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		<title>From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part II: From Coordination to Command — Designing India’s Joint Future</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-ii-from-coordination-to-command-designing-indias-joint-future/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Nov 2025 08:31:55 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai NM (Retd) Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act Introduction The first part of this discussion looked at why jointness matters — the habits and mindsets that must precede structure. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-ii-from-coordination-to-command-designing-indias-joint-future/">From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part II: From Coordination to Command — Designing India’s Joint Future</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai </strong>NM (Retd)</span></h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The first part of this discussion looked at <em>why</em> jointness matters — the habits and mindsets that must precede structure. This part turns to <em>how</em> those ideas might evolve in practice. Having observed the Air Force’s journey from both maritime and joint vantage points, I find its caution doctrinally sound — not defensive, but disciplined. What appears to some as resistance is, in fact, professional logic: the instinct to preserve flexibility, unity, and clarity of command as one enters significant efforts at integration. Understanding <em>why</em> the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does is essential before judging <em>what</em> must change — and how the Service can, in fact, lead the process.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Air Force Perspective </strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s position is rooted in doctrine, not defensiveness. Indeed, air power is, by design, a single, flexible national instrument. Aircraft and sensors can shift across fronts within hours, concentrating effect where it matters most. Dividing those assets among multiple theatre commanders could fragment effort and dilute unity. Command of the air, therefore, must remain a national responsibility.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Such caution reflects professional discipline. Air power thrives on agility, but agility depends on coherence. As Brigadier General J. D. Hittle observed in <em>The Military Staff: Its History and Development</em>, the true strength of command lies in firm direction from the top combined with initiative at every level.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a> Centralised planning and decentralised execution remain the bedrock of effective operations.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Recent Air Chiefs have consistently urged that doctrine, networks, and training must come before structure.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> That sequence is sound. It reminds policymakers that integration should enhance agility, not erase it. From my own experience in joint planning environments, this emphasis on sequencing is professional caution rooted in operational realism.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Historical Models of Balance</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">History offers lessons in how strong commanders and strong staffs can rationalise the contradictions that are the military.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><em>South East Asia Command (SEAC):</em> Admiral Lord Mountbatten relied on his Chiefs of Staff — Brigadier Francis Festing and later Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning — to knit together Army, Navy, and Air operations across a vast, under-resourced theatre. As Arthur J. Marder notes in <em>Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–1945</em>, even Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s clashes with Admiral Sir James Somerville showed that shared Service identity cannot replace structured oversight.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[3]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><em>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF</em><strong>):</strong> In Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder turned coordination into unity. Drawing on lessons from the Middle East, Tedder urged a unified air command and direct access for ground commanders to call air support.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[4]</a> It was this blend of central planning and frontline flexibility that made SHAEF an exemplar of joint command.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><em>Patton and Weyland</em><strong>:</strong> The partnership between General George Patton’s Third Army and Brigadier General Otto Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command demonstrated real jointness. Their staff shared maps, radios, and urgency. As David N. Spires notes in <em>Air Power for Patton’s Army</em>, their effectiveness came from shared education, mutual trust, and a clear divide between central planning and decentralised execution.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[5]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><em>Montgomery and de Guingand</em><strong>:</strong> General Bernard Montgomery’s close partnership with his Chief of Staff, Major General Francis de Guingand, showed how command and dissent can coexist productively. De Guingand tested assumptions, filtered information, and ensured that plans aligned with the commander’s intent — precisely the role envisaged by Scharnhorst and Moltke, two military geniuses who offer many lessons two centuries later.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[6]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">From these cases flows a consistent truth: empowered staff strengthen, rather than weaken, command.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Modern Staff Logic</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As Charles Edward White notes in <em>The Enlightened Soldier</em>, Scharnhorst conceived of the General Staff as “a system of brains” — a collective intellect designed to ensure that strategy was tested by logic rather than driven by personality. Scharnhorst created the General Staff as a <em>professional counterweight to command</em> officers trained to test plans, challenge assumptions, and ensure that decisions followed logic, not impulse.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[7]</a> Moltke refined this idea: staff officers were to think, not just assist, and to exercise independent responsibility within the commander’s intent.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[8]</a> This institutionalised professional dissent makes it a form of discipline rather than disobedience.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Institutional Balance through Staff Design</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">For the Indian Air Force — operating alongside an Army of far greater size and presence — balance must come from institutional design, not numerical equivalence. Mass cannot be matched, but structure can offset scale. The Prussian reformers Scharnhorst and Moltke demonstrated that intellect could compensate for numbers: a “system of brains” where analysis, critique, and command coexisted in productive tension.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India can adapt that principle through a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) supported by an empowered Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS–VCDS axis could serve as an institutional counterweight — one focused on direction, the other on disciplined dissent — ensuring that strategy benefits from dialogue, not deference. For the IAF, this balance may be necessary to preserve its culture of procedural precision and doctrinal clarity within a joint framework that values questioning as much as compliance.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Commonwealth Legacy and Its Limits</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Indian military did not inherit the Prussian model; it inherited the British one — efficient, orderly, but wary of internal debate. In Britain (and in colonial India), aristocrats and senior officers long commanded not just with strategy but with rank and class, treating staff as advisers rather than partners.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">At Waterloo, Prussian liaison to the headquarters of Wellington General von Müffling urged two British commanders to seize a fleeting opportunity against Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. Both agreed, but refused to act without written orders, fearing court-martial if they did. Wellington later confirmed that such an initiative would indeed have been punished. It was a system built on control, not trust.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[9]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">That instinct would carry into the Royal Air Force (RAF) through its Army lineages, and from there to the Indian Air Force. The RAF headquarters were organised by functional branches — operations, plans, maintenance, and administration — without a system of an empowered Chief of Staff. The design delivered efficiency but discouraged institutional challenge. The IAF inherited this form almost intact: precise, methodical, and professional, yet inclined toward compliance rather than contest.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Managing Large Air Formations vs All-Domain Forces</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s centralised command model is highly effective within the air domain. Large formations drawn from different bases can be tasked as a single instrument, with tight vertical control ensuring precision and responsiveness. From personal experience, such centralisation works superbly in air operations, where speed and concentration are decisive.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">But managing an all-domain force is a different challenge. Air operations shift in hours; land and maritime campaigns unfold over days; cyber and space effects operate on entirely different temporal scales. A Commander responsible for land, sea, air, cyber, and space must orchestrate <em>effects</em>, not simply allocate sorties. That requires a lateral staff structure where domain specialists plan together, share data, and challenge each other’s assumptions in real time.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Air component planning thrives on centralisation; joint command thrives on collaboration. The task before the IAF is not to abandon its precision but to extend it — to translate air-power discipline into a joint habit of dialogue and co-design. Only when staff from every Service can think, argue, and decide together will India’s theatre commands move from intent to effect.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>From Coordination to Command</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The relationship between command and staff is, as noted earlier, not just structural but also symbolic. Rank conveys authority, but how command interacts with staff reveals the maturity of that authority. Before the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee reforms, hierarchy made this distinction clear: the staff advised, command decided. After rank parity blurred those lines, the Army has notionally reintroduced clarity through distinct command and staff streams — reaffirming that direction, not designation, defines authority.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As India now attempts to design integrated commands, this semiotic balance becomes critical. Theatre commands will require staff who can question without overstepping, and commanders who can decide without silencing debate. That equilibrium — advice without rivalry, command without insularity — is what will turn integration from structure into strategy.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India’s reform journey — from the Kargil Review Committee (1999) to the Group of Ministers (2001), the Naresh Chandra Task Force (2012), and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) — culminated in the creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (2019). The Inter-Services Organisations (ISO) Act (2023) added a legal framework, but one primarily administrative; it governs people and discipline, not missions or operational direction.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Five years on, we have <em>coordination without command</em>. Authority is dispersed among four coequal Chiefs, leading to caution when decisiveness is required. Theatre Commanders remain three-star officers, junior to the four-star Service Chiefs whose forces they must lead. In a hierarchy-sensitive military, this imbalance weakens confidence and clouds authority.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[10]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986) in the United States resolved the same issue by raising theatre commanders to four-star parity, aligning rank, responsibility, and remit. India can learn from the logic of that Act— consistent with the Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act (1955)<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[11]</a> — without creating a politically sensitive “supreme commander.” Aligning rank, responsibility, and remit is not cosmetic; it is the foundation of credible command.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Toward a Balanced Joint System</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">There are glimpses of what this could look like. Air Marshal K. K. “Timmy” Nohwar’s tenure as Chief of Staff at the <strong>Andaman and Nicobar Command</strong> — the only time an Air Officer has held that post — proved that when officers step outside Service silos, the quality of joint planning improves. This is as told to me by his Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN).</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Building on such precedent, India could:</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(a)         <span style="color: #000000;">Get the post of</span><span style="color: #0e0e0e;"> CDS, like so much else in defence reform, </span><span style="color: #000000;">to be rotational</span><span style="color: #0e0e0e;"><span style="color: #000000;">.</span> Jointness isn’t rocket science — it’s just common sense, applied consistently.</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(b)          Appoint a four-star VCDS from another Service as the CDS’s counter-ego, safeguarding diversity of perspective;</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(c)         Transform HQ IDS from a coordinating secretariat into a Joint Staff HQ, the analytical and doctrinal core;</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(d)         Legally distinguish Administrative Control (ADCON) from Operational Control (OPCON);</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(e)       Create a Permanent Joint Operations HQ under the CDS with regional hubs (pilot projects could be a maritime command and possibly the Central Command);</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">(f)     Establish a Joint Operations Fund, ring-fenced under parliamentary oversight, to finance ISR, cyber, logistics, and training, gradually pooling Service budgets.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Such steps would shift reform from paperwork to purpose — where law provides the foundation, structure provides direction, and funding provides the muscle.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion — From Clarity to Coherence</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As a person who has pushed Critical Thinking from about 2015 till recently at the faculty and students of DSSC, Wing Commander Raja’s work is valuable in helping restore factual clarity to a debate too often clouded by sentiment. But clarity is only the beginning. Five years after creating the CDS, we still have <em>coordination without command</em> — structure without synthesis.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">For jointness to mature, India must separate ADCON from OPCON, build a permanent operational core, align rank with responsibility, and embed joint education early in Service careers.  The IAF, with its tradition of disciplined planning and mission precision, is best placed to lead this evolution.  If it can carry its internal coherence into the joint arena, India’s Armed Forces will move decisively — from coordination to command, and from clarity to coherence.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/CAPSS_InFocus_SP_01_11_25_Part-II.pdf"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF</strong></a></span></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes:-</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> J. D. Hittle, <em>The Military Staff: Its History and Development</em> (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1961; Kindle ed.), p. 2.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, remarks at <em>Ran Samvaad</em>, Mhow, August 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> Arthur J. Marder, <em>Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–45</em> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> Stephen E. Ambrose, <em>The Supreme Commander</em> (New York: Doubleday, 1970).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> David N. Spires, <em>Air Power for Patton</em>&#8216;<em>s Army</em> (Washington, DC: USAF History and Museums Program, 2002).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> Francis de Guingand, <em>Operation Victory</em> (London: Hodder &amp; Stoughton, 1947); Nigel Hamilton, <em>Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942</em> (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Charles Edward White, <em>The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805</em> (New York: Praeger, 1989; Kindle edition).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> Helmuth von Moltke, <em>Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings</em>, ed. Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993; Kindle edition).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a>White, n. 7.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[10]</a> Sudhir Pillai, &#8220;Theaterisation Reform Is Stuck on Ranks and Roles — India&#8217;s Military Needs Clarity,&#8221; <em>The Print</em>,  September 25, 2025, <a href="https://theprint.in/opinion/theaterisation-reform-is-stuck-on-ranks-and-roles-india-military/2750307/">https://theprint.in/opinion/theaterisation-reform-is-stuck-on-ranks-and-roles-india-military/2750307/</a>. Accessed on October 27, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[11]</a> Ministry of Law, Government of India, &#8220;The Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act, 1955. Act No. 19 of 1955,&#8221;   May 03, 1955,  <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/repealedfileopen?rfilename=A1955-19.pdf">https://www.indiacode.nic.in/repealedfileopen?rfilename=A1955-19.pdf</a>. Accessed on October 28, 2025.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-ii-from-coordination-to-command-designing-indias-joint-future/">From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part II: From Coordination to Command — Designing India’s Joint Future</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part I: The Idea of Jointness: Beyond Structure and Slogan</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-i-the-idea-of-jointness-beyond-structure-and-slogan/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 15:17:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Goldwater–Nichols Act]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Kargil Review Committee (KRC)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OCTOBER 2025]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Theaterisation]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai NM (Retd) Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act Setting the Stage Among the many contributions to India’s debate on jointness are two essays on the Centre for Aerospace Power [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-i-the-idea-of-jointness-beyond-structure-and-slogan/">From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part I: The Idea of Jointness: Beyond Structure and Slogan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai </strong>NM (Retd)</span></h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Setting the Stage</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Among the many contributions to India’s debate on jointness are two essays on the <em>Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</em> (CAPSS) portal by Wing Commander A. Pichipoo Raja. His earlier piece, <em>“Revisiting the Eight-Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,” </em><a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a> traced the evolution of India’s inter-service integration. His later article, <em>“08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command,”</em><a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> builds on that foundation—trying to bring discipline to a discussion that has often been shaped more by sentiment than by evidence.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Both essays mark a welcome maturity in professional debate and, in an oblique way, remind us that the Air Force’s caution is often misread. What some see as reluctance is, in truth, doctrinal logic: a concern for coherence, unity, and agility. Before judging what needs to change, it is essential to understand why the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does—and how it could, in fact, lead India’s transition to genuine jointness.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Early Roots of Jointness</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">In his first of the two articles referred to here, Wing Commander Raja suggests that the idea of theaterisation arose to address India’s “lack of jointness,” tracing its roots to 1944, when he links the origins of jointness to the founding story of the National Defence Academy (NDA), using the Sudan Block donation as a symbolic anchor. That is partly right, though the deeper roots lie in Britain’s wartime experience.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The campaigns of 1939–45 showed how badly the Services faltered when they operated in silos. The setbacks in France, North Africa, Greece, and the Far East were not just tactical defeats—they were failures of coordination between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Only after repeated reverses did joint planning and staff education become central to success. By the time of Normandy and Burma, integration had matured: General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Europe and Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command demonstrated how air-land-sea cooperation, properly institutionalised, could turn friction into synergy.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As an alumnus of the NDA, I still remember quiet Sunday mornings spent in the library after breakfast—hours lost in military history that gave us our first authentic taste of joint thinking. Has that early exposure in jointness at the NDA fully percolated to the echelons of the Indian Military?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The DSSC and Its Limits</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India established the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington even before the National Defence Academy (NDA) came up at Khadakwasla. Its core focus, however, has mainly remained single-service — given the Army’s central role under an Army Commandant and its mission, much like Quetta before it, to prepare junior staff officers for mid-level formations.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This was not for lack of vision. The second Commandant, Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne, had to take it up with the then Governor-General, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, to convince the Defence Minister that the new college had to be tri-Service — a move the Army initially resisted but one that made DSSC India’s first real step toward integrated professional education.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[3]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Over time, DSSC has evolved into a respected postgraduate, mid-career institution, yet its joint curriculum remains more a conversation than a culture. General Lentaigne himself once remarked, “I only wish the Army could cut down its syllabus and also get more time for research and discussion.”<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[4]</a> The college’s history notes that as Army subjects multiplied, the Naval and Air Wings pressed for greater combined and joint instruction to balance their programmes.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">It is not the aim of this submission to get into the subtleties of words used, like <em>training</em> and <em>education,</em> but readers would benefit if they read through the author’s writings on the subject.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[5]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Personal Ties and Professional Distance</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Wing Commander Raja notes the personal bonds among recent Chiefs — NDA coursemates and Sainik School Rewa classmates — as examples of natural synergy. These connections are real, but they do not automatically create operational integration. If friendship alone could guarantee jointness, India would have achieved it long ago.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">When the government accepted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and Group of Ministers’ (GoM) recommendations to establish the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the three Chiefs then in office were all my own NDA contemporaries. Yet that did not by itself deliver integration. At the highest levels, professionalism outweighs personality. Structures, doctrine, and accountability—not nostalgia—bind the Services together.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">I saw this clearly as Chief of Staff at the Andaman and Nicobar Command. One Commander-in-Chief and the Lieutenant Governor were, coincidentally, classmates at Sainik School Rewa—the very school Wing Commander Raja mentions. Yet their conduct was always defined by role, not relationship. Professional distance kept both focused on duty. Familiarity can ease communication, but it never substitutes for institutional design.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Revisiting the “Eight Myths”</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Raja’s <em>08 Myths</em> article aims to clear the fog that surrounds the theaterisation debates. It succeeds in re-centering the argument on evidence rather than emotion. But the real task is to link these “myths” to the broader history of reform—from the KRC and GoM to the Naresh Chandra Task Force and the Shekatkar Committee. Together, they form India’s official reform continuum. Once accepted <em>in principle</em> by the government, their recommendations gain directive weight even if implementation remains uneven.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Seen that way, the debate should not be about whose view prevails but about how to build common purpose. The aim here is not to impose a non-IAF perspective, but to offer, for an Air Force audience, a structured way forward—a method amid the noise.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Lessons from Kargil and <em>Sindoor</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Readers seeking a deeper anchor might look to my chapter <em>“Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command”</em> in <em>Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective</em>. It recalls the winter of 1998–99, when Pakistan’s Operation <em>Badr</em> led to the Kargil War and to two separate Indian responses—Operation <em>Vijay</em> by the Army and Operation <em>Safed Sagar</em> by the Indian Air Force.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[6]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As AVM Arjun Subramaniam notes, had the Army involved the IAF from day one, a single integrated plan could have exploited both Services’ strengths and covered their weaknesses. That insight remains strikingly relevant. Operation<em> Sindoor</em> again showed individual brilliance within each Service but exposed the absence of a unified design. The lesson from Kargil and <em>Sindoor</em> alike is not about our people or platforms, but about how we plan together. True jointness requires shared understanding, confidence, and a structure that aligns authority with purpose.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[7]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Myths and Realities of Reform</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Wing Commander Raja’s effort to separate fact from belief is valuable, but facts must be translated into design. Major General Alok Deb makes this point in <em>“Kargil and its Impact on India’s National Security.”</em> <a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[8]</a> His reading of the KRC and GoM reports shows that, even if the term “<em>theatre command”</em> wasn’t used, the intent toward integration was clear. The committees’ reforms—the Integrated Defence Staff, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Strategic Forces Command, and the Andaman &amp; Nicobar Command—were all steps toward jointness. The CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) represent a significant political step that places the onus on the militaries to get their act together.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">For a fuller view, readers should explore the <em>Journal of Defence Studies</em> special issue <em>“National Security since Kargil,”</em> which offers a 360-degree review of India’s progress two decades after the conflict.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[9]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Raja is also correct that reform in India has evolved through context and experience, not declarations. Our path to jointness has been deliberate, incremental, and built through learning rather than slogans.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The claim that India’s jointness “problem” lacks empirical proof confuses the absence of audit with adequacy. Without a structured review, neither strengths nor gaps are known. India still lacks cross-service mechanisms to analyse operations collectively. Lessons remain trapped within individual Services and seldom shape doctrine or training. A Joint Operations Review Board (JORB) under the National Security Council Secretariat—or the CDS—could fill that gap, turning anecdote into evidence.  The Army’s Headquarters Army Training Command (HQ ARTRAC) has a Lessons Learnt system, but do we have a joint Lessons Learnt system?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Learning from Others</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Raja’s reading of the United States (US) experience is broadly correct but incomplete. Unified Commands existed well before 1986; what the <em>Goldwater–Nichols Act</em> changed, as Gordon Nathaniel Lederman explains in <em>Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986,</em> was alignment, not architecture.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[10]</a> The Act enforced clarity—who commands, who is accountable, and who advances for joint performance. It linked professional reward to joint competence and turned what had been an organisational chart into a living system.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The caution that theaterisation alone cannot deliver jointness is well-taken. Structures succeed only when supported by doctrine, education, and incentives. The lesson from abroad is not imitation but adaptation—building systems that fit our realities while preserving each Service’s ethos and aligning all to a common strategic purpose.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Beyond Structure</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Theatre commands are meant to unify command—to bring planning, resources, and execution under one operational authority. That purpose is sound and long overdue. But unity of command is not the same as unity of purpose. Real jointness grows from shared education and professional incentives that make officers think and act as one, even when they wear different uniforms. Without that intellectual and doctrinal foundation, theatre commands risk becoming hollow frameworks—united in form but divided in spirit.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The final myth—that theaterisation is politically driven—needs nuance. In China, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2015 reforms certainly strengthened Party control, yet they also produced real operational integration.<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[11]</a> Under Xi Jinping’s centralised leadership, structural change combined with a genuine “military intellectual revolution” born of debate, international study, and relentless field experimentation. Political will can push reform, but professional depth must sustain it.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[12]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Way Ahead</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Taken together, these insights repair the record but leave open the core question: how do we turn factual clarity into functional reform?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">If the first part of this debate has explained <em>why</em> jointness matters—the habits of thought, education, and incentives that must underpin reform—the next must ask <em>how</em> those principles can work in practice. Understanding the IAF’s reasoning is essential here. Before prescribing change, one must first appreciate the logic behind its caution: a perspective shaped not by reluctance, but by doctrine, experience, and operational prudence.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CAPSS-InFocus_SP_30_10-25.pdf"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF</strong></a></span></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes:-</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> A Pichipoo Raja, &#8220;Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,&#8221; Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 03, 2025, <a href="https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/">https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/</a>. Accessed on October 26, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a>A Pichipoo Raja, &#8220;08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions,&#8221; Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 10, 2025, <a href="https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/">https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/</a>. Accessed on October 26, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> R. D. Palsokar, <em>A History of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington</em> (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1997), pp. 56-58.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> Ibid., p. 90.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> For earlier discussions on this subject, see Sudhir Pillai, &#8220;Faculty at DSSC – A Necessity of Professional Military Education,&#8221; <em>Trishul Journal</em> 17, no. 2, Spring 2015; Sudhir Pillai, &#8220;Schooled to Think,&#8221; <em>Force Magazine</em>, January 2018; and Sudhir Pillai, &#8220;Change with Times: Indian Professional Military Education System Needs Urgent Reform,&#8221; <em>Force Magazine</em>, November 2020.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> Sudhir Pillai, &#8220;Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command,&#8221; in <em>Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective</em>, ed. Arjun Subramaniam and Anil Chopra (New Delhi: National Defence College and KW Publishers, 2021), pp. 283–305.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Ibid., p. 285.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> Alok Deb, &#8220;Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security,&#8221; <em>Journal of Defence Studies,</em> vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, <a href="https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/13-3-2019-kargil-and-its-impact.pdf">Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security</a>. Accessed on October 25, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a> National Security Since Kargil, <em>Journal of Defence Studies </em>vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, <a href="https://www.idsa.in/journal-of-defence-studies-vol-13-no-3-july-september-2019">Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 2019 &#8211; MP-IDSA</a>. Accessed on October 25, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[10]</a> Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, <em>Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986</em> (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999).</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[11]</a> Brian Lafferty, &#8220;Civil Military Integrations and PLA Reforms,&#8221; <em>National Defence University Press,</em> February 05, 2019, <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748777/civil-military-integrations-and-pla-reforms/">https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748777/civil-military-integrations-and-pla-reforms/</a>. Accessed on October 25, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[12]</a> Sugiura Yasuyuki, &#8220;The PLA&#8217;s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities,&#8221; <em>NIDS China Security Report, </em>2022,  <a href="https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_A02.pdf">https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_A02.pdf</a>. Accessed on October 25, 2025.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-history-to-myths-a-naval-officers-dialogue-part-i-the-idea-of-jointness-beyond-structure-and-slogan/">From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part I: The Idea of Jointness: Beyond Structure and Slogan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[capsnetdroff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2025 15:07:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Armed Forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jointness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kargil Review Committee]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OCTOBER 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Theatre Command]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Kargil Review Committee, Theatre Command, Indian Armed Forces, Jointness ‘Post-truth’ is an adjective defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. [1] [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/">08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: </strong></span><strong>Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja</strong>, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Kargil Review Committee, Theatre Command, Indian Armed Forces, Jointness</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">‘Post-truth’ is an adjective defined as ‘<em>relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. </em><span style="color: #000000;"><a style="color: #000000;" href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a> </span>The debates in India around jointness and theatre commands have largely followed the post-truth trajectory. They are more based on individual experiences, hearsay, personal beliefs and not rooted in facts.  This article is aimed at providing objective facts derived from government sources to help the readers form their informed opinions.</h4>
<h4><strong>Myth 1 – The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) commented adversely on jointness during Operations in the Kargil War</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">If there is one document that is widely misquoted, that is the KRC Report. Despite the report being declassified, it was only available in print. This may have led people to use Google search, which delivered incorrect secondary sources. The actual terms of reference are reproduced below:</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16656" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16656" style="width: 882px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16656" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1.jpg" alt="" width="882" height="323" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1.jpg 882w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1-300x110.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1-600x220.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1-768x281.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1-150x55.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-1-696x255.jpg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 882px) 100vw, 882px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16656" class="wp-caption-text"><strong>Image</strong>: Terms of Reference of KRC., <strong>Source:</strong> From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited, 2000), p 25.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The mandate of KRC excluded the actual conduct of operations during the Kargil War, and the Committee stuck to its mandate. It did not examine events beyond May 26, 1999, when air power was employed.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16657" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16657" style="width: 895px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16657" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1.jpg" alt="" width="895" height="230" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1.jpg 895w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1-300x77.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1-600x154.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1-768x197.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1-150x39.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1-696x179.jpg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 895px) 100vw, 895px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16657" class="wp-caption-text"><strong>Image</strong>: Para 1.4 of KRC Declining to Comment on the Actual Operations., <strong>Source</strong>: From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited, 2000), p 26.</figcaption></figure>
<h4><strong>Myth 2- KRC recommended the creation of integrated Theatre Commands</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Countless authors have mentioned this. It is factually incorrect and does not appear in the KRC. The recommendations were for a National Defence Headquarters.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16658" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16658" style="width: 939px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16658" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1.jpg" alt="" width="939" height="260" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1.jpg 939w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1-300x83.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1-600x166.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1-768x213.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1-150x42.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-3-1-696x193.jpg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 939px) 100vw, 939px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16658" class="wp-caption-text"><strong>Image</strong>: Para 14.19 of KRC., <strong>Source</strong>:  From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited, 2000), p 258.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">KRC recommended better civil-military integration and did not mention any integration of the three services.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16659" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16659" style="width: 890px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16659" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1.jpg" alt="" width="890" height="306" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1.jpg 890w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1-300x103.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1-600x206.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1-768x264.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1-150x52.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-4-1-696x239.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 890px) 100vw, 890px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16659" class="wp-caption-text"><strong>Image</strong>: Para 14.19 of KRC., <strong>Source</strong>: From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited, 2000), p 259.</figcaption></figure>
<h4><strong>Myth 3- There is a serious problem of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">There has been no government-led high-level review of military operations since the 1962 Sino-India War. KRC also examined what led to the war, and not how it was fought. Only a thorough, in-depth enquiry into Indian military operations from the operational records by a suitable committee would reveal the prevalence/extent of the issue. In the absence of this, any arguments regarding the lack/abundance of jointness are either anecdotal or hearsay and devoid of factual evidence.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Myth 4- The Goldwater-Nichols Act led to the creation of Theatre Commands in the US</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Theatre Commands in the United States (US) were created in 1946 as a result of the implementation of the Unified Command Plan. <a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) was the first to be established as a unified command on January 01, 1947. <a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[3]</a> Therefore, any argument that the creation of theatre commands in the US as a direct outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is factually incorrect.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Myth 5- Creation of Theatre Commands automatically leads to jointness</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A popular argument is that the creation of theatre commands automatically results in jointness. If the creation of theatre commands leads to jointness, then the US should not have experienced disasters in Vietnam, Operation Eagle Claw, etc. They would not have had any reason to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to resolve the issues in jointness, as the theatre commands were initially established in 1947. Therefore, this argument lacks empirical support.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Myth 6- In the US, the commands of all the armed forces are co-located. In India, 17 single-service commands of all three services are located in different areas, resulting in a lack of jointness.</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This is another popular misconception. The table below shows the location of each Component Command Headquarters (HQ) in the US geographic Combatant Commands (Space Command is not shown).</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16660" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16660" style="width: 1570px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16660" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1.jpg" alt="" width="1570" height="422" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1.jpg 1570w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-300x81.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-600x161.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-1024x275.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-768x206.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-1536x413.jpg 1536w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-150x40.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-696x187.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pic-5-1-1068x287.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1570px) 100vw, 1570px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16660" class="wp-caption-text">Source: Table created by the Author using information from the US Department of War Website.[4]</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The table clearly shows the dispersed locations, with some even spread across multiple continents. Therefore, this too is post-truth. However, in the past, during Operations, some component commanders were occasionally co-located at a forward headquarters, although not always.</h4>
<h4><strong>Myth 7 &#8211; Most countries have Theatre Commands; therefore, India must too</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">During the post-World War II era, the world was divided into two camps. The popular choice was between the two. However, India declined both and adopted the Non-Alignment Movement. Thus, India has never fallen for following the crowd, even when it was weak and poor. Many countries have an obligation to align their doctrines and structures due to their commitment to fight as an alliance. India has no reason to follow this approach without careful consideration. It must do what suits best in the national interest.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Myth 8- China created Theatre Commands to bring in jointness in the Armed Forces</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The primary aim of the Chinese military is to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). <a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[5]</a> The threat to CPC leadership also comes from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as it serves as an alternate power centre. Following the reforms in 2015, which involved the creation of theatre commands and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), among other measures, President Xi also carried out a reduction of 300,000 personnel in the Army. <a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[6]</a> Since the 1970s, the PLA has reduced the size of its forces by 4 million and altered the ratio of its forces. It has reduced the Army while increasing the Navy and Air Force. The Army now accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total armed forces. <a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[7]</a> These reforms are primarily meant to spread the distribution of power that was concentrated in the Army through the erstwhile Military Regions. <a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[8]</a> PLASSF&#8217;s growth as a centre of power is also presumed to be one of the reasons that led to Xi disbanding it in 2024. During the announcement of the new Information Support Force creation, Xi’s statement read, ‘<em>ordered to resolutely obey the Party&#8217;s command, and make sure it stays absolutely loyal, pure and reliable’. <a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[9]</a></em></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Today, the primary go-to source for information is Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and videos on social media. LLMs curate data from the internet and produce results. Thus, if the data on the internet is incorrect, the results the LLMs generate are bound to be false as well. There is a renewed rigour in the debate on the creation of theatre commands in the country. As a result, there has been a surge in misleading articles and discussions. These invariably populate the database of LLMs and further reinforce false data.  Informed debates are essential for the healthy functioning of democracy. One of the most critical military reforms in India must be based on facts, not post-truths. The issue must be objectively debated beyond the military by civilians as well. This article aims to provide an authentic basis to the citizens for such discussions.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CAPSS_InFocus_APR_10_10_25.pdf"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF</strong></a></span></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a>  &#8220;Word of the Year 2016,&#8221; <em>Oxford Languages</em>, 2016,<a href="https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/">https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/</a>. Accessed on October 05, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Government of the United States of America, &#8220;The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993. Report No. ADA313508,&#8221; 1995, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA313508.pdf">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA313508.pdf</a><u>. </u>Accessed on October 5, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a>  Department of Defence, Government of the United States of America, “History of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,” <a href="https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/">https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/</a>.  Accessed on October 05, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> United States Department of War, &#8220;Combatant Commands,&#8221; <a href="https://www.war.gov/About/Combatant-Commands/">Combatant Commands | U.S. Department of War</a>. Accessed on October 5, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> Ministry of National Defence, The People&#8217;s Republic of China, &#8220;China&#8217;s Military Strategy,&#8221; 2015 <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html">http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html</a>. Accessed on October 5, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> &#8220;Full text: Xi&#8217;s speech at commemoration of 70th anniversary of war victory,&#8221; <em>China Daily, September 3, 2015,</em> &lt; <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015victoryanniv/2015-09/03/content_21783362.htm">https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015victoryanniv/2015-09/03/content_21783362.htm</a>&gt;. Accessed on October 5, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China, &#8220;Graphics: China&#8217;s military reform in past 5 years,&#8221;                               August 01, 2020, <a href="https://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/%20News_213114/TopStories/4869047.html">https://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/ News_213114/TopStories/4869047.html</a>. Accessed on October 07, 2025</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> Ashish Singh,<strong> &#8220;</strong>The Two Forms of Reform,&#8221; Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). October 6, 2018, <a href="https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/100-copy_The-Two-forms-of-Reform_06-10-2018.pdf">100-copy_The-Two-forms-of-Reform_06-10-2018.pdf</a>. Accessed on October 5, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a> &#8220;Xi presents flag to PLA&#8217;s information support force,&#8221; <em>Qiushi,</em> April 20, 2024, <a href="https://en.qstheory.cn/2024-04/20/c_981035.htm">https://en.qstheory.cn/2024-04/20/c_981035.htm</a>. Accessed on October 05, 2025.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/">08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[capsnetdroff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2025 16:22:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Armed Forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jointness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Defence Academy (NDA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OCTOBER 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Theaterisation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=16612</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wing Commander A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Theatre Commands, Force Reconfiguration, Warfighting, Joint War Fighting Introduction Operation Sindoor was the first significant armed conflict after the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in August [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/">Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: </strong></span><strong>Wing Commander A Pichipoo Raja</strong>, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Theatre Commands, Force Reconfiguration, Warfighting, Joint War Fighting</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Operation <em>Sindoor</em> was the first significant armed conflict after the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in August 2019. Since the establishment of CDS, there has been a consistent focus on jointness and shedding of single-service interests. Thus, over time, it has become almost sacrilegious to speak of individual service interests. Jointness is now the accepted convention. While the actions of the Indian Air Force (IAF) during Op <em>Sindoor</em> resulted in spectacular outcomes, many of which were caught on camera, there have been no attempts by the IAF to boast about their achievements. Likewise, considering the damage observed on the Indian border villages inflicted by Pakistan, it would be safe to assume that the Indian Army’s response would have been far more devastating on Pakistan. Similarly, no attempts were made to showcase them either. The tri-service press briefs have been well-coordinated and included the actions of the Navy, which were out of public sight. Another key aspect is the visible synergistic action of the Ministries of External Affairs (MEA) and Defence (MoD). In 2019, the initial press brief, following the Balakot strikes, was delivered by the Foreign Secretary with no MoD representation. Whereas in Op <em>Sindoor</em>, both MEA and MoD representatives participated in all press briefings. Thus, this operation could be studied in future as a textbook case of synergy in national security.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The concept of ‘theaterisation’ has been popularised as a solution to a perceived lack of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces. Various authors have proposed several models. However, in the absence of theatre commands, what explains the synergy during Op <em>Sindoor</em>? I attempt an explanation.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The results for this synergy can be traced back to 1944, when the original seeds of jointness were planted in India. The Government of Sudan, recognising the valour and sacrifice of Indians in the Second World War in the defence of Sudan, gifted an amount of £ 1,00,000 for the construction of an Indian national war memorial. The Indian National War Memorial Committee of Council was constituted.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16616" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16616" style="width: 807px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16616" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1.jpg" alt="" width="807" height="485" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1.jpg 807w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-300x180.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-600x361.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-768x462.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-150x90.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-1-696x418.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 807px) 100vw, 807px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16616" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Extract of Proposals of the Indian National War Memorial Committee of Council, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This committee, after a thorough debate, recommended the construction of a tri-services military academy as the most suitable form of a war memorial.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Following this decision, another subcommittee was formed to study and make recommendations for the Indian Military Academy. The Subcommittee thus recommended the creation of what is now known as the National Defence Academy (NDA) with the iconic Sudan Block as its central structure.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16617" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16617" style="width: 1461px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16617" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2.jpg" alt="" width="1461" height="623" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2.jpg 1461w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-300x128.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-600x256.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1024x437.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-768x327.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-150x64.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-696x297.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-2-1068x455.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1461px) 100vw, 1461px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16617" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Extract of Recommendations of the Sub-Committee, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Subcommittee included Vice-Chancellors from universities, the principal of a school, and members of all three services, including then-Wing Commander Subroto Mukerjee, who later became the Air Chief. They toured eleven military academies across the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Canada, studying in detail the training, syllabus, moral code of conduct, general orientation, and other aspects</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16618" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16618" style="width: 748px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16618" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3.jpg" alt="" width="748" height="624" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3.jpg 748w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3-300x250.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3-600x501.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3-150x125.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-3-696x581.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 748px) 100vw, 748px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16618" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Composition of the Sub-Committee and Objectives, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Indian Armed Forces officers, fresh from the experience of the Second World War, understood the significance of integration. None of the countries across the world then had a joint military academy. Thus, their proposal for a joint academy was novel.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16619" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16619" style="width: 1126px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16619" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4.jpg" alt="" width="1126" height="336" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4.jpg 1126w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-300x90.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-600x179.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-1024x306.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-768x229.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-150x45.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-696x208.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-4-1068x319.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1126px) 100vw, 1126px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16619" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Extract of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Military Academy, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">In terms of integration, considerable thought and discussion went into the design of the training. To date, NDA follows this model of common training for all three services in the first two years, followed by the introduction of service-specific training in the third year.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16620" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16620" style="width: 938px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16620" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5.jpg" alt="" width="938" height="508" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5.jpg 938w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5-300x162.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5-600x325.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5-768x416.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5-150x81.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/PIC-5-696x377.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 938px) 100vw, 938px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16620" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Extract of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Military Academy, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The training was also designed to foster a deeper appreciation of each other’s perspectives. All cadets were supposed to have sufficient exposure to aviation to make them ‘air-minded’. <strong>A lack of air-mindedness is often cited as the key cause by proponents of air power when issues of jointness are argued</strong>. Unfortunately, paragraph 148(d) is no longer part of the NDA training.  It is perhaps worth revisiting this recommendation from 1945. The formation of the National Defence Academy (NDA) laid the groundwork for jointness among the Indian Armed Forces (the first seed of jointness).</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16621" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16621" style="width: 1722px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16621" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6.jpg" alt="" width="1722" height="574" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6.jpg 1722w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-300x100.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-600x200.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-1024x341.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-768x256.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-1536x512.jpg 1536w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-150x50.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-696x232.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-6-1068x356.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1722px) 100vw, 1722px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16621" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Aspect of Air-Mindedness Amongst all as an Essential Training Requirement, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Admission into NDA was to be purely based on merit and devoid of any form of reservation, including that for the wards of ex-servicemen.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16622" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16622" style="width: 1028px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16622" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7.jpg" alt="" width="1028" height="268" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7.jpg 1028w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-300x78.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-600x156.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-1024x267.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-768x200.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-150x39.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-7-696x181.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1028px) 100vw, 1028px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16622" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Recommendations on Selection and Admission, Source: The National Archives of India</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This gave rise to a new problem: <strong><em>How could independent India generate a pool of suitable candidates to meet the annual requirement of an intake of 700 officer cadets from across the country’s diverse locations and varying income statuses when the educational setup in India was inferior?</em></strong> This led to the creation of Feeder institutes. Thus, the second seed for jointness — the feeder institutes was planted. These institutes offer joint military training right from class six onwards. The students go on to occupy leadership positions across various fields beyond the military as well.</h4>
<figure id="attachment_16623" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16623" style="width: 1836px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16623" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8.jpg" alt="" width="1836" height="634" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8.jpg 1836w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-300x104.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-600x207.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-1024x354.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-768x265.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-1536x530.jpg 1536w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-150x52.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-696x240.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Pic-8-1068x369.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1836px) 100vw, 1836px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16623" class="wp-caption-text">Image: Extract of Press Information Bureau Release, MoD, January 27, 1947, Source: Press Information Bureau Archives<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a><br /><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1"></a></figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Returning to the key question of this article, what explains the synergy during Op <em>Sindoor</em>? The answer lies in the bonhomie between the service chiefs. Army and Navy chiefs are classmates from Sainik School Rewa, and the Air Chief and the Army Chief are course mates from NDA.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[2]</a> These are lifelong relationships with the equivalent of a family-level bond characterised by depth and strength. People go to great lengths for each other. Both feeder institutes (schools) and NDA are Indian investments in jointness, even before independence and were pathbreaking in the world at the time of their inception. To put it differently, <strong>India has been a pioneer of jointness in the world</strong>. Therefore, if any shortcomings in jointness are perceived, it would be prudent to examine the training, staffing and culture at NDA and similar institutes as the source. Deviations from the core founding principles of any institution are possible as it evolves over time.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Finally, Colin Gray wrote, “<em>Joint, which is to say multi-service, doctrine should express a judicious melding of beliefs among culturally distinct institutions, but often it comprises more of a brute force stapling together of unlike elements than a coherent whole. So-called joint military plans and performance similarly can have the character of a shotgun marriage than of anything resembling harmony.”<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[3]</a></em> Neglecting one&#8217;s own history and pursuing solutions from foreign models can lead to a stapled model of jointness or a ‘shotgun marriage’. It is worthwhile to revisit the history of jointness in India, in depth, to avoid such a situation.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CAPSS_InFocus_APR_3_10_25-1.pdf"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF</strong></a></span></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> Press Information Bureau, Government of India, &#8220;Feeder Schools for the National War Academy,&#8221; January 27, 1947, <a href="https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/ArchiveSecondPhase/DEFENCE/1947-JULY-DEC-MIN-OF-DEFENCE/PDF/DEF-1947-01-27_030.pdf">https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/ArchiveSecondPhase/DEFENCE/1947-JULY-DEC-MIN-OF-DEFENCE/PDF/DEF-1947-01-27_030.pdf</a> . Accessed on September 24, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[2]</a> &#8220;Two Coursemates, Two Classmates, Will Now Head Three Armed Force Services,&#8221; <em>The Economic Times</em>, September 21, 2024,<a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/two-%20coursemates-two-classmates-will-now-head-three-armed-force-services/articleshow/113552033.cms.%20Accessed%20on%20September%2024">https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/two-coursemates-two-classmates-will-now-head-three-armed-force-services/articleshow/113552033.cms. Accessed on September 24</a>, 2025.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[3]</a> Colin S. Gray, <em>The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice</em>(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 77.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/">Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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