Keywords: North Korea, Hypersonic, Underwater Nuke, IRBM

The year 2024 started with major weapon tests on the Korean Peninsula. On January 15, 2024, North Korea claimed that it had successfully test-fired a new ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead. The test was Pyongyang’s first test this year and the first-ever test of a solid-fuel hypersonic Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The official press release states, “The test-firing was aimed at confirming the gliding and manoeuvring characteristics of the intermediate range hypersonic mobile control warhead and the reliability of the newly-developed multistage high-thrust solid-propellant motors.[1] The test was conducted at a time when the relations between North and South Korea are deteriorating at a fast pace, and after Kim branded Seoul as his “principal enemy” with an undertone of feasible greater military confrontation.[2] Several of the reports published by major news media houses also reported that North Korea has tested a hypersonic weapon. However, a close inspection of the test and the recent history of North Korea’s claim about its newly acquired hypersonic technologies is warranted. Just days after its first ballistic missile test of 2024, North Korea also tested an underwater nuclear weapon delivery system soon after a tri-lateral naval exercise conducted by the US, South Korea, and Japan. The underwater nuclear weapon delivery system test also needs some clarification regarding its claimed capabilities and strategic purpose.

Hypersonic and MaRV

A hypersonic missile essentially travels within the atmosphere at a speed greater than Mach 5 and can manoeuvre in the atmosphere for most of the flight. Hypersonic missiles are essentially of two types: boost-glide missiles and cruise missiles. A boost-glide missile entails a rocket motor that helps accelerate the missile to a high speed and a glide body with a warhead. Once a glide body detaches from the spent rocket, the boost-glide missile uses its kinetic and potential energy and lift to fly at a hypersonic range. A hypersonic cruise missile also initiates speed with a rocket booster but maintains its speed throughout its flight using a jet engine called ramjet or scramjet. A Manoeuvrable Re entry Vehicle (MaRV) is a ballistic missile warhead capable of changing trajectory when it re-enters the atmosphere for precision strikes. The point of consideration here is that both MaRV and boost-glide missiles follow non-ballistic trajectories, which is not the case with ballistic missiles. More importantly, while differentiating between a hypersonic weapon and a MaRV, the point of midcourse manoeuvring and terminal phase manoeuvring need specific attention. A boost-glide hypersonic weapon can manoeuvre during the midcourse and terminal phases. While a MaRV can only manoeuvre during the terminal phase.[3]

The Hypersonic Claim

The January 2024 claim is not the first time North Korea has claimed to have acquired hypersonic technology. In 2021, North Korea tested a new hypersonic missile, the Hwasong-8, for the first time. The Hwasong-8 test, as claimed by North Korean state media in 2021, “confirmed the navigational control and stability of the missile [booster] and also its technical specifications including the guiding manoeuvrability and the gliding flight characteristics of the detached hypersonic gliding warhead.” Additionally, the test reportedly “ascertained the stability of the engine as well as of missile fuel ampoule.”[4] North Korea conducted its second test of a hypersonic missile in January 2022. After the test, the state-owned KCNA reported that the “hypersonic gliding warhead detached and separated from its rocket booster and manoeuvred 120 km before it precisely hit a target 700 km away.”[5] It was unknown whether, during the second test, North Korea used Hwasong-8 or not.

After the tests in 2021 and 2022, the official press release from North Korea mentioned specific core characteristics of its missile. The tests emphasised ‘guiding manoeuvrability’ and ‘gliding flight.’ The 2022 and 2023 official press releases put emphasis on ‘precision strike.’ These three elements, guiding manoeuvrability, gliding flight and precision strike, are essential characteristics of hypersonic weapons, but these elements are also characteristics of a MaRV. This raises the question as to what exactly North Korea tested on January 5, 2024: a hypersonic weapon or a MaRV.

On January 14, 2024, North Korea seemingly tested a solid-propellant IRBM carrying MaRV rather than a traditional reentry vehicle or a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. The IRBM has instrumentalised the first two stages of Hwasong (HS)-18 stages, a three-stage solid-propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).[6] North Korea tested HS-18 for the third time in December 2023 and regarded the HS-18 ICBM as operationally deployed.[7] This was North Korea’s first ballistic missile test of 2024. The test, however, followed a trilateral naval drill by the US, South Korea and Japan. The naval exercise, among others, was meant to augment deterrence and response capabilities against North Korean nuclear, missile and underwater threats.[8] The exercise involved nine warships, including the U.S. aircraft Carl Vinson (CVN-70), a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. In response to the naval exercise, North Korea, on January 19, 2024, tested its Haeil-5-23 nuclear-capable unmanned underwater attack weapon in the Sea of Japan.

Underwater Nuke

The Haeil-5-23, as claimed by Pyongyang, is a nuclear-capable unmanned underwater attack weapon.[9] Not much is known about the specifications of this weapon system. However, in 2021, Kin Jong-un declared quite a few key strategic goals for North Korea’s nuclear programme and one among these was related to a nuclear-powered submarine and an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon.[10] North Korea first revealed the Haeil system in March 2023 as an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). The March test, according to Pyongyang, “correctly estimated all the tactical and technical specifications and navigational and technical indices of the underwater nuclear attack drone, verified its reliability and safety, and fully confirmed its lethal strike capability.”[11] It was also noticed in the press release that North Korea has been testing the UUV since 2012 to augment its self-defence capabilities and counter its adversaries’ military and technical superiority.[12] More importantly, the mission for which this particular UUV has been developed is to have stealth capabilities into the operational waters and to make a “super-scale radioactive tsunami through underwater explosion.”[13]

Serving Twin Objectives

Does North Korea have the capability to create such a UUV with nuclear ambition? Can the same weapon serve any strategic purpose, as claimed time and again by North Korea? The experts think[14] that North Korea does have the capacity to develop such a weapon system. However, experts are also of the view that to build such a system, North Korea need advanced nuclear weapons systems breakthrough, which it might not have currently.[15] More importantly, the weapon’s demonstration has more political underpinnings than military utility. The following are the reasons for demonstrating this particular weapon:

(a)    Haeil-5-23 is an inferior weapon when compared to the existing ballistic and cruise missile inventories of North Korea. The demonstration essentially helps North Korea communicate the message of diversification of its nuclear weapons.

(b)    The message of diversification helps North Korea create an environment where any preemptive strike will not lead to the decapitation of its nuclear capabilities.

(c)     Even though the underwater nuke has limited range and speed, which makes it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare, it still supports North Korea in showing its technological reach, which only major powers have.

Conclusion

A MARVed IRBM, which can manoeuvre, can be used to complicate missile defences. It makes sense for Pyongyang to develop it because of the ongoing US efforts to strengthen the missile defence of Guam. The US DoD is making every effort to build military infrastructure in Guam. The DoD’s five-year plan outlined in the Future Years Defence Programme (FYDP) seeks to spend approximately US $7.3 billion on military construction from FY2024 through FY2028. More importantly, to implement an integrated missile defence system in Guam, the Missile Defence Agency of the US is planning to invest an additional US $1.7 billion.[16] Furthermore, South Korea has again started its process of implementing its indigenous ballistic missile defence programme under the aegis of the Korean Air and Missile Defence (KAMD) system. A MARVed IRBM can augment North Korea’s capability to counter the KAMD system during a heightened crisis. A UUV with nuclear capabilities might not work as a strategic deterrent against North Korea’s adversaries. However, it can still create havoc in terms of knocking out the docks and ports meant for military objectives.

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Notes:

[1] “Hypersonic missile test-fired,” KCNA Watch, January 15, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1705309453-878019116/hypersonic-missile-test-fired/. Accessed on January 17, 2024.

[2] “North Korea claims to have fired solid-fuel hypersonic missile in latest weapons test,” The Guardian, January 15, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/15/north-korea-hypersonic-missile-claims-solid-fuel-pyongyang. Accessed on January 18, 2024.

[3] David Wright and Cameron L. Tracy, “Hypersonic Weapons: Vulnerability to Missile Defenses and Comparison to MaRVs,” Science & Global Security, p. 4.

[4] Masao Dahlgren, “North Korea Launches Hypersonic Missile Into Sea: State Media,” Missile Threat, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 28, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-launches-hypersonic-missile-into-sea-state-media/. Accessed on January 17, 2024.

[5] Frank Gardner, “North Korea successfully tested hypersonic missile, says report,” BBC, January 6, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59876989. Accessed on January 18, 2024.

[6] Kim Tong-Hyung, “The US, South Korea and Japan conduct naval drills in a show of strength against North Korea,” The Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/us-south-korea-japan-naval-exercise-north-korea-e04d3adef36799f6f31b3ba2643ff2fe,  January 17, 2024. Accessed on January 19, 2024.

[7] Vann H. Van Dipen, “Third Successful Launch of North Korea’s Hwasong-18 Solid ICBM Probably Marks Operational Deployment,” 38 North, December 21, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/12/third-successful-launch-of-north-koreas-hwasong-18-solid-icbm-probably-marks-operational-deployment/. Accessed on January 18, 2024.

[8] Kim Tong-Hyung, “The US, South Korea and Japan conduct naval drills in a show of strength against North Korea,” The Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/us-south-korea-japan-naval-exercise-north-korea-e04d3adef36799f6f31b3ba2643ff2fe, January 17, 2024. Accessed on January 19, 2024.

[9] Peter Suciu, “Haeil-5-23 Nuclear Bomb Drone: North Korea’s ‘Sneak Attack’ Weapon,” The National Interest, January 19, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/haeil-5-23-nuclear-bomb-drone-north-koreas-sneak-attack-weapon-208715. Accessed on January 20, 2024.

[10] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 78, No. 5, p. 273.

[11] “Important Weapon Test and Firing Drill Conducted in DPRK,” KCNA Watch, March 24, 2023, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1679649659-306237598/important-weapon-test-and-firing-drill-conducted-in-dprk/. Accessed on January 20, 2024.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea’s New “Unmanned Underwater Nuclear Attack Craft”: Red October or White Elephant?” 38 North, April 6, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/04/north-koreas-new-unmanned-underwater-nuclear-attack-craft-red-october-or-white-elephant/. Accessed on January 21, 2024.

[15] Sugam Singhal, “Should North Korea’s underwater nuke system test worry the world?” News Nine, January 19, 2024, https://www.news9live.com/world/should-north-koreas-underwater-nuke-system-test-worry-the-world-2411775. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[16] “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47643. Accessed on January 18, 2024.

The post New Year and Old Resolutions: Analysing North Korea’s Hypersonic and Underwater Nuclear Weapons appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Russia, BRICS, Security, Conflicts, Militarisation, Eurasia, Financial, Trade

Background

BRICS was formed in 2001 as an emerging investment market and global power bloc.[1] It brings together five of the largest developing countries of the world, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa, representing nearly 41 per cent of the world’s populace, 24 per cent of the global GDP and 16 per cent  of the world trade.[2] BRICS comprises of the fastest developing nations with their respective global ambitions, a fact mainly concerning China. This peculiar character of BRICS has the possibility of creating certain security challenges among the member countries, amidst varying regional aspirations.

Major Security Challenges in Eurasian Region

In brief, the major Security challenges in Eurasian region include:

(a)     Internal Conflicts: The conflicts, such as those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, have created refugee problems and may eventually threaten the security of other European states located around and outside the immediate geographic region.

(b)  Corruption and Organised Crime: These issues are peculiar to the developing nations and have been major obstacles to economic development in post-Soviet Eurasia. The Eurasian states after disintegrating from the erstwhile USSR had been grappling with economic problems post glasnost and despite perestroika or the restructuring brought in by Gorbachev.[3]

(c)   Protracted and Armed Conflicts: The major conflicts in Eurasia included strifes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in April 2021 with the latest being between Russia and Ukraine since February 2022.[4] These conflicts continue to harm peace and security in the region, while new armed conflicts have appeared, undermining regional stability.

(d)    Militarisation and Defence Spending: The rise in militarisation and defence spending in the region has contributed to the security challenges. China has been the major spender on militarisation amongst the BRICS members. As per the estimates of the U.S. government, during 2023, the Chinese annual defence budget was around $700 billion almost at par with the United States’ 2023 defence budget of just over $800 billion.[5] India was also found to be allocating defence budget to the tune of Rs 5,93,537.64 crore, which is 13.18 per cent of the total budget of Rs 45,03,097 crore during 2023-24 for the modernisation of its armed forces.[6] This speaks about the focus that these two major powers in the BRICS are directing towards their armed forces.

(e)    Regional and International Security Organisations: The effectiveness of these organisations in addressing security challenges in Eurasia has been questioned, as they have struggled to adapt to the new security landscape. Regional security groupings especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) have been doing well in promoting coordination among the Eurasian nations despite rising Chinese sway therein.[7]

(f)   Russia’s Influence: The Eurasian states trace their origins to the erstwhile USSR, and as such, Russia has had an influence on these states. However, with Eurasian states gaining prominence, mainly as reservoirs of precious minerals, energy resources and defence hardware in the global affairs, the Russian influence appeared to be gradually diminishing.[8] However, Russia has re-emerged as a central actor in Eurasia, with an agenda of amalgamation and an idea of establishing Eurasia as a distinctive politico-economic entity.[9]

How can BRICS address the security challenges in the Eurasian Nations?

The vast and geopolitically complex region of Eurasia faces innumerable security issues ranging from regional conflicts to terrorism and economic instability. BRICS nations especially India and Russia, collectively possess the potential to play a pivotal role in addressing security challenges in Eurasia:

(a)   BRICS can enhance cooperation through diplomatic channels to facilitate conflict resolution in Eurasia. It is felt that by utilising their collective diplomatic influence, the BRICS member countries can encourage dialogue and negotiations between conflicting parties, promoting peaceful solutions to the ongoing disputes. Diplomatic efforts can focus upon nurturing mutual understanding, building trust and establishing frameworks for conflict resolution amongst the nations within Eurasia.

(b)  BRICS can play a significant role in promoting economic stability as a foundation for regional security in Eurasia. By strengthening economic ties and trade relations among member nations, BRICS can contribute to the development of the Eurasian region. This economic integration can create a more interconnected and interdependent network, reducing the likelihood of conflicts due resource competition and economic disparities.

(c)  BRICS can provide financial support for infrastructure development, promoting economic growth and stability in Eurasia. A crucial aspect of security challenges in Eurasia involves addressing the threat of terrorism. Towards this, BRICS nations may collaborate on intelligence sharing, joint counter-terrorism training and operations and the development of comprehensive strategies to combat radicalisation and extremism. By pooling their resources and expertise, these countries can effectively tackle transnational threats and prevent the spread of terrorism within the region.

(d)   BRICS may also attempt to address these challenges through soft power drivers like promoting education and social programs that counter extremist ideologies and foster long-term stability.

(e)  BRICS can contribute to addressing the security challenges in Eurasia through multilateral military cooperation while respecting the sovereignty of the individual nations. Towards this, collaborative military exercises and joint peacekeeping missions can be organised to respond to crises and maintain stability in the region. This military cooperation should be conducted within the framework of international law and with a focus on promoting regional security rather than advancing the individual aspirations of the nations concerned.

(f)    BRICS can also engage in promoting a culture of good governance and the rule of law in Eurasian nations. By supporting the efforts of the concerned Eurasian nations to strengthen institutions, fight corruption and uphold democratic values, BRICS can facilitate the establishment of stable and accountable governance structures through mutual consultations. This, in turn, is expected to help in mitigating internal conflicts and fostering an environment conducive to regional security.

(g)    Energy security is a critical aspect of stability in Eurasia, and BRICS can play a vital role in ensuring an unhindered and sustainable diversified energy supply for the region. Collaborative initiatives in the development of renewable energy sources, infrastructure for energy transportation, and joint investment in the energy sector can contribute to reducing dependency on a single energy source, thereby enhancing the resilience of Eurasian nations to external pressures and conflicts related to energy resources.

(h)   BRICS can also work towards enhancing cultural and people-to-people exchanges in Eurasia. By promoting a better understanding of diverse cultures and fostering people-to-people connections, BRICS can contribute to building bridges of trust and cooperation among Eurasian societies. Cultural diplomacy can play a crucial role in softening geopolitical tensions and creating an atmosphere conducive to resolving conflicts peacefully.

To conclude, we can state that BRICS has the potential to be a significant force in addressing the security challenges in Eurasia. BRICS nations can collectively contribute to fostering stability in the Eurasian region through diplomatic efforts, economic cooperation, counter-terrorism initiatives, military collaboration, governance support, energy security management and cultural exchanges, to say the least. However, it is essential for these efforts to be made in a cooperative and all-inclusive manner, duly respecting the sovereignty of individual nations and considering the diverse interests within the Eurasian region.

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Notes:

[1] “What is BRICS,” The Economic Times, January 24, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/brics. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[2]  BRICS India 2021, “Evolution of BRICS,” https://brics2021.gov.in/about-brics. Accessed on January 23, 2024.

[3]  US Department of State Archive, “Dissolution of the USSR and the Establishment of Independent Republics, 1991,” January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/108229.htm. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[4]  International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Armed Conflict Survey 2022: Europe and Eurasia Regional Analysis,” November 18, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/11/acs-2022-europe-and-eurasia/. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[5] Peter Robertson and Wilson Beaver, “China’s Defence Budget Is Much Bigger Than It Looks”, Foreign Policy, September 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/19/china-defence-budget-military-weapons-purchasing-power/. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[6] “Defence gets Rs 5.94 lakh crore in Budget 2023-24, a jump of 13% over previous year,” Press Information Bureau, February 01, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1895472. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[7] Rajneesh Kumar, “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and India’s Strategic Options in Central Asia,” Center for Air Power Studies, May 22, 2023, https://capssindia.org/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-and-indias-strategic-options-in-central-asia/. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

[8] C Raja Mohan, “With Russia’s declining influence, India needs a new strategy in Eurasia,” The Indian Express, September 21, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/with-russias-declining-influence-india-needs-a-new-strategy-in-eurasia-8160821/. Accessed on January 24, 2024

[9]“Russia and Eurasia,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/research/conflict-peace-and-security/russia-and-eurasia. Accessed on January 24, 2024.

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Keywords: Kargil, C-130J, Night Landing, Air Operations

The Indian Air Force C-130J aircraft made a historic night landing at the Kargil airstrip with Garud commandos on board, marking a major milestone in the military aviation. The mission used cutting-edge terrain masking techniques to demonstrate skills in difficult terrain.[1] This accomplishment demonstrates the Indian Air Force’s C-130J aircraft’s successful night landing at the challenging airstrip as the first ever night landing by a fixed-wing aircraft at Kargil. It demonstrates the IAF’s readiness and experience and represents a major improvement in operational effectiveness in difficult terrains. The IAF’s dedication to perfecting complex manoeuvres is demonstrated by the real-time employment of skill, teamwork, technology and experience in the years of consistent man-machine combination.

Strategic Importance of Kargil Airfield and Challenges of Air Operations

Kargil, the second largest town in Ladakh, is located approximately 200 kilometres away from Srinagar, Leh, Padum Zanskar, and Skardo Baltistan. Kargil has always been a significant town assuming the strategic importance of being the most critical link between Ladakh and the rest of mainland India.[2] The 434-kilometer Srinagar-Leh Highway, also known as National Highway 1A, is the primary land access to Ladakh. The road  passes  close  to  the  Line of Control (LoC)  in  the  Kargil  district,  and  crosses through  the  critical Zoji-La Pass, the gateway to Ladakh and a chokepoint near the town of Drass.[3] The entire logistical support to Indian Army (IA) units deployed at Siachen Glacier is through this single access road. The Zoji-la pass, till recently, used to remain closed for around six months due to heavy snow, and ‘winter advance stocking’ was the only way to ensure the survival of troops deployed at icy heights of Siachen. The IAF, to ensure uninterrupted air maintenance support in these areas, has been gradually improving the infrastructure at forward air bases and Advance Landing Grounds (ALG) in the area such as Thoise, Fukche, Nyoma, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), with an eye toward both China and Pakistan.

The Airports Authority of India (AAI) had been managing the Kargil airfield, since the time the Jammu and Kashmir government had activated it for civilian aircraft operations in 1996.[4] However, at the commencement of military operations during the Kargil conflict in 1999, the control was shifted to the IAF. Kargil airfield while being the closest to LoC, had to be used sparingly, that too mostly for helicopter operations. During the Kargil War, AN-32 fixed-wing transport aircraft operated from the airfield, albeit in daytime only. Since then AN-32s have been operating regularly from there. In the first week of December 2013, the IAF started an air courier service from Kargil to Jammu to enable the transportation of civilian citizens due to road closures in winter.[5] This service has now been resumed in January 2024.  In 2011, IAF announced plans to extend the 6,000-feet runway in Kargil to facilitate the operation of all major transport aircraft, including the C-130J, C-17 and the IL-76.[6] In 2014, the Government of India (GoI) extended the operational control of Kargil airfield to the IAF for another 20 years for upgradation of infrastructure, including runway extension to 9000 feet.[7]

Even though the planned runway extension has not yet taken place, since 2020, the  C-130J Super Hercules aircraft have commenced flying day sorties to Kargil to move military personnel and supplies. There have always been severe limitations of basing aircraft in a location like Kargil airstrip, which is within the artillery fire ranges of the Pakistan Army. There have been multiple challenges faced by the IAF for conducting fixed-wing aircraft air operations from Kargil airfield that range from operational to geographical and availability of suitable aircraft in addition to the many factors of support and protection. Some of the critical challenges were:

(a)      Situated at 9604 feet AMSL in the heart of the rugged Himalayas, the Kargil airstrip presents unique difficulties for pilots. Due to the high altitude, narrow valleys with high cliffs, erratic weather patterns, and strong winds, pilots need to possess extraordinary skill and proficiency when approaching the airfield and also while landing.

(b)     The reduced aircraft performance at such high altitude makes the task of a pilot highly challenging when landing the aircraft safely. This challenge gets compounded for landing at Kargil airfield due to the shorter runway length of just about 6000 feet as against the standard length of 9000 feet. Srinagar airfield which is at about half the altitude of 5600 feet has almost double the runway length of 12000 feet. The challenge of landing at Kargil can well be compared.

(c)       The close proximity to LoC with Pakistan of just about 12 km, restricts the approach for landing to be unidirectional. The short runway length, coupled with the severe limitation of a unidirectional approach and proximity to LoC, poses a unique challenge of compulsive landing once committed on approach.[8] The limited reserve of thrust at these altitudes adds another challenge in safely executing a ‘Go-around’ or overshoot action.

(d)     All these challenges of daytime operation increase manifold in their degree of difficulty during air operations at night and in low visibility conditions, where visual cues for approach and landing are minimal.

In 1999, shortly after the signing of the Lahore Declaration, India and Pakistan fought the Kargil War. Under the code name Operation Badr, Pakistani forces, masquerading as infiltrators from Kashmir, broke into Indian territory along the LoC and occupied posts that the IA had abandoned for the winter. The objectives were to sever the connection between Kashmir and Ladakh, isolate Indian Army forces stationed on the Siachen Glacier, and compel India to engage in peace talks regarding the Kashmir dispute.[9] By mid-May, IA had moved in a large number of forces to evict infiltrators from the dominating heights of Kargil-Drass-Batalik sector by initiating Op Vijay (1999). IA suffered heavy casualties as the enemy had occupied strong positions and IA forces had to attack uphill under heavy fire from the top. Even though the Air Force offensive operation, Op Safed Sagar, started on May 26, 1999, the IAF had already started a massive airlift of troops, stores, and ammunition. The Kargil war officially ended on July 26, 1999, with the IAF and IA completely evicting the Pakistani infiltrators and IA regaining control of their original positions at LoC. However a large number of lessons emerged that were highlighted in the Kargil Review Committee that submitted its report on January 07, 2000.[10] Among the many important lessons, the two major takeaways for the IAF highlighted the urgent need for a strategic medium airlift capable aircraft with day and night operational capability in the Himalayan region and secondly of development of Kargil airfield as full-fledged fixed-wing aircraft operation airbase with the capability to handle day and night heavy air maintenance load.

C-130 Capabilities: A Game Changer for IAF

The IAF’s capability enhanced manifold with the induction of strategic airlift aircraft like C-130J Hercules and C-17 in February 2011 and September 2013 respectively.[11] Since their induction over a decade ago, both C-17 and C-130 have proved their strategic lift capability not only in India but also during international missions, including operational joint training exercises, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions, Vaccine Diplomacy missions during Covid pandemic as well as evacuation operations such as airlift of stranded Indians in Ukraine or the Silkyara tunnel evacuation in Uttrakhand. C-130J is an advanced two-pilot flight station Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) capable aircraft with fully integrated digital avionics, an all-weather day-night capability with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and infrared thermal imagery, colour multifunctional liquid crystal, Head-Up Displays (HUD), incorporating cutting-edge navigation with dual inertial navigation system and GPS that enhance its unique capability of operating from all types of terrain. The aircraft is designed to operate on rugged and unprepared surfaces. Additionally, the aircraft has a digital moving map display, low-power colour radar, and fully integrated defensive systems. The most recent night evacuation of Indians from an unprepared airfield in Sudan, with no landing or crash facilities, speaks volumes of the aircraft’s capabilities and highlights the professionalism of the IAF pilots.

The Uniqueness of C-130 Night Landing at Kargil Runway

An important milestone in the IAF’s operational capabilities was reached when its C-130J aircraft made its first successful night landing at the Kargil airstrip. This successful night landing at such a strategic location not only underscores the heightened capabilities of the IAF but also serves as a testament to its preparedness in challenging terrains. This historic achievement is unique in many ways. This was the first time a night landing had been attempted by a fixed-wing aircraft at the Kargil airstrip that is located so close to LoC, although transport planes had been earlier landing there during the day. The approach to the airfield is unidirectional and it is surrounded by steep hills of 14000 to 15000 feet, which give very limited space for manoeuvring, thus making a night landing one of the most challenging tasks. The reduced engine efficiency coupled with the severe limitation of ‘No Go Around’, adds another dimension to the challenge. The IAF selected C-130J for this most challenging task due to its capabilities in terms of aircraft performance with four powerful engines suited for the task, most modern onboard avionics and systems, night operation capabilities with the use of NVGs and infrared thermal imagery for landing. The most important aspect is that Combat-ready Garud Special Forces personnel being airlifted to such a forward location sends a strong message to the enemy about the IAF’s ability to strategically airlift forces through difficult terrain at all hours of the day. The IAF, by such an audacious attempt, has proved that its pilots are always pushing the limits of their operational capabilities, from manoeuvring through the hazardous terrain of Uttarakhand to mastering the intricacies of nighttime landings in Kargil.

The Way Forward

The IAF, since independence, has been facing constant challenges of defending the skies from two hostile nuclear-armed neighbours. True to its motto “Touch the sky with glory,” the IAF has always brought glory to the nation, whether in war, precision strikes, multinational joint training exercises or HADR missions. Even with the depleting strength of its fighter squadrons, the IAF has kept pace with the emerging technologies and changing threat scenarios and its quest for excellence has never slowed down. The recent night landing by C-130 is truly a game changer in the strategic capability of the IAF and would remain a historical milestone in the quest for excellence of the IAF. The importance of this special night landing operation of C-130 at Kargil Airfield goes beyond its technical details and execution. It conveys a very clear message of the rising level of the IAF capability to the world at large and especially to China and Pakistan. Deliberately showcasing these capabilities in public sends a strong message about India’s resolve and ability to protect its territorial integrity. Kargil was a surprise in 1999, with the changing geo-political construct and increasing threats, the IAF must now step up its efforts in developing robust operational infrastructure, including runway extension, not only at Kargil airfield but also at DBO, Nyoma and Thoise as alternative airfields for day-night operations.

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[1]“ Indian Air Force’s C-130 J aircraft achieves milestone night landing at Kargil airstrip,” The Economic Times, January 07, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-air-forces-c-130-j-aircraft-achieves-milestone-night-landing-at-kargil-airstrip/articleshow/106608806.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

[2] Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, “Kargil-Ladakh”, https://kargil.nic.in/lahdc/. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

 [3] Acosta, Marcus P., “High altitude warfare:  the Kargil Conflict and the future,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive,  https://core.ac.uk/reader/36694780. Accessed on January 08, 2024.

 [4] “Kargil to be a major Indian Air Force base,” ZeeNews media, October 03, 2011, https://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/kargil-to-be-a-major-indian-air-force-base_734785.html. Accessed on January 07, 2024.

 [5] “AN-32 Kargil courier service to resume operations from Jan 22,” The Week, January 20, 2024, https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/national/2024/01/20/des66-ladakh-air-courier.html. Accessed on January 22, 2024.

[6] ibid

 [7] Parliamentary Digital Library, Lok Sabha unstarred question number 1527 dated July 21, 2014, ,  https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/705927/1/5660.pdf. Accessed on January 10, 2024.

 [8]  “Why Indian Air Force plane C-130J’s night landing at Kargil airstrip is a big feat,” FirstPost, January 08, 2024,         https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/why-indian-air-force-c-130js-night-landing-at-kargil-airstrip-is-a-big-feat-13588832.html. Accessed on January 11, 2024.

 [9] Ministry of Defence, “THE KARGIL WAR: a war that defied all odds,” FinalKargil_Mainwriteup-2023-07-25.pdf (gallantryawards.gov.in). Accessed on January 14, 2024.

[10] Lt Gen Hazari, “Kargil Committee Report,” Institute of Peace and Conflict studies, May 01, 2000, https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=350. Accessed on January 13, 2024.

[11] “C-17 Globemaster III Inducted into the IAF,” PIB,  September 02, 2013, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=99048. Accessed on January 14, 2024.

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Keywords: India, France, Indo-Pacific, Japan, Security

Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are realigning their foreign policy outlooks and national security plans due to changes in power diffusion and transition. China’s unreserved power projection and push for unipolarity present the main obstacle to the Indo-Pacific region’s quest for multipolarity. France is one of India’s closest allies and a strategic partner in Europe along with being the second-largest arms supplier to India. This year, India’s Republic Day celebrations will include French President Emmanuel Macron as the Chief Guest which shows that France is an all-weather friend to India.^[1]

The growing collaboration between France and India takes on greater relevance in light of the Ukraine invasion, which has created polarised views of partnerships and foreign policy decisions. France and India strive for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, similar to how Japan strives for a peaceful Indo-Pacific region. India had requested the French government in October 2023 for the purchase of 26 Rafale Marine aircraft (worth U.S. $6 Billion) for the Indian Navy to bolster its capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

Two important nations with large economic and geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific area are France and India. “Prime Minister Modi’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and President Macron’s vision of security and cooperation outlined in the Indo-Pacific Strategy of France” should be aligned, as stated in the new Indo-Pacific roadmap.^[2] The roadmap also distinctly intensifies the understanding reached between these two Indian Ocean powers through the 2018 signing of the “Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region” and emphasises the observable results more.^[3] As a resident power with colonies in both the Indian and Pacific oceans, France views the Indo-Pacific region as a “geographical reality.” Approximately 93 per cent of the French Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is located in the Indo-Pacific area, home to the 1.65 million people who call France home.^[4] Additionally, 8300 French servicemen are stationed in this area by France. This demonstrates the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic significance to France.^[5]

France’s entry into India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and leadership of the maritime resource and marine security pillars are two recent advancements in the partnership. France and India are both The India Ocean Rim Association (IORA) members. France joined IORA in 2001 as a discussion partner and became a full member in 2020, focusing on important topics like biodiversity protection, climate change, and maritime safety and surveillance.

Under the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which was established in the Seychelles in 1984, France and India also collaborate.^[6] With an emphasis on island nations, the IOC unites five African countries in the Indian Ocean. France, representing Reunion, is a full member state in the IOC, while India is an observer state.^[7] This regional organisation addresses a broad range of topics, including marine safety, renewable energy, ecological preservation, and resource management. Furthermore, under the framework of the 2020 India-France-Australia trilateral dialogue, both nations also engage in trilateral interactions. “Ensuring peace, security, and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific” is the stated goal of the discussion.

Additionally, an MoU pertaining to the provision of “Reciprocal Logistics support between the Armed Forces” was signed by the two nations in March 2018. India and France collaborate extensively in the maritime sector in the area. Since 1993, the fleets of the two nations have regularly engaged in bilateral exercises aimed at promoting maritime cooperation. Japan and France too conducted a military drill in the Pacific in September 2023 between their ground forces for deepening coordination among the like-minded countries. India and Japan also conducted a bilateral Air Force exercise, ‘Veer-Guardian’ in 2023. Likewise, India and France too have been engaged in a bilateral military drill between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the French Air and Space Force named, Exercise Orion which was conducted in 2023 and was the first overseas exercise for the IAF’s Rafale aircraft. These Defence exercises show deep engagements between the nations.

Following Prime Minister Modi’s July 2023 Bastille Day visit to France, the two nations issued a joint statement highlighting their strong defence collaboration and their goal to expand their industrial relationships in areas such as cooperative combat aircraft engine development.^[8] France can be a valuable partner for domestic defence manufacturing, knowledge sharing, and research, as it is India’s second-largest defence exporter.

Positioning Japan

Minilateral agreements, such as the Quad (India, Japan, Australia, and the US), have been a common feature of the architecture of the strategically important and contested Indo-Pacific region. In the Indo-Pacific, minilateralism mainly unites “like-minded partners” by rallying around “shared values.” Japan is a country that has a good relationship with India for decades and both nations cooperate in the region significantly. Moreover, France, India, and Japan are in a position to work together to preserve the Indo-Pacific region’s security and stability.

The three nations share a great deal of concerns and interests, particularly in light of China’s growing aggressiveness and revisionism about its territory and maritime claims. Concerned about the future of international order, all three nations worry that China’s increasing strength and capabilities may lead to an American retreat. Japan, France, and India are actively working to keep the Indo-Pacific region stable and secure. With the 2018 announcement of the IPOI and the release of its new National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan has increased its level of commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The future of international order worries all three nations equally. They favour the democratisation of the UN Security Council’s decision-making process because they fear the council would become paralysed.

The importance of Southeast Asian geography and ASEAN Centrality has been emphasised by France, Japan, and India in their Indo-Pacific strategies. France, Japan, and India are crucial exporters of weaponry to Southeast Asian nations as well as major economic allies.

In Sri Lanka, France, Japan, and India have united to counter China’s expanding influence and advance an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. Their approach emphasises fostering connectivity, economic cooperation, and marine security, which reflects their fears about China’s growing regional dominance. As part of a bigger plan to counterbalance China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and establish a rules-based order, these states are cooperating with Sri Lanka.

In March 2023, a multilateral Maritime Exercise ‘La Perouse’ was conducted involving ships. helicopters and personnel of the Australian Navy, French Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force, Indian Navy and the US Navy in the Indian Ocean region. The French Navy led the exercise which has the dual objectives of improving maritime domain awareness and maximizing maritime coordination among participating navies in the Indo-Pacific area.

Way Forward

Increased tangible collaboration between France and India can offer a dependable engagement angle for island nations, primarily concerning development, security, and climate change adaptation, while enhancing the diplomatic efforts of like-minded allies in the area. While France’s Indo-Pacific strategy prioritises maintaining territorial sovereignty and access to shared maritime zones, New Delhi’s regional ambitions guarantee sustained attention to maritime concerns.

As G20 members, France, Japan, and India can contribute significantly to the creation of international standards for the digital economy and the use of digital technology to support sustainable growth. Many smaller companies in these nations stand to gain a great deal by promoting their products using digital technologies. India, France and Japan can expand their security and defence partnership by conducting military drills and exercises among their ground and air forces.

The three democratic nations may work together to identify shared interests and advance productive trilateral partnerships in order to counter China’s expanding hegemony in a number of future industries, as well as to advance digital inclusivity and an inclusive Indo-Pacific region governed by inclusive norms.

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Notes:

^[1] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India Announces Republic Day Chief Guest: French President Emmanuel Macron,” Observer Research Foundation, January 05, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-announces-republic-day-chief-guest-french-president-emmanuel-macron#:~:text=Clearly%2C%20the%20French%20president’s%20confirmation,at%20India’s%20Republic%20Day%20celebrations. Accessed on January 10, 2024.

^[2] Monish Tourangbam and Mayank Chari, “The French Connection: India-France Partnership for the Indo-Pacific Zeitgeist,” Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), September 21, 2023, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2023/09/Brief-France-Sep-21-FINAL.pdf. Accessed on January 10, 2024.

^[3] Ibid

^[4] Gesine Weber, “France in the Indo-Pacific: Not so Ambivalent after all,” 9Dashline, May 10, 2023, https://www.9dashline.com/article/france-in-the-indo-pacific-not-so-ambivalent-after-all. Accessed on January 11, 2024.

^[5] Ibid

^[6] Abhishek Kumar, “India and France in the Indo-Pacific,” Indian Council of World Affairs, November 03, 2023, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=10130&lid=6460#:~:text=India%20and%20France%20also%20cooperate,member%20state%20in%20the%20IOC. Accessed on January 11, 2024.

^[7] Ibid

^[8] Christina Mackenzie, “India, France increase defence ties with new Rafale jet and submarine buys,” Breaking Defence, July 18, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/india-france-increase-defense-ties-with-new-rafale-jet-and-submarine-buys/. Accessed on January 12, 2024.

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Keywords: Maldives-India ties, Muizzu’s China visit, Indian Ocean Region

The year 2024 is a significant year for the South Asian subcontinent. Most of the countries in the region have either gone or are scheduled to go through a bout of an electoral overhaul in the year 2024. Amidst all the changes, what impacted India the most happened in the penultimate month of 2023. In November 2023, the coalition of People’s National Congress (PNC) and the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) won the election in Maldives on the backs of a campaign that was largely anti-India. Mohamed Muizzu took over as the 8^th President of the Maldives.[1]  So far, his foreign policy has demonstrated and verified what optics held about his pro-China and anti-India stance.[2]  To this end, the utter disrespectful and derogatory remarks by the three deputy ministers from the Muizzu’s government against the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while the latter was in Lakshadweep sent signals of Maldives’ emerging cast of mind of treating Male versus New Delhi, instead of Male and New Delhi. This was further reinforced by President Muizzu’s five-day visit to China which began on January 08, 2024, where he was seen predicating Beijing as the ‘closest ally’[3], ‘integral collaborator’, and ‘closest development partner’[4] of Male.

The new president has visited Turkey[5] as his first overseas destination after taking office in November 2023. The visit to China can be seen as another quantum leap in this direction. It has been a standing tradition for any Head of the State of Maldives to visit New Delhi first. This also includes Yameen, who had set the stage for an anti-India movement in Maldives and began to play the Chinese card by signing up for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). However, Muizzu is not leaving any stone unturned to display his staunch anti-India perspective. Maldives also skipped the Colombo Security Conclave (a trilateral initiative initially between India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives) meeting at the NSA level in December 2023.[6] However, simultaneously quite an active participation was seen from the Maldives at the Vice-Presidential level in the second China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation, a Chinese led institutional engagement in the IOR.[7]

In another incident, Sri Lanka refused entry to the so-called Chinese research vessels in its waters, believed to have strategic interests and engage in espionage on India, after India objected to it. The same request by India went unnoticed by Muizzu’s government in Maldives, and a green signal has been given to the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 3.[8] Last but not least, setting March 15, 2024, as the deadline for the withdrawal of the Indian troops from Maldives, who have been operating the two Dhruva helicopters and a Dornier aircraft, has added strains in the relationship. All the above scenes in the Maldives’ script, with India and China as the protagonists, point to two important takeaways.

The upshot of Maldives’ Script with India

First, repeated attempts by the Maldives to limit its engagement and involvement with India, at the same time taking this forward by enhancing China’s role at the forefront. India has been an umbilical sibling of Maldives with whom the relationship has been based on mutual trust, faith, and respect. In addition to this, India’s approach and policy have always been to win the hearts and minds of Maldivians. Whether it was helping Maldivians reach the capital, Male, from different islands via gifted helicopters[9], providing them with drinking water in 2014[10] or offering food and medical aid during the COVID-19 pandemic. Being a considerate neighbour, India was the first country to have an air bubble arrangement during the pandemic and helped reboot its economy. According to the Ministry of Tourism of Maldives, Indians have been topping the list of tourists in Male in the post-COVID times, with their share nearly doubling to 11 per cent in five years.[11] Second, there is a clear indication of Maldives gasping for more economic oxygen, thus an expression of over-dependence on China and maintaining of cordial ties with the West Asian countries.

Muizzu took over at a time when the Maldivian economy was neck-deep in crisis and still coping to stay afloat after the pandemic amidst the global economic slowdown. Tourism and fishery, which are the twin pillars of its growth, are hanging in limbo and struggling to maintain the pre-COVID numbers. While the white sand beaches and the basking sun are still awaiting more tourists, the fishing sector faces challenges in sales and delayed payments, difficulties in acquiring ice and fuel, obstacles in using satellite phones, and banking limitations.[12] The economic situation is further deteriorated by increasing debt-to-GDP ratio that has reached an all-time high of 110% of the Maldivian GDP.[13] According to the World Bank report from January to August 2023, the debt servicing payment, which includes the interest and capital, has gone up by 15% and accounts for US$ 162.3 million, nearly double what was paid from 2014 to 2019.[14] On the other hand, the Muizzu administration is pulling all its strings to expand the infrastructure projects that are extremely high in cost and go beyond the paying capacity of Maldivians.

India’s Support to the Maldives: What is at stake for the Island Nation?

The Maldives’ increasing dependence on China needs to take into consideration the examples of other nations in its close neighbourhood. The world witnessed the ease with which the gigantic infrastructure projects such as the airports and seaports were accepted with open arms by the Sri Lankans and how they fell like a deck of cards out of the control of the Lankans themselves. Further, how New Delhi went out of its way to help Colombo deal with the crisis, which was beyond its absorbing capacity. In the case of Maldives too, the World Bank cautioned in October 2023 about getting too romantic with China, which could spell trouble in Maldives as it owes nearly 20 per cent of its public debt to the latter.[15] Hence, before getting absorbed in China’s chequebook and debt trap diplomacy, the Maldives must not ignore the red signals and be more cautious.

By embracing China and giving more grounds to Beijing, Maldives is inviting greater instability in the IOR in a second-handed way. Due to the geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic significance of the Indian Ocean, many distant and proximate powers today are involved in this part of the larger Indo-Pacific region. China’s estranged relationship with many of the significant players like the U.S., U.K., Japan, Australia, and others will feed into its dynamics with regional countries and bring increasing competition and confrontation to this region too. For instance, the U.S. has raised concerns over Chinese spying activities through its so-called research vessels in the IOR.[16] In future, an enhanced Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean waters by the regional powers will ultimately make the region a playground for greater power competition.

Further, looking with a focal lens on a larger canvas, the ultimate sufferers are the Maldivians who enjoy deep people-to-people connections and civilisational ties with Indians. Indian aid and assistance over the years have helped in building the Maldivian society, economy, and security. India’s role in High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs) such as establishing prosthetics and orthotics manufacturing workshops, drug detoxification centres, creating tourism zones in several islands, and procuring sea ambulances is worth mentioning.[17] In addition to this, being a proximate neighbour, India has assisted Maldivians in conducting the surveillance of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that has helped them deal with various non-traditional challenges, and offered cheap medical treatment in India all of which has helped advance the interests of Male at all times.

To conclude, despite Muizzu’s tilt towards China in recent times, the winning of a pro-India candidate at the recently concluded mayoral elections in Male shows the trust and faith of common Maldivian people in India’s roles and its significance in the future economic development. The wining of pro-India candidate, Adam Azim from the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) validates the proximity between Maldivians and Indians, which Muizzu will not be able to brush aside.[18] Thus, having said all, it’s time for Dr Muizzu to make the right calculations, and consequently, the right choices to make sure not only the Maldives remain secure, stable, and prosperous, but also the IOR remains free, open, and prosperous.

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Notes:

[1] The President’s Office (Republic of Maldives), “President Dr. Mohamed Muizzu,” Dr Mohamed Muizzu – The President’s Office (presidency.gov.mv). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[2] Varun Vasudevan, “The President-elect of Maldives is pro-China But Antagonising India Will Come At A Price,” The New Indian Express, October 03, 2023, The president-elect of Maldives is pro-China, but antagonising India will come with a price (newindianexpress.com). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[3] “China A ‘Valued Ally and Integral Collaborator’ says Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu,” The Economic Times, January 08, 2024, China a ‘valued ally and integral collaborator’, says Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu (indiatimes.com). Accessed on January 09, 2024.  Link is not working

[4] Pia Krishnankutty, “No Doubt China Will be Our Closest Partner’: Maldives President Muizzu Praises BRI Amid Row With India,” The Print, January 09, 2024, ‘No doubt China will be our closest partner’: Maldives President Muizzu praises BRI amid row with India (theprint.in). Accessed on January 09, 2024.

[5] Sanjay Kapoor, “‘India Out’: Maldives President Eyes Middle East Partners With Early Trips,” Al Jazeera, December 21, 2023, ‘India out’: Maldives president eyes Middle East partners with early trips | Politics | Al Jazeera. Accessed on January 09, 2024.

[6] N Sathiya Moorthy, “Colombo Security Conclave: Decoding Maldivian Absence in an India-Centric Forum,” Firstpost, December 15, 2023, Colombo Security Conclave: Decoding Maldivian absence in an India-centric forum (firstpost.com). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[7] China International Development Cooperation Agency, “2^nd China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation Opens in Kunming,” December 09, 2023, 2nd China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation opens in Kunming (cidca.gov.cn). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[8] NC Bipindra, “India ‘Knocks Out’ Chinese Spy Ship From Colombo; Its Sri Lankan Victory Turns Into a Failure in Maldives,” The Eurasian Times, January 06, 2024, India ‘Knocks Out’ Chinese Spy Ship From Colombo; Its Sri Lankan Victory Turns Into A Failure In Maldives (eurasiantimes.com). Accessed on January 09, 2024.

[9] “Maldives Ex-Defence Minister Praises Indian Troops, Blasts Muizzu Govt Amid Racism Row,” YouTube, 4:52, posted by “Hindustan Times,” January 10, 2024, Maldives Ex-Defence Minister Praises Indian Troops, Blasts Muizzu Govt Amid Racism Row | Watch – YouTube. Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[10] High Commission of India (Maldives), “Operation Neer: Indian Assistance to Maldives During Male Water Crisis,” Events : Operation Neer : Indian assistance to Maldives during Male Water Crisis (hci.gov.in). Accessed on January 09, 2024.

[11] Sukalp Sharma, “Indian tourists in Maldives near Double to 11% in 5 years,” The Indian Express, January 09, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-tourists-in-maldives-near-double-to-11-per-cent-in-5-years-9100860/. Accessed on January 16, 2024.

[12] The President’s Office (Republic of Maldives), “The Main Challenges Facing the Fisheries Sector Will be Resolved mid-2023, Says the President,” December 11, 2022, The main challenges facing the fisheries sector will be resolved mid-2023, says the President – The President’s Office (presidency.gov.mv). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[13] “Can the Maldives Replace China With India,” Youtube, 6:04, posted by “Firstpost,” January 10, 2024, Can the Maldives Replace India with China? | Vantage with Palki Sharma (youtube.com). Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[14] Ryan Woe and Joe Cash, “Maldives President Courts Investors in China as Indian Ties Sag,” Reuters, January 09, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/maldives-president-courts-investors-china-ties-with-india-sag-2024-01-09/. Accessed on January 11, 2024.

[15] n. 14.

[16] “After India, US Raises Concern with Sri Lanka Over the Visit of Chinese Research Vessel,” The Wire, September 26, 2023, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/after-india-us-raises-concern-with-sri-lanka-over-the-visit-of-chinese-research-vessel. Accessed on January 15, 2024.

[17] High Commission of India, “India-Maldives High Impact Community Development Projects,” November 2023, https://hci.gov.in/male/?pdf17749. Accessed on January 10, 2024.

[18] Shuba Solih, “New Male’ City Mayor to be sworn in on Monday,” The Edition, January 17, 2024, https://edition.mv/features/31079#:~:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20provisional,wins%20by%20a%20large%20margin. Accessed on January 19, 2024.

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Keywords: Russia, Economic, Strategic Commonwealth, Implications, Multilateral

Indian External Affair Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar visited Russia from December 25-29, 2023 and held meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Importantly, this visit has taken place at a time when India’s closeness with the West is increasing while also giving impetus upon India’s inevitable strategic need to balance its ties with its long-time friend, Russia. In order to objectively understand the implications of the visit, it would be worthwhile to first understand in brief, the historical context of India-Russia relations evolving over the years followed by analysing the visit and the implications thereof on Indo-Russia relationship.

Indo-Russian Ties over the Years

Immediately after attaining independence in 1947, India was feeling childlike (read insecure).[1] This was the time when the Soviet Union came forward and helped India in setting up various industrial units that included mainly the steel plants in Bhilai, Vishakhapatnam and Bokaro, in addition to a plant in Durgapur that was involved in the manufacturing of the equipment for mining and a thermal power station in Neyveli besides a venture in Korba that was dealing into electromechanical equipment. Notably, the erstwhile USSR provided this help to India as a friendly gesture, with no strings attached.[2] The USSR had also been a significant source of arms and military hardware for India by virtue of having provided tanks like T-72, T-90 and the infantry combat vehicle i.e. Boevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) to the Indian Army. The Indian Air Force (IAF) received the MiG and Su series of fighter fleets, as well as Mi series Helicopters and AN and IL series of medium and heavy lift transport aircraft respectively. Additionally, the USSR supplied a diverse range of radars and Air Defence systems to the IAF besides a host of other weapons and systems to the Indian Navy. This has positively helped in the modernisation of the Indian armed forces which of late had started turning their attention towards the West to meet the modernisation requirements, coupled with a growing emphasis on developing the indigenous capabilities.

This apart, the erstwhile Soviet Union was technologically an advanced nation from whom India could benefit in terms of the world-class technology as and when it needed. In addition to the Transfer of Technology (ToT) in multiple industrial sectors such as steel, defence, railways, construction equipment, metal & mining and petrochemicals, certain important public sector undertakings like the Steel Plants in Bhilai, Durgapur & Rourkela were built in India with Soviet assistance. These plants have been technologically superior and comparable with the best in the world. In short, the Soviet assistance provided significant impetus to the growth of core industries and helped greatly in transforming India from a developing country to a faster-growing nation.[3] On the economic front, India’s concept of Five Years Plans has its roots in the Central Planning Model of the erstwhile USSR, introduced by Joseph Stalin in 1920.[4]

However, in December 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated and was replaced by fifteen autonomous republics, forming a loose union of erstwhile Soviet republics known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[5] Soon thereafter, the special Indo-Russia relations of yesteryears got embroiled in the financial quandary, leading to a virtual collapse of Indo-Russian trade in 1992. Also, the Russian banking oligarchy endeavoured to manipulate the rupee fund to their advantage. Following all this, the Indo-Russian relations pulled away from each other. Coincidentally, India’s exposure and integration with the world economy through the New Economic Policy 1991 occurred concurrently with the Soviet collapse.[6]

Analysing the recent Russia visit of EAM and the implications thereof

The recent visit of EAM Dr Jaishankar to Russia in December 2023 can be seen as a significant reaffirmation of the friendship and strategic partnership between India and Russia, sending a clear message of India’s continued support and engagement with Russia. During this visit, Dr Jaishankar deliberated upon bilateral cooperation in trade and economics, energy, defence, connectivity, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. The perspectives on global and regional developments including multilateral cooperation also were discussed between the two sides. This apart, three protocols towards management of the Kudan Kulam Nuclear Power Plants besides a Memorandum of Understanding relating to cooperation in pharmaceuticals and healthcare spheres and a Protocol on Foreign Office Consultations were formalised during the visit. There were also deliberations with regard to the Indian foreign policy perspectives and the Russia-India relationship between the Indian side and the think-tanks & academic institutions of Russia. The discussions with respect to the cultural ties and people-to-people connect also formed part of the EAMs interaction with the Indian diaspora in Moscow. In Saint Petersburg, EAM discussed possibilities of cooperation in the economic and cultural fields with the Governor, H.E. Alexander Beglov. He also had discussions with an assorted cross-section of Indologists at Saint Petersburg University wherein the deliberations focussed upon enhancing a better mutual understanding and appreciation of developments in the two countries. As another step in the direction of soft power diplomacy, the EAM interacted with teachers and students at a leading Russian government educational institution named after Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, which notably has Hindi language in its course content.[7]

In short, EAMs Russia visit has showcased the prospects of objectively evaluating the current bilateral collaboration and further strengthening the distinct strategic ties existing between the two countries for the past nearly seven decades or so. Notably, the India-Russia bonding has always been strong based upon the strategic convergence, mutually shared geopolitical considerations and multilateral cooperation between India and Russia. The recent visit can be said to have further strengthened the strong and enduring ties between the two countries, with discussions focusing upon bilateral cooperation, trade and strategic relations. Despite Western efforts to isolate Russia due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, India has continued to maintain and strengthen its relationship with Moscow, highlighting the mutual historic diplomatic ties and India’s reliance on Russian imports, particularly in the defence and energy sectors. The major takeaways of the visit included the reaffirmation of a strong and enduring India-Russia relationship, discussions on trade and strategic cooperation and the invitation for Prime Minister Modi to visit Russia.

During the visit, Dr Jaishankar met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and discussed a diverse range of regional issues related to conflicts, connectivity and multilateralism.[8]Again no big announcements were made, but the visit emphasised the multifaceted nature of India’s diplomatic engagements with Russia and showcased the enduring strength of the India-Russia relationship. The interactions are expected to go a long way in defying all the apprehensions about strains in the relationship emerging from India’s recently growing ties with the West and Indian participation in the QUAD.

In order to objectively evaluate the implications of the EAM Dr Jaishankar’s visit to Russia in December 2023 for India, it would be worthwhile to consider a diverse range of factors. The geopolitical dynamics, status and extent of economic ties and extant diplomatic relations amongst the concerned nations play crucial role in shaping the impact of any such diplomatic visit. The economic considerations and deliberations thereupon form crucial parameters in evaluating any meaningful diplomatic interaction. An assessment of the state of trade agreements, discussions on investments and economic partnerships forged during a visit become the vital components of a successful diplomatic mission. Considered in this perspective, the visit may be treated as a pre-requisite of strengthening the ties between the two nations and as also carrying the potential to provide India with new opportunities in energy, defence as well as the technology sectors.

The diplomatic relations between India and Russia have been historically strong.[9] Therefore, understanding the nature of deliberations of the present visit with regard to political, security and defence cooperation is essential. Viewed from this angle, the visit involved discussions on regional and global issues which signify India’s global perspective on key international matters e.g. cooperation on global challenges like climate change, terrorism, or health crises indicating India’s commitment to multilateral ties.

The security concerns and international defence collaboration are considered vital to any international relationship, a point very relevant especially with respect to Indo-Russian ties. The discussions during the instant visit with regards to defence deals, joint military exercises or technological partnerships, would have far-reaching implications for augmenting India’s defence capabilities and emboldening its strategic posture. Assessing the level of trust and cooperation in these areas would be crucial for understanding the visit’s strategic impact.

Furthermore, considering the visit’s timing in December 2023, it’s also essential to evaluate the domestic political scenario in both India and Russia. Political changes or developments in either country are likely to have the potential to influence the dynamics of the visit and subsequent outcomes.

The ties between India and Russia hold significance owing to our longstanding defence affiliations and need for import of oil and gas, regardless of an apprehension that India’s growing association with Russia might irk the West with whom India is trying to progress its relations.[10] This anxiety is guided by the fact that the bitterness provoked by the Russia-Ukraine war has rendered the ties between Moscow on the one hand, and the US and Europe on the other, practically irreparable.[11]

Way Forward

However, notwithstanding the above, the visit holds tremendous significance in the realm of Indo-Russia relations taking one more step beyond the special and privileged partnerships already established between the two nations. The future of the Indo-Russia relationship appears bright also because India’s relationship with Russia from 2009 to 2023 has evolved with dynamism amidst the changing global order. The strategic, defence, economic and cultural dimensions of the Indo-Russian partnership have constantly remained significant, with both countries deftly navigating through emerging geopolitical challenges and the disturbing environment during and post pandemic. Undoubtedly the multifaceted character of the Indo-Russian engagement underscores the resilience and depth of the bilateral relationship flourishing between the two nations in the times to come.

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Notes:

[1] Rajneesh Kumar, Extract from Doctoral Thesis on “India’s Energy Security in terms of oil and natural gas contextualising Central Asia since 2012,” Submitted to Amity University Uttar Pradesh, September 2019.

[2] Monisha Pradhan, “Role of Soviet Union in India’s Industrialisation: A Comparative Assessment with the West,”IJRAR Journal, Vol. 6, Issue-1, January-March 2019,http://ijrar.com/upload_issue/ijrar_issue_20544196.pdf.

[3] Rajneesh Kumar, “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and India’s Strategic Options in Central Asia,”CAPS, May 22, 2023, https://capssindia.org/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-and-indias-strategic-options-in-central-asia/.Accessed on January 02, 2024.

[4] Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MOS&PI) Report,“Five Year Plans”,  Chapter 7 Para 7.3 & 7.4,  https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/Statistical_year_book_india_chapters/ch7.pdf. Accessed on January, 05, 2024.

[5] US Department of State,“Dissolution of the USSR and the Establishment of Independent Republics, 1991,”January 20, 2001- January 20, 2009, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/108229.htm. Accessed on January 03, 2024.

[6] OpCit Rajneesh Kumar, (n1)

[7] Ministry of External Affairs,“Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Russia (December 25- 29, 2023),”,MEA Press Release, December 30, 2023, https://fsi.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37489/Visit+of+External+Affairs+Minister+Dr+S+Jaishankar+to+Russia+December+25+29+2023.Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[8] Ministry of External Affairs,“Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Russia (December 25- 29, 2023)”, MEA Media Center Report),” December 30, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37489/Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar_to_Russia_December_25_29_2023. Accessed on January 03, 2024.

[9] Embassy of India in Moscow, “Bilateral Relations: India-Russia Relations,”January 03, 2024, https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/bilateral-relations-india-russia.php. Accessed on January 03, 2024.

[10] Ashok Sajjanhar, “Jaishankar in Russia: India-Russia ties are stable and steady,”India News Network, January 04, 2024, https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/20240104/jaishankar-in-russia-india-russia-ties-are-stable-and-steady. Accessed on January 08, 2024.

[11] Pankaj Saran, “Jaishankar Would Have Explored Every Aspect of India Russia Ties,”Strat News Global, January 01, 2024, https://stratnewsglobal.com/the-gist/jaishankar-would-have-explored-every-aspect-of-india-russia-ties/. Accessed on January 08, 2024.

The post Indo-Russia Ties and the Indian EAM’s Recent Russia Visit appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Simran Walia, Associate Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
12 January 2024

Keywords: ASEAN, Japan, Indo-Pacific, Security, Defence

The post Analysing Japan-ASEAN Security Dynamics appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Air Cmde SP Singh VSM (Retd), Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
10 January 2024

Keywords: UCAV, Ghatak, Drone, DRDO, AatmaNirbhar.

The post India Surging Ahead in Stealth Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Group Captain (Dr) Rajneesh Kumar, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
05 January 2024

Keywords: Afghanistan, symmetry, China, Strategy, economy, terrorism, drugs, Taliban.

The post China’s Growing Diplomatic Affinity with Afghanistan and its Implications for India in Central Asia appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Global, Oil, OPEC, Export, Exit, Geo-political, Industry

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in Baghdad in September 1960 with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, Iran, and Iraq as members. The mandate of the organisation was to coordinate the petroleum policies of its member countries and to provide them with techno-economic backing.[1] It was formed with the aim to emerge and function as an influential oil-exporting organisation. Initially headquartered in Geneva, OPEC was later moved to Vienna in 1965.

The major member countries inducted later included Qatar (in 1961), Indonesia & Libya (in 1962), Abu Dhabi (in 1967), Algeria (in 1969), Nigeria (in 1971), Ecuador in (1973), Equatorial Guinea (in 2017) and the Republic of the Congo (in 2018).[2] The non-OPEC countries which export crude oil are termed as OPEC plus countries. OPEC plus countries include Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, South Sudan and Sudan.

There were also a few members who terminated their membership of this organisation for some reason or other. For example, the OPEC membership of Ecuador was suspended from 1992 and remained so until 2007 when it finally withdrew from OPEC in 2020. Indonesia had suspended its membership in 2009 but briefly rejoined in 2016 before suspending its membership again that year. Qatar, during a prolonged blockade imposed by other OPEC countries, terminated its membership in January 2019 to focus on its indigenous natural gas production.

Angola’s association with OPEC    

Angola joined OPEC in 2007. As per the details available, for the year 2022, the members of OPEC taken together produce 34 million barrels per day (BPD), whereas Angola produces more than 1.11 million BPD[3]. In the November session of OPEC, Angola, which happens to be the second-largest oil producer on the continent, protested a decision by OPEC to cut its production quota for 2024. Angola holds the considered opinion that remaining in OPEC will not serve its interests as it will be forced to cut its production scales.[4]

Implications of Angola’s exit from OPEC for world oil prices

Angola’s decision to exit the OPEC carries mixed implications for world oil price levels, albeit within a context shaped by diverse factors such as extant geopolitical dynamics, global demand patterns and the evolving landscape of the global oil industry.

The decision of Angola to quit OPEC has raised questions about the potential impact on global oil prices, given the intricate interplay of geopolitical influences on the demand-supply dynamics of the oil market. One immediate consideration in this context is the role of OPEC in coordinating oil production among its member countries. The organisation often fixes and implements production quotas to stabilise prices by managing the global supply of oil. Angola’s departure from OPEC might be interpreted as a test of the unity among the member countries of the organisation. It is assumed that this may potentially undermine the effectiveness of OPEC in governing enforcement of the international production agreements.

Notwithstanding the above, the direct impact of Angola’s exit on world oil prices is likely to be limited. Angola’s oil production, though substantial, doesn’t carry the same weight as that of other major OPEC members such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE and the USA. It is also worth noting here that OPEC’s influence on global prices is more significantly shaped by the policies and performance of its larger members, particularly Saudi Arabia, which has historically played a pivotal role in adjusting oil output to balance the global market forces.

Furthermore, global oil prices are subject to a multitude of external factors. Geopolitical tensions, economic trends, and technological advancements all play integral roles in shaping the oil market trajectories. Angola’s departure from OPEC should be understood in the broader context of a rapidly changing energy landscape. One potential consequence is the signalling effect that Angola’s exit, along with terminations of membership by some other important members, may have on currently active OPEC members. It is because Angola’s exit hints at a growing discontent or divergence of interests within the organisation, which may lead to a weakened ability of the organisation to coordinate and control the production policies. This, in turn, might contribute to increased competition among oil-producing nations as they seek to secure or expand their market shares.

As the world transitions towards renewable and sustainable energy sources, the influence of traditional oil-producing nations could diminish. Angola’s exit might be seen as a strategic move to adapt to changing market dynamics, focusing on its own economic priorities outside the constraints of OPEC agreements. Additionally, the timing of Angola’s withdrawal coincides with global efforts to address climate change and reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

As nations commit to carbon neutrality goals, there is a growing emphasis on transitioning to cleaner energy alternatives. Angola, by distancing itself from OPEC, may seek to position itself more flexibly in this changing energy landscape, potentially diversifying its economy and reducing reliance on oil exports.

The implications also extend to the financial markets, where oil prices have a direct impact on various sectors. Investors and businesses globally closely monitor oil prices as they influence transportation costs, inflation rates, and the profitability of energy-related industries. Additionally, Angola’s exit also showcases an element of uncertainty and accords an opportunity for the global market participants to adjust their strategies based on perceptions of how this move could influence the broader oil market.

Significance of oil and its impact on India

Oil remains a strategic commodity, playing a crucial role in the development processes of countries worldwide, including those in the global south. The government, in response to a question on the floor of Lok Sabha, responded that India’s oil imports from Angola had been to the tune of 3,175.05 US$ million during 2022-23.[5] However, in response to the same question, the government explained that Indian imports from Iraq and Russia have been worth 33,599.57 and 31,024.66 US$ million respectively during 2022-23, which is much more than what India imports from Angola. This was followed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, Kuwait and Nigeria wherein Angola was followed only by Mexico and Oman.[6]

Therefore, considering Angola’s small percentage of total OPEC output, it is unlikely that Angola’s departure from OPEC will have any significant impact on oil supplies for India. However, the move does raise questions about the unity of the group.

The Fallout

Therefore, while Angola’s departure from OPEC may not have an immediate and dramatic impact on world oil prices, it certainly underscores the intricate relationship between geopolitical decisions and the prevailing trends in the global energy market. The implications extend beyond the realm of production quotas and could influence the strategies of both oil-producing nations and the broader international community as they navigate the evolving landscape of the global energy sector.

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Notes:

[1] Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries webpage, Member Countries, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm. Accessed on December 27, 2023.

[2] ibid

[3] “Crude oil production of the OPEC from 1998 to 2022,” Statista, December 14, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/265205/oil-production-in-opec-countries-in-barrels-per-day/#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20crude%20oil%20production,day%20in%20the%20previous%20year. , Accessed on December 29, 2023.

[4] Handan Kazanci, “Angola announces exit from OPEC amid dispute over oil production quota,” Anadolu Agency, December 22, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/angola-announces-exit-from-opec-amid-dispute-over-oil-production-quota/3089171. Accessed on December 29, 2023.

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, “Question on Exporting Against Crude Oil,” Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No-3888, Answered On- 11/08/2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/36998/question+no3888+exporting+against+crude+oil. Accessed on January 1, 2024.

[6] ibid

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