Keywords: IAF, HAL, Bangalore, HT-2, HPT-32, HTT-34, HTT-40, Basic Trainer

Introduction

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has a proud legacy of undertaking basic flight training in South India. IAF air bases and training establishments located in the region, have made it the ‘cradle’ of military flight training in India. Since Independence, the IAF’s requirements for basic trainer aircraft have also aided in the growth of aeronautical manufacturing in Southern India. Since 1948, a total of three indigenous basic trainer aircraft, the HT-2, HPT-32 and more recently, the HTT-40 have been developed and manufactured in India. While the latter two basic trainers were vitally important in the growth of India’s nascent domestic aeronautical design and development capability, the completion of design and development of the HTT-40 signals the maturity of the nation’s domestic aerospace and defence ecosystem, which is today producing fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft, utility and attack helicopters. The deliveries of the HTT-40 to the IAF are now slated to begin in Q1 2026.

As we strive towards the goal of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and self-sufficiency in defence production, it is important to note that the IAF, from 1948 till now, continues to drive the growth of India’s aeronautical industry and will continue to do so.

This is the second of a 3-part-series on indigenously developed basic trainers for the Indian Air Force

PART 2

Piston Pioneer

Following in the footsteps of the HT-2, in 1975 HAL began preliminary work on the development of a new basic trainer for the IAF. The Government sanctioned the design and development of a new basic trainer aircraft in 1976 at a cost of INR 5.53 crores. The requirement was for a total of 161 trainer aircraft and work was proceeding in earnest by 1977.

The design of the Hindustan Piston Trainer 32 (HPT-32). proceeded swiftly, with the first 1st HPT-32 prototype (X 2157) making its maiden flight in Bangalore on 6^th January 1977, piloted by Wg Cdr Inder Chopra, HAL’s Chief Test Pilot (CTP). The second HPT-32 prototype made its maiden flight in March 1979, incorporating several modifications. The third and last prototype made its maiden flight on 31^st July 1981 and was representative of the final production version and significantly lighter than the first two prototypes.[1]

The HPT-32 is a cantilever, low-wing monoplane and of all-metal construction. Unlike the HT-2, the HPT-32 was a nose wheel aircraft with side-by-side seating for two persons under a rearward sliding jettisonable framed canopy. The HPT-32 also had the provision for a seat behind the instructor and trainee, along with space for some luggage. This was due to the fact that HAL had also planned to offer the aircraft to undertake liaison roles. The aircraft had a non-retractable tricycle type landing gear. The aircraft was powered by a Textron Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5 flat-six 260 hp engine, driving a Hartzell two-blade constant-speed metal propeller. Fatigue life was quoted as 6.500 hours.

The IAF went on to place an initial production order for the new basic trainer in 1981, ordering 40 aircraft with an additional requirement for 100-150. At the time, the cost of each aircraft was estimated at INR 19.25 lakh.[2]

The HPT-32 was inducted into the Indian Air Force in March 1984. The trainer aircraft was used for Stage 1 flight training providing pupils with 65AIAF hours of flying.

HAL completed the delivery of 40 HPT-32s by March 1987. Just as it was with the HT-2, the Navy also acquired the HPT-32, ordering nine aircraft. INAS 550-B Flt at Kochi which was equipped with Islander aircraft in 1976, went on to induct the HPT-32 in January 1986. The squadron completed basic flying training on the HPT-32 in October 1987, for the first batch of six naval pilots. However, training on the HPT-32 was discontinued soon after, and the squadron ceased further basic flying training on the type.[3]

The IAF placed three additional orders for the HPT-32 in August 1988, January 1990 and March 1992 for 40, 30 and 24 additional aircraft respectively. In total, the IAF placed orders for 134 HPT-32s.

A turboprop version of the HPT-32, called as the HTT-34 took to the air for the first time on 17^th June 1984 piloted by Wg Cdr Ashok and another pilot. “The aim was to enhance its performance, while also overcoming the nagging supply problems of high-octane fuel. A turboprop engine uses turbine fuel (refined kerosene). “The more powerful engine on the HTT-34 gave the aircraft excellent performance,” Wg Cdr P Ashoka (retd)” said in his autobiography.[4] HTT-34 prototype was in fact the HPT-32 third prototype which was modified.[5]

However, despite the HTT-34s improved performance, HAL never received any orders for it.

The HTT-34 was also demonstrated as a trainer aircraft at the Farnborough (UK) and Paris Airshows in 1984 and 1985 respectively. “Later we (HAL) took it to Nigeria and Ghana in Africa on a marketing mission. Our aerobatic displays were greatly appreciated and some of the foreign pilots who flew the aircraft, were also duly impressed. Unfortunately, this did not result in any sales, probably for financial reasons,” Wg Cdr Ashoka added.[6]

Troubled Trainer

The HPT-32 took over the basic training role (Phase I) in the IAF in entirety from 1988 onwards, following the retirement of the HT-2.[7]According to a CAG report released in 2019, the HPT-32 aircraft was besieged with difficulties related to reliability and safety including engine failure, poor glide characteristics and absence of an ejection seat.

Due to a large number of accidents, the entire HPT-32 fleet was grounded in July 2009.[8] This decision followed the crash of an HPT-32 on 28^th July 2009 due to engine failure.[9]

A High-Power Study Team (HPST) was constituted by Air HQ and HAL’s Transport Aircraft Division in Jul 2009 to undertake an in-depth analysis of maintainability and reliability of HPT-32 aircraft and its engine. The HPST was tasked to undertake technical investigation to find out the cause of engine failures and suggest remedial measures

However, in August 2009, the IAF decided to discontinue flying of the HPT-32 fleet till the finalization of HPST report. The HPST report released in December 2009 stated that the HPT-32 aircraft was designed and developed in the early 1980s and did not meet present day standards (at the time). The technical investigation carried out by HAL was inconclusive in its findings.

As per a CAG report released in 2013, it observed that engine cut-off issues had resulted in 189 incidents/accidents on HPT-32 aircraft. Originally slated for retirement in 2014, the HPT-32 fleet was grounded in 2009 and resulted in HAL’s HJT-16 Kiran Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) being used for Stage I training from 2010 to 2013. In June 2012, the IAF opted not to return its HPT-32 fleet back into service, which at the time numbered approximately 116 aircraft.[10] [11]

In total when combining the HT-2 and HPT-32, 300 trainers were produced by HAL. The HPT-32 remained in service only for 25 years as compared to the HT-2, which remained in service for 34 years. Despite the trials and tribulations with the development of indigenous basic trainers, it would not be out of place, to say that the HT-2 and HPT-32 set the stage for the development of a new, modern and state-of-the-art basic trainer for the future.

A Unique Experience of Flying the HT-2, HPT-32 and HTT-40

Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari (retd) was commissioned into the Indian Air Force in December 1982 and has the unique distinction of having flown the HT-2, HPT-32 and HTT-40.

I joined the National Defence Academy (NDA) on 15 January 1979 and passed out from the NDA in December 1981. We reported to what was then called Elementary Flying School (EFS) at Bidar on 1 January 1982. Bidar at the time was the home base for the HT-2. The HT-2 was based only in two locations, Bidar and FIS Tambaram. It never flew in Dundigal, which had the T-6 Harvard and later the Kiran Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT). We underwent a brief one-week orientation course, getting our flying clothing and so on. In the second week of January, we started flying. At EFS Bidar, we also had ground school. This was ground training and primarily about seven to eight subjects, all aviation related. We had a little bit of exposure to all these subjects in the final term in NDA. So it was building up on the basics that we were taught there on aerodynamics and navigation and avionics and aviation medicine and meteorology.

Prior to us joining EFS Bidar and a year earlier, the HT-2 fleet there had experienced a spate of accidents. I cannot recollect the numbers but there were several fatal accidents. As a result, the decision was taken not to allow solo flying in the HT-2, instead our course would have what was then called Dual-cum-Solo (Dolo). This meant that we had a safety pilot in the rear  during our ‘Solo’ sorties. The instructor would not provide any guidance or handle the controls but acted as a safety pilot in the rear seat. We were the first batch at EFS Bidar to perform Dolo sorties. I flew 30.5 hours on the HT-2, which included all types of sorties including general handling, aerobatics and getting a feel of the aircraft. There was no night flying on the HT-2 at that time. If I recollect correctly – and going by my logbook – my 21^st sortie was the solo check clearance for going solo. I never flew the HT-2 solo but instead flew 4-5 Dolo sorties.

I have an anecdote to narrate here on the HT-2 which was a tail wheel aircraft. The tail wheel was held by two strong springs on either side to allow it to caster. So, when one landed the aircraft, it was important to touch down on the two main wheels. There were occasions however, when the aircraft would actually swing from side-to-side because of non-centering of the tail wheel. It could happen for many reasons; drift while landing, a strong cross wind or incorrect rudder inputs. When we applied the rudders the tail wheel also used to move along with the rudder. On the first day when our course started flying, we had two cases of HT-2s swinging on landing, with our entire course all lined up along the runway and in the ATC watching our first few course mates taking to the air.

The HT-2 was a very tricky aircraft to fly and we had quite a lot of attrition during basic flying training in our time. In our course along with 30 cadets from the army and from the air force (NDA and direct entry) we had 78-79 cadets. If I recall correctly when we left Bidar, only 65-70 of us remained in total. Only about 53 passed out from the Air Force Academy (AFA) eventually. Prior to flying the HT-2, I had only done some gliding at NDA and so flying a powered aircraft was a completely alien experience. But I adapted quite easily and quite well.

I have another interesting anecdote on the HT-2. In the cockpit the RT channel change box was on the right side. There were only four preset channels on the RT, so after take-off we had to change from the ATC frequency to the radar frequency. This involved just a change of RT channel, which required one knob selection. But for that the pilot had to take off his right hand from the stick and move the RT knob. This meant that the aircraft had to be trimmed very accurately, otherwise it would start pitching up or going down. So this emerged as a major challenge to most of my course mates.

The other aspect was that the HT-2 did not have an ejection seat. So in case something went wrong with the aircraft, we would have to bail out. There was no time to jettison the canopy also, so part of the downwind checks before coming in for landing was to open the canopy. It was a sliding canopy and when we had it open had the wind on our faces and that was a great experience while landing.

Taxying the HT-2 on ground was another experience, because you just could not see over the aircraft nose, due to the angle. So while taxying we did what was called a ‘snake taxying’ procedure, where we would weave from left to right. So, when you weave off the center line, go to the right and from the left side, now you see that the path ahead is clear. Then you weave to the left and then look over your right and see that the path is clear. It was certainly interesting but if one had the basic psychomotor skills, not so difficult after all.

I recall that the Cirrus Major engine was very reliable and there were not many cases of engine cuts and things like that. Though, yes, the occasional one was there, like in our course, also we had maybe one or two. But I think that was par for the course in those days. Being a tail-dragger aircraft, for take-off when we reached a speed of 55 knots or something like that, we had to push the stick forward to lift the tail wheel up first and then only when we were flying on the main wheels, we would rotate the aircraft by pulling back on the stick.

I have some recollections here from my diary. I had written on my first air experience sortie which took place in January 1982. In fact, I wrote that it was not as exciting as my first sortie in a glider! After my second sortie on the HT-2, I noted that “I must try one more cushion at the back.” We had to carry our own parachutes and seat cushions. On my third sortie I did aerobatics for the first time and noted that after the instructor demonstrated aerobatics, I did two loops, two barrel rolls and one roll, followed by stall turns. I noted that I had no issues with G forces.

We flew one sortie a day, which would be approximately 50-60 minutes duration. The HT-2 could stay in the air for even longer. We also used to do a running change-over on the aircraft. The instructor would remain strapped in the aircraft for three sorties, and the cadets would swap during the running change-over.

From Bidar, we went to the Air Force Academy (AFA) in Dundigal. The HAL Kiran Mk-1As were just entering service at that time. At the time the course consisted of about 30 hours on the HT-2, followed by 80 hours on the Kiran Mk-1A.

I was commissioned into the fighter stream of the IAF in December 1982 and moved to Hakimpet. As of December 1982, I had 116 hours total on the Kiran and the HT-2 put together at AFA. Here I flew the Polish Iskara IJT. Those of us who flew the Iskara went to fly MiG-21, MiG-23 and so on. I flew about 106 hours in the Iskara in day sorties with another eight hours of night flying.  Coming back to the Kiran Mk-1A which was an indigenously developed jet trainer, it was certainly better to fly as it was a little faster, but it had its own minor idiosyncrasies. I would say, each aircraft has some peculiarities, accuracy in flying for example on the Kiran was challenging due to its wing design and high-lift devices. Maintaining accurate speeds or other parameters during manoeuvres was quite a challenge. So, as an example, if I just do a 360 degree turn, maintaining height within a few feet was very difficult on the Kiran.

In summary, the HT-2 was a very good basic trainer aircraft; it took a lot of beating while being operated by young cadets and served the nation for 34 years. It did what was asked of it, no doubt about that.

HPT-32 ‘Deepak’

In 1990, I was sent for the Flying Instructors course to Tambaram. Ours was the first batch which started training on the HPT-32 and this was in June 1990. The batches previous to us had flown the HT-2. We also had to fly the Kiran IJTs so we did half the course on the Kiran and half the course on the HPT-32.

The HPT-32 had several peculiarities; it had very poor glide characteristics. For an aircraft with a not very reliable engine, at least its glide characteristics should have been half as good (at least) as the Kiran or HT-2. If we had an engine failure in the Kiran, we could still glide and make it to the nearest airfield.  The HPT-32 just came down rapidly and had very poor glide characteristics. So, one needed to be on the ball all the time. When you have an aircraft which does not have an ejection seat and bad flight characteristics, safety lies in altitude. So, the higher we flew, the safer we felt. But unfortunately, the HPT-32 didn’t have a very good climb performance, it took forever to climb.

We were flying absolutely brand-new HPT-32s, they were still being maintained by HAL not only at Tambaram but even in AFA. In our time we didn’t have so many engine cuts and that began many years later. The problem with bringing down the aircraft safely following an engine-cut was that the Deccan plateau is a rocky area, so it was challenging to find a flat piece of land. To bail out from the HPT-32, we had to get out of the aircraft and walk on the wing and then jump-off.

In its later years, the HPT-32 fleet engine cut-offs while in the air was too frequent and was a little too high for comfort.

The HPT-32 was also very different from the HT-2 due to having a nose wheel and dual-seating. I am afraid that the HPT-32 did not have too many positives. One of the positives, however, was that the side-by-seating for pilot and instructor, The latter could watch the cadets flying habits closely, this was of-course not possible in a tandem-seat trainer like the HT-2. Apart from this, the HPT-32 had good flying endurance, and we could have running-changeovers here too. Its avionics and flying instruments were a generation ahead of the Kiran Mk-1A.

The Kiran on the other hand, had very benign spin characteristics so when we put it in a spin, we could actually demonstrate something to the cadet and tell him about the nose down angle, how fast the aircraft is spinning, count the turns, etc. The HPT-32 spun so rapidly that it didn’t give time for instructing, we could do post-sortie debrief. The HPT-32 was a huge difference from the Kiran, which had very care-free handling.

I later flew the HPT-32 again as an instructor at AFA and then as an Air Force examiner and accumulated around 270 hours on the type. In comparison to the HPT-32, the HT-2 served the IAF well even though it was a very rudimentary aircraft. It definitely honed our skills in basic flying and for its age and vintage it was a good aeroplane that sufficed for our requirements.

The HPT-32 could have been a much better designed aircraft and should have served the IAF as long as the HT-2 or the Kiran. The design aspects required improvement. Like I said, the glide ratio, the spin characteristics, the power to weight ratio, poor climb performance, and so on. All this could have been much better. With the power of hindsight, I can say that HAL should have looked at a design that was little more futuristic even for a basic trainer. The HPT-32 entered service in the nineties and could have featured better avionics, an ejection seat, capability to teach somebody instrument landing procedures which occupies so much time on fighter aircraft. There were quite a few aspects on the HPT-32 which were lacking for a basic trainer in the nineties, and it was a design that was not ahead of its time.

HTT-40

In addition to flying the HT-2 and the HPT-32, I also s an opportunity to fly a prototype of the HTT-40. There of course will be a difference between a prototype aero plane and the aircraft which eventually enters serial production. The prototype HTT-40 which I flew was a little heavier than the PC-7 MKII and it had modern avionics. The cockpit comfort was very good and the aircraft had ejection seats. Its engine is also quite reliable. I did not undertake any manoeuvres or aerobatics nor did I fly the aircraft to the extremities of its envelope.

My Time with the HT-2

Air Marshal Anil Khosla retired from the Indian Air Force as Vice Chief of the Air Staff. He was commissioned into the Indian Air Force in December 1979.

My very first impression of the HT-2 as a cadet was that it looked simple and almost modest, yet purposeful. As a young flight cadet in the Indian Air Force during the early 1970s, my first encounter with the HT-2 was both exhilarating and a bit intimidating. The aircraft was a sleek, all-metal design with tandem seating and it was simple yet robust. The controls were responsive, but it demanded precision right from the start; a sloppy approach could lead to a bumpy landing on those narrow landing gear.

In total I flew a total of 215 hours on the HT-2. This included 40 hours of ab-initio training, 65 hours during the Flying Instructors’ Course, and 110 hours during instructing at Flying Instructors School (FIS) Tambaram. At FIS Tambaram I instructed on the HT-2 teaching young IAF pilots how to become instructors.

My abiding memories are vivid and multifaceted. I remember the distinctive sound of the engine starting up. I Remember the smell of gasoline during stall turns. One unforgettable sortie for me, was my second solo flight, during which, after take-off, I had an engine failure and had to force-land the aircraft.

The HT-2 was considered challenging to fly, however, it had many attributes that made it such a long-serving basic trainer in the Air Force. The HT-2 earned its reputation as challenging aircraft to fly as it tended to swing on the ground on landing. It required total concentration and focus to prevent over-controlling, especially in crosswinds.  It was known to be somewhat unforgiving if mishandled, especially in the stall/spin regime.

Yet, these very challenges made it an excellent trainer for basic flying skills. It remained in service for over three decades (from the 1950s until the late 1980s), with over 120 aircraft produced.

Its attributes included: –

• • Rugged airframe.

  • Easy to maintain (indigenously available spare parts).

  • Excellent visibility from the front cockpit.

  • Low operating costs.

  • Indigenous production with no dependency on foreign suppliers.

 The aspects of the HT-2 that I liked and disliked were many.

Likes:

• • Handling and Stability—perfect for building confidence in novices.

  • The response to controls was direct, making it great for learning coordination.

  • The bubble canopy and raised instructor’s seat provided panoramic views.

  • The engine was smooth and powerful enough for basic aerobatics.

  • Execution of aerobatic manoeuvres gave a lot of satisfaction and a boost to the confidence level.

Dislikes:

• • The narrow-track undercarriage made landings tricky as it was prone to swinging on the ground.

  • The seats weren’t the most ergonomic for extended sessions, causing back aches during prolonged flying.

  • The seat was fixed without height or position adjustment.

The parachute strapped to the pilot was not very comfortable or easy to bail out.

*****

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Notes:

[1] Global Security Org, “content” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/hpt-32.htm accessed on August 25, 2025

[2] Vijay Seth, The Flying Machines of the Indian Air Force 1933 – 1999  (New Delhi: Seth Communications, 2000), p. 41,

[3] Indian Navy NIC, “content” https://indiannavy.gov.in/content/dorniers-2

[4] Wg Cdr P Ashoka, Riding the Wind (New Delhi: Viji Books, 2011), p. 140.

[5] Vayu Aerospace Review 1984

[6] ibid

[7] Performance Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force, Report No. 3 of 2019

[8] Performance Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force, Report No. 3 of 2019

[9]  PIB.GOV.IN, “content”, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=75579&reg=3&lang=2 accessed on Oct 1, 2025.

[10]  Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force, Audit Report No. 34 of 2014

[11] Performance Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force, 2017

The post A History of Partnership: The Indian Air Force and Growth of Indigenous Basic Trainer Production in South India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: IAF, HAL, Bangalore, HTT-40, Basic Trainer

Introduction

The Indian Air Force (IAF) and its air bases in South India have a distinguished legacy of service to the nation and undertaking flight training. IAF air bases and training establishments located in the region have made it the ‘cradle’ of military flight training in India. Since Independence, the IAF’s requirements for training pilots for its helicopter and transport aircraft fleet have grown exponentially. Air Force Station Yelahanka is a unique station within the IAF, which not only has the responsibility of being the hub for transport and helicopter training but is also the home base for Aero India, which is one of the largest air shows in the world. AFS Yelahanka has a long and distinguished legacy that is the envy of many air forces worldwide. Yelahanka’s weather is ideal for year-round training with training days rarely being lost due to rain or poor visibility and an airspace that is well-managed and uncluttered. AFS Yelahanka is the jewel in the IAF’s crown for training of transport and helicopter personnel.

Setting the Foundations

Yelahanka’s history as an IAF air base stretches back over 80 years. It has its origins in the Second World War, when Prisoners of War (POW) were interned at various camps in India from 1941 to 1946. Bangalore was one of the locations where these POWs were kept in eight camps at Jakkur, Hebbal and Jalahalli. The POWs, who numbered over 20,000 were tasked with constructing three airfields in Bangalore at Jalahalli, Jakkur and Yelahanka.^[1]

Today only the airfields in Yelahanka and Jakkur are operational. Jakkur is home to the Government Flying Training School (GFTS) which is one of the oldest flying schools in India.^[2] The GFTS was started by the erstwhile Maharaja of Mysore’s Government and inaugurated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on December 28, 1948.^[3]

One of the first units located at RAF Station Yelahanka was the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) No. 225 Group Communication Flight. It was formed on July 1, 1942, at Jakkur and moved to Yelahanka on January 10, 1944.^[4] Several other RAF Squadrons were based in Yelahanka. No. 1672 (Mosquito) Conversion Unit, which operated between February – June 1944 and again from October 1944 – August 1945. No. 60 Squadron operated the Bristol Blenheim and later the Hawker Hurricane IIC between May – September 1943. No. 211 Squadron operated the Mosquito between June – July 1945. No. 684 Squadron, which operated in the photo reconnaissance role flew Mosquitoes and the Bristol Beaufighter between 1943-1946. No. 30 Squadron flew the Hawker Hurricane IIC and the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt between April – September 1944. No. 1302 (Meteorological) Flight flew at Yelahanka from July 1943 till it was disbanded in July 1946. No. 4 Squadron Royal Indian Air Force (Oorials) operated at Yelahanka with their Spitfire Mk VIIIs from December 1943 to February 1944 and again from April 1944 to March 1946.^[5]

On May 1, 1946, No. 225 Group Communication Flight moved to HAL Airfield, Bangalore and in June 1946, it was rechristened as No. 2 (Indian) Group Communication Flight. It was the last flying element to be transferred out of Yelahanka. The airfield later fell into disuse. On August 15, 1947, No. 2 (Indian) Group Communication Flight’s nomenclature was changed to No. 2 (Training) Group Flight. As on the day of India’s independence, No.2 (Indian) Group RAF was located at Bangalore, with Air Cmde CD Adams as Air Officer Commanding (AOC) responsible for Ground Training.^[6]

The IAF reorganized Air HQ in 1948, and on July 22, 1949, No. 2 (Training) Group was renamed as Training Command. HQ Training Command occupied the buildings of HQ No.2 (Training) Group RIAF at Bangalore High Grounds. Air Cmde RHD Singh was the first AOC and Gp Capt R Atmaram was the first Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) of Training Command.

The IAF’s Technical Training College (TTC) was established at Jalahalli in 1949 in collaboration with Air Service Training Ltd, Hamble, UK. Prior to the establishment of TTC, the IAF’s direct entry officers of the Technical Branch were trained in the UK Gp Capt MJ Kriplani took over as the first Indian Commandant of the TTC in July 1956. The TTC was renamed as Air Force Technical College (AFTC) in 1957.

In 1950, No. 2 (Training) Group Flight was renamed Transport Communication and Coordination Flight (TCCF) and remained at HAL airfield. It moved back to Yelahanka on June 4, 1964,[7] where the flight was established as a lodger unit of Transport Training Wing (TTW).

All flying establishments of the IAF were transferred to Training Command on 15 September 1954, making it responsible for the entire training in the IAF. HQ Training Command moved from High Grounds, Bangalore to Hebbal on May 31, 1958.

The President of India sanctioned upgradation of the rank of the post of Air Officer Commanding (AOC), Training Command on 08 April 1960 and re-designated the post as Air Officer Commanding in Chief (AOC-in-C). The permanent establishment of HQ Training Command at Hebbal was finally completed in 1968.

A New Beginning

Air Force Station Yelahanka was raised on August 1, 1963, following the 1962 Sino-India conflict. It was realised after the conflict that the IAF needed to expand its transport aircraft fleet. This resulted in the establishment of the Fixed Wing Training Faculty (FWTF) that has produced all of the transport pilots serving the IAF today. The FWTF is entrusted with the onerous task of conversion training of Transport Pilots and Navigators of IAF and other sister services. It also undertakes operational and RTR commitments assigned by HQ TC and Air HQ.

The FWTF has its roots in a conversion and training Squadron formed at Agra in 1948 which was relocated to Begumpet in 1957 and re-named as the Transport Training Wing (TTW). In 1963, after the Sino-India conflict and due to the necessity of expanding transport training in the IAF, the unit was divided into No 1 TTW at Begumpet and No 2 TTW at Yelahanka. No.2 TTW was established at Yelahanka, and the then deserted airfield was recommissioned in August 1963 under the command of Gp Capt PL Dhawan. He was one of the founding members of No.12 Squadron, the IAF’s first transport Squadron. He was awarded the Vir Chakra for his contributions in the Indo-Pak War of 1947-48 and was conferred with Bar to the Vir Chakra after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The Wing’s first batch of pilots were commissioned into service on December 31, 1963, and the 2^nd batch was commissioned on April 18, 1964.

In 1975, the Head Quarters Training Command Communications Flight (HQ TCCF) was established at AFS Yelahanka with HS-748 ‘Avro’ aircraft to undertake communication duties of dignitaries of all the three Services. The first HS-748 was inducted at AFS Yelahanka on July 10, 1974, and the full complement of aircraft were received by March 1975.^[8]

HQ TCCF remains operational today, making it one of the IAF’s longest-serving units, since it traces its origins to the RAF’s No. 225 Group Communication Flight. HQ TTCF AF presently operates two HS-748 aircraft being exclusively used for communication duties for military generals and other equivalent dignitaries. The unit has undertaken extensive communication duties for service and civil dignitaries over the last eight decades of its existence. The unit has an excellent flight safety record and has had no accidents to date.

The Dakota was inducted at Yelahanka in 1963 for transport pilot training as part of No.2 TTW. The Dakota performed this role till January 1975. In 1964, a Dakota from AFS Yelahanka was tasked with scattering the ashes of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.^[9]  Dakotas from AFS Yelahanka were also used in the 1965 war to ferry troops and supplies.

The DC-3 could accommodate 21 passengers and two crew members.  No.1 TTW merged with No. 2 TTW on January 1, 1968, to form a single TTW at Yelahanka. Initial conversion courses were conducted on Dakota Mk III and Mk IV. From 1972 – 1974 training was imparted to air force cadets from Iraq, Zambia, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Nepal. In January 1975, HS 748 aircraft replaced the Dakota, and the course was renamed Transport Conversion Course (TCC).^[10]

Duty with Valour

AFS Yelahanka was the nucleus of transport support operations south of Nagpur during the 1971 War with Pakistan. Before the hostilities began TTW took on the transport role. No.1 Air Delivery Flight was formed at Kanpur with personnel from TTW and flew 481 sorties, totaling 2,249 hours from 30 October 1971 to 03 January 1972. 25 tonnes of cargo was airlifted. ^[11]

In the Eastern Theatre a six aircraft detachment from AFS Yelahanka undertook paradrop operations near Dhaka. The six aircraft flew 100 hours towards paradrop operations, dropping 114 troops and three tonnes of equipment.

Airlift of refugees was also undertaken by these aircraft with a total of 151 hours flown and 52 tonnes of load, personnel and battle casualties carried. The aircraft from TTW and crew of this base were part of the task force assembled at Bihta for the historical Tangail Drop. The other IAF Squadrons that participated in the Tangail Drop were No.11, No.43 and No.49. From November 8 to 16, 1971, the wing’s aircraft flew 71 sorties over 198 hours from Hakimpet, transporting 27,095 tonnes of cargo. A detachment at Tambaram conducted reconnaissance flights along the Eastern Coast.

An element of two aircraft from TTW also formed the maritime component of the HQ Maritime Air Operations at Bombay. The two aircraft flew a total of 40 sorties, accumulating 237 hours from December 4 – 23, 1971.

Training Revamp

Today there are three technical flights at AFS Yelahanka which operate the Antonov An-32, Dornier Do-228 and Mil Mi-17. The An-32 and Mi-17 were inducted at AFS Yelahanka in 1986 and 1982 respectively, while the Do-228 was inducted for training in 1996.

The An-32 was inducted into the IAF in 1984 and inducted shortly thereafter in June 1986 at AFS Yelahanka. The station was placed on operational alert during Exercise Brasstacks with its An-32 and HS-748s, flying a total of 152 sorties totaling 263 hours. 1608 personnel and 13,345 kg of load were airlifted by these aircraft. During Op Pawan the station supported detachments belonging to No.7 Sqn, PTS and 12 Sqn. The station also maintained a detachment at AFS Tambaram for relief operations.

The Dornier Do-228 (built under license by HAL) was inducted at AFS Yelahanka in 1996. The establishment was subsequently renamed as the Fixed Wing Training Faculty (FWTF). Today, the training in FWTF is conducted in two stages — Stage II (T) and Stage III (T). The induction of the latest Glass Cockpit variant of the Do-228 at Yelahanka commenced in Oct 2023. Stage II (T) training is conducted as an integrated module comprising the Full Motion Full Mission Simulator and KD series aircraft. Stage III (T) training is conducted on the HM series of Do-228 aircraft.

AFS Yelahanka is also home to No. 112 Helicopter Unit (112 HU), the ‘Thoroughbreds’ which presently operate the Russian-origin Mil Mi-17 medium lift helicopters in the training role. 112 HU is christened as the Alma Mater of Heli-Lift and was honoured with the President’s Standard in March 2014.

112 HU was raised on August 1, 1963, at Jorhat with Bell 47 G helicopters. It was one of the first helicopter units in the Northeast. It was reequipped with Chetak (SA-316) helicopters on November 7, 1966, and moved to Bagdogra. The unit’s first Cheetah (SA-315) helicopters entered service in 1973. 112 HU moved to AFS Yelahanka in July 1982 and was re-equipped with Mi-8 ‘Pratap’ helicopters that same year. The first Pratap Pilot Conversion Course, to convert pilots from Chetak helicopters to Mi-8s was undertaken in July 1984. The training pattern was later modified and called Helicopter Conversion Course (HCC) which was the precursor to today’s Stage III (H) pilot training. 112 HU commenced the ab-initio Flt Eng Course for twin-engine Russian helicopters in Aug 1984 and Flt Gunners Course in Jul 1988.

The newer Mi-17 medium lift helicopters were inducted into 112 HU in February 2016. The Thoroughbreds bid farewell to their Mi-8s on December 2017 at AFS Yelahanka. The Mi-8s were instrumental in training IAF’s twin-engine helicopter pilots for more than four decades but by the time of their retirement were at the end of their life and demanded a high amount of maintenance.

Less than a handful of Mi-8s were operational by the time of their retirement from IAF service. As the Mi-8 neared its retirement, the IAF transferred its remaining Mi-8s to Yelahanka. In total, the IAF operated 10 HUs with the Mi-8. The last Mi-8 of the IAF received a special send off with Air Chief Marshal (Retd) FH Major at the controls of the helicopter on its final flight. ACM Major was the first helicopter pilot in the IAF to rise to the rank of Chief of the Air Staff (March 31, 2007 – May 31, 2009). On his final flight on the Mi-8, ACM FH Major had accumulated over 4,900 flight hours on the Mi-8.

The first Mi-8s arrived at docks in Bombay in 1971 and were formally inducted into service in 1972. The Mi-8 helicopters were a quantum leap ahead of the piston powered Mi-4 helicopters then operational with the IAF. Between 1971 and 1990, 107 Mi-8 helicopters were inducted into the IAF; 83 Mi-8 helicopters between 1971 and 1980 and a second batch of 17 Mi-8 helicopters were added between 1981 and 1990.

Since 2018, the medium lift helicopter training has been undertaken only on Mi-17. The Mi-17 features an AC-based electrical system as compared to Mi-8’s DC electrical system, which led to fewer snags and more reliable systems. The Mi-17s also have a more powerful engine and as compared to the Mi-8, does not face the issue of main rotor RPM dropping when operating at higher power regimes, thereby reducing sluggishness of controls.

Considering the sheer magnitude of the large number of aircraft that need to be maintained to generate a high sortie rate, the technical flights at AFS Yelahanka are often referred to as ‘Mini-BRDs’. Maintaining the legacy platforms is certainly demanding as the primary challenges lie in ensuring the availability of spares for aging systems, adapting older designs to modern operational requirements, and upgrading avionics to match current safety and efficiency standards.

Through Indigenisation of critical components, close coordination with HAL and OEMs, and rigorous preventive maintenance schedules, the engineering personnel at AFS Yelahanka have consistently kept these aircraft mission-ready, with the fleet remaining reliable workhorses for transport, training, and liaison duties.

In a tribute the aviator’s and their flying machines, past and present at AFS Yelahanka, ‘Vayu Path – The Aviation Gallery of Yelahanka” was inaugurated on December 22, 2025, by then Air-Officer-Commanding-in-Chief, Training Command, Air Marshal Tejinder Singh.

*****

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Notes:

^[1] CAPSS research visit to AFS Yelahanka, October 2025.

^[2] DYES Karnataka Govt, “https://dyes.karnataka.gov.in/7/The%20Government%20Flying%20Training%20School/en. Accessed on 15 October, 2025.

^[3] Naveen Menezes, “https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/experts-question-govt-s-move-to-relocate-jakkur-flying-school-to-mysuru-3832166, Deccan Herald, December 16, 2025. Accessed on December 20, 2025.

^[4] Anchit Gupta, “The Flying Wheelchair – Communication Flights in India”, https://iafhistory.in/2024/11/26/the-flying-wheelchair-communication-flights-in-india/, accessed on 20 October 2025.

^[5] CAPSS research visit to AFS Yelahanka, October 2025.

^[6] IAF NIC IN, https://indianairforce.nic.in/commands, accessed on 15 October

[7] Anchit Gupta, “The Flying Wheelchair – Communication Flights in India”, https://iafhistory.in/2024/11/26/the-flying-wheelchair-communication-flights-in-india/, accessed on 20 October 2025.

^[8] CAPSS research visit to AFS Yelahanka, October 2025.

^[9] ibid

^[10] ibid

^[11] ibid

The post Foundational Institution: AFS Yelahanka has a Distinguished Legacy of Service to the Nation that is the Envy of other IAF Stations appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: IAF, HAL, Bangalore, HTT-40, Basic Trainer

Introduction

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has a proud legacy of undertaking basic flight training in South India. IAF air bases and training establishments located in the region have made it the ‘cradle’ of military flight training in India. Since Independence, the IAF’s requirements for basic trainer aircraft have aided the growth of aeronautical manufacturing in Southern India. Since 1948, a total of three indigenous basic trainer aircraft, the HT-2, HPT-32 and more recently, the HTT-40, have been developed and manufactured in India. While the latter two basic trainers were vitally important in the growth of India’s nascent domestic aeronautical design and development capability, the completion of design and development of the HTT-40 signals the maturity of the nation’s domestic aerospace and defence ecosystem, which is today producing fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft, utility and attack helicopters. The first HTT-40 is now slated to be delivered to the IAF in 2026.

As we strive towards the goal of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and self-sufficiency in defence production, it is important to note that the IAF, from 1948 till now, continues to drive the growth of India’s aeronautical industry and will continue to do so

This is the final part of a 3-part series on indigenously developed basic trainers for the Indian Air Force

PART III

Milestone Moment

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is to begin deliveries of the indigenously designed and developed Hindustan Turbo Trainer 40 (HTT-40) to the IAF in the first half of 2026. The commencement of deliveries of a new domestic basic trainer will mark an important milestone in India’s history of domestically developed military aircraft. The HTT-40 has been entirely designed, developed, and flight tested by HAL, following in the footsteps of the Hindustan Trainer 2 (HT-2) and the Hindustan Piston Trainer 32 (HPT-32) Deepak. The commencement of HTT-40 deliveries will be a milestone moment for the IAF and India’s aerospace and defence ecosystem, which has come together to once again deliver an indigenous BTA, as in years past with the HT-2 and HPT-32.

Training Need

The induction of the HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA) will be a much-needed boost to the IAF, which has a longstanding requirement for 181 such aircraft. This need was partially met with the induction of 75 Swiss Pilatus PC-7 Mk II BTAs, introduced into service between February 2013 and November 2015. The HTT-40 will operate alongside the PC-7 MkII in the Stage I basic flying training role.

The HTT-40 will be used for basic flight training, aerobatics, instrument flying, close formation flight training, navigation and night flying. HAL also has plans for a future weaponised variant intended for weapons training, Counterinsurgency (COIN) and limited strike missions. This variant will have four pylons for carrying weapons and other stores, and could also be fitted with a Head Up Display (HUD). The tandem-seat turboprop basic trainer is also a fully aerobatic aircraft.

The IAF has played a pioneering role in the use of simulators for training, and HAL will deliver several synthetic training aids for the HTT-40, including a Fixed Base Full mission Simulator (FBFMS), Cockpit Procedure Trainer (CPT) and Avionics Part Task Trainer (APTT). It is expected that 30 per cent of the training on the HTT-40 will be met through synthetic training.

The IAF had earlier acquired two FBFMS, three CPTs and one APTT for its PC-7 MKII fleet.

Origins

In 2009, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had decided that the IAF’s BTA requirement for 181 aircraft would be met with 75 trainers to be imported and 106 of an indigenously developed type. The IAF opted for the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 MKII in May 2012 to meet its urgent need for Stage 1 BTA. All 75 aircraft ordered were delivered by 2015. An options clause for 38 additional PC-7 MKIIs was cleared by the DAC in March 2015, but orders were never placed.

The IAF originally issued its Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirement (PSQR) for the HTT-40 in 2009. The Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for a new indigenously designed and developed BTA was accorded by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) in February 2010. At the time, HAL was to have completed the maiden flight of the HTT-40 by February 2013, obtained certification by 2015, and begun deliveries by 2017. HAL began design and development work on the HTT-40 in earnest from August 2013, when it decided to proceed with the programme using internal funding. Company funds worth INR 177 crore were sanctioned by HAL to undertake the Preliminary Design Phase (PDP) and Detailed Design Phase (DDP) activities of the HTT-40 at the Aircraft Research & Design Centre (AERDC) in Bengaluru.

The first HTT-40 prototype (PT-1) made its maiden flight in Bengaluru on May 31, 2016, and the trainer’s first public flight took place in Bengaluru on June 17, 2016, in the presence of then Defence Minister, the late Dr Manohar Parrikar. During his visit, he made the first official announcement that additional HTT-40s would be procured and that further import of basic trainer aircraft would be capped.[1] At the time, he had stated that the total number of BTAs required would increase from 181 to 210. The second HTT-40 prototype (PT-2) took to the air in June 2022. To reduce the effort required during User Evaluation Trials (UET), a team of test pilots from ASTE were deputed for User Assisted Technical Trials (UATT). Pilots from the IAF’s Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) also flew sorties for assessing cockpit ergonomics, performance and handling, including stall, prior to the commencement of UETs.[2]

Certification from the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) was obtained in February 2025.

The delays in the HTT-40 programme can be attributed to several reasons, including the excessive weight of the prototype aircraft, obsolescence of the Engine Electronic Controller (EEC) on the Honeywell TPE331-12B turboprop engine powering the aircraft, and COVID-19.[3] HAL had issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a turboprop engine for the HTT-40 in June 2012 and selected the TPE331-12B turboprop engine in June 2015.[4]

                                    HAL HTT-40 Original Delivery Schedule

HAL finally awarded Honeywell a contract worth over USD100 million in July 2021 for 88 TPE331-12B engines/kits along with maintenance and support services. The engines will be assembled under license from Honeywell at HAL’s Engine Division in Bengaluru and maintenance infrastructure for the engine will also be created in India.

HAL had initially proposed to the IAF that initial Limited Series Production aircraft to be delivered would be powered by CAT-B engines, which were originally with the UK Royal Air Force (RAF). These engines were available to HAL after completion of full major overhaul with life restored back to 100 per cent (10,000 hours). [5] They were later to be replaced by brand-new engines and the CAT-B engines would be retained as spares.

The two flying prototypes of the HTT-40 are powered by CAT-B engines.

One of the other important but protracted phases in the development of the HTT-40 was spin trials. Six-turn spin (RHS and LHS) capability was successfully demonstrated towards the end of 2019, followed by eight-turn spin capability in 2020. HAL also benefited from consultations with Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales (ONERA) of France, which suggested the incorporation of a ventral fin to aid spin trials. ONERA had been contracted by HAL to undertake rotary balance wind tunnel tests for HTT-40 spin trials.^[6]

According to a former HAL official involved in the design and development of the HTT-40, the flying characteristics of the HTT-40 are comparable to the Kiran jet trainer. He stated that HAL test pilots were happy with the HTT-40’s docile handling qualities, with the stall behaviour and maneuvrability being good. There is a high level of commonality between equipment fitted on the HTT-40 and what is used on LCA ‘Tejas’, HJT-36 IJT, ALH, LUH and Dornier Do-228. The Landing Gear and Cockpit Canopy were designed and fabricated by HAL.

Delivering on a Promise

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), led by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, approved[7] the procurement of 106 HTT-40 aircraft on August 11, 2020. At that time, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had stated that post certification of the HTT-40, 70 aircraft would be procured initially from HAL, with a balance of 36 aircraft to be procured after the trainer was operationalised by the IAF. HAL announced in February 2021 at the Aero India airshow that it had received a Request for Proposal (RFP) from the IAF for 70 HTT-40 trainers with provision for 38 additional aircraft.[8]

The RFP was issued five years after the maiden flight of the first HTT-40 prototype in May 2016. HAL was awarded the contract for 70 HTT-40s in October 2022, worth approximately INR 6,828 Crore.^[9] The HTT-40 will be manufactured at two production lines established by Hindustan Aeronautics at its Aircraft Division, Bengaluru and Aircraft Manufacturing Division, Nasik, with the bulk of production to be undertaken at the latter facility. HAL has stated plans to attain a peak production rate of 20 HTT-40s per annum.

The second HTT-40 production line at HAL’s Nashik facility was formally inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on October 17, 2025. The assembly complex houses structural assembly shops for the manufacture of HTT-40 fuselages, wings and control surfaces.^[x]

While deliveries of the HTT-40 were planned to begin in September 2025, the IAF is now likely to receive its first aircraft in 2026. Deliveries of all 70 aircraft are to be completed by HAL by March 2030.

Training Impact

The IAF has one of the largest requirements in the Indo-Pacific region for trained pilots, navigators and weapon systems officers. Over two decades ago, the air force had planned to train 220 pilots annually during 2001-05; however, as per information provided by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to the Parliamentary Standing Committee, there was a shortfall ranging from 15 to 31 per cent. A decade later, in February 2015, the IAF assessed that it had a shortage of 486 pilots. At that time, the air force had proposed to increase the number of trainees from 260 to 350 pilots every year by 2017.

A 2024 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Training of Pilots in Indian Air Force presented in Parliament in December 2024 stated that “between the period 2016 to 2021, against the planned initial intake of 222 trainees annually, the initial annual intake ranged between 158 and 204 trainees. Also, the annual intake after wastage ranged between 124 and 167. As a result, the shortage of pilots rose from 486 to 596, which was expected to be filled up between January 2021 and January 2030,” the CAG report informed.

The IAF has a pressing need to have its requirement for 181 basic trainers fulfilled, but this has been impacted by the delay in deliveries of the HTT-40.  The IAF’s Stage I requirement will only be fully met when induction of all 108 HTT-40s is complete, joining the present fleet of 74 PC-7 MK IIs.

New Age Trainer

The HTT-40 is fitted with a state-of-the-art glass cockpit and modern avionics and can attain a maximum speed of 450 kilometres per hour, along with a maximum service ceiling of six kilometres. The HTT-40 is powered by a single Honeywell TPE331-12B turboprop engine fitted with a four-blade lightweight Hartzell aluminium propeller. TPE 331-5 turboprop engines have been produced at HAL since 1988, and its engine division is also an authorised service centre for TPE331-5 to –12 series engines.

Each aircraft features two Martin-Baker Mk16 Zero-Zero ejection seats. There are over 1,000 Martin-Baker Seats already in service in the IAF and Indian Navy. The aircraft also features indigenously developed avionics for radio communication, standby communication, VOR-ILS, TACAN, Radio Altimeter, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS).

The HTT-40 has a glide ratio of 12:1 and a maximum load factor +6/-3 G. HAL quotes a Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) of 3,040 kg with 460 kg of internal fuel. However, the normal training weight of the aircraft will be 2,800 kg. The time to climb to three km is quoted at 7.05 minutes, while the service ceiling is six km. The aircraft will have a maximum range of just over1,000 km and a maximum endurance of four hours.

The HTT-40 is capable of hot-refuelling, which allows the aircraft to be refuelled with the engine running. It is also capable of undertaking a running change, where, with the engine running, the propellers can be put into reverse, changing the blade angle. This results in no rotor downwash, allowing the canopy to be opened and the next cadet to strap into the aircraft. The HTT-40 flight test crew have rated cockpit visibility, crew comfort and the Environmental Control System as excellent. During conducted hot weather trials at Nashik, the cockpit temperature was maintained at a comfortable 25 °C as against an outside air temperature of 47 °C.

The HTT-40 features a largely all-metal construction and makes limited use of composites. HAL has put in extensive effort to ensure that the aircraft is easily maintainable, with the aim of achieving a high daily sortie rate along with high flight line availability. The indigenously developed BTAs are expected to fly 300 hours annually and will have a Total Technical Life (TTL) of 10,000 hours/30 years. HAL aims to deliver a 1200-hour Time Between Overhaul (TBO).^[11]

Development of indigenous military platforms has substantially spun off to the local industry. The HTT-40 is expected to have an indigenous content of 56 per cent for the initial aircraft produced, and this will progressively increase to over 60 per cent over the course of the programme through indigenisation of major components and subsystems. The HTT-40 programme could eventually provide direct employment to approximately 1,500 personnel, along with indirect employment for up to 3,000 people spread over more than 100 MSMEs.

Training Day

Basic Flight Training is the bedrock of IAF training for its pilots and aircrew, and the induction of the HTT-40 into service will provide a much-needed boost in BTA numbers for the IAF. The IAF is rapidly inducting new fighter aircraft, transport aircraft and helicopters, and the availability of sufficient numbers of trained pilots and aircrew is vitally important.

The HTT-40 marks the return of an indigenously developed BTA into the air force, and this is very welcome indeed. Hindustan Aeronautics will need to ensure that it delivers the promised aircraft on time, with high standards of quality, and is well supported in terms of maintenance and spare parts. The imminent induction of the HTT-40 into IAF service marks a new chapter for India’s military aviation and self-reliance and continues the legacy of the HT-2 and HPT-32.

*****

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Notes:

[1] Atul Chandra, “https://www.flightglobal.com/india-taps-locally-made-htt-40-as-next-basic-trainer/120919.article”, Flight Global, June 21, 2016. Accessed on December 20, 2025.

[2] Mr R Madhavan, HAL CMD in Q&A with author, 10-29-2020.

[3] Mr. Prashant Singh Bhadoria, Project Manager for HTT 40 in Q&A with author 11-30-2020

[4] Show News, https://aviationweek.com/shownews/paris-airshow/honeywell-provide-engines-hal-made-indian-training-aircraft, Aviation Week, June 17, 2015, Accessed on December 20, 2025.

[5] Mr. Prashant Singh Bhadoria, Project Manager for HTT 40 in Q&A with author 11-30-2020

^[6] Atul Chandra, “India’s Homegrown Trainer” Air Forces Monthly January 2021, p.85

[7] Press information Bureau, Government of India, “DAC approves procurement proposals worth Rs 8,722.38 crore, including 106 Basic Trainer Aircraft for IAF,” August 11, 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1645092&reg=3&lang=2. Accessed on December 20, 2025.

[8] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “ HAL receives Request for Proposal for 70 HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft from Indian Air Force at Aero India 2021,” February 04, 2021, https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1695163&reg=3&lang=2. Accessed on December 20, 2025.

^[9] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Union Cabinet approves procurement of 70 HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft from HAL for Indian Air Force at a cost of over Rs 6,800 crore,” March 01, 2023,  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1903445&reg=3&lang=2. Accessed on September 1, 2025.

^[10] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Flight of self-reliance: Raksha Mantri inaugurates 3rd Production Line of LCA Mk1A & 2nd Production Line of HTT-40 at HAL Nashik,” October 17, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2180339&reg=3&lang=1. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

^[11] CAPSS research visit to HAL, August 2025.

The post A History of Partnership: The Indian Air Force and the Growth of Indigenous Basic Trainer Production in South India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: IAF, HAL, HT-2, HPT-32, HTT-34, HTT-40, Basic Trainer

Introduction

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has a proud legacy of undertaking basic flight training in South India. IAF air bases and training establishments located in the region have made it the ‘cradle’ of military flight training in India. Since Independence, the IAF’s requirements for basic trainer aircraft have also aided in the growth of aeronautical manufacturing in Southern India. Since 1948, a total of three indigenous basic trainer aircraft, the HT-2, HPT-32 and more recently, the HTT-40, have been developed and manufactured in India. While the latter two basic trainers were vitally important in the growth of India’s nascent domestic aeronautical design and development capability, the completion of design and development of the HTT-40 signals the maturity of the nation’s domestic aerospace and defence ecosystem, which is today producing fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft, utility and attack helicopters. The first HTT-40 is slated to be delivered to the IAF this September

As we strive towards the goal of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and self-sufficiency in defence production, it is important to note that the IAF has driven the growth of India’s aeronautical industry since 1948 and will continue to do so.

This is part one of a three-part series on indigenously developed basic trainers for the Indian Air Force.

PART 1

Early Days

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as we know it today was originally registered by Seth Walchand Hirachand as Hindustan Aircraft Limited under the Mysore Companies Act on December 23, 1940. The work on India’s first aircraft factory formally commenced on January 12, 1941, when the foundation stone was laid for HAL’s Bangalore factory. The fledgling Hindustan Aircraft Limited assembled its first aircraft, a Harlow trainer, which flew within eight months of the company’s registration. The first local orders for aircraft production in India were awarded to HAL for assembly under license of 20 Harlow PC-5 trainers, 48 Curtiss 75A-SP Hawk fighters and 74 Vultee V-12-D attack bombers, to aid the WW II effort. [1]

By December 1942, control of Hindustan Aircraft was ceded to the United States (US) Tenth Air Force for the duration of World War II. [2] Following the end of World War II, the control of Hindustan Aircraft reverted to the Government of India in December 1945. [3] Bangalore was selected over Barrackpore and Poona to be the hub of aircraft manufacture in post-Independence India, as it was only at Hindustan Aircraft’s factories that the whole process of building an aircraft from semi-finished material had been undertaken, prior to Independence. [4]

Importantly, post-Independence, HAL immediately began the overhaul and reconstruction of approximately 150 Tiger Moth basic trainers and wartime residual Harvard advanced trainers. [5] This was crucial in allowing the IAF to begin elementary flying training immediately after Independence. HAL’s first license-produced aircraft after Independence was also a trainer aircraft, the Percival P.40 Prentice. The Prentice was developed to meet the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) requirement for a basic trainer aircraft to replace the Tiger Moth. A total of 375 units of this type were delivered to the RAF, with Argentina, India, and Lebanon being its other customers. [6] The Prentice was the RAF’s first side-by-side trainer and was also unique in that a second student could be accommodated in the rear cockpit to observe the instructor and student pilot in front!

To meet the IAF’s urgent need for a basic trainer aircraft, HAL produced sixty-five P.40 Prentice under license in just over a year. [7] The first Indian assembled Prentice made its maiden flight with HAL’s CTP Capt Jimmy Munshi at the controls on April 30, 1948. [8]

Note: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was formed on October 1, 1964, as the amalgamation of two companies, i.e. Hindustan Aircraft Limited and Aeronautics India Limited (created for license-production of the MiG-21 aircraft under license).

On a Wing and a Prayer

During 1947-48, discussions were held on the type of aircraft that would be designed for the first time in India. The IAF requirement for a basic trainer aircraft was accepted, and the Government of India sanctioned the development of such a type on October 11, 1948, which would also be used by flying clubs. It is interesting to note that the original plans called for three indigenous trainer aircraft types to be developed: the Hindustan Trainer 2 (HT-2) primary trainer, HT-10 advanced trainer, and HT-11 intermediate trainer. [9] However, the latter two never progressed beyond the mockup stage.

In any event, work proceeded swiftly on the HT-2 and its full-scale mockup was ready by August 1949, less than a year from programme sanction. The first HT-2 prototype (VT-DFW) made its maiden flight on August 5, 1951, and the second prototype (VT-DCG) took to the air for the first time on February 19, 1952. In a landmark moment for Indian aviation, the HT-2 received its Type Certificate on January 3, 1953, and was formally inducted into the IAF on January 10, 1955. [10]

The HT-2 replaced the long-serving Tiger Moth and initially operated alongside the Prentice.

In 1955, the indigenous trainer type was inducted into the Flight Instructors School at Tambaram and No.2 Air Force Academy, Begumpet, with pupils logging 40 hours on the aircraft before proceeding to the Harvard. The HT-2 was used to train cadets of No. 68 Pilot Instruction Course in 1955, and by the time of the 72^nd Course, the indigenous trainer had replaced the Prentice entirely. [11]

An all-metal piston-engine basic trainer, the HT-2 was powered by a 155-HP Cirrus Major III four-cylinder air-cooled piston engine with a two-blade fixed-pitch propeller. It could attain a maximum speed of 209 kmph. It had a range of 560 km and a service ceiling of 14,500 feet. Flight endurance was just under four hours.

In his autobiography ‘Riding the Wind’, Wing Commander P Ashoka provides an insight into the HT-2. “It was a tail wheel aircraft, requiring just that much greater attention during take-off and landing. It had conventional manual flight controls and an elevator trim tab. The controls were well harmonised and pleasant to feel. Though quite underpowered, it was still a fully aerobatic machine.” [12]

The HT-2 also served with the Indian Navy for a short period, less than a decade, during which three aircraft were operated for ab-initio flying training. The Navy’s first Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) was commissioned on May 11, 1953, at Venduruthy II, Kochi and recommissioned as INAS 550 on June 15, 1959. The HT-2 was inducted into the FRU in October 1956 and phased out of service by 1964. [13] HAL ceased production of the HT-2 in 1958 after manufacturing approximately 166 aircraft, out of which 150 were delivered to the air force.

The HT-2 was later also re-engined in the mid-eighties with the Avco Lycoming AEIO-320-D2B engine, receiving the designation HT-2L. Limited numbers of HT-2s were re-engined and operated by the Flying Instructor’s School (FIS) at AFS Tambaram. [14]  The last of the HT-2s were finally retired from service in 1989.  According to one estimate, over 5,500 air force, army and navy pilots trained on the HT-2. [15]

In the final analysis, the HT-2, as India’s first indigenous aircraft and one specifically designed for the IAF, can undoubtedly be considered a success. According to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, a total of 169 HT-2s were produced. [16] The HT-2s with the IAF served the nation for 34 years and helped not only solidify the foundation of IAF flight training but also that of aircraft manufacturing in India.

Overseas Sojourn

The HT-2 was also the first Indian designed and developed military aircraft to be exported. This was no small feat for newly independent India, and it remains the only indigenously developed fixed-wing military aircraft exported by India. Ghana acquired 12 aircraft, which it operated from 1959 to 1974. The Air Force deputed Wing Commander LM Katre (later CAS and CMD, HAL) to convert a few Ghanaian instructors on the type. [17]

It is interesting to note, however, that at least two of the Ghanaian aircraft, following their retirement from service, made their way to South Africa and were later offered for sale as restoration projects.[18] The HT-2 also made it as far afield as Australia with two demonstrator aircraft (VT-DIJ and VT-DJQ/VH-AWL) flying in-country from 1957-1960. Two aircraft were also sent to Singapore and Indonesia.

One of the HT-2s (VH-AWL) imported to Australia undertook a demonstration tour in June 1958, where the aircraft flown by Flt Lt Sunandan Roy, a HAL test pilot, demonstrated the type to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and several flying clubs in Sydney, New South Wales, Melbourne, Victoria, Adelaide, South Australia and Brisbane, Queensland.  One of the aerobatic demonstrations involved an eight-turn spin followed by low-level cloverleaf loops, with steep turns and slow rolls in a reciprocal direction. [19]

However, during a demonstration in Brisbane that same year, an aircraft impacted the ground, sustaining extensive damage and injuring the pilot. The aircraft was returned to India, but by the time a replacement aircraft arrived in Australia and conducted a sales tour, Royal Air Force (RAF) surplus Chipmunks were available to aero clubs, and the HT-2 received no orders. This aircraft was later returned to India and did not receive an Australian registration. [10]

INTERVIEW: Air Commodore KA Muthanna (Retd).

Air Commodore KA Muthanna retired as Chief of Test Flying (Fixed Wing) at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. He was commissioned into the Indian Air Force in June 1981.

I passed out of NDA in 1980, and in the second half of that year. I was to fly the HT-2 as a cadet in the No. 127 Pilots Course. We were all wide-eyed at the sight of the first powered aircraft that we would fly. There was excitement, apprehension, and some of us felt overwhelmed. At that stage, we had no knowledge of how to pilot this aircraft, as we had never flown a powered aircraft before.

After passing out of NDA, we went to Bidar and did the Maintenance Conversion Flight (MCF) on the HT-2. This was basically where we did ground training on the HT-2. Thereafter, we went to Dundigal and conducted dual-check sorties, which involved around eight instruction sorties. The HT-2 was a tail-wheel aircraft, yeah, so the first impression you had while sitting in the cockpit was that only you could see the sky! We could not see anything in front of us. As a result, while taxying out on the runway, I had to weave around the centreline and look out from the side of the cockpit to see where I was going. Also, when taking off on the HT-2, you had to push the stick forward to raise the tail wheel, then pull it back for liftoff.

In total, I must have flown around 40 hours on the HT-2 during my six months of basic training. Our course was also the last, in which cadets would get to fly this aircraft solo. Somewhere halfway through our course, or not even halfway (at least, definitely after I went solo), we had a fatal accident. One of the cadets stalled the aircraft while turning onto finals and went into the ground. Due to this and their history with the type, they stopped cadets from flying solo on this aircraft, and thereafter they only flew something called Dolo, which meant having an instructor sitting quietly behind.

My instructor was not too happy with my landing on my first solo flight.  On the HT-2, during the final approach, we had to perform a ‘round-off’. So, when we were about a foot or so off the runway, we had to drop the aircraft on the runway, so that it wouldn’t swing on landing, something the HT-2 was very prone to do.  Hence, it was mandated that, when coming in for landing, if the pilot was not happy with his height at which he ‘rounded off’ (this is known as a flare in a jet aircraft), then he had to go around and attempt the landing again. What I did was open the throttle, let the aircraft descend a little more, then close it and land! My instructor was not happy!

Later, when I moved on to the Kiran Intermediate Jet Trainer as part of my training, I realised that the faster Kiran was easier to fly than the HT-2.

Interestingly, six years later, I got to fly the HT-2 again, this time while doing my trainee instructor course at the Flying Instructors School (FIS) in Tambaram. We had to fly both the HT-2 and the Kiran equally, and this time we had to fly the HT-2 from the rear cockpit. Now, since many of us had done fighter flying, we were walking with a swagger, but the HT-2 brought us back down to Mother Earth! Frontal visibility, which was always poor on the HT-2, was even worse when in the rear seat with another pilot in front of you!

I did another 20 hours on the HT-2 and never flew it again for the rest of my career. When you consider that the HT-2 was developed just a few years after the end of World War II, we can certainly consider it a good design and an aircraft that served the air force well and for a long time.

*****

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Notes:

[1] Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Indian Aircraft Industry (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011), p. 45.

[2] Ibid., p.52.

[3] Ibid., p.52.

[4] Ibid., p.52.

[5] Ibid., p.52.

[6] “Digital Archive,” International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/files/original/1371/23293/PThomasAF20080027.2.jpg. Accessed on August 18, 2025.

[7] Ibid., p.110.

[8] Ibid., p.110.

[9] Ibid., p.111.

[10] Ibid., p.114.

[11] Kapil Bhargava, “HT-2 – India’s First Powered Aircraft,” Bharat Rakshak, November 30, 1999,  https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/iaf/aircraft/past/hal-ht2/. Accessed on June 22, 2025

[12] Wing Commander P Ashoka, Riding the Wind (New Delhi: Viji Books, 2011), p. 130.

[13] Indian Navy, “Dorniers,” https://indiannavy.gov.in/content/dorniers-2. Accessed on July 07, 2025.

[14] “HAL HT-2 [IX480],” Warbirds of India, November 25, 2008, https://www.warbirds.in/karnataka/bangalore/hal/hal-ht-2-ix480. Accessed on July 10, 2025.

[15] Vijay Seth, The Flying Machines of the Indian Air Force 1933–1999 (New Delhi: Seth Communications, 2000), p. 41.

[16] Author’s research visit to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.

[17] Bharat Rakshak, n. 11.

[18] David C Eyere, “Hindustan HT-2,” Aeropedia, August 25, 2019, https://aeropedia.com.au/content/hindustan-ht-2/. Accessed on June 25, 2025.

[19] Ibid.

[20]  Ibid.

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Keywords: IAF MiG-23BN, RSBN-6, PRMG, AN/ALE-44 CMDS, Mk.10 IFF, Tarang RWR, Operation Safed Sagar

In our previous interview segment with Air Commodore Ashit Mehta (Retd), we discussed the role of the MiG-23BN in the Indian Air Force (IAF) and what life was like in a ground attack Squadron of the IAF. In this segment, we will take a dive into how Close Air Support (CAS) now known as Battlefield Air Strike (BAS) and Air Interdiction (AI) work, and how this was put to test in a rather unorthodox situation–the Kargil Conflict, during which principles of CAS, evolved over the years for flat terrain, were modified and used successfully in mountainous terrain, for the first time in the history of military aviation. Air Commodore Ashit Mehta was at the forefront of this adaptation, as he was the Commanding Officer (CO) of No.221 Squadron ‘Valiants,’ flying the MiG-23BN, and also took part in Operation Safed Sagar.

Section 1: Tactics and Training

How does the IAF keep its pilots adequately trained in CAS? How is training for firing/dropping weapons during peacetime?

As part of our flight training and maintenance of flying currency, all operational pilots need to practice OAS (Operational Air Support) flying. The OAS is split into CAS (Close Air Support) and AI (Air Interdiction). The purpose of CAS is to support our Army in achieving their offensive or defensive objectives. IAF is requested for CAS support when the ground forces face any major fire/offensive action from the enemy that is beyond their capability to tackle/ engage. IAF, through a planned and coordinated system, provides these support missions. CAS is always under the real-time guidance and coordination of a FAC (Forward Air Controller). Whereas AI are missions flown to attack the assets/ infrastructure/lines of communication or back support of the enemy ground forces, with the aim of cutting off the replenishment of supplies, weapons, and forces to the enemy forces in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). For example, it could be an attack on a bridge/ railway junction, or a convoy that is likely to support the enemy forces engaged with our ground forces.

The training for CAS and AI is conducted almost every quarter through a proper process involving command-level planners, Army liaison officers, joint operational unit personnel, and IAF fighter squadron pilots. This is essential training and needs very precise and detailed planning, as it is a high-risk exercise and the usual Q&As for practice firing are not available. During the CAS exercise, an FAC guides the Fighters to the target through a planned and practiced process. In the case of AI missions, they also need to be very well planned and executed.

These exercises are of high risk, as pilots are guided towards ground targets that are at times mobile. This makes it very difficult for fighter pilots to visually acquire targets because of their small size and the high speeds of the aircraft. At times, when the targets are visually picked up, the aircraft is too close to the target or not aligned with the target and has to be manoeuvred. This at times results in engagement ranges being too short and the pull-out height being too low to pull out safely. Pilots are normally used to carrying out these attacks over a well-developed, defined, and integrated air-to-ground firing range, like Pokharan in Rajasthan, Sarmat in Gujarat, and SK in Punjab. Here, each dive or level attack is closely monitored under the expert eyes of the Range Safety Officer (RSO) and their team.

For weapons training, the MiG-23BN often carried the CBLS (Carrier Bomb Light Stores) pod, loaded with 3 kg and/or 25 Lb practice bombs. This allows pilots to rehearse attack profiles without expending operational/real ordnance, which is very expensive. These light bombs have been developed to exhibit ballistics exactly like a live bomb, in terms of their forward throw and trajectory. A 3 kg bomb behaves like a set of Retarder Bombs (those which can be dropped from low altitude in level flight), and they have drag chutes to ensure that the bomb will decelerate and explode well after the fighter has gone past the target in terms of safety.

Since you mentioned the potential risks involved in flying CAS missions, could you explain what a standard CAS mission looks like?

CAS is a type of mission where you are striking enemy targets that are situated very close to friendly forces, and that is how the term ‘Close Air Support’ originated. To enhance interoperability between various forces, in this case, the Indian Army and the IAF, there is something called the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) that coordinates such operations. In the IAF’s case, the MiG-23BNs and MiG-27s were designated for CAS missions, and they would be on alert to meet any such requirements. We, of course, had the SEPECAT (Société Européenne de Production de l’avion École de Combat et d’Appui Tactique) Jaguar, but they were specialised in striking high-value and strategic targets deep inside enemy territory, so they were rarely involved in CAS.

The distance between our own troops and the enemy’s is marked by an imaginary Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). When we are briefed for CAS missions, we are given a rough idea of where our own troops are, where the enemy is, what their potential objective is, and where we expect them to intrude on our territory/clash with our ground troops. In most circumstances, we try to conduct CAS and Air Interdiction (AI) simultaneously. For now, let’s just focus on CAS.

The entire principle of CAS is to support our own ground forces in their tasks of undertaking offensive or defensive action. Whenever our Army faces a major challenge from the enemy that is beyond our Army’s capabilities or range, they will request a CAS mission. CAS is undertaken to attack enemy troops and their war-waging capabilities in terms of their tanks/guns/other offensive equipment/communications, etc.

CAS and AI missions are also dangerous, as one is operating very much within the firing range of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems) and anti-aircraft gun systems. MANPADS and heavy machine guns have become more common, like what we saw during the Kargil Conflict, but the point is to still retain a certain degree of surprise when attacking enemy troops. The aim is not just to strike the advancing enemy, but to minimise their effectiveness by giving them very little time to react. Another way this is done is by making sure that the entry and exit points of your attack run are kept as unpredictable as possible, so as to keep the enemy air defences confused and delay their detection of the striking aircraft.

As we had discussed earlier, the various flying periods determined by bird activity also influence our attack patterns. During green periods, it is easy to fly in low and perform what we call a Lay Down Attack (LDA), wherein the aircraft flies over the target and drops the bombs in level flight, from a distance from the target so that the bomb glides accurately and explodes close to/on the target. During the red period, we often use dive attacks so that we don’t come too close to the ground, and risk getting hit by birds, MANPADS, and anti-aircraft guns. However, the attack patterns aren’t just determined by bird activity, but also by nature, numbers, and size of the targets being attacked. Of course, CAS tactics have changed drastically over the past 25 years, with the advent of precision-guided munitions and other means of standoff capability.

CAS is achieved through collaboration between the Army and the Air Force, so we have an operations centre set up at the air base, where a Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) representing the Army is posted. Once a request is received from the Army, they would relay the coordinates and other specifics of the area that is to be struck. Similarly, there is also an Air Force liaison who is attached to the forward location with the Army to coordinate CAS. Apart from the liaisons themselves, there is a system called Forward Air Controller (FAC), wherein a pilot, usually a junior pilot who is trained to coordinate airstrikes, is deputed to the forward unit that is expected to witness an immediate threat from the enemy, generally at the brigade level.

Now, based on the target information received, in terms of the latitude and longitude of the enemy’s position/movements, we have to decide something called a contact point – a predetermined, prominent feature or a landmark from where the FAC would guide the strike. So, once the aircraft is fueled and loaded, we take off and head to the contact point.

One may ask, “Why do we need a contact point when we know the location of the enemy?” In reality, when the GLO receives the coordinates, it is not a fixed point or a location, but rather a box area between a few coordinates where the enemy is present. In most cases, the enemy is mobile, meaning they are in motion somewhere within that particular area. So, the updated location of the target is only known to the FAC. So that is why a contact point is established beforehand, so that the FAC can use that position relative to guide the attacking aircraft to the moving target.

When we take off and fly towards the contact point, we constantly keep a watch on our Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) over the landmark. About one minute to the contact point, we switch over to the Radio Frequency (RF) on which the FAC guides the mission, and the FAC says something like “set course to 030 over contact point, speed 840 kmph, fly for 1 minute 30 seconds.” Very little information is provided initially to ensure that we maintain surprise. As soon as we near the Contact Point (CP), all members in our formation set their clocks to the ready position, and as and when we pass over the Contact Point, we start our watches, and in this case, it is bank 030. As we turn, we also tell the FAC to start their clock, so that the stop-clocks of both the FAC and ours are synchronised.

The FAC guides you through the run (by giving a running commentary) to the target, with something like “Maintain 450 knots and fly for 1 minute 30 seconds… at 30 seconds on your track, you will notice a culvert… 45 seconds on the right side of your track you will notice a cluster of white buildings or a Gurudwara, with a lake beside it… 1 minute and 10 seconds, you will see a railway station…” and so on. The FAC is basically guiding you to the target using other landmarks along the way between the Contact Point and the target, to ensure that you don’t go astray. Initially, very little information is given; in this case, it’s just “set course to 030 degrees, speed 840 kmph, fly for 1 minute 30 seconds.”

At that speed, you’re travelling close to 14 km a minute at ground speed, and they know that in 1 minute and 30 seconds, you would have covered 21 km. The FAC has a map with them to guide you. All the pilot does is keep acknowledging what they see based on the commentary from the FAC. Your navigation ends at the CP.  You are now under the direct control of the FAC. Once you are near the target, the FAC will now describe the target to you. “At 1 ’30” when you pull up, you will see on your right, a column of six tanks in close proximity, trailing dust and smoke. Confirm contact.” Now you know that the target is somewhere 7 km up ahead, trailing smoke and dust, and you will start looking out for it.

And once you call “Contact”, the FAC will remain silent. Now the communication is only between you and your formation members. From here, you will guide your No.2 (if in a two-aircraft formation) and confirm whether they have spotted the target as well, “Contact, six tanks trailing smoke, 11 o’clock,” and make sure that they also have the same visuals as you.

In case of a live drop/fire, there will be a small reminder from the FAC about ‘Switches’, meaning to make sure your weapon switches are ON (i.e., armed) to ensure the bombs/rockets and guns are ready to fire, and then you roll in to attack. The pattern and mode for attack, as stated earlier, depend on the type of target. You could do LDAs or dive attacks, conduct passes from different directions, etc., but usually, there is a 30-second gap between each aircraft conducting its pass, as it takes approximately that much time for the bomb to explode and the dust/debris to settle. Not every time the target is an enemy tank/vehicle column; it could be bunkers, machine gun/mortar nests, as they were in Kargil, or an artillery battery setup, or a building… attack patterns vary by target. The most crucial factor is maintaining visual contact with the target. Mostly, you execute what is known as a “Pull Up Attack” – when the target is well hidden or not visible while flying low, you pull up to a certain height to easily acquire the target and also be able to put in a dive attack before you reach the target. The idea is to look out for the enemy as you climb, so that you can work on a suitable attack pattern as you roll in.

In this example, that would be around 4 km to the target area. When your formation executes a sharp pull-up, say a 90-degree pull-up attack, you need to be able to correctly spot the target to execute a successful attack. Ideally, in a pull up attack, the target should be either at your 3 o’clock or 9 o’clock, but if you fail to spot them at the right time – your whole attack pattern would be disturbed, meaning by the time you would be within the correct weapon release envelope, either you would be too steep or shallow to dive attack or still not aligned, or your speed would be too fast or too slow.

If you come in too fast and make a very steep dive, in many cases, the aircraft becomes difficult to control as the speed may be too high; in that case, you need to start pulling out early, otherwise, the aircraft’s inertia will cause it to come too close to the ground or crash into the ground. And mind it, unlike in a range exercise, you don’t have an RSO guiding your attack here. The pilot’s awareness and judgment are critical. I’ve seen times where inexperienced pilots just managed to pull out of a dive barely 50 metres above the ground… It was an absolute miracle that the aircraft didn’t crash and become a fireball.

You mentioned how CAS and AI are conducted simultaneously in combat. Could you explain the difference between CAS and AI?

When we talk about CAS, it is either the enemy advancing onto our forces or our own ground forces advancing on the enemy, which means we have a temporary, or if I must say so, a rather rudimentary understanding of the FLOT. In a CAS mission, our targets are mostly located close to the FLOT, which immediately poses a threat to friendly ground forces, as we could erroneously target friendly forces due to their close proximity to the enemy, resulting in fratricide. Now, as much as it is important to prevent the enemy from striking our forces, we also need to ensure that the enemy does not have the capability to further their own operational plans or get backup support to sustain their attack. So, we conduct Air Interdiction (AI).

During AI, we strike targets that are within enemy territory, slightly beyond the front lines, to cut off their frontline troops from their rear command or reinforcements. Targets during AI include important communication infrastructures, such as bridges, railroads, and highway nodes; identified supply depots, launching areas, and middle-level command and control centres such as their brigade headquarters, and repair facilities. Sometimes, these also include their industrial sites, like ordnance dumps, Bulk Petroleum Installations (BPIs), and chemical and industrial manufacturing factories. When AI and CAS operations are executed simultaneously, we ensure that their forward troops are cut off from their reinforcements and their war plans are disrupted.

If we take this a step further and strike deeper into enemy territory, such as their key Command and Control sites and key air bases, it becomes Deep Penetration Strikes (DPS). The IAF uses the SEPECAT Jaguar as the dedicated platform for this role. But the MiG-23s and MiG-27s could strike the enemy’s forward air bases if the need arises.

Amidst all this, there is also something called Post-Battle Damage Assessment (P-BDA) that is conducted after every mission. This is done to qualitatively assess whether the said mission has fully achieved its objectives or not, and whether there is a need to strike the same target again. Of late, this has been mostly done using satellites with the resolution to even capture a person reading a newspaper while sitting on the ground. But back in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, whenever such a strike went through, usually the last aircraft in the last formation was typically expected to note down the extent of damage done to the target. This was done using multiple methods–Fighter Reconnaissance, where the pilot visually makes note of the extent of damage based on visual cues, or uses a handheld camera to click photos, and later, when adequate technology became available, we started using Tactical Photo Reconnaissance pods. Nowadays, BDA is being done by drones or Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites.

Based on the observations or photographs, our next mission would be planned. Immediate assessment was required, especially if it was a high-value or a strategic target, because striking it again would put our own aircraft and men into similar, if not more, danger (considering that the enemy would already know that you might come back again to strike, they would be better prepared the next time). Based on the assessment, we would decide how many aircraft and what kind of ordnance to use in the follow-up strikes.

So, we had multiple types of pods for that. One was called the Vinten 91 Long-Range Oblique Photographic (LOROP), which was mostly used on the Jaguar. Then we had Pan-Cameras, which could pan the entire horizon left to right. Then we had the Infra-Red Line Scanning pod (IRLS), which initially came with the Jaguar but was later integrated onto the MiG-23BN. For specialist reconnaissance, we, of course, had the English Electric Canberra PR.57/PR.67, and later we even got the MiG-25RBK, which was mostly used for intelligence gathering and survey flights.

Section 2: Aircraft Subsystems and Ordnance

As we know, the MiG-23BN and the MiG-27ML could carry a plethora of ordnance loadouts. But how do you decide which type of ordnance is to be used against what kind of targets?

In air warfare parlance, this decision-making is known as “Weapon to Target Matching,” and not all targets can be hit with the weapon. It all depends on a number of factors:

What kind of target are we flying against (buildings, air bases, radar sites, etc.)? Does the target require a specific type of attack pattern (such as dive attack, LDA, or Medium Altitude Level Release, also known as MALR, or Toss Bombing)? What control do we have over the airspace? Is it a favourable or an unfavourable situation? Is the target guarded by air defences? If so, what type (Anti-Aircraft Artillery, MANPADS, or full-scale Surface to Air Missile sites, and if enough intel exists, then how many of them and what types are they? What inventory does the squadron have? Is there an adequate supply of the required weapon?

An example of the last requirement is that, suppose you have non-retarded bombs. They have to be released in a dive. Sometimes your squadron may only have parachute retarded bombs. So, you have to drop it at a low level. However, as bright as we are in the IAF, we have trained ourselves such that if the need arises, we could carry out attacks with available weapons, and improvise on our tactics to ensure that even if we don’t have a full gun to target matching, we could still conduct attacks and achieve the desired results. So, there are a number of permutations and combinations we think about when you decide on the mode of attack, weapon to launch, and the kind of attack that you are going to carry out.

Since you mentioned dumb/gravity bombs, could you explain the common bombing methods?

Even during combat operations, planning is done in such a way that the safety of the pilot and the aircraft is prioritised. The various bombing tactics and types of ordnance developed over the years hinge on that important aspect.

With retarded bombs, the release is carried out at a low level. Since these bombs are fitted with a tail chute that slows their descent, it allows the aircraft to clear the target area before the ordnance detonates. In a typical retarded bomb, there is a 10 to 15 second delay between the bomb separating from the aircraft and it detonating. By that time, the attacking aircraft would have already been 10 to 15 km away, with a safe separation distance from the blast.

Toss bombing was originally conceptualised for nuclear bombs, where maximum separation from the target is essential due to the presence of enemy air defence at/near the target, and the size of the blast and the resultant mushroom cloud. In this method, the aircraft approaches at a low level and begins a sharp pull-up, roughly 10 to 15 km from the target, depending on the weapon carried. The bomb is then released during this upward climb, travelling in a ballistic arc before dropping vertically onto the target. By the time the detonation occurs, the aircraft is already at a 14-15,000 ft altitude and flying away from the target, because the mushroom cloud is expected to be so big that you would not be able to pull out if you are at a low level or in a dive when the detonation happens, and you want to remain outside the weapon launch range of the enemy air defence.

In case of dive bombing, the pilot would dive from a higher altitude, release the bomb, and then pull up, ensuring that he (and the aircraft) is above the blast ‘mushroom’ of the explosion. Sometimes, an adequate fuse setting is also used to cause the desired impact, such as delay fuses or penetration fuses (wherein the weapon would only explode after it has burrowed itself into a structure). Ultimately, the mode of attack is chosen based on safety requirements, target characteristics, and weapon-to-target matching, which is a learned science in itself. You can’t teach these things, and they are acquired through the pilot’s own experience and can’t be mastered overnight. Developing the judgement to select the right attack mode and execute it flawlessly takes years, if not decades, of operational flying. Only with such experience can a pilot move into planning and strategic leadership roles, rewriting tactics and strategies to suit both the lessons learned in combat and the capabilities of modern equipment.

Now, let us discuss what I consider to be an interesting aspect of the MiG-23BN – the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System. Could you tell us a bit about this system?

Initially, our MiG-23BNs did not carry the Soviet IFF. We deliberately choose not to buy IFFs from the Soviets with the planes, because that would have meant we would have to procure the additional required network of associated ground equipment, which would have been costly and complex to integrate. Furthermore, the IAF at that time operated a plethora of aircraft types, ranging from British to French to Soviet/Russian origin. In that case, identifying friend or foe using a standardised system becomes very difficult. Each of the aforementioned countries has its own standardised IFF packages. If India were to purchase that many systems, it would become an enormous expense to maintain, a logistical nightmare and possibly a technical one too. So, we decided to develop our own IFF system, which we have standardised on all our aircraft.

The critical module inside an IFF transponder is the frequency coder, which defines and maintains the specific band for identifying friendly aircraft. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) Ghaziabad designed and built this module, and successfully integrated it across all the IAF combat aircraft, giving us a standard, service-wide system. On the MiG-23BN, flight trials for the indigenous IFF began at the Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) around 1985–86. There were several phases of testing, and one early evaluation was interrupted when a bird strike caused an engine flameout, forcing the pilot to eject. Much later, in 1991–92, I was tasked with conducting the final clearance trials.

Let us get to the sighting systems. The Soviet MiG-23BN had the PrNK-23/Sokol 23 (ПрНК-23 «Сокол») [with a Fon (фон) laser rangefinder] navigation and sighting system, while the MiG-27 variant featured the PrNK-44L (ПрНК-44Л) with a Klyon-PS (Клён-ПМ) laser rangefinder and marked-target seeker. Could you please comment on these systems and their performance?

The Sokol-23 was a fairly basic system, a sight with a camera, and I am speaking from over 30 years of memory here. In those days, pilots were primarily trained in manual sighting techniques. For example, if you were in a 30-degree dive, you’d apply the “1 in 60” rule to calculate your release point. We learned these techniques early in our careers, and they became second nature to us. Using these calculations, we would set the required depression on the gunsight, then fire the gun, rockets, or release bombs manually, based on the specific weapon being fired. Sokol-23 had an automatic mode called the “gyro” mode, which could compute a release solution based on input parameters, but the gyros of that period weren’t very efficient; there was a lag, and if you relied entirely on them, due to gyro drift and lag, the errors could be significant while in mission. Still, it was a simple, robust sight, and over time, with experience, we refined our techniques enough to achieve excellent results with it.

As technology improved over time, especially on the MiG-27ML. I personally used the GPS-aided INS more than the Klyon LRMTS on the MiG-27ML. The PrNK-44L navigation and attack system could take up to 12 input parameters. The Russians had refined their design compared to the MiG-23BN. We also had at some point a GPS-aided INS (GPS-aided Inertial Navigation System) from Honeywell, which would deliver near-perfect results every time. So, we used automatic bombing in the MiG-27MLs but not in the MiG-23BN.

Could you talk more about the IKV (ИКВ, pronounced as ‘Ikava’), the gyro-stabilised Inertial Navigation System (INS) on the MiG-27? I have heard multiple instances about how they were prone to deviate if interfered with on the ground, while warming up/calibrating. Was it also the same on the MiG-23BN’s KN-23 Doppler navigation system?

The IKV system required a precise pre-flight alignment procedure, 15 minutes for coarse alignment and 15 minutes for final alignment. Frankly, it was a very sensitive system, and because of that, it wasn’t a very reliable system. It would drift over time and sometimes put us 5 to 7 km away from the target. In case there was any disturbance to the aircraft during the calibration process, the deviation in flight would be even greater.

On the MiG-23BN, we had an inertial system called Ikava (ИКВ). Before the flight, we would turn on the ‘Ikava’. It means to start the alignment, and during that time, the aircraft had to remain completely undisturbed, even by the ground crew. Once the alignment was complete, it would be in ‘operations’ mode, and only then would people (including pilots) be allowed to touch the aircraft. This is when the gyros and accelerometers would be calibrating, and even the slightest movement would throw off the calibration. The ground crew took this very seriously. The airman assigned to start ИКВ wouldn’t even rest a hand on the ladder touching the aircraft. He would lean forward without contact, flip the switch to “Operations,” and only then touch the aircraft once alignment was complete. Even with such precautions, the system itself used to drift, and if you relied purely on its position fixes, the accuracy was only about 50 to 70 per cent. Additionally, you would only be able to add about six or seven waypoints. For that reason, we primarily navigated using manual map reading and dead reckoning.

While talking about navigation, let’s focus on other major navigational aids used by the Floggers, in the form of the Radio Engineering System of Short-Range Navigation (RSBN)-6S and PRMG (ПРМГ, often pronounced ‘Paramga’). We have been told that we have a few PRMG ground systems as used by the MiG-23MF pilots. Could you share your experiences with RSBN and PRMG and the MiG-23BN, and how they were used in the IAF?

I respect the RSBN as a system. When it worked, it was quite reliable. In many ways, it was similar to a modern-day VOR (VHF Omnidirectional Range) station, giving both range and bearing to a ground station. A typical procedure would be to fly an “RSBN approach” by navigating to a particular radial over the beacon, then manoeuvring to feed into PRMG (which was the ILS equivalent) for the final approach. Once directly overhead the RSBN beacon, it would try to rotate. That meant you were on top of it. From there, you stayed on course, but then deviated slightly on the approach path. Then you approached, and by then the PRMG would pick you up and provide you with the requisite vertical and horizontal inputs for landing on the runway.

The RSBN was certainly more dependable than the MiG-23BN’s own inertial navigation system, and we trusted it for non-combat navigation, especially when returning to base in poor weather or at night. The use of PRMG was limited to the three MiG-23 bases: Jodhpur, Halwara, and Adampur.

Let us close this section with the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). Could you comment on the RWR’s performance on the MiG-23BN?

The original Soviet one was of little utility to us. The threat library on it was entirely geared towards American threats and primarily western aircrafts, which didn’t translate very well for us, due to both our and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fleet composition having types from multiple different countries (the PAF having a mix of American, French, and Chinese aircraft of partly Soviet origins). We integrated DRDO’s (Defence Research and Development Organisation) Tarang RWR on our Floggers as it could be programmed to our expected threats.

Shifting gears, let us look at the claws of the aircraft, the weapons. There is a famous picture of a MiG-23BN, integrated with the French BAP-100 Runway Denial Weapon (RDW). How was the BAP-100 integrated on the MIG-23BN, and, you know, how was it compatible with the aircraft, and what were the results?

The BAP-100 was a new technology in the 1980s, an Anti-Runway bomb made up of smaller rocket-type projectiles with penetration fuses and a hardened nose. Each sub-munition unit would strike the runway surface at high speed, penetrate roughly a metre into the concrete, and then detonate after a short delay. This would cause a violent upheaval of the runway surface, creating craters to deny enemy aircraft the ability to take off or land. We discussed it a lot internally and may have overestimated its utility. We conducted practice drops over range targets, but in my view, its real-world impact was somewhat overestimated because the BAP’s full effect required cluster launch. Personally, I never fired it, though I did participate in several trials with the weapon.

Did the MiG-23BN have any air-air weapons for self-defence? I understand that, for self-defence, the MiG-23BN could carry up to four R-3R/R-3S/R-60s. I have also heard there were attempts to integrate the French Matra R.550 Magic. Could you provide some context?

I recall the Magic being planned for integration, but I don’t think it ever happened. The R-60s were definitely integrated and could be carried without issue because they were part of the aircraft’s loadout. The R-60s also showed up in the mission planning stages, and we would talk about carrying a pair of R-60s for self-defence. The problem was the payload trade-off. Every station you gave to an air-to-air missile was one less station available for bombs. For example, carrying two R-60s could mean losing the capacity for up to a thousand pounds of bombs. That’s a 25 per cent reduction in bomb load on a MiG-23BN configured for maximum strike weight. For high-priority targets, the aim was always to maximise the strike package and let dedicated air-defence escorts protect you.

Ultimately, it was all about weapon-to-target matching and deciding what was more important for that mission: the number of bombs on target or the ability to defend oneself if intercepted.

Did the MiG-23BN have any Counter Measures Dispensing Systems (CMDS)?

The MiG-23BN had very rudimentary countermeasures systems. So, what we used to do was stuff in the chaff/flare cartridges inside the airbrakes and then shut them close. We never opened the airbrakes while flying. However, when there was a need to deploy countermeasures, we just opened the airbrakes, and the flare or chaff would just fly out. In the 1990s, we retrofitted the MiG-23BN and the MiG-27ML with the ‘Tracore’ CMDS (AN/ALE-44 CMDS), which could deploy flares and chaff alike in the same mission. I was also involved in testing that system. Eventually, when the MiG-27 upgrade was announced, we realised that this was an excellent system and a necessity, so it was integrated as a default on all airframes that received the upgrade.

Section 3: Flying the MiG-23BN into combat

As you always say that you were ‘fortunate’ to have taken the MiG-23BN into combat, and that it was certainly a ‘Baptism by Fire’ for the type, could you help us understand how you employed an aircraft designed for Close Air Support over flat terrain, into flying combat over the Himalayas? How were traditional CAS tactics and training adapted/modified for this unexpected change?

The IAF played a pivotal role during Operation Safed Sagar, and undeniably, the Mirage 2000 played a crucial role, because it could carry the Paveway II Precision Guided Bombs (PGMs). However, it is unfortunate that most people forget the role of MiG-23BN and MiG-27s during the war. It is even more important because these aircraft were never designed to be used at such high altitudes. Despite these inherent limitations, if the IAF managed to deploy them in Kargil and use them to great success, it shows how the IAF is adaptable and capable of innovating and improvising, even when nobody had fought an air battle before, at that altitude.

I took over command of No.221 Squadron during the war, around June 17, 1999. By that time, we had already lost three aircraft, two of them due to enemy MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems). The challenge still remained that we had to strike enemy bunkers and sangars atop mountains, which were too small to be hit with the high-calibre munitions that we usually use over flat terrain. Also, a five metre Circular Error Probable (CEP) in the plains would not yield the same results as a five metre CEP over the mountains, because, if your bomb overshot or undershot even by a bit, it could inadvertently cause an avalanche or kill friendly troops that were trying to scale the very peak you just attacked.

Due to these concerns, we had to improvise our regular tactics. We switched from dropping heavy bomb loads during a single sortie to cutting down the bomb load by almost half per sortie and doubling the number of sorties we flew. Around the same time, we also received the Time Arc handheld GPS, which we used to conduct our strikes, because the ‘Ikava’ was more prone to drift in that kind of terrain. We changed from using ‘Dive Attacks,’ whether bombs or rockets, to GPS-guided Medium Altitude Level Release (MALR). This not only helped us avoid further losses but also improved the accuracy of our strikes, although it wasn’t as accurate as a PGM.

In fact, our attacks had such an impact that the Pakistani forces were petrified due to our bombing missions. We flew missions starting at 6am. A high-frequency radio transmission intercepted by us (between the soldiers deployed and their commanders in Pakistan) conveyed the exact impact of this relentless bombing that they faced and felt so threatened. Just this message was enough to convey the impact of our missions on the enemy troops: “Badalaon me se qayyammat baras rahi hain… Hmare hawai fauj kahan hain?” (Trans.: Hell is raining upon us… where is our own air force?).

No.221 Squadron and the MiG-23BNs flew 28 per cent of the total combat sorties of the operation and dropped 30 per cent of the total ordnance. We conducted relentless airstrikes against enemy positions from 6 am through the day and night until 3am the next morning, and commenced strikes again at 6am. Between that three-hour gap, the Army climbed the cliffs. The MiG-23 and MiG-27 fleet were instrumental in driving them (the Pakistani infiltrators) out of their deployed positions. Our team of pilots, engineers and ground crew worked tirelessly throughout the campaign, and we had well over 90 per cent serviceability. We never aborted any missions and flew whenever possible to meet the overall objectives of the nation.

No.221 Squadron would go on to be awarded the Battle Honours for their contribution in the Kargil conflict. Six officers of the squadron were awarded for their gallantry. Then Wing Commander Ashit Mehta was Mention-in-Dispatches.

MiG-23BN

The MiG-23BN (NATO Codename: “Flogger-H”) is a variable geometry wing ground attack aircraft developed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was derived from its air defence cousin, the MiG-23M, when the Soviet Air Forces (VVS) were looking for a suitable ground attack aircraft that was rugged enough to operate from forward airbases located in remote areas.

The Indian Air Force procured the MiG-23BN as a successor to the ageing fleet of Dassault Mystere IVA, Sukhoi Su-7BMK, and HF-24 Marut, in the role of a Close Air Support and Tactical Strike aircraft. An order for 95 aircraft was placed in 1979, and two batches of pilots and maintenance officers were trained in Lugovoy and Frunze (now Bishkek), respectively, between 1980 and 1982. Four squadrons were equipped with the aircraft – No.10 Squadron ‘Winged Daggers’, No.31 Squadron ‘Lions’, No.220 Squadron ‘Desert Tigers’ and No.221 Squadron ‘Valiants.’ This aircraft was nicknamed ‘Vijay’ (Sanskrit: ‘Victory’) in the Indian service.

The MiG-23BN was the first variable geometry aircraft to enter the service of the IAF, and would go on to play a very important role in its power projection. On May 23, 1984, Squadron Leader AD Joshi landed the first MiG-23BN at Leh amidst rising tensions between India and Pakistan over the Siachen Glacier. No.221 Squadron would go on to become a specialist in high-altitude operations amongst the MiG-23BN squadrons of the IAF.

The MiG-23BN Squadrons of the IAF were primarily based out of Halwara (Nos. 31 and 221) and Jodhpur (Nos. 10 and 220). Although these aircraft were primarily designed for CAS over flat terrain like plains and deserts, the MiG-23BN would go on to redefine CAS doctrines not just for the IAF but also set an example for global air warfare standards by conducting successful missions during the Kargil conflict of 1999. A seven-aircraft detachment was based out of Srinagar throughout the conflict and participated in Op Safed Sagar from day one. The MiG-23BNs would also conduct night strike missions during the operation.

Throughout the 1990s, the aircraft was retrofitted with multiple new systems to keep it relevant to the emerging combat standards. A new Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS), a GPS, an IFF system, and a more advanced RWR were added to the aircraft, along with a series of integrations with different types of ordnance. In 1993-94, No.10 Squadron converted to MiG-27ML, leaving only three squadrons operating the Vijay.

The Vijay remained in service well into the first decade of 2000, with Nos. 220 and 221 Squadrons operating the type out of Halwara. The ‘Desert Tigers’ were number plated in 2005, and the last of the MiG-23BNs flew on March 6, 2009, after which the Vijay fleet was retired from service.

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