Keywords:Space Station, ISS, US-Russia cooperation, Seat Share, Space Agency, Roscosmos, NASA

Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, and NASA, the American space agency, announced on July 15, 2022, that they had reached a ride-share agreement for the exchange of seats on their spacecraft for astronauts. This would give Russian astronauts seats on SpaceX rockets in exchange for American astronauts getting rides to orbit on Russian Soyuz rockets.[i] So the next rocket to the International Space Station (ISS) launching from Russian soil could have an American astronaut on board and vice versa. The agreement was under deliberation for some time and was finalised despite the ongoing stand-off in Ukraine, a sign of continuing Russia-US cooperation in space.

            This could easily go down as the greatest paradox in the history of international relations, when relations between the two countries are at their lowest point, with western sanctions affecting the Russian space and technology sectors.[ii] The compulsion and necessity of keeping the ISS afloat have brought the two great space powers closer, at least in the space domain. Notwithstanding the competition in the military domain and historical rivalry, space agencies of the two nations – NASA and Roscosmos – were compelled to barter seat occupancy for the rides to the ISS.

            The rocket seat share phenomenon is, however, not a recent measure. The two space agencies had previously shared crew occupancy on the American Space Shuttle and the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. After the shuttle was phased out in 2011, the US had no spacecraft capable of transporting astronauts to the ISS. They utilised Russia’s Soyuz rocket for sending American astronauts to the space station until 2020, when the American company, SpaceX, operationalised the Crew Dragon capsule, which revived NASA’s human spaceflight capability.[iii]

            The history of space diplomacy dates back to 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the US entered into a series of agreements with Russia for expanding cooperation in outer space activities. For the US, space cooperation with Russia was driven by a number of considerations. The most prominent of these was the advantage to be gained from Russian space expertise and capabilities, which would augment the US space programme and help in reducing the cost of achieving US objectives in space, particularly with respect to the space station program. There was also a broader set of foreign policy, economic, political, and security factors supporting US initiatives, especially the invitation to join the International Space Station program.[iv] In 1993, the United States and Russia reached a landmark deal to merge their separate space station modules into a single facility, calling it the International Space Station. An MoU was signed between the space agencies of the two countries on January 29, 1998. The first two modules, the Zarya Control Module (Russia) and Unity Connecting Node (USA), were docked together in 1998. More modules were added in later years to form the ISS as it exists today. The ISS has been continuously occupied by Russian and American astronauts since then. They have routinely trained together, launched into space together, and returned to Earth together on the same spacecraft. The crew capacity of the ISS was increased to six astronauts in May 2009, when the ISS was declared fully operational. Partners from other countries were also included in the crew composition. The ISS is now at the far end of its service life and is likely to be abandoned in 2024 unless it gets approval for a life extension.[v] Reports indicate that the Russian space agency has already decided to exit the space station programme after 2024, while NASA intends to keep the ISS alive till the end of 2030.[vi]

            Joint space research onboard ISS is the purpose of the US and Russia’s coming together in space, although ferry trips to and fro from the space station have always been a bottleneck owing to the limited carriage capacities, training complexities, language barrier, and cost factor. Crew rotation on the ISS is a critical activity for various reasons, like human factors, which cannot wait for a rocket and spacecraft to be available. Hence, the seat share agreement comes at a critical juncture where the war in Ukraine has restricted Russian space activity.[vii]

         Presently, an international collaboration of space agencies provides and operates the multiple components of the ISS. The partners in this collaborative effort are the space agencies of the United States, Russia, Japan, Canada and Europe. All of them have contributed to the hardware and modules which comprise the ISS.[viii] The US and Russia have a major stake in the ownership of the ISS. While some modules have been launched into space and docked together in orbit, many other modules and equipment have been assembled in space. These modules are laboratories, living compartments, cargo capsules, power generation units, and control modules. Each partner has the primary responsibility to manage and run the module or hardware they provide. Having combined crews ensures there are appropriately trained crew members for each task on board the ISS for routine maintenance work, scientific experiments, essential tasks related to the station’s position keeping and safety in orbit as well as spacewalks. Therefore, having at least one American and one Russian astronaut on board the ISS is crucial to keeping the space station operational.[ix]

            Space cooperation is seen as one of the last links between the US and Russia as tensions flare over Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. The agreement is beneficial for both the US and Russia and will promote the development of space science and technology and space exploration within the framework of the ISS programme. The ISS has been the most politically complex space exploration programme ever undertaken. It has also emboldened the necessity of partnerships for the survival of space programmes. One could only hope that such harmony would be seen in other areas as well and serve as a precedent for global peace and unity.

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NOTES:

[i] “US, Russian astronauts will swap seats on rockets again”, Times of India, July 15,2022, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/92906601.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, accessed on July 24, 2022.

[ii] Jeremy Grunert, “Sanctions And Satellites: The Space Industry After The Russo-Ukrainian War”,

June 10, 2022, at https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/sanctions-and-satellites-the-space-industry-after-the-russo-ukrainian-war/, accessed on July 25, 2022.

[iii] Reuters, “NASA, Russian Space Agency Sign Deal to Share Space Station Flights – Roscosmos”, at https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-07-15/nasa-russian-space-agency-sign-deal-to-share-space-station-flights-roscosmos, accessed on July 24, 2022.

[iv] John Logsdon, James Millar , ‘U.S. -Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight Assessing the Impacts’, a report by ‘the Space Policy Institute’, February 2001, at https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/partners_us_russian_cooperation_in_human_spaceflight.pdf, accessed on July 24, 2022.

[v] Britannica, ‘International Space Station’, at https://www.britannica.com/topic/International-Space-Station, accessed on July 24, 2022.

[vi]  Uliana Pavlova and Kristin Fisher “Russia says it will quit the International Space Station after 2024”, CNN, July 27, 2022, at https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/26/world/russia-quit-iss-scn/index.html, accessed on July 27, 2022.

[vii] Jeremy Grunert, n-2.

[viii] NASA official website, ‘International Space Station, at https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html, accessed on July 24, 2022.

[ix] Reuters, n-3.

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Keywords:Shinzo Abe, Rare Earth, Foreign Policy, Japan

The legacy of former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe has been more than the world acknowledges. Besides his famous ‘Abenomics’ and ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy’ (FOIP), Abe has also directed Japan’s critical minerals and rare earth industries since he joined the office in 2012.

Prior to the Senkaku-Island dispute in 2012, Japan was heavily dependent on the Chinese rare earth supply. However, the export embargoes by China in response to the detention of a Chinese fishing trawler captain affected Japan’s auto industry, which is its major sector dependent upon rare earth for manufacturing. Japan had high-REE import reliance on China, reported more than 82 per cent till mid-2012, for the production of defence equipment, electronic warfare capabilities, and other high-tech industry.

When Abe came to office in 2012, he had a goal to foster the economic development of Japan, which was facing a recession due to Chinese export embargos. He implemented multiple policies and strategies, majorly framed as ‘Abenomics’, focusing on monetary, fiscal policy, and structural reforms. Although the major feature of Abenomics remained to promote inbound FDI, Japan also began outward FDI to enhance and secure its rare earth sources. It should be noted that Japan doesn’t have any rare earth reserve capacity, unlike other major players like the US or Australia, thus the solution was either to diversify sources or find alternatives.[i] Under Abe’s administration, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) began investing in partnerships in rare earth reserve countries to diversify its import sources. Under METI and Japan’s rare earth procurement strategy, Japan Oil, Gas, and Metal National Corporation (JOGMEC) took the major responsibility, although it was established in 2004, after China’s embargo to focus on the rare earth industry.

The major rare earth projects or investments under Japan’s umbrella began in countries like Australia, the USA, Canada, India, Jamaica, and Kazakhstan. The most important investment partnership started in 2012 with Lynas Corporation of Australia in which Japan provided a US$ 325 million loan. As per the agreement, Lynas was expected to supply approx. 8,500 tons of rare earth metals annually for the next ten years (2012-2022). In the case of India, Toyotsu Rare Earths India private limited (TREI) was established under the investment of Toyota Tshsho Corporation to boost rare earth production in India. In addition, a rare earth deal was inked between Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) and Japan, as part of which Japan was supposed to transfer technology to India, and IREL’s Odisha sand complex will export 2,500 tons of processed rare earth to the Toyota plant in Vizag, India. Toyota also developed a venture with Lavreco Rare Earth Company of Vietnam. Japan’s ITOCHU Corporation began investing in Burma (now Myanmar), which has now developed as an important interest and source of rare earth minerals for China in the past five years. JOGMEC also established a joint investment venture with Canada in the Lofdal rare earth mining project in Namibia to secure the supply of heavy rare earth metals. The two major companies in Japan-Mitsubishi Chemical and Kawasaki heavy-industries play an important role in the outbound FDI of Japan. Moreover, Mitsubishi is working on a clean-up project worth US$ 100 million at the Bukit Merah rare earth processing site in Malaysia, which can enhance Japan’s presence in the Malaysian industry.[ii]

Besides investment, Japan has also begun to follow the strategy of investing in research and development and has developed recycling technologies. For instance, Hitachi began separating rare earth metals from air conditioner compressors and using them to manufacture batteries for Toyota’s hybrid Prius. In 2013, the first full-scale rare earth recycling operation was launched in Japan under an industry-government-academic collaboration led by Fukuoka Prefecture, a small town in Japan. This recycling operation extracts rare earth metals from fluorescent light tubes to reuse them for the production of new tubes. Other companies, like Nissan Motors Co. Ltd., began working on designs to reduce the use of heavy rare earth elements in motor magnets and began using simpler and cheaper manual disassembly methods to remove the rare earth metals and recycle them.[iii]

The rare earth industry of Japan flourished to a great extent under the ruling years of Shinzo Abe and became the fifth largest exporter (as per 2020 data) of rare earth metals without even having any rare earth reserves.[iv] Abe’s historic address titled ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ guided the introduction of the Quad concept in the Indo-Pacific in 2007, whose 2.0 version since 2017 has turned into a major base of rare earth cooperation and collaboration among Quad members- Australia, Japan, India, and the US. The demise of Shinzo Abe is unfortunate for not only Japan but the whole Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese rare earth industry will remain grateful to his contributions and innovative ideas and will flourish even more as the trends reflects.

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Notes:-

[i] Marc Schmid, “Mitigating supply risks through involvement in rare earth projects: Japan’s strategies and what the US can learn”, Resources Policy, Vol. 63 (C), 2019. https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:63:y:2019:i:c:33. Accessed on 18 July 2022.

[ii] Michael Mazza, Dan Blumenthal, and Gary J. Schmitt, “Ensuring Japan’s Critical Resource Security: Case Studies in Rare Earth Element and Natural Gas Supplies”, American Enterprise Institute, July 2013. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Ensuring+Japan%27s+critical+resource+security%3A+case+studies+in+rare…-a0345461096. Accessed on 19 July 2022.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Rare Earth Metals, Scandium and Yttrium, in Japan”, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/rare-earth-metals-scandium-and-yttrium/reporter/jpn?redirect=true. Accessed on 19 July 2022.

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Keywords: I2U2 Summit, West Asian Quad, UAE-Israel relations, Indo-US partnership.

India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States of America (US), four unique pillars of world powers, have recently concluded the inaugural summit of a new grouping, the I2U2. The new forum is named by taking the initials of the respective countries in alphabetical order. The grouping might not have the most vibrant take on naming itself. However, its motivation and goals do stand by the urgency of the present world order.

On July 14, 2022, the heads of the governments of the four countries joined each other virtually to announce this new grouping. The grouping was first hinted at by a senior US official who mentioned that the heads of these four states would be connecting with each other during the official visit of US President Joe Biden to Israel.[i] According to the official joint statement on this summit, this new grouping is formed with the aim of focusing on “joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security.”[ii] The four associated countries are individually very capable and aware of the issues being focused on through I2U2. Thus, the coming together of these four pillars may lay the groundwork for the rest of the like-minded countries to follow suit.

The inaugural summit saw discussion and agreements on the issues of food security and clean energy. It was decided that the UAE would “invest 2 billion USD to develop a series of integrated food parks across India that will incorporate state-of-the-art climate-smart technologies to reduce food waste and spoilage, conserve fresh water, and employ renewable energy sources.”[iii] India would be providing adequate land and labour to implement the same. The US and Israel would contribute by lending their advanced technical know-how and helping improve the overall effectiveness of the initiative. The target for this would be to increase crop yields and help address food insecurities in South Asia and West Asia.[iv]

India would also be the location for the setting up of a “hybrid renewable energy project… consisting of 300 megawatts (MW) of wind and solar capacity complemented by a battery energy storage system.” The state of Gujarat has been selected for the feasibility study headed by the US Trade and Development Agency. This project will prove to be crucial for India to achieve its goal of “500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030.”[v]

Future Summits

The future summits would look into the aspects of water, transportation, space, and health. All the member countries stand to gain immensely in these sectors too. India has a distinct dominance in the health sector and thus can provide crucial leadership in its development. In the space sector, the US has been a historical innovator while the Indian space sector has shown tremendous growth. The UAE and Israel have collaborative links with both NASA and ISRO, and with their technological strides, this sector will hope to see the biggest gains. Both the water and transportation sectors also play a crucial role in contemporary geopolitics. Therefore, it can be hoped that the I2U2 Summits in the future will blaze the right paths for wholesome growth for the global society to trade.

The dilemma of US involvement

Since the Cold War era, the US has had a track record of creating regional groupings with its own motives in sight. Some of such organisations have either failed to meet their desired goal or disintegrated without any real impact. With this in mind, one must be cautious if the US is pursuing its own interests masquerading as a progressive association or might be actually interested in solving such wide-ranging issues. It must be noted that the I2U2 has already been claimed as the ‘West Asian Quad’ by the Ambassador of the UAE to India, Mr. Ahmed Albanna.[vi] Such statements not only dilute the intention of the organisation but also project a cryptic purpose. Considering the outline of the I2U2 Summit, one should stay away from such commentary.

Potential of Israel and UAE

Israel and the UAE are major powers in West Asia. While Israel is a world leader in technology and innovation, the UAE has begun investing in issues concerning environmental and sustainable sectors. Thus, the I2U2 platform provides a fertile ground for both of them to come together and contribute. It is also significant that both these countries have come together in an international grouping after the conclusion of the 2020 Abraham Accord. In terms of tangible benefits for these nations from the summit, India could be a crucial partner for them in the sectors of health, food security, and space. Thus, it would be worthwhile to see the coming together of these erstwhile adversaries and set an example for the world to see.

Conclusion

The I2U2 agenda aims to address issues that cut across all of the various tensions that exist in the world. In such a situation, it would be unfruitful and dishonest for it to pursue any unwarranted and ulterior motive. These four countries are leaders in their own right and have the capacity to make a lasting impact on issues like food security, health, and water. The pursuance of these goals with the right devotion is crucial. I2U2 provides a pristine scope for major leaders to come together and solve global issues; consequently, it becomes crucial for it to succeed and show a divided world the impact of collaboration.

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Notes:-

[i] Rishika Singh, “Explained: What is I2U2 that is holding its first-ever leader’s summit today?”, Indian Express, July 14, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/everyday-explainers/what-is-i2u2-holding-first-ever-leaders-summit-8027574/. Accessed on July 19, 2022.

[ii] “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 14, 2022, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35492/Joint+Statement+of+the+Leaders+of+India+Israel+United+Arab+Emirates+and+the+United+States+I2U2. Accessed on July 19, 2022.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Singh, n. 1.

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Keywords: INSTC, Russia, India, Iran, Chabahar Port, Central Asian Republics, Connectivity.

“Diplomacy is all about managing contradictions artfully, or to put it less elegantly, sitting on both sides of the fence and looking comfortable”.[i] The art of diplomacy has been skilfully wielded by Indian foreign policy-makers in the context of the volatility of emerging global alliances in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. By focusing solely on its national interests and standing by its traditional partners, India is treading its diplomatic path in the best possible way; balancing its immediate and long-term interests. Therefore, India’s initiatives to unite the interests of regional stakeholders through connectivity, transit and road networks in order to protect and promote its interests, should be seen in this light. The pilot test of transporting the first Russian consignment to India via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is one such important development that marks the operationalization of this long-awaited transport corridor.

        On June 11, 2022, a test cargo departed from Russia’s Caspian Sea port zone of Solyanka in Astrakhan, and from there, it was shipped to the Iranian port of Anzali and then taken to Bandar Abbas Port by road, and from there it was shipped to Nhava Sheva in Navi Mumbai (also known as Jawaharlal Nehru Port), India’s largest container port.[ii] Reportedly, the consignment included two 40-feet containers of wood laminates weighing approximately 41 tonnes. The whole journey took 24 days to reach India, which is much less than the traditional route via the Suez Canal.[iii] The shipment was executed by the Regional Bureau of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) in coordination with its logistics companies in India and Russia.[iv]

        The activation of this multi-modal route, which links the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran and onwards to northern Europe via St. Petersburg in Russia, was long overdue. The 22 -years old project was  initiated by India, Iran, and Russia in September 2000, in order to establish a transport network among the member states and boost connectivity with the Central Asian Republics. Later, it was joined by another eleven countries- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Oman, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine.[v] It envisages the movement of goods from Mumbai (India) to Bandar Abbas (Iran) by sea, from Bandar Abbas to Bandar-e Anzali[vi]  by road, from Bandar-e- Anzali to Astrakhan, which is a Caspian Port in the Russian Federation, by ship, and  from Astrakhan to other parts of the Russian Federation and further into Europe by Russian railways.

       Initially, the progress on the project was very slow. However, after 2014, it picked up a little pace when, for understanding the problem areas and realize the full potential of the corridor, a dry run was conducted by the Federation of Freight Forwarder’s Association in India (FFFAI), on the Nhava Sheva-Bandar Abbas (Iran)- Baku (Azerbaijan) and the Nhava Sheva – Bandar Abbas – Amirabad (Iran) – Astrakhan (Russia) route via the Caspian Sea was conducted in 2014. The dry run report pointed out that, “the proposed INSTC route via Bandar Abbas in Iran to Russia and CIS[vii] destinations could be the best route with optimal transit/ cost for the Indian exporters/ importers[viii]. Further, in 2015, officials from India, Iran, Russia, and other eleven countries met in New Delhi and approved draft transit and customs agreements for INSTC. This provided the legal framework for addressing the logistical issues and moving freight on the ship-rail-road route linking India, Iran, Russia, the CARs and Europe.[ix] In 2020, the state-owned Container Corporation of India (Concor) and Russian Railways Logistics Joint Stock Company (RZD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to transport cargo between the two countries via INSTC.[x] In June 2021, the western corridor of INSTC was operationalized to connect India with Europe. A Finnish logistics company dispatched a consignment of 30 containers to Mumbai using this corridor.[xi]

       Against this background, the successful completion of the pilot test is a significant development, especially at a time when both, Russia and Iran are under US sanctions. The corridor will give India a direct reach to Russian, Central Asian, and European markets in a shorter time than the traditional route, on the one hand, and will help Russia and Iran to overcome their sanctions-related challenges in doing business with their traditional trade partners, on the other hand.[xii] In fact, the decision to actively pursue the dedicated routes between India and Russia was taken during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in December 2021. During the visit, the joint statement affirmed that (i) India would source more crude oil from Russia through preferential pricing (ii) both countries would explore the ‘northern sea-route’ (the Arctic Sea route) to ship crude oil and LNG supplies from Russia to India; and (iii) the effective usage of the INSTC route to increase the trade between the two countries. The Russian side also offered its support for India’s proposal to include Chabahar Port within INSTC’s framework.[xiii] Six months later, the news of the successful dispatch of the first (trial) shipment through this route was a promising news, which was announced by the director of the joint-owned Iranian-Russian Port in Astrakhan, Dariush Jamali. He affirmed that “It is a first time a cargo travels between Russia and India through Iran and the INSTC with a single through bill lading (TBL) document which allows the transportation of goods both within domestic borders and through international shipment”.[xiv] Similarly, the pilot test followed Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian’s three- days visit to India from June 8-10, 2022. During his visit, a discussion over INSTC and Chabahar Port was one of the main agendas. Interestingly, on 8th June, 2022, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin and of Islamic Republic of Iran, Sayyid Abrahim Raisi had a telephonic conversation where they discussed their mutual commitment to actively work to develop and increase economic and trade cooperation.[xv]

      Boosting connectivity through INSTC has assumed significance for India, Iran, and Russia because it provides a sanction-free route which is not dominated by Western countries. Therefore, by giving this route the required boost, they can reap the benefits of the resultant trade. Acknowledging its importance, Russian President Putin expressed his intention to pay more attention to this corridor as it could help make the Caspian basin the hub of energy and logistics.[xvi] In this endeavour, Russia and Iran are cooperating in the maritime sector to use the Caspian Sea and shorten the transit route from Russia to India. IRISL has already assigned 300 containers to execute the first phase of a programme to transit Russian goods to India via INSTC using the Caspian Sea, and the number of containers would be increased if demand increases.[xvii] At the same time, the official launch of the eastern section of the corridor, which is essentially a railway link between Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, has further added a new zeal to strengthen the trade relations between Russia, Iran, and India. The first rail transit cargo, carrying 39 containers, from Russia to India, entered Iran through the Sarakhs border crossing, on July 12, 2022. From here, it will be taken to Bandar Abbas port and then shipped to India by sea.

         INSTC is critical for India on many accounts. It will not only help in strengthening the economic content of the relationship with Russia and Iran, but the corridor also provides India with feasible surface connectivity with the Central Asian region specifically and the wider Eurasian region in general. Hence, it would help boost India’s trade with the Central Asian Republics, which are known for their natural resource richness, especially hydrocarbons and minerals. Without direct transport access, it is difficult for India to acquire this natural wealth, and this is also one of the main reasons why India’s presence in the Central Asian energy sector has remained minimal and its trade with these republics nominal. It is just around US$ 2 billion and has not grown much.[xviii] Moreover, India has proposed to include Chabahar Port in the INSTC to maximise its potential. India’s Minister of External Affairs, Dr. S. Jaishankar suggested that the land route via Kabul (Afghanistan) and Tashkent (Uzbekistan) could form  INSTC’s “Eastern Corridor”[xix] and “establishing an eastern corridor through Afghanistan would maximise its potential”, and it would provide the land-locked Central Asian countries with unhindered access to the sea through Chabahar Port.[xx] In fact, some Central Asian countries have shown interest in being a part of  this project, specifically the Republic of Uzbekistan. The signing of an India-Iran and Uzbekistan trilateral agreement for the use of Chabahar Port gave a new impetus to India’s connectivity with Central Asia. Uzbekistan has already developed its railway connectivity with Afghanistan as a means to link up with Iranian railway lines. This, clearly, reflects its seriousness about using the port facilities in the Indian Ocean and expanding its trade and transit options.

       Thus, INSTC provides India with the opportunity to connect with the Chabahar Port, Anzali Port (of Iran) on the Caspian Sea’s southern coast and Astrakhan and Solyanka Ports (of the Russian Federation) on the northern part of the Caspian Sea, thus substantially cutting the time and cost of transportation of goods.

        India has been pursuing the goal of these connectivity projects for a long time. Therefore, the operationalization of the INSTC route should be considered as a great deal so far as its national interests are concerned. Amidst the Russia-Ukraine war, India’s decision not to cut down on its energy and trade relations with Russia, its refusal to snap ties with its time-tested friend, and going ahead with the operationalization of INSTC are purely guided by its national interest. One must remember that for decades, defence cooperation has remained one of the major pillars of the India- Russia partnership. To take this partnership to the next level, the economic content of the partnership needs due consideration. The rise of multimodal transportation through INSTC is a step in this direction.

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Notes:-

[i] “Future Power”, The Hindu Business Line, June 12, 2017, updated on January 12, 2018, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/future-power/article9725507.ece, Accessed on June 14, 2022

[ii] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “INSTC operationalized as Russia sends consignments for Indian port”, The Economic Times, June 14, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/instc-operationalised-as-russia-sends-consignments-for-indian-port/articleshow/92189350.cms, Accessed on June 15, 2022

[iii] Ibid

[iv] “INSTC Begins Operations”, Maritime Gateway, June13, 2022, https://www.maritimegateway.com/instc-begins-operations/, Accessed on June 15, 2022

[v] “International North-south transport Corridor” (INSTC), www.instc.org.ir/pages/home_ pages.aspx. Accessed on October 20, 2016.

[vi] Bandar-e Anzali is an Iranian port on the Caspian Sea

[vii] CIS stands for Commonwealth of Independent States.

[viii] “International North-south transport Corridor (INSTC)-dry run report 2014”,commerce.nic. in/publications/iNstC-dry-run-report-Final.pdf, accessed on October 20, 2016.

[ix] “International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) Conference-India 2015”, http://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadfile/MOC_635986655921421162_INSTC_Conference_Report_Final.pdf, accessed on November 26, 2018. Also see, Dipanjan Roy Choudhary, “INSTC Draft Approval: Big Step Forward on India-Iran-Russia Corridor”, The Economic Times, www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nations/instc-draft-approval- big-step-forward-on-india-iran-russia-corridor/articles/ow/48766349.cms, Accessed on October 20, 2016.

[x] “India and Iran To Connect Supply Chains Via Iran’s INSTC”, Silk Road Briefing, March 24, 2020, https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/03/24/india-russia-connect-supply-chains-via-irans-instc/, Accessed on June 15, 2022

[xi] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “INSTC connects Europe with India for the first time”, The Economic Times, June 24, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/instc-connects-europe-with-india-for-first-time/articleshow/83798511.cms?from=mdr, Accessed on June 15, 2022

[xii] Angelo Mathias, “Russia uses INSTC corridor to beat sanctions and drive trade with Iran and India”, The Loadstar, June 16, 2022, https://theloadstar.com/Russia-uses-instc-corridor-to-beat-sanctions-and-drive-trade-with-iran-aand-india/, Accessed on June 17, 2022

[xiii] “India-Russia Joint Statement following the visit of the President of the Russian federation”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 06 December, 2021, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl, India_Russia_Joint_Statement_following_the_visit_of_the_Presiedent_of_the_Russian_Federation, Accessed on June 17, 2022

[xiv] “Iran starts pilot transit between Russia and India through INSTC”, Press TV, June 13, 2022, http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/06/13/683861/Iran-transit-INSTC-Russia-India, Accessed on June 18, 2022

[xv] “Presidents of Iran, Russia talk over phone”, June 08, 2022, https://president.ir/en/136988, Accessed on June15, 2022

[xvi] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhry, “Russian firms launch chartered ships to India”, The Economic Times, July 10, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/russian-firms-launch-chartered-ships-to-india/articleshow/92775056.cms, Accessed on July14, 2022

[xvii] “IRISL assigns 300 containers to transport goods to Russia”, Tehran Times, July 11, 2022, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/474552/IRISL-assigns-300-containers-to-transport-goods-to-Russia, Accessed on July 14, 2022

[xviii] P. Stobdan, “India’s Economic Opportunities in Central Asia”, IDSA Policy Brief, http://idsa.in/system/files/policybrief/pb_india_economic_opportunities-in-central-asia-pstobdon.pdf, Accessed on October 22, 2018

[xix] The Eastern corridor of INSTC connects India to Russia through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

[xx] Suhasini Haidar, “India pushes for Chabahar in India-Iran-Russia INSTC corridor”, The Hindu, March 04, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pushes-for-chabahar-in-india-iran-russia-instc-corridor/article33988009.ece, Accessed on January 10, 2022

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Keywords: Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Caspian Sea, INSTC. 

The 6^th Caspian Summit was held in Ashgabat on June 29, 2022, and it engaged all littoral states of the Caspian Sea – Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, also referred to as the Caspian Five. In the final communiqué, the Caspian Five reiterated their commitments to ensure lasting peace, security, and stability in the region, and assured joint efforts to implement confidence-building measures in the region.[i] In the past, the summit has served as a common platform for all littoral countries to come together and focus on solving issues specific to the Caspian region. For instance, the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, trans-Caspian pipelines, and opposition to foreign military presence in Caspian waters have been major issues at Caspian summits since 2002.[ii]

It is important to note that at the 6^th Caspian Summit, the Caspian Five focused on the region’s prospect of becoming a transit hub for the East-West and North-South corridors. Earlier, all five states signed a cooperation agreement in the field of transportation at the 5^th Caspian Summit in 2018. At the 6^th Caspian Summit, Russian President Putin emphasized the need to improve the region’s transport and logistic architecture and specifically pointed to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects St. Petersburg (Russia) to ports in Iran and, finally, India.[iii] It is no surprise that, as a result of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Moscow is searching for an alternative route to access markets in Asia. Moscow has the following reasons to support the Caspian region’s infrastructure: access energy deficit markets of South Asia and South-East Asia; prevent Europe from gaining access to Caspian energy sources; and undermine western countries in their efforts to isolate Moscow. For instance, Russia’s interest in participating in the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline was expressed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.[iv] It is, therefore, safe to anticipate that in the upcoming years, Moscow will deepen its presence deeply in the Caspian region.

Since April 2022, India’s import of Russian crude oil has increased. Before Russia’s ‘special military operation,’ Moscow constituted 0.2 per cent of all crude oil imports. New Delhi took advantage of discounted rates to increase oil imports from Moscow, and currently, the latter makes up for 10 per cent of all crude oil imports, allowing it to become a top ten supplier.[v] Amidst these developments, Russia’s support for NSTC and TAPI project at the 6^th Caspian Summit is a clear indication of strengthening regional cooperation amongst the Caspian Five. As talks on the TAPI project are in progress and its future is uncertain,[vi] the INSTC project holds a promising future for cooperation with Caspian countries for India. Earlier, in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Modi, underlining INSTC, said, “As we look forward, we would lend our support to improving transportation and communication networks in the region. We can create a vast network of physical and digital connectivity that extends from Eurasia’s northern corner to Asia’s southern shores. The International North-South Transportation Corridor is a step in that direction.”[vii]

On June 11, 2022, Russia sent consignments to India from St. Petersburg which will reach India through the Caspian port of Astrakhan and the Iranian port of Anzali, and from there to Bandar Abbas and subsequently to ports in Western India.[viii] To introduce it briefly, the INSTC project was initiated by India, Iran and Russia in 2000 to establish transportation networks and enhance connectivity with Central Asian countries. It is a multimodal network of rail, road, and ship routes for transportation that reduces the cost of carriage between India and Russia by approximately 30 per cent. The corridor will boost trade connectivity between major cities of the member states. It envisages the movement of goods from India (Mumbai) to Iran (Bandar Abbas) by sea, from Bandar Abbas to Bandar-e-Anzali (port on the Caspian Sea) by land, and then from Bandar-e-Anzali to Astrakhan (Russian port in the Caspian Sea) by ship, and thereafter to St. Petersburg (Russia).[ix] According to the Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India (FFFAI), the route is “30 per cent cheaper and 40 per cent shorter than the current traditional route.”[x] The route will assist India to gain smooth access to the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and South Caucasus through Iran. Previous studies have highlighted the significance of INSTC for India in terms of its economic and strategic value. For instance, to reduce cost, transit time, and increase trade volumes; to bypass Pakistan territory to access markets in Eurasia; and as India’s countermove to China’s BRI.[xi] Nevertheless, challenges such as ongoing sanctions on Iran and Russia, and Russia’s participation in China’s BRI have been underlined. As an energy deficit country, one of the main objectives for India should be to envision the INSTC project as a prospective energy corridor for Caspian energy.

Can INSTC Help India Meet its Energy Requirements?

The prospect of INSTC for India as a possible energy route to import Caspian oil and gas depends on successful endeavour towards the development of midstream (e.g., pipeline, rail, barge, tankers, trucks) and downstream (e.g., refining, processing, purification) sectors. As Caspian littoral states have historical experience in exploration and production, India should tilt its focus on the above-mentioned sectors. Though earlier writings have shared the optimism of the INSTC as a transit route, they were unable to highlight the reasons which would facilitate such an endeavour.

First, as article 14 of the ‘Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea’ signed in 2018 permitted littoral states to lay trunk submarine pipelines with mutual agreement,[xii] the Caspian Five can now easily propose and work towards possible trans-Caspian energy pipeline projects to export the region’s reserves. For INSTC to be successful as an energy transit corridor, the participating countries need to come up with a uniform regional agreement on energy transit. Here, regional political cooperation amongst the Caspian Five is the key to unlocking Caspian energy for India.

The second element that requires attention is the mode of transportation from Iranian oil terminals to Indian refineries. The possibility of deep-sea routes has been debated earlier. For instance, the Middle East to India Deepwater Pipeline (MEIDP) project under South Asia Gas Enterprise Ltd. aims to transport natural gas from Chabahar (Iran) and Ra’s al Jifan (Oman) to Porbandar (India). Therefore, the possibility to merge the MEIDP energy corridor with that of INSTC needs to be explored.

The final element is the refineries’ ability to process crude oil, and their accessibility to receiving oil consignments. As the southern point of INSTC lies on the western coast of India, the region has refineries capable of processing imported crude oil. The western coast harbours eight refineries, including private refineries. Their significance lies in the fact that they have the ability to process heavy crude. As Russian crude is heavier with large quantities of sulphur, refineries located on the western coast can process such an oil type. Further, the location of refineries on the western coast makes them favourable for the prospective corridor as it will reduce the logistical costs of transportation of imported crude to India.

Amidst India’s growing appetite for hydrocarbon resources, Caspian Five has the potential to mitigate India’s energy demands to a certain extent. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both India and Caspian Five to work on a multilateral regional energy framework in the region. It will provide Caspian Five access to the world’s third largest energy-consuming economy, and provide India access to one of the important sources of global energy.

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Notes:-

[i] Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan, “The Sixth Caspian Summit was held in Ashgabat,” at https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/3233. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[ii] Bud Coote, “The Caspian Sea and Southern Gas Corridor,” April 2017, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Caspian_Sea_and_Southern_Gas_Corridor_web_0427.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[iii]The Office of the President of Russia, “6^th Caspian Summit,” at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68779. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[iv] “Russia interested in participating in TAPI Pipeline’s construction – Lavrov,” Business Turkmenistan, July 16, 2021, at https://business.com.tm/post/7331/russia-interested-in-participating-in-tapi-pipelines-construction–lavrov. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[v] “India’s Russian oil imports jump 50 times; now accounts for 10% of all import: Official,” The Economic Times, June 23, 2022, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/indias-russian-oil-imports-jump-50-times-now-accounts-for-10-of-all-import-official/articleshow/92417120.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[vi] “President Kovind arrives in Turkmenistan for three-day visit,” NDTV News, April 01, 2022, at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/president-ram-nath-kovind-arrives-in-turkmenistan-to-boost-bilateral-ties-with-key-central-asian-nation-2857236. Accessed on July 12, 2022.

[vii] Anil Sasi, “10 years on, SCO decides to induct India as full member,” The Indian Express, July 11, 2015, at https://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/10-years-on-sco-decides-to-induct-india-as-full-member/. Accessed on July 17, 2022.

[viii] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “INSTC operationalized as Russia sends consignments for Indian ports,” The Economic Times, June 14, 2022, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/instc-operationalised-as-russia-sends-consignments-for-indian-port/articleshow/92189350.cms. Accessed on July 17, 2022.

[ix] Meena Singh Roy, “International North-South Transport Corridor: Re-energising India’s gateway to Eurasia,” IDSA Issue Briefs, August 18, 2015, at https://idsa.in/issuebrief/InternationalNorthSouthTransportCorridor_msroy_180815. Accessed on July 17, 2022.

[x] Yeghia Tashjian, “Armenia and India’s vision of “North-South Corridor”: A strategy or a “Pipe Dream?” The Armenian Weekly, March 24, 2021, at https://armenianweekly.com/2021/03/24/armenia-and-indias-vision-of-north-south-corridor-a-strategy-or-a-pipe-dream/., Accessed on July 17, 2022.

[xi] Vaishali Basu Sharma, “The political economics of the International North-South Transport Corridor,” The Wire, June 30, 2022, at https://thewire.in/world/political-economics-international-north-south-transport-corridor-india-iran-russia. Accessed on July 17, 2022.

[xii] The Office of the President of Russia, “Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea,” August 12, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5328. Accessed on July 17, 2022.

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Keywords: US, China, G7, EU, Win-Win cooperation, Chinese Threat, and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. 

Introduction

The recent G7 Summit held in Schloss Elmau, Bavarian Alps, Germany, occurred when the West and its relationship with Russia and China became major strategic concerns. During the summit, the G7 agreed to extend support to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia and discusses issues like climate change, global hunger, and malnutrition. Meanwhile, the G7 also decided to establish ‘Climate Club’ by the end of 2022 and set up a Global Alliance on Food Security, a platform that provides global cooperation[i], and further launch the ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment’ (PGII). It is an important economic step to address the needs of low and middle-income countries by pledging to invest US$ 600 billion by 2027. As the PGII focuses to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which provided China a strategic advantage and economic strength which strained it’s relation with the West.

The BRI and its Impact

The BRI includes around 135 countries and is seen as a massive Chinese infrastructure project and within the “win-win cooperation”[ii], it assist and allow other countries to replicate China’s economic success. Since its launch, the BRI project has helped China to enjoy supremacy in Africa and influenced many EU members and US allies, which has caused significant concern for the West.[iii] In the context of Europe, the ‘17+1’ Initiative with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) along with the BRI helps China to become a major trading power in Europe.[iv] China continues to push Greece to advance the BRI[v] while, on the other hand, Chinese loans granted to CEEC created financial instability in many countries, such as Albania, which lacks the institutional capacity to assess agreements and became vulnerable to Chinese financing.[vi]

Moreover, the Uyghurs, Hong Kong, the Chinese debt, and the Taiwan issue all created a divergence between the EU and China. While bolstering its bilateral relationship with the EU members, China often uses its economic prowess to create a divide within the EU.[vii] To counter such an approach, the EU uses the ‘EU Connectivity Strategy’ to strengthen itself and further connect Asia and Europe[viii] where as Lithuania recently exited the 17+1 and call others to focus on the EU as a collective unit to deal with China.[ix]

G7’s PGII and its Significance

With the expansion of Chinese economic power led by the BRI, it pushed the G7 to launch the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative in 2021. The recent launch of the PGII not only transformed the B3W, but was also launched itself as an alternative to the BRI.[x] As the B3W has been unable to make much progress,[xi] questions are being asked about the significance of the PGII and whether it will counter the BRI’s influence or not.

US President Joe Biden argues that such contributions shouldn’t be seen as an aid or charity but rather as an investment which will provide a return for everyone, an advantage you gain by partnering with democracies.[xii] Such a statement was directed against China and the BRI’s win-win cooperation aspect, which has benefited China since 2013. Currently, out of the US$ 600 billion, the US has promised to raise US$ 200 billion, and the EU has pledged to provide US$ 300 billion. European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, believes that the launch of the PGII shows that developing countries now have an option.[xiii]

President Biden stated that the initiative is transparent and driven to deliver game-changing infrastructure projects to low and middle-income countries. He also believes that the PGII is significant as it allows the low and middle-income countries to determine which infrastructure initiative is viable for their economy and ensure their national security isn’t impacted.[xiv] In contrast, under the BRI China spent around US$ 1 trillion, which trapped 42 low and middle-income countries and caused debt of US$ 385 billion to 165 countries.[xv] So for a long time, there was a need to develop a competitive vision vis-à-vis China’s BRI, which allowed them to utilise economic leverage supported by a vast network of infrastructure developed under BRI, which gave China a political advantage.[xvi]

Many low and middle-income countries are in need of having access to high-quality financing, which helps them to address their long-term infrastructure investment goals. In this regard, the US, its partners, and private companies have a long history of providing technical support and high-quality financing for infrastructure projects across the globe.[xvii] In contrast to China’s BRI, the PGII is transparent and provides the freedom to choose.[xviii] 

Challenges for the PGII

Meanwhile, the PGII is an arduous task as the West has to match China’s BRI in terms of stability, coherence, and continuity, which the BRI has enjoyed for a long time.[xix] The PGII is yet to resonate with the heads of state in developing countries. In contrast, the BRI, being a state project, doesn’t have to juggle between multiple internal stakeholders even if they are accused of putting a host nation under huge debt.[xx] On the other hand, the execution of projects and success of the PGII relies on better communication and cooperation within the US and with the G7 countries, and the private sector.

President Biden reiterates that the BRI is reminiscent of the Silk Road, which connected East Asia with Europe, making partners beholden to Chinese interest. The PGII, on the other hand, offers a better opportunity to invest and improves the lives of the people around the world.[xxi] Although China argues that they welcome any efforts to promote global infrastructural development, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin sees the PGII as a ‘zero-sum game approach’ and will fail to gain any support.[xxii] In such a situation, the Biden administration should take advantage of the moment of strong bipartisanship in the Congress to counter China and strongly push the PGII along with its allies and friends.[xxiii] 

Takeaways

As the BRI is seen as predatory to partners, the value of the projects under the BRI has diminished from US$ 80 billion in 2020 to US$ 13.6 billion in 2021.[xxiv] The PGII, on the other hand, an infrastructure plan and a lifeline, shouldn’t be ignored by the low and middle-income countries. Although it’s too early to argue that the PGII would provide a viable alternative to China’s BRI, the G7 should project it as a real win-win cooperation for the developing countries. In conjunction, there is also a need to ensure that the area where the West has an advantage over China needs to be further strengthened, ensuring the global infrastructure project doesn’t become an area dominated by China alone.

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Notes:-

[i] G7: Summit outcomes at a glance, G7 Germany, June 28, 2022, https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/current-information/g7-summit-outcomes-2058314, Accessed on July 15, 2022.

[ii] Wang Xinjuan, “President Xi calls for high-quality partnership for new era of global development” China Military, June 25, 2022, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2022-06/25/content_10166421.htm, Accessed on July 04, 2022.

[iii] Chriss Devonshire-Ellis, “European Union Member States who joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative are seeing their exports rise faster  by nearly 5% more than those who have not”, Silk Road Briefing, November 20, 2022, https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/11/20/european-union-member-states-who-joined-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-are-seeing-their-exports-rise-faster-by-nearly-5-more-than-those-who-have-not/, Accessed on July 02, 2022.

[iv] “Top Trading Partners – Trade -European Commission”, European Commission, May 06, 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf, Accessed on July 11, 2022.

[v] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “BRI in Central and Eastern Europe: China’s gateway to EU”, The Economics Times, January 20, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/bri-in-central-and-eastern-europe-chinas-gateway-to-eu/articleshow/89019684.cms, Accessed on July 11, 2022.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Samuel Pleeck and Mikaela Gavas, “A new Global Connectivity Strategy: The EU’s Response to the BRI”, Centre for Global Development, August 04, 2021, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-global-connectivity-strategy-eus-response-bri, Accessed on July 11, 2022.

[ix]  Chaudhary, n.10.

[x] “Where is the G7 headed?”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/where-g7-headed, Accessed on July 06, 2022.

[xi] Rishika Singh, “Explained: The G7’s infrastructure investment plan to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Indian Express, June 29, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/g7-infrastructure-investment-plan-china-belt-and-road-initiative-explained-7996374/, Accessed on July 04, 2022.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] “G7 summit: Leaders detail $600bn plan to rival China’s Belt and Road initiative”, BBC News, June 27, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61947325, Accessed on July 01, 2022.

[xiv] Remarks by President Biden at Launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, The White House, June 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/26/remarks-by-president-biden-at-launch-of-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment/, Accessed on July 15, 2022.

[xv] Rajeshwari Ganesan, “What is the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment launched at G7 summit to counter China?”,  Times Now, June 28, 2022, https://www.timesnownews.com/exclusive/what-is-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-launched-at-g7-summit-to-counter-china-article-92516218, Accessed on July 06, 2022. Also See. Rajeshwari Ganesan, “The ugly face of Chinese debt traps: 42 nations owe China debts that exceeds 10% of their GDP, thanks to BRI”, Times Now, September 30, 2021, https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/the-ugly-face-of-chinese-debt-traps-42-nations-owe-china-debts-that-exceeds-10-of-their-gdp-thanks-to-bri/818845, Accessed on July 06, 2022.

[xvi] Shibani Mehta, “G7 infra plan a lifeline developing nations can’t ignore but first crack this code, like BRI”, The Print, July 04, 2022, https://theprint.in/opinion/g7-infra-plan-a-lifeline-developing-nations-cant-ignore-but-first-crack-this-code-like-bri/1023591/, Accessed on July 06, 2022.

[xvii] Memorandum on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, The White House, June 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/06/26/memorandum-on-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment/, Accessed on July 15, 2022.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Mehta, n.20.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Conor M. Savoy and Shannon Mckeown, “Future Considerations for the Partnership on Global Infrastructure and Investment”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 29, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-considerations-partnership-global-infrastructure-and-investment, Accessed on July 06, 2022.

[xxiv] Mehta, n.20.

The post G7 Response to China’s BRI appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: BIMSTEC, Cyberspace, Cyber, Cybersecurity, Regional Cooperation, South Asia. 

The Bay of Bengal region has witnessed impressive digitalization growth in recent years. The region is inhabited by nearly 22 per cent of the world’s population. However, it remains absent from the global cyberspace governance discussions and suffers from low digital literacy rates and cyber hygiene practices. As the digital footprint expands in the region, it will be accompanied by an exponential growth in the regional threat profile in the cyber domain.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has been often deemed as India’s Plan B for establishing a framework for robust regional cooperation. But for a better part of the 25 years of its existence, it has remained in the shadows of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan.

But as SAARC remains in a deadlock with no solution in sight, both because of Pakistan’s persistent sponsorship to terrorism and the changed dynamics in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, the time for BIMSTEC to take over seems to have arrived. To revamp and reinvigorate BIMSTEC, the member nations adopted the long overdue BIMSTEC Charter during the 5th BIMSTEC Summit in March this year. While earlier member nations focused on 14 priority areas distributed among them, the charter formalized the BIMSTEC structure and functioning by reorganizing the activities. Now each member oversees one pillar of activity.

India leading the way

In the new structure, India leads the much important security pillar, which encompasses counterterrorism and transnational crime (CTTC), disaster management, and energy security. Invariably, as cybersecurity is now embedded in every aspect of national security, India’s leadership in the cyber domain is important for a successful regional cooperation mechanism.   India’s increased focus on improving regional cybersecurity goes back at least half a decade. In March 2017, India led the maiden BIMSTEC National Security Advisor (NSA) level meeting to combat challenges arising from the violation of cyberspace, extremist ideologies, and cross-border terrorism.[i] The meeting flagged the emerging trends in cyberspace that have security implications and agreed to establish a Joint Forum of Cyber Security to deepen cooperation between national cyber institutions.

India has also taken a lead in establishing Track 1.5 and Track 2 mechanisms to deliberate the cyber issues. In December 2018, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), India’s premier defence think tank, held the BIMSTEC Workshop on Regional Cyber Security Cooperation, which concluded with a cybersecurity cooperation roadmap proposal.[ii] In November 2019, the 2nd BIMSTEC Think Tanks Dialogue on Regional Security, hosted by the New Delhi-based Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), discussed cybersecurity cooperation. The dialogue underlined the role of civil society and the state in addressing the spread of radicalization through cyberspace (internet and social media).[iii]

The delegates from the BIMSTEC nations also deliberated on strengthening cyber security through practical measures and the role of think tanks in this endeavour. The dialogue put forth recommendations for cooperation in skill building through public-private partnerships, mechanisms for information sharing on cyber threats like a BIMSTEC Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and awareness programs for developing cyber hygiene and digital literacy.

BIMSTEC 2.0

These efforts have received a boost with the BIMSTEC restructuring. India hosted a two-day meeting of the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Cyber Security Cooperation in July 2022.[iv] The meeting—based on the agreement made during the March 2017 NSA-level meeting—was chaired by India’s National Cyber Security Coordinator, Lt. Gen Rajesh Pant, and was attended by officials from the cyber police, armed forces, and consuls of the BIMSTEC nations.

The expert group meeting is aimed at developing a BIMSTEC Plan of Action on Cybersecurity. The BIMSTEC 5-year Action Plan “will cover the exchange of information on cybersecurity, cybercrime, protection of critical information infrastructure, cyber incident response, and international developments related to cybersecurity norms.”[v] It has also been reported that there were discussions to establish a BIMSTEC CERT by 2025, for real-time information sharing on cyberattacks.[vi]

Way Ahead

BIMSTEC is envisioned as a purely technical and economic cooperation mechanism. This enables it to overcome regional political and geopolitical dilemmas. With the increasing geo-strategic stature of the Indo-Pacific, BIMSTEC can help the region develop a robust cybersecurity ecosystem through regional cooperation. It is often highlighted that cyber threats transcend national borders. Thus, countering these threats requires multilateral coordination. While cybersecurity and cyber governance remain a dividing area in global politics, BIMSTEC members can coordinate a regional regime like the EU Cybersecurity Act 2019, the ASEAN Cyber Cooperation Strategy 2017, and the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.

For India, BIMSTEC presents the avenue for establishing its credentials as a regional leader towards mutual growth and development. In the second quarter of the BIMSTEC legacy, India can converge its ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policies, as well as its Indo-Pacific vision, to take the BIMSTEC forward.

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Notes:-

[i] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “BIMSTEC National Security Advisers strive to create common security space amid rising multiple threats”, The Economic Times, July 12, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/bimstec-national-security-advisers-strive-to-create-common-security-space-amid-rising-multiple threats/articleshow/57766714.cms. Accessed on July 12, 2020

[ii] “IDSA-BIMSTEC Workshop on Cyber Security Cooperation”, BIMSTEC Secretariat, https://bimstec.org/?event=idsa-bimstec-workshop-on-cyber-security-cooperation. Accessed on July 15, 2022

[iii] “2nd BIMSTEC Think Tanks Dialogue on Regional Security- Conference Proceedings”, Vivekananda International Foundation, January 29, 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/paper/2020/january/29/2nd-bimstec-think-tank-dialogue-on-regional-security. Accessed on July 15, 2022

[iv] Sandhya Sharma, “India takes the lead in setting up BIMSTEC cyber-response team”, The Economic Times, July 15, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/india-takes-the-lead-in-setting-up-bimstec-cyber-response-team/articleshow/92901162.cms. Accessed on July 16, 2022

[v] “Fifth BIMSTEC Summit”, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, March 30, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35093/5th+BIMSTEC+Summit. Accessed on July 15, 2022

[vi] n. 4

The post Revamped & Reinvigorated: BIMSTEC Advances in the Cyber Era appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Khyati Singh, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies
19 July 2022

Keywords: Cyber Security, Cyber Norms, Cyber Laws, Cyber Persistent

The post Cyber Persistent: A Game Changer for New Age Norms appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Sri Lanka, India, BIMSTEC, crisis, cyberspace, cybersecurity. 

Sri Lanka is amidst a deepening humanitarian and financial crisis today. The unfolding crisis has been deemed an outcome of a combination of ‘bad luck, bad policy, and bad politics’.[1] In April, the island nation pre-emptively defaulted on around US$ 51 billion in foreign debt, and the Prime Minister declared the nation ‘bankrupt’ in early July. Many years of financial mismanagement have resulted in soaring inflation rates, and Sri Lankans are now struggling to meet daily necessities.

With the future still looking uncertain, the only certainty is that the crisis will induce far-reaching consequences at societal, national, and regional levels. While much is being talked about the economic, political, and geopolitical aspects, there has been less consideration towards how the crisis impacts Sri Lanka’s interests in the cyber domain.

As seen in conflict and crisis situations around the world, societies are heavily influenced by the information they consume through the digital space. Further, national security is now deeply embedded in digital systems, through dependence on critical infrastructure sectors like communications., electricity, water, and waste management. This not only invokes a vulnerability at the societal level but also provides an exploitative avenue to shape the national discourse. Ultimately, these developments and their consequences spill over beyond the national frontiers, causing ripples in the regional dynamics.

In the past decade, Sri Lanka has risen in geostrategic significance, with China, Russia, and the US (among others) aspiring to benefit from the island nation’s strategic location at the confluence of shipping routes in the Indian Ocean.[2] The Chinese ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy, India’s concerns around it, and the absence of robust and active regional partnerships have played significant roles in shaping Sri Lanka’s strategic landscape. As the world becomes increasingly dependent on digital technologies for growth and sustenance, it has to be asked what this crisis means for Sri Lanka’s future in the cyber domain.

 Sri Lanka in the cyber era

Sri Lanka has faced several cyberattacks in recent years. While the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) has sought to exploit cyberspace through proxy organizations like Tamil Eelam Cyber Force in recent months,[3] the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has utilized Sri Lankan cyberspace to disseminate propaganda and hate speech in the recent past.[4]

In February 2021, several ‘.lk’ domains were attacked and downed.[5] The websites were redirected to web pages highlighting social issues that impact Sri Lankans. Later in the year, a loss of an estimated 2,000 gigabytes of classified information from the Sri Lanka Cloud came to light.[6] The data was related to the National Medicines Regulatory Authority (NMRA) and contained confidential information on drug formulation.

As the economic struggle worsened, Sri Lankans sought new ways to retaliate against the government. In reaction to public uproar and pleas, the decentralized and international hacktivist collective ‘Anonymous’ crashed the websites of the Sri Lanka Police, the Ceylon Electricity Board, and the Department of Immigration and Emigration with Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks in April.[7] These instances have highlighted the chinks in Sri Lanka’s cyber armour.

However, as cyberattacks rarely remain confined to the intended battleground, this cyber campaign too had undesired consequences. The Anonymous group shared thousands of email addresses and usernames connected to students of various higher education institutions by attacking the database of ‘Sri Lanka Scholar’, which connects students to their institutions. In a similar attack, the hacktivist group revealed information about Sri Lankan employees working abroad who are registered with the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE).

Before the crisis erupted, Sri Lanka had been taking small but gradual steps toward establishing legislation and strategies for the cyber domain. In October 2021, the Sri Lankan Cabinet granted approval to the proposals for drafting two bills on cybersecurity laws – on data protection and cyber defence.[8]

Due to Colombo’s efforts towards cybersecurity, Sri Lanka’s position in cyberspace improved. This was reflected in indexes like the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) where Sri Lanka jumped from the 98^th position in 2020 to the 69^th position in 2021, out of 160 countries.[9] The NCSI is prepared by the International Telecommunications Union and measures the preparedness of countries to prevent cyber threats and manage cyber incidents. However, as the political and economic situation deteriorated, so did the investments and focus on cybersecurity seemingly waned. Consequently, Sri Lanka dropped to the 78^th position in 2022.[10]

What Lies Ahead

Several case studies like Israel, Estonia, and North Korea raise the point that a country’s size doesn’t matter in the cyber domain. While this might be true to a certain extent, it cannot be ignored that the development of cyber capabilities requires legislative and strategic focus, as well as economic and human resources.

In the present scenario, Colombo will find it difficult in the short term to attend to cyber issues while its population struggles to meet basic necessities. In the long term, Sri Lanka will have to make significant efforts toward cyber capacity and capability building.

The crisis has exponentially increased the cyber threat profile in Sri Lanka. A 2021 estimate revealed that Sri Lanka will have 10,000 cybersecurity-related roles in the job market over the next five years but only a few hundred cybersecurity graduates to fill these positions.[11] As and when the Sri Lankan market looks to recover from the crisis, it will now need to put even more emphasis on securing its cyber interests.

The legislative process regarding Sri Lanka’s cyber laws is bound to face delays. Further, as cybersecurity requires robust investments, Colombo will be in a quandary for balancing Sri Lanka’s interests in the cyber and non-cyber domains. However, as the two domains are now deeply entrenched in each other, these delays will in turn affect Sri Lanka’s prospects for attracting investments amidst an unsecured cybersecurity ecosystem.

South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world in political, economic, and security cooperation. As the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains deadlocked, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has gained currency in recent years. In an effort to rejuvenate cooperation through the BIMSTEC framework, the member nations adopted a long-overdue charter at the recently held fifth edition of the BISMTEC Summit in March this year.[12] The summit, hosted by Sri Lanka, formalized the structure and functioning of the grouping and reoriented the sectors to be led by the BIMSTEC members. With India focusing on the security pillar and Sri Lanka expected to lead the science, technology, and innovation in the new BIMSTEC framework, Colombo should formulate a strategy for improved engagement with New Delhi in the cyber domain.[13]

To solve its emerging cyber quandary, Colombo will not only have to fast-track the legislative processes in the coming years but will also need to find ways to develop education frameworks and infuse infrastructural upgrades. Invariably, strong regional cooperation will be a necessity. As Colombo battles with economic and political turbulences, Sri Lanka’s cyberspace remains at more risk than ever before.

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Notes:-

[1] Roshan Kishore. “Bad luck, policy mess, politics hit economy: Why the Sri Lankan economy tanked”, Hindustan Times, July 13, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bad-luck-policy-mess-politics-hit-economy-why-the-sri-lankan-economy-tanked-101657723674798.html. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[2] N Sathiya Moorthy, “Guess, who is wooing Sri Lanka now?”, Observer Research Foundation, February 11, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/guess-who-is-wooing-sri-lanka-now-61282/. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[3] “Potential Internet Risks”, Ceylon Today, June 27, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/guess-who-is-wooing-sri-lanka-now-61282/. Accessed on July 14 ,2022

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Sri Lankan Domain Attack: Exposed Credentials available in Dark Web for Eight Years!”, Cyber Security Works. February 11, 2021, https://cybersecurityworks.com/blog/cyber-risk/sri-lankan-domain-attack-exposed-credentials-available-in-dark-web-for-eight-years.html. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[6] AP, “Sri Lankan Cabinet approves to draft two bills on cyber security laws”, Economic Times, October 13, 2021, https://cio.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/digital-security/sri-lankan-cabinet-approves-to-draft-two-bills-on-cyber-security-laws/86982753. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[7] Dimuthu Attanayake, “Anonymous wanted to help Sri Lankans. Their hacks put many in grave danger”, Rest of World, May 10, 2022,  https://restofworld.org/2022/anonymous-sri-lankans-hacks-danger/. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[8] “Sri Lankan Cabinet approves to draft two bills on cyber security laws”, n. 6.

[9] “Potential Internet Risks”, n. 5.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Naveed Rozais, “Sri Lanka’s future lies in its cybersecurity”, The Morning, August 8, 2021, https://www.themorning.lk/sri-lankas-future-lies-in-its-cybersecurity/. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[12] Diksha Munjal, “Explained | What is the BIMSTEC grouping and how is it significant?”, The Hindu, April 6, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/explained-what-is-the-bimstec-grouping-and-how-is-it-significant/article65275690.ece. Accessed on July 14, 2022

[13] Sripathi Narayan, “5^th BIMSTEC Summit”, Indian Council of World Affairs, April 22, 2022, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7277&lid=4914. Accessed on July 14, 2022

The post Crisis & Consequences: An Emerging Cyber Quandary for Sri Lanka appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM AVSM VM VSM (Retd), Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies
15 July 2022

Keywords: Doomsday, Russia, U.S, IL-80, E-4, TACAMO

The post Doomsday Planes – The Airborne Command Post appeared first on CAPSS India.