Keywords: Ex Garuda, Garuda-2025, India-France Defence Relationships

Introduction

A bilateral Exercise Garuda-VIII (2025) is ongoing from November 16 to 27, pitting the Indian Air Force (IAF) against France’s Air and Space Force (FASF) in a simulated combat.  This exercise features the IAF’s Su-30MKI aircraft manoeuvring alongside French multirole fighters in complex air combat situations. The primary focus will be on air-to-air combat, air defence, and joint strike operations. In addition, ‘Garuda-VIII’ provides a platform for the two forces to interact professionally, exchange knowledge, and share best practices, reinforcing the strong Indo-French strategic partnership.[1]

The exercise is a building block on previous versions, as it lays stress on interoperability and sharing of tactics, which will strengthen India-France defence relations in the context of joint ventures such as Rafale procurement and co-development of military hardware. It will provide a platform for IAF Rafale pilots to enhance their general employability and the exploitation of aircraft in peculiar conditions.

Exercise Garuda is a tactical bilateral air exercise aimed at enhancing interoperability, sharing of best practices and strengthening defence cooperation between the IAF and the FASF. The exercise is usually complex, incorporating complex air defence and ground attack missions with often sophisticated fighter aircraft, aerial refuelling and joint tactical operations. The locations have slipped back and forth between India and France, with the memorable First edition held at Gwalior Air Force Station (India) and Mont-de-Marsan Air Base (France).

Brief History (from 2003-2024): The ‘Garuda’ Legacy of 22 years

The exercise “Garuda” has a 22-year history and offers forward-looking strategic and doctrinal advantages to the IAF.  The Garuda exercise series, which was inaugurated in 2003, has been carried out in phases. It was initially focused on the basics of interoperability (2003-2010); later moved on to critically pre-inducting the Dassault Rafale and its operational systems (Garuda VI, 2019); and finally became a top-notch platform for demonstrating the validity of India’s indigenous combat systems, like the LCA Tejas and LCH Prachand (Garuda VII, 2022).

The genesis of Exercise Garuda is explicitly linked to the Indo-French strategic partnership, which started on January 26, 1998. This partnership made defence and security principal pillars of the bilateral relationship. To make this cooperation dynamic, the two countries introduced a set of regular triennial training exercises for the collaborating Armed forces of both countries. These exercises are:

(a)          Ex Varuna, for both Navies,

(b)          Ex Shakti, for both Armies, and

(c)          Ex Garuda, for both Air Forces.

The first five editions focused on creating basic-level interoperability. During the exercise, the IAF and the FAF flew various air combat missions both by day and by night. These missions included 1 vs 1 and 2 vs 1 visual air combats.  Large Force Engagement (LFE) in a near-realistic environment were the attraction of air combat training missions. Both Air forces exchanged best practices to enhance their operational capabilities. The objective of the exercise was to enhance professional engagements and interoperability between IAF and FAF through the exchange of operational knowledge and experience, besides the solidification of bilateral relations between the two air forces.[2] The focus areas of previous versions of exercises were:

(a)     The first edition, Garuda I (February 2003), was held at Air Force Station Gwalior, India, and was attended by the Chief of Staff of the FASF.

(b)      Garuda II (June 2005) was held at Istres Air Base, France. It was the Indian Air Force’s first exercise in Europe.[3]

(c)       IAF hosted the FASF for the Garuda III (February 2007) at Air Force Station Kalaikunda,

(d)     Garuda IV (June 2010) was organised at Istres Air Base, France and saw the participation of Singapore Air Force with its F-16s and some of the impressive paratrooper jumps of Indian Garud and French Special Forces from Indian IL-76s. It was an opportunity for IAF IL-78 MKI tankers and FASF KC-135 Stratotankers to practise and validate cross-refuelling procedures.

 (e)    The IAF hosted exercise, Garuda-V (June 2014), at its air base in Jodhpur. It was to solve the complicated “East-West” doctrinal and technical equation. Historically, a major user of Russian-origin platforms, the IAF used the exercises to operate the Su-30MKI heavy fighter alongside FASF’s Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters. This integration involved the standardisation of communication procedures, air combat tactics, and the acquisition of complex technical procedures such as air-to-air refuelling (AAR). The IAF contingent had four Su-30 MKIs, one IL-78 AAR, and two C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft.  The C-17, the strategic lift aircraft, flew with 134 air warriors, ground equipment and the logistic support for the IAF contingent during its induction and later de-induction after the exercise. The FAF had deployed Mirage 2000, Rafale, and Alpha Jet fighter aircraft, E-3F Sentry AWACS, C-135 flight refuelling aircraft, and C-130 and CN-235 transport aircraft, with 94 personnel.[4]

(f)      Garuda-VI (July 2019) was held at Mont-de-Marsan Airbase 118. The IAF contingent, of seven Indian aircraft – 4 Sukhoi Su-30, 2 C17s and 1 Ilyushin 78, landed at the southwest of France at Mont-de-Marsan Airbase 118 on June 28. This exercise saw the deployment of a great number of French Air Force aircraft: Rafale, Alpha Jet, Mirage 2000, C135, E3F, C130, and Casa. [5]

(g)     Ex Garuda VII (November 2022): The LCA Tejas and the LCH Prachand were part of any kind of international exercise for the first time. The exercise incorporated four FASF Rafale fighters and one A-330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft. The IAF contingent was besides the LCA and LCH, Su-30 MKI, Rafale, and Jaguar fighter aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters. Combat Enabling Assets that constituted a part of the IAF contingent were Flight Refuelling Aircraft, AWACS, AEW&C, and Garud Special Forces.[6] The Exercise witnessed the combined flying of Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of IAF, in an IAF Rafale fighter, and the Chief of the Air Staff of FASF, General Stephane Mille, in an IAF Su-30MKI fighter.[7]

Garuda 2025: Doctrine Refinement 

The eighth edition, Garuda-VIII (16-27 November 2025), marks a new doctrinal phase. The IAF contingent, which arrived in France on November 10, 2025, consists of six Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets, supported by an IL-78 mid-air refueller and a C-17 Globemaster-III transport aircraft, for the exercise.[8] FASF is employing 10 Rafales, six Mirage 2000s;  andon an ad hoc basis, one H225M Caracal, one A330 MRTT Phénix and one A400M Atlas.[9]   The focus of this exercise is the optimum level of operational synergy between the IAF’s mature and heavyweight Su-30MKI force and the FASF’s  Rafale-centric force. This objective is accomplished through stress testing of IAF tactics in complex, high-intensity simulated scenarios, including joint strike operations, in an unfamiliar “away game” environment at Mont-de-Marne, France.[10]

IAF’s Tri‑Level Benefit 

The strategic benefits granted by the IAF are threefold. From the doctrinal point of view, the exercise was of invaluable value as it resulted in IAF pilots gaining exposure to Western combat methodologies and subsequently incorporating the same into the training and operational syllabus of the IAF. Tactically, it perfects the integrated “potent combination” of its Su-30MKI and Rafale fleets. Strategically, it wants to validate IAF’s transcontinental power-projection capability by rigorously testing its IL-78 tanker and C-17 Globemaster III transport assets.

Strategic Cornerstone for Multilateralism 

The deep, high-level trust and technical interoperability between the two sides achieved through the bilateral Garuda series has become the foundation for India’s larger multilateral air power ambitions. This is proven by the fact that France was part of India’s first multinational exercise -Tarang Shakti exercise in 2024 as an anchor participant, a multilateral event with a stated intention of being “broadened from Garuda”. Consequently, Garuda has helped IAF transform from a participant in foreign exercises to a global convenor of air power.

Significance of Ex Garuda

These exercises have gone through a prolonged process starting from MiG-21 to Mirage-2000 and more advanced ones such as Su-30 MKI, Rafale, and the indigenous Tejas aircraft, which reflects the upgrade in technology for both air forces. Early editions included basic air defence, while recent ones included SEAD, electronic warfare, night ops and multi-domain integration. Aerial refuelling, AWACS coordination and joint planning have become the norm, increasing operational synergy. Exercises have coincided with India-France defence deals (e.g. the Rafale purchase) and with security issues in the region (e.g. Indo-Pacific security, China).

Conclusion

The IAF participates in ‘Garuda-VIII’ at Mont-de-Marsan, France, with the FASF until November 27, to ensure better exploitation of tactics and interoperability. This exercise is characterised by complex combat situations, with an emphasis on air-to-air BVR combat, air defence, and joint strike operations, thereby strengthening a long-standing strategic partnership.

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Notes:

[1] “Indian and French Air Forces Collaborate in ‘Garuda 25’ Air Exercise,”   Devdiscourse, November 15, 2025, https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/3699884-breakthrough-arrest-in-red-fort-car-bomb-attack-case. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[2] S.B.P. Sinha, “Exercise Garuda-VI: Sukhoi 30 MKI & Rafale, A Formidable Combination,” SP Aviation, August 1, 2019, https://www.sps-aviation.com/experts-speak/?id=410&h=Exercise-Garuda-VI-Sukhoi-30-MKI-and-Rafale-A-Formidable-Combination. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[3] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda V,” April 21, 2022, https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-V. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[4] Ibid.

[5] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda VI,”, July 2019, https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-VI. Accessed on November 18, 2025.

[6] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF and FASF Chiefs fly as part of Ex Garuda VII,” November 8, 2022,  https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1874508. Accessed on November 16, 2025.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Press Information Bureau, n. 6.

[9] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda VI,”, November 18, 2025, , https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-2025-Exercise-20756. Accessed on November 18, 2025.

[10] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Exercise Garuda 25: Indian Air Force Participates In 8th Edition of Bilateral Air Exercise With French Air And Space Force,” November 15, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2190299. Accessed on November 16, 2025.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post Exercise Garuda: From Tactical Interoperability to Strategic Convergence appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Warfare, Airspace Management (ASM), Tactical Battle Area (TBA), Air Littoral, Op Sindoor

“Future warfare is all about air, space and sub-surface domains.

The conventional land and sea domains will restrict to holding territories.”

–Author

Group Captain Swaim Prakash Singh, PhD

Introduction

Warfare is an inherently complex and serious business that cannot be conceptualised or executed on the flawed premise of the primacy of a single warfighting arm. The long standing assertion that ‘the nature of warfare remains same, while its character evolves with time’ warrants nuanced deliberation, structured reasoning and a contextually grounded understanding especially in the light of a few western narratives being built on the topic of Air Littoral. As expected, like others, this term has also been picked up by few land warfare enthusiasts trying to embed into the Indian context.

In this regard, the proposition of delineating fixed geographical limits under the construct of Air Littoral and advocating for its control under a land forces-led command structure[1] reflects a myopic view with borrowed and ill-conceived unprofessional arguments. Such construct[2] not only risks diluting the core integrated Airspace Management (ASM) but also contravenes the doctrinal imperatives of jointness and integration across Services by diluting the basic tenets of air power.

This approach appears counterproductive and potentially regressive in the context of contemporary and future warfare especially when the Indian Armed Forces are making concerted efforts to overcome legacy challenges and institutional frictions in pursuit of a genuinely integrated battle management architecture.

Essentially, the stated narratives focus on two distinct issues of defining the term ‘Air Littoral’ and the concept of its ‘Control by the land forces.’ This paper aims to highlight the drawbacks in the philosophy behind the control of the air littoral, using source based, conceptual and contextual arguments. It will also underscore the critical importance of ASM in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and why it must continue to remain under the control of the Indian Air Force (IAF) within the integrated battle management framework.

Air Littoral: A Conceptual Misfit

Militarily, the term ‘Maritime Littoral’ is broadly defined worldwide as “the portion of land and sea adjacent to the coast that is susceptible to influence or control from the sea and to influence or control the sea from the land.” Operationally, this zone demands specialised capabilities such as amphibious operations, coastal defence, mine countermeasures and the integration of naval gunfire and air support with land operations through an integrated tri-services mechanism.

Drawing a simile with this, a few academicians have coined the term Air Littoral, though it does not appear in any doctrinal publications globally. In reality, Air Littoral is an inconsiderate borrowing[3] from Western narratives and lacks conceptual validity.

In the air domain, there is no equivalent physical or geographical feature. Airspace is a continuous, three dimensional medium defined by altitude, range and threat environment. It is in no case by fixed boundaries like a shoreline. Both Indian and global air doctrines already classify airspace by altitude bands (very low, low, medium, high etc), threat environment (permissive, contested, denied) and mission type (Counter Air, Coordinated Operations, Air Defence (AD) etc).

The proposed concept of Air Littoral adds no doctrinal clarity. Rather, it risks creating artificial silos and confusion over command and control (C2) responsibilities. The low altitude fight is not a distinct ‘special zone’ requiring separate service ownership as envisaged by land warfare enthusiasts. It is simply a segment of airspace within the Joint Air Defence System managed through layered AD Systems, counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) measures, Close Air Support and Rotary Wing Operations through Joint Air Defence Centre (JADC) under centralised command of the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

Furthermore, the Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine, the IAF Doctrine and the Joint Services Study Group (JSSG) documents make no reference to Air Littoral as an independent operational construct. Likewise, leading air forces such as the United States Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force (RAF) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) do not recognise the term in their doctrinal lexicon. It just remains an academic expression without operational relevance.

Source Based Arguments

Borrowed Western Narrative: Not Suited for Indian Context

The core argument of Air Littoral is largely based on foreign doctrinal experimentation and recent conflict-specific adaptations (eg Ukraine, Israel, USA) from couple of foreign literatures. These examples emerge from unique geopolitical, technological and command structure environments. Attempting to replicate these foreign constructs especially regarding the C2 of the air littoral without contextual adaptation, amounts to simply force fitting foreign models into India’s vastly different strategic, organisational, and doctrinal ecosystem.

India’s battle management philosophy is shaped by the following realities:

• • India is not expeditionary in nature, like the US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

  • Joint operations are driven by sovereign geographical imperatives, not global force projection requirements.

Within this framework:

• • India already operates under established joint doctrines and procedures governing air-land cooperation, including the so-called Air Littoral zone in form of TBA.

  • JSSG is the master document which unambiguously brings out the detailed coordination and operating procedures for all aerial platforms in the highly contested and congested TBA.

Reviewing Foreign Literature

Foreign literature on the subject is largely academic or opinion-based and cannot be applied to the Indian context either selectively or in entirety without due consideration of India’s doctrinal outlook, geography and capabilities. In most cases, the Indian Joint Doctrine and the IAF’s existing capabilities already address the stated vulnerabilities thereby negating the case for creating a new concept of an ‘Air Littoral’.

Various doctrines and documents such as the Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (2017), IAF Doctrine (2012, 2022), JSSG and the précis of Staff and War Colleges categorically negate the validity of this borrowed construct in its entirety. The following table, however, brings out opposing statements from Western literature itself, thereby validating the inadequacies of these arguments.

Table 1: Air Power Doctrinal Stand against Imported Quotes

Interestingly, the Air Littoral concept mentioned in the above-referred documents has been notably downplayed by USAF airpower practitioner Lt Col Grant Georgulis in his article “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia”, published in Air & Space Forces Magazine on 25 July 2025.[15]

The aforesaid paper presents several arguments which seem to accord considerable emphasis to the perceived impact of drones on land warfare. The bottom line is that the loosely used term ‘Drones’ for UAS, now being projected as a revolution in land warfare had already evolved within air forces at least two decades ago. Consequently, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) including ASM in the TBA have long been in practice. The devastating effect of such technology has been widely witnessed during Operation Sindoor in May 2025.[16]

In the Indian context, particularly for drones of nuisance value (eg Swarm drones), a chain of counter-UAS (CUAS) systems with both soft and hard kill capabilities already operate under the centralised command of IACCS with decentralised execution with full operational freedom meeting the requirements of the IA, thereby eliminating the need for a separate structure. Further, the wide variety of UAS spread over the flight envelope in terms of height and speed of operation makes any separate structure needless. Nevertheless, it requires further strengthening and it has to be both joint and integrated effort.

Notably, NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy of 26 June 2018 negates all aforesaid imported quotes. Also, USAF Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations published in 22 Jan 2025 provides a self-explanatory paragraph on ‘Fires’ and ‘Air Space Control.’  An excerpt is mentioned below:

“The fire’s function is supported by the airpower tenets of synergistic effects and concentration as airpower masses and maneuvers to surprise adversaries by creating effects at the times and locations of the JFC’s choosing. USAF contributions to fires are primarily captured in AFDP 3-01, Counter Air Operations, AFDP 3-03, Counter Land Operations, AFDP 3-04, Counter Sea Operations, AFDP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, AFDP 3-14, Air Force Space Support, AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack, and AFDP 3-72, Nuclear Operations. In addition, for long-range fires considerations, see AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control, and AFDP 3-60, Targeting”.

The Fallacy of Drawing Lessons from Ukraine

• • The literature has also tried to draw inferences from Ukraine as a template for battlefield air control which is rather problematic.

  • OSINT indicates Ukraine operates under a ‘weapons free’ environment characterised by minimal restrictions on engagement within contested zones, primarily because the protracted conflict has not manifested as a classical air war in the conventional sense.

  • Indian Rules of Engagement (RsOE) are more controlled, disciplined and politically calibrated. Airspace is a regulated battlespace, especially given proximity to nuclear thresholds with both adversaries and escalation management.

  • Drawing conclusions from a unique warzone with permissive engagement and applying them to a structured Indian context or TBA is operationally dangerous with flawed foundation.

  • Operation Sindoor has clearly reminded that joint and integrated warfare is the only key to success in the Indian context.[17]

Conceptual & Contextual Arguments in the Indian Context

Understanding the Tactical Battle Area (TBA)

The TBA refers to a geographically defined zone of military operations that is dynamically flexible and horizontally fluid. While land operations form its core air operations conducted by both manned and unmanned platforms are an integral component of the TBA. These flying platforms vary significantly in speed, ranging from slow movers to high-speed and very high-speed systems and operate across a wide vertical envelope from terrain hugging altitudes to high altitude flight levels thus making it Multi-Level Multi-Domain (MLMD) warfare.

Given this multi-layered tactical environment, all aerial platforms within the TBA operate under a complex, multi-level threat scenario, often from friendly weapon systems. To prevent fratricide and ensure the optimal employment of the most suitable weapon systems, a designated authority must regulate the use of airspace. This function is known as Airspace Management. This aims to provide freedom of action to all operators through defined and dynamic procedures while avoiding fratricide and simultaneously denying the use of the air medium to the enemy.

In the Indian context, the responsibility of Air Defence of the country lies with the Air Force as mandated by the Union War Book. The Control and Reporting (C&R) element of the IAF as the designated authority through IACCS exercises the entire air space management 24x7x365, be it during peacetime, wartime and No War No Peace (NWNP).

With the advancement of technology and the availability of longer-range weapon systems, it has been necessary to reassess vertical boundaries within the TBA. As a result, it was revised once in late 2000. However, such reassessment must not infringe upon the operational freedom of other combat elements within the same space in increasing the vertical limits manifold, as envisaged in the said concept. It is to be ensured that C2 continues to be centralised irrespective of the number of users in the TBA.

In light of the narrative of the proposal to allocate a vertical limit of coordinating altitude of 3 km (10,000 feet) exclusively to land forces[18] is a tall claim lacking not only operational rationale but also conceptual and contextual application.

Conceptual Divergence Vs Conceptual Overreach

The proponent of Air Littoral who claim the concept to be the so-called ‘Conceptual Divergence’ with air forces is less an innovative doctrinal breakthrough and more a case of ‘Conceptual Overreach’ under a borrowed maritime metaphor that has no intrinsic significance in the air domain.

The contribution of UAS to warfare is substantial and complementary but not transformational. Drones can observe, harass or even sting, but they cannot control. Air power is characterised by control of the airspace, strategic reach and decisive impact.

In the Indian context the divergence between the need of land and air forces is already doctrinally resolved in existing joint documents and related SoPs through integrated C2, layered engagement and shared situational awareness via IACCS. By ignoring these established mechanisms and importing a non-doctrinal term like Air Littoral, the argument is creating an artificial fault line between Services where joint doctrine already provides the solution.

Therefore, the assertion of Air Littoral as a key imperative needs correction in light of established doctrinal considerations. A few of the critical questions that merit introspection by the land forces are mentioned below:

• • What is the rationale for setting a vertical limit of 3 km (10,000 feet)? Are only guns, artillery, AD guns, and UAVs intended to operate below this altitude?

  • Will the land forces not also be controlling the Short, Medium and Long Range Surface to air Guided Weapons (SAGWs) of Army units deployed in the TBA or in adjacent areas falling within their engagement ranges?

  • Will Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO) be restricted to altitudes above 3 km, and would that be tactically and doctrinally viable?

  • Will fighter aircraft be permitted to ingress and egress within the TBA only above the 3 km ceiling?

  • How will the land forces ensure that fighter aircraft can switch from subsonic to supersonic speeds and change altitudes rapidly during BVR hot/cold patterns, in order to optimise missile performance while remaining outside enemy radar coverage within the 3 km altitude band?

  • The IAF inventory of 4.5-generation aircraft achieve optimal engine performance at around 3 km altitude, while deep-penetration aircraft require even lower altitudes for maximum effect. How would the land forces effectively control and coordinate the operations of such aircraft?

  • What mechanisms will ensure effective deconfliction of multi-domain operations, particularly in high-threat and high-tempo scenarios?

  • Would interdiction missions under coordinated air operations be excluded from TBA or fall under land forces control within it?

  • How will air-landed and air assault operations transition between outside and inside the TBA?

  • What measures will protect aircraft operating within the TBA from aerial threats and standoff weapons originating outside this envelope?

  • What would be the implications for air operations near forward airfields or Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), often located within or adjacent to the TBA?

  • How will land forces manage airspace across the International Border (IB), Line of Control (LoC), Line of Actual Control (LAC), and rest of the sectors during peacetime, wartime and in the NWNP scenarios near/ adjacent/ within TBA?

These few questions out of many underscore the need for a balanced and integrated approach to airspace control, rather than adopting vertical limitations and seeking command and control that risk operational friction and tactical incoherence affecting strategic outcomes.

Lack of Doctrinal Merit

In another work, the notion of an ‘‘Air-Surface Littoral’’[19] has been introduced. This reflects a divergence in the understanding of doctrinal nuances related to integrated operations in the TBA. The following arguments indicate that the proposed construct of an Air Littoral or Air-Surface Littoral does not align with established doctrinal principles.

• • Joint document on the subject exists both at the joint level and Service specific level.

  • It clearly defines roles & responsibility, C2 structures and deconfliction procedures in the TBA.

  • There is no doctrinal void per se, only a need for adherence is missing.

  • There is a need to trust the process and adhere to the joint document for better interoperability, strengthening air-ground coordination mechanisms and not command takeover or Army ownership.

  • Elevating a threat perception into an argument for Army-led control of the airspace dilutes the very purpose of jointness which is meant to synergise not override the inter Service roles.

  • Unity of Command is essential to ensure optimal employment and freedom of action for all weapon systems (land or air, manned or unmanned, across multiple operational levels) in TBA.

  • The fundamental doctrinal tenet of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution remains non-negotiable and sacrosanct for implementing dynamic ASM within TBA.

  • The stated joint document stands as one of the most comprehensive operational documents for integrated battle management. However, its utility remains under leveraged due to limited understanding and non-ratification by the land forces.

Air Littoral is not about Control but Efficiency and Safety Issues

Though the term Air Littoral is undefined, is inherently a shared battle space, it is not about one that must be ‘controlled’ solely by one Service. While the Army is the primary user in the TBA especially with the advent of drone swarms and loitering munitions, this does not logically lead to the Army ‘owning or leading’ the air littoral. This remains applicable globally.

Instead, existing and time-tested JADC structure need to be further strengthened by trained manpower and digital communication from land forces for both voice and data in the Indian context. The very fact that most of the air domain threats to land forces now emerge from the low altitude envelope makes it more imperative for the IA to be familiar to the nuances of air power and its utilisation in MLMD warfare. It needs to be internalised that the Air Force retains:

• • Generation of Integrated Air Picture through feeding by Army and Navy networks (Digital/Manual) as well.

  • Building up of Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) in indispensable congested airspace through sensor fusion, real-time data links, and air deconfliction.

  • Battlefield air strike coordination and execution.

  • Control of air traffic, deconfliction and dynamic management of weapon fire areas/zones (WFA).

Instead of displacing the IAF, Army integration can be enhanced through:

• • Empowered Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) and embedded TACs with enhanced operational training.

  • Need based shared access to IAF’s ISR and C2 pictures.

  • Creating/Strengthening Joint battle planning cells at Corps HQs through effective implementation of procedures in Corps Area Control Centre (CACC).

  • Integration with the proposed Drone Airspace Management Cells (DASM) at airbases.

  • Immediate operationalisation of Akashteer at the unit level and seamless integration into the IACCS architecture.

  • To ensure fratricide-free airspace management, enhance war-footing training of IA operators in C&R digital reporting and in executing orders received from IACCS.

  • Participation of IA troops in the realistic tactical and operation exercise/war gaming in TBA.

Trust in the Joint Process is the Real Need

A recurring theme in such arguments is the perceived trust deficit concerning timely decision making, execution of orders, responsiveness and communication latency. These concerns however, can be effectively mitigated, if IA acknowledge that ‘Unity of Command’ is a non-negotiable principle in the regulation of airspace especially in an environment where a diverse range of aerial platforms (manned-unmanned, slow-fast and hypersonic) operate simultaneously.

The land forces’ apprehensions regarding responsiveness are best addressed by Tactical Air Centers (TACs), Forward Area Controllers (FACs), and enhanced IA-IAF integration at lower echelons which need to be further institutionalised, not bypassed. Also the land forces coercing the concept of ‘persistent presence’ and ‘under command’ must be examined within the bounds of available technology, capability and survivability, which the Air Force is best equipped to manage for an effective integrated battle management.

Operation Sindoor: A Contextual Reality Check

Future warfare is increasingly shifting its centre of gravity towards the air, space and sub-surface domains where speed, precision, stealth and information dominance are decisive. As technology redefines the character of conflict, these domains offer strategic advantages far beyond the physical occupation of land or sea. Air and space provide unparalleled reach, surveillance and rapid strike capabilities while sub-surface operations ensure stealth, survivability and disruption of critical infrastructure.

In contrast, the traditional land and maritime domains are progressively being relegated to roles focused on holding ground and securing strategic chokepoints rather than initiating or shaping the battle. This statement is not an off-the-cuff remark but requires a serious, impartial, and futuristic professional brainstorm that rises above the arguments of structures, notions of victory, etc. The essence of future war lies in mastering the intangibles such as electromagnetic spectrum, cyber space, orbital dominance and deep sea superiority where control equates to deterrence, denial and domination.

Operation Sindoor, with clearly defined conflict termination criteria, has redefined this argument within the Indian context. The punitive impact delivered through the medium of air achieved in less than 30 minutes during each wave of targeting has reaffirmed that contemporary conflicts are increasingly being shaped in the vertical dimensions rather than solely on the ground.

While the primacy of land and maritime domains remains undisputed, it is time to acknowledge a significant shift. The traditional roles are reversing with air power now taking a decisive lead and surface forces assuming more supportive functions in shaping and concluding conflicts.

Before advocating for the Control of Air Littorals, it is important to recall the operational realities witnessed during Op Sindoor. The air operations were orchestrated in a manner that enabled tactical freedom of action for all types of weapon systems (manned, unmanned aircraft and surface weapons) based on real-time threat assessments and the required response. However, classical airspace management, wherein both aircraft and surface-based weapons operate with full freedom, remained limited.

The prevalence of mass unarmed drone saturation, often deployed as a nuisance and harassment wave, necessitated prioritising surface based weapon engagement in most scenarios. Fighter aircraft were thus employed primarily for offensive missions and maintaining air defence (AD) watch beyond the effective envelope of surface based weapons. This operational arrangement dictated by situational constraints cannot be misconstrued as a precedent for reshaping or rewriting an Air Littoral doctrine under the primacy of Indian Army.

Op Sindoor demonstrated the IAF’s operational acumen and responsiveness to an unprecedented situation. A robust joint AD and CUAS grid was rapidly put in place, utilising existing procedures and coordination arrangements to excellent effect.

The operation was conducted with de-novo operating procedures for the first time while dealing with such scenarios that already exist in the joint operating mechanism. It is just a matter of how best and timely it is orchestrated. The forward looking planning and careful planning facilitated unproblematic utilisation of available platforms, networks and procedures.

The success highlighted the power of jointness, agility and innovation within real-time battlefield scenarios. Notably, the operation also produced valuable lessons and the process of consolidating tactics, techniques and procedures continues to be an ongoing effort to improve future readiness.

In fact, it is to be internalised by the land forces that such smooth conduct of operations could take place only because of Unity of Command with the principle of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution through IACCS of IAF.

Conclusion

In contemporary and future warfare technology plays a pivotal role in shaping capabilities enabling new forms of engagement and offering enhanced situational awareness. However, the formulation of military doctrine must remain a product of strategic foresight, operational logic and historical military wisdom and not of reactionary impulses triggered by emerging technologies under the trap of ‘technological panic.’

The discourse advocating for the creation of new C2 structures redefining air domain boundaries ostensibly to accommodate unmanned systems and slow movers risks distorting the fundamental principles of joint warfare.

The proposal to give land forces command over the air littoral is an agenda based conceptual overreach based on foreign models, false doctrinal gaps and misapplied conflict lessons. Building narrative of Control of Air Littoral is operationally risky and counterproductive leading to mass fratricide scenario. Rather than questioning the IAF’s primacy in airspace management and gaining control of airspace by the IA, efforts must focus on the following:

• • Airspace remains centrally controlled for safety, deconfliction and tactical flexibility for achieving operational and strategic effects.

  • Land-Air synergy is achieved through joint training, empowered liaison and procedural reforms not structural domination.

  • Strengthening joint structures for air-ground integration.

  • Joint planning and execution of operational fires.

  • Avoiding doctrinal fragmentation in pursuit of temporary tactical convenience.

  • Operationalisation of Akashteer and enmeshing into IACCS without any more delays.

Army to devise and revise the ground tactics in view of emerging technological challenges in multi domain scenario.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Notes:

[1] Maximilian K Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco. “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (2021): 67-80, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3092, United States Army war College Press.       https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/ Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel “Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the US Air Force” War on the Rocks, 7 March 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-the-air-littoral-and-the-looming-irrelevance-of-the-u-s-air-force/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[3] “Control of Air Littoral by Land Forces: A Key Battle Imperative” An Indian narrative in circulation. Accessed on 31 July 2025.

[4] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[5] Airpower in Joint Operations: Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations (AFDP3.0) https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/AFDP3-0Operations.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[6] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[7] Ibid N2. Barno and Bensahel.

[8] Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 30, Number 2, Summer 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1018276.pdf. Accessed on 20 Aug 2025.

[9] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[10] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[11] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[12] Posen Barry. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” Summer 2003, Harvard                             Kennedy School – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/command-commons-military-foundation-us-hegemony. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[13] Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-03, Counterland Operations, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AFDP-COUNTERLAND.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[14] “India’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS): A NCW Milestone”, ANALYSIS, IndraStra Global, 5 October 2015. https://indrastra.medium.com/analysis-india-s-integrated-air-command-control-system-iaccs-a-ncw-milestone-e1f4fea09f2b. Accessed on 12 Aug 2025.

[15] Grant Georgulis. “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 25 July 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-airpower-amnesia/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[16] “Operation SINDOOR: The Rise of Aatmanirbhar Innovation in National Security: India’s growing technological self-reliance” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 14 May 2025.               https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128746#:~:text=Loitering%20munitions%20also%20known%20as,minutes%2C%20demonstrating%20India’s%20technological%20edge. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[17] “Operation SINDOOR: Forging One Force- The Synergy of India’s Armed Forces” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 18 May 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[18] Ibid N3. Control of Air Littoral……

[19] Abhishek Singh, “The Air-Surface Littoral: Tomorrows Kurukshetra (Battleground)” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 4 March 2025. https://cenjows.in/the-air-surface-littoral-tomorrows-kurukshetra-battleground/. Accessed on 09 Aug 2025.

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Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Bunker Buster, B2 Bombers, Operation Midnight Hammer

Introduction

On June 22, 2025, at approximately 0230 Iranian Standard Time, the United States Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN) carried out a joint attack on three nuclear facilities in Iran. The Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center were targeted using the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), 30,000 pounds bombs carried by seven Northrop B-2 Spirit Stealth bombers and a barrage of Tomahawk missiles fired from a submarine. This operation, codenamed “Operation Midnight Hammer”, was aimed at destroying Iran’s weapon grade Uranium manufacturing capability, which posed a direct threat to the US and the West in general. In the first ever operational use of the GBU-57 MOP, six B-2 bombers dropped a total of 12 MOPs on the Fordow facility while the seventh B-2 targeted the Natanz facility with two MOPs. Following this aerial assault, a US submarine launched multiple Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) on the Isfahan facility. [1]

Israel attacked Iran on June 13, 2025 by launching a series of strikes on Iranian military and nuclear facilities. In the first few hours, Israeli forces attacked and killed some of Iran’s top military leaders, nuclear scientists and politicians and damaged/destroyed Iran’s Air Defenses and associated military infrastructure. Iran responded by launching a series of drones and missile attacks on Israel. For the first nine days, the United States refrained from joining the war and then on June 20, 2025, President Donald Trump gave Iran two weeks to surrender. Just two days later, the US launched the attack. Whether this was a part of a larger deception plan or not is unclear. The Israel-Iran War 2025 is an escalation of decades-long animosity between the two nations, with Israel considering the Iranian nuclear programme as an existential threat and Iran challenging the legitimacy of Israel, calling for its destruction.

Historical Background

Although not known to possess nuclear weapons, Iran is often called a nuclear threshold state with the availability of technology needed to build nuclear warheads. Over the years, Iran has been stockpiling highly enriched uranium large enough to fuel multiple weapons with minimal further enrichment. [2] Iran has long maintained that its nuclear programme is benign and authorised by its membership as a non-nuclear weapon state in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees its members the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Iran is known to have secretly developed the technology to build nuclear weapons. These clandestine activities date back to the 1980s when Iran began a secret uranium enrichment programme, importing essential equipment from Pakistan and China. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, Iran’s covert project, known as the AMAD Plan continued to develop this technology. It was eventually discovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations (UN) body responsible for monitoring compliance with the NPT. [3] In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an umbrella organisation made up of several Iranian dissident groups, revealed the existence of two Iranian nuclear sites, a Uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water production facility at Arak, both possible dual use facilities. [4] Iran’s concealment of these facilities from the IAEA raised significant international concerns and suspicions.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Iran failed to follow through on its commitments to the IAEA and its declarations in 2004 and 2005 were deemed incomplete and inconsistent, hindering the IAEA from developing a comprehensive and complete understanding of Iran’s nuclear programme. Over the years, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a series of increasingly severe resolutions imposing international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear programme. Diplomatic efforts reached a new level of urgency in September 2009, when a new covert facility for uranium enrichment was discovered near Qom, later renamed as Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). The 2010s saw Iran continue its enrichment programme. By 2013, Iran had amassed a stockpile of about 9,700 kg of uranium enriched up to five per cent and 370 kg enriched up to 20 per cent, which could yield enough weapons grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon, with further enrichment within two to three months. [5]

By October 2013, owing to secret back-channel talks between the USA and Iran and negotiations with P5+1 (UNSC members plus Germany) large scale negotiations led to a preliminary agreement called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) granting certain relief to Iran provided it resumed its commitment to the IAEA and allowed increased monitoring and access to its nuclear sites. In return, the P5+1 agreed to reduce sanctions, not impose new ones and released more than USD 4.2 billion worth of Iranian funds held abroad. [6] It also laid down a framework for negotiations toward a more comprehensive agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in July 2015. After more than two years of implementation, the USA withdrew from the JCPOA citing Iran’s lack of transparency and reimposing sanctions on Iran, curbing its oil sales. Even as the US (under Trump 1.0) withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, the remaining P5+1 countries and the IAEA were satisfied with  Iran’s actions. In January 2020, the US killed Qassem Soleimani, an Iranian Major General, in a drone strike (ordered by the then President of the USA, Donald Trump) near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq. Iran reacted by reducing its compliance with the deal and by January 2020, announced that it had abandoned all JCPOA limits on its uranium enrichment programme. Ever since, Iran has continued to expand its nuclear activities and amassed a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, sufficient to fuel several nuclear weapons if enriched further.[7]

The Iran-Israel conflict has its roots in the larger Israel-Palestine conflict where Iran has championed the cause of the Palestinians, whom Iran believes to have been oppressed by Israel. By doing so, some scholars believe that Iran has been seeking a greater acceptance among Sunnis and Arabs, both of whom dominate West Asia. Israel has also accused Iran of supporting proxy terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, thereby adding to the threat matrix of Israel. As a result, Israel views Iran as an existential threat and has sought sanctions and military action against Iran to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The Build-up Phase

Israel attacked Iran on June 13, 2025. It was touted as a resounding success by President Trump and his associates. The attack targeted key military infrastructure, nuclear sites, top Iranian leadership (both political and military) and Iranian air defence sites. Embedded within this plan was another plan awaiting approval by the President of the United States regarding when and how the US would join the fray. On June 20, 2025, President Trump gave Iran two weeks to surrender while contemplating whether the USA would join the war effort. This was conveyed to Iran and the world via a press conference by the White House Press Secretary, Karoline Leavitt, who stated that President Trump would decide whether to strike Iran “within the next two weeks”. What followed was a series of coordinated actions on television and social media to build a narrative that the USA was still keen on talks and that a large scale war could be avoided if Iran came to the negotiation table. Meanwhile, the order for planning the attack must have been given and preparations underway. It is likely that the orders for planning the attacks had already been issued, and preparations were already underway. An attack of this magnitude requires discretion and should include a well-developed decoy or deception plan along with a clearly defined end state. The possibility of a large scale escalation could not have been ruled out; therefore, a thorough analysis of the escalation matrix must have been done. The plan would have to be dovetailed with Israel’s ongoing war effort so as not to duplicate things and capitalise on gains made by Israel. Towards that, Israeli efforts to create the desired degree of control of air would add to the essential pre-requisites for the conduct of strategic bombing operations by the American forces. Shaping operations such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), radar jamming, and cyber operations would be intrinsic to the entire mission.

The Execution Phase

The attack was launched from mainland USA giving the bombers almost 18 hours to fly from the USA to Iran undetected, bomb the targets and fly back. The total mission duration was approximately 37 hours and involved various elements of the USAF and the US Navy including submarines, to create the desired effect. This was to be the first American military strike inside Iran since 1979 and would put the USA firmly into a large-scale conflict in one of the world’s most volatile regions. The aircraft selected for the mission was the B-2 Spirit Stealth bomber, which has a service ceiling of 50,000 feet, an unrefuelled range of more than 6,000 nm and can carry an array of conventional and strategic weapons in stealth configuration. Capable of high subsonic speed with a payload of 40,000 pounds (18,144 kg) kg in two internal bays. Built with low observable technology, the aircraft’s stealth features make it the platform of choice for such strategic missions. [8]

Suppression/destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) operations by Israeli and US forces, deception and decoy attacks and Electronic Warfare (EW) was carried out prior to the main attack. The B-2s dropped 14 MOPs on Fordow and Natanz to cause the desired degree of destruction and the Tomahawk LACMs attacked the Isfahan facility. The MOP, also known as the “bunker buster”, was developed by Boeing for the USAF in 2011. Weighing 27,125 pounds (12,304 kg) and carrying a warhead of approximately 5,342 pounds (2423 kg), the MOP has impressive penetration capabilities reaching a depth of 60 m of earth or 18m of concrete with a compressive strength of 5,000 PSI. [9] The B-2 is the only aircraft in the USAF capable of carrying and dropping these bombs. The entire mission included more than 125 aircraft and utilised about 75 Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) during the operation. Excitedly, 4^th and 5^th generation aircraft acted as sweeps ahead of the main package, and dozens of refuelling aircraft provided vital support during the mission. Remarkably, Iranian air defence remained inactive, with no Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) being launched either during ingress or egress.

A post-strike damage assessment would have been conducted by various ISR platforms such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and satellites. These assessments would have evaluated the extent of damage to the targets and determined whether a revisit would be necessary. Media reports suggest that there was significant damage to all three targets, potentially hindering Iran’s nuclear weapons development and may have set Iran back by four to five years. However, this claim might not be entirely accurate.

The Aftermath

While Russia and China have condemned the US strikes, calling them a serious violation of international law further inflaming tensions in the Middle East, the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres has said that he is gravely alarmed by the use of force by the USA and that there is a growing risk that this conflict can get out of control. Iraq has also condemned the US strikes, calling them a grave threat to peace and security in the Middle East and has called for diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis. Surprisingly, Pakistan has condemned the US strikes, calling them a violation of international law and warning of the risk of further escalation of violence in the region. Iran has closed the Straits of Hormuz for all traffic and vowed to strike back and has also launched a series of missile attacks on Tel Aviv. A raging internal debate within the USA has also started, led by the members of the Democratic Party, questioning the legality of the attacks and whether the US should have got involved. They are also questioning President Trump for not having taken the US Congress’ approval prior to launching such an operation. What Iran does is something that the world is watching with abated breath. Meanwhile, the Iran-Israel conflict rages on.

Points to Ponder

Leading up to the attack, some interesting events occurred that warrant further examination and analysis.

(a)      Especially with regards to the US, there are no free lunches, so why would President Trump invite Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir for lunch? What is brewing and what could have been offered to the USA by Pakistan. Could it be the use of military bases, intelligence on Iranian officials, or just access to the Pakistani airspace. Pakistan has been known to sell its soul to the highest bidder. What have they sold here?

(b)     The USA has supported Pakistan’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package despite its involvement in terrorist activities across the world. What does it seek in return from Pakistan?

(c)      New trends in warfare are visible in this Israel/USA vs Iran conflict, like direct and open targeting of leadership, both military and political, including scientists and academia involved in Iran’s nuclear project. This trend has been partially seen in the Russia-Ukraine war but not on such a large scale. Direct threats to the head of the government are also being made, signalling a possible new trend. All of this suggests that the Americans may be considering a regime change in Iran.

(d)     Meanwhile, Pakistan has been playing its cards quite smartly by cosying up to both China as well as the USA. The United States has supported the IMF bailout plan for Pakistan, while China has offered the J-35 fighter. This scenario presents a win-win situation for Pakistan.

(e)       Will Iran attack US bases in the Middle East? This is a question that might raise eyebrows, but if it were to happen, what would be the repercussions and how would the USA react?

(f)       How long can Iran keep the Strait of Hormuz closed? What would be the global impact? Does Iran have the residual military capability to ensure long-term closure of the strait?

(g)       Have these attacks really and unequivocally caused sufficient damage to Iranian nuclear capability especially in terms of the capability to build a nuclear weapon? The answer to this is known only to the Iranians but based on photographs in the media, it does not seem to be the case. Therefore, the question remains, whether this attack was just a show of American might with no substantial aims being achieved.

(h)       China has been watching the USA’s actions in Russia and Iran. Most of it points to empty threats and unwillingness to get embroiled in large scale conflict. What lessons is China learning from these conflicts, especially when it comes to Taiwan and the South China Sea?

(i)      These attacks have yet again demonstrated the use of air power as an instrument of choice for modern military action. Important characteristics of air power such as reach, flexibility, shock effect, concentration of force, mobility, offensive action and responsiveness have been amply demonstrated. What lessons can India draw from such strikes? Does India need to fast track its IAF capability development plans and whether the current numbers are adequate? A fact check needs to be done at the earliest.

(j)       Control of air is a pre-requisite for all air and surface action. This must be accomplished through shaping operations and adequate effort must be earmarked for them. There are no shortcuts.

(k)     Operation Midnight Hammer is being touted as a resounding success. However, that was possible due to complete air supremacy in the area of operation. Such missions can be safely carried out when only there was no prohibitive interference, but in contested air space, the story can be very different.

(Disclaimer: The article was written on June 23, 2025)

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Notes:

[1] The Straits Times, “Operation Midnight Hammer: Pentagon Press Conference on US strikes on Iran Nuclear Sites,”. YouTube,     June 22, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stFTEn93d6o.  Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[2] “A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Iran Watch. December 19, 2003 https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[3] Ibid. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[4] Ibid. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[5] Ibid. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[6] Ibid. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[7] Ibid. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[8] Department of the Air Force, The United States of America, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104482/b-2-spirit/. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

[9] “GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP),” Global Security.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mop.htm. Accessed on June 23, 2025.

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Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Air Defence (AD), IAF, PAF, IACCS, Attacks

Introduction

Operation Sindoor has proven to be another feather in India’s cap after the Balakot strikes in February 2019. India’s Air Defence (AD) and the Indian Air Force demonstrated their professional acumen and technological prowess, with the Indian Navy and Army playing a decisive and supportive role.

The planning for Op Sindoor was initiated following the unrestricted authorisation to use air power. Comprehensive intelligence was gathered regarding the status of terrorists at 21 identified locations. Ultimately, only nine of these locations were selected based on specific information indicating the presence of terrorists. Preparations were made for a plan to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The plan included various contingencies following an escalatory ladder disproportionate to Pakistan’s actions in a carefully coordinated use India’s air power.

Some members of the Indian media had started to question the preparedness of Indian forces, showing a lack of understanding regarding the complexities involved in preparing for military conflict with a determined, nuclear-armed, and religiously motivated adversary. One commentator even suggested, “India could stop short of an escalatory military assault similar to the Balakot air strike of 2019.” ^[1] Everyone thought Jabba Top attack was the highest point of India and any such strikes would breach the nuclear threshold for Pakistan and India was unlikely to take military measures and would be content with only abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).

Precisely 14 days after the terrorist attack, the Indian government passed orders to all states to practice civil defence and blackouts on the evening of May 07, 2025. Blinded by the love for their terrorists, the adversary could never have assessed or even guessed the D-Day for Indian forces to be the same.

Pakistan tried in vain to clarify its position with regards to the Indian strikes on May 07, 2025, following a call from the Indian DGMO (Director General of Military Operations) to explain that India’s fight was against terrorist activities targeting innocent tourists and that no civilian, military, or intelligence infrastructure was attacked.

Pakistan military and intelligence nexus which had become a collusive, all powerful front, superior to the Pakistani government, decided to attack Indian military installations and air bases in response to the Indian strike on terrorist infrastructure/ camps on May 07, 2025. They even dared to attack India with ballistic missiles creating a nuclear bogey but in vain. All Pakistani attacks, big or small were thwarted with professionalism keeping our men safe and systems operationally ready.

Source: Maxar Technologies

IAF’s perfect and accurate attacks on Nur Khan and Murid Air Bases’ C2 AD (Command and Control, Active Duty) facilities [2] rendered Pakistan Air Force’s capability to launch any air operations untenable bringing Pakistan to its knees.

This paper looks at Op Sindoor through the kaleidoscope of satellite imagery to explain India’s intent of lauching escalatory strikes to achieve its aim.

Revisiting Balakot

Pakistan has typically obfuscated evidence whenever it has been presented, especially in the form of dossiers. When the Pulwama attack happened, India decided to attack one of the terrorists’ training camps, masquerading as a madrassa.

Source: Google Earth and Internet

On February 26, 2019, the attack on Jaba Top took the PAF by surprise. The Indian Air Force (IAF), for the first time after the 1971 war, had crossed the International Boundary (IB) to hit a target inside Pakistan. Even before India announced it, Pakistan’s Director General ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations) had already tweeted about the attack. The aim of the early and quick tweets by DG ISPR was to ensure that India did not deny crossing the IB. However, on the contrary, India claimed the attack across the IB within minutes.

The Pakistan Army, which excels in cleaning operations, was more than ready that day. It ensured a cleanup and minor repairs before 10 am so that satellites wouldn’t be able to notice anything unusual.

Source: Google Earth and Digital Globe

However, a lot was observed on satellite images despite Pakistan Army’s efforts to hide the damages. The peculiar small holes of SPICE 2000 were covered up in no time but the job obviously was done very unprofessionally leaving behind telltale signs.

The Corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) sheets are very pliable and have a tendency to try to regain their original shape. The penetrating power of the SPICE 2000 missiles is so strong at those high speeds (>Mach 2) that the holes created in CGI sheets look much smaller than even the size of the missile on satellite imagery. This makes it difficult for an untrained eye to believe if any attack had taken place.

Source: Google Earth

The change in CGI sheets is visible in the images of Google Earth dated February 27, 2019, which is not a particularly difficult thing to do. The comparison of before and after images provides more clarity on the changes to the CGI sheets that occurred after the IAF attack.

Source: Maxar Technologies

A similar comparison with images from Op Sindoor illustrates how challenging it is for an untrained eye to discern from satellite imagery that the IAF has indeed hit buildings, unless ground photos are made available. The size of the impact point is tiny (less than a meter), which is barely equal to two or three pixels on the satellite image with a 30 cm resolution.

Source: Via Internet

The buildings in the Muridke headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) were hit with precision and possibly with similar weapons used during the Balakot strike. This time, the cleaning operation by the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was caught on satellite images.

Source: Maxar Technologies

The second building at Muridke, located next to the hospital, was used by terrorists as a storage facility for their small arms and was destroyed. However, the changes visible in satellite imagery were quite subtle, even to a trained eye. The distorted walls and roof suggest that the building had collapsed, and the dome had fallen below ground level.

Source: Maxar Technologies

These changes can be proved with ground photos. Still, Jaba Top being heavily guarded (Image-3 above), no one could access the site until the Pakistan Army opened it for the Defence Attaches 43 days after the attack. By then, all evidence of a terrorist camp being run under the garb of Madrassa Taleem-Ul-Quran at the site was removed.

Misinformation and disinformation campaigns by Pakistan were marred by the DG ISPR Twitter handle and his press conference, which claimed that two Indian pilots caught by them were being treated at Combined Military Hospital (CMH). Whatever escapades Pakistan was trying to make proved to be false, and their face of a pathological liar was exposed to the entire world then in 2019 and also now in 2025.

Jittery Pakistan

Pakistan’s armed forces are the most jittery in the world and at the slightest hint of danger, they begin firing indiscriminately. The nighttime can be pretty entertaining. The troops of the Pakistan Army are so fearful of a potential attack from the Indian Army that they continuously launch flares throughout the night during tense periods.

In the aftermath of the Balakot strikes, Pakistan remained jittery throughout the month of March 2019.^[3] The airport in Multan suddenly shut down for all flights one day. The reports emanating from Multan city indicated an IAF attack on the airport, claiming Pakistan lost an F-16B, and later, some reports suggested the JF-17 was shot down by their own LY-80 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM). Chinese SAM systems identified their own aircraft. These were skylarking by PAF to somehow make good their losses of an F-16B during the episode with Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.

Battlefield Testing of Indian Armed Forces Weapons and C2 Systems

In the early morning of May 10, 2025, Indian armed forces lit up Pakistan, covering its entire land border with India from Karachi to Skardu. The Indian Navy was already operationally deployed in the Arabian Sea to ensure that the Pakistani Navy was stalled in their ports and did not interfere in the actions of the IAF and the Indian Army. The aim was to disproportionately escalate to counter Pakistan’s response of attacking Indian air bases and military installations, despite India successfully repelling the attacks; kudos to the latest IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System) supporting the air defence of Indian airspace.

To remind readers, the Mian Channu episode of the Indian BrahMos was a fluke firing of the missile in March 2022. The entire team was later punished adequately by the IAF for negligent firing, taking cognisance of the possible devastating consequences. It was reported that the missile was launched from Ambala and crossed into Pakistan through the Suratgarh border. When plotted on Google Earth, the missile’s trajectory shows that it made a sharp 90° turn and reached Mian Channu without causing any damage. It possibly travelled around 124 kilometres within Pakistan for 3 minutes and 44 seconds, moving at a speed of approximately Mach 1.6. However, Pakistan’s Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) produced a report ^[4] more than two years later, claiming that the firing was not inadvertent but a test in which Pakistan’s radars failed miserably.

The BrahMos is notable for being the first cruise missile tested at supersonic speeds in a steep dive mode, which necessitated thorough validation, especially in the unpredictable conditions of a battlefield. The successful neutralisation of targets by the Indian armed forces, with significant impact, is no small achievement. However, a closer examination of the chosen targets along the entire land border with Pakistan reveals that India was not acting indiscriminately. Instead, it was testing its missiles and their variants, as well as the crucial Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), across the entire country using live targets.

The plotted targets on the maps indicate that the chosen ranges were between 350 km and 500 km. This strongly suggests that the BrahMos was tested at its maximum ranges at night, against a live enemy who was at full alert. This information also indicates significant success in our radar systems, communications, and Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC), as well as the exceptional integration achieved by the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

The complete cooperation, jointness and synergy between not only the various uniformed services but also branches of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and other government departments was tested during Op Sindoor and proved to be outstanding.

Conclusion

Pakistan, after the Op Sindoor attacks, was in no position to claim that only a single crow died. The enormous devastation was a stark reminder for everyone to see. The damage was so extensive that Pakistan could not hide any of the targets, even for a short time. Pakistan had no choice but to wave the white flag and request for a ceasefire. The considered decision by India to accept the ceasefire, when requested, should not be construed as a lack of Indian political or military will to escalate the situation.

India remains vigilant, with Operation Sindoor becoming the new normal. India has been prepared and continues to be willing to ensure that its adversary faces disproportionate consequences for its terrorist misadventures. This operation would undoubtedly go down in history as one of the best examples of the shortest war on terror with a stubborn nuclear neighbour called Pakistan.

दण्डो दमयतामस्मि नीतिरस्मि जिगीषताम् ।
मौनं चैवास्मि गुह्यानां ज्ञानं ज्ञानवतामहम् ॥ 10.38॥

(I am just punishment amongst means of preventing lawlessness, and proper conduct amongst those who seek victory. Amongst secrets I am silence, and in the wise I am their wisdom: Lord Krishna in The Bhagwat Gita Chapter 10 verse 38)

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Notes:

^[1] Sidharth Raimedhi, Bashir Ali Abbas, “Any Cross-Border Strike by India Faces a Potential Drawback. It May be Seen  as underwhelming,” The Print, May 01, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/cross-border-strike-india-pakistan-drawback-underwhelming/2610410/. Accessed on June 04, 2025.

[2] Vinayak Bhat, “Precision, Perfection and Accuracy have been Hallmarks of IAF Golden Strikes in Pakistan: Targets  Obliterated from the Face of Earth,” Centre for Air Power Studies, May 30, 2025, https://capssindia.org/precision-perfection-and-accuracy-have-been-hallmarks-of-iaf-golden-strikes-in-pakistan-targets-obliterated-from-the-face-of-earth/. Accessed on June 03, 2025.

^[3] Vinayak Bhat, “Jittery Pakistan shut Multan airport not because it ‘shot’ own JF-17 jet or terror attack,” The Print, March 27, 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/jittery-pakistan-shut-multan-airport-not-because-it-shot-own-jf-17-jet-or-terror-attack/212141/. Accessed on June 03, 2025.

^[4]  Atia Ali Kazmi, “Accidental, Inadvertent or Deliberate Launch: The Case of Indian Air Force’s Nuclear  Supersonic Cruise Missile,” Center for International Strategic Studies, April 06, 2024, https://newsitedev.ciss.org.pk/blog/2024/04/06/accidental-inadvertent-or-deliberate-launch/. Accessed on June 03, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Op Sindoor: IAF Achieved its Aim and Validated Weapon Systems appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Air Defence, Terrorism, PAF Airbase

Why did Pakistan request a ceasefire within 80 hours of Operation Sindoor? The Pakistani Operation Bunyan Marsoos, meaning “Wall of Lead”, was abruptly called off, and Pakistan waved a white flag.

The horrendous Pahalgam terrorist attack was the largest after Pulwama, which happened in February 2019. Pahalgam attack was claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a terror outfit working as a front organisation part of the officially banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) but fully supported by the Pakistani establishment.

The entire world condemned these ghastly and horrific terrorist attacks, but neither did Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif feel any remorse, nor did their Chief of Army Staff condemn the terrorist activities.

The precise and perfect attacks carried out with the backing of accurate intelligence have become a hallmark of IAF’s strikes inside Pakistan since the destruction of the terrorist training camp at Jabba Top, popularly known as Balakot. This time, India struck at nine well-known terror locations, including the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist training academy at Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) headquarters at Muridke.

Pakistan sent in drones the next day to avenge the Indian attacks on terror hubs by attacking cities and towns along the border and shelling the border villages, causing casualties of innocent civilians, including women, children and elderly. PAF tried attacking armed forces bases and installations, but all in utter vain.

India was forced to retaliate in kind by attacking various radars, SAM sites, IADS centers and other PAF facilities at 13 locations. All the attacks were carefully calibrated and planned to display India’s technological prowess in controlling the enemy’s reactions.

India has held the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance until Pakistan gives up supporting terrorism. The Indian government has announced that it will stop India’s share of water flowing into Pakistan and has already started cleaning up the dams.

This report takes a look through satellite imagery at only two of more than 25 targets hit by the IAF that broke the back of Pakistan and brought them down to their knees to beg the DGMO for a cessation of hostilities.

Hardened Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs)

Militaries around the world try to safeguard their assets from adversaries. One favourite method is to dig deep to survive from your enemies. Following World War II, most weapon systems underwent massive technological advances in targeting enemy facilities remotely. This prompted all militaries to dig further and provide shelters hardened against aerial attacks, both conventional and nuclear.

Such underground facilities, constructed with special materials, reinforced bars and hardened with multilayered protective covers, are called HDBTs. These facilities feature heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units to maintain a cleaner environment underground.

Pakistan had at least 22 such HDBTs, located mainly around its airbases, with a few in and around Islamabad and Karachi. India, during Op Sindoor, attempted and successfully hit at least two HDBTs, one at Chaklala and the other at Murid airbase respectively.

Both targets were C2 centres for air defence, as per the DGMO (Air), Air Marshal A.K. Bharti. However, the author agrees with the IAF’s assessment but strongly feels that these were used more like C4I Centers.

Every HDBT needs to be studied in depth regarding its soil composition, number of layers, and other relevant factors and then tackled accordingly.

Generally, these are attacked with low-yield nuclear, thermobaric, conventional, or directed energy weapons. All weapons have their advantages and disadvantages.

The choice of weapons depends on the desired effect, what effect is needed at the target end and the underground facility’s construction design and materials used.

Both facilities were constructed by different companies, as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. Very potent and accurate ISR systems are required to study the HDBTs. The intelligence about these HDBTs must be highly accurate and corroborated through multiple sources. A blueprint of the entire facility is always considered the best.

Then, Geologic Assessment Methodology for Underground Targets (GAMUT) must have been adopted to enhance the location and characterisation of the HDBTs.

The IAF also must have been forced to use  conventional, possibly penetrating bombs to destroy these two targets, keeping in mind India’s no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy.

Islamabad Chaklala Airbase

The C2 AD Centre at Chaklala Airbase now known as Nur Khan Airbase, is situated at 33.612222°N 73.096650°E within Islamabad city.

The facility was constructed in the 1990s over an area of 750 sqm, probably by General Electric (GE) Aviation, a US company specialising in underground construction.

The construction technology, along with its blueprints, were shared with Pakistan, possibly in exchange for a promise to stop their cold tests at Kirana Hills. By then Pakistan had already achieved nuclear weapons technology through cold tests and computer simulations, as per A Q Khan’s interview to Kuldeep Nayyar on January 28, 1987.[1]

Most VIPs visiting Islamabad were given a tour of this HDBT and shown the technological advances Pakistan’s air force had achieved.

The US and Chinese generals, after visiting this facility, were always praising it and how the PAF has achieved its integration with other systems indigenously.

The Pakistan Strategic Plans Division’s own Special Works Department (SWD) took over the task of constructing at least 21 more of these underground facilities (UGFs), with the first one starting at Karachi’s Masroor airbase.

The C2 AD Centre, as seen on satellite imagery, had been expanded/renovated twice in 2005 and 2015 after its construction by the GE.

The satellite images from the last fifteen years suggest that this facility was also used as a research and simulation data collection centre for all new radars. It has been observed over the last decade that all aircraft collecting intelligence have been downloading data at this centre for integration with both old and new systems.

The IAF attacked the facility with extreme precision through an HVAC shaft directly leading to the main chamber of the UGF or HDBT. The internal size of the shaft was 45 cm, which is very small, even for measuring on an open-source image, as its single pixel measures 30 cm at the best resolution.

Hence, there was no margin for error, and the task must have been given to the best pilot with all data fed to the missile beforehand, including high-resolution (HiRes) images and pictures of the facility, especially the HVAC shaft.

This is probably the first of its kind, the most unique, and the smallest target hit by any air force in the entire world.

The after-strike imagery, which was released during the DGMO press conference, showed a large chunk of concrete which had risen above the surface, possibly with the explosion below the surface of a penetrating bomb.

The explosion must have been so large as to pulverise everything and everybody inside the HDBT instantly. The effect of the explosion was so significant that the multilayered concrete rebar roof was broken from below and thrown up.

Unlike at other locations, PAF was not in a hurry to remove the debris from this site as it would have confirmed the size and immensity of damage caused by a perfect IAF attack.

However, after a period of four days, a decision must have been made, in consultation with the families of dead PAF soldiers and officers, to bury them in situ as not even shreds of them would have been available to be put in a coffin.

Nobody inside the C2 AD centre available at the time of the strike would have been left alive to tell the story of how the devastation occurred.

After the decision to bury the dead in situ was taken, the broken and destroyed C2 AD Center’s entire structure was seen being levelled on the satellite imagery.

The JCBs, along with concrete paving machines, were observed levelling and cementing the entire area of this HDBT.

As of date, it can be confidently said that the entire facility was obliterated from the face of the Earth.

Chakwal Murid Airbase

The Murid Airbase is located very close to Chakwal on the Pothohar Plateau in Punjab. It is approximately 85km South of Islamabad.

The airbase is located away from the civil population and stands out as a large, lush green  patch in the entire district.

Pakistan’s Special Works Department understood very well the technology either shared or stolen from GE of the USA. And they further improved upon it with minor innovations.

In all the underground facilities, the HVAC ducts have been enlarged in size and pulled away from the facility by at least 10m to a maximum of 100m. This does not permit any penetrating bomb to be effectively dropped on the HVAC ducts/ shaft to destroy the HDBT.

In the case of the Murid C2 AD Centre, too, similar extensions of shafts precluded their use for dropping a penetrating bomb.

Thus, it was possibly decided by the IAF to attack directly at the central section of the HDBT without any pillars resisting the penetration of the missile.

The afterimage of Murid C2 AD Center vividly displays a small rectangular crater of approximately 1.16m X 0.98m size, indicating a deeper penetration. The top layer of the HDBT is composed of compressed earth; a deeper study of satellite images reveals very little compressed earth scattered around. This indicates a deeper penetration of the weapon before it explodes.

The external colour of the crater seen in the satellite image, being very light, is clear evidence that it is only an impact crater and not an explosion crater. This strongly suggests that the penetrating weapon has penetrated the subsurface facility and exploded rather than exploding at the surface.

A possible ten-ton (8m long) truck is observed in the after-satellite image, stationary at the entrance with its rear end partially inside the larger entrance of the underground facility. This suggests that the truck is trying to salvage any material that may be suggestive of the remains of dead officers and airmen.

Only one single possible ambulance has been observed near the entrance of the facility in after-strike imagery, strongly suggesting possibly a lone survivor, indicating considerable casualties of personnel.

This activity, after almost 7-8 hours of the strike, is evidence that a massive effort must have been required to retrieve the possible lone survivor from the debris of the most hardened cement concrete.

Assessment

Pakistan’s efforts at safeguarding their assets by hiding them in HDBTs have failed miserably, by the ingenuity of IAF in striking with impunity.

The latest satellite images procured from Maxar indicate that the two targets discussed in this paper have been completely obliterated from the face of Earth as promised by the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi.

The other locations at Sargodha and Jacobabad targeted by IAF indicate that India has hit PAF’s nerve centres in a very calculated strike and ensured they remain inactive for more than six months at least.

This renders all smaller C2 AD Centres in those theatres defunct, such as the one on the eastern side of Islamabad International Airport, where the PAF Chief of Air Staff (CAS) was hiding during Operation Sindoor. A special HDBT was possibly prepared for the safety and security of the PAF CAS. In the month of March this year, the HDBT was given another protective layer or two, to further strengthen its protective character. The evidence of satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan had prepared for a longer war with India and had prepared hideouts for their Chiefs well in advance of the terrorist act of 22 April 2025.

This entails that any orders given by the PAF CAS would never reach the commands, theatres, or squadrons or be directly issued to the aircraft (for nuclear options).

There would be no coordination between various entities, thus making any air operation untenable in this highly informative warfare in the aerospace domain.

The satellite imagery reveals extraordinary successes achieved by the IAF, far exceeding expectations, even considering the standards of the world’s best air forces.

The entire world, although very quiet about the satellite imagery proofs available for all to see, was indeed all shell-shocked as to how India had pulled this skirmish off against Pakistan within barely 80 hours.

The damages observed on satellite images vividly indicate evidence of wiping out of entire staff at Pakistan’s Air Defence Command Centre at Nur Khan. The airbase, as well as the complete staff at Murid Airbase’s C2 AD Centre, was fully staffed.

The number of officers and airmen would total anywhere from 100 to 200, as the attacks were conducted at the peak of operational alertness when no staff would have been off duty for any reason whatsoever.

However, the discussion of casualties in men and material cannot be compared one to one since our sectoral and national aims were much different than the PAF’s aims.

It suffices to say that the Indian Air Force has displayed its lethality and technological prowess to the most obdurate adversary who wanted only a pretext to use the nuclear arsenal.

The Indian calibrated attacks were extremely restrained yet so lethal that they provided Pakistan with a face-saving option and yet did NOT give Pakistan the face-saving nuclear option.

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥47॥

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The article was uploaded on 30 May & updated on 10 June 2025

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Notes:

[1] Ramindar Singh, Dilip Bobb, “Dr A.Q. Khan’s Pak N-bomb revelation brings prospect of nuke arms race to the subcontinent,” India Today, March 31, 1987, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19870331-dr-aq-khans-pak-n-bomb-revelation-brings-prospect-of-nuke-arms-race-to-the-subcontinent-798697-1987-03-30. Accessed on May 28, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Precision, Perfection and Accuracy have been Hallmarks of IAF Golden Strikes in Pakistan: Targets Obliterated from the Face of Earth appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Integrated Air Defence System, Joint and Integrated Operations, Space based capability, Offensive Air Power, Atmanirbharta.

Introduction

Operation Sindoor, the Tri-Services joint operation, was launched in the early morning hours of May 07, 2025, in response to the dastardly, heinous and religiously provocative terrorist attack on innocent Indian civilians at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025. Op Sindoor was a stupendous success and achieved its laid-down military objectives in less than four days. While the success of Op Sindoor should be celebrated for its decisiveness, highly professional and integrated execution, the Indian Armed Forces also need to do a comprehensive, honest, and unbiased analysis of the entire operation to draw the correct lessons and prepare for future more challenging battles. During Op Sindoor, a disturbing facet was noticed; there was significant military collaboration between Pakistan and its all-weather friend China. Turkey also provided military support to Pakistan not only in the run-up to Op Sindoor but even during the conflict. India needs to be cognisant of the increasingly collaborative approach of China and Pakistan and the possibility of a full-fledged two-front war. A few enduring takeaways from Op Sindoor are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs

Defence Budget Enhancement

The defence budget of India for financial year (FY) 25 is approx. USD 79 billion (fourth largest in the world), which is slightly less than 2% of our GDP. However, it is significantly smaller than the defence budget of our Northern adversary (China) for FY 25, which is USD 245 billion. ^[1] It needs to be enhanced to approximately 2.5% of GDP as there are several critical capability gaps in the technological upgradation and modernisation of our Armed Forces. This enhanced commitment of funds for external security is absolutely essential for expeditiously developing our military capabilities and capacities to deter our adversaries to our West and North. We need to develop disruptive or asymmetric capabilities for credible deterrence. ’Deterrence is costly, but wars are even costlier’ is a well-known military adage. Presently, India cannot afford to get embroiled in an unnecessary conflict that diverts our focus from our nation’s economic growth.  India needs to ensure that national security is embedded into the edifice of financial security, implying that economic growth cannot be achieved in an unstable geopolitical environment.  India has to achieve its goal of becoming a high-income nation before we become old. We need to wisely utilise our demographic dividend to accelerate our technological, economic and military development and achieve our goal of becoming ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047.

Joint and Integrated Operations

Whenever the three Services have planned their operations jointly and executed their plans in an integrated and synergistic manner, they have achieved sensational victories. The only previous example of synergistically executed operations by the Indian Armed Forces has been the 1971 war. One of the most heart-warming features of Op Sindoor was the precise articulation of the national and military objectives and complete synergy was achieved not only amongst the three Services but the Civil-Military fusion as well. Op Sindoor was a jointly planned and synergistically executed operation, wherein the core strengths of the three Services were individually applied towards attaining the common overall military objective. Another feature of Op Sindoor that needs to be stressed is that the overall integrated plans were made under the aegis of the CDS while the individual Service plans were executed under the skilful and professional tutelage of the three Service chiefs. The strengths of this highly successful joint and integrated operations should be thoroughly analysed while finalising and implementing the impending Integrated Theatre Commands. Op Sindoor’s success was also attributable to the ‘whole of nation’ approach – wherein all the diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) measures were synergised to achieve the stated military objective of dismantling the Pakistan military-supported and sponsored terrorist infrastructure and establishing credible deterrence for the future. Any terrorism-related misadventure by Pakistan in the future would incite an even stronger response from India (costs would be higher for Pakistan) is the point that has been made amply clear to Pakistan.

Primacy of Air Power

Op Sindoor’s success has once again very empathetically reiterated the undisputed primacy of air power, which implies that a nation needs to succeed in the air operations to win the war. The same is however not true for land or naval operations. During any conventional or even sub-conventional contingencies, air power is always the fastest to respond and can hit the enemy’s Centres of Gravity simultaneously. In Op Sindoor, air power was used by India in an offensive, unrestrained, precise and calibrated manner for the first time after the 1971 war, and it produced exceptional results wherein the shock and awe of the sustained IAF air strikes forced Pakistan to ask for a ceasefire in slightly less than four days. Op Sindoor is the shortest military operation executed either by India or any other country, wherein the laid-down military objectives were achieved, and operations ceased within a total of 90 hours. The Balakot air strike in the aftermath of the Pulwama incident was the first time that India offensively used air power in pursuit of the national interests in a sub-conventional contingency.  In Op Sindoor, the use of air power in a sub-conventional contingency was taken to the next level with the simultaneous air strikes on nine terrorist training camps/infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Op Sindoor emphatically demonstrated that calibrated, deliberate and focused use of air power in sub-conventional contingency is non-escalatory. Air power can be utilised offensively in both conventional and sub-conventional operations, even under the nuclear overhang. Op Sindoor also unequivocally emphasised air power’s ability to produce strategic effects using long-range precision weapons with minimum collateral damage without crossing the international borders (IB) and remaining within the bounds of escalatory control.

Equipping IAF Appropriately

Op Sindoor demonstrated the precision, lethality and coercive impact of IAF offensive air strikes. The offensive air strikes had a profoundly demoralising effect on Pakistan’s national morale and war-waging capability. It forced the Pakistanis to throw in the towel and ask for a ceasefire. The IAF is presently grappling with an acute shortage of fighter aircraft due to the repeated extended timelines in the indigenous fighter aircraft development programme and the time-consuming, cumbersome and inefficient defence acquisition procedures (with the delays in procurement of 114 x MRFA aircraft). IAF is also facing a crippling shortage of force multipliers (AWACS and AARs) for supporting offensive air operations. IAF’s fighter squadron strength has dropped to a precarious level (31 Squadrons), the lowest level in the past five decades. ^[2] These shortages of fighters and force multipliers need to be addressed on a war footing, which has also been recommended by the high-powered defence committee led by Defence Secretary in March 2025. ^[3] There is an urgent need to build up IAF capabilities expeditiously so as to bridge the large capability gaps with our Northern adversary and also be able to cater for a two-front conflict.

Offensive Air Power – Fighter or UAV Dilemna?

The self-defence capabilities of the modern-day manned fighters combined with the precision, lethality and load-carrying capability; better Situational Awareness and decision-making ability in complex situations mandates that manned fighters would remain the primary aerial offensive platforms in the foreseeable future. In spite of the rapidly increasing capabilities and ranges of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (FPV drones, loitering munitions, swarm drones and UCAVs), UAVs still have problems of survivability in contested air spaces and are capable of carrying out only limited damage to the adversarial weapon systems. UAVs would increasingly take on a lot of roles of manned aircraft but aerial offence would continue to be predominantly the preserve of manned fighters. UAVs would complement manned fighters in offensive aerial operations rather than replace them in the foreseeable future.

Space Based Capability (ISR, PNT & Communication) Enhancement

The limited number of Indian electro-optical and radar imaging, communications, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellites performed creditably and provided accurate targeting data and other support services for the air operations during Op Sindoor. However, we were forced to utilise commercial imagery data (Maxar, etc.) to beef up the layered targeting imagery provided by our domestic satellites or for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). India needs to accelerate the proposed timelines for the launches of our Space-based Surveillance network (SBS-3) satellites to shorten the revisit times to approximately 2 hours (Chinese ISR satellites presently have a revisit time of approximately 30 mts). India also needs to replace the old life-expired NavIC satellites with new satellites expeditiously, strengthen the ground segment and upgrade the NavIC services to NavIC 2.0.

Focus on Defence R&D and Induction of State-of-the-art Technologies

The mil-technological edge of India vis-a-vis Pakistan that was amply visible during Op Sindoor needs to be further enhanced while making all endeavours to narrow down the mil-technological edge that China presently enjoys with regard to India. This needs to be achieved through a dedicated focus on the development of cutting-edge technologies like high-power jet engines, hypersonics, long-range precision weapons and Artificial Intelligence and their rapid induction into the Services. A holistic approach towards technology development must be fostered wherein failure must be accepted as a stepping stone to success. The MoD’s defence R&D budget needs to be enhanced significantly, and guidance and hand-holding must be provided to the private defence industry and start-ups. MoD must encourage and foster collaboration amongst the DPSUs, the private defence industry, the start-ups and the academia.

Strengthen Atmanirbharta

Op Sindoor demonstrated the stupendous success of India’s Atmanirbharta initiatives. The sterling performance and contribution of the indigenous weapon systems and weapon platforms to the success of the operations was indeed commendable and needs to be sustained. Though the gestation period for indigenous development of weapon systems is always much longer, the services must continue to encourage and support the indigenisation process. All the players – the DPSUs, the three services, the private industry, the start-ups and the academia need to be fully involved and supportive of the indigenisation process. The Atmanirbharta initiative needs to be further strengthened with a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach and be made more broad-based. The indigenous development programs of Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk II, AMCA, the 110 kN high-performance jet engine, long-range precision weapons, larger range BVR AAMs (Astra- II, III), Ghatak UCAV, swarm drones, larger range DEW C-UAS systems and the CATS air warrior program need to be focused upon and speeded up.

Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC)

The IACCS and Akashteer were a huge success, the backbone of the Integrated Air Defence network centricity, and they were crucial enablers for air defence operations during Op Sindor. The IACCS and Akshteer Integrated Air Defence System endowed its numerous users with an unmatched Situational Awareness that significantly reduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop, the Sensor-to Shooter time-lag and ensured the protection of the Indian air space. India must further enhance this network by integrating the naval sensors and their C&C network (Trigun) with IACCS. Simultaneously, India needs to start working on upgrading the integrated Tri-Service C&C network to the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC), which would be capable of coordinating and controlling all the sensors and shooters in multiple domains (all five domains) – Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyberspace.

Information Warfare/Cognitive Warfare

Information/Cognitive Warfare has become increasingly critical in shaping the strategic narrative as the perception battle is being intensely monitored and commented upon by the international media. The briefings done by the DGMOs of the three services were comprehensive and done professionally. They were very well received not only by the national but also by the international media. They helped in shaping the strategic narrative. In all future operations, this system of briefings by the DGMOs of the three services should be followed, with interim briefings  by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and MoD representatives.

Conclusion

India needs to prepare for the future and expeditiously build up the capabilities of our Armed Forces as future battles/wars would be appreciably more intense, more widespread (probably two-front) and multi-domain (encompassing Land, Sea, Air, Space, Cyberspace and the Cognitive domains.)  Future wars would have a greater infusion of technology and artificial intelligence and would be increasingly fought in the digital and shadowy grey zones of cyberspace, space and cognitive domains. It would need an integrated ‘Whole-of-Nation’ approach with even greater Civilian Military Fusion for ensuring success.

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Notes:

^[1] “India vs China: Defence Gap Widens as Beijing’s $245 billionMilitary Budget Nears Half of India’s National Outlay,” The Economic Times, March 06, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-vs-china-defence-gap-widens-as-beijings-245-billion-military-budget-nears-half-of-indias-national-outlay/articleshow/118752902.cms. Accessed on May 23, 2025.

^[2] “As Fighter Strength Dips Below 1965 level, Air Chief Vows to Fight with ‘whatever we have’,” The Economic Times,                   October 04, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/as-fighter-strength-dips-below-1965-level-air-chief-vows-to-fight-with-whatever-we-have/articleshow/113992521.cms. Accessed on May 23, 2025.

^[3] Press Information Bureau, India, “Defence Secretary Presents Report of the Empowered Committee to Raksha Mantra for Capability Enhancement of IAF,” March 03, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2107847. Accessed on May 21, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Op Sindoor’s Enduring Takeaway (The Ten Commandments) appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: IACCS, NCW, RASP, Akashteer

During Operation Sindoor, the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) played a significant role successfully managing air operations. On May 07, 2025, these Operations commenced by targeting nine terrorist hideouts, training camps, etc., in Pakistan. Network -centric operations were used to conduct offensive as well as Air Defence operations successfully. Defending its airspace during Operation Sindoor was not a fluke but proof of India’s well-organised air defences. Central to achieving this success was the IACCS, which links information, observational networks, AD weapon systems and decision-making mechanisms from the IAF, Army, and related forces.[1]

As a vital part of Indian air defence, the IACCS has a network that allows it to detect, track, and identify aerial targets as Hostile when they appear. Thanks to the use of the Air Force Network (AFNET), AI, satellite, and a broad range of sensors, the IACCS was able to achieve better air superiority and better coordination with joint operations. All air actions of Operation Sindoor were controlled and co-ordinated from IACCS.

Background on Operation Sindoor

On May 07, between 01:05 am and 01:30 am, India launched a tri-service operation called ‘Operation Sindoor’, targeting nine terror infrastructure sites in Pakistan and PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). This was in retaliation to several terrorist activities and the deadly Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025.  Four terrorists killed 26 civilians, including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. These terrorists were launched by ‘The Resistance Front (TRF)’, a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The air strikes, part of the Op Sindoor, were precise and measured without co-lateral damage. The strikes avoided all non-terrorist targets, including Pakistani military sites, to keep the situation non-escalatory. Also, no civilian locations were targeted. [2]

The Pakistani Government’s propaganda machinery claimed that India was acting aggressively by targeting civilians.  Pakistan decided to extend support to terrorist groups, exposing, once again, their explicit nexus with terrorist outfits. In response, the Pakistani Army launched an offensive by air strikes, drones, missiles, and rockets on Indian vital installations, including Jammu, Pathankot and Udhampur. This forced India to intensify its air defence, and IACCS was at the forefront of this effort.

Understanding IACCS

During Operation Sindoor, IACCS was the nerve centre for not only Air Defence operations, but also for Offensive Operations. IACCS is an indigenously developed Command and Control system provided by the IAF, built to accelerate its activities in air defence and make network- centric warfare possible. The system includes input from all types of radars, whether homogeneous, heterogeneous, two-dimensional or three-dimensional, as well as AWAC (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes, UAVs, airbases, air traffic control radars for civil aviation and observation posts. Using information from ground sensors, airborne sensors, air defence weapon systems and command systems, IACCS makes a ‘Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP)’ to help manage air threats.[3]

With IACCS, commanders at all levels — strategic, operational, and tactical, are able to track and watch every development in the air in real-time. The Akashteer system which has been recently installed by the Indian Army, is a subset of IACCS. Therefore, IACCS is making Air Defence operations comfortable, for both the Land and air forces to work together.

Commanders exploited IACCS to monitor the air situation in real time which allowed them to update their situational awareness. The AFNET, a fast and secure digital grid, launched on September 14, 2010, hosts IACCS. AFNET depends on Internet Protocol (IP) and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) for dependable transmission of data, voice and video over its network.[4]

With the help of IACCS, commanders could react promptly to the developing air activity as their situational awareness was up-to-date. With IACCS, the air defence functions have become quick. Appropriately selecting sensors and interceptor fighter aircraft and surface to air AD weapon systems of varying ranges ensures that there is no duplication of action and the incoming target is being successively engaged in multiple layers from the IB to the VA/VP.

The Role IACCS During Operation Sindoor

During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan attacked Indian military installations and civilians with drones, missiles and rockets. IACCS facilitated the Indian Air Force to deal with these threats efficiently and effectively. The main contributions of IACCS are appended below:

(a)     Detection and Tracking: IACCS presented the integrated air data, obtained from ground radars, AWACS aircraft and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems to detect and track any aircraft in Indian Airspace. The system could even detect Pakistani drones and missiles, with low RCS, before they could reach their destination.[5]

(b)    Real-time Situational Awareness: Commanders could rely on the RASP provided by IACCS, which congregated all necessary air information in one place for rapid action. A picture of the IACCS node displayed at the briefing on May 12, 2025, clearly showed people using an IACCS picture to monitor the air situation.[6]

(c)    Coordination and Command: IACCS enabled the appropriate selection of the weapons available, like the S-400, Akash missiles, and homemade counter-UAV systems to stop and destroy the threats. IACCS architecture works to ensure that assets from the Army, and Air Force are exploited on merits for smooth operations.[7]

(d)    Activation of Akashteer: Integration of Akashteer AD system with IACCS had been achieved a few months prior to Ex Sindoor. Akashteer synergised the joint operations, where ground-based resources and the IAF’s air defence teams could efficiently work together, leading to the best possible solution. Akashteer has led to orders for more than 400 C2C centres, and 107 of them have been delivered so far, with full integration planned by the end of the year.[8]

(e)     Successful Interceptions: With operational assistance from IACCS, Pakistani drones and PL-15 missiles were successfully detected and shot down from May 08 to May 10, 2025. Briefings by military leaders underlined that current battles could only be won because the net-centric operation strategies were successful.[9]

(f)    IACCS prevented Pakistan’s aerial threats from causing damage by quickly neutralising them. The system was so quick and accurate, that the attackers could not penetrate the Air Defence shield and enter the airbases, schools, temples, and civilian places.

Pakistan’s loss was attributed to India’s strong and advanced air defences which were directed from the IACCS. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s failure to use its Chinese HQ-9 system, which could not detect or hit Indian strikes, made the IACCS seem more effective.

Implications

The real-time Command and Control from IACCS ensured that India’s air defence was better than Pakistan’s, as most of the latter’s Chinese systems, had several technical and operational flaws. IACCS with Akashteer have reinforced the Indian Air Defence system in exploiting networks for warfare, improving its response to aerial attacks. India’s achievement in Operation Sindoor reflects its ability to rely on its defence technology and enhance its readiness against nearby rivals.

AI is being used in IACCS to help monitor enemy planes and ensure the best possible use of weapons. During the next decade, IACCS wants to support in-flight movement of missile target assignments to enable changing the type of attack “on the fly. ” Old THD-1955 3D radar equipment will be replaced with modern high-power radars (range at 600 kilometres) to strengthen IACCS.[10]

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Notes:

[1] “India’s shield in the skies: What is the Integrated Air Command and Control System used during Operation Sindoor?,”  The First Post,  May 13,2025, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/india-air-defence-iaccs-operation-sindoor-how-it-works-13888060.html.  Accessed on May 18, 2025.

[2] Sameer Patil, Rahul Rawat, “Operation Sindoor: Understanding Context and Consequences,” Observer Research Foundation,    May 09, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-understanding-context-and-consequences. Accessed on May 18, 2025.

[3] Ibid First Post.

[4] “Op Sindoor: Pivotal Role of India’s Integrated Air Command and Control Sys (IACCS) in Thwarting Aerial Threats,” Resonant News May 13, 2025, https://resonantnews.com/2025/05/13/op-sindoor-pivotal-role-of-indias-integrated-air-command-and-control-sys-iaccs-in-thwarting-aerial-threats/. Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[5] Amrita Nayak Dutta, “Operation Sindoor | How India’s air defence shield works: Inside the IACCS command system”, The Indian Express, May 15, 2025,  https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indias-air-defence-shield-10003549/. Accessed on  May 18, 2025.

[6] Ibid First Post.

[7] “Integrated Air Command and Control System: The heroes behind Operation Sindoor,” The Hindustan Times,

May 12, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/integrated-air-command-and-control-system-the-heroes-behind-operation-sindoor-101747055842040.html. Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[8] Divyam Sharma, “Guardians Of The Sky – India’s Integrated Air Defence That Outfoxed Pakistan,” NDTV, May 12, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/guardians-of-the-sky-indias-integrated-air-defence-that-outfoxed-pak-operation-sindoor-indian-air-force-akash-missile-8395760.  Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post IACCS: Proves Mettle of IAF’s Network Centric Operations appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Op Sindoor.

We have all seen Top Gun, where Maverick responds to all situations with the cool and vivacious dialogue, “Maverick is supersonic, will be there in thirty seconds.” Those were the days of aerial close combat, designed to make the fighter pilot look good. The modern battlefield is a far cry from it. It is more lethal, complex, precarious, dense, and, more importantly, unforgiving.

A pertinent question that comes to the fore is what makes the modern aerial battlefield so different from the earlier one? There are no set patterns or definitions to understand the modern battlefield clearly. However, specific characteristics make it different from what was prevalent in the 20^th Century. In the early days of air combat, there was a sensor and a shooter. The sensor would identify a potential target, and the shooter would decide whether it is hostile or not and shoot it down. The less time the sensor takes to shoot, the more effective the system. As technology improved, so did the sensors and capabilities of the shooter. With time, the number of sensors increased, and the shooter, therefore, had many inputs to work on and decide whether to shoot or not, eventually saturating the mind of the shooter with too much information, often termed as situational overload or SITOL. From one sensor and shooter, the battlefield transformed into multiple sensors and multiple shooters, and finally, there was a humongous network of sensors and shooters linked with each other to achieve the original aim of short sensor-to-shooter time. Technology like computers, complicated algorithms and multiple sensor tracking was introduced to sift through the vast amount of data available, so that a recognised and refined picture would be available for the shooter to take the call. With time, essential decisions started being taken by a series of professionals on the ground, who would identify hostile targets and hand them over to the shooter to do the needful. The aerial battlefield was linear with clearly defined players in the kill chain, and the need of the hour was information superiority, viz., the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Maverick could handle it all and come out with flying colours.

The modern aerial battle space has a huge array of sensors and shooters constituting multiple kill chains spread across multiple of land, sea, air and cyberspace domains. Linear kill chains have transformed into complex kill webs; therefore, plain old information superiority is inefficient. This is where Kelly McGillis’s character of Charlotte “Charlie” Blackwood, Instructor, Top Gun, comes in with the famous dialogue to Maverick, “It takes a lot more than just fancy flying.” Maverick would therefore need to evolve and change because the modern aerial battlefield has also undergone a transformation. Decision superiority is required, viz., the degree of dominance in the cognitive domain an air force must achieve through its decision-making processes that enables it to acquire and maintain an advantage over its adversary. Maverick is just another lethal weapon system available, amongst many other systems which a commander could use to achieve kills. So, does that make Maverick irrelevant? The answer is no. Maverick will always remain relevant because, when used judiciously, only Maverick can deliver lethal and decisive firepower.

Key features of the modern aerial battle field are trans and cross domain operations, network centric architecture, technology ranging from small drones to Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) to Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missiles (QRSAMs), Medium and Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MR and LR SAMs), stealth aircraft, long range and stand-off precision weapons, electronic and cyber warfare; Hypersonic weapons and space-based combat support. All this is being augmented by the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data integration. As a result, the kill web that has been created is far more complex and therefore needs closer evaluation, critical thinking and unmatched decision superiority. Many questions come to the fore when we look at the attributes of war fighting in such an environment. How does one fight a war in such an environment? How will we decide which weapon system to use and when? What response options are available to a developing situation and which is most optimal? Are concepts like Favourable Air Situation (FAS), Air Superiority and Air Supremacy relevant? What doctrinal precepts are to be followed when fighting the modern war? Will the classical Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Air Defence (AD) pan out the way we have seen in the past few years? When do the air, land and sea campaigns begin and end? How does one handle cyber and information warfare, which is spread across the entire spectrum of conflict, affecting the entire continuum? These are just a few questions that must be answered when planning for future warfare.

Certain events that have unfolded in the period following the dastardly terror attacks at Pahalgam give us all a glimpse of what is to come in the future. A lethal attack on innocent tourists by state-sponsored terrorists was the trigger event. The event triggered a response strategy by India against Pakistan, which involved action in the diplomatic, information, economic, and military domains. What was interesting was the way events unfolded in the military domain. In response to the terror attacks, India launched Op Sindoor with precision long-range attacks by the Indian Air Force (IAF) on terrorist infrastructure without physically crossing the International Boundary (IB) or the Line of Control (LoC). The Pakistani armed forces responded in the form of large-scale mass drone attacks with drones ranging from quad copters to large UCAVs on military targets successfully repelled by India’s robust Air Defence (AD) comprising of weapons of differing vintage and capability, including hard and soft kill using Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS). What followed was kinetic action using manned aircraft to target airfields and other critical military infrastructure, albeit from within their own territory by both sides. Under a nuclear overhang, this was a new kind of war, far different from the one between Russia and Ukraine or Hamas and Israel. While the Indian Navy was deployed in a deterrent posture in the Arabian Sea and the land forces were looking eye to eye, no direct ‘conventional’ exchange of firepower took place between the two armies and navies. Tanks did not roll and heavy artillery had not fired, yet, there was significant damage to Pakistani critical military infrastructure and war-waging potential.  No FAS or Air Supremacy was established, yet targets well within Pakistani and Indian territory were taken on. There was no formal declaration of war, nor can this be termed as Responses Short of War (RSOW). Civil defence measures like air raid sirens and blackout measures saw a return after decades of hibernation. Conventional wisdom on how wars between India and Pakistan would pan out has been thrown out of the window, and the war was swift, deadly, modern, sophisticated, and multi-domain; the ceasefire was the only thing that was swifter. In the entire gamut of things as they unfolded, our beloved Maverick was very relevant and instrumental in delivering decisive punches. Yet, he was also ever so vulnerable because our thought process on how to use him had not changed.

This war has brought out certain important lessons that must become inputs for revising our doctrines and helping us fight tomorrow’s wars. This conflict has clearly shown us that, though the nature of war has not quite changed, the character of war has undergone significant changes. As Lt Col Frank G Hoffman wrote in his article on Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, “the most distinctive change in the character of modern war is the blurred or blended nature of combat. We do not face a widening number of distinct challenges but their convergence into hybrid wars.”[1] As we debate the scale and shape of our Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote and remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.[2] The problem will be response strategies to completely newer ways of warfighting—whether kinetic, non-kinetic, lethal, or non-lethal—directed not only at the armed forces but at the country in general. I want to end by bringing out certain takeaways from this war and highlight some facts on air power and its application in modern combat.

(a)   There is and will remain adequate space for conventional and sub-conventional action in wars under a nuclear overhang. This, therefore, calls for recalibration of red lines and response options.

(b)   Use of air power in this conflict has again demonstrated how it  can seamlessly transcend the outer rings of Warden’s model of centre of gravity and hit where it hurts.

(c)   AD operations are inextricably linked to the conduct of OCA operations. The two campaigns will remain symbiotic.

(d)   Air power may not achieve conventional levels of air control like FAS or Air supremacy. Still there will be windows of opportunity for conventional OCA forces to go through, and these must be fully exploited.

(e)   There can never be adequate soft power without credible and adequate hard power. Ultimately, hard power will prove decisive and must be built up.

(f)   There are glaring gaps in our hard power capability. Conventional air power needs a major impetus, especially in a scenario like the one we saw during Op Sindoor. IAF needs adequate squadrons and aircraft to remain relevant and effective because numbers matter. A strong and modern IAF will help deter any future misdeeds by Pakistan.

(g)   Legacy weapon systems have an essential role and will always remain relevant. These systems’ maintenance and life cycle management is essential to maintain the right balance.

(h)   The classical OCA versus AD battle may not play out how it has been envisaged, and Maverick does not need to go through every time. There is a need to change that mindset. Offensive AD can do a lot, especially if one has the longer stick.

(j)    Centralised planning, distributed control, and decentralised execution were amply displayed in this conflict. Integrated application of combat power, irrespective of ownership, is key to success in modern warfare.

(k)   There is a need for a joint planning set-up at the apex level. Joint planning has always been our weak area and must be addressed. Towards this, setting up of Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) is essential.

(l)    Manned aircraft will always remain relevant because no number of unmanned systems can deliver lethal and decisive air power like a manned aircraft. We have seen the vulnerability of drones in a contested environment; therefore the narrative that unmanned systems will replace manned aircraft should be safely discarded. At best, they will augment but not replace.

(m)    The present Japanese Navy Chief had mentioned in his address during Raisina Dialogue 2025 that the battlefield has changed from being platform-centric to network-centric and now to decision-centric. Kill chains have transformed into kill webs. We must invest in AI and big data to suitably handle such a complex battle space to enable decision superiority, which will prove decisive.

This war has been significantly different from previous ones, with many lessons that can be drawn. Air power as an instrument of war will always remain crucial and critical in any conflict and must therefore remain effective and credible. We cannot afford to dwindle air power away in penny pockets, nor can we let it deteriorate. While autonomous unmanned systems have utility, the manned fighter is irreplaceable and essential. Maverick will need to be called in at the right time and place to deliver the decisive blow, and for that we will need decision superiority, and a change of mindset. The fighter pilot is here to stay; wish him away at your peril. When Maverick requests a flyby, the classical Top Gun response, “Negative Ghostrider, the pattern is full”, may be the right response untill that window of opportunity arises and he can go in, guns and missiles blazing.

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Notes:

[1] Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 1^st Quarter 2009,  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA516871.pdf, accessed on May 12, 2025.

[2] Ibid.

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Keywords: Pahalgam attack, terrorist attack, Operation Sindoor, Integrated Air Defence System.

In the aftermath of the barbaric, heinous, religiously targeted killings of 26 innocent civilians in Pahalgam by The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the Pakistan based UN-designated terrorist group, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), PM Narendra Modi on April 24, in a public rally in Bihar, very explicitly announced his intentions to not only extract revenge from the perpetrators of the terrorist strike but their backers as well. He said, ’Today, from the soil of Bihar, I say this to the whole world, India would identify, trace and punish every terrorist, supporter and conspirator. We will pursue them to the end of the Earth. They will be punished beyond their imagination.’^[1]

Towards achieving that aim, the Indian armed forces launched Op Sindoor in the early hours of  May 07, 2025, targeting nine terrorist training centres/camps, five across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and four across the international border (IB) in Pakistan. India’s response to the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist strike was precise, measured and non-escalatory; wherein only terrorist infrastructure was engaged and military or civilian targets were avoided. Pakistan was clearly warned that any follow-up strikes by Pakistan would be considered as further escalation and would be responded by India. Unfortunately, Pakistan failed to heed this sound advice.  It continued to progressively up the ante by firstly carrying out aerial strikes with hundreds of drones, missiles and loitering munitions on religious sites and other civilian targets in Indian cities all along our Western border and subsequently on IAF airfields. The Indian armed forces responded to each of these escalations with precise, measured, calibrated but escalated responses – initiating with precise strikes on terrorist camps, leading to Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) attacks on PAF surveillance and AD radars and finally the massive, precise attack on eleven PAF frontline airbases, which forced Pakistan to wave the white flag and beg for a ceasefire. Each step up the escalatory ladder by Pakistan was responded with a befitting and escalated response by the Indian armed forces.

In barely four days, the Indian armed forces achieved a resounding military victory – obliterating nine Pakistani terrorist training camps/centres and very systematically and professionally decimating the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan’s air defences and their major airfields; leaving all the Pakistani strategic and economic infrastructure targets fully exposed. The Indian Air Force’s and Indian Army’s phenomenal defence of the Indian airspace against repeated, mass aerial attacks by aircraft, missiles, drones and loitering munitions; extending across a border exceeding 3000 kms was a masterful and unmatched performance by the Indian Integrated Air Defence system. The fact that no Pakistani aircraft could enter the Indian air space throughout the period of hostilities speaks volumes of this highly professional performance. A defining feature of Op Sindoor was that the major architects of its stupendous success were the indigenous Indian designed and developed or Indian manufactured weapon systems and weapon platforms – fruits of our Atmanirbharta initiative.

Atmanirbharta Success Story – the Crowning Glory

Though there are several reasons for this stupendous success of the Indian armed forces, the most significant  contributor to the success of Op Sindoor has been the phenomenal performance of the indigenously developed Indian weapon platforms – the indigenously designed and developed Integrated Air Defence System, the indigenously designed and developed Akash Missile system, the Medium Range Surface to Air Missile system (MRSAM), jointly developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and Israel Aerospace Indistries (IAI), the integration by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) of the Brahmos Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) onto the Su-30 MKI, the locally manufactured loitering munition (Skystriker) and the DRDO developed C-UAS system [(D-4) Drone, Detect, Deter and Destroy] system, our Regional Navigation Satellite System (RNSS) – the Navigation by Indian Constellation (NAVIC) providing precise coordinates for our long range precision weapons, the re-engineering of life-expired R-73’s as Surface to Air Missile for Assured Retaliation (SAMAR) weapons, the indigenously upgraded L-70 guns, the Zu-23 mm systems and the Schilka systems.

The other major contributors to the success of Op Sindoor, though not of Indian origin, were the Russian Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) – the S-400, the French Rafale aircraft with its Meteor Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-to-Air Missile (AAM), SCALP and HAMMER long-range precision weapon systems, and the Israeli IAI designed Loitering Munition (Harop).

The development details of a few of these Atmanirbharta success stories are highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs.

IACCS cum Akashteer Integrated Air Defence System

The undisputed star of Op Sindoor’s stupendous success was undoubtedly the indigenously developed multi-layered Integrated Air Defence System – the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System) and the Indian Army’s (IA’s) Akashteer. IACCS has successfully fused all ground-based and the airborne sensors scanning the humongous volume of Indian airspace. IACCS has provided a clear and Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) to the various AD weapon systems for engaging the incoming enemy targets. The IACCS exercised timely and effective control over the numerous AD weapon systems of IAF, from the shoulder-fired QRSAMs like the Igla missile to the LRSAMs like S-400. Likewise, the Indian Army’s component of the Integrated Air Defence System, the indigenously developed Akashteer contributed to the effective monitoring of the airspace over the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and real-time control of all the ground-based AD weapon systems in the TBA. Both the IACCS and Akashteer worked in synergy to ensure that the ‘fog of war’ was dispelled and freedom of operation was provided to the all the AD weapon systems for neutralising the hundreds of incoming enemy targets comprising of armed drones, swarm drones, Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs), loitering munitions and even Air to Air Missiles (AAMs). This ensured that our airspace was practically impregnable to the repeated aerial assaults by our Western adversary throughout Op Sindoor. We can proudly claim that our Integrated Air Defence System is better, if not equal to, the Israeli Iron Dome. A point to be reiterated here is that the airspace volume of Israel is only a minuscule percentage of what the IAF has to defend, and this was done with a resounding success during Op Sindoor.

The decision to develop the Integrated Air Defence System indigenously rather than buy a Commercial Off- The-Shelf (COTS) Air Defence system was indeed a visionary decision of the IAF, which has paid back handsomely in Op Sindoor. The evolution of the Integrated Air Defence System has taken several decades, starting in the early 1960s, with the incremental advancements in Air Defence concepts over the years.^[2] The IACCS was conceptualised to integrate all the radars of the three Services and even the radars of civil aviation. One of the biggest hurdles in developing the IACCS was the need to fuse the radar picture of the various sensors, all of different makes and different vintages. Due to the complexities involved, the development of IACCS was initially restricted to the IAF only. IACCS was jointly developed over slightly more than a decade through continuous hard work, ingenuity, and innovation by dedicated IAF officers (fighter controllers and engineers) and the engineers of Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). IACCS was completed and operationalised across the IAF in 2010.^[3] Even after the operationalisation, it has been undergoing software upgrades and modernisations to further enhance its performance. Building on the experience and success of IACCS, the Indian Army and BEL had successfully developed the Akashteer Project for similar command and control over the IA sensors and the AD weapon systems in the TBA and integration with IACCS.  IA inducted the first phase of project Akashteer into Service on April 04, 2024.^[4] The entire project is scheduled to be completed by early 2027. The Indian Navy’s similar command and control project is named ‘Trigun.’  It is being indigenously designed and developed by the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) in DRDO and is presently in an advanced stage of its development.

It is  indisputable that the IACCS was the backbone of IAF’s network centricity and a crucial enabler for the air operations during Op Sindoor. The system’s phenomenal capabilities endowed its numerous users with an unmatched Situational Awareness that significantly reduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop, the Sensor-to-Shooter time-lag and thereby contributed immensely to the protection of the Indian air space and also the execution of offensive air strikes by IAF.

Akash Short Range Surface-to-air Missile System

One of the AD missile weapon systems that was a major contributor to the success of Op Sindoor and its excellent performance was the indigenously designed and developed Akash missile system, which was developed as a part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). The development of the Akash missile was initiated in 1983 and IAF was intricately involved throughout its development process, through its several variants (Akash Mk-1, Akash- 1S and the latest Akash Prime) and the induction of the first Akash unit into IAF in 2010.^[5] The Akash missile system was inducted into the IA in May 2015.^[6] The Akash missile system is capable of intercepting high speed, agile aerial threats like fighter aircraft, missiles, helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Akash system can track and engage multiple targets simultaneously and relies on its Rajendra Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) 3D radar for guiding the missile to the target. The system also has a built-in Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) capability, enhancing its kill probability even in contested EW environments. The Akash missile system has been designed by DRDO and is being jointly manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and BEL. The missile is a supersonic, short-range SAM with command guidance and an effective range varying from 4.5 km to 30 km and a maximum engagement altitude of 20 km. The Akash missile system can engage multiple targets simultaneously in all weather conditions. It was one of the key AD weapon systems of India’s multi-layered Integrated Air Defence system during Op Sindoor and was successful in neutralising multiple enemy aerial threats. DRDO successfully conducted a flight test of the New Generation Akash (Akash-NG) missile on January 12, 2024 and the missile is now being prepared for user trials. Akash NG would be capable of intercepting high-performance, low-RCS supersonic targets apart from conventional targets. It would have a maximum interception range of 70 kms.

Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM)

The exceptional performance of the MRSAM was another contributing factor  to the success of Op Sindoor. The MRSAM, is an indigenous variant of the Israeli Barak-8 SAM system, has been jointly developed by DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) as an advanced network centric combat Air Defence System. The MRSAM has been a significant step in our Atmanirbharta initiative and has contributed to the ‘Make in India, Make for the world’ program. MRSAM can simultaneously engage multiple aerial threats like fighter aircraft, guided and unguided munitions and cruise missiles, both in single and saturation attacks, up to a maximum range of 70 kms. The first unit of MRSAM was inducted into IAF in Sep 2021^[7] and into the IA in Feb 2023. The IAF and IA variants are slightly different, with the IAF version being semi-static and the IA version being mobile.

Integration of Brahmos ALCM on Su-30 MKI

The successful indigenous integration of the Brahmos ALCM by HAL on the locally centre pylon modified Su-30 MKI in 2017^[8] has been another success story that significantly enhanced the deep strike capability of the IAF. The precise and massive damage inflicted on the PAF airbases by the Brahmos attacks has indeed been highly demoralising to Pakistan. It would be of immense deterrence value in the future. Brahmos missile presently has a maximum range of 290 kms, but this would get enhanced to 800 kms in the Brahmos ER, which is currently under development.

Locally Manufactured Loitering Munition (Skystriker) & DRDO Developed C-UAS system (D-4)

The Israeli Elbit Systems designed, Alpha Design Technologies locally manufactured Skystriker loitering munition and the DRDO designed and developed C-UAS system (D4) were other huge success stories. They had a decisive impact on Op Sindoor. The IA operated Skystriker loitering munitions were instrumental in the precise destruction of the terror training camps and other training infrastructure in POK and Pakistan in the early morning of May 07. The DRDO developed the D4 C-UAS system, with its 3 km engagement zone, which was successful in neutralising the repeated attacks by the enemy drones and contributing to the safety of our VA/VPs.

Conclusion

The most obvious and enduring lesson of Op Sindoor has been that India’s Atmanirbharta initiatives towards the indigenous development of weapon systems and weapon platforms have started bearing fruit, and they contributed massively towards the phenomenal success of Op Sindoor. Even though the gestation period for indigenous development is relatively longer, all the players – from the DPSUs to the three Services to the private industry to the Start-ups need to not only persist with it, but they need to speed up the indigenisation process. The Atmanirbharta initiative needs to be further strengthened with a whole of nation approach and be made more broad-based. The indigenous development programs of Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk II, AMCA, the 110 kN high-performance jet engine, Ghatak UCAV, larger range C-UAS systems and the CATS air warrior program need to be focused upon and speeded up.

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Notes:

^[1] “Pahalgam Attackers, Conspirators will be Punished Beyond their Imagination : PM Modi in Bihar,” The Hindu, April 24, 2025 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-speech-bihar-pahalgam-terror-attack-punish/article69485876.ece. Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[2] Air Mshl VPS Rana, PVSM, VSM, “Invisible Warriors – Scientific Art of Fighter Controlling”, (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), p. 182.

^[3] Air Mshl VPS Rana, PVSM, VSM, “Invisible Warriors – Scientific Art of Fighter Controlling”, (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), p. 176.

^[4] “Army Starts Induction of Akashteer System to Enhance Air Defence Posture,” The Times of India, April 04, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-starts-induction-of-akashteer-system-to-enhance-air-defence-posture/articleshow/109044544.cms.  Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[5]  Ajai Shukla, “First Akash Missile System to Fill Gap in Air Defence,” Broadsword, May 22, 2010, https://www.ajaishukla.com/2010/11/first-akash-missile-system-to-fill-gap.html.  Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[6]“Induction Ceremony of Akash Weapon System into Army Air Defence,” PIB, May 05, 2015, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=121193, accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[7]   “DRDO Hans over MRSM to IAF in presence of RM Shri Rajnath Singh at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan,” PIB, September 09, 2021, https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1753559. Accessed on May 11, 2025.

^[8] “Inside Story : How Brahmos Missile Got Integrated with Su-30 Fighter Plane,” The Print,  November 29, 2017, https://theprint.in/opinion/inside-story-how-brahmos-missile-got-integrated-with-sukhoi-30-fighter-plane/19329/. Accessed on May 11, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Pahalgam Attack, Operation Sindoor, Terrorist Attack, IAF

The recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam that resulted in the death of 26 innocent lives led to intense speculation and debate on the involvement of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and the action that India as a country needed to take. Public pressure in a democracy for justice and action is indeed understandable and justified, and the day’s government found itself in an unenviable situation to ‘do something.’ Having carried out surgical strikes in the past by special forces in 2016, post the Uri terror attack and by the IAF in 2019, post the Pulwama terror attack, the expectation from the domestic constituency had only increased. While diplomatic steps taken by the government to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, expulsion of military advisors, closing of the border and revoking visas of Pakistan nationals were carried out immediately, these would take time to fructify and take effect. Terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, followed by plausible deniability and the willingness to cooperate for a joint and impartial probe by Pakistan, is a familiar playbook that India had only got weary of listening to. Diplomatic support from the international community has been more than forthcoming, along with the advice for India to exercise restraint.

India exercised restraint, albeit for a period of fifteen days that seemed like eternity, until ‘Operation Sindoor’ was carried out on the night of 06-07 May 2025. In a deliberate and carefully planned attack that was focused, measured and non-escalatory, the Indian Armed Forces struck nine terrorist training camps, indoctrination centres, and staging areas inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. These were targeted based on credible intelligence, ensuring no loss to civilian lives and property and no military targets were struck. Pakistan indeed was taken by surprise and has since then reacted with drone and missile attacks, targeting Indian cities and airfields. The raison d’ être of the Pakistan military, which considers itself the sole guardian of its security, is keeping the threat from India alive. Not reacting to the present situation would only have undermined its credibility and sanctity. India has not been reticent and has responded by targeting the air defence network of Pakistan from Lahore to Karachi. The onus for further escalation now rests with Pakistan, and international opinion is already against Pakistan, with the world having realised that the scourge of terrorism emanates from the country with the tacit support of the state. Any further attack by Pakistan on Indian military targets would be at its peril, as India has already demonstrated that it would respond appropriately.

Having briefed global leaders and envoys from friendly foreign countries who understand India’s predicament and the need to act against terror, India today stands on high moral ground as a responsible nation. The need for ‘just’ action within a specified time was felt by the leadership, which did respond, not only by sending a clear message to Pakistan that acts of terror would not be tolerated but also to its citizens that the nation would do all it could to protect its citizens. The Indian Air Force, which played a significant role in neutralising the targets, is better equipped than it was post Pulwama in 2019. The air defence umbrella that the IAF provides has ensured that the population has remained safe despite relentless attacks by Pakistan. The impregnable air defence system of the IAF, integrated with the smallest unit on the ground, remains ever vigilant and ready to respond with alacrity. Military power and capability take years to build and develop, and crises do not come knocking to give a warning. The nature of airpower is such that nations cannot necessarily buy the airpower they need in good enough time when they need it.

The Indian government has resolutely displayed its will to act against state-sponsored terrorism in bringing the perpetrators of this heinous act to justice. The Indian Armed Forces, which responded in a measured and calibrated manner at the outset, has ensured that the ‘Integrated Air Defence’ put in place by the IAF and controlled by the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) responded in a manner that precluded any damage to IAF bases and cities by the attacks carried out by Pakistan. In addition, the retaliation to these attacks has been carried out by the IAF’s long-range weapons that have caused damage to military targets in Pakistan.

Nations chart their destinies through their polity and actions. Having eschewed violence post partition in 1947, India has emerged as a peaceful and progressive nation that is counted as a growing and responsible power in the comity of nations. Pakistan, on the other hand, has used state-sponsored terrorism as a policy through which it attempted to stymie India’s growth while using its geostrategic location as an advantage to curry favour from the West. While the jury is out on whether the chickens have finally come home to roost as far as terrorism is concerned in Pakistan, both India and Pakistan can ill afford to get drawn into a conflict that could simmer unabated. Intelligence failures have plagued India since Kargil, Pulwama, Doklam and Eastern Ladakh. Having taken a slew of measures since then to plug the gaps, the recent incident serves as a stark reminder that it is not enough, and India needs to take a hard look at the shortcomings within while simultaneously making attempts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.

Building military capability and capacity cannot be neglected, and efforts must continue unabated. The absence or lack of capacity of a national instrument of power cannot be offset by diplomacy or economic means. India’s predicament is unenviable to say the least, as far as its national security is concerned. A strong and capable military will  deter, and a united and cohesive national resolve to act will mitigate such threats from fructifying in the future. While the nation stands united in grief and anger, public sentiment should not get divided on communal lines, or else we would be playing into the hands of our adversary. India’s secular fabric, that is its innate strength, needs to be preserved and protected at all costs.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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