Keywords: Indus Waters Treaty, Hydroelectric Power Project, Court of Arbitration, Graded Mechanism of Dispute Settlement.

With India insisting that Pakistan revise the agreement on how the waters of the six rivers that make up the Indus Basin are shared, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has entered choppy waters. While there have been disagreements, in the past, regarding the sharing of water, this time the dispute resolution process itself is under question. The step to give Pakistan notice and ask for a response within 90 days is a significant move that could result in the unravelling and renegotiation of the water-sharing agreement. The treaty is frequently regarded as a unique illustration of the India-Pakistan consensus during a period when the two countries had ceased their commerce, cultural, and most bilateral talks.

Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty

On September 19, 1960, India and Pakistan signed the IWT following more than nine years of negotiations, brokered by the World Bank.[1] The Indus River system encompasses the Beas, Ravi, Sutlej, Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum. The treaty primarily established and regulated the rights and obligations of both countries for the use of the water from these rivers. When the agreement was signed, a framework for communication and collaboration between the two countries was outlined in the treaty. The Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, collectively known as the ‘three eastern rivers,’ have been ceded to India under the terms of the treaty.[2] While Pakistan was given jurisdiction over the three western rivers- Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum. Of the entire water carried by the Indus system, India receives roughly 20 per cent while Pakistan receives 80 per cent.[3] According to the treaty, India is permitted to utilise the western river waters for unrestricted non-consumptive uses, including power generation, navigation, fish farming, and others, as well as limited agricultural usage.[4]

Why is India seeking to revise Indus Waters Treaty?

On January 25, the Indian side delivered the ‘notice for revision’ of the treaty via the two sides’ respective Indus Waters Commissioners. India has always been a steadfast supporter and a responsible partner in executing the IWT in law and spirit. India was forced to issue a notice of amendment due to Pakistan’s adamant stance on the treaty.[5] India said that the notification was sent in response to Pakistan’s ongoing ‘intransigence’ in carrying out the terms of the treaty by repeatedly objecting to the development of hydroelectric projects on the Indian side.[6] The notice for amendment is intended to give Pakistan the chance to engage in intergovernmental consultations within 90 days to address the significant IWT breach. Additionally, via this process, the treaty will be updated to reflect the lessons learnt during the previous 62 years.[7] The notice was given in accordance with Article XII (3) of the treaty, which reads: “The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments”.[8]

India is requesting changes to the IWT that are likely to address concerns with the agreement’s dispute resolution process. The notice appears to be a result of the long-running conflict over two hydroelectric power projects that India is constructing; one on the Chenab and the other on the Kishanganga river, a tributary of the Jhelum.[9] However, the Indian projects are of run-of-the-river nature, hence it doesn’t violate the reservoir provision of the treaty. Though the dispute settlement procedures outlined in the treaty have been used numerous times in response to Pakistan’s objections to these projects, but no resolution has been found. Pakistan has expressed worries about the design of the Indian dams, which are intended to generate electricity, and has accused India of infringing the treaty by allegedly obstructing the flow of the rivers that supply water for 80 per cent of its irrigated crops.[10] These accusations have been refuted by India. India has instead charged Pakistan with abusing and even breaching dispute settlement provisions set forth in the treaty.[11]

The mechanism for resolving conflicts is outlined in Article IX of the treaty and is divided into three categories: questions, disagreements, and disputes.[12] The agreement includes a graded mechanism to deal with such matters; ‘questions’ are handled by the two Indus Waters Commissioners, ‘differences’ are settled by a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank, and ‘disputes’ are brought before the Court of Arbitration, a seven-member arbitral tribunal whose chair is also appointed by the World Bank. Pakistan requested the appointment of a neutral expert in 2015 to address its concerns with the two hydropower projects, but unilaterally withdrew that request in 2016 and asked for a Court of Arbitration instead. India submitted a separate application, requesting the appointment of a neutral expert, which is a lower level of the dispute resolution process provided in the treaty. India maintained that Pakistan’s bid for a Court of Arbitration breached the treaty’s graded mechanism of dispute settlement. Consequently, the arbitrator’s chair and a neutral expert were both chosen by the World Bank in 2016. However, both processes were put on ‘hold’ by the World Bank in 2016, but this was lifted at Pakistan’s request in March 2022, and work on them has since resumed. The World Bank terminated the parallel processes in 2016, citing the possibility of inconsistent results that would jeopardize the pact itself.[13] On February 3, however, the World Bank announced that it was allowing the two distinct processes to proceed concurrently. Despite the best efforts of all parties concerned over the years, the World Bank believes that the treaty itself is at risk because no satisfactory solution has been found. It has consequently decided to resume the two distinct processes that Pakistan and India have both sought. However, India has maintained that having two concurrent dispute-resolution procedures is against the terms of the treaty and that the World Bank is not in a position to interpret the treaty.[14] India has constantly raised the prospect that the two processes could result in conflicting decisions, which could create an unusual and legally untenable situation. India has therefore been forced to submit a notice of modification of the treaty due to this infringement of the IWT requirements.

Further, India has significant technical and legal grounds to ask for treaty amendments. Despite being a thorough document that addressed almost every aspect of dam construction and water usage, the IWT’s letter has started to diverge from its original intent. Many of the technical requirements outlined in the treaty no longer follow its spirit, which was to promote collaboration between India and Pakistan and ensure the best possible use of water resources in the Indus River basin. The treaty was established decades ago, therefore it is not designed to account for the development of hydropower plants using new techniques, technologies, and studies that extend their lifespan and efficiency.[15] More crucially, Pakistan has utilised the treaty to escalate disagreements over designs to the level of disputes rather than working to resolve any such disagreements, which India claims adhere to the treaty’s stipulations. This causes the Indian projects to be delayed, raising their costs and jeopardising their techno-economic sustainability.

India has issued a notice regarding its intent to modify the IWT. However, it remains to be seen if Pakistan is willing to engage in negotiations to amend the treaty or if it will revert to its old tactics and increasingly deteriorating strategy of impeding any action by India.

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Notes:-

[1] Basudha Das, “Indus Waters Treaty: India issues fresh notice to Pakistan for modification in water-sharing deal,” Business Today, January 27, 2023, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/world/story/indus-waters-treaty-india-issues-fresh-notice-to-pakistan-for-modification-in-water-sharing-deal-367796-2023-01-27 . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[2]“The Indus Waters Treaty 1960”, Ministry of Jal Shakti, https://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/sites/default/files/INDUS%20WATERS%20TREATY.pdf . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “India issues notice to Pakistan to modify Indus Waters Treaty”, Hindustan Times, January 28, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-issues-notice-to-pakistan-to-modify-indus-waters-treaty-101674839706437.html . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[6] Suhasini Haider and Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India sends notice to Pakistan to amend 1960 Indus Water Treaty,” The Hindu, January 27, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-notifies-pakistan-on-modification-of-indus-waters-treaty/article66438780.ece . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ministry of Jal Shakti, n. 2.

[9] Harikishan Sharma and Amitabh Sinha, “The Indus Waters Treaty, and why India has issued notice to Pakistan seeking changes”, The Indian Express, January 28, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-pakistan-notice-indus-waters-treaty-8408109/ . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[10] Nachiket Deuskar, “Explainer: Why India wants to modify the Indus Water Treaty after 62 Years”, Scroll, February 8, 2023, https://scroll.in/article/1043303/explained-why-india-wants-to-modify-the-indus-water-treaty-after-62-years . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[11] Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s looming water war”, Project Syndicate, February 16, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-pakistan-indus-waters-treaty-renegotiation-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-02 . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[12] Ministry of Jal Shakti, n. 2.

[13] “World Bank Declares Pause to Protect Indus Waters Treaty”, The World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/12/12/world-bank-declares-pause-protect-indus-water-treaty . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

[14] Nachiket Deuskar, n. 11.

[15] Sushant Sareen, “Indus Waters Treaty: Opening the water front”, Observer Research Foundation, January 28, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indus-waters-treaty/ . Accessed on February 20, 2023.

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Keywords: Japan, Philippines, China, Indo-Pacific, Defence, Brahmos.

Introduction

As tensions in Asia rise due to China’s expanding influence, the leaders of Japan and the Philippines have decided to significantly strengthen their defence ties, giving Japanese troops greater access to Philippine territory.[1] In a recent move towards cooperation, the two island nations have made the first move in what may develop into a comprehensive defensive partnership. The rising regional tensions and China gaining influential in the region is a certain cause for this development. During his visit to Japan, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. had a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and discussed ways to restrain China’s expanding geopolitical sway in the area. A proposed agreement that would allow the armed forces of the two countries to work together to respond to disasters was signed by both leaders. This action is widely regarded as a first step towards a deal that would allow the deployment of military units on one another’s soil.

The China Factor 

The South China Sea territorial disputes, which are intensifying as a result of China’s increasing assertiveness and the rivalry between the claimant states over resources, heavily involve the Philippines and Japan as key players in blocking the ambitions of China.[2] The seething maritime conflict between Beijing and Manila is becoming more and more linked to the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States and its allies. The Spratly Islands and the surrounding sea, including the Scarborough Shoal, a small group of rocks and reefs located more than 200 km west of Luzon, the largest and most populous island of the Philippines, are the main source of dispute in the claim between China and the Philippines.[3] The greatest threat to Philippine maritime sovereignty continues to come from China’s ‘grey zone operations,’ which are measured seaborne actions that don’t involve live fire but are still meant to intimidate rivals. In the past, the Philippines has adopted a more practical strategy that avoids confronting China in the hopes of gaining economic advantages, as opposed to relying on international law as a defence against China’s claims. However, it does not seem to have reaped the benefits that were expected by the Philippine government.

The US Factor 

For more than ten years, China has vehemently asserted its claim to the majority of the South China Sea (SCS) as its sovereign territory, within the so-called nine-dash line.[4] Invading the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has recognized the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the foundation for resolving disputes in 2020. This was majorly due to the collective diplomatic efforts of these four nations. Despite the projected threats from China, the US continues to support these four nations with security assistance, cooperate with them, and hold multilateral joint exercises with their armed forces.[5] China intends to use force against US military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations in China’s EEZ.

The strategic importance of the Philippines to both China and the United States can be attributed to its geographic location. The archipelago forms an essential part of what is frequently referred to as the ‘first island chain,’ which defines China’s near sea. It is situated between a section of China’s coast and access to the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the Philippines is an important participant in the geopolitical conflict taking place in the area. It is likely to continue to support Washington’s forward presence in the South China Sea for the US Indo-Pacific strategy. In 2014, a mutual security cooperation agreement between the United States and the Philippines called the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed. This increased opportunities for bilateral training and modernisation between U.S. forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[6] The US Defence Secretary, during his recent visit to the Philippines, announced US plans to accelerate the full implementation of EDCA. The Philippines also agreed to designate four new locations towards military cooperation with the US. The Philippines needs its US ally for domestic defence as it struggles to defend itself and its EEZ and is enhancing its defence ties with the US.

Japan-Philippines and Philippines-India Defence Ties

Japan and the Philippines both support the established rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and are natural and vital partners for each other. Given that both frequently find themselves on the receiving end of Beijing’s power projection and strategic manoeuvres in the South and East China Seas, Manila and Tokyo also perceive a rising and more assertive China as a major threat.[7] Therefore, defence cooperation is an essential component of the strategic alliance between the Philippines and Japan. The ‘2+2 joint statement’ between Japan and the Philippines expresses their agreement to improve their overall defence relationship through the fusion of defence capabilities, visits by the navy, and the transfer of defence hardware. A Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and other agreements that would provide a legal foundation for granting Japan’s Self-Defence Forces and the Philippine armed forces reciprocal access are also confirmed, with an eye towards conducting joint exercises. As per this recent important defence pact, Japanese troops would be able to participate in training exercises to deal with issues relating to natural disasters and humanitarian needs in the Philippines. In addition, the renewed agreement with the US under the EDCA could pave the way for stronger cooperation and more frequent interactions between the militaries of the US, Japan, and the Philippines.

The Philippines and India formally commenced diplomatic relations on November 26, 1949, not long after both nations gained independence. India’s ‘Look East policy,’ a key tenet of its foreign policy, has led to closer ties with the Philippines in the area on a bilateral and regional level. The stage appears to be set for a dramatic intensification of bilateral relations, especially given recent developments in the Philippines.[8] During External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s first visit to the archipelago, India and the Philippines vowed to increase their security and defence cooperation and to forge a closer alliance under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework with a focus on China.[9] The visit took place barely a month after Manila signed a US $374 million contract with BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited (BAPL), giving India its first export order for BrahMos missiles. The BrahMos deal represented a decisive step in the Philippines’ integration into India’s strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

Way Forward

The burgeoning momentum in Japan-Philippines relations is not only positive news for both nations but also indicates that more opportunities can be fully exploited in the near future. Placing Japan’s relations first, will not only allow the Philippines to improve its domestic manufacturing capacity but will also serve as a proactive platform to expand Manila’s centrality and diplomatic networks in light of the geopolitical changes taking place in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the Philippines can gain from a potential easing of restrictions on technology transfers to support its ongoing military modernisation program at a time when Japan is also looking to strengthen and promote its arms industry. The Japanese Foreign Ministry will also receive roughly US $15.2 million in April to support the defences of allies in the Indo-Pacific. Manila can effectively take advantage of such an initiative. It is now time for major players in the Indo-Pacific, including the US, India, and Japan, to increase proactive defence cooperation measures and once more demonstrate their credibility in the defence and security realms to like-minded nations in Southeast Asia, given that nations like the Philippines in the ASEAN have started to push back against China.

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Notes:-

[1] Julian Ryall, “As Japan and Philippines seek closer defence ties, could trilateral pact with US be next?”, South China Morning Post, February 15, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3210189/japan-and-philippines-seek-closer-defence-ties-could-trilateral-pact-us-be-next. Accessed on February 20, 2023

[2] “The Philippines’ Dilemma: How to Manage Tensions in the South China Sea”, International Crisis Group, December 02, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/316-philippines-dilemma-how-manage-tensions-south-china-sea. Accessed on February 20, 2023

[3] Ibid

[4] Stephen Burgess , “Confronting China’s Maritime Expansion in the South China Sea”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/31/2002488087/-1/-1/1/BURGESS.PDF. Accessed on February 20, 2023

[5] Ibid

[6] Premesha Saha, “Reinvigorating United States-Philippines Defence Partnership”, ORF, February 06, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/reinvigorating-united-states-philippines-defence-partnership/. Accessed on February 20, 2023

[7] “Deterring China Should Be a Common Defense Goal of Japan and the Philippines”, Japan Forward, April 19, 2022, https://japan-forward.com/editorial-deterring-china-should-be-a-common-defense-goal-of-japan-and-the-philippines/. Accessed on February 21, 2023

[8] “India-Philippines Bilateral Relations”, Embassy of India, Manila, December 2013,  https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Philippines__December_2013_.pdf. Accessed on February 21, 2023

[9] Nayanima Basu, “India, Philippines vow to expand defence ties & Indo-Pacific partnership on Jaishankar’s visit”, The Print, February 15, 2022, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-philippines-vow-to-expand-defence-ties-indo-pacific-partnership-on-jaishankars-visit/832873/. Accessed on February 21, 2023

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General Anil Chauhan PVSM UYSM AVSM SM VSM, CDS (Left to Right): Air Mshl Anil Chopra (Retd), Air Vice Mshl Anil Golani, Gp Capt AK Chordia (Retd), Wg Cdr SP Singh, Col SK Tanwar, Air Cmde SP Singh (Retd), Air Mshl KK Nohwar (Retd) and Gp Capt A. Pandey (Retd)

The post CAPS’s New Journal ‘Blue Yonder’ Released by the Chief of Defence Staff appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Neha Mishra, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
21 February 2023

Keywords: REE Deposits; EuRare; Mineral Self-Sufficiency; Carbon Neutral

The post REE Self-Sufficiency of THE European Union appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle, AGNI-I, DRDO, MoD.

Introduction

On January 27, 2023, India tested the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) for the third time.[1] The HSTDV is a missile powered by a scramjet engine. It has a speed of Mach 6. The program is in charge of the DRDO. As per the Ministry of Defence (MoD) statement in 2020, the HSTDV is basically a hypersonic cruise missile.[2] Hypersonic cruise missiles are missiles that are very difficult to detect because they have the capability to maintain high speeds (Mach 6-10) at low altitudes, while being manoeuvrable.

Understanding the Origin of Hypersonic Flight

The first time a missile flew faster than Mach 5 was on February 24, 1949. This missile was an old V-2 rocket, which had been mounted with a WAC Corporal second-stage rocket. Its launch was conducted from White Sands, a proving ground in New Mexico.[3] It achieved a high speed of 5150 miles per hour while it entered back into the atmosphere. With the 1950s setting in, intercontinental ballistic missiles were flying at speeds of Mach 25. The speed was noted when the nose cones were tested for entry. In the 1950s, special focus was given by the US to hypersonic glide vehicle development, but at that point in time, the technology had not matured enough. By the beginning of the 21^st century, countries like Russia and China started working on hypersonic weapons with higher determination than ever before.

On April 12, 1961, Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin[4] became the first human being to go around the Earth in the form of an orbit. Hence, he experienced a hypersonic flight at Mach 25 while the entry phase was on. By the end of 1961, the X-15 hypersonic research aircraft had, for the first time, exceeded Mach 5 during its flight.[5] X-15 was only for research purposes; it was not intended to have warfighting abilities. So, it basically collected data to support the design of future combat vehicles.[6] During 1969 and the 1970s, the Apollo lunar-return vehicles reached a speed of Mach 36 while entering the Earth’s atmosphere. In India, scientists developed the re-entry vehicles of AGNI-I, which entered back into Earth at hypersonic speeds of Mach 12.[7] The AGNI-I was successfully tested in May 1989.[8]

Technological Attributes of HSTDV 

In 2019, the DRDO tested the HSTDV for the first time.[9] VK Saraswat, the former DRDO chief, had said in 2008 that demonstrating the performance of scramjet engines at an altitude of 15-20 km was the aim.[10] Saraswat had also predicted in 2008 that under this project, we would develop a hypersonic missile powered by a scramjet engine.[11]

A scramjet engine is defined as an engine conducting combustion inside a ramjet engine at supersonic speeds. Similar to a ramjet engine, a scramjet engine carries the fuel in the missile, it uses air for oxidization, and then compresses the air forcefully, which comes into the intake at supersonic speed (before it enters the combustion chamber). It is important to highlight that the ramjet engine slows down the velocity of air to subsonic velocities (speeds less than 340 m/s) before combustion takes place; on the other hand, the airflow in a scramjet is supersonic from the start till the end. Therefore, the engine only starts after the hypersonic missile is released at a certain speed. For example, on June 12, 2019, the AGNI-I in the form of a booster rocket carried the HSTDV. DRDO in a statement said[12] that the “missile was launched successfully” and that the data collected would be used to “validate critical technologies”. In another test on September 7, 2020, India tested the scramjet-powered HSTDV.[13] After sustained combustion at hypersonic speeds for 20 seconds, the hypersonic cruise vehicle achieved a velocity of 2 km per second. According to the MoD statement, “the critical events like fuel injection and auto ignition of scramjet demonstrated technological maturity”. According to the MoD, the scramjet engine performed exactly as per textbook knowledge.[14]

Conclusion

A missile of this nature will compress the observe, orient, decide, act loop of India’s adversaries, giving them little time to react. It is not possible to intercept this missile, as no credible technology has yet been developed worldwide for intercepting hypersonic missiles. Radar can detect these hypersonic missiles, but only when the missile is about to reach its intended target. So current command and control systems across the world are unable to track it in order to scrutinize data for intercepting it. Due to the high speeds of a hypersonic missile, a plasma cloud is created due to air pressure in the front section of the missile. This absorbs all radio waves, making it untraceable by radar systems.

As of now, India’s HSTDV is going through the rigours of testing. It is too early to predict when it comes to what form of deterrence the HSTDV would take vis-à-vis the two nuclear-armed adversaries of India. This is because it is unknown whether or not the HSTDV will be a conventional-tipped or a nuclear-tipped missile. However, it is clear that this hypersonic cruise missile would be a game-changer for India.

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Notes:-

[1] Ujjwal Shrotryia, “India Tests Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle; Here’s Everything We Know About It”, Swarajya, January 27, 2023, https://swarajyamag.com/defence/india-conducts-second-test-of-hypersonic-technology-demonstrator-vehicle Accessed on February 11, 2023.

[2] “DRDO successfully flight tests Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle”, PIB–Ministry of Defence, September 7, 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1651956 Accessed on February 11, 2023.

[3] “Stop Saying Hypersonic Missiles Can’t be Killed Because They Are Mach 5 Fast”, 1945, July 28, 2022, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/stop-saying-hypersonic-missiles-cant-be-killed-because-they-are-mach-5-fast/ Accessed on February 12, 2023.

[4] “Yuri Gagarin: First Man in Space”, NASA, April 13, 2011, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/sts1/gagarin_anniversary.html Accessed on February 12, 2023.

[5] W.D. Kay, “The X-15 Hypersonic Flight Research Program: Politics and Permutations at NASA”, NASA, https://www.history.nasa.gov/SP-4219/Chapter6.html Accessed on February 12, 2023.

[6] Nicholas Michael Sambaluk, “The Other Space Race”, Naval Institute Press, 2015, Page 88.

[7] APJ Abdul Kalam with Arun Tiwari, “Wings Of Fire”, Universities Press, 1999, Page 138.

[8] Ibid, Page 151

[9] Snehesh Alex Philip, “DRDO test-fires futuristic missile test, but its success is in doubt”, The Print, June 12, 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/drdo-test-fires-futuristic-missile-tech-but-its-success-is-in-doubt/249386/ Accessed on February 11, 2023.

[10] T.S. Subramanian, “DRDO developing hypersonic missile”, The Hindu, May 9, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080513092221/http://www.hindu.com/2008/05/09/stories/2008050955301300.htm Accessed on February 12, 2023.

[11] Ibid

[12] Philip, n9.

[13] PIB, n2.

[14] Ibid

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Keywords: Technology, Strategic Partnership, Defense Cooperation.

The United States (US) and India believe that their shared democratic ideals and respect for all human rights should guide how technology is invented, developed, managed, and exploited. Keeping this particular objective in mind, the two countries have managed to establish a ‘strategic partnership’ in the Indo-Pacific region.[1] This Indo-US partnership was echoed in the commitment President Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi made, when they agreed to establish the ‘Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies’ (ICTE).[2] The US and India are working closely to cooperate over technological and defence partnerships. This is aimed at containing China from posing itself as a leader of global technological initiatives and paving the way for its hegemonic status in the world. The actual realization of this commitment occurred on January 30, 2023, with a roundtable conference.

Scheme of the Initiative 

The event comes at a crucial juncture as President Biden recently asked India to reduce its dependence on Russian defence exports.[3] A weak show of Russian military prowess in Ukraine also nudged India to diversify the source of its military equipment. Through a standing mechanism under ICTE, the US and India reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate in addressing concerns relating to regulatory impediments, corporate mobility, and talent mobility in both countries. To deepen and expand the technology partnership, India and the US launched new initiatives in the fields of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, defence, space, and other areas crucial to developing a robust innovation ecosystem between the countries. The agreements will serve as a test to see if the Biden administration can implement its plan for “friend-shoring,” or moving the production of some key elements to friendly nations.[4] The persistent reliance of the US on China for semiconductors, telecom components, and other vital items has raised concerns from officials in the Biden administration. They have tightened restrictions on the export of cutting-edge semiconductor technology to China in recent months in a bid to halt the sector. The White House claims that semiconductors may give China a strategic advantage in the future.

Creating a new bilateral defence industrial collaboration roadmap with a primary focus on investigating projects connected to jet engines, munition-related technologies, and other systems to enhance technical collaboration between the two countries for joint development and manufacture. Recently, General Electric submitted a request to the US for permission to co-produce jet engines that might power Indian-operated and produced jet aircraft. The nations also committed to stepping up their efforts to help launch and produce a variety of defence technology, such as artillery systems, jet engines, and armoured infantry vehicles. The US pledges to consider this application as soon as possible, improving long-term research and development collaboration with a focus on discovering operational use cases for maritime security and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and establishing a new ‘Innovation Bridge’ to link military start-ups between the US and India.

The broadening of the semiconductor supply chain is another component of the program. This issue has become more serious as a result of Chinese threats against Taiwan, which controls the majority of the world’s supply of high-tech semiconductors. The Government of India Semiconductor Mission is a member of a task force established by the US Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in collaboration with the India Electronics Semiconductor Association (IESA) to develop a ‘readiness assessment’ to identify short-term commercial opportunities and enable the longer-term corporate strategy of supplementary semiconductor ecosystems.[5]

The initiative also takes into account the strengthening of space cooperation between both nations. It hopes to enhance collaboration in human spaceflight, notably by creating partnerships that will involve NASA Johnson Space Center and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and provide extensive training for astronauts. It also aspires to find creative ways for the two countries’ business sectors to work together, particularly concerning initiatives connected to NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) project. To develop this project, NASA and ISRO will bring together American CLPS companies and Indian aerospace companies within the next year.

Way Ahead for India

For many years, technology has been at the heart of the U.S.-India relationship. It was a major cause of conflict starting in the middle of the 1970s when export restrictions were put in place by the US following an Indian nuclear test explosion. However, in more recent years, technology cooperation—including a landmark civil nuclear agreement reached in 2006—has fuelled stronger ties between the US and India. The recent geopolitical environment and post-pandemic recovery of world economic growth came as a potential benefit for India. However, finding the manufacturing space and experienced staff that many businesses would require to shift their supply chains out of China has proven to be a challenge. However, India has a highly qualified labour population and a leadership that wants to increase foreign investment. Global corporations are looking to set up shop in the subcontinent but continue to lament the country’s strict rules, poor infrastructure, and other obstacles. In light of these calculations, the India-US technological partnership has come at a significant moment.

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Notes:-

[1] Mahrukh Khan, “Growing India-US Strategic Cooperation: An Analysis.” Strategic Studies, vol. 37, no. 4, 2017, pp. 97–117. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48537574. Accessed on February 1, 2023.

[2] “FACT SHEET: United States and India Elevate Strategic Partnership with the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET),” White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/31/fact-sheet-united-states-and-india-elevate-strategic-partnership-with-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology-icet/ Accessed on February 1, 2023.

[3] Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Peter Martin, “US seeks to reduce India’s dependence on Russian weapons with arms-aid package,” The Print, May 18, 2022, https://theprint.in/world/us-seeks-to-reduce-indias-dependence-on-russian-weapons-with-arms-aid-package/960496/ Accessed on January 31, 2023.

[4]Alexander Benard, “What America’s Plan to Bring Home Technology Manufacturing Gets Wrong,” Foreign Policy, September 29, 2022,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/29/us-china-technology-it-supply-chains-manufacturing-decoupling-reshoring-friend-shoring-chips-act/ Accessed on January 31, 2023.

[5] “US Semiconductor Industry Association signs MoU with IESA,” Times of India, April 12, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/gadgets-news/us-semiconductor-industry-association-signs-mou-with-iesa/articleshow/90806998.cms. Accessed on February 1, 2023.

The post The Objectives of the ‘Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology’ Conference appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Indian Budget, Green Growth, Renewable Energy, Electric Vehicles.

India’s economy is the fifth largest in the world. However, India is severely depleting its mineral, water, and fossil fuel resources to achieve its growing needs. This ongoing depletion of natural resources can have severe negative effects on both the economy and the environment. Therefore, environmental sustainability is not just a growing need but is a must. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated at the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) that India needs US $1 trillion in climate financing to support its goals. That’s because it’s an investment in the future of humanity as a whole, one that will pay off in more ways than climate-related progress.[1]

Keeping this goal in mind, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced ‘Green Growth’ as one of the seven priorities, or saptarishi in this year’s budget. She promised a spate of initiatives for “Green Growth” in an effort to lessen the country’s reliance on fossil fuels, advance the country’s clean energy goals, and create a significant number of green jobs. She said India is working toward net-zero carbon emissions by 2070 to start a green industrial and economic transition. Green fuel, green farming, green transportation, green buildings, and green equipment are all part of a set of initiatives.[2]

Budget-Promised Green Growth Initiatives

 As part of the green growth priority, six initiatives have been announced:

• National Green Hydrogen Mission with an outlay of ₹19,700 crore to help the country “take technical and market leadership in this new industry,” lessen its reliance on imported fossil fuels, and speed up the transition to a low-carbon intensity economy.

• Energy transition will be accelerated with a capital investment of ₹35,000 crores.

• Sustainable development will be advanced by providing funds for a battery energy storage system of 4,000 MWh.

• Building an interstate transmission infrastructure for grid integration and renewable energy evacuation will cost ₹20,700 crores, of which ₹8,300 crores will come from central funding.

• Launch of PM Program for Restoration, Awareness, Nourishment and Amelioration of Mother Earth (PM-PRANAM) will incentivize states and UTs to advance their transition to a green economy.

• ‘Green Credit Program’ and scrapping of old vehicles.[3]

Green Transportation in India

Among other aspects, special focus was given to improving green initiatives in the transportation sector. The ‘Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles’ (FAME) scheme has been allocated ₹5,700 crore in the current budget, which is a huge increase from its initial phase financing of ₹359 crore in 2015.[4]

Two factors have fueled India’s transition to electric vehicles (EVs): (1) the quantity of renewable energy sources and (2) the accessibility of skilled labour in the manufacturing and technological industries. The FAME scheme was launched in two phases: FAME-I in 2015 and FAME-II in 2019 as part of the National Electric Mobility Mission Plan (NEMMP), which the government announced in 2015.[5] Due to issues with technology, materials, and the market, FAME-I failed. However, FAME-II was soon put into place for a period of three years. It emphasised the building of EV production infrastructure and demand through incentives for buying EVs and hybrid cars. As part of FAME-II, in cities with a population of ten lakh, charging stations will be put in place every 25 kilometres. To assist the NEMMP, about 14 states have been pushing EVs. The Indian government introduced the ‘Charging Infrastructure for EVs’ plan in 2018 with reference to the updated Electricity Act, 2003, which took effect on January 14, 2022. The infrastructure regulation aims to ensure dependable and economical charging infrastructure and an associated ecosystem to speed up EV adoption.[6]

The Central Electricity Regulation, which was adopted in 2019 for the distribution and generation of resources, has helped make the plan for an EV infrastructure more feasible. According to the Centre for Energy Finance figures, EV sales are anticipated to surpass 15 million by 2030.

At the COP26 meeting, India unveiled the e-Accelerated E-Mobility Revolution for India’s Transportation portal, or the e-AMRIT portal, as a one-stop resource for all information on EVs. According to the webpage, EV regulations have helped India reduce 191.5 kg of CO₂ and have resulted in 7.96 lakh registered EVs, 25+ states with EV policies, 380 EV manufacturers, 1800 EV charging stations, and 380 EV manufacturers. The portal also credited Ola Electric Mobility, Mahindra Electric, Tata Motors, and Ather Energy as the top EV manufacturers in India.[7]

India’s Green Growth Potential

India’s renewable energy and green growth ambitions have been guided by the four Cs: commitment, co-benefits, cost, and capital.[8] Nevertheless, the factors that can sustain its green growth and complement the ‘four key Cs’ are:

a)   Job creation: According to a study published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), India’s transition to a net-zero economy may result in the creation of nearly 50 million new jobs and a US $15 trillion contribution. In order to show its continuous commitment to solar energy harvesting and ecological sustainability, the Indian government had set goals for developing 175 gigawatts of renewable capacity by 2022nd 450 gigawatts by 2030. By October 2022, the reported renewable capacity was 165.94 gigawatts.[9] Renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and geothermal are ideally suited for an industrialising nation like India. Due to the steadily falling price of solar panels, solar power has appeared to be a promising choice in India for a number of years. According to a research by the Council on Energy, Environment, and Water and the Natural Resources Defense Council, India’s wind and solar energy sectors currently employ 111,400 people. The solar industry makes up around 77 per cent of these jobs, and those in the wind industry make up the remaining 23 per cent.[10]

b)  Focus on rare earth elements (REE) and increase the investment in it. Switching from non-renewable to renewable energy sources will increase the efficiency of EVs. REE enter the picture as a result of this shift’s requirement. Different battery types, including Li-metal (V), Li-ion (Mn, Ni, and Co), NaNiCI, NiMH (AB2 and AB5), NiCd, and PbA, are used in EVs. These batteries use metals or combinations of metals that could be in short supply, including lithium, nickel, cobalt, vanadium, cadmium, lead, and mixed metals (rare earth elements). In addition to help improve clean and emission-free electricity generation, REEs can be used to make EVs. Neodymium magnets (NdFeB) are used for cars’ motors, speakers, doors, and windows. Europium and Yttrium are used in fluorescent powders for lightning in EVs. Lanthanum and cerium are utilised as power sources in hybrid EVs and as battery electrodes in nickel-metal hybrid batteries.[11] In a nutshell, REEs can give EV technologies vital functionality and sustainable mobility.

The aforementioned issues should be addressed with the budget funds allotted in order to promote India’s green growth and long-term economic viability.

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Notes:-

[1] Mihir Swarup Sharma, “The Four Cs of India’s Green Growth”, ORF, January 26 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-four-cs-of-indias-green-growth/. Accessed on 1 February 2023.

[2] “Budget 2023 | What are the Centre’s initiatives for ‘Green Growth’ and energy transition? The Hindu, February 1 2023.https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/budget-2023-energy-transition-carbon-reduction-policies/article66457760.ece. Accessed on 1 February 2023.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ministry of Heavy Industries, ‘FAME I”, (2019), https://fame2.heavyindustries.gov.in/content/english/15_1_FAMEI.aspx. Accessed on 1 February 2023.

[5] ‘Electric Vehicle’, Ministry of Power,  https://powermin.gov.in/en/content/electric-vehicle. Accessed on 2 February 2023.

[6] “Charging Infrastructure for Electric Vehicles (EV)- the revised consolidated guidelines & standards”, Ministry of Power(2022),https://powermin.gov.in/sites/default/files/webform/notices/Final_Consolidated_EVCI_Guidelines_January_2022_with_ANNEXURES.pdf. Accessed on 2 February 2023.

[7] “E-Mobility at a Glance”, E-AMRIT Portal, https://e-amrit.niti.gov.in/home.  Accessed on 2 February 2023.

[8] Sharma, n.1

[9] Economic Times, “India achieves 166GW of renewable energy capacity till October”, December 8, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-achieves-166gw-of-renewable-energy-capacity-till-october/articleshow/96086130.cms. Accessed on 3 February 2023.

[10] CEEW, NRDC, and SCGJ, India’s Expanding Clean Energy Workforce: Opportunities in the Solar and Wind Energy Sectors, January 2022, https://img.saurenergy.com/2022/01/ceew-green-jobs-report-2022.pdf.Accessed on 3 February 2023.

[11] Xiang Yang Li, Jian-Ping Ge, Wei-Qiang Chen, Peng Wang. 2019. “Scenarios of Rare Earth Elements demand driven by automotive electrification in China: 2018-2030.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling Vol.145, 322-331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.02.003. Accessed on 3 February 2023.

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Keywords: M1 Abrams, Leopard2 Tanks, Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Military Aid, Defence Strategy.

The US has recently approved a battalion of 31 M1-Abrams tanks to be sent to Ukraine to help increase its offensive capabilities in the conflict with Russia.[1] The tanks play a unique and important role in the overall conflict, as they possess certain specifications that make them different from the other combat vehicles. For instance, the installation of new laser rangefinder technology, colour cameras, and advanced meteorological sensors.[2] Indeed, if the tanks are used after extensive training, they might help reshape the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, these specialised tanks require high maintenance and experienced personnel to perform efficiently.

The US is sceptical about whether Ukraine will engage in training campaigns for operating those tanks.[3] However, it has been noticed earlier that Ukraine’s military has shown its capability to acquire western weapons, especially through rapid training and efficient usage of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).[4] Therefore, it will be a boon for Ukraine if it properly carries out its responsibilities with the aid provided.

In addition, there are other M-88 recovery vehicles that are included in the aid package from the US to Ukraine. It has been observed that the announcement that came from the US was followed by months of requests from Ukraine officials. The requests were made in order to give a boost to their defences amid the war with Russia. President Joe Biden to diplomatically explain the US’s action with Ukraine in time of need by claiming that it is “helping Ukraine defend to protect Ukrainian land.”[5] However, it is in the best interest of the US not to start a war with Russia and to play strategically against it.

On the other hand, it is clearly noticeable that around 105 western tanks are sanctioned to be sent to Ukraine. The United Kingdom, for example, pledged 14 Challenger-2 tanks; Poland is prepared to send 14 Leopard-2 tanks; and France may provide an unspecified number of tanks to Ukraine. However, Germany seems to be lagging behind in showing the level of cooperation compared to the other countries. Germany should strategically and naturally show its aid-providing nature towards Ukraine on humanitarian grounds and not under any pressure.[6] But it is also understandable, as after being a belligerent party to two of the deadliest wars in history, Germany has not really experienced a full-blown war and hence is not used to such tactics.

As far as the tanks are concerned, it seems that Ukraine has a strategy planned already to secure enough ground for their own territory using the Abrams. The technicalities of Abrams will ensure that they contribute to the ambitions and aims of Ukraine. It contains not only thick armour, a 120mm M256 Smoothbore cannon, and an advanced targeting system with a lot of technical developments, but also automatic stabilisers that allow the gun to stay locked on targets, even when the tank is going through rough terrain.[7] The smoke grenades on the sides of the tanks are an additional benefit for the weapon system to hide during combat. The viewports are designed in such a way that it makes it easier for the commander of the tank to have a 360  view. Named after General Creighton Abrams, a World War II hero, it first entered combat in 1991 in the Gulf War. The tanks are not only used by the US but are also sold to countries such as Australia (M1A1), Egypt (M1A1), Kuwait (M1A2), and Saudi Arabia (M1A2).[8]

These tanks will be crucial decision-makers in Ukraine’s current war, as they will provide a modern element on the battlefield. However, looking at it from the western perspective, it seems that the delivery of the tanks is a move to expand the conflict, and it is sort of risking the confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia.[9] Shedding light on this topic, it seems that western tanks are outperforming the Russian tanks, at least technically. The number of tanks being sent from different countries is less than what was expected from Ukraine, and this might not be a stage that actually leads to radically changing the direction of the war as such. Moreover, the Russians’ deployment of anti-tank missile systems gives them the capability to destroy tanks and other armoured vehicles with laser-guided missiles. Therefore, it also predicts Russia’s preparedness for the war, perhaps not only with Ukraine but also with the West.

Considering the increasing number of weapon systems, there is a high possibility that the conflict might reshape in the future. Time is another factor that will play quite an essential role in shaping the conflict since the Abrams will take months to reach Ukrainian grounds; however, until that time, European tanks might contribute to the overall conflict. It remains to be seen whether the entire scenario will devolve into a world war.

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Notes:-

[1] Nandita Bose and Steve Holland, et. al, “In change of course, U.S. agrees to send 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine”, Reuters, January 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/reversal-us-agrees-send-31-abrams-tanks-ukraine-2023-01-25/ , accessed on January 27, 2023.

[2] Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army M1 Abrams Vs.  Russia’s T-14 Armata”, Warrior Maven, January 24, 2023, https://warriormaven.com/russia-ukraine/abrams-t-14-armata-tanks , accessed on February 03, 2023.

[3] Olivia Baker, “What You Need to Know About the M1 Abrams Tank Headed to Ukraine”, Observer, January 26, 2023, https://observer.com/2023/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-m1-abrams-tank-headed-to-ukraine/ , accessed on January 27, 2023.

[4] Sanya Mansoor, “Why U.S. HIMARS Rockets Are Becoming Increasingly Decisive for Ukraine”, Time, January 05, 2023, https://time.com/6244479/himars-rockets-ukraine-russia/ , accessed on January 27, 2023.

[5] Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on Continued Support for Ukraine”, White House, January 25, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/01/25/remarks-by-president-biden-on-continued-support-for-ukraine/ , accessed on January 27, 2023.

[6]  Lauren Kent and Mick Krever, et. al, “Germany set to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, Der Spiegel reports”, CNN, January 25, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/24/europe/germany-leopard-2-tanks-ukraine-announcement-intl/index.html , accessed on January 27, 2023.

[7] Tara Copp and Lolita Baldor, “What you need to know about the Abrams tanks bound for Ukraine”, PBS, January 25, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-abrams-tanks-bound-for-ukraine , accessed on January 28, 2023.

[8] Gabriel B. Collins, “The M1 Abrams Is the Right Tank for the Job in Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, January 24, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/24/m1-abrams-tank-ukraine-germany-russia-invasion-leopard/ , accessed on January 28, 2023.

[9] Brad Lendon, “Ukraine’s new tanks won’t be the instant game-changer some expect”, CNN, January 27, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/27/europe/ukraine-war-nato-tanks-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html , accessed on January 28, 2023.

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Keywords: North Korea; Nuclear Law; Missile Tests.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea formally promulgated its nuclear weapons policy on September 8, 2022. After conducting a string of nuclear weapons and missile tests, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un announced the decision at the 7^th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly[1] (SPA) to make the country’s nuclear weapons a permanent fixture and not up for ‘bargaining.’[2] This marked the move towards the irreversible status of the country as a nuclear-weapon state and ended any speculation of negotiations relating to denuclearisation.

The announcement came ahead of the 74^th founding anniversary of North Korea, where the North Korean Supremo announced the country’s status as a “responsible nuclear weapon state.”[3] He reiterated that nuclear weapons capability is essential for “defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and fundamental interests of the state, preventing a war on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia, and ensuring the strategic stability of the world.”[4] This law could be put into effect if Pyongyang feels a nuclear assault is imminent and that dangers to its survival or its nuclear forces’ command structure exist. The current law gives North Korea’s 2013 declaration of nuclear weapons status a lasting effect, a crucial move following the ‘North Korean Crisis of 2017.’

Prior to this development, at the 6^th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Worker’s Party held in early 2021, there were deliberations on testing, expansion of the missile and nuclear arsenal (including ICBMs), and modernisation of the weaponry within five years to attain quick counter-strike capacity.[5] There was also mention of developing tactical nuclear weapons and accelerating the progress of a military satellite for intelligence-gathering purposes. Further, the need to regularly update the nuclear arsenal to meet the changing nature of international threats also figured prominently.

Highlights of the Nuclear Law of the DPRK

The primary rationale behind sustaining the nuclear weapons capability of North Korea is to possess a functional deterrence mechanism against hostile states that might intend to start a “war on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia,”[6] as well as destabilise the international security structure. North Korea has constantly proclaimed to possess a wide range of nuclear weapons and weapon-delivery systems, including a robust command and control system. The principle of last resort has been applicable regarding the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear posture of North Korea is to be at a regular level of readiness, which lets it be prepared to respond to any emergency security situation. It is noted that North Korea has kept the option of using its nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive manner in the event of an ensuing strategic threat and failure of the country’s existing deterrence mechanism.

By pledging not to target any nation without nuclear weapons, transfer nuclear weapons, relevant technology and equipment, or nuclear substances with the potential to use as weapons, North Korea maintained its commitment to upholding the non-proliferation standards. This demonstrated Kim Jong-un’s willingness to present North Korea as a responsible nuclear-armed state. This is further encapsulated in the nuclear strategy document, which mentions the resolve to maintain the safety and security of the country’s nuclear facilities in accordance with national regulations and management systems instead of compliance with an international regulation under the 2013 nuclear weapons law.[7]

Reactions

In his speech to the SPA, at the unveiling of the country’s nuclear weapons policy, Kim Jong-un stated that the primary goal of the country’s nuclear programme was to successfully deter threats from countries like the United States. Several responses subsequently came about as a result of the publication of North Korea’s nuclear policy. On the one hand, North Korea had positioned itself as a responsible nuclear weapon state, but the discussion on any steps toward denuclearisation has come to a stop. Furthermore, following the publication of its nuclear policy statement, North Korea increased the frequency of its missile testing, resulting in more significant nuclear and military concerns in the area.

North Korea’s updated nuclear policy has raised national security concerns in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea, which are its immediate neighbours. 2022 has seen the highest number of missile test since the 2017 North Korean missile crisis, including “Korea’s short- and medium-range systems comprising a host of artillery and short-range rockets, including its legacy Scud-based and No-Dong missiles.”[8] In addition, it has made progress towards developing its long-range missile program, such as the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This has gone hand-in-hand with strides in developing its space program. The numerous missile tests were considered to have come as a response to the US-South Korea military exercise Vigilant Storm, which worked on bolstering regional interoperability. In the recently released 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States that came out in October 2022, North Korea has been mentioned as a persistent threat[9] to itself and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, along with it being “a target for the US nuclear weapon planning.”[10] This is because the close allies of the US in the northeast Asian region, such as Japan and South Korea, appear to be within the targeting range of the majority of the North Korean missile launches. On October 3, 2022, North Korea fired “an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Hwasong-12, over the Japanese archipelago into the Pacific Ocean”[11] and fired another ICBM in November near Japanese waters that had the range to reach mainland US territories. North Korea has threatened to expand its nuclear and missile arsenals further. Additionally, the belief by the North Korean regime that it can use tactical nuclear weapons to target South Korea to leverage a limited nuclear conflict is misplaced and has the potential to spiral down to a full-blown nuclear conflict.

Consequently, the South Korean government has started discussing plans to work towards being self-reliant for nuclear deterrence purposes, which might imply “the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons, to NATO-style nuclear-sharing programs, to the acquisition of nuclear latency.”[12] According to US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, to sustain its commitment to extended deterrence towards its allies in the region, the US has deployed the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan for the military exercise mentioned earlier. There were also suggestions to restart the dialogues between Japan, South Korea, and the US on trilateral security cooperation and information-sharing, which had been suspended earlier because of rising tensions between Japan and South Korea.[13]

Furthermore, the South Korean government, after being driven up the wall by the nuclear threats from North Korea’s testing and developing advanced missiles and nuclear program,  had contemplated acquiring tactical nuclear weapons.[14] However, as South Korea is a signatory to the NPT, it would be a violation of the treaty to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, President Yoon Suk Yeol has proposed that US tactical nuclear weapons be moved to the peninsula or that South Korea get its own nuclear arsenal.[15] But President Biden responded negatively when Yoon claimed that Seoul and Washington were talking about conducting joint nuclear exercises. Yoon, meanwhile, insisted he has complete confidence in the US’ extended deterrence in an interview with The Wall Street Journal on the outskirts of Davos.[16]

These events have dashed the hopes of a diplomatic dialogue between North Korea and the South Korea. North Korea has openly stated its disinterest in maintaining diplomatic relations with the Yoon Suk-Yeol government of South Korea. Meanwhile, the US, the United Kingdom, France, Albania, Norway, and Ireland had called for a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting on October 5, 2022,[17] to deliberate on the issue of unprecedented North Korean weapon launches. However, given the Russia-Ukraine ongoing conflict and China’s belligerent behaviour and weapon modernisation, the move was blocked by Russia and China, with the rationale that it might further alleviate tensions in the region. It is believed that Pyongyang is attempting to bandwagon diplomatically with China and Russia to balance the presence of the United States in the area.[18]

Thus, the ship appears to have set sail with the intention of diplomatically persuading North Korea to denuclearise. However, Kim’s strategic vision for the nation is demonstrated by preparations to test yet another nuclear weapon as well as grow and improve the country’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Rather, renewed efforts must be made to prevent the North Korean government from engaging in proliferative behaviour with other non-nuclear states.

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Notes:-

[1] Mitch Shin, “With New Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, North Korea Says its Nuclear Status is ‘Irreversible’”, The Diplomat, September 9, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/with-new-law-on-nuclear-forces-policy-north-korea-says-its-nuclear-status-is-irreversible/. Accessed 10 January 2023.

[2] “North Korea makes Nuclear Weapon Policy ‘Irreversible’”, Nikkei Asia, September 9, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-makes-nuclear-weapons-policy-irreversible,\. Accessed January 10, 2023. INVALID LINK

[3] “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated”, KCNA Watch, September 9, 2022, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662687258-950776986/law-on-dprks-policy-on-nuclear-forces-promulgated/, Accessed 12 January 2023.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hyonhee Shin, “North Korea’s Kim unveils new military goals at key party meeting -KCNA,” Reuters, December 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-unveils-new-military-goals-key-party-meeting-kcna-2022-12-28/. Accessed January 14, 2023.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Jun Bong-guen, “Comparing North Korea’s Nuclear Forces Policy Laws,” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, November 21, 2022, https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/comparing-north-koreas-law-on-nuclear-forces-policy-2022-with-the-law-on-consolidating-the-position-of-nuclear-weapons-state-2013, Accessed January 14, 2023.

[8] Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified November 22, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. Accessed January 15, 2023.

[9] “2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF . Accessed 25 November 2022.

[10] Josh Smith, “New North Korea Law Outlines Nuclear Arms Use, Including Pre-emptive Strikes,” Reuters, September 9, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-passes-law-declaring-itself-nuclear-weapons-state-kcna-2022-09-08/. Accessed 2 December 2022.

[11] Victor Cha, Ellen Kim, and Andy Lim, “North Korea Tests Missile over Japan,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 5, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-tests-missile-over-japan-0. Accessed January 15, 2023.

[12] Bong-guen, n. 7

[13] Joe Gould, “US, South Korea to Extend Military Drills After North Korean Launches,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/11/03/us-south-korea-to-extend-military-drills-after-north-korean-launches/. Accessed January 16, 2023.

[14] Choe Sang-Hun, “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option”, The New York Times, Janaury 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html. Accessed Janaury 20, 2023.

[15] Paula Hancocks, “Why are South Koreans losing faith in America’s nuclear umbrella?”, CNN, January 21, 2023,  https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/21/asia/us-nuclear-umbrella-south-korea-analysis-intl-hnk-dst/index.html. Accessed Janaury 22, 2023.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Lim, n. 11

[18] Shin, n. 1

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