assistance for the massive exercise. This support will facilitate a comprehensive pan-India movement of around 10,000 Indian Air Force personnel and ammunition. The purpose of this movement is to validate the aspects of the Indian Air Force’s Operational Rail Mobilisation Plan (ORMP). [1]

The latest edition of the IAF doctrine, released in 2022 and including several significant additions compared to the earlier version, will be put to the test during the exercise. One of the most critical aspects of the new doctrine is the connection between air power as a national instrument of military power and national security strategy in order to accomplish national aims and objectives in the context of the current geopolitical environment and technical difficulties.

In light of the fact that the IAF has been grappling with a shortage of assets in terms of fighter aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), it is of the utmost importance that the IAF makes smart use of precious assets while maintaining centralised command and control. In the current environment of operations across multiple domains, it is a fact that neither the Army, Navy, nor the IAF can achieve victory on its own in the direction of the accomplishment of political objectives. Consequently, this is magnificently encapsulated in the conclusion of the IAF doctrine, which states that “the establishment of robust joint structures to enable right sizing, joint training and operations, while maintaining service specific core competencies”[2] is the recommended course of action. In a significant way, the upcoming Gagan Shakti exercise intends to accomplish all of these things and more with the active involvement of the Indian Army and the Indian Navy. The Indian Army has already begun to take action by aiding the Indian Air Force units in mobilising for the exercise in cooperation with the Indian Railways. Moreover, the Indian Navy will also be deploying its vessels for the purpose of the exercise.

When it comes to employing force by any service, whether by itself or in conjunction with other forces, doctrinal precepts serve as a guide and control strategy. However, it is training and operational employment that ultimately produce the desired results. Because of this, military professionals must undergo training that is realistic or very close to real operational scenarios. This enables them to refine their skills and acquire invaluable knowledge regarding the employment of force. It is anticipated that the Rafale fighter aircraft and Prachand helicopters, in addition to the S-400 air defence system, will be operated for the very first time during the current iteration of the Gagan Shakti exercise. During the exercise, the entire IAF, along with all of its operational bases, would be activated. The exercise aimed to test the IAF’s readiness to carry out intense operations encompassing a wide range of operations, including counter-air, air defence, counter-surface force, electronic warfare, long-range strikes, and rapid deployment of forces from one theatre to another. Additionally, to test the various contingencies that could occur, operations would be carried out from civil airfields, and landings would be made from designated sections of national highways spread across the country.

Exercise Tarang Shakti, which is scheduled to take place in August 2024, is going to be the most extensive multilateral exercise that has ever been carried out in India. It is anticipated that aircraft from the Air Forces of Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, the United States of America, and Germany will take part in the war game. Additionally, the German Air Chief is planning to fly into the country in a fighter aircraft personally. Participants are expected to come from about twelve different nations. This exercise will improve military cooperation and interoperability and highlight India as a nation that must be taken seriously. India now possesses the fourth-largest air force in the world, and this exercise will showcase India as a formidable competitor. The IAF participated in exercises abroad in the past year, in addition to other air forces from friendly foreign countries coming into India. This was one of the most significant events that took place. This pattern indicates that the IAF is becoming more widely acknowledged as a professional force, as well as the significance of the country as an emerging power in the area. The purpose of these exercises is to give a platform for various air forces to engage in the exchange of knowledge, the sharing of best practices, the accomplishment of joint training, and the formation of personal relationships, all of which serve as vital intangibles in the process of developing synergy during joint operations. These cooperation and multilateral exercises foster military diplomacy and go a long way towards guaranteeing regional security and stability by sending a strong message to any government with hostile and hegemonic intentions. India is the only regional air force that has participated in multilateral exercises on such a large scale.

With the completion of Vayu Shakti, the IAF is actively conducting an exercise, Gagan Shakti, on a national pan-air force level. The objective of Gaganshakti-2024 is to conduct an evaluation of integrated war-fighting techniques and tactics within the context of the Indian Army and the Indian Navy together. The last time an exercise of this magnitude was carried out was in 2018, when the IAF launched more than 11,000 sorties in preparation for a scenario involving two fronts.[3] Since then, a lot of things have changed, including recent purchases made by the IAF, the current security situation in the region, which includes a border standoff with China that has been going on for the past four years, and the requirement to practise and train in a setting that is nearly as realistic as possible. Tarang Shakti is a multilateral air force exercise that will take place later this year, and the Indian Air Force is looking forward to participating in it, as well as preparing and directing it. The IAF is committed to leaving no stone unturned in its pursuit of national security, always striving to reach new heights and achieve glory in consonance with its motto of ‘touching the sky with glory.’

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Notes:

[1] “IAF’s 10-Day Mega Exercise ‘Gagan Shakti’ Set To Begin”, The DD News, April 1, 2024, https://ddnews.gov .in/en/iafs-10-day-mega-exercise-gagan-shakti-set-to-begin/. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

[2] “Preparing For The Future: A Road Map”, Doctrine 0f the Indian Air Force, Chapter:7, Page:84, 2022, https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf#:~:text=Establishment%20of%20robus t%20joint%20structures%20to%20enable,and%20operations%20while%20maintaining%20service%20specific%20core. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

[3] Huma Siddiqui, “Gaganshakti 2024: India’s Show of Strength and Preparedness”, The Financial Times, March 26, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-gaganshakti-2024-indias-show-of-strength-and-preparedness-3437354/. Accessed on April 1, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Near Space, High Altitude Platforms, Airspace, Sovereignty

The recent shooting down of a Chinese high-altitude balloon that drifted over the US airspace has brought the spotlight on the region of the upper atmosphere, which is relatively underutilised. As aerospace technology develops, air-planes are flying higher, while at the same time, satellites are exploiting the lower orbital regions. Effectively, the previously underutilised region of the vertical dimension, which lies sandwiched between the atmosphere and orbital space, is shrinking and has now become a much-desired zone for the armed forces. This region, which lies between 20 to 100 kilometres, is commonly referred to as the ‘Near-Space’ region.[1] While space law experts disagree with the use of this term, this region is an emerging battlefield, and terming it ‘near-space’ accrues some benefits for the military.

Why do we want to be in near-space? Is it to achieve specific goals or enhance our capabilities? This exploitation of near-space cannot be viewed in isolation. Significant capabilities have already been established that enable armed forces to operate through the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region. Near-space can augment and support military applications like surveillance and reconnaissance, communication, and many other applications. Capabilities developed in near-space will have to be integrated with those of LEO and the airspace region. Long-range weapons, such as missiles, have always transited through this region. With other aerial platforms now entering near-space, what are the likely complications that emerge, and how are they to be dealt with?

Although the term ‘Near-Space’ is an American jargon, the potential for near-space platforms to provide some of the same capabilities as space-based platforms, at much lower costs and with greater flexibility and persistence, is reason enough to consider the near-space region for military effects. This would contribute to an operationally responsive space capability.

Lighter-than-air vehicles operating in near-space could provide the capabilities that are demanded by the armed forces, albeit with the added advantage of having the liberty of going into enemy airspace without being detected. Communications, network relays, and Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities could be effectively achieved through near-space. These lighter-than-air vehicles could include balloons, airships, high-altitude drones, etc. The key advantages lie in the persistent loitering ability and survivability of these platforms while escaping detection in covert missions.

Despite the overwhelming benefits of the military exploitation of near-space, some key issues remain unaddressed, as mentioned below:

    (a)    Demarcation and sovereignty of the near-space region.

    (b)    Traffic management and collision avoidance.

    (c)    Integration of airspace and space.

Demarcation and Sovereignty of the Near-Space Region

As regards the extent of sovereign airspace and the near-space region, two fundamental questions arise. Firstly, why is near-space region being called so when it is not space? Secondly, why is the demarcation between airspace and space set at 100 km? Neither of these practices is internationally accepted; rather, they have emerged out of convenience to escape the sovereignty issue with airspace for operating high-altitude platforms beyond the limits of geographical boundaries. In fact, near-space is not space, even though it is being termed as such. If we stop thinking of near-space as space, many issues on regulations will be resolved.

Near-space is not technically space. It is the upper atmosphere. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation, also called the  Chicago Convention of 1944, states that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.[2] The extent of airspace in the vertical dimension is an undefined quantity in legal terms. Hence, it is an accepted norm that airspace would extend up to the limits of space, as nothing exists between airspace and space. Therefore, near-space is the unused upper atmosphere or the airspace where aeroplanes cannot fly owing to the rare density of air. This is an unregulated airspace and can be used by military aeroplanes only.

The boundary between airspace and space is deemed to be the upper limit of airspace or the lower limit of space. However, the existing regulations and treaties are silent on this crucial definition of where space begins. The Kármán line at 100 km is the most commonly accepted demarcation between airspace and space, though the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) favours a boundary at 80 km altitude.[3] This understanding of the demarcation between airspace and space has vast implications for airspace regulations as well as space regulations.

It is not science but law that has to decide on where space begins. While many theories have been propounded on this subject, some practical approaches need to be considered. One such approach is to limit airspace up to the highest altitude that can support flight. The second is to have the lowest orbital altitude as the beginning of space. However, there are many indispensable factors that suggest the need to have a buffer zone between airspace and space. Firstly, orbiting is possible only above 160 km, but practical orbits with sufficient orbital life of satellites would be possible only above 200-250 km. Also, the upper atmosphere will increasingly be used as future technologies would support high-altitude aviation. Any traffic transiting between airspace and space, either after launch or on re-entry, would have to pass through the entire range of aviation flight bands. Hence, having a buffer zone between 50 km to 150 km is essential to de-conflict and restrict aviation to lower altitudes (below 50 km). This will also make the implementation of airspace and space regulations a less daunting task.

Sovereignty of airspace is a necessity for Air Defence, but it cannot extend up to the undefined limit of space. The Chicago Convention, as well as the Outer Space Treaties, need a relook, as the effects of undefined limits impact the regulatory processes for Insurance, taxation laws, arbitration, as well as command and control for military activities in this region.

Traffic Management

The near-space region poses a very complex situation for traffic management. This is because the traffic being mentioned is not aircraft, but high-altitude platforms (near-space vehicles), transiting traffic like space launch vehicles going into space and spacecraft returning from space, reusable launch vehicles, responsive and flexible launch systems, and space planes which could be operating in the near-space and lower orbital regions. The situation is complex because these altitude bands in the upper atmosphere will be utilised for military purposes on dual-use platforms. Most missions will be covert, which hinders the identification and deconfliction process. Also, the outbound and inbound traffic to space is set to increase in the coming years, and we may see simultaneous space transportation activities from multiple places around the globe. Adding to the surveillance nightmare is the presence of stratospheric balloons and the relative ease with which they can be launched and recovered, even by amateurs. The regulatory framework and operating rules for this kind of activity in the near-space region are yet to evolve. Moreover, large surveillance gaps exist, not only in the geographical extent of radar coverage but also in the vertical extent. Near-space awareness is going to become as critical for safe operations as space situational awareness.

Integration of Airspace and Space

The atmosphere, where airspace exists, and space are two distinct mediums with diverse physical properties. It is not possible to have a regulatory coherence between two substantially different mediums. This is perhaps the reason for having a different set of regulations and laws for airspace and space. It is a flaw to apply the laws governing space activities to the near-space region.

It is, therefore, practically impossible to integrate airspace with space without riders. To consider an integration of both these mediums, one must look at the operational imperatives necessitating such an integration. The immediate necessity is to have operational continuity in surveillance, tracking and engagement for objects transiting from the sub-orbital regions into the upper atmosphere for air defence and missile defence. Integration is also required to have continuity for the deconfliction of traffic in this region to prevent collisions. Therefore, while an Air Force may find an operational convenience in gaining continuity, the same is not the case with civilian use of airspace and space.

Hence, the orbital space is beyond reach, and we only need to consider the integration of the sub-orbital space with the upper atmosphere, which is being called near-space. This needs to be addressed at an organisational and operational level. Effectively, we are saying that airspace already exists up to the limits of space defined by the Kármán line. We need to expand our understanding and utilisation of airspace. For operational continuity, sub-orbital space should be integrated with the airspace and managed by the same entity as airspace.

Conclusion

The upper atmosphere is fast emerging as a vital resource for military applications. Advancements in aerospace technologies are enabling the exploitation of the unused portion of the airspace, which is the upper atmosphere. This region is being termed as ‘near-space’, even though it is not a known region of space. Such a nomenclature of the upper atmosphere has implications for the sovereignty of airspace, which is deemed to exist up to the commonly accepted demarcation between airspace and space. In reality, near-space does not exist. The unutilised upper atmosphere is, in effect, a sovereign airspace till the geographical limits of a State and international airspace beyond the sovereign limits.

The use of the upper atmosphere is beneficial for military applications, which are being derived through satellite services. High-altitude platforms provide most of the benefits of satellites, with the added advantage of providing persistence as they do not orbit. However, the use of high-altitude platforms in this region has several implications in terms of the safety of traffic transiting through the upper atmosphere and the inadequacy of regulations governing the use of near-space.

Misidentifications can lead to hostile situations, resulting in conflicts. Most high-altitude platforms are dual-use systems, hence civilian assets are also under threat of military action. Amongst the many challenges of operating in the upper atmosphere is the issue of inadequate surveillance, which makes it ideal for covert military operations but also creates a nightmare for traffic management.

There is an urgent need to evolve norms of behaviour for the so-called near-space region. It is also a critical juncture to define the limits of airspace and space. A buffer zone between airspace and space with distinct operating rules would rule out any misunderstandings in interpretation.

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Notes:

[1] Hampton Stephens, ‘Near-Space’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, July 01, 2005, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0705near/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force’s%20operating%20domain,spacecraft%20orbits%2022%2C000%20miles%20up. Accessed on March 31, 2024.

[2] International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Convention on International Civil Aviation – Doc 7300’, https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx. Accessed on January 20, 2024.

[3] “Karman line”, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/science/Karman-line. Accessed on March 30, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: India-Afghanistan, India-Taliban, Humanitarian Assistance, Afghanistan-Pakistan

Indian delegation from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) visited Kabul in early March and held meetings with the senior members of the Afghanistan administration. The visit generated curiosity regarding the India-Afghanistan relations and is seen as a crucial step by New Delhi. The visit signifies India’s sustained approach towards Kabul, which has traditionally focused on the people of Afghanistan. According to the MEA spokesperson, the visit focused on two critical issues: humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and the use of Chabahar port by the Afghan traders. Two and a half years after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan (August 2021), we have witnessed a gradual shift in India’s position towards the Taliban. From a complete closure of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan in 2021 owing to security concerns based on New Delhi’s past experience with the Taliban regime (in the 1990s), to a gradual engagement with the Taliban now is part of India’s efforts towards bringing stability in Afghanistan. While India has not recognised the Taliban regime, it is engaging with the Taliban to facilitate humanitarian assistance.

India-Afghan relations have gone through changes owing to strategic developments in the past. Post-2001, the two countries shared a cordial relationship (till August 2021), which was not limited to governmental exchange but was also driven by strong people-to-people contacts. India’s position has been of a supporting actor focused on development and capacity building in Afghanistan. India has deep-rooted civilisational ties with Afghanistan, and both countries have historically shared a good relationship. The bilateral ties did suffer a major blow during the Taliban rule in the 1990s when India continued to support the Northern Alliance. Post-2001, the focus of Indian activities was on developmental projects, including industrial, hydro, education and health sectors, as well as humanitarian assistance. India was a key donor to Afghanistan, and the cumulative level of commitment of Indian assistance to Afghanistan amounted close to US$3 billion. The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between India and Afghanistan in 2011 provided a further boost to the relationship.

Most of India’s development projects in the past could be broadly divided into four categories:[1]

(a)   Large Infrastructure Projects: India initiated several medium and large infrastructure projects in its assistance program to Afghanistan, including the construction of a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram, a 220/110/20 kV sub-station at Chimtala and 220kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul.[2] The inauguration of the new Afghan Parliament (2015) and the Salma Dam (2016), known as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, located in the Herat province in western Afghanistan, were significant initiatives that were part of the Indian assistance.

(b)   Humanitarian Assistance: Indian efforts included the supply of wheat and commitment to regularly contribute to the Afghan Red Crescent Society for the treatment of Afghan children with Congenital Heart Disease.[3]

(c)   Capacity Building Initiatives: This was a significant area of Indian assistance to Afghans, and critical initiatives included Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) courses for Afghan Government officials, training via telecommunication at medical facilities, and Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) fellowships for Afghan students.[4]

(d)   Small Development Projects: These were initiated in the fields of agriculture, rural development, vocational training, health, education, etc.[5]

India’s engagement focused on improving the lives of the Afghans, and owing to its developmental role, India continued to wield a considerable amount of soft power in Kabul. Although India shared a cordial relationship with the Afghan Republican government, it did feel the constraints of Pakistan’s approach, which aimed at deterring India’s engagement in Afghanistan.

Engagement Post-2021

New Delhi’s immediate reaction post-August 2021 was to close the consulates and ensure the safe return of its people. There were apprehensions regarding the Taliban’s approach towards India, as the Taliban has traditionally been seen by India as Pakistan’s proxy and anti-India. Afghanistan has witnessed curious developments post-2021. The Taliban have very much monopolised power as they have moved from an insurgent movement to a functional government. While there have been reports regarding dissension and fissures amongst Taliban’s top brass, power appears to remain consolidated under the leadership of reclusive Supreme Leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, sitting in Kandahar. According to a World Bank report, there are indications of meek economic recovery, but around 50 per cent of households struggle to maintain their livelihood and meet their basic needs. The country remains highly dependent on external economic assistance, and formidable economic and humanitarian challenges question the long-term survival of the state. The Taliban have evolved in terms of their willingness to stay connected to the world, and they extensively use traditional and social media to appeal for recognition across the globe.

New Delhi has been keen to address the instability in Afghanistan and safeguard its security and strategic interests. In November 2021, India hosted a regional security conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan declined to attend the conference, and China too skipped the meeting. New Delhi opted for a collaborative approach at the regional level to address common challenges emerging from the instability and security situation in Kabul. In December 2022, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, hosted a special meeting with his counterparts in Central Asia.  The security situation in Afghanistan was one of the most critical focus areas of the talks. A joint communiqué that focused on regional security issues, including Afghanistan and counterterrorism, was issued after the meeting. The second meeting was held in Kazakhstan in October 2023, and Afghanistan was one of the key issues discussed in the meeting.

At the bilateral level, India took a rather bold decision to take a step forward and engage with Kabul in June 2022. This decision was primarily due to two factors: the intensifying humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and not to allow India’s previous investments in Afghanistan to go in vain. The Indian embassy in Kabul was reopened, and a technical mission was assigned to oversee the distribution of humanitarian aid.

The Taliban have refrained from anti-India statements and consistently assured India that the Afghan soil will not be used against India. They have been extremely keen for India to expand engagement in Afghanistan. Until now, India has focused on humanitarian assistance, food security, medical supply and education. New Delhi has offered 50,000 metric tons of wheat and 300 tons of life-saving medicines.[6] Apart from this, medical equipment is likely to be supplied to Kabul. For drug addicts, India is helping the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and assistance has been offered in terms of medical kits, clothing, etc.[vii] India’s role in education has formed a critical area of its engagement in the past. So, last year, in 2023, India offered 1000 scholarships entailing an online educational scheme for Afghans. The programme gives priority to the students living in Afghanistan, and reportedly, out of the 1000 scholarships, approximately 300 have been granted to Afghan girls.[7]

India has also been pushing to develop the Chabahar port project to boost regional trade and encourage Afghan traders to use the port. The port would facilitate India’s assistance in reaching Kabul, bypassing Pakistan. Chabahar port is also seen by New Delhi as a critical hub for the  International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 km long multi-mode transport project to facilitate trade amongst India, Iran, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

The Afghan embassy in New Delhi continues to function and is being operated by the Consul Generals appointed by the Ghani regime. India’s engagement with Afghanistan does not imply India’s recognition of the Taliban regime. New Delhi is very much in consensus with the international community (on the recognition of the Taliban regime), which has based recognition (and further assistance) on two critical conditions: inclusive government in Kabul and girls’ education and employment.

The Taliban have welcomed India’s approach and have been keen for India to expand its assistance into the domain of development. While India has been extending its support in humanitarian assistance, it is likely to move ahead with a well-considered approach, given its historical and cultural linkages with Kabul, its commitment to support the Afghans, and, very importantly, the evolving regional, strategic and security dynamics.

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* Parts of the article have been published in Shalini Chawla, “Afghanistan: The Taliban and the world nations finds a way to engage, without recognition”, Moneycontrol, August 22, 2023, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/afghanistan-the-taliban-and-world-nations-find-a-way-to-engage-without-formal-recognition-11234031.html

Notes:

[1] Embassy of India Kabul, Afghanistan, “Indo-Afghan Relations: Development Partnership”, http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0707?000. Accessed on March 20, 2024.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Interaction with the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi on March 13, 2024.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

The post India Adopts a Cautious Middle Path in Afghanistan appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Pakistan Elections 2024, Shehbaz Sharif, PTI, Imran Khan, Pakistan Military, Economic Crisis, Asim Munir

After days of speculation, the controversial Pakistan general elections held on February 8 led to an agreement between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to form a coalition government. PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif will assume the role of Prime Minister for the second time, and PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari has been nominated for the position of President. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) has agreed to extend support to the alliance. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) candidates who contested as independents and joined hands with the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) failed to get a majority. The elections have been marred by accusations of rigging and violence in favour of the party ‘selected’ by the military establishment, the PML. The most popular leader, Imran Khan, is behind bars fighting more than 150 legal cases. PTI candidates contested as independents as the party was denied its election symbol and did manage a surprising number despite claims of rigging and the establishment’s coercive tactics during the elections. The elections saw a voter turnout of about 48%. It is important to note that the elections were held against the backdrop of prolonged political uncertainty, deep economic challenges, an alarming security situation with continued attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the reverberation of the May 9 violence. The events of May 9 were completely unprecedented in a military-run state and manifested deep polarisation within society and state institutions and growing anti-military sentiments within the masses. Pakistan’s electoral system has remained, by and large, controversial, marked by political engineering and the military’s interference, and elections in 2024 are no exception.

However, this phase of elections is distinct as the establishment encountered the challenge of the unfathomable popularity of Imran Khan, which challenged its capacity to manipulate political dynamics. The PTI-backed candidates performed well despite rigging and misreporting, as confessed by Rawalpindi Commissioner Liaquat Ali Chattha, who took responsibility for the wrongdoing and resigned from his post. Chattha also claimed the involvement of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Chief Justice in the rigging and mishandling of the elections to preclude the victory of the PTI candidates. In a volte-face, a few days after his announcement, Chattha denied his claims. Even after months of rigorous efforts by the establishment to weaken PTI and undermine Imran Khan’s position, the people’s mandate, clearly, was in favour of Khan. In the 2018 elections, it was the military that supported Imran Khan against the PML-N and projected him as a clean leader needed for the upliftment of Pakistan.

 Some developments in the elections are positive and do indicate a welcome change in society. Firstly, a large sector of the voter base—approximately 44%—was below the age of 35 and played a major role in defining the mandate. Also, there was a larger participation of women in this election, and over 20 women candidates won across the national and provincial constituencies. Secondly, the 2024 elections demonstrate deep anti-military sentiments among the masses, who directly or indirectly hold the military responsible for the country’s deepening economic woes and persistent political instability. Clearly, every successive election in Pakistan leads to a stronger political hold of the establishment and further weakening of the democratic forces. The suppressive tactics of the establishment did not deter the voters in the elections from supporting the PTI candidates who are not part of dynasty politics and not favourites of the military. Thirdly, and very importantly, the radical religious parties did not perform well in the elections and failed badly. The reasons could be twofold—the 2024 elections were mainly driven by three political personalities: Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif, and Bilawal Bhutto, and the leaders of the religious parties had little space here. Secondly, the elections had a significant young voter base who did not seem to be attracted by the radical parties.

Pakistan will start a new journey under the political leadership of Shehbaz Sharif, who has had a good and stable record with the military, and he is likely to not assert himself against the establishment, unlike Nawaz Sharif, who shares a rancorous past with the generals. Although PML-N had complete support from the establishment and Nawaz’s return was perceived as a game changer for the party, the party could not perform very well in Punjab and barely managed a lead. The PPP maintained its hold in Sindh and performed well as anticipated. The PTI has rejected the idea of joining or extending support to either of the leading parties, and has been challenging the election results. The PTI has joined the right-wing SIC, which is an alliance of Islamic political and religious parties. It remains to be seen how this alliance will impact PTI’s image within its support base. Although the elections were seen as a blow to the military’s stature and its ability to manage people’s perceptions, the fact remains that the outcome of the elections is very much in sync with the military’s choice. Pakistan is likely to have a weak coalition that lacks credibility. This works in favour of the establishment, as the coalition will have a restricted ability to assert itself and will be highly dependent on the military for its survival. Imran Khan & party will continue to challenge the functioning of the government. The military’s role in the economic domain has been further strengthened and institutionalised with the creation of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). Foreign investment will, by and large, stay under the control of the military. Although Pakistan’s economic crisis has been managed for some time, it’s far from stability. The foreign reserves stand at approximately US $8 billion, which is barely sufficient to cover eight weeks of imports. Inflation stands at around 30 per cent, and the value of the Pakistani rupee against the US dollar dropped to a record low last year. The Shehbaz Sharif government will need to take tough decisions for structural changes and deal with economic strains. A new plan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) needs to be negotiated. Imran Khan has reportedly written to the IMF, requesting that the financial organisation conduct an audit of the election results before sanctioning a new loan. Conventional wisdom suggests that a weak coalition will face the challenges of getting consensus on these decisions. Even though the military in Pakistan has experienced a strong anti-establishment mandate in the elections, it has been successful in manoeuvring the election outcome. The establishment gathered additional powers constitutionally and institutionally after May 9, 2023, and will continue to assert itself. How long the new government manages to stay in the good books of the generals remains to be seen.

Speculations are rife as to how the India-Pakistan strained relations will shape up under the new regime. Political statements from Pakistan expressing interest in talking to India are not unlikely in the months to come. Previous statements issued by the caretaker government under Shehbaz Sharif and again by Nawaz Sharif during the election campaign did express willingness for regional peace and talking to India, based on the condition (driven by wishful thinking) that India should reverse its decision to abrogate Article 370. Will the new government deviate from Pakistan’s existing political position in talks with India? The second critical question is whether the Pakistan military sees stabilising relations with India serving its strategic interests?

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Logistics, visibility, desert storm, resource planning, military, materials management

The government of India announced the New Logistics Policy (NLP)-2022 on September 17, 2022, duly considering and incorporating the advancements in Information Technology (IT) having global impact. Talking in military context, the revolutionary changes in the nature of modern warfare coupled with improvement and systematisation in resource planning have assumed greater significance, especially for the armed forces. These advancements have been prompted by the magnitude of the security challenges of the 21^st century underscoring a compelling need to respond more rapidly & decisively thereto.

Today’s military policies are based upon operational inputs, force capabilities, resource availability and logistical effectiveness. In case of today’s warfare, the logistics management becomes a complex science, being extremely specialised owing to the high costs involved and the inherent lengthy supply lead times directly impinging upon operations. These complexities emanate also from the technological diversities of weapon systems operating over the entire spectrum of the armed forces of the day.

With the changing landscape of warfare, the battlefield environment of the future is likely to be characterised by the following:

(a)   Short, intense conflicts and surgically focused strikes.

(b)   Operations against apprehension of use of nuclear weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the adversary.

(c)   Effective use of night vision devices.

(d)   Increased transparency of the battlefield.

(e)   A high-intensity and high-tech war, possibly non-linear initially but having potential to be a multidimensional air-land-sea warfare.

(f)   Strikes into deep enemy territories with increased surveillance using weapon delivery platforms.

(g)   High rate of attrition.

(h)   Tactical interdiction.

(i)    Enhanced mobility and manoeuvrability.

Therefore, the key elements of logistics activities relevant to any operational scenario would be:

(a)   Foresight

(b)   Anticipated preparation, planning, deployment & diversions.

(c)   Flexibility.

(d)   Economy of effort.

(e)   Military-Civil Interactions.

(f)   Integrated logistics operations with asset visibility at all levels.

Considering the above, an all-enveloping e-platform would, therefore, be an inevitable need of the hour to define as to which echelons of logistics command & control should be created or altered to facilitate effective logistics support to the fighting forces in the theatre of operations, which happens to be as diverse as ours.

Concept of IT-Enabled Operational Logistics

With an aim to facilitate smooth air operations, the armed forces, especially the Air Force has to evolve and sustain an excellent Enterprise Resources Platform (ERP). The system has to operate amidst an effective interface between the logistics intelligence data and field logistics support in terms of critical spares for the smooth conduct of air operations. The military materials management revolution with IT as a force multiplier needs to be supplemented by simultaneous advances in the operational fields of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, interoperability and surveillance and reconnaissance (C⁴I²SR), accompanied by enhanced lethality & precision of weapon systems.

However, the element of IT in use in the armed forces materials management has to migrate to the integration of global asset management with real-time transit logistics in the theatre of operations. The Materials Management system needs to be more meaningful and operations-oriented with the ability to closely monitor the inter and intra-theatre movement of equipment and combat formations. The manifestation of today’s armed forces’ resolve to fine-tune their materials management functions, needs to be guided in the direction of sustaining an operationally effective logistics infrastructure in the theatre of war.

The requirement, therefore, would be to understand as to what the war fighters need, how to share a common operating picture, how to maintain real-time asset visibility and In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and how to maximise the effectiveness of the distribution logistics apart from accurately configuring the loads to optimise the material handling and economic utilisation of the aircraft fleet.

Future Perspective of IT-Enabled Operational Logistics in Indian Armed Forces

While the Indian army uses the Computerised Inventory Control Project (CICP), the Indian Navy uses the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS), and the IAF showcases heavy reliance upon the Integrated Materials Management On Line System (IMMOLS) for its logistics operations. Considering the terrain peculiarity scenario wherein the Indian armed forces operate, the shape of a comprehensive operational logistics character needs to be achieved through certain additions to the existing MM systems of the Indian armed forces, as under:

(a)   Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) in Wartime Scenario: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was the largest support effort that the US military had ever undertaken in modern times. The RFID technology was widely used by United States Central Command (CENTCOM) forces in Afghanistan during OEF. The improvement in visibility of assets was considered a Key Result Area (KRA) during OEF more than what was visualised during the Gulf War. The RFID tags which were used extensively in OEF as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom were instrumental in providing better asset visibility to the field commanders. The RFID application by US forces greatly reduced the distribution process timelines and significantly enhanced the ITV. In OEF, the US forces had applied the same tactics to keep track of all battlefield logistics movements. RF tags were placed on all items of supply in a satellite-enabled tracking eco-system providing constant visibility.

(b)   RFID for Peacetime Materials Management: Besides war, the RFID can be effectively utilised in peacetime too. In India, this technology is already in use by a number of major corporate players e.g. Maruti, Tata Steel and Nestle. Blue Dart courier service, one of the best-acclaimed logistics services countrywide, besides other logistics service providers in India, makes effective use of similar technology aiming at real-time tracking of consignments moving from one destination to another. Possibilities for peacetime utilisation of IT-enabled logistics blended with RFID in Indian armed forces, especially IAF, are as under

(i)   RFID-Enabled Warehousing: RFID tags can be installed atop storage bins/racks in the warehouses, with the hand held readers used by the warehouse in-charge.

(ii)   RFID-Enabled Issue Process: Tag reader antennae are to be installed at the entrance of the stores to record issue and ensure the movement of stocks out of the storehouse only under proper authority.

(iii)   RFID-Enabled Stock Updation: With the integration of RFID, a Store-in-Charge would be able to update the location by just clicking a button. With every issue, the stock status thus automatically gets updated.

(iv)   RFID-Generated Auto Triggers: Automatic updation of stocks would indicate the stocks falling to critical levels and auto-generate the provisioning reviews/replenishment demands on respective supply agencies.

(v)   RFID-Enabled Receipt Process: All incoming consignments need to be tagged with an RFID tag containing relevant details of the item e.g. description, denomination of quantity, price, source of supply, technical details etc. Each item synchronised with RFID on receipt will be updated on the main server.

(vi)  RFID-Enabled Inventory Tracking: Inventory is tracked as it moves out of the warehouse to the consignee’s destination. This would be achieved by pasting RFID-enabled labels on consignment.

(vii)   RFID-Enabled Inventory Management: A warehouse in-Charge, through handheld RFID readers, should be able to automatically update his stocks via RFID server in near real-time with every issue. This will enable the RFID server to have updated inventories 24×7, which, in turn, would greatly help a logistics manager in realistic material planning.

(c)    RFID-Enabled In-Transit Visibility: Similarly, it is also possible to enable the Logistics vehicles with RFID. The vehicles could, preferably, be closed container trucks. This can be modified to be RFID-enabled with a tracking device i.e. an integrated RFID reader (Satellite-linked GPS). This device would automatically synchronise the vehicle’s location in near real-time to the RFID server. The RFID tag on the vehicle can also have various additional sensors like humidity, temperature, light, and pressure etc. This would help in knowing the exact status of the consignment inside the container through various parameters while in transit. Automatic alerts shall be raised when any of these parameters change due to any change in the condition of the consignment while in transit. These alerts can be tracked at all times by a centrally located domain server. The use of technology will provide total visibility of assets even during transit, the benefits in terms of reduced time cycles of vehicles to and fro their designated path, and increased visibility inside the vehicles for future planning/diversions.

(d)   Broad Utility of RFID in Indian Military Context: The nature of warfare has undergone a complete transformation in the last two decades or so. Inter and intra-sector mobility of the forces has become the biggest logistical challenge for a strategic commander. With battlefields becoming more transparent than before, it becomes imperative for a Tactical commander to track each move of his forces. This apart, the free flow of weapons, ammunition and spares into the theatre of war is another big challenge for a logistician. The lethality of punch that a weapon system can deliver is proportionally related to the degree of efficacy of just-in-time battlefield supply chain management.

It is imperative that goods and personnel carriers moving into the battlefield be fitted with RFID Tags atop containers/vehicles whereas their readers can either be fitted at designated transit routes or scattered over the theatre of war. To achieve this, RF tags are to be placed on the complete range of items. This infrastructure can be used in a satellite-enabled tracking system providing high level of visibility to the logistics managers at all echelons of the logistics hierarchy. It would ensure the locations get updated on the server as soon as the transport carrying the goods passes through the pre-decided routes.

(e)   Global Assets Visibility in Military Materials Management: Global visibility of assets would ensure the availability of real-time data to a logistics Manager. Besides, the end user in the field, with network-centric materials management tool at the click of a button would know as to where would his requirements be available. The future migration to a user with a handheld terminal/laptop having satellite phone connectivity would render him in a better position to place an online demand on his immediate logistics source, besides knowing as to where else the required stores are available. He then can raise a demand directly on the source instead of getting into the rigmarole of finding out availability. This would lead to global stock always being visible. In case of NIL/inadequate stock at a unit, option would be available to an indenter to transcribe inability directly to the echelon showing balances. This would not only streamline the supply chain but also ensure that surpluses at one point offset critical shortages at the other. Besides with handheld terminals and laptops, the end user would always be able to quickly requisition his requirements from a known and confirmed source. It would, in turn, reduce his downtime for unserviceabilities to a fairly large extent, apart from leaving him free to concentrate upon enhancing the punch of his armour.

Broad Prospects for Indian Armed Forces Logistics Amidst New Logistics Policy-2022

The Indian Armed Forces can leverage various logistics techniques in alignment with the New Logistics Policy-2022 to enhance operational efficiency. Embracing modern technologies, such as real-time tracking systems, can optimise supply chain management, allowing for better visibility and control over the movement of men & material.

Automation in the procurement processes can streamline acquisitions, reduce lead times, and enhance resource allocation. Integration of artificial intelligence and predictive analytics can aid in forecasting material requirements, thereby facilitating a proactive logistics planning.

Furthermore, the adoption of cloud-based logistics solutions can enhance data accessibility and collaboration among different branches of the military with due regard to the tenets of security. Formulating and implementing a logistics command structure under the theatre command can improve coordination and responsiveness, fostering the efficacy of joint operations across the entire spectrum of armed forces.

The use of GPS-enabled vehicles and drones for logistics transportation can expedite the delivery of critical supplies in challenging terrains. Additionally, investing in renewable energy sources for transportation and storage has the potential to perfectly align itself with the sustainability goals outlined in the new logistics policy.

Capacity-building through regular training programs by reputed agencies, especially the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), would ensure that personnel are well-versed in the latest logistics techniques. Collaboration with private sector partners for expertise in logistics management and infrastructure development can further enhance the military logistics capabilities.

Conclusion

Considering the above, it can safely be assumed that the road ahead is clear, leading to a future scenario wherein the last man in the chain i.e. a combatant on the battlefield, would be able to requisition his requirements just by the click of a mouse on the handheld terminal/laptop. A field commander would have a much clearer & constant visibility of his assets amidst inter and intra-theatre mobility. Amidst recent dynamics of geopolitical scenario resulting into India gradually assuming the status of a global power, there is every possibility of Indian Armed Forces operating in various roles across the national boundaries.

If that is the future perspective, then the concept of operational logistics would become a reality by transforming itself into a real-time war-oriented weapon of e-logistics. We can positively state that a comprehensive and technology-driven approach, coupled with strategic partnerships in terms of training, will empower the Indian Armed Forces to meet the challenges of modern warfare in line with the objectives of the New Logistics Policy 2022.

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Keywords: Kargil, C-130J, Night Landing, Air Operations

The Indian Air Force C-130J aircraft made a historic night landing at the Kargil airstrip with Garud commandos on board, marking a major milestone in the military aviation. The mission used cutting-edge terrain masking techniques to demonstrate skills in difficult terrain.[1] This accomplishment demonstrates the Indian Air Force’s C-130J aircraft’s successful night landing at the challenging airstrip as the first ever night landing by a fixed-wing aircraft at Kargil. It demonstrates the IAF’s readiness and experience and represents a major improvement in operational effectiveness in difficult terrains. The IAF’s dedication to perfecting complex manoeuvres is demonstrated by the real-time employment of skill, teamwork, technology and experience in the years of consistent man-machine combination.

Strategic Importance of Kargil Airfield and Challenges of Air Operations

Kargil, the second largest town in Ladakh, is located approximately 200 kilometres away from Srinagar, Leh, Padum Zanskar, and Skardo Baltistan. Kargil has always been a significant town assuming the strategic importance of being the most critical link between Ladakh and the rest of mainland India.[2] The 434-kilometer Srinagar-Leh Highway, also known as National Highway 1A, is the primary land access to Ladakh. The road  passes  close  to  the  Line of Control (LoC)  in  the  Kargil  district,  and  crosses through  the  critical Zoji-La Pass, the gateway to Ladakh and a chokepoint near the town of Drass.[3] The entire logistical support to Indian Army (IA) units deployed at Siachen Glacier is through this single access road. The Zoji-la pass, till recently, used to remain closed for around six months due to heavy snow, and ‘winter advance stocking’ was the only way to ensure the survival of troops deployed at icy heights of Siachen. The IAF, to ensure uninterrupted air maintenance support in these areas, has been gradually improving the infrastructure at forward air bases and Advance Landing Grounds (ALG) in the area such as Thoise, Fukche, Nyoma, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), with an eye toward both China and Pakistan.

The Airports Authority of India (AAI) had been managing the Kargil airfield, since the time the Jammu and Kashmir government had activated it for civilian aircraft operations in 1996.[4] However, at the commencement of military operations during the Kargil conflict in 1999, the control was shifted to the IAF. Kargil airfield while being the closest to LoC, had to be used sparingly, that too mostly for helicopter operations. During the Kargil War, AN-32 fixed-wing transport aircraft operated from the airfield, albeit in daytime only. Since then AN-32s have been operating regularly from there. In the first week of December 2013, the IAF started an air courier service from Kargil to Jammu to enable the transportation of civilian citizens due to road closures in winter.[5] This service has now been resumed in January 2024.  In 2011, IAF announced plans to extend the 6,000-feet runway in Kargil to facilitate the operation of all major transport aircraft, including the C-130J, C-17 and the IL-76.[6] In 2014, the Government of India (GoI) extended the operational control of Kargil airfield to the IAF for another 20 years for upgradation of infrastructure, including runway extension to 9000 feet.[7]

Even though the planned runway extension has not yet taken place, since 2020, the  C-130J Super Hercules aircraft have commenced flying day sorties to Kargil to move military personnel and supplies. There have always been severe limitations of basing aircraft in a location like Kargil airstrip, which is within the artillery fire ranges of the Pakistan Army. There have been multiple challenges faced by the IAF for conducting fixed-wing aircraft air operations from Kargil airfield that range from operational to geographical and availability of suitable aircraft in addition to the many factors of support and protection. Some of the critical challenges were:

(a)      Situated at 9604 feet AMSL in the heart of the rugged Himalayas, the Kargil airstrip presents unique difficulties for pilots. Due to the high altitude, narrow valleys with high cliffs, erratic weather patterns, and strong winds, pilots need to possess extraordinary skill and proficiency when approaching the airfield and also while landing.

(b)     The reduced aircraft performance at such high altitude makes the task of a pilot highly challenging when landing the aircraft safely. This challenge gets compounded for landing at Kargil airfield due to the shorter runway length of just about 6000 feet as against the standard length of 9000 feet. Srinagar airfield which is at about half the altitude of 5600 feet has almost double the runway length of 12000 feet. The challenge of landing at Kargil can well be compared.

(c)       The close proximity to LoC with Pakistan of just about 12 km, restricts the approach for landing to be unidirectional. The short runway length, coupled with the severe limitation of a unidirectional approach and proximity to LoC, poses a unique challenge of compulsive landing once committed on approach.[8] The limited reserve of thrust at these altitudes adds another challenge in safely executing a ‘Go-around’ or overshoot action.

(d)     All these challenges of daytime operation increase manifold in their degree of difficulty during air operations at night and in low visibility conditions, where visual cues for approach and landing are minimal.

In 1999, shortly after the signing of the Lahore Declaration, India and Pakistan fought the Kargil War. Under the code name Operation Badr, Pakistani forces, masquerading as infiltrators from Kashmir, broke into Indian territory along the LoC and occupied posts that the IA had abandoned for the winter. The objectives were to sever the connection between Kashmir and Ladakh, isolate Indian Army forces stationed on the Siachen Glacier, and compel India to engage in peace talks regarding the Kashmir dispute.[9] By mid-May, IA had moved in a large number of forces to evict infiltrators from the dominating heights of Kargil-Drass-Batalik sector by initiating Op Vijay (1999). IA suffered heavy casualties as the enemy had occupied strong positions and IA forces had to attack uphill under heavy fire from the top. Even though the Air Force offensive operation, Op Safed Sagar, started on May 26, 1999, the IAF had already started a massive airlift of troops, stores, and ammunition. The Kargil war officially ended on July 26, 1999, with the IAF and IA completely evicting the Pakistani infiltrators and IA regaining control of their original positions at LoC. However a large number of lessons emerged that were highlighted in the Kargil Review Committee that submitted its report on January 07, 2000.[10] Among the many important lessons, the two major takeaways for the IAF highlighted the urgent need for a strategic medium airlift capable aircraft with day and night operational capability in the Himalayan region and secondly of development of Kargil airfield as full-fledged fixed-wing aircraft operation airbase with the capability to handle day and night heavy air maintenance load.

C-130 Capabilities: A Game Changer for IAF

The IAF’s capability enhanced manifold with the induction of strategic airlift aircraft like C-130J Hercules and C-17 in February 2011 and September 2013 respectively.[11] Since their induction over a decade ago, both C-17 and C-130 have proved their strategic lift capability not only in India but also during international missions, including operational joint training exercises, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions, Vaccine Diplomacy missions during Covid pandemic as well as evacuation operations such as airlift of stranded Indians in Ukraine or the Silkyara tunnel evacuation in Uttrakhand. C-130J is an advanced two-pilot flight station Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) capable aircraft with fully integrated digital avionics, an all-weather day-night capability with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and infrared thermal imagery, colour multifunctional liquid crystal, Head-Up Displays (HUD), incorporating cutting-edge navigation with dual inertial navigation system and GPS that enhance its unique capability of operating from all types of terrain. The aircraft is designed to operate on rugged and unprepared surfaces. Additionally, the aircraft has a digital moving map display, low-power colour radar, and fully integrated defensive systems. The most recent night evacuation of Indians from an unprepared airfield in Sudan, with no landing or crash facilities, speaks volumes of the aircraft’s capabilities and highlights the professionalism of the IAF pilots.

The Uniqueness of C-130 Night Landing at Kargil Runway

An important milestone in the IAF’s operational capabilities was reached when its C-130J aircraft made its first successful night landing at the Kargil airstrip. This successful night landing at such a strategic location not only underscores the heightened capabilities of the IAF but also serves as a testament to its preparedness in challenging terrains. This historic achievement is unique in many ways. This was the first time a night landing had been attempted by a fixed-wing aircraft at the Kargil airstrip that is located so close to LoC, although transport planes had been earlier landing there during the day. The approach to the airfield is unidirectional and it is surrounded by steep hills of 14000 to 15000 feet, which give very limited space for manoeuvring, thus making a night landing one of the most challenging tasks. The reduced engine efficiency coupled with the severe limitation of ‘No Go Around’, adds another dimension to the challenge. The IAF selected C-130J for this most challenging task due to its capabilities in terms of aircraft performance with four powerful engines suited for the task, most modern onboard avionics and systems, night operation capabilities with the use of NVGs and infrared thermal imagery for landing. The most important aspect is that Combat-ready Garud Special Forces personnel being airlifted to such a forward location sends a strong message to the enemy about the IAF’s ability to strategically airlift forces through difficult terrain at all hours of the day. The IAF, by such an audacious attempt, has proved that its pilots are always pushing the limits of their operational capabilities, from manoeuvring through the hazardous terrain of Uttarakhand to mastering the intricacies of nighttime landings in Kargil.

The Way Forward

The IAF, since independence, has been facing constant challenges of defending the skies from two hostile nuclear-armed neighbours. True to its motto “Touch the sky with glory,” the IAF has always brought glory to the nation, whether in war, precision strikes, multinational joint training exercises or HADR missions. Even with the depleting strength of its fighter squadrons, the IAF has kept pace with the emerging technologies and changing threat scenarios and its quest for excellence has never slowed down. The recent night landing by C-130 is truly a game changer in the strategic capability of the IAF and would remain a historical milestone in the quest for excellence of the IAF. The importance of this special night landing operation of C-130 at Kargil Airfield goes beyond its technical details and execution. It conveys a very clear message of the rising level of the IAF capability to the world at large and especially to China and Pakistan. Deliberately showcasing these capabilities in public sends a strong message about India’s resolve and ability to protect its territorial integrity. Kargil was a surprise in 1999, with the changing geo-political construct and increasing threats, the IAF must now step up its efforts in developing robust operational infrastructure, including runway extension, not only at Kargil airfield but also at DBO, Nyoma and Thoise as alternative airfields for day-night operations.

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[1]“ Indian Air Force’s C-130 J aircraft achieves milestone night landing at Kargil airstrip,” The Economic Times, January 07, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-air-forces-c-130-j-aircraft-achieves-milestone-night-landing-at-kargil-airstrip/articleshow/106608806.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

[2] Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, “Kargil-Ladakh”, https://kargil.nic.in/lahdc/. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

 [3] Acosta, Marcus P., “High altitude warfare:  the Kargil Conflict and the future,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive,  https://core.ac.uk/reader/36694780. Accessed on January 08, 2024.

 [4] “Kargil to be a major Indian Air Force base,” ZeeNews media, October 03, 2011, https://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/kargil-to-be-a-major-indian-air-force-base_734785.html. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

 [5] “AN-32 Kargil courier service to resume operations from Jan 22,” The Week, January 20, 2024, https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/national/2024/01/20/des66-ladakh-air-courier.html. Accessed on January 22, 2024.

[6] ibid

 [7] Parliamentary Digital Library, Lok Sabha unstarred question number 1527 dated July 21, 2014, ,  https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/705927/1/5660.pdf. Accessed on January 10, 2024.

 [8]  “Why Indian Air Force plane C-130J’s night landing at Kargil airstrip is a big feat,” FirstPost, January 08, 2024,         https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/why-indian-air-force-c-130js-night-landing-at-kargil-airstrip-is-a-big-feat-13588832.html. Accessed on January 11, 2024.

 [9] Ministry of Defence, “THE KARGIL WAR: a war that defied all odds,” FinalKargil_Mainwriteup-2023-07-25.pdf (gallantryawards.gov.in). Accessed on January 14, 2024.

[10] Lt Gen Hazari, “Kargil Committee Report,” Institute of Peace and Conflict studies, May 01, 2000, https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=350. Accessed on January 13, 2024.

[11] “C-17 Globemaster III Inducted into the IAF,” PIB,  September 02, 2013, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=99048. Accessed on January 14, 2024.

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