Author: Jayesh Khatu, Doctoral Candidate, Jawaharlal Nehru University
22 February 2022

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, West, Europe

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Keywords: Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, US and Indo-Pacific, India and Indo-Pacific.

After one year of taking office, the Biden administration’s much-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy was released on February 11^th, 2022,[1] amid the US’ foreign policy being entangled in the Ukraine crisis and East Asia. During many visits by senior government officials to the Indo-Pacific region, they indicated that the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy would focus on economic and strategic aspects to counter China’s economic and military dominance in the region.[2] China’s military challenge to the US has long been a concern for the US. However, the Covid-19 crisis has emboldened China’s economic stewardship in Southeast Asia, especially in the areas of the digital economy, supply chain management, foreign direct investments, and Covid induced assistance.

        The strategy document underlies the US’ committed focus on the Indo-Pacific region, allying to the concerns of the allies and partners of the US’s resilience against China through “integrated deterrence” and building strong partnerships with the regional countries, and its efforts to drive “Indo-Pacific [economic] prosperity” through trade, investments, and economic assistance. It “will be principled, long-term, and anchored in democratic resilience”. The US will rely on the strength of the “collective capacity” of its and the regional countries – five treaty allies and partners – especially the regional heavyweights of India, Australia, and Japan, which can be accrued through bilaterally as well as under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) partnership. The document uses the word “collective” eight times which include “collective capacity”, “collective efforts”, “collective strength”, collective action”, “collective military advantage”, “collective regional capabilities”, and “collective cybersecurity.” This signifies the increasing level of cooperative efforts between the US and the regional partners to promote peace and stability in the region. Instead of depending on the US’ sole material capability to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, it seeks the material capability of regional countries to contribute to regional security. It also shows that it is not the US’ unilateral vision enforcing upon the regional countries, rather the US attaches considerable importance to the choices of regional countries such as India’s strategic autonomy, Japan’s economic priority over security, ASEAN’s centrality in Asian multilateralism, and Australia’s balancing acts between the US and China.

Salient features

“Salient features” of the strategic document are:

• The geographical area of the Indo-Pacific region comprises four regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania, including the Pacific islands.

• The US sees two levels of challenge from China: global and regional. China seeks to challenge the US’ global supremacy by “combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power”. The US criticises China for much of the regional tensions “from the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbours in the East and South China Seas”.

• The thrust area of the US’ engagement with the region will be in a manner of “sustained and creative collaboration with allies, partners, and institutions, within the region and beyond it”, and consider them as “like-minded” partners.

• The US is trying to embark on its early post-war model of ‘security-prosperity’ concept to contain China, which tends to follow a unilateral and authoritarian style of leadership in the region. The ‘security-prosperity’ theory was rooted in democratic principles that had been propagated in Western Europe against Soviet communism in the post-war era.

• US’ engagement with the region is comprehensive in nature which includes maritime security, regional prosperity, disaster management, climate change, Covid-19 pandemic, non-proliferation issues, critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyberspace.

• It seeks to create a new “Indo-Pacific economic framework” based on the principles of aborted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) touted as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in which China is the dominant anchor.

• The US is committed to helping Indo-Pacific partners close the region’s infrastructure gap through the ‘Build Back Better World’ initiative and also with the G7 grouping. Build Back Better World was launched by President Biden in June 2021 as an “alternative to the BRI for the infrastructure development of low- and middle-income countries”.

• The US will enhance the deterrent capability in the Indo-Pacific through its mechanisms of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). The PDI is a new deterrence mechanism launched by the Biden administration to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities,[3] while the MSI is an Obama era approach that aims to “increase maritime security and maritime domain awareness of foreign countries along the South China Sea and into South Asia”.[4]

• In case any military alliances are needed to diffuse the crisis in the region, then the US might seek support largely from its traditional military partners such as NATO rather than creating a military coalition in the Indo-Pacific. The document explicitly states that the US will harness the capabilities of outside partners such as NATO to implement the US’ “initiatives” in the region.”

The Indo-Pacific has become a focus area in the US security strategy since the George W. Bush administration due to the pacing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Initially, the US pursued a policy of ‘engagement’ with China but later resorted to following strategic competition because the PRC used the benevolent environment to enhance its own power in the region, without considering the rights and interests of other countries in the region. China wants the US to strategically withdraw from East Asia and accept Chinese suzerainty in the region. It argues that the US has been an erstwhile power while China is the new great power; the former one will have to give way for the new one to rise without any contest. However, the US has a commitment to protect the sovereignty of as many as five countries (including Taiwan) through bilateral security treaties, so the US tries to counter China’s rise and seeks to embolden its deterrent mechanism to counter China. Also, the freedom of navigation rests on the US’s concept of global commons and takes responsibility to guarantee it.

        On the other hand, China is not just focusing on military superiority over the US in the western Pacific theatre but is also attempting to make sure that it is the leader in all areas, from trade to investment and to economic assistance, and upholds benevolent, and cultural superiority over others. The major challenge for the US is that hardly any country from the region is willing to take on China, as Beijing has ensured that the region is integrated with China. In this regard, the latest US strategic document attempts to give considerable care to the strategic dilemmas of the regional countries and tries to accommodate their vision of Indo-Pacific security.

India and the new strategic document

The document says, “We support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision”, suggesting Washington accords higher priority to place India in its vision for Indo-Pacific security. The US considers India a Major Defense Partner, a “leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean”, and supports India’s “role as a net security provider” in the Indian Ocean region. Washington recognises India’s military capabilities to ensure a stable Indian Ocean and expects an increased military contribution not only for Indian Ocean security but also for the larger Indo-Pacific under the Quad framework.

        The US plans to launch Quad Fellowship in 2022, and 100 students will be recruited for the first batch from the member countries to pursue graduate degrees in STEM fields in the United States, beginning in 2023. “The objective of the fellowship is for cutting-edge joint research in critical domains of science and technology, a key area in Quad’s emphasis to counter China’s advancement in new generation technologies. Gradually, India could become a partner of joint development of new defence systems under the US initiative”.

        The US has also termed India as the “driving force of the Quad, and an engine for regional growth and development,”[5] given New Delhi’s close association with the ASEAN countries and other like-minded US allies and partners. In short, the US expects India to assume regional leadership in the Indo-Pacific as most other partners are either militarily weak or dependent on the US for their own security.

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NOTES

[1] The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, February 12, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. Accessed on February 12, 2022.

[2] Takashi Nakano and Taisei Hoyama, “U.S. pushes for Indo-Pacific rules on digital trade, AI”, Nikkei Asia, November 18, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/U.S.-pushes-for-Indo-Pacific-rules-on-digital-trade-AI.  Accessed on February 12, 2022.

[3] Joseph Trevithick, “This Is The Pentagon’s $27 Billion Master Plan To Deter China In The Pacific”, The Drive, March 5, 2021. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39610/this-is-the-pentagons-27-billion-master-plan-to-deter-china-in-the-pacific . Accessed on February 12, 2022.

[4] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)”, Department of Defence, US Government. https://www.dsca.mil/section-1263-indo-pacific-maritime-security-initiative-msi . Accessed on February 13, 2022.

[5] PTI, “India driving force of Quad, says White House”, The Hindu, February 15, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-driving-force-of-quad-says-white-house/article65051307.ece . Accessed on February 16, 2022.

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Keywords: European Union, EU, Energy, Natural Gas, Russia.

The European Union (EU) is currently facing a major energy crunch. Having faced an exceptionally long, cold winter last year, EU has entered this year with unnaturally low storage of gas. Other factors that have contributed to EU’s energy problems include a drop in Russian supply, truncated domestic production, increased Asian demand and the issue of maintenance of French nuclear reactors. This has left EU to face a problem that not many had anticipated. With scepticism surrounding Russian troop withdrawal from the Ukrainian border, the impending geopolitical crisis has huge implications for EU’s energy security. Given the possibility of a major Russian offensive in Ukraine, EU’s dependence on Russian energy is alarming and has set EU to scramble for alternatives.

          Russia is an energy leviathan. It ranks second and third in the world’s production of natural gas and oil, respectively.[1] 35% of Europe’s natural gas comes from Russia.[2] According to Eurostat, Russia remained the largest supplier of oil and natural gas to EU in 2021.[3] The bulk of the natural gas supply comes through pipelines, namely Nord Stream directly to Germany, Yamal through Belarus and Poland to Germany, Druzba oil pipeline to Czechia and Hungary, Blue Stream and Turk Stream to Turkey. Not all countries in Europe get a direct supply from Russia. Europe’s gas markets are internally well connected as an effect of Russia’s energy disruption post 2009 and Crimean annexation in 2014. In 2019, more than 60 percent of imports from Russia were energy products. In 2020, Europe imported 167.7 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia of which, Germany bought the most, accounting for 56.3 billion cubic metres followed by Italy, with 19.7 billion, and the Netherlands, with 11.2 billion cubic metres.[4]  According to Eurostat, in 2019, EU’s dependency rate was equal to 61 percent, which means that more than half of  EU’s energy needs were met by net imports.[5] Russia, being the main supplier of crude oil, natural gas and solid fossil fuels, is now dictating EU’s energy discourse and constantly reminds EU of its dependence on it.

             Two situations could emerge from the above scenario. First, as a part of the greater west coalition against Russia, EU could take a hard military stand against the threat over Ukraine. This would have a direct impact on the energy issues in EU. Russia could sever its supply of energy in the face of a military standoff or imposed sanctions. Germany is the largest importer of oil from Russia thus giving it a priority in energy discussions with Russia. The controversial Nord Stream 2 project was completed in late 2021 but is not yet operational. Therefore, Germany has put forth the discussion about the continuation of Nord Stream 2. The pipeline is a joint project involving a consortium of Russian, German, Dutch, and French energy companies. If allowed to become operational, it will be able to pump 55 billion cubic metres of gas into Germany each year. The European consortium could either give permission for its full functionality, consequently giving Russia the ability to continue its weaponization of energy; it could also reject the project to show its anger. But this would also mean losing the project’s deterrent value.

         Second, EU could recognize and renegotiate the perimeter that Russia seeks and give in to the demands of Russia and its territorial aspirations in eastern Europe. This would likely set off a chain of events resulting in Russian impunity. Russia could use its energy dominance to further its political goals, wherein the crisis could go beyond Ukraine. Looking back, Russia has reduced its supply volume to the EU since the latter half of that year.[6] Russia is all set to weaponize EU’s dependency on itself.

           What is EU’s plan of action in such a crisis? EU has a three-step plan to avert the possibility of reaching a critically low level of gas supplies. The first two steps involve a voluntary reduction in consumption and the provision of alternate LNG supplies. EU and USA are jointly working towards a continued, adequate, and timely supply of natural gas from different sources around the globe to avoid supply shock.[7] US is already EU’s largest natural gas provider,[8] and in the face of such crisis there is only so much that the US could provide. US and EU have reached out to Qatar to consider the possibility of diverting gas supplies from Asia to EU in case of an escalation of the crisis.[9] The third step would have to be invoked in case of an emergency and could involve potential blackouts. In such a case, the priority would be to supply households with electricity since this receives legal protection under EU laws[10]. Also, non-commercial industrial estates have already agreed to a voluntary cut back on gas usage[11].

           A sanguine view of the situation would call it mildly problematic as it is highly unlikely that Russia would abruptly cut its supply through Ukraine to EU. Such an act would have mutual repercussions. By brusquely halting its supply, Russia would have to look for other, more substantial outlets for its gas consumption. Recently, Russia has agreed to a thirty-year supply contract to China via a new pipeline, which would bolster an energy alliance with Beijing amid the emerging issue in Russia-Europe geopolitical space.[12] In the long run, this would increase Russian dependence on China and would not be conducive to Russia’s growing ambitions in Asian geopolitics.

            EU’s green deal, launched in 2019, enunciates its plan for a carbon-neutral EU by 2050. This is envisaged through a framework of legislation and regulation aiming at a 50-55 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 level.[13] This is to be undertaken by slowly phasing out EU’s dependence on fossil fuels by eliminating the use of coal by 2030 and of oil and gas by 2050; an increased contribution from renewable energy sources is expected to complement these moves. Highly ambitious as it is, the current energy scenario does not support EU’s claim to carbon neutrality. In 2019, EU imported 320 billion euros worth of energy products.[14] In the subsequent years, it stood second in global crude oil imports.[15] While EU moves towards an ambitious embrace of carbon neutrality, its dependence on imports could hurt its energy security. EU urgently needs to reconfigure its energy security policies. The current trajectory of the international system points to an increase in the problems faced by EU as its energy policy moves towards an uncertain future.

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NOTES

[1] US energy information administration, https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/RUS, Accessed on January 30, 2022.

[2] Cathrin Schaer, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: how Europe may cope if Putin shuts off gas”, Al Jazeera,  https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/3/russia-ukraine-crisis-how-europe-may-cope-if-putin-shuts-off-gas, Accessed on February 5, 2022.

[3] Eurostat, “EU imports of energy products – recent developments,” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments, Accessed on February 5,2022.

[4] Cathrin Schaer, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: how Europe may cope if Putin shuts off gas”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/3/russia-ukraine-crisis-how-europe-may-cope-if-putin-shuts-off-gas, Accessed on February 5,2022.

[5] Eurostat, “From where do we import energy?,” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html, Accessed on February 6,2002.

[6] Sam Meredith, “Russia is pumping less natural gas to Europe as Nord stream 2 nears completion,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/24/russia-is-pumping-less-natural-gas-to-europe-as-nord-stream-2-nears-completion.html, Accessed on February 6,2022.

[7] Jamison Cocklin, “US Europe pledge cooperation on LNG supplies as Russia-Ukraine tensions continue,” Natural Gal Intel, http://www.naturalgasintel.com/u-s-europe-pledge-cooperation-on-lng-supplies-as-russia-ukraine-tensions-continue/, Accessed on February 6, 2022.

[8]“EU-U.S. LNG Trade,” European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/eu-us_lng_trade_folder.pdf, Accessed on January 28, 2022.

[9] Tim McNulty, “Europe US pleading Qatar to divert gas supplies from Asia in preparation for Russia war”, Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1559535/Europe-latest-US-Ukraine-invasion-EU-NATO-Joe-Biden-Qatar-gas-supplies-Russia-war-vn, Accessed on February 6, 2022

[10] “Consumerprotection inthe EU”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565904/EPRS_IDA(2015)565904_EN.pdf, Accessed on January 29, 2022.

[11] Cathrin Schaer, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: how Europe may cope if Putin shuts off gas”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/3/russia-ukraine-crisis-how-europe-may-cope-if-putin-shuts-off-gas, Accessed on February 5,2002.

[12] Euractive.com with Reuters, “Russia, China agree 30 year gas deal via new pipeline to settle in euros,” Euractive,  https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russia-china-agree-30-year-gas-deal-via-new-pipeline-to-settle-in-euros/, Accessed on February 6, 2002.

[13] Reporter, “What is the European green deal and will it really cost,” Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-and-will-it-really-cost-1tn, Accessed on February 8, 2022.

[14] Mark Leonard, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Jeremy Shapiro, Simone Tagliapietra and Guntram Wolff, “The geopolitics of European green deal,” European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-european-green-deal/, Accessed on February 8, 2022.

[15] “Leading global crude oil importers in 2020,” Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/240600/global-oil-importers-by-region-2011/#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20China%20alone%20imported,with%2012.6%20million%20daily%20barrels, Accessed on February 8, 2022.

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Keywords: AUKUS, Japan, Indo-Pacific, Australia, India.

In September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) came up with an enhanced trilateral security as well as defence partnership, known as the AUKUS. This agreement is established to deepen cooperation in the areas of security and defence capabilities through defence-related science, technology, supply chains and industrial bases. One of the fundamental ideas of this trilateral initiative is that the UK and the US would together provide Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) flotilla^[1]. The AUKUS nations possess a level of mutual trust which builds their cordial relations, and this further extends to the intelligence sharing through the ‘Five Eyes’ partnership and the high-end defence technologies as well^[2].

      Through AUKUS, Australia would be better equipped to diversify its cooperation in the areas of cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and undersea capabilities. This would further be useful for the wider Indo-Pacific region. US President Joe Biden said, “this pact is about investing in our greatest source of strength, our alliances, and updating them to better meet the threats of today and tomorrow”^[3]. The utmost priority for the US and other nations is to maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific amidst China’s belligerent behaviour. Furthermore, this trilateral agreement is an effective way for Britain to have a stance in the Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand, Beijing opposed the agreement by accusing the member countries of attempting to initiate an arms race in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan’s response to the AUKUS

Japan is a member of the Quad^[4] and has been excluded from the AUKUS trilateral arrangement, which has brought mixed responses from Tokyo. Japan’s response to this initiative has mostly been welcoming. This framework aims to increase Australia’s firm commitment to ensure peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, which is appreciated by Tokyo. The Australian SSNs are supposed to patrol the South China Sea, which would help the US to maintain the balance of power in line with China’s aggressiveness. This would further create opportunities for cooperation between Australia and Japan. Both nations signed a Defence agreement in January 2022, known as the ‘Reciprocal Access Agreement’ for cooperation between their militaries.^[5] It also aims at countering China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. This agreement further displays that Japan is willing to play a proactive role in the region.

        The AUKUS would strengthen the UK’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region through deployments of SSNs. Tokyo has been working towards strengthening its defence ties with the UK. Therefore, this would help in enhancing defence ties between Japan and the UK. However, Tokyo has not been very welcoming regarding the nuclear submarine deal per se. Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu said that the government “welcomes the launch of AUKUS in the sense of strengthening engagement [of those countries] in the Indo-Pacific region.”^[6] This implies that for Japan, diesel-electronic submarines are more feasible for patrolling the East China Sea than having SSNs. Australia’s SSNs are most likely to be integrated with that of the US in the South China Sea, which could undermine Japan’s role in the US strategy and operations in the region. Moreover, Australia is also about to become the world’s seventh nuclear submarine power, which would influence the security and non-proliferation thinking in Japan.

         In the current Japan-US alliance’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) plan, Japan has been working on its submarine fleet. The future ASW operations that would have greater missions with partners like Australia. Japan would be better equipped to possess nuclear submarines in the future. Australia’s capability in the ASW and medium to long-range strike capability means that it would be involved in the East Asian security dynamics, and Australia’s involvement would be desirable for Japan’s security in the Indo-Pacific region.

        Japan needs to work on sustaining the Free and Open Indo-Pacific together with the AUKUS by enhancing its national defence efforts. The leaders of Japan’s defence establishment should take the AUKUS as an opportunity to consider how to establish a similar arrangement with the US and its allies, which would include the UK and Australia. The Quad is already in place with rising enthusiasm among its member countries. Japan could perhaps work with the US and Australia to find ways for a security cooperation framework among the Quad member countries. Japan could help this initiative in other areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and cyber security for security and peace in the Indo-Pacific region.

         As far as India is concerned, it believes that AUKUS is provocative to China which could also destabilise the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean states. Since India and Japan are both vital partners of the Quad, they are content for Australia to receive nuclear submarine technology from the US and the UK. India also fears that the agreement may instigate Beijing to expand its military activities in the littorals and the Indian Ocean, which would be problematic for the Indo-Pacific region.

          AUKUS will serve as a vital arrangement for security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region that will be desirable for Japan and other countries in the world. Japan should envision its role in the Indo-Pacific region by partnering with Australia, South Korea and other like-minded countries. However, how AUKUS will take shape in the near future in stabilising the Indo-Pacific remains to be seen.

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NOTES

^[1] Andrea Moreschi, ‘AUKUS, strategic autonomy, and the future of the Indo-Pacific: A French perspective’, Observer Research Foundation, October 4, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/aukus-strategic-autonomy-and-the-future-of-the-indo-pacific/ (Accessed on February 5,2022)

^[2] Raghav Bikhchandani, ‘What is ‘Five Eyes’, the intelligence alliance US wants South Korea, India, Japan to be part of’, The Print, September 9,2021 https://theprint.in/world/what-is-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-us-wants-south-korea-india-japan-to-be-part-of/730475/ (Accessed on February 9, 2022)

^[3] White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS’,  September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/  (Accessed on February 5, 2022)

^[4] Lavina Lee, ‘Assessing the Quad: Prospects and limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for advancing Australia’s interests’, Lowy Institute, May 19, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/assessing-quad-prospects-and-limitations-quadrilateral-cooperation-advancing-australia (Accessed on February 9, 2022)

^[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), ‘ Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement’, January 6, 2022 https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page4e_001195.html (Accessed on February 6, 2022)

^[6] MOFA, ‘ Press Conference by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu’, September 21, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken25e_000038.html (Accessed on February 7, 2022)

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Keywords: Defence, Budget, India, Atmanirbharta, Indigenisation, MoD, Indian Army, IAF, Indian Navy, DRDO, DPSU.

India’s Finance Minister, Shrimati Nirmala Sitharaman, presented the annual budget for 2022-23 on February 01, 2022. ₹5.25 lakh crore ($70.23 billion) was allocated for military spending in this year’s budget. This year’s allocation saw an enhancement of ₹46,970 crore, or 9.82% compared to the Budget Estimates for 2021-22, which was ₹4.78 lakh crore ($63.9 billion). For the financial year 2020-21, the budget allocation was ₹4.71 lakh crore ($63.0 billion). This year, the defence allocation is 13.31% of the total union budget outlay of ₹39.45 lakh crore. The defence outlay is 2.03% of India’s projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2022-23. Defence allocations traditionally get accounted in four demands for grants: 1) Demand Number 19 – Civil Expenditure of Ministry of Defence (MoD); 2) Demand Number 20 – Defence Services Revenue Expenses; 3) Demand Number 21 – Defence Services Capital Outlay and 4) Demand Number 22 – Defence Pensions.

Figure 1. Defence expenditure in US$ billion (minus defence pensions)[1]

The total defence budget (excluding defence pensions) amounts to ₹4.05 lakh crore ($54.20 billion) (refer Figure 1). Of the total defence budget, ₹2.3 lakh crore ($30.7 billion) would be for revenue expenditure. The capital outlay was ₹1.52 lakh crore ($20.33 billion) for new acquisitions and, in turn, the modernisation of the armed forces. This was higher by 12.82% than the budget estimates (BE) for 2021-22, when it was ₹1.35 lakh crore ($18.05 billion). The special fact was that a sum of ₹1.03 lakh crore ($13.7 billion), or 68% of the defence capital budget, was to be spent for acquiring only locally produced weapons and systems. This would thus give a boost to the indigenous defence production sector. Another feature to promote the local private defence industry is that 25% of the defence R&D budget has been set aside to aid academia, startups, and private industry and encourage them to research and develop defence products and systems. Apart from that, ₹1.19 lakh crore ($15.9 billion) is earmarked for pensions.

       The Revised Estimates (RE) indicate that the armed forces spent over ₹21,000 crore beyond the budget allocations last year to make emergency purchases to cater for the face-off with China in Eastern Ladakh. This included the short-notice purchase of weapons and systems.

         Defence Minister Shri Rajnath Singh termed the budget ‘growth oriented’. In his tweet, he said that the budget would give a fillip to ‘Make in India’, boost demand & build capacities for a New India[2]. It would give further impetus to the modernisation of the Armed Forces and give a boost to border infrastructure and infrastructure for coastal security.

Modernisation and Indigenisation Push

The Capital outlays grew steadily since 2013-14 from ₹86,740 crore to ₹1.52 lakh crore ($20.36 billion) in 2022-23, implying a 76% increase. On the other hand, in the same period, the total defence budget, including defence pensions, has increased by 107.29%, from ₹2.53 lakh crore ($33.8 billion) in 2013-14 to ₹5.25 lakh crore ($70.23 billion) in 2022-23.

Figure 2. Capital Allocations (US Dollars)[3]

The general trend indicates that the thrust remains on an increased spend on modernisation and operational infrastructure and a specific push towards indigenisation, or ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’. The share of domestic defence purchases has been steadily growing, and this year has gone up to 68% vis-à-vis 64% in the previous year’s budget, amounting to ₹84,598 crore ($11.29 billion). Dedicated indigenous procurement allotments began being made three years back. Major amounts would go towards Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, Light Combat Helicopters (LCH), basic trainer HTT-40 aircraft, Arjun Mk-1A tanks, many missiles and other weapons.

Revenue Allocations

Figure 3. Revenue Budget in US Dollars[4]

At ₹2.3 lakh crore ($31.14 billion), the revenue budget for 2022-23 (Figure 3) has increased by around 10% compared to the revenue expenditure of 2021-22. More specifically, it is a nearly 10% increase for the Indian Army (IA), 8% for the Indian Navy (IN), and 7% for the Indian Air Force (IAF). The exact breakdown of revenue expenditure is in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Breakdown of revenue expenditure (US$ billion)[5]

Border and Installation Security

The Capital budget for organisations like the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) and the Directorate General Defence Estates (DGDE) also had a jump of 55.60% to ₹8,050 crore ($1.07 billion) this year. Most significantly, BRO gets ₹3,500 crore ($467 million), a 40% increase for infrastructure building for roads, tunnels, and bridges coming up mainly close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). ₹173.03 crore Capital budget is also provisioned for DGDE, which would be used for improving the boundary security of installations.

Maritime Security

Giving higher importance to maritime security, the Capital Budget of the IN has gone up by 44.53%, at ₹46,323 crore ($6.18 billion). Some of it will be spent on naval and island infrastructure in addition to platform acquisitions. The Capital budget of the Indian Coast Guard has gone up by 60.24% to ₹4,246 crore ($567 million). This will be used for acquiring ships, aircraft, and upgrading infrastructure and security networks.

Defence Industrial Eco System

The newly created seven Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) constituting the old Ordnance Factories (OF) have been allocated ₹1,310 crore ($175 million) for their modernisation. Additionally, ₹2,500 crore ($334 million) is set aside as an Emergency Authorization Fund. Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) gets ₹60 crore. This will support an improved environment for innovation and technology development by R&D institutes, academia, startups, and innovators. Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS) gets ₹23 crore to create an international standard testing infrastructure that can also be used by the private sector to boost indigenous defence and aerospace manufacturing. Defence R&D will be given much greater access to the private industry, startups and academia, and 25% of the defence R&D budget will be used for this purpose. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) will be encouraged between DRDO and private players. Private industry would also be supported for testing and certification through a nodal umbrella. Clearly, the thrust will be on self-reliant ‘Make in India’. Defence Minister Shri Rajnath Singh said that the budget was in line with the ‘Vocal for Local’ push. The president of the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM), Mr. SP Shukla, welcomed these initiatives.

Key Takeaways

IN and IAF are getting nearly 43% and 4% increases respectively, while the IA is getting a 12% reduction in their capital budgets. This indicates the trust towards greater reach and changing threat perception. Also, aviation and naval platforms are more technology-intensive and require greater obsolescence management.

       The Capital outlay for aircraft and aero-engines shows a nearly 50% reduction for IA and 21% and 7% for IAF and IN, respectively. In the previous year, both IN and IAF had actually spent more than their allocations under this code head. IA had spent nearly 69% less. A substantial allotment increase for IN indicates focus on the Indian Ocean and acquisitions of ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines. IA’s reduced allotment for aircraft related items would mean more concentration on their organic ground systems such as Main Battle Tanks, AK-203 rifles, amongst others. IAF’s Capital budget would perhaps be committed substantially to the committed liabilities of LCA, Rafale, and S-400 Triumf purchases. With the winding down of the OFs, the seven new DPSUs would have to be nurtured, and suitable allocations have been made to corporatize them.

       Duty rates have now been re-aligned to allow ‘Make-in-India’ to be preferred. A simplified customs tariff for some items like helicopters, some parts of aircraft, etc., will come into force on May 01, 2022. Similarly, some of the existing exemptions on the import of defence and security items will stop on March 31, 2023. There are also proposed changes to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) to make it friendlier for local manufacturers.

       Aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) gets a boost, and imports will be discouraged. Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) items will now get the highest priority. Dedicating 25% R&D allocation for institutions and private entities will bring competition and commitment and create indigenous technologies and intellectual property. The budget also puts greater pressure on Indian industry and defence PSUs to both invest and deliver. Capital outlays promote the modernisation of the armed forces, and they should help bridge the gap for all the services. Increased defence production will also open avenues for exports and amortise costs. It will also generate jobs and support the nation’s target of reaching a $5 trillion economy and ₹1,75,000 crore (US$25 billion) defence production by 2025.

     The new policies would promote industry and armed forces interaction and coordination, and confidence in domestically produced weapon systems. In the high technology areas, the foreign equipment manufacturers would be more inclined to form Joint-Ventures (JV) and bring in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Some of these JVs will also support defence exports. With defence manufacturing corridors already getting in place, clearly, the tone and tenor of the defence budget has been to make India a defence production hub.

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NOTES

[1] Graphics are from an Ernst and Young report authored by K. Ganesh Raj, Partner & National Leader – Aerospace & Defence, EY – India, February 01, 2022,  https://www.ey.com/en_in/alerts-hub/2022/02/budget-2022-defence-sector Accessed on 03 February 2022.

[2] Ministry of Defence, Union Budget 2022-23, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1794415 Accessed on 03 February 2022.

[3] n1

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

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Keywords:  Kishida, Diplomacy, FOIP, India, Japan, Supply Chain Resilience, Manufacturing, Advanced Technology, Defense.

Within months of securing an expectation-defying[1] victory for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in October 2021,[2] Kishida’s leadership was tested both domestically with the spread of the Omicron variant, and internationally with rapidly rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific. An old hand at foreign policy – as Japan’s longest-serving Foreign Minister under Abe’s cabinet – Kishida declared 2022 the year of “summit diplomacy” with a refocus on “deft handling of diplomatic and security issues” and the “establishment of a stable administration”.[3] Where will India – one of Japan’s closest partners in the region – figure in Kishida’s foreign policy manifesto and Indo-Pacific outlook?

Kishida in 2022: New-Era Realism Diplomacy

Thus far, Kishida’s foreign policy agenda has been overshadowed by urgent issues at home, as he failed to produce sufficient traction and visibility for his ‘new-era realism diplomacy’ owing to the rapid spread of the Omicron variant.[4] In 2022, Kishida has committed to boldly pursue an inclusive transformation of Japan’s economy and society through astute diplomacy on the international front. This includes a focus on three pillars: first, promoting universal values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law – which includes promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and outreach to its Northeast Asian neighborhood (South Korea and Russia); second, tackling global challenges like climate change, nuclear disarmament and the pandemic; and thirdly, resolutely protecting the lives and livelihoods of Japanese citizens.[5]

           Despite touting such a bold and forward-looking diplomatic agenda, Kishida has accorded only a modicum of focus to the Japan-India bilateral in his statements. Kishida has already met with Biden on the sidelines of the 26^th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26), and held a substantial virtual meeting on January 21, which point to US being a top priority for Kishida.[6] In contrast, since assuming leadership in October 2021, Kishida has interacted with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi only once in a 25-minute phone call where Modi congratulated him and both reaffirmed a desire to further strengthen ties.[7] Although Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar agreed to plans for Kishida to visit India,[8] although this has been halted as in-person diplomatic engagements took a hit amid the Omicron crisis.

         India barely gained a mention alongside (and in comparison to) Quad partners, the United States (US) and Australia, in Kishida’s address to Japan’s Diet in January 2022.[9] While he emphasized Tokyo’s plans to hold in-person talks with US President Biden to further reinforce their alliance as a “cornerstone” of Japanese diplomacy and security, and highlighted the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement as a significant upgrade to their defense cooperation, India only merited a passing reference as a Quad partner state; accordingly, in context of India, Kishida’s focus seems largely limited to Quad initiatives on vaccine assistance and high-quality infrastructure that form core areas of interest of the Quad.[10]

         To some extent, this complacency is prevalent because India and Japan already share a well-institutionalized relationship with ample synergy in the Indo-Pacific. Despite Kishida’s push for robust in-person diplomacy, determining a fixed agenda for face-to-face interactions between Tokyo and New Delhi has taken a back seat while Kishida remains occupied with domestic concerns. Kishida’s most pressing political challenge is perhaps ensuring domestic stability to avoid becoming a revolving-door leader, and while he prioritizes making favorable impressions as the LDP gears up for Upper House elections, his diplomatic front has lagged in focus. To champion his own policy agenda, Kishida – a party man through and through – will need to wait and see how much political capital he possesses post-election.[11]

New Areas for Cooperation

Over the past decade, under the personal camaraderie built between Modi and Abe, the two states have swiftly expanded their bilateral relationship into Asia’s most pivotal and fastest growing partnership. However, notwithstanding their progress in building an action-oriented partnership, it is vital that both states carefully and regularly nurture ties to successfully charter the uncertain regional geopolitics. There remain several nuanced gaps and missed opportunities between India and Japan to which both must accord attention. Over and above continued cooperation in infrastructure development (in India’s Northeast and third-country projects in the Bay of Bengal and Africa), and defense (with institutionalized dialogues and joint exercises), both states must pursue cooperation in four key areas in 2022.

Supply Chain Resilience

De-risking supply chains for instance has emerged as a key area for India-Japan cooperation through both bilateral and minilateral arrangements like the Quad and India-Japan-Australia-led Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). Here, cooperation with like-minded third partners like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea, Taiwan and the European Union (EU), and in critical areas (such as semiconductors, renewable energy and batteries) must be pursued.

Strengthening Industrial Competitiveness

Amid Japan’s slow but steady industrial chain exodus from China,[12] Japanese companies have quickly diversified to the highly competitive Southeast Asian region. However, in India, there are limited success stories of Japanese companies, pointing to a cultural gap that has hindered Japanese participation in India’s manufacturing sector. Now, with Japan’s subsidy support to firms shifting production out of China and to India, and India’s Production-Linked Incentive Scheme – that focusses extensively on areas like automotive, batteries and electronics (see Image 1) that are vital to electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing and therefore a core focus for Japan – immense cooperation that can be pursued in this area.

Image 1: Approved Outlays for India’s Production-Linked Incentive Scheme Source: Oxford Analytica Daily Brief[13]

Advanced Technologies

Apart from strengthening industrial competitiveness in the new sustainability-driven era, India and Japan need greater engagement in domains like Open-RAN networks[14] – which remains steeped in geopolitics but critical to cost-effective 5G development – and research and development on 6G (and its international standards). Japan and the US are already working in this direction under their Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) partnership,[15] while India has recently begun exploring the field independently with aims to launch locally by 2024.[16]

Defense

Security cooperation amid a shared China threat remains a bedrock of the India-Japan partnership. For instance, both countries accelerated air power cooperation by initiating joint air combat drills involving India’s Su-30 flanker fighter jets in “view of the China threat”; this marked a rare opportunity for Japan to get familiar with the basic capabilities of the Su-30 family, which could prove invaluable in both a close-range dogfight and long-range air-to-air combat.[17] However, beyond this, greater technical cooperation in co-development of weapon systems, including AI-driven sixth-generation aircrafts, as India plans to integrate sixth-generation technologies in its Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft Mark-2 (AMCA Mk2) variant, and Japan looks to develop engine demonstrators for sixth-generation fighters.[18] Additionally, India has much to gain from collaborating with Japan in ship-building – a strategic industry where Japan (and South Korea) hold significant expertise while India remains sorely lacking.[19]

Conclusion

With 2022 marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between New Delhi and Tokyo, the timing is opportune for both states to take another leap forward and elevate their ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’. While Kishida faces challenges abound on both the domestic and international fronts, New Delhi must take up the mantle and push for increased exchanges and cooperation with Tokyo. Only sustained collaborations can ensure that the India-Japan partnership emerges as a strategic and stable anchor in the Indo-Pacific and yields rich dividends.

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NOTES

[1] Sakura Murakami and Ju-min Park, “Japan’s Kishida defies expectations as ruling LDP easily keeps majority,” Reuters, November 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-votes-test-new-pm-kishida-political-stability-2021-10-30/. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[2] “Kishida’s LDP Retains Solid Majority in Lower House Election,” Japan Data, Nippon, November 1, 2021, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01141/. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[3] Fumio Kishida, “New Year’s Reflection by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio,” speech, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, January 1, 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202201/_00001.html. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[4] “Kishida struggling to achieve diplomatic visibility as omicron hampers travel,” The Japan Times, January 13, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/01/13/national/politics-diplomacy/kishida-diplomatic-policy-achievements-election/. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[5] Fumio Kishida, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to the 208^th Session of the Diet,” speech, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, January 17, 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202201/_00009.html. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[6] White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with Prime Minister Kishida of Japan,” press release, January 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/21/readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-prime-minister-kishida-of-japan/. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[7] “Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 8, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page1e_000360.html. Accessed February 1, 2022.

[8] “Japan, India to Arrange Kishida’s Visit,” Nippon, November 22, 2021, https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2021112200975/. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[9] Kishida, n. 5.

[10] White House, “Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” September 24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/#:~:text=We%20stand%20for%20the%20rule,with%20a%20range%20of%20partners. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[11] Michael Macarthur Bosack, “Understanding Kishida’s political landscape for 2022,” The Japan Times, January 12, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/01/12/commentary/japan-commentary/fumio-kishida-future/. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[12] Hemant Adlakha, “Japanese firms’ slow and steady exit is sounding alarm bells in Beijing,” Modern Diplomacy, September 21, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/21/japanese-firms-slow-and-steady-exit-is-sounding-alarm-bells-in-beijing/. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[13]“India: Production-Linked Incentive scheme,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, February 18, 2021, https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GI259643/India-Production-Linked-Incentive-scheme.

[14] Eugina Jordan, “Open RAN adoption accelerates in 2022 and beyond – a growing ecosystem,” RCR Wireless, December 30, 2021, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20211230/opinion/readerforum/open-ran-adoption-accelerates-in-2022-and-beyond-a-growing-ecosystem-reader-forum. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[15] White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership,” April 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/fact-sheet-u-s-japan-competitiveness-and-resilience-core-partnership/.  Accessed February 2, 2022.

[16] Juan Pedro Tomás, “India aims to launch locally developed 6G tech in 2024: report,” RCR Wireless, November 29, 2021, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20211129/5g/india-aims-launch-locally-developed-6g-tech-2024-report. Accessed February 2, 2022. Muntazir Abbas, “Government sets up multiple task force for 6G development,” The Economic Times, December 31, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/telecom/telecom-news/government-sets-up-multiple-task-forces-for-6g-development/articleshow/88618459.cms. Accessed February 2, 2022.

[17] These drills came as a progression of the India-Japan joint air exercise Shinyuu Maitri (held 2018 in Agra with focus on HADR, and 2019 in West Bengal with focus on joint mobility and tactical interoperability). See “Why is Japan keen on exercise with IAF Sukhoi fighters?,” The Week, August 25, 2021, https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2021/08/25/why-is-japan-keen-on-exercise-with-iaf-sukhoi-fighters.html. Accessed February 3, 2022.

[18] Andrew Chuter, “Britain and Japan join forces on next-generation fighter engine,” Defense News, December 22, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/12/22/britain-and-japan-join-forces-on-next-generation-fighter-engine/. Accessed February 3, 2022.

[19] Arun Prakash, “Shipbuilding is our maritime sector’s ‘missed opportunity’. It needs its own ministry,” The Print, July 23, 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/shipbuilding-is-our-maritime-sectors-missed-opportunity-it-needs-its-own-ministry/701101/.

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Keywords: West Asia, drone attack, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran.

On January 17, 2022, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) faced the deadliest drone attacks on its key oil storage facility of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) in the southwest part of Abu Dhabi and an under-construction area inside Abu Dhabi International Airport. Yemen’s Houthi rebels took the claim for this attack. The attack resulted in the killing of three people, including two Indians. This attack has brought to the forefront the security issue especially highlighting the fragility of the West Asian region. This attack comes two weeks after the Houthis hijacked the UAE’s Rwabee—a civilian cargo vessel. This further highlights the “dangerous escalation” in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf region. Even though the monetary and financial loss for the UAE after these attacks could have been negligible, it could have affected the Emirate’s peaceful stability and tourism. As per the inputs from the UAE’s security agencies, there were two low intensity attacks using small projectiles to target civilian infrastructures. This attack brings Iran back into the quagmire of this region’s already complicated sectarian issues. Iran is allegedly supporting the Houthi rebels, who took the claim for the attacks.

       In November 2021, the Saudi-led coalition along with the Emirati forces moved towards the Shabwa front. This coalition included the “Giants Brigades”—a militia supported by the UAE which is more systemized in comparison to other military units in this coalition. This, in a way, sought to redefine the rules of engagement in Yemen. Yemen has been wrecked by the civil war between the Houthis and Saudi-led forces with the aim of restoring the internationally recognized government. The UAE joined the Saudi military operations in Yemen in 2015 and has been deeply entangled in the conflict till 2019, when it announced the withdrawal of its forces. However, the UAE continues the presence of its support forces in Yemen, along with the Saudi-led forces.

Emerging West Asian Politics

West Asian politics is marred by the competition for power and influence among major regional nations and various non-state actors, which continues to shape the regional landscape. In this scenario, the nations are operating with a greater degree of assertiveness. Several West Asian nations are trying to reanalyze and reconstruct their inter-regional relations. This is visible in various probable rapprochements between various nations, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia or Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Iran. However, the pace remains slow as this is also linked to issues such as the economy, energy, and mutual security amongst nations. With the Taliban assuming power in Afghanistan and the hardliners coming to power in Iran—the regional political scenario is shifting.

          Definitely, oil plays a crucial role in regional geopolitics. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, oil prices have gradually increased. This could also be due to signs of tensions in the oil market and persistent uncertainties about Russian intervention in Ukraine. The looming threat of a Russian-led incursion has further deteriorated the West Asian security scenario, leading to an increase in oil prices. The UAE is the third-largest oil-producing member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), producing more than 4 million barrels of oil per day. The ADNOC controls oil operations in Abu Dhabi. In such a scenario, the attack on Emirati oil facilities could be destructive to the fragile regional balance. In 2018, the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack in the UAE during the time when the Emirati forces moved further and nearly seized the port city of Hodeidah before the UN intervention.

          In terms of preparing for such kinds of attacks, West Asian nations such as Iran and Turkey have been mounting up their production or acquisition of weaponized drones. These can be utilized both for-profit through sales as well as for regional influence. The risk of military drone attacks in the region is fast increasing with the easy conversion of agricultural drones to weaponized drones. Various Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations are gearing up to integrate the risks associated with drone attacks in their national defense policies. In retaliation to the January 2022 drone attack, the Saudi coalition forces have declared that they have launched airstrikes targeting the capital city of Sana’a. Saudi coalition forces conducted strikes against the Houthi strongholds and camps in Sana’a.

Why Drone Attacks?

Drones are fast becoming the ‘weapons of choice’ for various non-state actors or terrorist organizations. In terms of cost and technology, the use of drones for such kinds of attacks has unmatched benefits. Drones offer a much cheaper attack option without the need for physical presence for carrying out the attack, along with providing the much-needed visibility for carrying out an attack. For this reason, various terrorist organizations and non-state actors are utilizing drone attacks as the new tool for fifth-generation warfare, with obvious advantages. Furthermore, their ability to go undetected by even the most sophisticated air defense systems in possession of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE—namely the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air defense system is making them the better ‘weapons of choice.’ Also, the target chosen by the Houthis is highly volatile. With the requirement of only some kind of high-temperature starters can cause the fire to burn fuel, sometimes for days, which can be economically drastic for the victim nation. So, it can be said that through these attacks, the Houthi rebels wanted to convey the message to one of the most important members of the Saudi-coalition[1] forces fighting against them in Yemen.

          The escalation in attacks conducted by the Houthis in the past few years is their strategic choice to make it a ‘costly affair,’ for the regional actors and gain international attention. Previously, such kinds of attacks were mainly limited to the maritime region or civilian infrastructures in the Najran and Jizan provinces of Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich provinces of the Kingdom were seldom targeted. However, this did not deter the Kingdom from toning down its attack on Houthi installations. In fact, Saudi-led coalition has also sieged the Houthi-controlled city of Sana’a and Hodeida port city, in a way restricting the Houthis. So, it can be said that the attacks on the UAE are apparently in response to Emirate’s quest to secure the oil rich city of Marib which the Houthis were trying to capture.

Effects on India

India has strongly condemned the UAE drone attacks in violation of international law. Furthermore, India has underlined the fact that such attacks can definitely alter the status quo in the unstable West Asian region. However, there remain the lessons that India needs to learn from these attacks considering that it faces two hostile neighbours and some of its significant industrial installations are along the coastal regions. The physical inability of India to keep track of inimical elements in international waters makes it imperative for New Delhi to strive for a multilayer strategy to safeguard its strategic industrial installations. In these terms, counter-drone solutions have become the much-desired option for nations to prepare against such attacks.[2]

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NOTES

[1] Saudi Coalition includes nations such as the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Egypt. These are supported by the US, Britain, France and other Western nations by weapons, logistics and intelligence support to the Saudi coalition.

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