Keywords: ASAT, UNGA Resolution, US, Russia, Weaponisation

Kinetic Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons tests have been in the news at fairly regular intervals for the wrong reasons. The Chinese ASAT test of 2007 caught public attention due to the enormous debris it created in space, most of which is still in orbit. During the past decade, Russia and China have conducted multiple ASAT tests, but none of them produced any debris of significant quantity. India conducted an ASAT test in 2019 that produced some debris, albeit at lower altitudes, most of which has decayed. The Russian ASAT test of November 2021, which produced significant debris, was perhaps the turning point that the global space community could have leveraged to broker a multilateral and complete ban on ASAT weapons. An earlier attempt was made by the Outer Space Institute based in Canada through an ‘Open-Letter,’ urging the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to take up consideration of a kinetic ASAT test ban treaty.

On April 18, 2022, US Vice President Kamala Harris announced that “the United States commits not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing.” Through this statement, the US declared a self-imposed moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing and aimed to lead by example and establish a new international norm for responsible behaviour in space.[1] Since then, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have been quick to join the voluntary moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing.

Kinetic ASAT tests create debris on impact, which jeopardises the long-term sustainability of space and affects the safety of satellites and spacecraft for all nations alike. Accordingly, a draft resolution was introduced by the US in the 77^th session of the UNGA first committee on November 1, 2022, to halt destructive kinetic ASAT tests in outer space. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 155 in favour to 9 against, with nine abstentions (including India).[2] Though this is not a legally binding development, it reflects the momentum towards a weapons-free outer space, specifically the chorus for preventing further growth of debris in outer space.

The Indian space community has been divided in its opinion on the issue, and there have been mixed reactions to India’s abstention at the UNGA. Having abstained from a vote at the UNGA, India needs to have a firm reason for its stand. Whether it serves India’s defence strategy and posture or not may be a secondary issue here, but ostensibly, a voluntary moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing may do little for the sustainability cause in space. This certainly doesn’t mean that India is willing to do a kinetic ASAT test. Through its statements on multiple occasions at the UN, India has conveyed that its focus is on “the use of space for ‘welfare’ and not for ‘warfare’. India is opposed to the weaponisation of outer space and India has not and will not resort to an arms race in outer space.”[3] The reasons why India should keep a distance from such partial bans are enumerated in subsequent paragraphs.

Firstly, what could be the purpose of a voluntary moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing, which has been initiated by the US? Beyond the geopolitics of the issue, the primary concern is to prevent an increase in space debris, which is already a major concern for the safety of satellites and spacecraft. The other possible reason is to make a beginning to prevent the weaponisation of space while negotiations continue for a lasting treaty. However, both of these purposes may not be fulfilled through a voluntary initiative. As for debris, although kinetic ASATs have been a major contributor, they are not the only sources for creating debris. Debris is being generated by other means, like collisions, disintegration or explosions of rocket bodies in orbit, and various other natural and human activity-related causes. Also, destructive ASAT tests have been done on rare occasions, unlike the other debris-generating phenomena, which have a much higher probability of occurrence. As for preventing an arms race, today there are smarter ways to harm satellites. There is an ongoing, invisible arms race in space by way of electronic interference, cyber-attacks, and the repurposing of satellites in orbit for possible military objectives through proximity operations.

Secondly, if we consider space sustainability as being under threat, then just banning a kinetic ASAT may not be enough. It is a moratorium on the testing of a single type of ASAT weapon and on one of the many methods of testing. Effectively, this ban may result in other types of ASAT weapons and other methods of testing kinetic ASAT gathering momentum. Moreover, the moratorium doesn’t preclude tests against simulated targets in space.

The other issue is the relevance of a kinetic direct ascent ASAT weapon in today’s scenario, where the option of more efficient and effective means of targeting satellites is available with Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), cyber means, electronic interference, and other in-orbit techniques. These kinetic ASAT weapons are unusable in a hostile situation for two reasons: (a) the debris fallout will render the nearby orbits permanently unusable for all users, irrespective of state affiliations; (b) it will attract global condemnation and isolate the defaulting state. Hence, more likely than not, these types of weapons will not be used and are only meant for deterrent posturing. There is also a changing employment philosophy owing to the diminishing utility and effectiveness of kinetic ASAT weapons in this era of mega-constellations. These constellations of satellites are designed to provide continuous coverage through multiple satellites. Hence, redundancy in services is in-built, and the loss of one or two satellites will not have any impact. The question, therefore, will be whether a state will use multiple kinetic ASATs to take down a network of satellites. It would be a cost-prohibitive exercise and an unachievable task, and therefore other means of targeting will have to be explored. So, by imposing a moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing, it would be an attempt to ban a weapon of yesterday for conditions that do not exist today.

The geopolitics of disarmament in space is rather interesting. The US and the erstwhile USSR have been testing kinetic ASAT weapons since the 1960s. Nuclear weapons have also been detonated in space till the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banned such tests. It can therefore be said that the US and Russia have achieved a certain level of proficiency in ASAT weapons. This would include China too, which has conducted at least ten kinetic ASAT tests from 2005 till now. Hence, those who have already tested their kinetic ASAT weapons multiple times are unlikely to continue doing the same. Newer space-faring states are unlikely to follow this path due to the shifting focus towards reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviours. Most nations do not possess the technological capability to conduct such missile tests. China and Russia, who voted against the UNGA resolution, are most unlikely to join a voluntary ban on ASAT testing. Russia’s destructive kinetic ASAT in 2021, prior to its military offensive in Ukraine, demonstrated its capability and could possibly be the reason for a US-led initiative to ban kinetic ASAT testing. It is also worth noting that the resolutions only ban testing, not the actual use of weapons under hostile conditions. This leads one to believe that the US wants to deter other countries from developing anti-satellite capabilities while protecting its own satellites from space debris.

While the US, through the UNGA, is trying to convince all states to adopt this moratorium on ASAT testing as an urgent, initial measure aimed at preventing damage to the outer space environment, the key question that remains is on the effectiveness of such a ban on controlling the weaponisation of space and containing further growth of harmful space debris. As for India’s position, it has kept its options open by abstaining from the vote on the resolution. This has also created strategic ambiguity, which augurs well for India. Here on, India should press for a complete ban on all forms of weapons in space through binding multilateral agreements.

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Notes:

[1] ”FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Advances National Security Norms in Space”, White House, April 18, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/, accessed January 30, 2023.

[2] “Approving 21 Drafts, First Committee Asks General Assembly to Halt Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests in Outer Space”, United Nations, November 01, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/gadis3703.doc.htm and https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12478.doc.htm, accessed January 30, 2023.

[3] ‘Report of the Secretary-General on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors (2021)’,United Nations, https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/outerspace-sg-report-outer-space-2021/, accessed January 30, 2023.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post A Voluntary Kinetic ASAT Test Ban is Merely Symbolic appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: UAS, Autonomous, AMR, Drone.

As the name suggests, any unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can be flown without a pilot on board because they can be controlled remotely. Although the terms ‘drone’ and UAV are frequently used interchangeably. There is some debate about whether the ‘cool’ aerial tricks UAVs perform on their own qualify as autonomous flights or are simply self-flying or self-piloting actions. In the past, the terms ‘autonomous’ and ‘self-flying’ (or self-piloting) have been used synonymously, but with the industry moving forward a proper distinction between the two has become essential. If a UAV has obstacle avoidance sensors, it may have some autonomy over some of its routes when it takes off to fly in a circle, but it is simply self-piloting at that point. A drone will almost certainly never be completely autonomous, and it probably should not be.[1]

Hence there is a clear distinction between the two: while UAVs lack autonomous flight capabilities, ‘Unmanned Autonomous System’ (UAS), as autonomous UAVs are called, do have them. Although the term ‘UAV’ can be used to describe aerial vehicles used for commercial or non-commercial purposes, it is most frequently associated with military applications.

What is Autonomous System?

A system that is truly autonomous would be able to complete a specific set of tasks in a dynamic environment gather data about the surroundings, and operate for a considerable amount of time without human direction or intervention. Therefore, an autonomous system would be defined as a system that is capable of sensing, perceiving, planning, and acting without human assistance. Common examples are the use of autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) in warehouses and self-drive cars.^[2] By putting safety measures in place, warning other drivers, and even assuming full control of a vehicle, if necessary, autonomous systems lower the likelihood of collisions and accidents. For instance, self-driving cars are capable of detecting and responding to other vehicles, pedestrians, cyclists, construction zones, potholes, and traffic accidents. Most crucially, self-driving cars follow safety regulations that human drivers may neglect on purpose or accidentally.[3]

Advanced robotics and computing are combined with mechanical systems and sensors in unmanned autonomous systems. An autonomous vehicle is one that can sense its surroundings, navigate, and operate independently of human intervention. UAVs are the most popular autonomous vehicles that are already widely used.^[4]

UAS are sophisticated, intelligent vehicles that can move through the air, land, or water without a human crew on board. UAS are adaptable machines with the ability to manoeuvre in a variety of, and occasionally hazardous, environments because of advanced computing, sensing, and electronic technologies, as well as mechanical design. To monitor threats to human lives and property, UAS can fly into the eye of a storm or into the path of a spreading wildfire, or other through remote areas to collect environmental data. Other uses for UAS include data collection and mapping, an inspection of hazardous waste, search and rescue, and entertainment. UAS cannot be remotely controlled by a person. UASs essentially carry out all of their operations on their own, including take-off, flight, and landing. UASs are flown using an on-board computer, sensor suite, and autopilot.

What is an autonomous UAV?

The term ‘UAS’ refers to both the UAV and the individual or group responsible for flight control on the ground, as well as the system that links the two (GPS, ground control, transmission systems, cameras, software, etc.). A UAS encompasses all of the components required for the UAV to function properly, as opposed to a UAV, which represents the specific vehicle. The development and functionality of UAVs are made possible by the complexity and numerous moving parts of a UAS. The technological level of unmanned systems has gradually increased with the growth of human knowledge.

An autonomous UAV is, by definition, a part of a UAS because it is operated by software rather than a person and is, by definition, a UAV that is piloted by software. UAVs are one type of UAS but not all UAVs fall under this definition. In the case of UASs, mission coordination and aircraft control are handled by communications management software as opposed to a person. An ‘autonomous UAV’ is a part of a UAS by definition because it is flown by software rather than a person and because it needs a full system to function.[5]

AI-powered software that controls the UAV and evaluates the collected visual data in order to navigate and drive. Autonomous vehicle technology combines AI-powered algorithms, specialised cameras, and sensors. These frequently consist of GPS, inertial navigation systems, lidar, radar, and sonar. In order to plot navigational paths and respond in real-time by stopping, accelerating, decelerating, and avoiding objects, self-driving vehicles analyse the data produced by these sensors.

The capacity to detect and recognise targets of interest in a non-dynamic and unknown environment is a necessary component for networks of autonomous vehicles. The success of these missions depends on the algorithms’ capacity to handle the informational uncertainty of the dynamic environment and their capacity to deal with the potentially sizable amounts of communicated data that will need to be broadcast in order to synchronise data across networks of vehicles. A conflict-free task assignment across all vehicles has previously been created using centralised mission management algorithms, which have been developed because of their relative simplicity. To provide a consistent situational awareness from distributed sensors, these algorithms, however, frequently take a long time to respond to changes in the fleet and its surroundings and require high bandwidth connection.

Recently, decentralised decision-making algorithms have been presented that lower the amount of communication needed between agents and increase the system’s robustness and reactivity to bandwidth constraints as well as fleet, mission, and environmental variables.[6] These technical improvements are anticipated to help proficient UAVs become even more competent.

Most current autonomous systems fall into the semi-autonomous category rather than the fully autonomous category. Semi-autonomous devices include robot vacuums, robotic surgery systems, and the majority of UAVs. Driver support systems in cars, such as ‘lane-keep assist’ and advanced braking systems, also fall under this category (UAVs and drones). However, most fully autonomous systems, including driverless cars, are still too expensive, data-intensive, power-intensive, or unsafe for widespread public use.[7]

SAE International, formerly known as the Society of Automotive Engineers, is an international professional association and standards body. By networking and training mobility specialists, it primarily focuses on the aerospace, automotive, and commercial vehicle sectors, enabling safe, clean, and accessible mobility solutions. The U.S. Department of Transportation has since adopted SAE International’s six levels of driving automation, which were developed in 2014.[8]

(a)   Level 0: No driving automation

(b)   Level 1: Driver assistance

(c)   Level 2: Partial driving automation

(d)   Level 3: Conditional driving automation

(e)   Level 4: High-driving automation

(f)   Level 5: Full driving automation

It would actually be considered level 5 autonomy for a UAV to be able to operate completely without any human intervention. However, the majority of commercial UAVs do not yet function entirely on their own. At this time, the level of autonomy is restricted to following a predetermined course or set of waypoints and returning to the home location once the flight is finished. Even in this case, the technology for commercial UAV use is still in its infancy, necessitating the use of a pilot to maintain the UAV. As a result, most UAVs have attained level 1 autonomy and are working their way up to level 2.

Autonomy of level 5 is assumed when dealing with UAS, but can human intervention be totally detached? According to Air Marshal Vinod Patney, former Vice Chief of Air Staff of the Indian Air Force, “UAVs have a wonderful future, expanding in popularity and utility, but no machine can match the human gift of discovery and situational awareness.” The first known air-to-air conflict took place in December 2002 between an American Predator UCAV and an Iraqi MiG-25 equipped with a Stinger missile. They each launched a missile towards the other. The UAV was shot down, and the video downlink confirmed this. A fighter jet has a better chance of scoring an air-to-air kill due to its superior placement, speed, and manoeuvrability.[9]

In order to give autonomous technologies ever-higher levels of autonomy, advanced technologies like AI, memory, networking, and high-performance computing are collaborating. Vision systems and sensors interconnect, and memory and networking technologies are also becoming more sophisticated. Drones, robots, and driverless cars all immediately come to mind when discussing autonomous applications. The ability to gather information about their surroundings, process it, understand it, and take action on it is often what they all have in common. An autonomous machine’s ability to think for itself independently is, of course, what distinguishes it from a straightforward remote-controlled or programmable gadget. The level of autonomy of unmanned aerial vehicles is increasing as increasingly complicated mission scenarios are anticipated.[10]

When working with UAVs, safety comes first. In order to prevent mid-air collisions, UAVs must be programmed with ‘detect and avoid’ capabilities that are comparable to those of manned aircraft. Therefore, drones must be able to recognise probable collisions and steer clear of them.

Conclusion

UASs are very popular because they eliminate the risk of human error and the overhead of piloted UAV systems. But all UAVs are not autonomous.  Intelligent unmanned autonomous systems are complex systems created by the fusion of various technologies related to mechanics, control, computers, communication, and materials. The way industrial and critical infrastructure sites perform routine maintenance, supervise safe and secure operations, ensure business continuity after severe weather and other incidents, and maintain compliance are all being changed by autonomous industrial UAVs.

There are many different kinds of intelligent UAS developing, and they will have a big impact on society and daily life. In recent years, issues with maintenance and safety, as well as the reliability of UAVs, have all taken on a significant amount of importance. This is due to improved avionics and more durable engines. Despite this, the attitude toward the dependability of drones remains overly fatalistic. Naturally, we believe that the lack of a pilot or other person on board does not permit us to build and realise the UAV with less strict requirements than those used for aeroplanes, based on dependability evaluations that are already available. From a different angle, highly developed UAV systems have a 25 percent overall failure rate. The difficulty is in extending a drone’s dependability while optimising maintenance procedures.

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[1] Jonathan Feist, “Autonomous drone vs self-flying drones, what’s the difference?”, Drone Rush, May 8, 2022, https://www.dronerush.com/autonomous-drone-vs-self-flying-drones-10653/. Accessed on January 19, 2023.

[2] “Ultimate Guide to Autonomous Systems”, BlackBerry, 2022, https://blackberry.qnx.com/en/ultimate-guides/autonomous-systems. Accessed on January 10, 2023.

[3] “SAE levels of automation in cars simply explained (+Image)”, Rambus, June 9, 2022, https://www.rambus.com/blogs/driving-automation-levels/. Accessed on December 29, 2022.

[4] Harsha Vardhan, “Autonomous Drones for geospatial professionals”, GW Prime, March 07, 2017, https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/autonomous-drones-geospatial-professionals/. Accessed on December 29, 2022.

[5] Ariel Avitan, “The Differences Between UAV, UAS, and Autonomous Drones”, Percpto, January 3, 2019  , https://percepto.co/what-are-the-differences-between-uav-uas-and-autonomous-drones/#:~:text=The%20term% 20%E2%80%9Cautonomous%20drone%E2%80%9D%20describes,missions%2C%20and%20land%20completely%20autonomously. Accessed on January 10, 2023.

[6] Jonathan, Cameron, Fraser, Kulling, Nicholas Roy “Increasing autonomy of UAVs”, IEEE Xplore, July 2009, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224503391_Increasing_autonomy_of_UAVs. Accessed on January 20, 2023.

[7] Blackberry, n. 2.

[8] Rambus, n.3

[9] Air Marshal (Retd) Anil Chopra,“Manned Vs Unmanned”, SP Aviation, Issue: 08-2013, , https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=1278#:~:text=UAVs%20have%20much%20lower%20training,be%20handled%20by%20manned%20fighters. Accessed on January 20, 2023.

[10] “Technologies for drones, robots and autonomous vehicles”, AVNET, February 17, 2022, https://www.avnet .com/wps/portal/us/resources/article/technologies-drones-robots-autonomous-vehicles/#:~:text=Light%20 detection%20and%20ranging%20(lidar,as%20in%20driver%20assistance%20systems. Accessed on January 20, 2023.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Explaining ‘Autonomous’ Factor of UAVs appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Shayesta Nishat Ahmed, Associate Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
23 January 2023

Keywords: US, Nuclear Posture Review, Vertical Proliferation, Deterrence, Arms Control, United States, Indo-Pacific

The post An Assessment of the 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: United Nations Biodiversity Conference, Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, Common but differentiated responsibility, Lifestyle for Environment.

As India formally took over the presidency of the G20, climate change, food security, sustainable living, climate finance, and energy security would be high on India’s G20 agenda. This sharpened focus will undoubtedly provide the burgeoning climate dialogue, innovations, and business models in India and around the world a multifaceted boost. Additionally, it will solidify India’s position as a world leader in climate change negotiations. In fact, biodiversity is facing a greater threat due to anthropogenic actions. The Living Planet Report of 2022 highlights that there has been an average decline of 69 per cent in species populations since 1970.[1] The stakeholders are indeed making efforts for conservation; however, expedited actions are needed to redress the damage already done. Taking these factors into account, the representatives of 190 countries met in Montreal, Canada, between December 7 and 19, for the United Nations Biodiversity Conference of Parties summit (COP15).

There are various international organizations and treaties to ensure the conservation of biodiversity. Mostly, these efforts are voluntary in nature, but some treaties, like the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are legally binding.[2] The CBD functions under the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).[3] The 15^th meeting was held in December 2022. The major aim of the CBD includes the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.[4]

Landmark outcome of United Nations Biodiversity Conference (COP15)

Chaired by China, the COP15 was concluded with the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).[5]  The major goals of GBF include: addressing biodiversity loss, protecting indigenous rights, and restoring ecosystems.[6] The framework aims to take concrete measures to reverse the nature loss by putting 30 per cent of the degraded ecosystem and 30 per cent of the planet under protection by 2030.[7] It emphasizes on increasing the finances of developing countries.

The GBF includes four major global objectives to preserve nature. These are as follows: stopping the anthropogenically caused extinction of threatened species as well as limiting the rate of extinction of all species by 2050; ensuring the sustainable use and management of biodiversity to guarantee that the benefits of nature to people are acknowledged, preserved, and improved; the benefits of using genetic resources as well as the digital sequence data on genetic resources should be fairly distributed; and means of implementing the GBF should be easily available to all parties, especially Small Island Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries.[8]

The GBF also includes 23 goals to accomplish by 2030, such as ensuring that at least 30 per cent of the world’s land, marine, and coastal areas are effectively conserved and managed. Currently, 8 per cent of marine regions and 17 per cent of land areas are protected. Reduce the loss of regions with high ecological integrity and biodiversity value to almost zero; reduce global overconsumption and waste production significantly, cut global food waste in half; the amount of positive incentives for biodiversity preservation and sustainable use should be increased while removing or reforming the incentives that harm biodiversity; securing at least US $200 billion annually from both public and private sources for funding related to biodiversity; increasing international financial transfers to at least US $30 billion annually from the global north to the global south; requiring multinational corporations and financial organizations to examine, monitor, and publicly report risks to and effects on biodiversity related to their business operations, portfolios, supply chains, and value chains.[9]

Finance was a major point of discussion during COP 15 in the context of how much money developed countries should transfer to developing countries for the conservation of biodiversity. Hence, the Global Environment Facility was requested to set up a special trust fund, the ‘GBF Fund,’ to ensure a timely and adequate transfer of funds as well as to support the implementation of the GBF.[10]

India’s position at COP15

Developing states have argued that the current multilateral sources are inadequate to meet the GBF’s requirement at CBD COP15 and have called for the creation of a new, specifically designated biodiversity fund. India has claimed that because developing countries primarily bear the burden of carrying out the goals for biodiversity protection, these countries need significant funding and technology transfer. India has asserted that the targets of GBF should be both ambitious as well as realistic. India has claimed that biodiversity conservation should also be based on common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities.[11]  The application of CBDR has been a point of contention in climate negotiations between the global north and the global south.

Further, at the COP15, the parties also attempted to agree on eliminating environmentally detrimental subsidies, such as those for producing fossil fuels, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, by at least US $500 billion annually. However, India disagreed with cutting the subsidy for agriculture and diverting the savings to biodiversity preservation because there are other national objectives.[12]  India has argued that agriculture is the primary economic source for rural people in developing countries, and that the crucial support given to these sectors cannot be diverted. In order to assist the livelihoods of farmers, mostly small and marginal ones, who make up the majority of the rural population in India, the government offers a number of subsidies, including those for seed, fertilizer, irrigation, agricultural equipment, and infrastructure. Hence, diverting these subsidies would adversely affect the agriculture sector.

Further, the proposed GBF includes measurable targets such as a two-thirds reduction in pesticide use.[13]  India has claimed that the prescription of numerical targets for pesticide reductions when food security is of the utmost significance for developing countries is unwarranted and must be left to the countries to decide, depending on their conditions, priorities, and capabilities.[14] India highlighted at COP15 that the GBF must take into account science, equity, and nations’ sovereign rights over their resources. Moreover, India’s appeal for Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) found an echo in the GBF.[15] The LiFE initiative aims to promote conscious and purposeful utilization, which is in consonance with the 16^th target of the GBF, which is sustainable consumption.[16] Further, the Digital Sequence Information (DSI), which was accepted as a part of the historic agreement to conserve biodiversity, would ensure that money is transferred to countries like India from users like biotechnology corporations that access its biodiversity and associated genetic information.

In the context of conserving biodiversity, India can use the opportunity to offer global leadership. Even for the countries in the global north, their customs and community-conserved biodiversity regions serve as a successful example of participatory biodiversity conservation. In fact, climate change and sustainable living will be two of the main agenda items during India’s G20 presidency.

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Notes:-

[1] “Living Planet Report 2022,” WWF, https://livingplanet.panda.org/en-IN/ . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[2] “COP 15: What Is Convention On Biological Diversity, Its Targets And Why Is It Important?”, Outlook, https://www.outlookindia.com/international/cop15-what-is-the-convention-on-biological-diversity-what-are-its-targets-and-why-is-it-important–news-244432 . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[3] “UN Biodiversity Conference (COP 15),” UNEP, https://www.unep.org/un-biodiversity-conference-cop-15 . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[4] “Introduction,” Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/intro/ . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[5] “Nations Adopt Four Goals, 23 Targets for 2030 In Landmark UN Biodiversity Agreement,” Convention on Biological Diversity, https://prod.drupal.www.infra.cbd.int/sites/default/files/2022-12/221219-CBD-PressRelease-COP15-Final_0.pdf . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[6] “COP15 ends with landmark biodiversity agreement,” UNEP, https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/cop15-ends-landmark-biodiversity-agreement . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Convention on Biological Diversity, n. 5.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “Union Minister for Environment, Forest and Climate Change Shri Bhupendra Yadav delivers the National Statement at COP15 of Convention on Biodiversity,” PIB, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1884341 . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[12] Ibid.

[13] “India pushes for new biodiversity fund”, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/cop15-india-pushes-for-new-dedicated-fund-for-biodiversity-conservation/article66277386.ece . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[14]  PIB, n. 11.

[15] “COP 15: India to mobilise domestic finance for biodiversity conservation”, Business Standard, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/cop-15-india-to-mobilise-domestic-finance-for-biodiversity-conservation-122122300572_1.html . Accessed on January 11, 2023.

[16] Ibid.

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Keywords: Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, Supply Chain, US-Africa, Geo-economics.

Every week, a new concession agreement is signed or a foreign company invests in rare-earth mining projects in the continent of Africa. Africa has the world’s largest mineral reserves. Countries like Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia have an abundance of neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium.  Some deposits are already being developed through investment collaborations. For instance, in 2020, Pensana Rare Earths, a British company, was granted the exclusive mining rights for the Longonjo Mine, a rare earths operation in Angola, for 35 years. In 2022, Mkango Resources, a Canadian exploration company, declared a total of US$ 2.1 billion investment in the Songwe Hill rare earths mine in Malawi (East Africa). Similarly, in 2022, Australia-based Bannerman Energy purchased a 41.8 per cent stake in Namibia Critical Metals, a company that controls 95 per cent of the Lofdal heavy rare earths operation in Namibia. These mines have rich deposits of dysprosium and terbium, two of the most valuable heavy rare earth metals, and produce 2,000 tonnes of rare earth oxides annually.[1]

Similarly, the US is joining these collaborative initiatives to secure its supply chain sources. This brief intends to assess the potential and future of US investment in the African critical mineral industry, the obstacles it may encounter with China’s already heightened presence, and the implications it has for India, which is also prioritising the security of its supply chain.

US- Africa Leaders’ Summit

During the recent US-Africa Leaders’ Summit in Washington (16-19 December 2022), the US committed to a two-way trade agreement worth US$ 15 billion with a number of African nations.[2] Sectors like sustainable energy, health systems, agribusiness, digital connectivity, infrastructure, and finance were announced as the key priorities. Furthermore, the United States will deepen its long-term relationship with African governments, businesses, civil society and, non-profit organisations..[3] Before this summit, the US had participated in the ‘Investing in African Mining Indaba 2022’ and had shown interest in expanding its engagement in African minerals. At this annual conference held in Cape Town, South Africa, Jose Fernandez, the US Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, called for attention to Africa’s role as a vital supplier of strategic minerals in meeting US plans to diversify its supply chains. According to Fernandez, the US Geological Service has identified nearly 40 critical minerals that will be necessary for a future powered by clean energy as well as for products like cars, computers, and chips.[4]

Key Progress in US-Africa Critical Mineral Partnership

President Biden announced over US$ 15 billion in funding to speed up the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP27) meeting. He reaffirmed the United States’ dedication to helping Africa’s most vulnerable nations and communities adapt to and manage the effects of climate change as part of PREPARE’s work on the continent. Since taking office in January 2021, the Biden administration has pledged and committed at least US$ 1.1 billion to fund African-led efforts to aid in conservation, climate adaption, and a just energy transition. Some of these investments are in infrastructure projects supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).[5]

Since 2021, the United States government has reportedly helped 47 African countries close bilateral trade and investment deals valued at over US$ 18 billion. Similarly, private companies in the United States have signed investment deals in Africa totaling $8.6 billion.[6] For example, with representatives from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed a memorandum of understanding on developing the value chains for the countries’ electric vehicle batteries and advancing multilateral objectives on the supply of essential minerals. President Biden hosted close to 50 African leaders in Washington as part of his efforts to strengthen ties between the United States and African nations in light of worries about China’s expanding influence in the continent.[7]

The key initiatives of the US in Africa include:

1. Power Africa has assisted in providing nearly 165 million people in sub-Saharan Africa with access to electricity since 2013. In order to support Power Africa, the Biden Administration has already committed US$ 193 million and has plans to add another US$ 100 million in the fiscal year 2023.

2. US-Africa Clean Tech Energy Network (CTEN)

3. Health Electrification and Telecommunications Alliance (HETA)

4. The Climate Action Infrastructure Facility supports large-scale climate solutions

5. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has committed more than US$ 438 million to climate-related projects in Africa since January 2021.

6. The United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) has invested US$ 4 million to support a just energy transition in several African nations, for instance, direct air capture with geothermal energy in Kenya, Solar Decathlon Africa Design Challenge in Morocco, commercial deployment of carbon management in Nigeria; and others.[8]

Challenges and Potential

Northern and Western Africa have increasingly become the center of geopolitical rivalry with the growing interest of China and Russia to mine and process their REEs deposits. China’s expansion of the Belt and Road initiative is largely to blame for this. About one-fifth of all loans made to Africa by Chinese banks were made to resource or strategically important nations like Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia as of October 2021. The fact that China is actively trading with African mineral producers essentially relocating the US-China mineral conflict to Africa, where China once again controls a larger proportion of resources and resource production, may be of greater concern to the US.[9]

The US, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission launched the Minerals Security Partnership in September 2022 at the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention. On September 22, in conjunction with the UN General Assembly, the US gathered these allies as well as mineral-rich nations hoping to gain access to the resources and expertise of developed nations in order to advance domestic rare earth processing. Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the five African nations that received invitations. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the partnership aims to enhance mining practices while also ensuring that developing nations begin to gain more from processing their natural resources.[10] The US has chosen Mkango Resources, based in Malawi, as a way to diversify its source of rare earth minerals. The Songwe Hill mine, owned and run by Mkango, has rare earth grades of up to 2.2 per cent over £ 6.7 million, according to drilling studies finished last year.[11] TechMet, a Maltese investor, has sponsored a $3 million rare earths separation plant at Rainbow Rare Earth’s Gakara project in western Burundi, which may be even more appealing to U.S. investors.[12] 

Implications for India

India-Africa shares a deep bond since historic times. Their trading in terms of pharmaceutical, food and other forms of necessary securities represent a close connection. Their interaction needs to be more frequent as the next round of the India-Africa Forum Summit is pending since 2015. India can even use its G20 presidency to extend membership to Africa to deepen relations.

China is already investing in Africa for a long time and has been the largest leading investor in the African continent[13], which has been a cause of concern for India. With the US looking to increase its engagement and investment in Africa, India has both opportunities and causes for concern. As a member of Quad, which prioritises the four principles of critical supply chain security—Security, Transparency, Autonomy, and Integrity—the US-Africa partnership can open up new doors for India.[14] Nonetheless, India may feel threatened by the United States’ growing investments in Africa and its exclusion from the recently formed Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), which includes the United States, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission.[15]

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Notes:-

[1] Gracelin Baskaran, “Could Africa replace China as the world’s source of rare earth elements?,” Brookings, December 29, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/12/29/could-africa-replace-china-as-the-worlds-source-of-rare-earth-elements/. Accessed on 2 January 2023.

[2] The White House. “FACT SHEET: U.S.- Africa Partnership in Promoting Two-Way Trade and Investment in Africa”. December 14, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/14/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-in-promoting-two-way-trade-and-investment-in-africa/. Accessed on January 2 2023.

[3] “US, Africa seal $15 billion in trade investments during Washington summit,” Business Standard, January 2, 2023, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/us-africa-seal-15-billion-in-trade-investments-during-washington-summit-122121500093_1.html. Accessed on January 3 2022.

[4] Vicky Stark. “US Interested in Africa Mining Investments, says American Official,” Voa News, May 11, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-interested-in-africa-mining-investments-says-american-official-/6566969.html. Accessed on January 3 2022.

[5] “FACT SHEET: U.S-Africa Partnership in Supporting Conservation, Climate Adaptation and a Just Energy Transition,” The White House, December 13, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/13/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-in-supporting-conservation-climate-adaptation-and-a-just-energy-transition/. Accessed on January 4 2022.

[6] Business Standard. “US, Africa seal $15 billion in trade investments during Washington summit”. January 2, 2023. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/us-africa-seal-15-billion-in-trade-investments-during-washington-summit-122121500093_1.html. Accessed January 5 2022.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ariel Cohen. “China And Russia Make Critical Mineral Grabs in Africa While the U.S. Snoozes,” Forbes, January 13 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/01/13/china-and-russia-make-critical-mineral-grabs-in-africa-while-the-us-snoozes/?sh=5b9c57646dc4. Accessed on January 5 2022.

[10] Julian Pecquet, “US looks to Africa to diversify supply chain for critical minerals”. The Africa Report, September 23, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/243847/us-looks-to-africa-to-diversify-supply-chain-for-critical-minerals/. Accessed on January 5 2022.

[11] JP Casey. “Into Africa: the US’ drive for African rare earth minerals,” Mining Technology, September 18, 2019, https://www.mining-technology.com/features/into-africa-the-us-drive-for-african-rare-earth-minerals/. Accessed on January 6 2022.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Carla D. Jones, Hermann A. Ndofor, Mengge Li. “Chinese Economic Engagement in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy”. January 24 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa/. Accessed on January 6 2022.

[14] Neha Mishra. “QUAD’s Quest to Overcome Dependence on China in Critical and Emerging Technologies,” Bharat Shakti, July 5 2022, https://bharatshakti.in/quads-quest-to-overcome-dependence-on-china-in-critical-and-emerging-technologies/. Accessed on January 7 2022.

[15] Akhil Ramesh. “India’s Exclusion from US Rare Earths Alliance Makes Little Economic Sense” Quint, August 10 2022, https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/indias-exclusion-from-us-rare-earths-alliance-makes-little-economic-sense#read-more. Accessed on January 7 2022

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Keywords: Japan, defense strategy, nuclear disarmament.

On December 2, 2022, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a 15-member International Group of Eminent Persons from nuclear and non-nuclear states to initiate discussions on steps towards universal nuclear disarmament. The first meeting of the group was held on December 10-11, 2022, in Hiroshima, his hometown. The choice of the venue turned out to be both emotional and educational. Visiting ground zero, hearing from the hibakushas (survivors of the atomic bombing) on what they were doing on the morning of August 6, 1945, and engaging with the Japanese youth and civil society, who appealed to the members to show courage in identifying bold steps for the elimination of nuclear weapons, added a sombre dimension to the deliberations. Clearly, the challenges to moving towards a nuclear weapons-free world in the current circumstances are humongous, as acknowledged by PM Kishida himself.

In fact, this is his second such effort. In 2017, too, as foreign minister, he instituted a similar group. Meanwhile, nearly a decade earlier, in 2008, Japan teamed up with Australia to form the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. However, the lack of progress on disarmament by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognised by the NPT has resulted in a situation where strained geopolitical relations have made nuclear buildup, not disarmament, the order of the day. Therefore, a fresh call by the Japanese PM to yet again explore steps towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons reflects his leadership on an issue close to his heart and to a majority of the Japanese public.

Interestingly, this initiative also comes at a time when Japan is facing a rather rough security environment. In fact, on December 16, 2022, Tokyo announced a new National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defence Strategy (NDS), and Defence Build-up Program (DBP), taking into account Japan’s current security concerns. The first of these, expectedly, arises from China’s military advances and its frequent incursions into Japanese waters and around the islands disputed between the two. The latest NSS describes China as an unprecedented ‘strategic challenge’ rather than just an ‘issue of concern,’ as had been done in the 2013 NSS. A second threat comes from North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea tested more than 90 missiles in 2022, some of which flew over Japanese territory. Pyongyang’s continued nuclear and missile buildup and the lack of progress on the part of the USA, South Korea, and Japan to handle the challenge cause worries in Japan. The third threat has arisen from the Russian operation against Ukraine, which has awakened Tokyo to the possibility of military action by an NWS against another non-nuclear nation. While Japan relies on the US nuclear umbrella to avert such a possibility, the incident has underscored the need for a sufficient national military capability to handle regional contingencies, especially if Washington was distracted by other priorities, as it presently is with Europe.

In the wake of these palpable security threats, it is not surprising that Japan’s NDS 2022 has acknowledged that “Japan must: fundamentally reinforce defense capability with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare; and actively adapt to new ways of warfare.” Accordingly, the DBP has decided to hike defence spending from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of Japan’s GDP by 2027, making it Japan’s largest military spending since World War II. Secondly, Japan has also outlined plans to acquire ‘counterstrike capability’ through long-range land and sea-launched missiles. In the past, Tokyo preferred relying on missile defence. But now, it appears ready to accept counterstrike as a way to thwart enemy attacks rather than just defending itself. Finally, of course, the NDS clarifies that “counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy.”

None of the three documents mentions nuclear weapons. Japan continues to maintain the centrality of the ‘Three Non-Nuclear principles,’ adopted by the National Diet in 1971. These include a commitment to “not possess, not produce, and not permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.” However, discussion on nuclear sharing a la NATO has surfaced amongst the Japanese strategic community of scholars and retired practitioners. Soon after the Russian military action against Ukraine, the former PM of Japan, late Shinzo Abe, also from the same political party as the current PM, had hinted at a reappraisal of security strategies by the NNWS, including Japan. He had called upon Tokyo to cast off taboos around its possession of nuclear weapons and consider hosting them as NATO members do in Europe.

For now, though, Japan does not seem to be ready to accept this advice. Rather, it appears to be basing its defence strategy on three planks. One, it is significantly enhancing its conventional forces. Secondly, it is seeking reinforcement of the US commitment to keep nuclear weapons as a core component of their alliance. So, Japan is supportive of the US first-use strategy and its deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons to deter regional contingencies. Thirdly, Japan is looking for universal nuclear disarmament to strip its adversaries of their nuclear weapons and thus ease its security concerns in the long term. Is there a dichotomy amongst these three efforts? Are the first two in conflict with the last one?

Not necessarily, when seen through the lens of Japan’s increasingly hostile threat environment. This is forcing Tokyo to balance a pacifist constitution and a desire for eventual nuclear disarmament with the compulsion of military enhancements, including through US affirmations of an “unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan, including… by the full range of conventional and nuclear capabilities.”

It may be recalled that India, too, faced a somewhat similar dilemma in the 1980s and 1990s when it was faced with threats from two nuclear-armed nations, China and Pakistan. Without the protection of a nuclear umbrella of any NWS, India too had then campaigned for prioritising nuclear disarmament. PM Rajiv Gandhi presented an action plan to the third special session on disarmament in 1988. However, Cold War politics killed the initiative. Thereafter, the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 made India realise that the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) had lost any leverage on the NWS to push them towards giving up their nuclear weapons. The belief was strengthened when the CTBT, in 1996, accepted the rights of the NWS to undertake non-explosive nuclear tests to hone their nuclear arsenals while binding others to a ban on nuclear testing. All these developments shattered New Delhi’s hopes for universal nuclear disarmament. Acquisition of nuclear weapons became a necessity to safeguard against the threat of nuclear blackmail and coercion from nuclear-armed neighbours who lay claim to Indian territories. But, even as a nuclear possessor, India has continued to campaign for a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW). There is no contradiction in this position. Nuclear weapons remain a short-term compulsion owing to immediate security threats, but an NWFW is a long-term aspiration to remove nuclear risks and ease the security environment.

Today, Japan, too, is looking for its security by fortifying all possible routes: conventional modernisation, strengthening alliances (with the US and others, such as the Quad), and searching for universal nuclear disarmament. Each one of them is being built as a bulwark to keep the country from having to amend its policy of nuclear ‘no’. Indeed, crossing that bridge will not be easy, given that 75 per cent of the Japanese public supports nuclear disarmament. It is, therefore, not surprising that PM Kishida has chosen to give disarmament another chance in the face of the deteriorating regional and global nuclear threat environment. As he has said, “giving up is not an option”.

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Author is member of International Group of Eminent Persons set up in 2022

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: ISIS, ISKP, ISIS Media, Media Jihad, Voice of Khorasan (VOK), Wilayah al-Hind, Daesh, Tinder-Terror, Terrorist Propaganda, Trending Hashtags, SOCMINT.

ISIS and the Use of Media

In November 2022, a pro-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Telegram account encouraged its followers earlier to carry out terrorist attacks at the 2022 FIFA World Cup, hosted by Qatar. Messages in the account urged the ISIS supporters to take this event as a ‘golden opportunity’[1] to carry forward what they call their fight against the Kafirs, be it in the form of biological or any other forms of innovative attacks.

It is important to note that similar threats to carry out attacks were made by ISIS and its sympathisers even during the 2018 FIFA World Cup, hosted by Russia, but nothing unfortunate occurred. However, the Wafa Foundation, a media unit of the ISIS, used an image of Lionel Messi[2] to send terror threats during the 2018 FIFA World Cup. ISIS has set up the trend of using the FIFA World Cup platform to propagate their doctrine. The height of the ISIS trend of hijacking occurred during the 2014 World Cup. They made use of the hashtag “#WorldCup2014”. Instead of football, all tweets under this hashtag became synonymous with ISIS.[3] This indicated that the trend was hijacked by ISIS supporters and their bot accounts.    ISIS, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh, is an offshoot of Al-Qaeda. Although it began in West Asia, it has now extended its tentacles to most parts of the world through its offshoots like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) active in Afghanistan. This group is a radical militant organisation whose focus has always been on building a proto-state (new caliphate). The organisation employs social media as a strategic tool for promoting its message and recruiting globally. In addition, this group is well-known for uploading various Jihadi propaganda content on the internet.

According to the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), ISIS is growing its influence in Africa. The Times has recently reported that an African version of the Tinder dating app is now being used by ISIS to gather funds for their terror outfit.[4] ISIS operatives use the app by making fake profiles and using pictures of less-known personalities. Single men and women are lured and contacted by ISIS operatives. Intimate conversations, pictures and videos are exchanged, and when the tone of the conversation turns sour and tense, the person is blackmailed and money is demanded. This technique is banded as ‘Tinder Terror’.[5] It is important to trace the patterns that ISIS over the years have focused and succeeded in their propaganda game, along with their various techniques of  courtship- what we know of as honey trapping.

ISIS Media Footprint in India and the Neighbourhood

Earlier this year, the ISKP reached out to its followers through the Voice of Khorasan (VOK), an Afghanistan-based digital English magazine. In its April 2022 issue, it emphasised that, ‘fighting with the tongue is equally as important as fighting physically’. This digital magazine covers a wide range of subjects related to politics and theology and is published by ISKP’s official al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production.

The above statement showcases their desperation to mark their presence in the region, be it physically or by asserting their dominance in the cyber domain in the name of ‘Media Jihad’. After ISIS lost its stronghold of its significant territories in Iraq and Syria back in 2017, the terrorist outfit’s propaganda narratives have shifted towards encouraging lone wolf attacks, and since then, social media warfare has been their main focus. This is done in order to infest their radical ideologies among the Muslim population worldwide.

The return of the Taliban in August 2021 has reinvigorated the terror threats in the South Asian neighbourhood. ISIS has taken advantage of the instability in Afghanistan and asserted itself on Afghan soil. ISKP is using Afghanistan as a launchpad for Jihad and is penetrating itself into the Indian soil. Threats of ISIS have been very prevalent in the recent months, particularly in Kashmir and Kerala. For example- Wilayah al-Hind, the ISIS division in Kashmir, reportedly pledged their allegiance to the new Caliph, and videos and pictures of the same are published in official ISIS media outlets.[6] In December 2022, ISIS operatives from all over the world pledged their allegiance to the new ISIS Caliph, Abu al-Husseini al-Qureshi.[7] In the same month, a missing family from Kasaragod, Kerala, has been suspected of joining ISIS in Yamen.[8] This is yet another example of Kerala’s Islamic State connection. Over the years, India has witnessed one of the highest recruitment of individuals to ISIS from Kerala.

The state institutions are deeply concerned about the use of the internet for terrorist financing, terrorist recruiting, and radicalisation to violence, as well as for inflaming interreligious conflicts. Several reports in the media and from the National Investigation Agency (NIA)[9] indicated probable cases of internet terrorist radicalisation, recruitment, and financing, most recently showcasing links to ISIS in various parts of India. Moreover, the coming back of the Taliban has certainly increased ISIS’s threats to India’s national security.

Preferred Tools for Propaganda

According to a statement issued by the propaganda network of ISIS,[10] three propaganda foundations associated with the group will be merged with the group’s Sarkh al-Khilafah Foundation. Al-Khayr Information Foundation (Mu’asasat al-Khayr al-I’lamiya), Al Gholam al Dawlawi Foundation, and Khadamat al Ansar Foundation (the supporters’ services foundation) will be merged under the banner of Sarkh al-Khilafah Foundation. According to the release, the reason for the merger is to unite forces and ease the flow of information materials. Does this action show the fragility of the ISIS media network and the desire to enhance their propaganda machinery? It is likely that ISIS appears incapable of functioning on its own. Probably this may be the reason for working towards enhancing their institutional capacities by merging with a number of independent organisations.

Al Jihad fi Sabil Allah[11] meaning ‘Jihad for the sake of Allah,’ is an Android application that was recently launched by ISIS for the people of Al Hawl camp. This camp largely consists of ISIS families, and this application is useful for them because it contains news, information on what is going on in the camp along with ISIS propaganda. Terrorist organisations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda attempted to capitalise on communal tensions and released a 10 minutes long video titled ‘The Polytheists are The Brothers of The Polytheists,’ which was focused on India.[12] Thereby, with the fusion of political, social, and technological factors, gathering information using SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence) and disseminating terror propaganda has become a much easier task for terrorist organisations.

Recent media propaganda about ISIS is aimed at agitating and radicalising the Muslim population based on domestic conflicts and encouraging communal violence globally. Seeking more recruiters is also an objective for ISIS, along with propagating and gathering support for their ideology. Albeit with limited success, ISIS has been able to create its own ‘brand’ of terrorism, along with a carefully developed network, that has been able to hijack and generate trends, and giving the group an appearance of being a global existential threat. To spread their propaganda, ISIS has utilised various anonymous user identities, trending hashtags of various social media platforms, online chatting rooms, and their media houses. All these activities are done by crafting their messages to gain attention from various targeted audiences. India needs to be watchful of these activities and take steps to check the propaganda impacting young minds.

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Notes:-

[1] “Pro-ISIS Telegram Channel Threatens Attacks At FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, Encourages Biological Attacks, Provides Telegram Account To Connect To Obtain Biological Substances”, MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, November 7, 2022, https://www.memri.org/jttm/pro-isis-telegram-channel-threatens-attacks-fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022-encourages-biological. Accessed on November 18, 2022.

[2] “Pro-#ISIS media unit Wafa’ Foundation continues to threaten 2018 FIFA #WorldCup, this time using an image of #Lionel Messi in a prison outfit”, SITE Intelligence Group (Twitter Account), October 24, 2017, https://twitter.com/siteintelgroup/status/922863797928329216. Accessed on November 18, 2022.

[3] “The Command of The Trend: Social Media as a Weapon in The Information Age”, The School of Advanced AIR and Space Studies- AIR University, June 2017, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=805404. Accessed on November 18, 2022.

[4] “ISIS funds terror with ‘Tinder’ love scams”, The Times, November 14, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-funds-terror-with-tinder-love-scams-nv08xnbcz#:~:text=At%20face%20value%20it%20looks,once%20the%20conversation%20turns%20sour. Accessed on November 18, 2022.

[5] “ISIS funding terrorism with Tinder scams”, The OZ, November 14, 2022, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/the-oz/news/isis-funding-terrorism-with-tinder-scams/news-story/ad2cdd9df8005c1a06e6a1f2b561680e. Accessed on November 18, 2022.

[6] “ISIS India Kashmir: Kashmir terrorists salute the new ‘Khalifa’ of IS, a big threat to India”, Nav Bharat Times, December 8, 2022, https://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/world/uae/isis-in-india-kashmir-wilayah-hind-fighters-pledging-allegiance-to-new-islamic-state-caliph/articleshow/96075850.cms. Accessed on December 15, 2022.

[7] “The Battle of Hearts and Minds- Pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s new leader”, Spotlight on Global Jihad, December 8-14, 2022, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2022/12/E_205_22.pdf. Accessed on December 15, 2022.

[8] “Kerala: Six member family from Kasaragod on radar of security agencies after they illegally enter war-torn Yemen, suspected of joining ISIS”, OpIndia, December 25, 2022, https://www.opindia.com/2022/12/kerala-security-forces-family-six-kasaragod-yemen/. Accessed on December 30, 2022.

[9] “Tamil Nadu: ISIS module busted in Chennai, close on heels of Coimbatore suicide bombing, 18 detained and interrogated”, OpIndia, November 16, 2022, https://www.opindia.com/2022/11/tamil-nadu-isis-terror-module-busted-coimbatore-suicide-bombing/. Accessed on November 17, 2022.

[10] “Merging three ISIS propaganda foundations”, Spotlight on Global Jihad, November 10-16, 2022, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2022/11/E_181_22.pdf. Accessed on November 26, 2022.

[11] “ISIS supporters recently launched an application for Android devices for the residents of Al Hawl refugee camp”, Michael Barak PHD @Michael_Barak (Twitter Account), November 10, 2022, https://twitter.com/Michael_Barak/status/1590643174803853312/photo/1. Accessed on November 26, 2022.

[12] “Islamic State’s Video on Nupur Sharma, Taliban Threatens Attack on Hindus”, Hindustan Times, June 16, 2022,  https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/islamic-state-s-video-on-nupur-sharma-taliban-threatens-attack-on-hindus-101655353764244.html. Accessed on November 9, 2022.

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Keywords: NSA Doval, Indo-Pacific, Atmanirbhar, Technology Co-operation.

Ajit Doval, India’s National Security Advisor (NSA), met his counterpart, Emmanuel Bonne, Diplomatic Adviser to the French President, on January 5, 2023, for a bilateral strategic dialogue. The meeting was aimed at promoting a strategic partnership to ensure peace, stability, and security in the Indo-Pacific based on shared beliefs. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to rule-based international order and strategic autonomy in the emerging Indo-Pacific construct[1]. The bilateral issues covering cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, space, cyber, and nuclear energy domains remained the focus areas. The two sides discussed the prevailing global security environment, the scope for expanding the existing defence cooperation, and jointly developing future technologies in line with the ‘Make in India’ or ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ priorities.[2]

Historical Bilateral Engagements

Historically, France and India have had cordial relations, and since the two countries formed a strategic partnership in 1998, there has been significant progress in all areas of their bilateral cooperation thanks to frequent high-level meetings. Defence, counterterrorism, nuclear energy, and space exploration head of state/government level interactions and collaboration [3]. Mirage -2000 deal, followed by Nuclear Peace Cooperation, cemented the bilateral relations with India, soon becoming a preferred defence acquisition partner with France. France was the first country with which India signed a treaty agreement on public cooperation in the field of nuclear energy to enable India to resume full civil nuclear cooperation. France was the first country with which India entered into an agreement on nuclear energy following the waiver given by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. France has consistently supported India’s growing international role in every international forum, including India’s permanent membership to the UNSC.[4] A landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement was signed between India and France during then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s visit to France. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and its French counterpart, the Centre National de Etudes Spatiales (CNES), are holding an umbrella agreement that has been operating since 1993 and has successfully integrated space programmes like Mega-Tropiques and SARAL. On the defence cooperation front, after the Indo-French Air Exercise, Garuda IV, in June 2010, the first joint military exercise, called Shakti, was held in October 2011, followed by an Indo-French Naval Exercise in July 2012.[5] Subsequently, these exercises have been a part of joint training programmes on both sides. It is evident that both nations, over the last few years, have developed very strong defence ties while strengthening the bilateral two-decade-long relations of nuclear peace cooperation along with technology, space, and cyber domain joint developments.

Strategic Partnerships

France has supplied India with military aircraft since the 1950s. France has consistently proven to be a dependable supplier and almost a dependable partner who has resisted any pressure against this partnership. This tie began in 1953 with the purchase of a first-generation jet fighter named the Toofani for the Indian Air Force (IAF), the Dassault Ouragan. Later in 1956, the IAF also received the Dassault Mystere IV, which was used in the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan.[6] The single-engine Mirage 2000 fleet of multirole aircraft from Dassault, which was introduced at the beginning of the 1980s succeeded the Mystere IV. Since then, the Mirage-2000 has been the frontline multirole fighter in the IAF and has proven its mettle during the Kargil war in 1998. India and France formed a strategic partnership that has since grown into a close bilateral relationship with closely overlapping views on a number of global issues.[7] The main pillars of this strategic partnership are defence and security cooperation, space and cyber domain cooperation, and civil nuclear cooperation. Indian warships are able to use French bases in the Indian and southern Pacific oceans. India has for a long time also been utilising the space launch station in French Guiana for its space programmes.

The Indian Ocean Region, climate change, and sustainable growth and development within the framework of rule-based governance in the Indo-Pacific umbrella are just a few of the new areas of cooperation in which both countries have increased their involvement. During President Macron’s visit to India in March 2018, the two agreed to establish an annual Ministerial Defense Dialogue, the first of which took place in October 2018. This was followed by regular workshops and service chief-level visits to enhance defence cooperation. On September 23, 2016, the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for India’s purchase of 36 Rafale jets in flyaway condition was signed and will be fully implemented before the end of 2022.[8]

The Indian Navy, during their recent acquisition trials, have found Rafale-M to be a better aircraft over US FA-18 for the operations from the latest Indian Aircraft Carrier – INS Vikrant, commissioned into the Navy last year.[9] The contract for six Scorpene submarines was signed in October 2006. By way of ‘Transfer of Technology’ (ToT) agreement, Mazagaon Docks Ltd. will be able to construct all six vessels. The project is currently being implemented. The first submarine, INS Kalvari, was commissioned in December 2017. Similar cooperation is taken up in the nuclear, cyber, and space domains. The mature outlook of both countries on the recent Ukraine conflict has strengthened these ties better.

Early in March 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron is scheduled to travel to New Delhi, where he will hold bilateral talks with PM Modi about the Indo-Pacific region, climate change, and strengthening strategic relationships in defence and security.[10] This would be a great opportunity for India to not only strengthen its defence, space, and peaceful nuclear ties but also to engage in taking forward the strategic cooperation in bilateral air, land, and maritime exercises, especially focused towards securing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and blocking the expansionist ambitions of China. His subsequent visit to India for the G20 Summit in September 2023 would be a landmark visit in many ways. The visit would not only be to honour India’s G20 presidency but also signal the strong diplomatic, defence, and economic relations between the two nations.

Future for India and Indian Armed Forces

India, in the past, has immensely benefited from a strategic partnership with a technically advanced nation like France. Despite France not being a member of either the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) trilateral, Indo-French ties on Indo-Pacific issues have been growing in almost every domain. Today, the IAF has a state-of-the-art Rafale in its inventory to thwart the threat from China. The Indian Navy’s close monitoring of the Rafale-M is also a clear indication of the growing mutual trust and deep relations between the two nations. The major gains for the Indian Armed Forces are through the commitment by France towards assisting the AtmaNirbhar initiative by way of technology transfer and joint development programmes aimed at enhancing indigenous development of defence equipment in India. The recent bilateral NSA-level talks have provided an impetus to this effort, and the Indian Armed Forces, especially the IAF, would immensely gain from this bilateral relationship.

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Notes:-

[1] “Doval meets French counterpart, discusses Afghanistan, Indo-Pacific”, Indian Express, January 07, 2023 at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ajit-doval-french-counterpart-strategic-partnership-india-france-8363985/ Accessed on January 07, 2023

[2] Ibid

[3] “India-France Bilateral relations,” Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-France_Relations.pdf, Accessed on January 07, 2023

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd), SP’s Aviation at https://www.sps-aviation.com/experts- Accessed on January 07, 2023speak/?id=19&h=Indo-French-Cooperation

[7] Embassy of India, Paris, https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/page/bilateral-brief/ Accessed on January 07, 2023

[8] ibid

[9] “India’s future airborne fighter: the Rafale M outperforms the F-18,” Air&Cosmos, https://aircosmosinternational.com/article/india-s-future-airborne-fighter-the-rafale-m-outperforms-the-f-18-3408, Accessed on January 07, 2023

[10] “Ahead Of G20, German, French Heads To Visit India; Green Hydrogen, Indo-Pacific On Agenda,” Business World, January 08, 2023, https://www.businessworld.in/article/Ahead-Of-G20-German-French-Heads-To-Visit-India-Green-Hydrogen-Indo-pacific-On-Agenda/07-01-2023-460810/, Accessed on January 08, 2023.

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Keywords: Air Capability, Maritime Domain Awareness, P-8I Poseidon.

In one of his recent addresses, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief, Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, commented that the air capability needs to be strengthened not only on the land borders but also in the maritime domain due to the increasing forays of China in the region. The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the playground of strategies in the current geopolitical flux. The four factors that will determine any country’s influence and dominance include Diplomacy, Information Dominance, Military Might and Economic Prowess (DIME). New Delhi forms the heart of the region, and hence its role in ensuring that the region remains outside the influence of any one country remains important. Having a dominance in the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the key to ensuring that the Indian Ocean region (IOR) remains a ground of convergence for all the players. And in this regard, the role is not limited to the aviation branch of the Navy, but rather strong air power acts as a force multiplier to achieve an effective and efficient MDA. In this regard, the Air Force must concentrate on and exploit the role of island states to enhance and refurbish the security of the region.

According to the Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015, MDA means being cognizant of the positions and intentions of all actors, whether own, hostile, or neutral, in all dimensions of a dynamic maritime environment, across the areas of interest.[1] Thus, information awareness and dissemination become the mainstays of strong maritime reconnaissance. MDA is essential for both military and non-military purposes. The former helps to keep an eye on the enemies, while the latter allows for keeping a tap on the cargo and merchandise ships. As India is a residential power in the IOR, it has a geographical advantage not only due to its large coastline but also due to the presence of island chains across its eastern and western seaboard, which further enhance its strategic presence in the region via sea patrolling.

If there are opportunities, there are also challenges in the IOR, with both traditional and non-traditional threats sharpening India’s edge. Over the last two decades, increasing Chinese presence in the IOR and its littorals through its infrastructure undertakings and movements of so-called research vessels have raised concerns on the strategic viability of the same. Other areas that require stringent maritime reconnaissance are drug trafficking and human trafficking; sea-based terrorism; piracy; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, etc.

In this regard, the role of the P-8I multimission maritime patrol aircraft, imported from the United States, becomes quintessential and central to leveraging India’s influence and ensuring its dominance in the IOR. Poseidon aircraft is equipped with systems that are capable of long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of broad area, maritime, and littoral operations.[2] It is also armed with torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles and can also drop or monitor sonobuoys. It can operate in conjunction with other states, including the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.[3] Its excellent surveillance quality has rendered it an important asset for the Indian Navy and the IAF to cover the broader area in the IOR and fulfill India’s goal of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Its application is not just limited to coastal patrolling; it can also be used for other critical missions like search and rescue, anti-piracy, and supporting operations of other arms of the military.[4]

Such diplomatic initiatives also foster bilateral ties between the countries. In this case, it is the upward trajectory of Indo-US defence ties. It will also enhance India’s role as a net security provider in the region and strengthen its defence diplomacy and military might. One such initiative includes India deploying P-8I Poseidon in the Australian territory of Darwin in April 2022, while the latter deployed P-8A Poseidon in Goa as part of India-Australia maritime surveillance initiative in June 2022.[5] Such activities enhance the maritime interoperability between the forces, thereby acting as a force multiplier in the bilateral ties too.

New Delhi recently carried out maritime surveillance and ocean mapping operations to further enhance its presence, safety, and security by staging its P-8I Poseidon in the French overseas territory of La Reunion Islands in the southern Indian Ocean Region.[6] Such joint inventiveness increases the joint maritime capability and widens the ground of convergence between the partner countries. It also provides an opportune moment for India to leverage the island territories in the IOR. India has logistic agreements with Japan, the US, France, and Australia, all of which are major players in the region. And this provides ample space for India to manoeuvre its role in the region.

MDA can be further reinforced by not limiting the cooperation to a few countries but instead by also undertaking defence diplomacy effectively. Selling and buying arms provides fertile ground to cultivate healthy partnerships, thereby avoiding boots on the ground. In August 2022, India gifted two Donier aircraft to Sri Lanka to strengthen maritime security, which will help Colombo deal with human and drug trafficking and other kinds of smuggling in the coastal waters.[7] Partnering with friendly countries further creates a positive image for India and increases its visibility in the region.

The IOR, which extends from the eastern shores of Africa to the western shores of Australia, is big enough to be surveyed by a few aircraft. As India aspires to play a critical role in building a safe, stable, and prosperous IOR, it will have to step up its role in the region in the wake of rising challenges. According to a Pentagon report, the current number of aircraft is not enough to cover the whole of the IOR and thus requires a total of 25-35 Poseidons for the region.[8] The IAF Chief also opined that to retain its combat edge, IAF will have to induct more squadrons and force multipliers.[9]  Thus, the IAF has a long way to go before there is parity between aspiration and capability.

Air power has certain advantages like speed, agility, and swiftness, which complement the strength of the Navy, which can move large aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines. Therefore, it can be conclusively said that any coherent and broad-based maritime reconnaissance will remain deficient and insufficient without an active role for the Air Force. The alignment between the Navy and Air Force becomes necessary to enhance the security of the region.

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Notes:-

[1] “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, Indian Navy, January 25, 2016, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf ,accessed on December 25, 2022.

[2] “Boeing Delivers 12^th P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft to Indian Navy”, The Economic Times, February 24, 2022 Indian Navy: Boeing delivers 12th P-8I maritime patrol aircraft to Indian Navy – The Economic Times (indiatimes.com) ,accessed on 25 December 2022

[3] “Indian Navy Deploys P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft at Frances Reunion Island”, Navy Recognition, November 10,2022, Indian Navy deploys P-8I maritime patrol aircraft at France’s Reunion island (navyrecognition.com) ,accessed on December 26, 2022

[4] “21^st Century Maritime Security for the Indian Navy”, Boeing, Boeing India – P-8I ,accessed on December 26, 2022

[5] “India-Australia Maritime Surveillance Operation Underway in the Indian Ocean Region”, Asian News Agency, June 08, 2022, India-Australia maritime surveillance operation underway in Indian Ocean region (aninews.in) accessed on December 26, 2022

[6] Rajat Pandit, “India and France in Defence Clinch, in Air and On Sea”, Times of India, November 09, 2022, India and France in defence clinch, in air and on sea | India News – Times of India (indiatimes.com) ,accessed on December 26, 2022

[7] “India Gifts Dornier Aircraft To Strengthen Maritime Security of Sri Lanka”, Business Standard, August 15, 2022 India gifts Dornier aircraft to strengthen maritime security of Sri Lanka | Business Standard News (business-standard.com) ,accessed on December 26, 2022

[8] Raunak Kunde, “India Will Require 25-35 P-8 Poseidons For IOR: Pentagon”, Indian Defence Research Wing, July 9, 2022, India will require 25-35 P-8 Poseidon’s for IOR: Pentagon – Indian Defence Research Wing (idrw.org) ,accessed on December 26, 2022

[9] “Air Chief Flags ‘Critical Deficiencies’ in Indian Air Force “, Hindustan Times, December 23, 2022, Air chief flags ‘critical deficiencies’ in Indian Air Force | Latest News India – Hindustan Times ,accessed on December 25, 2022

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Keywords:Trilateral Partnership, Combat Aircraft, International Security, Defense Strategies.

Japan is now joining hands with two European Nations, the United Kingdom and Italy, to develop a new next-generation fighter jet. It was almost 100 years ago that the battle of Tsushima was won by the Japanese ships against the Russian fleet. All thanks to the technologies and efforts put in to it by Britain and Italy to make the ships combat-ready. Japan’s reengagement with these nations draws attention to whether Japan is preparing for a military exercise in the Indo-Pacific. If not, what is the rationale behind such a strategic move in the security domain?

The whole initiative successfully combines the British-led Future Combat Air System Project with Japan’s FX program to form a ‘Global Combat Air System.’[1] The aim of the project is to develop a next-generation fighter jet by the year 2035. This next-generation fighter jet will primarily work with Artificial Intelligence to assist human pilots under stress or in emergencies. The fighter jet will be a successor to the F-2s and the Eurofighter Typhoons. It would also include cutting-edge air combat technologies. The fighter jet will be highly capable of holding hypersonic missiles and possessing laser weapons which require high amounts of electricity to function. The programme will be built with the combined efforts of Britain’s BAE Systems, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Italy’s Leonardo, along with many other high tech companies.[2]

Since Fumio Kishida became Prime Minister of Japan, the country has not only enhanced its defence capabilities at a rapid pace but also joined hands with leading liberal nations in Asia and beyond. PM Kishida was the first leader from Japan to attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit is a perfect example to show that he looks for an upgrade in the country’s ties with NATO. The increase in the defence budgets over the next five years and the development of a counterstrike capability perhaps signals a transformation in the overall strategic game of Japan.[3] With the increasing testing of missiles by North Korea and disturbances instigated by China in Taiwan. It is clear that Japan will enhance its security measures.[4]

The European presence in the Pacific region has never declined, and this partnership with Japan sets a relevant example. Undoubtedly, Japan intends to increase its defensive capabilities in the region by stressing deterrence and security partnerships. Japan realized that now was the time for a solution, and there was an increasing need to provide protection against future iterations. Skipping an entire generation of fighter aircraft was indeed tough, but it was the only viable option left for the country. Japan is diversifying its defence partners so that it is not dependent on just one ally, the US. Japan was successful in building up the Mitsubishi X-2 Shin-Shin, which indeed was a critical part of the F-X project [5]

Noticeably, the UK, Japan, and Italy are moving ahead with the technological advancements within the domain of modern warfare, and that too without the assistance of the US. This is indeed a big step for all three countries that generate a self-reliant sentiment across the globe. Japan ignoring the US and choosing Italy and UK instead must have been shocking news for the US.[6] However, on the other hand, the AUKUS partnership (Australia, United Kingdom, and United States), which is a defence cooperation act and an alignment against China’s growing influence and power in the Indo-Pacific, aims to bring Japan back into the picture, and that may formulate the name to JAUKUS.[7] It was also seen in a joint statement released by US-Japan officials that stated, “We have begun important collaboration through a series of discussions on autonomous systems capabilities, which could complement Japan’s next fighter program among other platforms.”[8]

The countries are boosting their trilateral relationships through channels of defence cooperation, trade enhancements, and economic progressivity. The trilateral relationship will not only increase employment opportunities at massive levels but also enhance scientific developments. The three countries are yet to unveil how the program will progress in the coming years, which will include the how and whereabouts, but it is believed that the project, once successfully delivered, will be a boon for the three countries’ trilateral partnership in the future.

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Notes:-

[1] T Kosuke, “Why Japan Chose Britain and Italy for Its F-X Fighter Program,” The Diplomat, December 09, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/why-japan-chose-britain-and-italy-for-its-f-x-fighter-program/, accessed on January 01, 2023.

⁽²⁾ A Shukla, “UK, Italy, Japan team up to build sixth-generation fighter by 2035,” Business Standard, December 10, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/uk-italy-and-japan-partnership-to-develop-sixth-generation-fighter-122120900858_1.html  , accessed on December 19, 2022.

[3] J Johnson and G Dominguez, “Japan approves major defense overhaul in dramatic policy shift”, The Japan Times, December 16, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/16/national/japan-dramatic-defense-shift/, accessed on December 29, 2022.

[4] M Cheung, “Japan’s reluctant realism on Taiwan” East Asia Forum, May 13, 2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/05/13/japans-reluctant-realism-to-taiwan/ , accessed on December 26, 2022.

[5] C McFadden, “The Extraordinary Power of Japan’s Sixth-Gen F-X Fighter Jet,” Interesting Engineering, August 19, 2021, https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/the-extraordinary-power-of-japans-sixth-gen-f-x-fighter-jet , accessed on January 01, 2023.

[6] K Iwamoto and & RI Bartlett, “Japan shuns U.S. to sign next-gen fighter plan with U.K., Italy.” Nikkei Asia, December 09, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-shuns-U.S.-to-sign-next-gen-fighter-plan-with-U.K.-Italy , accessed on December 26, 2022.

[7] “Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China.” BBC, September 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837 , accessed on January 01, 2023.

[8] “U.S. Department of Defense and Japan Ministry of Defense Joint Statement on Cooperation for Japan’s Next Fighter Aircraft,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 08, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3241016/us-department-of-defense-and-japan-ministry-of-defense-joint-statement-on-coope/ , accessed on December 26, 2022.

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