Keywords: Space, Foreign Direct Investment, Technology, ISRO.

Space has been the centre of a lot of developments recently, both at the technological level and at the administration front. The government announced 100 per cent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the satellites sector,^[1] aligning with the Indian Space Policy 2023, which aimed to attract investments, encourage private participation, and accelerate the space ambitions of the nation. The direct effect of this was seen in the rise of space stocks by up to 7 per cent^[2], but there are further implications. The size of the global launch market will grow five times, with an estimated worth of US $47.3 billion by 2032, which would significantly improve India’s position in the space economy, which is only 2 per cent of the total global estimates.^[3]

The space sector in India has increased by 77 per cent between 2021 and 2022, and there are nearly 190 new space start-ups. This indicates the untapped potential that the space domain has. The estimates of IN-SPACe project that the Indian space economy has the potential to reach US $44 billion in the next ten years, which is currently at US $8.4 billion. This growth is possible with the changed FDI norms as it allows big companies to invest freely and explore new technologies. It will also facilitate the transfer of modern technologies and put India’s private sector on the path of more self-reliance. Moreover, Indian industries would have better opportunities to integrate into the global space industry, allowing them to be more competitive and market-oriented.

The ‘Make in India’ campaign, along with the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative, is expected to benefit as there will be more manufacturing facilities in the country, promoting domestic production. In addition, it would resolve the issues that the government faced in the space domain. It will bring both funds and talent and address the issue of brain drain. In the year 2023 alone, the private sector invested US $12.5 billion in space companies globally.^[4] Moreover, satellite manufacturing and launch are the most sought-after domains by the private sector. They account for 84 per cent of all the infrastructural investment made in space. The reason for this is the available markets for satellites and the increased installation of small satellites by companies. There is also a constant demand for launch services from governments.

The main ways through which space companies acquire capital include private venture funds, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), internal investment, spin-offs and partnerships. Space companies are best positioned to use the capital inflow to accelerate innovation and facilitate growth. Furthermore, it would also open new avenues in space tourism, a domain that is afresh and has plenty of scope for development. Countries like UAE, Japan and Luxembourg are even considering establishing a legal framework that secures the private rights over resources mined in space.

At present, there are numerous private sector initiatives shining in space, and the majority of them are from the United States. The list entails SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk, which has set the trend for private sector in the space domain. Their list of achievements includes launching reusable rockets and project Starship to facilitate interplanetary travel. Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin also focuses on tourism in suborbital space with the aim of making space accessible to all. Their New Shepard rocket completed numerous crewed flights successfully. Virgin Galactic by Richard Branson is also working on a similar space flight for tourists and is heading towards commercial operations. Apart from exploring space tourism, companies like Bigelow Aerospace are deploying expandable modules in LEO that could serve as space habitats in the future. In addition, ventures like Rocket Lab are specialising in launching payloads into orbit through their Electron rocket. This has allowed small satellites to access space. Likewise, Firefly Aerospace makes small and medium lift launch vehicles, which is in sync with industrial demands. Other firms like OneWeb are launching satellites that provide global internet coverage through a constellation of LEO satellites, while Relativity Space is aiming to revolutionise space by inducting 3D-printed rockets, which would significantly bring down the costs of such missions. Planet Labs is also focusing on creating real-time imagery for a range of applications, including disaster monitoring, agriculture, and forestry.^[5] They are operating a large constellation of Earth imaging satellites for the same. These companies are just the tip of the iceberg, signalling the tremendous scope and potential that the private sector in space has and the ways in which it can be beneficial for India.

Indian space companies that are already pursuing these goals include Skyroot Aerospace, which was the first start-up to partner with ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation). ISRO also granted them access to their facilities and provided them with expertise to test subsystems and launch vehicles^[6]. Dhruva Space is India’s first private space-tech company. They offer scalable, modular satellite platforms for various missions in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and beyond. Meanwhile, companies like Agnikul are working on building Small Satellite Launch Vehicles (SSLVs) that can carry payloads to space. Their approach emphasises simplicity and cost-effectiveness. Bellatrix Aerospace is focusing on developing green propulsion systems for satellites and launch vehicles. Their innovations aim to make space travel more sustainable and efficient. The increased ray of opportunities and ways to collaborate with ISRO is a win-win situation for both sides.

Apart from giving India a technological edge, these private sector companies are also set to change the political landscape of India, both domestically and globally. Domestically, more companies will be able to cooperate and compete with global partners, and that will allow them to function efficiently. On the global front, this move put India in the same spot as major spacefaring nations. While it will bring more FDI to India, it also gives out a strong message of the increasing market space that India is willing to offer to the world and its determination to progress in critical sectors. It will also have positive externalities in other sectors, including technology, skill development, Make in India, employment creation, start-up boost, and economic incentives. The move is in the right direction and will bring sweet fruits in good times.

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Notes:

^[1] “India opens its space sector to 100% foreign investment with new FDI policy,” WION, February 23, 2024, India opens its space sector to 100% foreign investment with new FDI policy – World Business Watch News (wionews.com). Accessed on February 28, 2024.

^[2] Dev Sethia, “Space stocks soar up to 7% on approval for 100% FDI in space sector,” Financial Express, February 22, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/market/space-stocks-soar-up-to-7-on-approval-for-100-fdi-in-space-sector-3401838/. Accessed on February 28, 2024.

^[3] “India eases approval process for foreign direct investment in space sector,” Reuters, February 22, 2024, India eases approval process for foreign direct investment in space sector | Reuters. Accessed on February 28, 2024.

^[4] Stephen Clark, “Taking stock: Private investment in space companies rebounded in 2023,” Ars Technica, January 18, 2024, Taking stock: Private investment in space companies rebounded in 2023 | Ars Technica. Accessed on February 28, 2024.

^[5] Press Information Bureau, Enhancing the private participation in Space activities, March 2023, doc2023410179001.pdf (pib.gov.in). Accessed on March 5, 2024.

^[6] Julia Seibert, “Top Private Space Companies in India & Industry Landscape,” Space Impulse, July 12, 2023, Top Private Space Companies in India & Industry Landscape (spaceimpulse.com). Accessed on March 5, 2024.

The post Creating Space in ‘Space’ for Private Sector: India’s Big Move for Technology Development appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Abhishek Sharma, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
01 March 2024

Keywords: Quantum communication, India, and Indian Military

The post Quantum 2.0 Revolution, India, and the Military: Keeping up with the Innovation and Competition in the Quantum Communication Race appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Pakistan Elections 2024, Shehbaz Sharif, PTI, Imran Khan, Pakistan Military, Economic Crisis, Asim Munir

After days of speculation, the controversial Pakistan general elections held on February 8 led to an agreement between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to form a coalition government. PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif will assume the role of Prime Minister for the second time, and PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari has been nominated for the position of President. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) has agreed to extend support to the alliance. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) candidates who contested as independents and joined hands with the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) failed to get a majority. The elections have been marred by accusations of rigging and violence in favour of the party ‘selected’ by the military establishment, the PML. The most popular leader, Imran Khan, is behind bars fighting more than 150 legal cases. PTI candidates contested as independents as the party was denied its election symbol and did manage a surprising number despite claims of rigging and the establishment’s coercive tactics during the elections. The elections saw a voter turnout of about 48%. It is important to note that the elections were held against the backdrop of prolonged political uncertainty, deep economic challenges, an alarming security situation with continued attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the reverberation of the May 9 violence. The events of May 9 were completely unprecedented in a military-run state and manifested deep polarisation within society and state institutions and growing anti-military sentiments within the masses. Pakistan’s electoral system has remained, by and large, controversial, marked by political engineering and the military’s interference, and elections in 2024 are no exception.

However, this phase of elections is distinct as the establishment encountered the challenge of the unfathomable popularity of Imran Khan, which challenged its capacity to manipulate political dynamics. The PTI-backed candidates performed well despite rigging and misreporting, as confessed by Rawalpindi Commissioner Liaquat Ali Chattha, who took responsibility for the wrongdoing and resigned from his post. Chattha also claimed the involvement of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Chief Justice in the rigging and mishandling of the elections to preclude the victory of the PTI candidates. In a volte-face, a few days after his announcement, Chattha denied his claims. Even after months of rigorous efforts by the establishment to weaken PTI and undermine Imran Khan’s position, the people’s mandate, clearly, was in favour of Khan. In the 2018 elections, it was the military that supported Imran Khan against the PML-N and projected him as a clean leader needed for the upliftment of Pakistan.

 Some developments in the elections are positive and do indicate a welcome change in society. Firstly, a large sector of the voter base—approximately 44%—was below the age of 35 and played a major role in defining the mandate. Also, there was a larger participation of women in this election, and over 20 women candidates won across the national and provincial constituencies. Secondly, the 2024 elections demonstrate deep anti-military sentiments among the masses, who directly or indirectly hold the military responsible for the country’s deepening economic woes and persistent political instability. Clearly, every successive election in Pakistan leads to a stronger political hold of the establishment and further weakening of the democratic forces. The suppressive tactics of the establishment did not deter the voters in the elections from supporting the PTI candidates who are not part of dynasty politics and not favourites of the military. Thirdly, and very importantly, the radical religious parties did not perform well in the elections and failed badly. The reasons could be twofold—the 2024 elections were mainly driven by three political personalities: Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif, and Bilawal Bhutto, and the leaders of the religious parties had little space here. Secondly, the elections had a significant young voter base who did not seem to be attracted by the radical parties.

Pakistan will start a new journey under the political leadership of Shehbaz Sharif, who has had a good and stable record with the military, and he is likely to not assert himself against the establishment, unlike Nawaz Sharif, who shares a rancorous past with the generals. Although PML-N had complete support from the establishment and Nawaz’s return was perceived as a game changer for the party, the party could not perform very well in Punjab and barely managed a lead. The PPP maintained its hold in Sindh and performed well as anticipated. The PTI has rejected the idea of joining or extending support to either of the leading parties, and has been challenging the election results. The PTI has joined the right-wing SIC, which is an alliance of Islamic political and religious parties. It remains to be seen how this alliance will impact PTI’s image within its support base. Although the elections were seen as a blow to the military’s stature and its ability to manage people’s perceptions, the fact remains that the outcome of the elections is very much in sync with the military’s choice. Pakistan is likely to have a weak coalition that lacks credibility. This works in favour of the establishment, as the coalition will have a restricted ability to assert itself and will be highly dependent on the military for its survival. Imran Khan & party will continue to challenge the functioning of the government. The military’s role in the economic domain has been further strengthened and institutionalised with the creation of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). Foreign investment will, by and large, stay under the control of the military. Although Pakistan’s economic crisis has been managed for some time, it’s far from stability. The foreign reserves stand at approximately US $8 billion, which is barely sufficient to cover eight weeks of imports. Inflation stands at around 30 per cent, and the value of the Pakistani rupee against the US dollar dropped to a record low last year. The Shehbaz Sharif government will need to take tough decisions for structural changes and deal with economic strains. A new plan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) needs to be negotiated. Imran Khan has reportedly written to the IMF, requesting that the financial organisation conduct an audit of the election results before sanctioning a new loan. Conventional wisdom suggests that a weak coalition will face the challenges of getting consensus on these decisions. Even though the military in Pakistan has experienced a strong anti-establishment mandate in the elections, it has been successful in manoeuvring the election outcome. The establishment gathered additional powers constitutionally and institutionally after May 9, 2023, and will continue to assert itself. How long the new government manages to stay in the good books of the generals remains to be seen.

Speculations are rife as to how the India-Pakistan strained relations will shape up under the new regime. Political statements from Pakistan expressing interest in talking to India are not unlikely in the months to come. Previous statements issued by the caretaker government under Shehbaz Sharif and again by Nawaz Sharif during the election campaign did express willingness for regional peace and talking to India, based on the condition (driven by wishful thinking) that India should reverse its decision to abrogate Article 370. Will the new government deviate from Pakistan’s existing political position in talks with India? The second critical question is whether the Pakistan military sees stabilising relations with India serving its strategic interests?

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: ASAT, Outer Space, Space Debris, Russia

Russia has been causing turmoil in the US security circuit following the White House confirmation of Russia testing an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability. This capability, which would be nuclear powered, has not been deployed. POTUS has requested a diplomatic engagement with its Russian counterpart to discuss this issue at length.^[1] Although there is ‘no immediate threat’ that is been deciphered from such developments, there are reasons to worry about these capabilities.^[2] Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are an indispensable mechanism of both civil and military systems, and therefore, satellites are the cornerstone of technology-enabled lifestyles. Their disruption would be the primary goal of an adversary in odd times, and hence, it becomes fundamental for a state to protect their satellites from disruption. Anti-Satellite weapons, commonly known as ASATs, try to destroy the satellites in orbit.

The potential ASAT that Russia is developing aims to launch a nuclear weapon in space to take down crucial US satellites that serve communication, military operations, navigation, and intelligence gathering. The report suggests that Russia is working to develop an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) with nuclear explosion.^[3] If launched successfully, it would destroy and leave a huge orbital real estate, that the world relies on, redundant.

ASAT capabilities have been around almost parallel to the invention of satellites. In 1957, when the USSR launched the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, their Cold War rival, the United States responded with the first-ever ASAT weapon, ‘Bold Orion’, which is an air-launched ballistic missile. This resulted in an unintended race of ASATs, where the Soviets responded with their own ASAT capabilities. The Soviets developed ‘Co-Orbital’ ASATs, they fly alongside the satellites and eventually explode, taking the satellite along with them.^[4]

Like all other technology, ASATs also continued to evolve and saw new entrants. China too fired a ballistic missile in 2007 to destroy an old satellite. These unending tests have resulted in a plethora of debris in the space. The United States took the lead and announced in 2022, that it would discontinue the missile use against satellites.^[5] This was an important action given the possibilities of Kessler Syndrome, where debris in space could reach a point where it creates more and more junk, wreaking havoc for any kind of space program, as suggested by NASA scientist Donald Kessler in 1978.^[6] European Space Agency has launched the ‘Clean Space Initiative’ to tackle this issue.^[7] Four countries, including China, India, Russia, and the US have destroyed their own satellites in ASAT tests.

However, Russia in November 2021 tested a direct ascent ASAT against a live satellite. This test and the debris thus created garnered plenty of international concern and the question around the declining sustainability of Space resurfaced.^[8] The test put into question the human-made objects in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) along with China’s Tiangong Space Station and International Space Station.

The recent speculations about Russia developing new ASATs violate the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Article VII of the treaty holds states responsible for damaging the satellites of other states, while Article IX prohibits parties from causing ‘harmful contamination’ of space.^[9] In the past, the United States detonated a thermonuclear bomb 400km above ground in a high-altitude test named ‘Starfish Prime’. It was a joint effort of the Defence Atomic Support Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). It is the largest nuclear test conducted in space to date. However, this test precedes the OST, which was conceived in 1967. Since then, there has not been any nuclear activity in the space. There are other treaties like the Liability Convention 1972 and the Registration Convention 1976 that aim at addressing the issues of Outer Space.^[10]

There has been a constant demand to have a new outer space treaty which can actively address emerging trends like the weaponisation of space, an unprecedented spike in the number of satellites, active involvement of the private sector, resource exploitation, and the issue of space debris. These issues would need increased international cooperation, effective governance, innovation, and risk mitigation mechanisms in outer space. The last development in this regard was the UN guidelines and framework agreed upon in 2022 on the issues of long-term sustainability of outer space activities and nuclear power safety along with mitigation of space debris, transparency and confidence building measures (CBM) in outer space.^[11]

The recommendation for the new treaty includes a legal framework and jurisdiction for environmental pollution in space, an effective framework for exploration activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies, prevention of arms conflict in space, and bringing binding and non-binding norms to address the question of emerging risks pertaining to safety, security, and sustainability of the outer space.

India’s ASAT Profile

In March 2019, India conducted its first ASAT missile test called ‘Mission Shakti’. India used the Defence and Research Organisation’s (DRDO) Ballistic Missile Defence Interceptor as a kinetic ASAT missile. ASATs are generally of two kinds, kinetic energy, and non-kinetic type. The kinetic energy ASATs cause direct physical damage by crashing into satellites and includes anything that can enter space and damage the satellites, including drones, ballistic missiles, and other satellites.^[12] Whereas, the non-kinetic type uses non-physical attacks like jamming, cyber-attacks, blind satellites with laser, etc. and can be carried out from LEO, ground installations, or from the air.

India is only the fourth country after Russia, the US and China to have ASAT capabilities. This increases India’s capabilities in the face of a war and reserves a seat for India in the international conversations on ASATs. This has been one of the many developments that India is making in the domain of space, and the missions lined up would further boost its capabilities and credentials.

Whereas, the Russian EMP can have devastating impact on the global space including economic impact as Industries has huge reliance on satellite communication, such as shipping, aviation, finance, and agriculture, could suffer losses due to interruptions in service and increased operating costs. In addition, it would likely strain diplomatic relations and could lead to retaliatory actions or international sanctions. It could also undermine trust in international agreements aimed at preventing the militarization of space. Therefore, efforts to prevent such an attack and to strengthen the resilience of space systems against EMPs are essential for safeguarding global security and stability.

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Notes:

^[1] Sandra Erwin, “White House confirms it has intelligence on Russia’s anti-satellite weapon, but says no immediate threat,” Space News, February 15, 2024, White House confirms it has intelligence on Russia’s anti-satellite weapon, but says no immediate threat – SpaceNews. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[2] Katherine Tangalakis-Lippert, “Reports of Russia building nuclear space weapons have alarmed officials, but security experts aren’t panicked — yet,” Business Insider, February 19, 2024, Reports of Russia building nuclear space weapons have alarmed officials, but security experts aren’t panicked — yet | Business Insider India. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[3] Rajagopalan, “Why Russia’s Latest Space Weapon Is So Dangerous,” The Diplomat, February 17, 2024, Why Russia’s Latest Space Weapon Is So Dangerous – The Diplomat. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[4] Smith, “Anti-satellite weapons: History, types and purpose,” SPACE.COM, August 10, 2022, Anti-satellite weapons: History, types and purpose | Space. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[5] Gohd, “Russian anti-satellite missile test was the first of its kind,” SPACE.COM, August 10, 2022, Russian anti-satellite missile test was the first of its kind | Space. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[6] International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, “Kessler Syndrome,” Space Safety Magazine, Kessler Syndrome – (spacesafetymagazine.com). Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[7] “Clean Space,” The European Space Agency, ESA – Clean Space. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[8] Ankit Panda, “The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” The Carnegie, November 17, 2021, The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[9] “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, The Outer Space Treaty (unoosa.org). Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[10] Gutierrez, “Why the U.S. once set off a nuclear bomb in space,” National Geographic, July 16, 2021, Why the U.S. once set off a nuclear bomb in space | National Geographic. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[11] “Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities:
2022, Forty-first session,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN-Space 2022: 41st session of the Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities (unoosa.org). Accessed on February 21, 2024.

^[12] Doris Elin Urrutia, “India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why,” SPACE.COM, August 10, 2022, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why. | Space. Accessed on February 21, 2024.

The post Russia’s Resurgence in Space: Anti-Satellite Capabilities & Tests appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Hypersonic technologies, Hypervelocity Expansion Tunnel, India, BrahMos

On February 5, 2024, it was reported that the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (IIT-K) “successfully established and tested India’s first Hypervelocity Expansion Tunnel Test Facility,  S2.”[1]

The ground-breaking establishment and test have been lauded as a major step for India to further enhance its aerospace research and defence capabilities. Hypersonic technologies have become the new buzzwords in the strategic domain. Major powers, such as the US, Russia and China, are actively looking forward to deploying hypersonic weapons, along with the less advanced powers, such as Iran and North Korea. India is also showing interest in hypersonic technologies. India’s hypersonic interest is in its infancy and will take some years to operationalise. However, the Hypervelocity Expansion Tunnel Test Facility have pointed to India’s continuous interest in the hypersonic sphere.

Understanding Hypersonic Technology

Hypersonic delivery platforms fly at speeds of at least Mach 5. There are two essential types of hypersonic weapons: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCM). An HGV is a glide vehicle which uses a rocket as a launch platform before gliding to a target. The HCM, on the other hand, is powered by air-breathing engines, known as scramjets, once the missile acquires its target. Hypersonic technology differs from ballistic missiles as the former does not follow a ballistic trajectory and can manoeuvre on the way to their target. Hypersonic weapons have the potential to avoid detection because of their speed, manoeuvrability, and low altitude of flight.

The Facility and Test

The press release states, “S2 is capable of generating flight speeds between 3-10 km/s, simulating the hypersonic conditions encountered during atmospheric entry of vehicles, asteroid entry, scramjet flights, and ballistic missiles.”[2] Achieving such results is not easy, and the team involved in this project has stated that “Building S2 has been extremely challenging, requiring in-depth knowledge of physics and precision engineering. The most crucial and challenging aspect was perfecting the ‘free piston driver’ system, which requires firing a piston at high pressure between 20-35 atmospheres down a 6.5 m. compression tube at speeds of 150-200 m/s, and bringing it to a complete stop or ‘soft landing’ at the end.”[3] The S2, nicknamed ‘Jigarthanda’, is a 24-meter-long facility located at IIT Kanpur’s Hypersonic Experimental Aerodynamics Laboratory (HEAL) within the Department of Aerospace Engineering. Establishing such kind of scientific results will help India in its ongoing missions of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV), and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles.

Tracking the Progress

India’s interest in the hypersonic domain can be traced back to the year 2007 when former President of India, APJ Abdul Kalam while commencing the delivery of the BrahMos missile system to the Army, mooted the idea of having a Mark-II version of BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile.[4] Then, in September 2009, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between India and Russia. The 2009 MoU essentially paved the way for the realisation of what would be the final parameters of the new version of the BrahMos missile. The new version was given the name ‘BrahMos-2.’[5] The 2009 MoU presented certain specifications of BrahMos-2. The specifications were as follows:

1. 1. BrahMos-2 will be based on a hypersonic scramjet technology.

   2. The prime purpose of such a weapon is to target deeply buried enemy nuclear bunkers and heavily protected locations.

   3. All three defence services will utilise this weapon.[6]

Scramjet technology is one of the central elements of a hypersonic weapon. Unlike standard subsonic or ramjet engines, a scramjet uses an inlet force in supersonic compressed air before mixing it with hydrogen fuel, thus allowing the engine to achieve Mach 5 speeds and beyond.[7] India began testing scramjet technology in 2016. On August 28, 2016, the ISRO successfully tested two indigenously developed scramjet engines.[8] To further enhance its scramjet capabilities, India, in 2019 and 2020, tested an indigenously developed hypersonic technology demonstrator vehicle (HSTDV). A scramjet engine powered the HSTDV.[9] While the 2019 test was deemed failed, the 2020 test was successful. During the 2020 test, the scramjet-powered HSTDV flew for about 22-23 seconds at Mach 6 speed. For the 2020 HSTDV test, the solid motor of the Agni-I ballistic missile was used as a launch vehicle. The 2020 HSTDV test helped India’s hypersonic ambitions cross-check many crucial elements of a hypersonic weapon. Essentially, the following critical technologies were proven successful:

1. 1. aerodynamic layout for hypersonic manoeuvres;

   2. use of scramjet propulsion for ignition and constant combustion at the hypersonic stream;

   3. thermo-structural enactment of high-temperature materials;

   4. separation mechanism at hypersonic velocities.[10]

The 2020 HSTDV test, however, only established a “powered flight duration of 20 seconds at an altitude of 31 km at Mach 6.” A 20-second flight duration may not produce adequate results for isentropic flows, the implication of shockwaves on boundary layers and, more importantly, the impact of the atmosphere on thermodynamics. To further learn about the critical issues concerning developing and eventually deploying a hypersonic weapon, the DRDO conducted its third-phase test of HSTDV in 2023. It was reported in 2020 when India conducted its second test of HSTDV, that the third phase test “will include 600 seconds of controlled, sustained, powered flight to a distance of about 1,500 km while carrying a 300-400 kg payload.”[11] India conducted the third test of its HSTDV in 2023 to further expand its hypersonic ambitions. It is not clear whether the third test was a success or not. The Indian defence ministry or the DRDO did not release any information about the test’s parameters. However, reports in the public domain stated, “The initial launch and take-off was successful. But there are question marks on the subsequent performance of the scramjet engines of the HSTDV, for which the data has to be analysed in detail.”[12]

Conclusion

The use of hypersonic technology in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated increased interest among nations regarding developing similar technologies. China is one of the pioneers in the hypersonic arena and has already deployed the DF-17 HGV-armed Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). China is also developing advanced nuclear delivery systems, such as the fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) system. In July 2021, China managed the “first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle.”[13] Once deployed, the FOB system will substantially increase China’s nuclear second-strike capabilities and will work as a hedge against deploying adversary’s missile defence systems. India’s hypersonic ambitions are on the right path, and the recent developments in this domain are a testament to it. In 2023, the BrahMos Aerospace Corporation stated, “If we want a hypersonic missile, we will take only eight years to develop it after the approval from the government.”[14] India’s interest in hypersonic technology needs priority attention with an increasingly belligerent China.

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Notes:

[1] Sibu Kumar Tripathi, “Hypervelocity facility at IIT Kanpur: How it will propel India’s high-speed dreams,” India Today, February 05, 2024, https://www.indiatoday.in/science/story/hypervelocity-facility-at-iit-kanpur-how-it-will-propel-indias-high-speed-dreams-2497864-2024-02-05. Accessed on February 7, 2024.

[2] “IIT Kanpur achieves major milestone with India’s First Hypervelocity Expansion Tunnel Test Facility,” IIT Kanpur, February 05, 2024, https://www.iitk.ac.in/new/hypervelocity-expansion-tunnel-test-facility. Accessed on February 09, 2024.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Kalam asks BrahMos team to develop ‘Mark-II’ version” Hindustan Times, June 21, 2007, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/kalam-asks-brahmos-team-to-develop-mark-ii-version/story-4v5htemS0MfLQT5oGU7w3L.html. Accessed on February 9, 2024.

[5] “India, Russia to develop new hypersonic cruise missile’ The Indian Express, October 9, 2009, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/latest-news/india-russia-to-develop-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile/. Accessed on February 9, 2024.

[6] “India to develop BrahMos-II missile,” BrahMos Aerospace, August 3, 2009, https://brahmos.com/newscenter.php?newsid=95. Accessed on February 9, 2024.

[7] A. Misra, J. Njuguna (ed.), “Composite materials for aerospace propulsion related to air and space transportation,” Lightweight Composite Structures in Transport: Design, Manufacturing, Analysis and Performance, (Oxford: Woodhead Publishing, 2016).

[8] “ISRO’s Scramjet Engine Technology Demonstrator Successfully Flight Tested” Indian Space Research Organisation, https://www.isro.gov.in/ScramjetEngineTechnology.html#:~:text=The%20August%2028%20test%20was,Scramjet%20engines%20at%20supersonic%20conditions. Accessed on February 10, 2024.

[9] Rajat Pandit, “India successfully test scramjet technology for hypersonic missiles,” The Times of India, September 8, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-successfully-test-scramjet-technology-for-hypersonic-missiles/articleshow/77973889.cms. Accessed on February 10, 2024.

[10] Ministry of Defence, “DRDO successfully flight tests Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle”, September 07, 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1651956. Accessed on 10 February 2024.

[11] Kapil Kajal, “India test-flies Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle” Janes, February 02, 2023, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/india-test-flies-hypersonic-technology-demonstrator-vehicle. Accessed on February 12, 2024.

[12] Rajat Pandit, “India conducts another test in a bid to develop hypersonic weapons,” The Times of India, January 28, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-conducts-another-test-in-a-bid-to-develop-hypersonic-weapons/articleshow/97389386.cms. Accessed on February 12, 2024.

[13] Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2023, p. 111, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. Accessed on February 12, 2024.

[14] Manjeet Negi, “India can develop hypersonic missiles in 8 yrs post govt nod: BrahMos Aerospace” India Today, February 21, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/can-develop-hypersonic-missiles-within-eight-years-brahmos-aerospace-2337780-2023-02-21. Accessed on February 12, 2024.

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Keywords: India-France, trilateral cooperation, triangular development, Indo-Pacific region

The presence of France’s President, Emmanuel Macron, at Kartavya Path to witness the 75^th Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi was not the first of its kind. This was the sixth time when a French leader was invited as a Guest of Honour to India’s celebration of democracy. However, the style and symbolism of this visit were unique and unparalleled. The roadshow and the Chai par Charcha between the heads of the two states in Jaipur not only threw the spotlight on the diverse culture, customs, and traditions of India, but the payment made for tea through UPI set the stage for the perfect synthesis of what the two nations want to do together, as stated by President Macron.[1] Further, the joint statement released after the visit covering issues from ‘seabed to sky’ is a testimony to the unveiling of ‘Horizon 2047’ between Paris and New Delhi. The visit has set the tone to transform the enthusiasm and ambitious goals that each wants to achieve collectively in the larger Indo-Pacific region.

At a time when the waters of the Indo-Pacific are churning due to larger contestations between the United States of America and China, the Indo-French partnership showcases the potential to shape and materialise cooperation. Like India, France is also a traditional and residential player in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In addition, France also has a significant presence and outreach in the Pacific Ocean through its overseas island territories that include French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. This complements India’s ambitions to reach the islands of the Pacific Ocean, especially through the Forum for India-Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC). The aspiration of taking forward this partnership across the length and breadth of the region can be witnessed through the shift in the focus areas of both countries from the 2018 Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region[2] to the Comprehensive Roadmap for the Indo-Pacific finalised in 2023.[3] In this context, trilateral cooperation with Australia and triangular development provides much-needed impetus to go ahead.

 Undercovering the Indian Ocean through Trilateral Cooperation

Apart from the defence cooperation (including the recent deal on Rafale Marine Fighters and Scorpene class submarines), which remains one of the pillars of the India-France partnership in the Indo-Pacific region, trilateral cooperation and triangular development have emerged as essential takeaways from the Modi-Macron meeting.[4] The bilateral interests of both nations to deal with the evolving security dynamics are feeding into each other’s broader interests and taking the relationship forward. Paris needs New Delhi, which is centrally located in the IOR, with two island territories across its eastern and western seaboard, to deal with the emerging inter-state competition and non-traditional challenges. Similarly, India needs France, which not only has an overseas territory of Mayotte and La Reunion islands in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), but also has a strong francophone influence in the vanilla group of islands and the Eastern Coast of Africa, all of which would allow New Delhi to expand its reach in its backyard further. The emphasis on the extension of the joint surveillance mission, currently operating in the Southwest Indian Ocean, to India’s neighbourhood[5] to secure the entry and exit points of the Indian Ocean speaks about the intention of taking the cooperation further to the South and Southeast of India in the Bay of Bengal region.

In this context, the revival of the India-France-Australia trilateral relations as posited by the French President in the joint statement[6] will act as a stepping stone in enhancing the security of the IOR. To this end, a cooperative mechanism by using the island territory of La Reunion (France) in the WIO, India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the East, and Cocos (Keeling) of Australia near its western coast will ensure robust surveillance and reconnaissance covering the entire stretch of the IOR. India is already deploying its P-8I on the French territory in the WIO, and the intention of taking such bilateral cooperation further with like-minded partners like Australia is reflected in the talks that are underway for strategically using Cocos (Keeling) for joint surveillance. But the need of the hour desires that this bilateral cooperation must now be transformed into a trilateral which will not only enhance interoperability between the militaries of the three countries but also assist in effectively and economically dealing with non-traditional challenges like piracy, drug trafficking and smuggling, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing which is a concern for one and all in the region. To this end, cooperation between the three nations can also be extended to include niche areas like hydrographic surveys, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-drone warfare.

 Meeting of Minds: Triangular Development as a Case in Point

Meeting larger areas of interest, such as support for climate change mechanisms, resilient infrastructure, reformed multilateralism, and upholding sovereignty and strategic autonomy, ensures that India and France can carry out triangular development in the Indo-Pacific region. This will not only supercharge the bilateral partnership between New Delhi and France but will also provide the right opportunity to strike the nodes in third countries, thereby further expanding their outreach to the countries of the Global South. It will also help create positive branding amongst the citizens of the respective countries. Both nations have made significant progress in the areas of climate change, like being co-founders of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and willing to cooperate through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (India launched CDRI, while France has recently shown its interest in being the next co-chair). Reiterating the need for the early launch of the Indo-Pacific Triangular Development Cooperation Fund is a step in the right direction.[7]

One of the ways can be creating institutional mechanisms in the region, similar to the opening of a solar academy in Senegal, West Africa. Robust institutional arrangements comparatively cast a longer shadow on the relationship and have the ability to withstand the ebbs and flows of evolving times. In this direction, both countries can capitalise on the agreed roadmap on blue economy and ocean governance and jointly build research institutes, particularly in the Indian Ocean, where both have considerable stakes and influence. France has several research institutes, such as the Louis Malarde Institute, the Centre for Island Research and Environmental Observatory, the Research Institute for Development, and many others in the Pacific region.[8]

As India and France take a step further by engaging and multiplying their synergy and convergences in the Indo-Pacific through trilateral partnerships and triangular development, they must also navigate carefully through their divergences. For instance, while the former has long endorsed anti-colonialism and also played an important role in the national movement of several countries, the latter has been a colonial power in the Indo-Pacific region.[9] Therefore, the joint approach of both countries needs to take into account this sensitivity as they dive deep into the waters of the Indo-Pacific, especially the island nations for whom sovereignty remains the core national interest. Further, there is a different perception of China between India and France. While India’s ties are nose-diving with Beijing, particularly after the Galwan crisis, France seems to be having a muddied approach when dealing with China in the region.[10]

Despite the above mentioned divergences that seem to make the India-France relationship parallel to each other, history is testimony to the fact that the sum of this partnership is greater than the parts. From being one of the few countries to support India during its first nuclear test, to respecting each other’s strategic autonomy, both the residential players of the IOR have travelled far to take the relationship on a journey of co-development through trilateral initiative and triangular development.

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Notes:

[1] Geeta Mohan, “Chai with PM Modi, paid through UPI, ‘unforgettable’ memory for President Macron,” India Today, January 27,2024, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/emmanuel-macron-pm-modi-upi-chai-republic-day-chief-guest-jaipur-france-2494286-2024-01-27. Accessed on January 31, 2024.

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region,” March 10, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29598/Joint+Strategic+Vision+of+IndiaFrance+Cooperation+in+the+Indian+Ocean+Region+New+Delhi+10+March+2018. Accessed on January 28, 2024.

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, “India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap,” July 14, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36799/IndiaFrance_IndoPacific_Roadmap. Accessed on January 29, 2024.

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, “India – France Joint Statement on the State Visit of H.E. Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of French Republic, to India (25 – 26 January 2024),” January 26, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37534/India__France_Joint_Statement_on_the_State_Visit_of_HE_Mr_Emmanuel_Macron_President_of_French_Republic_to_India_25__26_January_2024. Accessed on January 27, 2024.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ministry of External Affairs, “Horizon 2047: 25th Anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership, Towards A Century of India-France Relations,” July 14, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36806/Horizon_2047_25th_Anniversary_of_the_IndiaFrance_Strategic_Partnership_Towards_A_Century_of_IndiaFrance_Relations. Accessed on January 29, 2024.

[8] Shourya Gori, “The Pacific Frontier of France,” Observer Research Foundation, August 04, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-pacific-frontier-of-france. Accessed on January 28, 2024.

[9] Akash Sahu, “The India-France Partnership: New Avenues for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” South Asian Voices, December 27, 2023, https://southasianvoices.org/the-india-france-partnership/. Accessed on January 30, 2024.

[10] Harsh V. Pant, “Macron’s Muddled China Outreach,” Observer Research Foundation, April 13, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/macrons-muddled-china-outreach. Accessed on January 29, 2024.

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Author: Dr Joshy M Paul, Research Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
14 February 2024

Keywords: East Asian Airpower, Japanese Airforce, India-Japan defence cooperation

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Keywords: Connectivity, Caspian Sea states, International North South Transport Corridor, India.

Dr S. Jaishankar (Indian External Affairs Minister) paid a visit to Iran on January 14-15, 2024, as part of the two countries’ ongoing high-level discussions. Concerning the Chabahar Port, the minister said, “…we discussed India’s involvement in the development and operation of the Chabahar port, a joint project with a joint vision of connectivity…discussed how we can establish a firm, sustainable and long-term roadmap, for India’s continued involvement over the coming years.”[1] Further, on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), he said, “Regional connectivity has been a critical pillar of India-Iran relations, and was naturally prominent in the agenda of today’s discussions. I reiterated India’s interest in benefiting from Iran’s unique geographical position to access markets in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Eurasia. We discussed the prospects of energising the INSTC.”[2] The joint statement underscores the importance of connectivity in achieving India’s developmental objectives and its wider ambition for global collaboration. It implies that connectivity serves not just as a method to accomplish India’s economic goals, but also as a vital element of its approach to international relations.

Connectivity, in general, can help improve energy security in the following ways: First, broadening the range of oil and gas supply sources and routes. Countries can access a broader selection of suppliers and lessen their dependency on any one supplier by connecting multiple oil and gas markets. This can help to reduce the likelihood of supply disruptions and price shocks. Second, new oil and gas resources can be developed. Connectivity can help isolated places develop new oil and gas resources by giving access to infrastructure and markets. This can help to improve oil and gas supply and lessen the likelihood of supply shortages. Third, the efficiency and dependability of oil and gas infrastructure must be improved. Countries may build a more linked and robust oil and gas system that can survive interruptions by connecting diverse pipelines and storage facilities. This can facilitate an increase in supply reliability and reduce the danger of price shocks.

Exploring the Energy Dimension of INSTC

As Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine enters its second year, the Caspian Sea countries have seen a significant shift in the sector of transport infrastructure development. In recent years, the Caspian region has seen an increase in non-regional governmental interest in midstream oil and gas development. The most recent European Union (EU)-Central Asia Summit, held in June 2023, emphasised Brussels’ interests and the geopolitical significance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The region has evolved as an important energy hub for the European Union. One of the key aspects of the EU-Central Asia Summit was Kazakh President Tokayev’s request to the EU for the development of Caspian Sea ports.[3] Likewise, at the 6^th Caspian Summit held in June 2022, President Putin, too, stressed the significance of seaport by adopting and implementing the ‘Strategy for the Development of National Seaports in the Caspian Sea.’[4]

With the proliferation of new connectivity projects, it is vital for India to boost its participation by looking into the energy dimension of INSTC. Because the corridor uses a combination of seaports, railways, and roadways, INSTC’s potential for oil and gas transportation must be explored.

Collaboration in Trans-Caspian Maritime Connectivity Initiatives

Sea port is one of the areas which has drawn the interests of many global players to the Caspian Sea region. It has played a pivotal role in the development of the oil and gas sector, particularly in terms of providing access to offshore oil and gas fields and allowing the exportation of oil and gas resources. In the last few years, new ports—Amirbad port in Iran (2017), Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan (2018), and Kuryk port in Kazakhstan (2018)—have emerged because of littoral states’ desire to become the region’s key transportation hub, and to promote a competitive climate in the Caspian Sea. While Iran and Russia have access to international waters, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are landlocked. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan currently rely on two major pipelines—the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)—to export their oil. Currently, all five Caspian states have mini fleets of tankers plying the world’s largest enclosed inland waterbody as regional trade continues to increase. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are steadily increasing their shipping, while Turkmenistan has opted to charter and build vessels for the Caspian hydrocarbon transit.

India should intensify its efforts in maritime infrastructure development. It is critical for India to take advantage of the current and proposed maritime projects initiated by the Caspian countries. For example, the recent manifestation of bilateral agreements between India and Russia pertaining to shipbuilding activity in Astrakhan demonstrates the possibility for such initiatives with the other four Caspian governments. The project includes the construction of new piers, berths, terminals, and cargo-handling equipment.

The prioritisation of ports as facilitators of energy security is essential for the Indian energy requirements as they have the potential to enhance maritime energy transit. The use of ports facilitates the accessibility of offshore oil and gas reserves, hence allowing the streamlined transfer of people, equipment, and supplies to-and-from offshore platforms. Ports have the potential to facilitate the development of new offshore fields and enhance production capacity. Considering the geographical distance of India, it would be prudent for India to give priority to the development and progress of midstream projects. As ports would help improve marine energy transportation, the Indian shipping and energy industries must prioritise ports as an enabler of energy security.

Collaboration in Rail Connectivity Initiatives

The railways have historically played a crucial role in transporting energy from the Caspian shores. Since the beginning of Russia’s special military operation in 2022, the Caspian littoral governments have engaged in many bilateral and trilateral agreements for railway connection. On the eastern Caspian Sea front, Iran and Turkmenistan inked a transit agreement on November 17, 2023 which emphasised on Turkmenistan’s connecting Chabahar Port (Iran) through a railway, giving it direct access to international waters. Similarly, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have signed a contract regarding a transportation connection. In November 2023, the Russian Railways Logistics (RZD Logistics), Kazakhstan Railways (KTZ Express), and the Transport and Logistics Centre of Turkmenistan (TULM) entered a memorandum of cooperation for international and transit freight transportation. On the western Caspian Sea front, railway networks in Russia and Azerbaijan do not have a direct physical link with Iran.[5] As Russia and Iran have agreed to finish the Rasht-Astara railway, which is part of the INSTC, the route has the potential to boost the number of products transited via Iran. The Rasht-Caspian railroad is one of two railroads that complement the Rasht-Astara train line in Iran’s Gilan Province. It connects the province to the Caspian port, which is situated in the Anzali Trade-Industrial Free Zone. Due to its sea access, the prospects of this line to facilitate the transportation of oil and gas requires serious thought by the INSTC member states.

Along with the development of intra-regional railway and maritime network, the member countries need to work on the development of port ‘transportation nodes’ in the region. A port transportation node is a port complex, which includes a seaport with its facilities and infrastructure; a port rail hub, which includes stations, yards, freight areas, intra-node lines and other facilities for wagon and locomotive maintenance; and industrial, automobile, pipeline, and urban transport. It allows for the movement goods from the sea to land, and back.

In the middle of the ongoing geopolitical unrest, Caspian Sea countries are revising their overseas trade strategies and building new logistical routes. For New Delhi to realise this, it must carefully coordinate its approach with the Caspian States to serve not just its own interests but also the interests of its member states. To capitalise on the INSTC’s potential for oil and gas delivery to India, major infrastructure expansion and upgrade are required, particularly for ships, railroads, and roads. As the INSTC routes run through substantial hydrocarbon deposits, it would be inconsiderate to overlook or constrain the INSTC’s potential for moving commodities alone. It is necessary to look beyond the transportation of goods. As regional hydrocarbon transport infrastructure development necessitates significant investment, India should cooperate proactively to meet its energy needs. Creating a robust multi-modal transportation infrastructure is critical for maximising the region’s export potential, especially harnessing the INSTC corridor for India.

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Notes:

[1] Ministry of External Affairs of India, “Joint Press Statement by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran,” January 15, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37513/Joint+Press+Statement+by+EAM+Dr+S+Jaishankar+with+Minister+of+Foreign+Affairs+of+Iran. Accessed on February 08, 2024.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Natalya Butyrina, “The President of Kazakhstan called on Europe to take part in the development of the Caspian ports,” Caspian Bulletin, June 06, 2023, http://casp-geo.ru/prezident-kazahstana-prizval-evropu-prinyat-uchastie-v-razvitii-kaspijskih-portov/. Accessed on February 08, 2024.

[4] President of Russia “6^th Caspian Summit,” June 29, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68779. Accessed on February 09, 2024.

[5] Vali Kaleji, “Will Russia Complete Iran’s Rasht–Astara Railway?” The Jamestown Foundation, May 16, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/will-russia-complete-irans-rasht-astara-railway/. Accessed on February 09, 2024.

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Keywords: Logistics, visibility, desert storm, resource planning, military, materials management

The government of India announced the New Logistics Policy (NLP)-2022 on September 17, 2022, duly considering and incorporating the advancements in Information Technology (IT) having global impact. Talking in military context, the revolutionary changes in the nature of modern warfare coupled with improvement and systematisation in resource planning have assumed greater significance, especially for the armed forces. These advancements have been prompted by the magnitude of the security challenges of the 21^st century underscoring a compelling need to respond more rapidly & decisively thereto.

Today’s military policies are based upon operational inputs, force capabilities, resource availability and logistical effectiveness. In case of today’s warfare, the logistics management becomes a complex science, being extremely specialised owing to the high costs involved and the inherent lengthy supply lead times directly impinging upon operations. These complexities emanate also from the technological diversities of weapon systems operating over the entire spectrum of the armed forces of the day.

With the changing landscape of warfare, the battlefield environment of the future is likely to be characterised by the following:

(a)   Short, intense conflicts and surgically focused strikes.

(b)   Operations against apprehension of use of nuclear weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the adversary.

(c)   Effective use of night vision devices.

(d)   Increased transparency of the battlefield.

(e)   A high-intensity and high-tech war, possibly non-linear initially but having potential to be a multidimensional air-land-sea warfare.

(f)   Strikes into deep enemy territories with increased surveillance using weapon delivery platforms.

(g)   High rate of attrition.

(h)   Tactical interdiction.

(i)    Enhanced mobility and manoeuvrability.

Therefore, the key elements of logistics activities relevant to any operational scenario would be:

(a)   Foresight

(b)   Anticipated preparation, planning, deployment & diversions.

(c)   Flexibility.

(d)   Economy of effort.

(e)   Military-Civil Interactions.

(f)   Integrated logistics operations with asset visibility at all levels.

Considering the above, an all-enveloping e-platform would, therefore, be an inevitable need of the hour to define as to which echelons of logistics command & control should be created or altered to facilitate effective logistics support to the fighting forces in the theatre of operations, which happens to be as diverse as ours.

Concept of IT-Enabled Operational Logistics

With an aim to facilitate smooth air operations, the armed forces, especially the Air Force has to evolve and sustain an excellent Enterprise Resources Platform (ERP). The system has to operate amidst an effective interface between the logistics intelligence data and field logistics support in terms of critical spares for the smooth conduct of air operations. The military materials management revolution with IT as a force multiplier needs to be supplemented by simultaneous advances in the operational fields of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, interoperability and surveillance and reconnaissance (C⁴I²SR), accompanied by enhanced lethality & precision of weapon systems.

However, the element of IT in use in the armed forces materials management has to migrate to the integration of global asset management with real-time transit logistics in the theatre of operations. The Materials Management system needs to be more meaningful and operations-oriented with the ability to closely monitor the inter and intra-theatre movement of equipment and combat formations. The manifestation of today’s armed forces’ resolve to fine-tune their materials management functions, needs to be guided in the direction of sustaining an operationally effective logistics infrastructure in the theatre of war.

The requirement, therefore, would be to understand as to what the war fighters need, how to share a common operating picture, how to maintain real-time asset visibility and In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and how to maximise the effectiveness of the distribution logistics apart from accurately configuring the loads to optimise the material handling and economic utilisation of the aircraft fleet.

Future Perspective of IT-Enabled Operational Logistics in Indian Armed Forces

While the Indian army uses the Computerised Inventory Control Project (CICP), the Indian Navy uses the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS), and the IAF showcases heavy reliance upon the Integrated Materials Management On Line System (IMMOLS) for its logistics operations. Considering the terrain peculiarity scenario wherein the Indian armed forces operate, the shape of a comprehensive operational logistics character needs to be achieved through certain additions to the existing MM systems of the Indian armed forces, as under:

(a)   Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) in Wartime Scenario: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was the largest support effort that the US military had ever undertaken in modern times. The RFID technology was widely used by United States Central Command (CENTCOM) forces in Afghanistan during OEF. The improvement in visibility of assets was considered a Key Result Area (KRA) during OEF more than what was visualised during the Gulf War. The RFID tags which were used extensively in OEF as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom were instrumental in providing better asset visibility to the field commanders. The RFID application by US forces greatly reduced the distribution process timelines and significantly enhanced the ITV. In OEF, the US forces had applied the same tactics to keep track of all battlefield logistics movements. RF tags were placed on all items of supply in a satellite-enabled tracking eco-system providing constant visibility.

(b)   RFID for Peacetime Materials Management: Besides war, the RFID can be effectively utilised in peacetime too. In India, this technology is already in use by a number of major corporate players e.g. Maruti, Tata Steel and Nestle. Blue Dart courier service, one of the best-acclaimed logistics services countrywide, besides other logistics service providers in India, makes effective use of similar technology aiming at real-time tracking of consignments moving from one destination to another. Possibilities for peacetime utilisation of IT-enabled logistics blended with RFID in Indian armed forces, especially IAF, are as under

(i)   RFID-Enabled Warehousing: RFID tags can be installed atop storage bins/racks in the warehouses, with the hand held readers used by the warehouse in-charge.

(ii)   RFID-Enabled Issue Process: Tag reader antennae are to be installed at the entrance of the stores to record issue and ensure the movement of stocks out of the storehouse only under proper authority.

(iii)   RFID-Enabled Stock Updation: With the integration of RFID, a Store-in-Charge would be able to update the location by just clicking a button. With every issue, the stock status thus automatically gets updated.

(iv)   RFID-Generated Auto Triggers: Automatic updation of stocks would indicate the stocks falling to critical levels and auto-generate the provisioning reviews/replenishment demands on respective supply agencies.

(v)   RFID-Enabled Receipt Process: All incoming consignments need to be tagged with an RFID tag containing relevant details of the item e.g. description, denomination of quantity, price, source of supply, technical details etc. Each item synchronised with RFID on receipt will be updated on the main server.

(vi)  RFID-Enabled Inventory Tracking: Inventory is tracked as it moves out of the warehouse to the consignee’s destination. This would be achieved by pasting RFID-enabled labels on consignment.

(vii)   RFID-Enabled Inventory Management: A warehouse in-Charge, through handheld RFID readers, should be able to automatically update his stocks via RFID server in near real-time with every issue. This will enable the RFID server to have updated inventories 24×7, which, in turn, would greatly help a logistics manager in realistic material planning.

(c)    RFID-Enabled In-Transit Visibility: Similarly, it is also possible to enable the Logistics vehicles with RFID. The vehicles could, preferably, be closed container trucks. This can be modified to be RFID-enabled with a tracking device i.e. an integrated RFID reader (Satellite-linked GPS). This device would automatically synchronise the vehicle’s location in near real-time to the RFID server. The RFID tag on the vehicle can also have various additional sensors like humidity, temperature, light, and pressure etc. This would help in knowing the exact status of the consignment inside the container through various parameters while in transit. Automatic alerts shall be raised when any of these parameters change due to any change in the condition of the consignment while in transit. These alerts can be tracked at all times by a centrally located domain server. The use of technology will provide total visibility of assets even during transit, the benefits in terms of reduced time cycles of vehicles to and fro their designated path, and increased visibility inside the vehicles for future planning/diversions.

(d)   Broad Utility of RFID in Indian Military Context: The nature of warfare has undergone a complete transformation in the last two decades or so. Inter and intra-sector mobility of the forces has become the biggest logistical challenge for a strategic commander. With battlefields becoming more transparent than before, it becomes imperative for a Tactical commander to track each move of his forces. This apart, the free flow of weapons, ammunition and spares into the theatre of war is another big challenge for a logistician. The lethality of punch that a weapon system can deliver is proportionally related to the degree of efficacy of just-in-time battlefield supply chain management.

It is imperative that goods and personnel carriers moving into the battlefield be fitted with RFID Tags atop containers/vehicles whereas their readers can either be fitted at designated transit routes or scattered over the theatre of war. To achieve this, RF tags are to be placed on the complete range of items. This infrastructure can be used in a satellite-enabled tracking system providing high level of visibility to the logistics managers at all echelons of the logistics hierarchy. It would ensure the locations get updated on the server as soon as the transport carrying the goods passes through the pre-decided routes.

(e)   Global Assets Visibility in Military Materials Management: Global visibility of assets would ensure the availability of real-time data to a logistics Manager. Besides, the end user in the field, with network-centric materials management tool at the click of a button would know as to where would his requirements be available. The future migration to a user with a handheld terminal/laptop having satellite phone connectivity would render him in a better position to place an online demand on his immediate logistics source, besides knowing as to where else the required stores are available. He then can raise a demand directly on the source instead of getting into the rigmarole of finding out availability. This would lead to global stock always being visible. In case of NIL/inadequate stock at a unit, option would be available to an indenter to transcribe inability directly to the echelon showing balances. This would not only streamline the supply chain but also ensure that surpluses at one point offset critical shortages at the other. Besides with handheld terminals and laptops, the end user would always be able to quickly requisition his requirements from a known and confirmed source. It would, in turn, reduce his downtime for unserviceabilities to a fairly large extent, apart from leaving him free to concentrate upon enhancing the punch of his armour.

Broad Prospects for Indian Armed Forces Logistics Amidst New Logistics Policy-2022

The Indian Armed Forces can leverage various logistics techniques in alignment with the New Logistics Policy-2022 to enhance operational efficiency. Embracing modern technologies, such as real-time tracking systems, can optimise supply chain management, allowing for better visibility and control over the movement of men & material.

Automation in the procurement processes can streamline acquisitions, reduce lead times, and enhance resource allocation. Integration of artificial intelligence and predictive analytics can aid in forecasting material requirements, thereby facilitating a proactive logistics planning.

Furthermore, the adoption of cloud-based logistics solutions can enhance data accessibility and collaboration among different branches of the military with due regard to the tenets of security. Formulating and implementing a logistics command structure under the theatre command can improve coordination and responsiveness, fostering the efficacy of joint operations across the entire spectrum of armed forces.

The use of GPS-enabled vehicles and drones for logistics transportation can expedite the delivery of critical supplies in challenging terrains. Additionally, investing in renewable energy sources for transportation and storage has the potential to perfectly align itself with the sustainability goals outlined in the new logistics policy.

Capacity-building through regular training programs by reputed agencies, especially the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), would ensure that personnel are well-versed in the latest logistics techniques. Collaboration with private sector partners for expertise in logistics management and infrastructure development can further enhance the military logistics capabilities.

Conclusion

Considering the above, it can safely be assumed that the road ahead is clear, leading to a future scenario wherein the last man in the chain i.e. a combatant on the battlefield, would be able to requisition his requirements just by the click of a mouse on the handheld terminal/laptop. A field commander would have a much clearer & constant visibility of his assets amidst inter and intra-theatre mobility. Amidst recent dynamics of geopolitical scenario resulting into India gradually assuming the status of a global power, there is every possibility of Indian Armed Forces operating in various roles across the national boundaries.

If that is the future perspective, then the concept of operational logistics would become a reality by transforming itself into a real-time war-oriented weapon of e-logistics. We can positively state that a comprehensive and technology-driven approach, coupled with strategic partnerships in terms of training, will empower the Indian Armed Forces to meet the challenges of modern warfare in line with the objectives of the New Logistics Policy 2022.

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The post Information Technology as a Force Multiplier in Operational Logistics appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Gaurav Sen, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
02 February 2024

Keywords: China, Taiwan, Indo-Pacific, Election

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