Keywords: Kargil Review Committee, Theatre Command, Indian Armed Forces, Jointness

‘Post-truth’ is an adjective defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. [1] The debates in India around jointness and theatre commands have largely followed the post-truth trajectory. They are more based on individual experiences, hearsay, personal beliefs and not rooted in facts.  This article is aimed at providing objective facts derived from government sources to help the readers form their informed opinions.

Myth 1 – The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) commented adversely on jointness during Operations in the Kargil War

If there is one document that is widely misquoted, that is the KRC Report. Despite the report being declassified, it was only available in print. This may have led people to use Google search, which delivered incorrect secondary sources. The actual terms of reference are reproduced below:

The mandate of KRC excluded the actual conduct of operations during the Kargil War, and the Committee stuck to its mandate. It did not examine events beyond May 26, 1999, when air power was employed.

Myth 2- KRC recommended the creation of integrated Theatre Commands

Countless authors have mentioned this. It is factually incorrect and does not appear in the KRC. The recommendations were for a National Defence Headquarters.

KRC recommended better civil-military integration and did not mention any integration of the three services.

Myth 3- There is a serious problem of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces

There has been no government-led high-level review of military operations since the 1962 Sino-India War. KRC also examined what led to the war, and not how it was fought. Only a thorough, in-depth enquiry into Indian military operations from the operational records by a suitable committee would reveal the prevalence/extent of the issue. In the absence of this, any arguments regarding the lack/abundance of jointness are either anecdotal or hearsay and devoid of factual evidence.

Myth 4- The Goldwater-Nichols Act led to the creation of Theatre Commands in the US

The Theatre Commands in the United States (US) were created in 1946 as a result of the implementation of the Unified Command Plan. [2] The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) was the first to be established as a unified command on January 01, 1947. [3] Therefore, any argument that the creation of theatre commands in the US as a direct outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is factually incorrect.

Myth 5- Creation of Theatre Commands automatically leads to jointness

A popular argument is that the creation of theatre commands automatically results in jointness. If the creation of theatre commands leads to jointness, then the US should not have experienced disasters in Vietnam, Operation Eagle Claw, etc. They would not have had any reason to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to resolve the issues in jointness, as the theatre commands were initially established in 1947. Therefore, this argument lacks empirical support.

Myth 6- In the US, the commands of all the armed forces are co-located. In India, 17 single-service commands of all three services are located in different areas, resulting in a lack of jointness.

This is another popular misconception. The table below shows the location of each Component Command Headquarters (HQ) in the US geographic Combatant Commands (Space Command is not shown).

The table clearly shows the dispersed locations, with some even spread across multiple continents. Therefore, this too is post-truth. However, in the past, during Operations, some component commanders were occasionally co-located at a forward headquarters, although not always.

Myth 7 – Most countries have Theatre Commands; therefore, India must too

During the post-World War II era, the world was divided into two camps. The popular choice was between the two. However, India declined both and adopted the Non-Alignment Movement. Thus, India has never fallen for following the crowd, even when it was weak and poor. Many countries have an obligation to align their doctrines and structures due to their commitment to fight as an alliance. India has no reason to follow this approach without careful consideration. It must do what suits best in the national interest.

Myth 8- China created Theatre Commands to bring in jointness in the Armed Forces

The primary aim of the Chinese military is to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). [5] The threat to CPC leadership also comes from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as it serves as an alternate power centre. Following the reforms in 2015, which involved the creation of theatre commands and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), among other measures, President Xi also carried out a reduction of 300,000 personnel in the Army. [6] Since the 1970s, the PLA has reduced the size of its forces by 4 million and altered the ratio of its forces. It has reduced the Army while increasing the Navy and Air Force. The Army now accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total armed forces. [7] These reforms are primarily meant to spread the distribution of power that was concentrated in the Army through the erstwhile Military Regions. [8] PLASSF’s growth as a centre of power is also presumed to be one of the reasons that led to Xi disbanding it in 2024. During the announcement of the new Information Support Force creation, Xi’s statement read, ‘ordered to resolutely obey the Party’s command, and make sure it stays absolutely loyal, pure and reliable’. [9]

Today, the primary go-to source for information is Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and videos on social media. LLMs curate data from the internet and produce results. Thus, if the data on the internet is incorrect, the results the LLMs generate are bound to be false as well. There is a renewed rigour in the debate on the creation of theatre commands in the country. As a result, there has been a surge in misleading articles and discussions. These invariably populate the database of LLMs and further reinforce false data.  Informed debates are essential for the healthy functioning of democracy. One of the most critical military reforms in India must be based on facts, not post-truths. The issue must be objectively debated beyond the military by civilians as well. This article aims to provide an authentic basis to the citizens for such discussions.

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Notes

[1]  “Word of the Year 2016,” Oxford Languages, 2016,https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

[2] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Government of the United States of America, “The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993. Report No. ADA313508,” 1995, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA313508.pdf. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[3]  Department of Defence, Government of the United States of America, “History of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,” https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/.  Accessed on October 05, 2025.

[4] United States Department of War, “Combatant Commands,” Combatant Commands | U.S. Department of War. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[5] Ministry of National Defence, The People’s Republic of China, “China’s Military Strategy,” 2015 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[6] “Full text: Xi’s speech at commemoration of 70th anniversary of war victory,” China Daily, September 3, 2015, < https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015victoryanniv/2015-09/03/content_21783362.htm>. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[7] Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China, “Graphics: China’s military reform in past 5 years,”                               August 01, 2020, https://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/ News_213114/TopStories/4869047.html. Accessed on October 07, 2025

[8] Ashish Singh, “The Two Forms of Reform,” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). October 6, 2018, 100-copy_The-Two-forms-of-Reform_06-10-2018.pdf. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[9] “Xi presents flag to PLA’s information support force,” Qiushi, April 20, 2024, https://en.qstheory.cn/2024-04/20/c_981035.htm. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

The post 08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Theatre Commands, Force Reconfiguration, Warfighting, Joint War Fighting

Introduction

Operation Sindoor was the first significant armed conflict after the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in August 2019. Since the establishment of CDS, there has been a consistent focus on jointness and shedding of single-service interests. Thus, over time, it has become almost sacrilegious to speak of individual service interests. Jointness is now the accepted convention. While the actions of the Indian Air Force (IAF) during Op Sindoor resulted in spectacular outcomes, many of which were caught on camera, there have been no attempts by the IAF to boast about their achievements. Likewise, considering the damage observed on the Indian border villages inflicted by Pakistan, it would be safe to assume that the Indian Army’s response would have been far more devastating on Pakistan. Similarly, no attempts were made to showcase them either. The tri-service press briefs have been well-coordinated and included the actions of the Navy, which were out of public sight. Another key aspect is the visible synergistic action of the Ministries of External Affairs (MEA) and Defence (MoD). In 2019, the initial press brief, following the Balakot strikes, was delivered by the Foreign Secretary with no MoD representation. Whereas in Op Sindoor, both MEA and MoD representatives participated in all press briefings. Thus, this operation could be studied in future as a textbook case of synergy in national security.

The concept of ‘theaterisation’ has been popularised as a solution to a perceived lack of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces. Various authors have proposed several models. However, in the absence of theatre commands, what explains the synergy during Op Sindoor? I attempt an explanation.

The results for this synergy can be traced back to 1944, when the original seeds of jointness were planted in India. The Government of Sudan, recognising the valour and sacrifice of Indians in the Second World War in the defence of Sudan, gifted an amount of £ 1,00,000 for the construction of an Indian national war memorial. The Indian National War Memorial Committee of Council was constituted.

This committee, after a thorough debate, recommended the construction of a tri-services military academy as the most suitable form of a war memorial.

Following this decision, another subcommittee was formed to study and make recommendations for the Indian Military Academy. The Subcommittee thus recommended the creation of what is now known as the National Defence Academy (NDA) with the iconic Sudan Block as its central structure.

The Subcommittee included Vice-Chancellors from universities, the principal of a school, and members of all three services, including then-Wing Commander Subroto Mukerjee, who later became the Air Chief. They toured eleven military academies across the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Canada, studying in detail the training, syllabus, moral code of conduct, general orientation, and other aspects

Indian Armed Forces officers, fresh from the experience of the Second World War, understood the significance of integration. None of the countries across the world then had a joint military academy. Thus, their proposal for a joint academy was novel.

In terms of integration, considerable thought and discussion went into the design of the training. To date, NDA follows this model of common training for all three services in the first two years, followed by the introduction of service-specific training in the third year.

The training was also designed to foster a deeper appreciation of each other’s perspectives. All cadets were supposed to have sufficient exposure to aviation to make them ‘air-minded’. A lack of air-mindedness is often cited as the key cause by proponents of air power when issues of jointness are argued. Unfortunately, paragraph 148(d) is no longer part of the NDA training.  It is perhaps worth revisiting this recommendation from 1945. The formation of the National Defence Academy (NDA) laid the groundwork for jointness among the Indian Armed Forces (the first seed of jointness).

Admission into NDA was to be purely based on merit and devoid of any form of reservation, including that for the wards of ex-servicemen.

This gave rise to a new problem: How could independent India generate a pool of suitable candidates to meet the annual requirement of an intake of 700 officer cadets from across the country’s diverse locations and varying income statuses when the educational setup in India was inferior? This led to the creation of Feeder institutes. Thus, the second seed for jointness — the feeder institutes was planted. These institutes offer joint military training right from class six onwards. The students go on to occupy leadership positions across various fields beyond the military as well.

Returning to the key question of this article, what explains the synergy during Op Sindoor? The answer lies in the bonhomie between the service chiefs. Army and Navy chiefs are classmates from Sainik School Rewa, and the Air Chief and the Army Chief are course mates from NDA.[2] These are lifelong relationships with the equivalent of a family-level bond characterised by depth and strength. People go to great lengths for each other. Both feeder institutes (schools) and NDA are Indian investments in jointness, even before independence and were pathbreaking in the world at the time of their inception. To put it differently, India has been a pioneer of jointness in the world. Therefore, if any shortcomings in jointness are perceived, it would be prudent to examine the training, staffing and culture at NDA and similar institutes as the source. Deviations from the core founding principles of any institution are possible as it evolves over time.

Finally, Colin Gray wrote, “Joint, which is to say multi-service, doctrine should express a judicious melding of beliefs among culturally distinct institutions, but often it comprises more of a brute force stapling together of unlike elements than a coherent whole. So-called joint military plans and performance similarly can have the character of a shotgun marriage than of anything resembling harmony.”[3] Neglecting one’s own history and pursuing solutions from foreign models can lead to a stapled model of jointness or a ‘shotgun marriage’. It is worthwhile to revisit the history of jointness in India, in depth, to avoid such a situation.

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Notes

[1] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Feeder Schools for the National War Academy,” January 27, 1947, https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/ArchiveSecondPhase/DEFENCE/1947-JULY-DEC-MIN-OF-DEFENCE/PDF/DEF-1947-01-27_030.pdf . Accessed on September 24, 2025.

[2] “Two Coursemates, Two Classmates, Will Now Head Three Armed Force Services,” The Economic Times, September 21, 2024,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/two-coursemates-two-classmates-will-now-head-three-armed-force-services/articleshow/113552033.cms. Accessed on September 24, 2025.

[3] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 77.

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