Keywords: Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism, Cross-border Terror Networks, White-collar Terrorism, Global Governance Failure, FATF Compliance Gaps, IMF Conditionality, International Security Cooperation, Counterterrorism Reforms, India’s Deterrence Strategy, Operation Sindoor, Pahalgam Massacre, Delhi Blast.

Introduction

The 22 April 2025 Pahalgam massacre was not an instance of random violence; it was a carefully planned and thought-out intervention designed to send out a signal. Twenty-six unarmed tourists murdered in a valley named Baisaran, picked and killed because of their religious beliefs. The attackers were named by the police as being from The Resistance Front, which is commonly perceived to be an alias for a rebranded version of Lashkar-e-Taiba a group that has operated with the support of Pakistan’s security establishment. While the US has since admitted that the TRF is a Lashkar-e- Taiba controlled proxy, India was well aware of it based on repetitive past experience.[1] What the attack exposed was not some new terror threat, but the world’s continuing refusal to even recognise that Pakistan is home to terrible networks, from which terrorists continue to hurtle out and strike around our already traumatised world.

While India was still coping with the Pahalgam killings, the blast in Delhi laid bare another new evolution of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, from its conventional, militant methods to an increasingly urban, white collar and technology-driven methodology. The scenario illustrates a deliberately planned mix of hidden sources of funding, electronic money- laundering methods, middlemen, and non-combatants who are made safe by heavy protection from the authorities and courts. The incidents provide further proof to a statement made by India on several occasions that terror activities from Pakistan do not stop or weaken only because the world is watching.[2]  Cross-border terrorism continues unabated, with constant rebranding of the terror groups and their methodology, global pacts being the main driving force, as more and more prefer political convenience over sincere efforts to root out terrorism. This pattern has led to a situation where India faces the burns by terrorism, while Pakistan takes advantage of gaps in global systems to escape responsibility. Against this evolving backdrop, the paper examines the shifting patterns, tactics, and global responses surrounding Pakistan-linked terrorism.

Pakistan’s Terror Ecosystem: Continuities and Transformations

For over three decades, Pakistan has maintained a resilient and adaptive terror ecosystem that re-emerges and recalibrates itself as geopolitical conditions shift.[3] The core strategy, however, has barely changed, Pakistan continues to mobilise its military along the Line of Control, deny involvement when challenged, rebrand its terror groups to escape global attention, and rely on the resulting instability to trigger national-level reactions in neighbouring countries. In many ways, the Pahalgam massacre was a re-issue of this older model, of gunmen, equipment stolen from across the border, routes of escape, and ideological and religious stamp, commissioned by Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI.[4] The long-running nature of these operations throughout the 1990s has had a psychological impact that goes back to almost a century of violence like suicides attacks and targeted killings committed by terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizbul Mujahideen. These groups operate, as the Pakistani state secures their command, resources and financial pipelines.[5]

But Pakistan’s approach has grown more demonstrative or sophisticated. Originally facing a series of world-wide criticism after major incidents like the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2019 Pulwama bombing in Pakistan, Pakistan mobilised financial, technological and organisational insulation to protect itself.[6] The result was a new, complex model of terrorism that could be placed not in militant camps but in cities and professional environments. This “white-collar” version uses crypto-currency, NGO fronts, manipulated charity funds, hawala networks, and digitally coordinated sleeper cells which makes it difficult to trace the handlers from Pakistan.[7]

This move is symbolised by the recent blast in Delhi. Unlike cross-border infiltration, the attack relied on decentralised actors, disguised finance, and urban networks operating within a fabric of civilian normality. Such operations thrive because international institutions have not been able to develop their strategies to identify and prevent white-collar terror. FATF keeps enforcing documentation compliance while Islamabad manages to conceal the active terrorist pipelines behind a veneer of superficial reforms.[8] Pakistan has evaded FATF scrutiny by merely changing the names of proscribed groups to avoid genuine arrests, resulting only in symbolic detentions and limited financial disclosures whereas measures that were nonetheless enough for it to be removed from the grey list.[9]

The United Nations’ actions against terrorism are affected majorly by political considerations based on international relations, which are mainly influenced by the strength of the global veto-holders. Thus, a system of selective accountability was created. Pakistan, for instance, is known for branding itself as the biggest victim of terrorism, while at the same time, it supports the very terrorists it claims to be fighting.[10] It is not the case that one accepts the reconciliation so easily since the global institutional framework tends to take individual terrorists as its targets rather than the structures enabling state institutions to commit such acts. A bright example of such global institutional failure is the perpetual dependency of Pakistan on IMF’s charity.[11] This occurs in a context where the military establishment controls a huge part of the national budget, and international financial aid has been offered not only to conventional but also to more sophisticated financial-terrorist targets.[12] There have been cases in the past when the IMF provided bailouts to countries that are caught up in regional conflicts.  These bailouts have not stabilised Pakistan they have stabilised its terror infrastructure by giving the ISI fiscal breathing room. When India was conducting Operation Sindoor, the IMF was releasing funds to Pakistan.[13] When Pakistan’s economy was collapsing under its own mismanagement, the IMF stepped in with relief packages that directly or indirectly allowed Islamabad to divert money towards the extremist groups. This was not accidental. This is institutional negligence with deadly consequences.

The US government is using a strategic patience policy while interacting with Pakistan but still recognising in private the opacity of the Pakistani government.[14] Global counterterrorism standards have been heavily influenced by the tectonic shifts in geopolitics and therefore, Pakistan is not often held accountable for its actions. Alternatively, Pakistan’s conduct seems less to be a case of strategy and more a result of a world order characterised by fragmentation and shifting politics that allow the creation and exploitation of such spaces for vested interests.

Global Institutional Failures and Pathways for Reform

The issue of Pakistan state-sponsored terrorism has remained unresolved not because of lack of evidence, but rather the unnecessary dependence on international institutions that have possibly, to a large extent, along with their deep-rooted structural weaknesses, failed to deliver. Every single case of violence directed at India, whether it is by traditional militant attacks or urban sabotage, points to a fundamental systemic problem that has somehow gone unnoticed by the world and hence, no solution has been offered. The global community has not yet set up any credible mechanism that would hold states liable for the employment of terrorism as a means of state policy. This problem is going to require thorough investigation followed by the creation of practical reform proposals.

The United Nations too has been unable to muster courage on numerous occasions and deal decisively with state-sponsored terrorism because of veto politics.[15] India cannot afford to rely on a consensus-based system which structurally would not have to face the politically vital states. A sustainable solution would be the establishment of a wide coalition of states in South Asia, West Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia who are at a similar risk. This alliance can be organised to advocate reforms in the UN counterterrorism procedures to emphasise evidence-based attribution, reduced dependence on the veto-based procedures, and give powerful mandates to trace the cross-border terrorist aid systems.

FATF is overly dependent on documentation provided by states, rather than independently checking their work. Pakistan has always exploited this provision. India must demand the creation of automatic punitive triggers for repetitive non-adherence, rechristening banned entities or financial reporting anomalies.[16] Those could include immediate blacklisting, targeted sanctions on military-tied financial institutions and imposing restrictions on the access to the international financial system. The aim should be to make FATF a body of accountability rather than just compliance.

Investment patterns like the above would eventually force the IMF to rethink our taxes falling into hollow pits of the country’s debt, security allowances. Aid frameworks must include enforceable utilisation criteria to prevent the allocation of financial support to sectors unrelated to socio-economic development. The involvement of independent auditors and monitoring could serve as a safeguard against the diversion of funds to military or extremist uses. The IMF support should be conditional on the complete reform implementation. Otherwise, this would run the risk of bolstering the networks that are the main sources of regional instability.

The US has always been the one trying to tackle terrorism in the world. What India wants then is, for the US to work with India in making their counterterrorism policies based on the US- South Asia strategy, which are the same and clear. This involves constant talks with American decision-makers, those shaping opinion, and the whole society about the issues that arise from Pakistan’s way of dealing with things. It is through this good working relationship that the complete package of principles for counterterrorism will be laid down, and not by improvising as we go along and deciding on our responses.

India’s Policy Roadmap: Strengthening Deterrence and Reshaping Global Norms

Given the limited effectiveness of international regimes in constraining Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, India has continued to build and refine non-military counterterrorism approaches. The military operation, termed Operation Sindoor, has all the features of a military intervention tactic that Bharat Karnad categorises as ‘cross-border surgical strikes’, with the purpose of destroying terrorist infrastructures.[17] Furthermore, the border police and military reinforcement and the use of any diplomatic means that might be available all of these are signs of the Governments readiness to act without waiting for a national consensus that would indicate the return to a strictly “do not disturb” policy even when domestic debates sometimes underestimate the scale of the security challenges India faces. This is a smart move, as it reaffirms the position of India that its national security is paramount even in the cases when international ways are less trustworthy or are not giving the anticipated results.

The usual threats have been handled effectively, and at the same time, they are becoming masters of the new form of white-collar terrorism. Their recent campaigns across different states have involved explosions, instances of terrorists going missing, and signs that radical ideas are influencing both ordinary citizens and members of the elite. These actions signify both the evolution of terrorism and the adaptation of the corresponding countermeasures.[18] Pakistan is focusing on urban centers and utilising financial sources while India is investing in intelligence gathering, new technologies, and inter-agency cooperation as its countermeasure.

In order to make a significant and effective progress, India needs to put a lot of effort on the intelligence front. This means that countries should improve their cybersecurity, forensics and work closer together on the state and national data systems, monitor online extremism more actively, and use sophisticated laws that would control the flow of cryptocurrencies and the individuals engaged in online radicalisation.[19] In fact, the focus is being given to the prevention of the problems in the early stages, before they grow into bigger ones.

India’s diplomacy is critically needed to effectively direct the global systems to the right path. This implies applying constant pressure oconditions andthe enactment of more stringent laws, advocating for IMF funding under certain conditions, and mending the faults in the UN system.[20] We must take the initiative in uniting the states that suffer from state-sponsored terrorism. Such a coalition will be devoid of any old disputes and historical problems, as it is with the intricate past between most of these countries.

India is in a position to define its role and expectations in the fight against terrorism, in the framework of the strategic relationship with the U.S. It would be futile to be partitioned in one’s responsibilities.[21] During the talks, the Indian side should convey that a strong alliance can only be built if both partners take equal measures in putting pressure on Pakistan to stop its state-sponsored terrorist activities leading to unrest in the area.[22]

Conclusion

The massacre in Pahalgam, the explosion in Delhi and many other unsuccessful plans of terrorists in the Indian subcontinent are merely a few instances highlighting the fact that Pakistan-supported terrorist activities in India are on the increase. It includes old-fashioned militant muscle and also well-linked white-collar networks that continue to thrive while the world community lands with a thud, unable to apply much in the way of accountability here. The UN’s pusillanimous stance, the FATF’s token compliance, the IMF’s thoughtless fiscal support and the decades-old strategic vacillation of US have all combined to sustain Pakistan in freely carrying on its business for so long.

These developments demonstrate that India cannot rely solely on the existing international system to address Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This is occurring because the security interests of dominant world powers are being allowed to outweigh the interests and concerns of the local population. What is needed instead of the current approach is a comprehensive policy that would not only go the route of strengthening domestic intelligence and police force, not only of building a credible security and deterrence set up but also aiming at the most radical changes in the current global counter-terrorism practice. The outcome of Operation Sindoor has substantiated that independent, intelligence-based operations are indeed effective and the Indian agencies’ actions have pointed out that one needs to be on the alert and do preventive work in dealing with the changing threats at a maximum level.

Lastly, the global order ought to acknowledge that selective accountability is incompatible with the norms of international security cooperation. Pakistan is in a position to take advantage of these loopholes, while India has “the singular focus” to build up strong policies, diplomatic moves and strategic capacities to strangle them. Only through the infliction of the fear of punishment and the granting of enough support to the victims of state terrorism in the neighbouring countries, persistent peace for the region might be assured. Nevertheless, a real barrier will necessitate a mix of internal strength and much more.

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Notes:

[1] How Pakistan reacted as US lists Lashkar proxy TRF as terrorist organisation for Pahalgam attack,” Hindustan Times, July 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-pakistan-reacted-as-us-lists-lashkar-proxy-trf-as-terrorist-organisation-for-pahalgam-attack-101752889759258.html.

[2] Neerja Mishra, “‘This Is Not New’: India Tells World to Wake Up to Pakistan’s Terror Havens,” The Daily Guardian, July 25, 2025. https://thedailyguardian.com/india/this-is-not-new-india-tells-world-to-wake-up-to-pakistans-terror-haven-627560/.

[3] C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 45–49.

[4] Bharti Jain, “Pahalgam an ISI-LeT conspiracy; only Pak terrorists were engaged to maintain secrecy,” Times of India, July 15, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pakistans-political-military-brass-ordered-hit-at-pahalgam-officials/articleshow/122462721.cms.

[5] Ibid., 102–103.

[6] “Pakistan Faces Global Heat Over Terror Role After Pulwama Attack,” LiveMint, March 25, 2019, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/pakistan-faces-global-heat-over-terror-role-after-pulwama-attack-1550851055713.html.

[7] Ashreet Acharya, “Following the Money: How Terror Funding Shapes India–Pakistan Tensions,” Washington International Law Journal, September 26, 2025, https://wilj.org/2025/09/26/following-the-money-how-terror-funding-shapes-india-pakistan-tensions/.

[8] Financial Action Task Force, Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (Paris: FATF, 2025), 31-34, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/Comprehensive-Update-on-Terrorist-Financing-Risks-2025.pdf.

[9] Santosh Chaubey, “Back to the Grey List? Renewed Scrutiny for Pakistan’s Consistent Failure to Meet Terror Finance Standards,” DD News, May 15, 2025, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/back-to-the-grey-list-renewed-scrutiny-for-pakistans-consistent-failure-to-meet-terror-finance-standards.

[10] Firstpost, “Pakistan’s tryst with terrorism: How Islamabad cries victim of its own creation,” Firstpost, August 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/pakistans-tryst-with-terrorism-how-islamabad-cries-victim-of-its-own-creation-13865293.html.

[11] Laxmi M. Puri, quoted in “Pakistan using IMF loans to bankroll terror networks: Top UN ex-official,” The Hawk, May 11, 2025, https://www.thehawk.in/news/economy-and-business/pakistan-using-imf-loans-to-bankroll-terror-networks-top-un-ex-official.

[12] Business Today, “IMF Funds Flow to Pakistan, Relief Flows to Masood Azhar: India Questions Fund Oversight,” Business Today, May 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/imf-funds-flow-to-pakistan-relief-flows-to-masood-azhar-india-questions-fund-oversight-476585-2025-05-16.

[13] First Disbursement of IMF Bailout to Slain Terrorists? Pakistan Declares Rs 10 Million for ‘Martyrs’ Killed in Operation Sindoor,” Organiser, May 13, 2025, https://organiser.org/2025/05/13/291882/bharat/pakistan-announces-rs-10-million-payout-for-slain-terrorists-imf-aid-diverted-to-compensate-dead-and-injured-jihadis/.

[14] Observer Research Foundation, “Hyphenating US-Pak: Doing Business with Gunmen,” ORF Policy Brief, June 14, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/hyphenating-us-pak-doing-business-with-gunmen.

[15] South Asia Monitor, “India assails ‘disguised veto’ at UNSC anti-terrorism panel protecting Pakistan-based terrorists,” March 12, 2024, https://southasiamonitor.org/un-watch/india-assails-disguised-veto-unsc-anti-terrorism-panel-protecting-pakistan-based.

[16] C. D. Sahay, Terror Financing and the Global CTF Regime, Occasional Paper, Vivekananda International Foundation, January 27, 2017, 10, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/final-terror-financing-and-the-global-ctf-regime.pdf.

[17] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force,” May 2025, 1. https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/may/doc2025512553601.pdf.

[18] Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 112-118, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rjbs.

[19] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), Beneath the Surface: Terrorist and Violent Extremist Use of the Dark Web and Cybercrime-as-a-Service (New York: UNICRI, 2024), https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/dw_beneath_the_surface_update.pdf.

[20] Counter-Terrorism Diplomacy: India’s Role in Shaping a Global Framework, PolSci Institute, https://polsci.institute/india-foreign-policy/india-counter-terrorism-diplomacy-global-framework/.

[21] Max Abrahms and Soumya Awasthi, “U.S.-India Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Redefining Convergence Amidst Challenges,” ORF Issue Brief No. 736, October 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/english/research/u-s-india-cooperation-in-counterterrorism-redefining-convergence-amidst-challenges.

[22] Bruce Riedel, India‑U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation, Brookings Institution, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-india-us-counterterrorism-cooperation-riedel.pdf.

The post Why Pakistan’s Terror Networks Survive: An Examination of Global Governance and India’s Strategic Response appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Nuclear Suppliers Group, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India-US Civil Nuclear Deal, Nuclear Energy, IAEA Safeguards

Abstract

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of countries formed in 1974 after India’s first nuclear test. Main job of the group is to make sure that nuclear materials and technology are not misused, by controlling its trade. India, despite its non-NPT status, has been seeking its full membership since 2016. India’s membership goals are to gain strategic legitimacy, access advanced nuclear technology, and strengthen its energy security. This paper examines India’s quest for NSG membership and its engagements with the global nuclear order.

The analysis focuses on the challenges which are surrounding India’s membership bid, such as the NSG’s consensus-based decision making, persistent opposition from China and select European states, and the contentious issue of India’s non-NPT status. The paper argues India’s exemplary non-proliferation record and commitment towards peaceful use of nuclear energy should facilitate India’s entry into the group. Additionally it’s voluntary adherence to IAEA safeguards are the few criteria which should be reconsidered for India’s membership. Admitting India would confirm its responsible nuclear status and also increase the NSG’s relevance in the changing geopolitical and energy environment.

The paper argues that India’s integration with NSG, based on its non-proliferation credentials rather than treaty status, represents a mutually advantageous step for both the NSG and the global non-proliferation regime.

Introduction

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is one of the four leading multi-lateral global nuclear export control regimes, apart from Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. It is an informal arrangement comprising of 48 nuclear supplying countries working towards nuclear non-proliferation by controlling nuclear and nuclear related trades on international level since 1974. The NSG has its own rules and principles. These rules include many of the responsibilities that countries normally follow under treaties like the NPT or Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone agreements. So even if a country has not signed those treaties, NSG still monitors the obligations when dealing with nuclear material. The group allows a country to trade only when they are satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to spread of nuclear weapons. The guidelines set by NSG are not legally binding on the participating government of NSG but they are voluntarily committed to apply them nationally for peaceful nuclear transfer.^{[1] [2]}

Participating in NSG holds a considerable significance to any country for its strategic, economic, and diplomatic goals. India started its pursuit in the year 2016, to gain international recognition and legitimacy as a responsible nuclear state. Following India’s application, Pakistan as well filled its proposal in 2016. India is ready to join the mainstream nuclear commerce with the support of majority of the group members’ viz. US, Russia, France, U.K. etc. Given that the NSG’s decisions are based on the principle of consensus voting, it is not enough that the majority of members are in support of India’s membership. India’s trouble mainly comes from Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland and China, their core argument revolves around India’s non-NPT status. The consensus was in favor for no debate on India’s membership in NSG unless detailed strategy for non-NPT countries’ involvement in the club is developed. Additionally, China argues that if India were to be considered for the membership, then the application of other non-NPT countries such as Pakistan should also be considered alongside. In 2008, the NSG and International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) gave India a special approval because India has a better record in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Pakistan does not have the same good record. But China is still trying to give Pakistan the same kind of NSG membership benefits that India has received.^{[3] [4]}

India acknowledges challenges associated for gaining the NSG membership, as few participating governments tries to push criteria that undermines India’s national interests. To overcome such challenges India is engaging with the opposing countries to clarify their concerns about India’s non-NPT status through events like the visits in 2015 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s to Ireland, President Pranab Mukherjee to Sweden and Foreign Secretary Dr. S. Jaishankar to Switzerland. While countries like China and few other European nations continue to oppose, India pushes its efforts to convey that it upholds NPT principles despite not being a signatory.

History and Evolution

The discovery of neutron induced fission in uranium (fissile reaction) in early 1939 by two German Scientists – Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, triggered fear in the international community that Germany could acquire atomic weapons if they got hold of large quantities of Uranium which the Belgium were mining in Congo, Africa. The announcement of this discovery was combined with later findings of Britain’s MAUD committee and the Einstein-Szilard letter in the United States. It prompted both the nations to explore not only controlled fission but also the possibility of an uncontrolled, explosive chain reaction. Britain carried out its classified Tube Alloys project in 1941 which was a research and development program to progress towards nuclear weapons during the Second World War. United States launched the Manhattan project in 1942 which resulted in dropping of first atomic bombs on the cities of Japan. The massive destruction concluded the Second World War and its effects can be still witnessed till date. Since then the global movement for nuclear disarmament has striven to move the world towards a safer future.^{[5] [6]}

Nearly three decades later, on May 18, 1974, India conducted its initial test explosion of nuclear device, code named “Smiling Buddha”, at the Pokhran test facility under the supervision of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Physicist Dr. Raja Ramanna. The test certainly helped but did not catapult India onto the global state as the Indians might have hoped. Instead, it resulted in ostracism, as it attracted international criticism and led to restrictions on India’s future nuclear programs. The direct reaction to Pokhran I was establishment of US led Nuclear Suppliers Group, in 1974, by major suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology, for legitimized nuclear powers, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to keep India out of the nuclear club. India’s test made the international community realize that the nuclear technologies and equipment acquired by any state could possibly be used to build nuclear weapons. Hence, the group identified list of materials, technologies, and relevant equipment which could be used to develop nuclear weapon and held the first meet in 1975 at London. Other few series of meeting held in London built their identity as the “London Club” before it became as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The founding members of the group were – United States, USSR, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Canada, and Japan.^{[7] [8]}

The 1974 test was not enough for India to be on the same page as other nuclear states. The Indian leadership started working towards revival of Indian nuclear research. In 1995, the then Prime Minister of India P.V. Narshima Rao ordered another nuclear test. Unfortunately it had to be terminated after the CIA’s satellites picked up preparatory activity of test at Pokhran test facility which resulted in extreme pressure from US President Bill Clinton. Then in1998, under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, DRDO chief Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Chairman of Indian Atomic Commission R. Chidambaram, India carried out five underground nuclear tests. These tests shocked the West, prompting strong condemnation and sanctions from Clinton administration. India justified that it is facing threat from nuclear armed neighbour with whom distrust persisted due to unresolved border issues. After, around three decades of international sanctions on India’s nuclear progress India’s vigorous efforts in nuclear domain and shift in US economic policy led both the nations to initiate negotiations in 2005. The negotiations ultimately led to a civil nuclear deal in 2008 between PM Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush.^[9]

On July 18, 2005, both the governments launched the India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. The initiative undertook the following broad, mutually agreed goals:-

(a)       To undo the core differences that hampered their relations.

(b)       To boost their economic and energy growth in an environmentally sound way.

(c)        To support international non-proliferation regime.

(d)       India to commit all of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.

On August 1, 2008 the governors of IAEA accepted India’s safeguard agreement. This agreement granted waiver from NSG and permitted India and USA to carry forward their nuclear trade deal for India’s peaceful nuclear sector. On December 6, 2008 India – US signed the ‘123 Agreement’ under Section 123 of US Atomic Energy Act 1954. The Agreement ended technological denial and nuclear isolation against India that had been in place for three decades. It enabled India to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with the US as an equal partner, and helped address its energy security and environmental challenges. Most importantly it brought India the recognition of non-NPT State with nuclear program equivalent to IAEA standards for which it had strived for over decades. In response, India agreed to put its existing fourteen and future nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards. As per the terms, India also closed its CIRUS research reactor and replaced it with French APSARA.^{[10] [11] [12] [13]}

The Quest for NSG Membership

The NSG guidelines aligns with various international standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation which includes major treaties such as NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America), Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), Treaty of Mongolia (Mongolia), Treaty of Semipalatinsk (Central Asia), Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa – except South Sudan) etc. Such treaties restrict countries from testing, developing, or deploying nuclear materials or technology. For instance Namibia, one of the top five largest producers of Uranium, agreed to trade nuclear fuel with India in the year 2009. However, that hasn’t happened, as Namibia is a signatory to Treaty of Pelindaba, which controls the trading in Uranium from Africa to the rest of the world. The 2008 waiver enabled access of advanced nuclear technologies to India that could be used for enrichment process. The deal indeed helped India; however the success was restricted to US technologies only. Hence the desire to improve nuclear trade and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, India started bidding for the NSG membership since its first formal application in 2016.^{[14] [15] [16]}

India being a responsible nuclear state since 1974, the NSG membership has remained a one of the central concerns of India’s foreign policy over a decade. Few key reasons that forms the basis for ‘why India needs to join NSG’ are listed below –

(a)       State-of-Art-Technologies:          The membership will unlock access to state-of-art technologies which currently India does not possess such as Generation IV nuclear reactors, enriched Uranium, single flagship reactor design such as France’s European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), Pyro-processing for fast reactors, etc.

(b)       Energy generation at commercial level:          Being a member of group means India could initiate commercial production of nuclear energy and equipments, which could be sold for civil use to other countries as well in future.

(c)       Boost to indigenous production:          With enhanced access to nuclear technology India could stimulate considerable economic growth through indigenous production of equipments which would improve Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in India, employment generation, and foster the development of supporting Indian industries under the Government of India’s initiative of ‘Make in India’.

(d)       Harnessing Indian approach to international stage:     India’s nuclear program holds a unique position. Its natural resources provide limited Uranium (U 233) but abundant Thorium (T 232) which can be used to produce nuclear energy. The properties of T232 do not allow any country to use it directly as fuel but it can be converted into U 233 (synthetic fissile isotope) in a nuclear reactor. It is the same technology which India operates its three-stage nuclear power program. This technology is a notable example of using available resources effectively and sustainably which aims to increase India’s energy production to at least 100 gigawatts by 2047. With the NSG membership, India will bring such ideas on the international stage, benefitting other countries with small or developing civil nuclear programs.^{[17] [18]}

(e)       Meeting Climate Change Goals: India has pledged to reduce its fossil fuel consumption and ensure around 45% of energy generated in India is from cleaner sources at the Paris Climate Agreement. To reach this goal, India needs to improve its nuclear energy generation because nuclear power is considered as cleaner source of energy as it does not release any greenhouse gases or other harmful pollutants making it good alternative of traditional fossil fuels.^[19]

(f)        Expansion of Non-Proliferation objectives:    India has a long standing impeccable non-proliferation record. As a responsible nuclear power, India has never been a source of proliferation of crucial nuclear technologies. The inclusion will expand the scope of NSG by allowing them a greater access to India’s nuclear plants, enable more transparency and improved risk monitoring.

Challenges

The major challenge India is facing to gain membership is NSG’s consensus voting system. Consensus voting requires all the participating governments to draw a unanimous decision and agree to any changes made. The 2008 waiver divided the participating governments into three distinct groups – first group consist of countries such as Russia, US, France and the UK, which were in complete favor of India. Second group includes Germany, Japan and Canada who were in favor of India but request more persuasion. The last group highly opposed India’s entry which includes China, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland. The two broad discussions put forth by the opposing parties were that India is not a signatory to either NPT or the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT), or accepting moratorium on producing fissile materials, and another argument was suspension of all types of nuclear tests.^[20]

The fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT, yet has applied for NSG membership, presents a distinct dimension that needs to be examined. India believes that treaties like NPT are discriminatory in nature which hampers India’s sovereignty. While India does not meet this criterion, there is no such clause which binds any country to meet all the factors, to begin with NSG. Hence, if a consensus is built, then the country that does not meet all the criteria can be brought into the group. According to one of the factors stated by NSG that are taken into account for participation includes – “Be a party to the NPT, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok, or Semipalatinsk, or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and in full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s), and, as appropriate, have in force a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA”. Despite, India being a signatory to IAEA’s safeguards agreement (2009) and additional protocol which came into force in 2014, and being a part MTCR (2016) which is an international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, India is still struggling to become a participant of the group.^[21]

Secondly, India has a very firm stance on its right to conduct tests in future. It has clearly conveyed that India may conduct additional tests, if necessary in its national interest. However, India, as a responsible nuclear state would continue to observe its voluntary halt of testing, follow its policies of credible minimum deterrence and ‘No First Use’.^[22]

Recommendation

(a)       India has a long standing commitment to the idea of nuclear disarmament since its independence. In 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru outlined a proposal for nuclear disarmament (standstill agreement), and warned of the inherent threats that the spread of nuclear weapons could bring. The argument India brings to the table is that, the adoption should be universal, non-discriminatory, and total elimination of nuclear weapons.^[23]

(b)     The NSG can adopt a certain sets of criteria that a participating government must meet before applying for membership. The criteria should be based on the country’s proliferation records, norms adopted against testing, disarmament efforts and nuclear safety and security practices.

For instance, one of the reasons China is blocking India’s bid is Pakistan’s membership application. Given proliferation history of both the nations, India being a responsible state with no proliferation record, Pakistan on the other hand, especially after Scientist AQ Khan Network which illegally supplied nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya raises concerns.

(c)        NPT should not be a factor of consideration to either approve or deny membership of NSG. Other factors should be taken into consideration, as mentioned in the guidelines, similar to how France was granted membership in 1974 before signing NPT in 1992.^[24]

Conclusion

India has always proven itself as a responsible nuclear power state whose nuclear capabilities should do the world a lot good than any harm. It’s pursuit of NSG membership has evolved into a defining test of how rising powers are absorbed into the current international nuclear order. Although India already enjoys the rights of nuclear commerce granted by the 2008 waiver, full NSG membership carries a symbolic and strategic value which will affirm India as a responsible nuclear state, giving it a voice in global nuclear governance. Technically, India has fulfilled almost all conditions required for membership, however, India’s non-NPT status and opposition from NSG’s certain participating governments, particularly China, continue to complicate its entry procedure, despite the fact that its entry would bring significant advantages. By allowing a major market, a prospective supplier, and a state with advanced technological capabilities to join the group would expand group’s relevance in a rapidly changing global energy landscape.

Ultimately, India’s accession should be viewed not as a concession but as a mutually beneficial step. As both India and the NSG navigate the global challenges ahead, sustained dialogue and consensus building will be crucial. If properly pursued, India’s full membership can reinforce the integrity of the non-proliferation regime while embedding a rising nuclear power more firmly within the global governance framework.

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Notes:

[1] Nuclear Suppliers Group. “About the NSG.” Nuclear Suppliers Group. Accessed November, 2025.https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/index.php/en/about/about-the-nsg.

[2] “What Is the NSG? | Nuclear Suppliers Group Explained | NSG Guidelines & Non-Proliferation.” YouTube video, 4:12. Posted by Nuclear Suppliers Group, July 18, 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UKX9Hm8F40

[3] Testbook. “Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG: Background, Members & Significance.” Testbook, accessed November, 2025. https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg

[4] Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, and Arka Biswas. “India’s Membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.” ORF Issue Brief, May 17, 2016. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-membership-to-the-nuclear-suppliers-group

[5] Nuclear Museum (Atomic Heritage Foundation). “The Einstein-Szilard Letter – 1939.” July 18, 2017. Accessed November, 2025. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/einstein-szilard-letter-1939/

[6] Fakley, Dennis C. “The British Mission.” AtomicArchive.com. Originally published in Los Alamos Science, Winter/Spring 1983. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.atomicarchive.com/history/british-mission/index.html

[7] Hafeez, Nasir. “The Legacy of India’s Nuclear Weapons Test.” Arms Control Today, November 2024. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-11/features/legacy-indias-nuclear-weapons-test

[8] Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Guidelines, Origins, Structure, and Role – INFCIRC/539/Rev.8. Vienna: IAEA Information Circular, 5 November 2019. Accessed November, 2025.https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files%20and%20Documents/Documents/Publications/infcirc539r8.pdf

[9] “Pokhran-II: When India Fooled the CIA and Successfully Conducted Its Nuclear Test.” Firstpost, May 11, 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/india/pokhran-ii-when-india-fooled-the-cia-and-successfully-conducted-its-nuclear-test-10660491.html

[10] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. – India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation.” 2001–2009 State Department Archive. Accessed November, 2025. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm

[11] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs. Frequently Asked Questions on the India–US Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 1 November 2008. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/19149_Frequently_Asked_Questions_01-11-2008.pdf

[12] “India and the World Nuclear Order: India’s bid at the NSG.” *International Journal for Research in & Progression (IJRPR) 6, no. 5 (2025). Accessed November, 2025. https://ijrpr.com/uploads/V6ISSUE5/IJRPR45821.pdf

[13] Yeon-jung, Ji. “A Path to NSG: India’s Rise in the Global Nuclear Order.” ORF Occasional Paper no. 129, December 2017. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-path-to-nsg-india-s-rise-in-the-global-nuclear-order

[14] Nuclear Suppliers Group. “About the NSG.” Accessed November, 2025. https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/index.php/en/about/about-the-nsg

[15] Neelakantan, Shailaja. “How Exactly India Will Benefit from Being a Member of Nuclear Suppliers Group: 6 Examples.” Times of India, June 11, 2016. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/how-exactly-india-will-benefit-from-being-a-member-of-nuclear-suppliers-group-6-examples/articleshow/52699296.cms

[16] “India and the World Nuclear Order: India’s bid at the NSG.” International Journal for Research in Progression (IJRPR) 6, no. 5 (2025). Accessed November, 2025. https://www.ijrpr.com/uploads/V6ISSUE5/IJRPR45821.pdf

[17] World Nuclear Association. “Nuclear Power in India.” Updated October 29, 2025. Accessed November, 2025. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india

[18] Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. “Thorium Fuel Cycle.” Research & Development. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.barc.gov.in/randd/tfc.html

[19] Khan, Saqib Sajad, and Irfan ul Haq. “India and the World Nuclear Order: India’s Bid at the NSG.” International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews 6, no. 5 (May 2025): 86208625. https://ijrpr.com/uploads/V6ISSUE5/IJRPR45821.pdf

[20] Yeon-jung, Ji. “A Path to NSG: India’s Rise in the Global Nuclear Order.” ORF Occasional Paper no. 129, December 2017. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-path-to-nsg-india-s-rise-in-the-global-nuclear-order

[21] Nuclear Suppliers Group. “Participants.” Accessed November, 2025. https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/index.php/en/about/participants

[22] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs. Frequently Asked Questions on the India–U.S. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 1 November 2008. PDF. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/19149_Frequently_Asked_Questions_01-11-2008.pdf

[23] Futter, Andrew. “The Politics of Nuclear Weapons”. 2nd ed. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021

[24] Sood, Rakesh. “India and the NSG: Unfinished Business.” ORF, July 25, 2016. Accessed November, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-nsg-unfinished-business

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Keywords: South Korea, China-South Korea Relations, US-South Korea alliance, THAAD

Introduction

For South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung, the new year began with a busy week, marked by a four-day trip to China from January 4 to 7, 2026. This meeting took place in the backdrop of an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to Lee, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, held in November 2025.[1] This marked the first official visit by a South Korean President since 2019, following the conservative Yoon Suk-Yeol’s administration’s swift fall with the imposition of martial law in December 2024.[2]

The previous conservative government largely maintained a hostile approach towards China and North Korea while deepening the United States (US)-South Korea alliance, including President Yoon’s participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summits.[3] These series of events culminated in worsening relations between China and South Korea.

Strengthening Economic Ties with China

Lee Jae-Myung, since coming into power, has invariably highlighted the importance of engaging with China while maintaining a robust alliance with the US. This was evident with the accompaniment of around 200 business leaders during his visit to China.[4] This also included a summit-level meeting with Xi, participation in the Business Forum, and meeting the Korean nationals working in China. Meetings with high-level officials, including Chairman of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji and Premier of China Li Qiang, were also part of his visit’s agenda.[5] During Lee’s time in China, South Korea and China signed 15 agreements spanning technology, intellectual property, and Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Lee’s visit to China sent a clear signal of practical cooperation with the aim of bilateral relations with “full-scale restoration.”[6] This meeting’s significance can also be gauged by the strategic opportunities it offered both China and South Korea. China can mediate to ease tensions with North Korea, while South Korea’s balanced relations with Japan can help improve China’s plummeting relations with Japan. China’s relationship with Japan soured amid the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s hardline remarks on military assistance to Taiwan in the event of an attack from China.[7] On the other hand, Seoul gave a clear message of no potential involvement in case of Taiwan’s contingency and maintained the ‘One China’ policy as cleverly mentioned by Lee during his interview with Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, right ahead of his visit.[8]

Highlighting the need to maintain closer ties with neighbours, Xi reiterated, “Friends grow closer with each meeting, and neighbours grow closer with each visit,” Lee also echoed similar sentiments by stating, “As friends and neighbours, South Korea and China must interact more frequently and communicate diligently.”[9] These statements signalled the importance of respecting each other’s core national interests.

Choosing a Pathway in Turbulent Times

Assessing the turbulent realities of the current international order, Xi Jinping also called on President Lee to join China in making the ‘right strategic choices’ in a world that is ‘becoming more complex and turbulent’,[10] especially with respect to China’s tensions with Japan. To strengthen people-to-people ties and address anti-Chinese sentiments in Korea, Lee also suggested “panda diplomacy”[11] by requesting a pair of giant pandas for a zoo in Gwangju. Xi referred to an old proverb to Lee during the summit, “Three feet of ice doesn’t melt at once, and fruit will drop on its own when ripe,”  hinting at the contentious the ban on tourism and K-pop since South Korea’s deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016,[12] but also assured that the intent of China remains open for dialogue.

Addressing North Korea

The tensions between the inter-Korean relations have increased significantly since China’s omission of ‘denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula’ from its defence white paper on arms control were released in November last year.[13] This was also notable during the summit, when both leaders pledged efforts “to reduce tensions and build peace on the Korean peninsula” without directly referring to denuclearisation. It is important to note that ahead of Lee’s visit to China, North Korea fired a ballistic missile. Highlighting such continuous nuclear threats emanating from North Korea, the South Korean President discussed with President Xi the need to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as ways to re-engage with North Korea.

A Look at Seoul-Tokyo Summit Talks

Lee’s subsequent visit to Japan after China on January 13, 2026 underscored the significance of maintaining trust with Japan to sustain a robust alliance between the US and South Korea, sensitively addressing historical grievances, and prioritising Tokyo’s role in peace and regional stability. The Korean President’s visit was marked by a much more informal approach from both leaders, including them joining an impromptu drum session, playing songs from Netflix’s show “K-pop Demon Hunters” and South Korean Boy band, BTS, emphasising the importance of cultural power.[14] Before his travel to Japan, Lee maintained a balance between South Korea’s two neighbours, stating in a televised NHK interview that “relations with Japan are just as important as relations with China,” which was conceived as a welcome gesture in Japan.[15] Both leaders also refrained from directly mentioning Taiwan, hinting at a return to normalcy from the Japanese side, at least in the short term. The two leaders also showed signs of engagement with a warm reception, with Lee travelling to Nara, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s hometown and political base, while PM Takaichi paid a personal greeting at Lee’s hotel. However, other contentious issues remain in Korea-Japan ties, like Seoul’s 2013 ban on fishing imports from eight Japanese prefectures, including Fukushima over radiation concerns following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. However, with strengthening relations, Seoul is hopeful of Tokyo joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Though talks concerning North Korea were sidelined in Beijing, in Nara, both Lee and Takaichi reaffirmed their commitment to ‘complete denuclearisation’ and reinstated it as a key part of their close cooperation with Washington. Responding to Lee’s outreach to China and Japan, Kim Yo-Jong, North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un’s influential sister, characterised it as an attempt at ‘solicitation diplomacy abroad’ and mocked the renewed dialogue efforts as ‘wild dreams.’[16] Even though these visits and Lee’s dedicated diplomatic outreach offer a normal starting point for South Korea’s side, still achieving normalcy in ties remains a distant reality.

President Lee’s visit to China might not yield great results immediately in terms of mutually beneficial exchanges, but it has established a pathway for maintaining political messaging, securing national interests, and pursuing economic benefits.

Parting Thoughts

President Lee’s subsequent visits to China and Japan hold significance against the backdrop of numerous events unfolding at a rapid pace in other parts of the world, especially the US’s capture of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and President Donald Trump’s renewed focus on the western hemisphere. With Trump’s way of dealing with the world leaders becoming increasingly turbulent and unpredictable, Lee’s earlier visit to the US was considered a success, as he was able to secure Washington’s permission to build its first nuclear-powered conventionally armed submarine in exchange for USD 350 billion investment in the US’s decaying shipbuilding sector. [17] The first year of Lee’s tenure was marked by policies securing national interests and by maintaining the US-South Korea alliance. The consecutive visits to China and Japan hint at Lee’s policy of prioritising regional stability.

Lee’s visit to China was not intended to achieve a breakthrough in Korea-China relations, but rather to set the tone for more economic engagement while keeping in check the threats emanating from North Korea. It has always been a challenge for the South Korean leadership to balance its foreign policy trajectory between its economic partner, China, and its security ally, the US. For Lee’s foreign policy, managing Trump while restoring relations with China and engaging Japan in a ‘shuttle diplomacy’ will be challenging, and it remains to be seen whether what has been said can be put into practice.

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Notes:

[1] Mitch Shin, “Lee and Xi Agree to Strengthen China-South Korea Relations,” The Diplomat, November 03, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/lee-and-xi-agree-to-strengthen-china-south-korea-relations/. Accessed on December 10, 2025.

[2] Andy Lim,  Seiyeon Ji,  and  Victor Cha, “Yoon Declares Martial Law in South Korea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 03, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/yoon-declares-martial-law-south-korea. Accessed on December 11, 2025.

[3] Sandip Kumar Mishra, “South Korea’s Pragmatic Funambulism: Lee Jae Myung Visits China,” India’s World January 13, 2026, https://indiasworld.in/south-koreas-pragmatic-funambulism-lee-jae-myung-visits-china/. Accessed on January 13, 2026.

[4] Fan Anqi and Chi Jingyi, “ROK president arrives in Beijing with 200 business delegates, hails full restoration of bilateral ties ‘the greatest achievement’,” Global Times, January 05, 2026, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352267.shtml. Accessed on January 13, 2026.

[5] “China and South Korea Sign 15 Cooperation Documents; Lee Jae-myung to Meet Li Qiang and Zhao Leji Today,” United Daily News, January 06, 2026, https://uniteddaily.my/en/0d133b26-d9c9-42da-83ab-a631c43bb859. Accessed on January 13, 2026.

[6] Anqi and Jingyi, n. 4.

[7]  “China takes spat with Japan over Taiwan to UN, cites right of ‘self-defence’ against armed intervention,” The Hindu, November 22, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-takes-spat-with-japan-over-taiwan-to-un-cites-right-of-self-defence-against-armed-intervention/article70310603.ece. Accessed on January 15, 2026.

[8] David D. Lee, “Can China and South Korea reset complex ties after Xi-Lee summit?,” Al Jazeera, January 06, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/6/can-china-and-south-korea-reset-complex-ties-after-xi-lee-summit.  Accessed on January 18, 2026.

[9] Ibid.

[10]Sandip Kumar Mishra, “South Korea’s Pragmatic Funambulism: Lee Jae Myung Visits China,” India’s World, January 13, 2026, https://indiasworld.in/south-koreas-pragmatic-funambulism-lee-jae-myung-visits-china/. Accessed on January 13, 2026.

[11] Seo Ji-Eun, “Lee’s summits in China, Japan a delicate exercise in ‘managed stability’,”  Korea JoonAng Daily, January 15, 2026, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-01-15/national/diplomacy/Lees-summits-in-China-Japan-a-delicate-exercise-in-managed-stability/2500551. Accessed on January 16, 2026.

[12]  Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on South Korea’s Deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 02, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/02/chinese-views-on-south-koreas-deployment-of-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad?lang=en. Accessed on January 16, 2026.

[13] Jinwan Park, “China’s Quiet Retreat From North Korean Denuclearization,” Foreign Policy, January 09, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/09/china-north-korea-denuclearization-xi-jinping-lee-kim/. January 15, 2026.

[14]  Ji-Eun, n. 11.

[15] Kim Eun-jung, “(2nd LD) Lee stresses ties with Japan as vital as China, urges cooperation while squarely facing history,” Yonhap News Agency, January 12, 2026, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260112010652315. Accessed on January 16, 2026.

[16]  “North Korea’s Kim Yo Jong says South’s hopes for better relations are an illusion,” The Hindu, January 14, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/north-koreas-kim-yo-jong-says-souths-hopes-for-better-relations-are-an-illusion/article70507904.ece. Accessed on January 15, 2026.

[17] Josh Wingrove & Soo-Hyang Choi, “U.S. and South Korea discuss jointly building nuclear-powered submarines,” The Japan Times, November 14, 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/14/asia-pacific/politics/us-south-korea-nuclear-submarines/. Accessed on January 15, 2026.

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Keywords: Islamabad, Washington, Lobbying, Terrorism, President Trump

The Government of Pakistan nominated the United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize in June 2025. This followed Trump’s claim that he brokered the ceasefire that ended the clash between India and Pakistan in May.[1] The clash was sparked by the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, 2025 and involved a series of airstrikes conducted by India on  May 07 against nine terror sites across Pakistan’s Punjab province and PoJK (Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir).[2] Following Pakistan’s retaliation, India moved up the escalation ladder on May 10 and struck 11 airbases in Pakistan.[3] New Delhi denies Trump’s claim and has stated that an understanding between India and Pakistan to bilaterally stop all military action was reached after the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan called his Indian counterpart.[4] Trump’s claim suggests greater concern regarding India and Pakistan’s hostilities than he displayed in the days following the terror attack, when he told reporters “…they’ll get it figured out”, referring to two nuclear powers.[5] Islamabad has contradicted New Delhi’s statement by supporting Trump’s claim as part of a push towards warmer relations with Washington. Concurrently, Pakistan is making efforts to build strategic cooperation with the U.S. across several domains, with notable gains in the critical minerals sector.[6] Its Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, bore witness to the signing of an MoU between Pakistan’s military-led Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM) in early September. He also visited Washington in late September with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir, who has made multiple trips to the U.S. capital independent of Sharif.[7] A day after their visit, Sharif asserted Trump’s claim of brokering peace between India and Pakistan in a speech delivered at the 80^th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). He referred to Trump as a “Man of Peace” and reaffirmed the Nobel Peace Prize nomination.[8]

The notable upswing in Islamabad and Washington’s relationship in 2025 began following the commencement of Trump’s second term in office on January 20. The ongoing bonhomie signals a crucial shift in the U.S. President’s stance on Pakistan since his first term (2017-2021). In 2018, Trump criticised Islamabad for harbouring terrorism and offering Washington nothing but “lies and deceit” in his first tweet of the new year.[9] Subsequently, the U.S. suspended military aid to Pakistan, which had been decreasing gradually since 2011 amid straining ties between the nations.[10] As a consequence of the growing proximity between Islamabad and Washington, both sides have reaffirmed their counterterrorism partnership, which U.S. military officials have described as “phenomenal”.[11] Washington’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) also initiated a USD 686 million upgrade package for Islamabad’s F-16 fighter fleet in early December, which is aimed at supporting U.S. national security objectives.[12]

Islamabad is using various channels to seek its strategic interests in Washington, among which its renewed U.S.-based lobbying efforts in 2025 stand out. In April and May, it added USD 600,000 per month across six new lobbying firms.[13] There are over 13,000 lobbyists registered in the U.S., who are contracted by state and non-state actors from across the world to influence Washington’s foreign policy. Their parent firms often leverage personal connections to achieve the terms of their contracts. Islamabad’s latest lobbying acquisitions warrant particularly close attention for New Delhi, as they hold ties with the Trump administration, the U.S. defence sector, and U.S. policymakers. If New Delhi’s lobbying efforts lose parity with Islamabad’s, its long-term interests in Washington’s USD 4.4 billion influence economy may be adversely affected.[14]

Tracing Islamabad’s Lobbying Efforts in Washington

Table 1: Pakistan’s U.S.-Based Lobbying Investments in 2025

Source: Created by the author based on information collected from O’Dwyers, June 06, 2025, JD Supra, January 07, 2025, Global Witness, August 06, 2025, Squire Patton Boggs, Hindustan Times, August 14, 2025, Javelin Advisors, The Sunday Guardian, July 10, 2025 and Legistorm.

Islamabad’s newly contracted lobbying firms include Orchid Advisers LLC and its subcontractor Squire Patton Boggs LLP, Seiden Law LLP and its subcontractors Javelin Advisors LLC and Conscience Point Consulting Inc., and Qorvis LLC. These organisations are the latest additions to Islamabad’s lobbying roster in the U.S., while others, such as Team Eagle Consulting LLC, have been working with Islamabad for longer and have aided in securing various benefits for it. Team Eagle was awarded a USD 1.5 million contract with the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) to bolster Foreign Direct Investment into Pakistan and assist with grassroots organising within Pakistan’s diaspora in the U.S. During the Bush administration, Team Eagle also worked with the Government of Pakistan to strengthen economic and military relations with the U.S. and helped Pakistan secure a USD 3 billion aid package.[15]

1.  Orchid Advisors LLC

At USD 250,000, nearly half of Islamabad’s latest monthly investments on lobbying in the U.S. are spent on retaining Orchid Advisors, who signed on to a six-month long representation agreement with the Government of Pakistan on April 08, 2025. As per the agreement, the firm shall “provide a team of experts in both Washington and New York to serve as (Pakistan’s) trusted advisors to further Pakistani commercial, business and security interests.”[16] The firm is directing its advocacy efforts at the White House, along with the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund and the International Finance Corporation, which is the World Bank’s private sector arm.[17] Orchid is closely involved in the defence sector and helps firearms manufacturers sell their products. Its co-founder and CEO, Jon Rydberg, has handled the R&D management of tactical weaponry for companies such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing.[18] Notably, Lockheed has been picked as the main contractor for the new F-16 upgrade package.[19]

2.  Squire Patton Boggs LLP

Orchid Advisors’ subcontractor, Squire Patton Boggs, is drawing half its monthly payment from the Government of Pakistan. It grants Islamabad access to three key avenues to seek U.S. support through its links to the Trump administration, U.S. military leadership and the U.S. arms sector.[20] Everett Eissenstat—a Partner at the legal firm—was Trump’s economic advisor during his first term (2017-2021), when he served as Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council.[21] Additionally, the firm’s Senior Advisor Mark Esper served as U.S. Secretary of the Army from November 2017 to June 2019 and as U.S. Secretary of Defense from June 2019 to November 2020. He is a U.S. Army veteran and has also worked as Vice President, Government Relations at Raytheon Co.[22]

3.  Seiden Law LLP

Seiden Law inked a USD 200,000 per month contract with the Government of Pakistan in April to facilitate stronger cooperation between Islamabad and Washington in rare earth mineral mining. In July, Seiden also helped broker a trade agreement, reducing a 30 per cent tariff hike placed on Pakistan by Trump in April to 19 per cent. The law firm is closely associated with the Trump administration through its founder, Robert W. Seiden, who has spent time as a private investigator for Trump.[23] Notably, the firm’s founder specialises in “creative use of the law to achieve his client’s objectives”, as Seiden’s website states. Seiden’s experience could play a role in removing legal restrictions that hinder Islamabad’s strategic interests in Washington.[24]

4.  Javelin Advisors LLC

Javelin Advisors is a subcontractor to Seiden, and is paid USD 50,000 per month by the law firm to provide strategic and advisory services to Islamabad. It was founded by Keith Schiller, George A. Sorial, and Seiden Law’s Robert W. Seiden. Schiller and Sorial are both Trump alumni, with Schiller having served as Trump’s bodyguard and Director of Oval Office Operations, while Sorial was The Trump Organisation’s Executive Vice President and Counsel.[25] Javelin Advisors references its proximity to the Trump administration on its website through the slogan “Founded by Insiders. Defined by Access”, placed over an image of the White House.

5.   Conscience Point Consulting Inc.

Conscience Point Consulting is another Seiden subcontractor earning USD 25,000 per month from it.[26] It was founded by a former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Nathaniel Wienecke, who has also served as Vice President of Global Government Relations at JPMorgan Chase & Co.[27]

6.   Qorvis LLC

The latest in the series of Pakistan’s newly contracted lobbying firms is Qorvis, which is a specialist in strategic communications. It was awarded a USD 150,000 per month contract by Islamabad on May 30, for a total payout of USD 1.8 million. As per the agreement, Qorvis will “craft Pakistan’s overarching narrative, reflecting its gracious culture, the aspirations and indomitable spirit of its people, and its bright undeniable future, manifesting in its rapidly transforming economy and incorporating Pakistan’s proud history and rich legacy.” The firm shall also “apprehend and help counter misinformation and disinformation, especially targeting state institutions, e.g., armed and security forces and judiciary via credible messaging tailored to platforms and audiences.”[28] Qorvis’s services could blur narratives that harm Islamabad’s interests, such as conversations around its human rights abuses and its sustained support for terrorism.

Conclusion

Lobbying firms are one of the critical elements of Islamabad’s influence network in Washington. Pakistan’s latest engagement with them has played a role in building its current ties with the Trump administration and also supported its efforts to renew military support from Washington. These are concerning developments, as they would invariably embolden Islamabad, which may likely feel empowered to retain its policy of terrorism against India. While Islamabad’s forthcoming air assets are intended to support U.S. interests, renewed U.S. military support could also enable another misadventure against India. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan can sustain gains from their Washington-based lobbying investments. Islamabad and Washington share a history of mutual mistrust, and their current status quo may prove to be short-lived as the change in perception that Islamabad seeks might be unsustainable without a change in actual strategy.

*****

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Notes:

[1] “’My administration brokered a historic ceasefire between India and Pakistan’,” Times of India, May 14, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/my-administration-brokered-a-historic-ceasefire-between-india-pakistan-us-president-donald-trump/articleshow/121144502.cms. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[2] “Operation Sindoor: Full list of terrorist camps in Pakistan, PoJK targeted by Indian strikes,” The Hindu, May 7, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-full-list-of-terrorist-camps-in-pakistan-pojk-targeted-by-indian-strikes/article69547986.ece. Accessed on September 21, 2025.

[3] . “IAF severely damaged 11 Pak airbases in May 8–10 military strikes — Nur Khan, Sargodha, Skardu among key targets,” The Economic Times, May 10, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-pakistan-ceasefire-iaf-strikes-11-pakistani-airbases-inflicts-severe-damage-targets-include-nur-khan-sargodha-and-skardu/articleshow/121060642.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on September 26, 2025.

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Statement by Foreign Secretary,” May 07, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39488/Statement_by_Foreign_Secretary_May_10_2025. Accessed on October 24, 2025.

[5] “India, Pakistan will ‘get it figured out,’ says Trump on border tensions,” DD News, April 26, 2025, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-pakistan-will-get-it-figured-out-says-trump-on-border-tensions/. Accessed on December 05, 2025.

[6] U.S. Mission Pakistan, U.S. Embassy & Consulates In Pakistan, “U.S. Strategic Metals Signs MOU on Critical Minerals in Pakistan,” September 08, 2025, https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-strategic-metals-signs-mou-on-critical-minerals-in-pakistan/. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

[7] “Shehbaz Sharif To Meet Trump Next Week, Asim Munir To Tag Along: Report,” NDTV, September 16, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-news-shehbaz-sharif-to-meet-donald-trump-next-week-asim-munir-to-tag-along-report-9286299. Accessed on September 21, 2025.

[8] United Nations General Assembly, “His Excellency Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif Prime Minister,” September 26, 2025, https://gadebate.un.org/en/80/pakistan. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[9] Hannah Bloch, “U.S. Suspends Most Security Assistance To Pakistan,” NPR, January 04, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/04/575492300/u-s-suspends-most-security-assistance-to-pakistan. Accessed on November 04, 2025.

[10] “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,” Center for Global Development, 2013, https://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers. Accessed on November 04, 2025; “Pakistan: US suspends $800m of military aid,” BBC, July 10, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14099402. Accessed on November 04, 2025.

[11] Elian Peltier, “Pakistan Is in Trump’s Good Graces, but for How Long?,” The New York Times, August 13, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/13/world/asia/pakistan-trump-munir.html. Accessed on October 24, 2025.

[12] Anwar Iqbal, “Washington okays upgrade package for Pakistan’s F-16 Fleet,” Dawn, December 23, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1962751. Accessed on December 23, 2025.

[13] Shashank Mattoo, “Pak outspending India 3:1 in US lobbying,” Hindustan Times, August 14, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pak-outspending-india-3-1-in-us-lobbying-101755111126993.html. Accessed on September 01, 2025.

[14] Mo Shehu, “Lobbying Statistics and Trends in 2025: Everything You Need to Know,” Column Content, June 6, 2025, https://columncontent.com/lobbying-statistics-trends/. Accessed on December 01, 2025.

[15] “Team Eagle Signs Agreement with Pakistan for Strategic Political Advocacy and Economic Development Advisory,” PR Newswire, October 23, 2024, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/team-eagle-signs-agreement-with-pakistan-for-strategic-political-advocacy-and-economic-development-advisory-302284874.html. Accessed on September 03, 2025.

[16] Kevin McCauley, “Orchid Advisors Counsels Pakistan,” O’Dwyer’s, April 23, 2025, https://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/22895/2025-04-23/orchid-advisors-counsels-pakistan.html. Accessed on September 01, 2025.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Thomas Fox, “Interview with John Rydberg,” JD Supra, January 07, 2014, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/interview-with-jon-rydberg-95999/. Accessed on September 01, 2025.

[19] Iqbal, n. 12.

[20] “Trump-linked firms make millions from aid-deprived nations,” Global Witness, August 06, 2025, https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/revealed-trump-linked-firms-cash-in-on-mineral-lobbying-deals-as-us-cuts-aid/. Accessed on October 07, 2025.

[21] “Everett Eissenstat,” Squire Patton Boggs, https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/en/professionals/e/eissenstat-everett. Accessed on October 07, 2025; Ibid.

[22] At the time of writing, Esper may have left Squire Patton Boggs. This is unconfirmed. “Mark Esper,” Legistorm, https://www.legistorm.com/person/bio/265/Mark_Thomas_Esper.html. Accessed on October 07, 2025.

[23] Mattoo, n. 13.

[24] “Robert Seiden,” Seiden Law, https://seidenlaw.com/attorney/seiden-robert-w-esq/. Accessed on December 23, 2025.

[25] Caitlin Oprysko, “Trump alums line up against each other on India-Pakistan dispute,” Politico, April 29, 2025, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2025/04/29/trump-alums-line-up-against-each-other-on-india-pakistan-dispute-00317161. Accessed on September 03, 2025.

[26] “In Trump’s Washington, Pak Quietly Erects It’s Largest Ever Influence Network,” The Sunday Guardian, July 10, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/in-trumps-washington-pak-quietly-erects-its-largest-ever-influence-network-133161/. Accessed on September 21, 2025.

[27] “Nat Wienecke,” Legistorm, https://www.legistorm.com/person/bio/65815/Nathaniel_Frederick_Wienecke.html. Accessed on September 21, 2025.

[28] Kevin McCauley, “Pakistan Picks Qorvis for $1.8M Pact,” O’Dwyer’s, June 06, 2025, https://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/23113/2025-06-06/pakistan-picks-qorvis-for-18m-pact.html. Accessed on September 03, 2025.

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Keywords: Matsya Nyaya, Modern War Fighting, Realpolitik, Air Power, Operation Absolute Resolve

Matsya Nyaya: The Big Fish Will Swallow the Small Fish

The concept of ‘Matsya Nyaya’, translated as the ‘Law of the Fish’, where the big fish devours small fish, was articulated in the Arthashastra by Chanakya (Kautilya) during the Mauryan period around the 4^th to 2^nd Century BCE. It remains one of the most profound contributions to Indian political thought and understanding of great power politics, world order and anarchy. Matsya Nyaya describes a condition of anarchy, in which hard power alone determines survival. In such situations, the powerful will prey on the weak unless they are restrained by a capable and legitimate authority. During the Cold War, the balance of power ensured order; however, post the breakup of the USSR in 1991, hegemony and unipolarity have resulted in an absence of control mechanisms, later giving rise to anarchy. What Chanakya wrote back then still resonates strongly with modern geopolitics, where idealism and realism have given way to hard-hitting ‘Realpolitik’, a pragmatic and interest-driven approach to world affairs.

In today’s world, power has become diffused, interests have become transactional, and behaviour has become opportunistic. While classical Realism has always theorised power, Realpolitik practices it unabashedly without any concern for stability and moral legitimacy. It is only concerned with outcomes, advantages, and available leverages. Another interesting feature of Realpolitik is selective morality, where norms are applied when convenient and ignored when considered to be costly. The transition to Realpolitik has been hastened because of the arrival of China and the resurgence of Russia, along with the USA, on the global stage. All three have displayed similar patterns of behaviour whenever core interests have been involved. This further emphasises the fact that while a bipolar world is inherently stable, a unipolar world is transitory in nature, and a multi-polar world creates a state of anarchy where Realpolitik, hard power and pragmatic, interest-driven competitions rule the roost.

In such a world, the rise of middle powers further complicates the issue because they tend to practice strategic pragmatism, joining the Realpolitik bandwagon when convenient. The world is a canvas visible to all, and each player wants their own colour to be splattered on it. Modern Realpolitik extends way beyond pure hard power, where supply chains, energy security, data, and finance have now become instruments of coercion. Sanctions, tariffs, technological denial, and export controls have become means to achieve ends. In such a world, nations may confuse rhetoric for reality, thereby risking strategic irrelevance and, therefore, as Chanakya had said, in an anarchical world, the big fish will swallow the small fish.

Calipso Venezolano

On February 20, 2025, the Trump administration formally designated eight Latin American crime organisations as foreign terrorist organisations, a label normally reserved for hardline terror outfits like Al-Qaeda that use violence for political ends and not for profit-focused crime rings.[1] On August 19, 2025, the US Military deployed three guided-missile destroyers off Venezuela and added another three amphibious assault ships, including other support vessels carrying about 6,000 soldiers.[2] In September, the USA sent F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico, and a submarine equipped with cruise missiles was deployed. On September 2, 2025, the USA carried out its first strike against a drug-carrying vessel that departed Venezuela, killing all 11 people on board, and a short video clip was also posted on social media.[3] This was followed by another strike on an alleged drug boat, killing three people. Both the strikes were carried out without justification, and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, a top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the US Military was not “empowered to hunt down suspected criminals and kill them without trial.”[4] On September 19, 2025, a third strike on another alleged drug-laden vessel was carried out by the US military, drawing criticism from various factions and individuals. From October to December 2025, in excess of 25 strikes on boats were carried out by the US military, drawing ire from all factions, including the US Congress. On December 10, 2025, the US seized an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast carrying about two million barrels of heavy crude, and the Venezuelan government called it “a blatant theft and an act of international piracy.”[5] On December 16, President Trump ordered a blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers going into and out of Venezuela and pledged that the military buildup would continue till Venezuela returned to the US oil, land, and assets, the legitimacy of the claim being questioned by all. The President also alleged that Venezuela had been using its oil to sponsor and fund terrorism and drug trafficking. On December 30, 2025, the CIA carried out a drone strike at a docking area believed to have been used by Venezuelan drug cartels.[6] The strike was the first to be carried out on mainland Venezuela. The USA thereafter imposed sanctions on four Venezuelan oil companies and designated another four additional tankers as ‘blocked property’ which were trying to evade US sanctions. On January 01, 2026, during an interview on television, President Nicolas Maduro said that Venezuela was open to negotiating an agreement with the USA to combat drug trafficking. He also distinctly mentioned that the USA was trying to force regime change in Venezuela and also gain access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

On January 03, 2026, the USA launched Operation Absolute Resolve with air strikes across Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. This was followed by the insertion of Special Forces using helicopters with an aim to capture the President of Venezuela. President Maduro and his wife, Flores Maduro, were captured by this crack force and flown out of the country and eventually to New York. President Maduro was accused of leading “a corrupt and illegitimate government which, for decades, had leveraged government power to protect and promote illegal activity, including drug trafficking.”[7] President Maduro and Flores Maduro have meanwhile pleaded not guilty.

Democracy, Drugs, and Air Power: Operation Absolute Resolve

The capture of a sitting President of a sovereign state has never been seen before in recent history. The only probable exception could be the surrender of Manuel Noriega, the de facto leader of Panama, to the US Armed Forces in January 1990. In a rules-based world order, this operation has been able to bring to the fore the stark reality of Realpolitik where self-interest and a pragmatic outlook ‘trumps’ global law and order. The operation also put all caution to the wind with blatant disregard for sovereignty and international order. Leaving legality and ethics aside, the operation has demonstrated the importance of hard power and brought out the effectiveness of joint planning and integrated application of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in the planning and conduct of Multi Domain Operations (MDO). Ranging from precision strikes on fast-moving boats, conduct of a dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD) missions to the insertion of special forces to capture President Maduro from a densely populated urban terrain, the primacy of air power has also been amply demonstrated. The operation was preceded by months of cyber operations, signals intelligence, pattern-of-life analysis and the unprecedented integration of US Cyber Command and Space Command into kinetic military action.[8] From intelligence gathering by the CIA (August 2025 onwards), the multi-domain pressure campaign between September and December 2025, culminating in the final assault and extraction of the President, the operation is a classic example of how modern combat is likely to take shape.[9] Increasingly, Air Power is being extensively used for the conduct of operations across the entire spectrum of war. From shaping the battlefield, establishing control of air, conducting kinetic and non-kinetic action, achieving the laid down end state and finally restoration of peace, air power has been seen to be an instrument of choice. Characteristics of air power like flexibility, mobility, concentration of forces, offensive action, responsiveness and the resultant shock effect are facets that are essential for the conduct of modern wars and have been seen to be decisive.

The Indian Conundrum

Op-Sindoor conducted by the Indian Armed Forces brought out certain important lessons in the Indian context, and Operation Absolute Resolve has only highlighted them.[10] An important takeaway from such operations and the two major conflicts going on in the world (Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas) is that the entire force structure of a nation cannot be equipped and trained to carry out MDO due to financial and technological constraints. Operation Absolute Resolve did not exercise any specific Combatant Command/Theatre Command. It was an amalgamation of forces from various individual commands, equipped and trained for specialised application in multi-domain scenarios. The forces employed were from the US Cyber Command, US Space Command, CIA, Delta Force, and Special Operations Aviation Regiment, US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Air Force. India must learn relevant lessons from such conflicts, especially when it is looking at modernising its own force structures. Neither does India have very deep pockets for creating huge and ambling Theatre Commands, nor does it have the luxury of decades of procrastination and debate to embark on paradigm changes in war fighting. What India does have is tactically sound armed forces capable of delivering effective firepower where it counts. The problem is integration and joint planning. The creation of an apex, all-encompassing Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) should be the starting point for all reforms in the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) of India.[11]

Organising a Joint Task Force (JTF), similar to Operation Absolute Resolve, drawn from all relevant arms, support services and ancillaries would essentially be the responsibility of the JFHQ. A classical Theatre Command will never have the wherewithal to independently undertake such missions. The need of the hour is to develop a flexible force structure designed to be highly ‘intelligentised and informatised’ and act as force multipliers, augmenting conventional forces.[12] In an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, flexible options to the national leadership must be available in order to successfully prosecute conventional, asymmetric, hybrid or multi-domain operations. Unless all elements of CNP sit together and strategise, the desired outcomes will not be met, and therefore, it is time that India also adopts a more pragmatic and Realpolitik outlook to how future wars would be fought.

Parting Shots

The 21^st Century has seen air power emerge as a uniquely compatible instrument because it is flexible, coercive and adaptive. Realpolitik demands shaping outcomes and simultaneously minimising exposure. Op-Sindoor has also demonstrated the large space available for the conduct of full-spectrum operations under a nuclear overhang. Future wars are likely to be aerospace-centric, with cyber playing a key role. Modern forces will need to coerce without conquering, signal without committing and more importantly, punish without occupying. As the world transforms from a unipolar to a multi-polar world, air power will not just support Realpolitik but increasingly redefine grand strategy because soft power can never replace hard power, and the world recognises and respects it. Matsya Nyaya remains the silent grammar of geopolitics. Norms may attempt to soften its expression, but power determines its outcome and the big fish will always swallow the small fish!

*****

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Notes:

[1] Ben Finley, Konstantin Toropin, Regina Garcia Cano, “A timeline of U.S. military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture,” PBS News, January 03, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-u-s-military-escalation-against-venezuela-leading-to-maduros-capture.   Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[2] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[3] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[4] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[5] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[6] Ibid. Accessed on January0 6, 2026.

[7] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[8] “Operation Absolute Resolve: A Deep Dive into the Cyber, OSINT, and Intelligence Operations Behind Maduro’s Capture,” Breached Company, January 06, 2026, https://breached.company/operation-absolute-resolve-a-deep-dive-into-the-cyber-osint-and-intelligence-operations-behind-maduros-capture/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[9] Ibid. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[10]  VP Naik, “India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence, Para on Problem Statement,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, November 29, 2025, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[11] VP Naik, “Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands-Redux,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, September 27, 2025, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-theatre-commands-redux/. Accessed on January 06, 2026.

[12] VP Naik, n. 10.

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Keywords: National Security Strategy, strategic autonomy, China White Paper, Non-proliferation

In November 2025, two major nuclear powers, China and USA, released strategy documents within weeks of each other. Though not on the same subject, they provided insights into strategic issues as they envision them. They also make for a study in contrasts. While the Chinese document is old school, classic diplomatic writing, the document by the United States of America reflects the personality and style of the current leadership.

China was first off the mark with its White Paper entitled, China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation in the New Era. This was the second iteration of a Paper on the same subject released in 2005. The new document provides fresh insights into Chinese thinking on nuclear issues. Later the same month, the USA released its broad-based National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, the first official document on the subject by the current administration. As is the tradition in the USA, each president brings out his own set of official documents on national security, defence strategy, and nuclear posture.

Different Styles, Divergent Priorities

The recent Chinese and American documents vary widely in language, tenor, and messaging. China’s White Paper adopts a diplomatic tone though liberally extolling the ‘constructive role’ that Beijing plays in shaping global security. The US NSS, on the other hand, is unapologetic about its ‘America First’ approach. It does not couch its objectives in diplomatese, nor does it pretend to pursue global peace and stability. In fact, there is an expressed unwillingness to share global burdens that do not directly align with American national interests.

Also divergent from the US NSS of 2022, which had identified Russia and China as near-peer threats of equal weightage, the 2025 version plays down Russia’s threat potential. China is listed as the primary challenger to be addressed by reshaping the economic relationship on the basis of “reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence” and by building deterrence to prevent any large-scale military conflict by “maintaining American economic and technological pre-eminence.” In meeting these objectives, the US exhorts its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific too, to step up through increased defence spending and preparedness.

China’s White Paper, meanwhile, does not mention the USA by name. Instead, it uses the code word “a certain country” that seeks “absolute strategic superiority by constantly expanding its armaments, strengthening combat readiness, and provoking bloc confrontation.”  China decries such policies for their impact on regional peace and security, erosion of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and exacerbation of security risks of emerging technologies.

Both also frame their relationship with friends, partners and allies quite differently. Washington adopts a transactional approach of ‘burden sharing and burden shifting’, asking the allies and partners to take more responsibility for their own security. As the Strategy states, “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”  China, meanwhile, emphasises joint handling of issues by “building a community with a shared future for humanity.” It envisions international relations characterised by “mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.” The irony is that while China uses lofty terms that are seldom evident in its relationships, the USA has discarded even lip service to such ideals. On the economic front, for example, the USA has weaponised trade by emphasising tariffs and reshoring, while China seeks to secure resources through elite capture and debt diplomacy.

The Nuclear Dimensions

As regards nuclear weapons, the US explicitly states that it seeks “the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent, plus next-generation missile defences—including a Golden Dome for the American homeland—to protect the American people, American assets overseas, and American allies.” China criticises such pursuit as stubborn maintenance of a “massive nuclear weapons stockpile while further reinforcing its nuclear deterrence and war-fighting capabilities.” BMD is particularly opposed for “reshaping the traditional strategic offense-defence dynamic, posing new challenge to global strategic stability.” As things stand, both are engaged in a nuclear arms race – expanding arsenals, building new delivery systems, developing missile defences and refusing to engage in strategic stability dialogues.

Both also seek dominance in emerging technologies. The USA blatantly declares, “We want to ensure that US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” China, meanwhile, couches its desire to lead the regulation of these fields within the framework of global governance and equity through UN-mandated mechanisms. Given its position and influence in the Global South, it leverages numerical support within multilateral institutions by prioritising these debates in such forums.

China’s White Paper is explicitly on arms control and non-proliferation, but it does not offer any new ideas for advancing these fronts. It describes nuclear weapons as a ‘sword of Damocles’, recounts the grim state of affairs and laments the risks. The bulk of the paper, however, extols China’s ‘constructive role in international arms control’ by listing its membership of multilateral treaties. It applauds China’s commitment to the principle of nuclear restraint by stating that it has “never used nuclear weapons to threaten other countries nor deployed nuclear weapons outside its territories, and has never provided a nuclear umbrella for other countries.” However, it neither mentions nor explains the rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear arsenal. The US NSS, meanwhile, makes no mention of arms control or non-proliferation, which have slid low down in the US priority for now.

Both documents indulge in strategic storytelling, as is the wont of such articulations. They create narratives for global consumption. While the USA shows little regard for the existing order and is in retreat from its traditionally global role, China positions itself as a guardian of stability by invoking the vision of a multipolar world an “equal and orderly” international order where it can institutionalise its influence over old and new domains.

Takeaways for India

As the two major powers reimagine their competitive relationship and work out a modus vivendi, it is clear that India should build its relationships with both of them independently of the other. The USA and China are both important for India for different reasons. Its relations with one must not be contingent on the other. In fact, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is of utmost importance in a world where the major powers will only be looking out for themselves. India must continue to team up with nations wherever its interests align and not hesitate to stand apart on divergent issues. A flexible response, rather than the fixity of relationships, seems to be the order of the day.

Given the centrality of the Indo-Pacific to India’s security, New Delhi must keep its focus on building the necessary relationships in the region, irrespective of the level of US participation. China will try to use all kinds of proxy tools to create digressions for India and disrupt its rise as a contender. India will have to be prudent to choose its fights wisely and concentrate on building its comprehensive national power. That would be the biggest deterrent.

India must also not hold back on leveraging its economic strength of demographics, skilled workforce, manufacturing potential, and markets. Simultaneously, it must enhance its soft power by showcasing the stabilising effects of its philosophy of strategic restraint in military operations and nuclear build-up. No-First-Use (NFU) should be India’s too to leverage in multilateral fora. In fact, none of the other nuclear-armed states has shown as much restraint and responsibility as India in building its nuclear arsenal and in the use of conventional force in nuclear shadow in the face of complex security challenges.

One way to let the world know the Indian side of the story could be to bring out one’s own strategy document of sorts. Irrespective of whether it is called a White Paper or a National Security Strategy, the document could provide the Indian version of how the country perceives the global landscape, where it plans to go, and how it intends to navigate its way towards the goals. The document would be a high-order articulation of the principles/guidelines that reflect the nation’s vision on all elements of national security. Such an articulation could serve as a compass for different ministries to find their fix while keeping a common goal in sight.

Over the decades, various governments have drafted such vision documents and toyed with the idea of putting them in the public domain. But there has been a hesitation to do so. Of course, not having such a publicly articulated document does not mean the country lacks a coherent strategy. On the other hand, having a publicly shared strategy document could make it more inclusive for fellow citizens, and also provide clarity to the rest of the world on India’s vision and priorities.  A clear national security strategy that has been well deliberated across all strands of comprehensive national power could better enable India to harness resources in service of its expressed aspiration of being a consequential power in a world as fractious as the present one.

The new year may be a good time to start a debate on the pros and cons of a publicly articulated Indian NSS given that India has changed, and so has the world.

*****

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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