Author: Air Vice Marshal Ashish Vohra VSM (Retd), Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: Defence Diplomacy, Defence Attaches, Strategic Partnerships, Defence Cooperation, Diplomats in Uniform, Capacity Building

The post Defence Diplomacy: A Strategic Imperative for India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Ridges, logistics, strategic, militants, surveillance, infiltration, altitudes, modernisation, operations

Background

The Kargil conflict of 1999 has been a significant military engagement between India and Pakistan in the present century. It took place in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir, in a primarily high-altitude warfare scenario. The Indian Air Force (IAF) played a crucial role in the military operations conducted by India, contributing significantly to realisation of the strategic and tactical objectives.

The conflict in Kargil was noticed when regular Pakistani troops in the garb of militants, intruded into the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) during winters of 1998-1999. They occupied high-altitude positions that overlooked the strategically vital Srinagar-Leh highway, casting a direct eye on India’s logistical and strategic interests in the region. The intrusion was detected in early May 1999, and India immediately launched Operation Vijay to evict the intruders from the Indian part of the terrain[1].

Strategic engagement of IAF

The strategic use of air power by the IAF was imperative for several reasons, the first and foremost among them was that IAF provided critical intelligence and situational awareness through aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions. This helped in accurately mapping the positions of the intruders and assessing their strength besides observing the efficacy of their supply lines. The harsh terrain and high altitudes of the Kargil region had rendered the ground operations exceedingly difficult. On May 11, 1999 the IAF was directed by the government to provide air support using mainly the helicopters.

Subsequently on May 25, 1999, the thumbs up was given by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) to IAF to launch calculated response to the infiltrators from within the LoC.  Notwithstanding the adversities, the IAF launched the offensive missions, targeting the well-entrenched hideouts of intruders and the logistics supply routes and logistic dumps. This apart, the aerial presence and active engagement of the IAF served as a significant psychological deterrent to the intruders[2].

Initial Challenges in Tactical Operations

The IAF faced numerous challenges in the initial phase of the conflict. The most significant limitation was that the constraint of high altitude ranging from 10,000-18,000 feet and the rugged terrain which rendered the Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFOs) and flying operations extremely difficult. The operations in this terrain were tricky in view of the ridges that were off shoots of K2 Mountain ranges, approximately 8611 metres high and the world’s second tallest mountain called Nanga Parbat at a height of approximately 8126 metres and unfavourably enough, both were on the Pakistani side of the mountain range. To further complicate the task were the adverse climatic conditions, permeated with strong winds and fluctuating wind direction. These natural onslaughts made the task harder especially due to a large number of peaks of the Indian side having plodding slopes on the other. The area had peaks of altitudes ranging from 2700 metres at Kargil to 3400 metres in Drass region alongside the Tiger Hill being around 5000 metres high.

Situation remained intricate till IAF could ascertain the suitable aircraft type that could be optimized for high-altitude operations. Initially it was contemplated to utilise the Attack Helicopters as the MiG-21s and MiG-23s had limitations in terms of range and payload at such altitudes. Besides, as per the intelligence reports the intruders were found to be equipped with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) which posed a potent threat to the IAF war machines[3].

The initial operations by the IAF were marked with low level strikes in the Tololing Sector by Mi-17’s, MiG-21, MiG-23 & MiG-27 aircraft. But on 27th May, the loss of one Mi-17 helicopter followed by the two fighter aircraft to Pakistani ground based AD weapon systems on May 28, 1999, brought a turning point in IAF’s thought process. Accordingly, the IAF started re-assessing and recalibrating the situation. It was found that only the Mi-17 helicopter could operate at this altitude whereas the Mi-35 attack helicopters could not. Under this situation, the IAF planners started thinking about committing the Mirage-2000 to the conflict to augment its fighter fleet. It was contemplated to press the Mirage 2000s equipped with Thomson-CSF Laser Designator Pod (LDP), called ‘ATLIS’ equipped with the capability of delivering Matra 1000 kg LGBs. But as per a report in public domain, the weapons used on this platform were very expensive, so it was decided to augment the capability of Mirage-2000 aircraft by adding 1000 lbs bombs with Paveway II LGB kit. To complicate the issue, the spares of this aircraft were on embargo list due to this aircraft having been used as part of the Nuclear Tests conducted by India. But finally, on the 30th May, IAF decided to commit Mirage-2000 to the operations[4].

Operation Safed Sagar

On May 30, 1999, the IAF launched Operation Safed Sagar under the overall umbrella of Operation Vijay. This operation involved the deployment of a mix of IAF fighter jets, helicopters and the transport fleet to achieve the tactical objectives in the mission mode[5]. The primary aim of the operations focussed upon achieving and sustaining the air dominance and providing Close Air Support (CAS) to the ground troops. The IAF employed a mix of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s and Mirage-2000 fighter aircrafts[6].

The Mirage-2000s, with their advanced avionics and weaponry, played a crucial role in carrying out punitive precision strikes over enemy hideouts. These aircraft were equipped with laser-guided bombs (LGBs), which were instrumental in targeting and destroying well-fortified enemy positions and disrupting the supply lines of enemy. The precision bombing by IAF aircrafts significantly degraded the enemy’s capability to sustain their positions.

Apart from this, the IAF’s Mi-17 helicopters were used in multiple roles like troop transport, casualty evacuation and even in the direct ground attack missions. These helicopters provided critical support in areas where fixed-wing aircraft could not operate effectively due to terrain constraints. In addition, the IAF undertook missions for Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD). This involved targeting and neutralizing Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) and other anti-aircraft installations that posed a threat to the aircraft.

Prominent Missions undertaken by IAF in course of conflict & Strategic Upshots

Several missions carried out by the IAF during the Kargil operations stand out for their simply superb tactical brilliance and strategic impact. But the most significant among them was the IAF’s offensive on Muntho Dhalo, which was a strategically significant logistics base in Batalik Sector supporting the Pakistani intruders. On the 16th June, this major enemy supply depot was sighted by a Mirage-2000 on the LDP. The very next day, it was hit by another Mirage-2000 of 7 Sqn using dumb bombs. This devastating attack left over 100 dead and 50 structures destroyed. The IAF’s precision strikes on this base completely disrupted the enemy’s supply chain and significantly weakened their operational capabilities[7].

The IAF’s contributions during the Kargil conflict had far-reaching strategic outcomes in so far as the sustained air operations led to the neutralization of key enemy positions, enabling the Indian Army to march ahead and recapture the Indian territories occupied by the Pakistani intruders. The operations also showcased close coordination between the IAF and Indian Army (IA) exhibiting the efficacy of joint operations.

This synergy was efficaciously crucial in addressing the difficulties of terrain and recapturing the well-fortified enemy positions. Besides this, the IAF’s air operations also highlighted the need for advanced technology and tactical innovations in high-altitude warfare. The successful use of LGBs and precision bombings went a long way in setting a new benchmark for future air operations[9].

In fact, the IAF’s awe-inspiring presence coupled with efficacious missions potentially left a demoralizing effect on the enemy psyche on one hand and boosted the morale of the Indian forces on the other. This psychological impact was a critical factor in the eventual withdrawal of the intruders within reasonably shorter timeframes.

Post-Kargil Developments

The Kargil conflict underscored several key lessons for the IAF and India’s defence establishment. The most significant among the developments that took place post Kargil operations, was an undeniable need for modernization of IAF aircraft Fleet. The limitations faced due to inherent serviceability related constraints in the existing aircraft fleet led to a renewed focus on modernizing the IAF’s inventory, which included the induction of more advanced fighters and Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs).

Apart from this, the importance of real-time intelligence and surveillance was highlighted, leading to enhanced investments in satellite reconnaissance and advanced UAVs. The realisation of usefulness of joint operations paved the way for the development of integrated warfare doctrines, ensuring better coordination between the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The conflict also led to the realisation of a need for bringing about advancements in the operational infrastructure and logistical capabilities, particularly in the high-altitude regions and the airbases located therein. The Kargil Review Committee set up by the Government of India on July 29,1999, highlighted various aspects crucial to the need for joint operations[10].

Major Lessons of Operation Safed Sagar for IAF’s Future Capability Build Up

The Kargil conflict in general and IAF’s Operation Vijay in particular, imparted various tactical lessons for the IAF. The operation was a critical engagement certainly long time after 1971 war and underscored the undisputed strategic significance of air superiority and tactical importance of air power in modern warfare, especially while operating in high-altitude and tricky inhospitable terrains. Some of the major tactical lessons learnt by the IAF from this operation are summarised as under: –

(a)    Operation Vijay brought home the significance of precision bombing. The Mirage-2000 aircraft equipped with LGBs successfully sighted and accurately devastated the enemy hideouts. The operation accentuated the importance of cutting-edge PGMs for the IAF, to potentially avoid the collateral damage while successfully destroying the strategic targets on the adversary’s side.

(b)     The air operations at high altitudes of 10,000-18,000 feet, posed thitherto not experienced tests for IAF which included the thin air at high altitudes which potentially affected the aircraft performance consequent upon the dipping aeroengine performance and ultimately impacting the tactical lift. The operation underlined the need for the flying machines and aircrew to be specifically trained and equipped for high-altitude operations besides the importance of helicopters with capability of operating effectively in logistics and casevac operations amidst such challenging environments.

(c)      Operation Vijay validated an inevitable need for close synergy between IAF and IA. The IAF’s capability of providing required Close Air Support (CAS) to the Indian army was instrumental in obtaining control of Tiger Hill and Tololing. This also accentuated the need for sustaining effective battlefield communication and formulating canons of joint operations to achieve synergised air and ground operations.

(d)      The engagement also underscored the strategic need for Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Surveillance capabilities. The IAF’s expertise in collecting real-time intelligence through aerial reconnaissance accurately identified the enemy coordinates and accordingly placed higher premium on augmenting the EW capabilities duly utilising the advanced surveillance technologies, UAVs besides satellite recce.

(e)      The timely intel about MANPADS used by the enemy helped the IAF aircraft to pre-empt the threats from ground fire, ofcourse we still sadly lost our aircraft and crew. Post operations, the IAF embarked upon deliberating upon the strategies to elude and nullify such threats by taking recourse to better ECMs and self-protection suits on aircraft. The conflict also put emphasis upon a robust Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability.

(f)    The operations also stressed upon the need for augmenting the night operation capabilities of IAF mainly in mountainous terrains. The conflict underscored the importance of equipping the aircraft with advanced night vision devices and targeting systems to facilitate effective operations despite poor visibility.

(g)    The high-altitudes and rocky topography of Kargil demanded effective logistics supply chain management especially with regard to conveying the troops, equipment and supplies amidst air superiority thereby supporting and sustaining the ground operations by the Army.

(h)     The fastest ever deployment of IAF war machines in the Northern sector within the shortest timeframes was a definite morale booster for the Indian army besides posing an effective deterrent to the enemy. The swiftness and flexibility of IAF emphasised the indispensability of air power as a potent constituent of modern warfare.

(j)   The restrictions of inadequate aircraft availability due vintage fleet unambiguously accentuated an inevitable need for subsequent fleet modernisation and upgrade. Post-Kargil, there was a renewed stress upon the efforts towards fleet upgradation utilising better platforms, incorporating advanced avionics, weapon systems and EW suites.

Summing Up

Undoubtedly, the operation Safed Sagar brought home the shortcomings of tactical applications of air power in high-altitude war. The lessons learnt were contributory to shaping the modernisation and strategic planning of IAF. The air operations underscored the significance of precision bombing, high-altitude preparedness, synergy between the air & ground operations, EW, vulnerability against SAM threats, night ops, lean and efficacious logistics supply chain, effect of psychological war and an inevitable need for fleet upgrade.

The IAF’s role in the Kargil operations was pivotal in achieving the strategic and tactical objectives of Operation Vijay. Through a blend of Precision Ground Attack Strikes, CAS and operational logistics, the IAF significantly underwrote the success of Indian armed forces in successfully evicting the intruders from the ridges. The lessons learnt and the subsequent fleet rejuvenation efforts have gone long way in helping the fortification of India’s defence capabilities. The Kargil conflict remains a testament to the effective use of air power in achieving military objectives and safeguarding the national security.

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommendations have been instrumental in enhancing the effectiveness of the defence infrastructure and support substructures. The KRC takeaways were tested and accepted by the government to a large extent. Most importantly, the Kargil conflict drove home the significance of the jointness and synergy of operations among the Indian armed forces.

In this regard, the most significant recommendation of the KRC was the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which found an on-ground manifestation with the appointment of the first CDS on January 1, 2020. This is further getting emboldened now, through cross posting of the officers of the three Services amongst the sister services which has already started taking shape and from here upon, we are moving to conceptualisation and formulation of the theatre commands of the day.

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Notes

[1] Rifat Fareed, “20 years of Kargil war: India, Pakistan remain tense over Kashmir”, Al Zazeera, July 26, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/26/20-years-of-kargil-war-india-pakistan-remain-tense-over-kashmir, Accessed on July 22, 2024

[2] “Ops Safed Sagar, The summer of 1999”, IAF’s official website, https://indianairforce.nic.in/ops-1962/, Accessed on July 22, 2024

[3] Prof Prodyut Das, “The Aerodynamics of the MiG 21s Accidents”, Barat Rakshak, November 30, 1999, https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/iaf/today/flightsafety/mig-prodyut/, Accessed on July 22, 2024

[4] Philip Camp, “The Mirage 2000 in Kargil”, History Kargil War, Bharat Rakshak, October 15, 2009, https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/iaf/history/kargil/mirage2000-operations/, Accessed on July 23, 2024

[5]“Operation Safed Sagar”, Gallantry awards, Government of India website, https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/assets/uploads/home_banner/TheOperationSafedSagar-2023-07-07.pdf, Accessed on July 22, 2024

[6] ibid

[7] Air Mshl R Nambiar to Nitin Gokhale, “Attack On Muntho Dhalo Changed The Theatre Of War In Kargil”, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8PX8X0o-kU, Accessed on July 22, 2024

[8] Ibid

[9] A Subramanian, “Kargil Revisited: Air Operations in a High Altitude Conflict”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Summer 2008, https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/464654525_ASubramanian.pdf,  Accessed on July 22, 2024

[10] “Kargil Review Committee Report”, Parliament Digital Library, https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/63945/1/15_Defence_2.pdf, Accessed on July 23, 2024

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Keywords: Launch Failures, Accidental Launch, ISS Crew, iSpace

The past few weeks have been a bit rough for spaceflight, with rockets and spacecraft suffering setbacks. The months of June and July 2024 saw some unexpected failures in space activity, including some by established players in this arena, blemishing their record of safety in spaceflight. Over the years, the failures in space systems have been mitigated through automation in procedures and remote monitoring of system health. However, the rapid increase in space activity that has been seen in recent years could have had some effect on the risk-taking ability of space operators. A brief narrative of each incident is given below:

(a)     The accidental launch of a Chinese rocket on June 30, 2024, could be termed an accident rather than a failure. The accidental launch happened during a static fire test of a Tianlong-3 first stage from the launch pad. This rocket belonged to a private Chinese company named Space Pioneer, also known as Tianbing Technology, and was scheduled for launch into space in the coming weeks. The probable cause is a structural failure at the connection between the rocket body and the test bench, also called the anchoring point, causing the rocket to take off. The onboard computer automatically shut down, and the rocket fell into a deep mountain very close to the test bench. There were no casualties reported.[1][2]

(b)   Another launch failure from China happened on July 10, 2024. The Chinese company iSpace’s seventh launch of its rocket, Hyperbola-1, failed to reach orbit. The first, second and third stages of the rocket performed normally, but the fourth stage worked abnormally, resulting in the failure of the launch mission. With this failure, iSpace’s launch success rate has dipped below 50 per cent.

(c)      The launch of Ariane-6 on July 09, 2024, proceeded as planned until a minor hitch towards the end of the flight resulted in an incomplete mission. A de-orbit burn was planned to put the rocket onto a trajectory to burn up over the South Pacific. The controlled re-entry for burn-up was to be a demonstration of the European Space Agency’s (ESA) commitment towards a ‘zero-debris’ policy. Eventually, the de-orbit burn could not be initiated because an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) that pressurises the liquid oxygen and hydrogen tanks malfunctioned, preventing re-ignition. Though the mission was successful in placing satellites in orbit, it highlighted a malfunction of the rocket engine.[3] Ariane is amongst the most reliable launch service providers in the global space transportation market.

(d)    SpaceX’s most reliable workhorse rocket, the Falcon 9, suffered a catastrophic and unexpected failure after launch on July 11, 2024. Shortly after the launch, the rocket’s second stage failed to ignite, and it could not reach its planned orbit. The 20 Starlink satellites onboard were left in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) below their desired altitudes, which is not a sustainable orbit. The incident has resulted not only in the loss of 20 Starlink satellites but also in the grounding of the Falcon 9 rocket for further investigation. The Falcon rocket was scheduled to carry a Cygnus cargo module to the International Space Station (ISS) and later to carry a replacement crew to the ISS, both of which would get delayed.[4]

(e)      The Boeing Starliner carrying two astronauts, including Sunita Williams, in early June this year suffered a malfunction that was detected after the spacecraft docked with the ISS. The two astronauts are stranded on the ISS with no replacement spacecraft readily available, extending their planned duration of stay on-board the ISS indefinitely. It has been reported that five thrusters of the crew capsule failed as it approached the ISS on June 6, 2024, however, the docking was safe.[5]

These events have brought to focus the uncertainties that exist in spaceflight despite advances in technology and refinement in procedures and equipment. The variables are too many, and how equipment behaves in microgravity conditions cannot be predicted with certainty, even though extensive tests and simulations are done before assembly and launch. Malfunctions can happen, and one has to be prepared with the mechanisms and drills to deal with them, whether they result from technical failure or human error. Advanced computer modelling and decades of experience in sending rockets into space have given designers of space systems a much better idea of what to expect. But the unknowns still exist, and how a new system will behave in space remains hypothetical until the first launch.[6]

Statistically speaking, the failure rates over the decades have been somewhat consistent. Even though the failure of new systems can be expected to be higher at around 30 per cent, it settles down at around 5-6 per cent after the tenth launch. The historical launch failure rate for manned missions is much lower at around 2 per cent, and only around 1 per cent involve a total failure.[7] There may be environmental similarities leading to a comparison between air accident rates and space failure rates, however, it may not be just to compare the two, as the quantum of flying activity in the air is much higher than the present space activity. The statistical data recorded by a former website www.spacelaunchreport.com gives the following launch failure report:[8] 

Statistical Record of Launch Failures in Space Missions 

Source: Tabulated by Author

The Gaganyaan mission, a joint project by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Indian Air Force (IAF), aims to put Indian astronauts in orbit soon. Once humans are involved in a space launch, extra precautions and checks are needed to ensure crew safety. ISRO has carefully curated the sequence of activities to include two unmanned launches before the actual manned space mission. Any defect or error noticed in the unmanned mission will necessitate an additional unmanned mission to ensure that the problem is resolved. With this approach, the chances of failure in the manned mission will be minimised. Despite all precautions, ISRO and IAF must be prepared for contingencies, and all possible situations need to be thoroughly rehearsed.

 Military culture demands that everything must go right the first time we try it. However, in space, it may not always be possible to execute a perfect mission despite the advances in technology. Prudence demands that one should expect the best possible outcome but be prepared for the worst-case scenario. Back in the 1960s, both the US space programme and the Soviet Union’s space programme went through a process of trial and error as they repeatedly tried to land the first Moon mission but failed. They learnt from each attempt and incorporated the lessons learnt. Space missions should come out stronger when things go wrong. The first Moon missions failed, including India’s Chandrayaan landing, but they provided lessons on how to achieve success in subsequent missions. The epic dialogue “Failure is not an option,” spoken by actor Ed Harris in his role as NASA’s legendary flight-operations director Gene Kranz in the 1995 film ‘Apollo 13’,[9] sounds compelling only in the movies. In research and development, failure is indeed a possibility that needs to be incorporated into the planning. It should be viewed as a necessary learning objective on the path to success.

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Notes

[1] “China rocket crashes after ‘accidental’ launch”, BBC, July 01, 2024, at https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/c897xl1r7v9o. Accessed July 18, 2024.

[2] Michael Wall, “Not-so-static fire: Private Chinese rocket accidentally launches during test”, Space.com, July 02, 2024, at https://www.space.com/space-pioneer-tianlong-3-rocket-accidental-launch. Accessed July 18, 2024

[3] Jeff Foust, “When a workhorse falters”, The Space Review, July 15, 2024, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4829/1. Accessed July 18, 2024.

[4] Ibid.

[5] David Propper, “Astronauts stuck in space from Starliner problems confident Boeing will get them home safely”, New York Post, July 10, 2024, at https://nypost.com/2024/07/10/us-news/astronauts-stuck-in-orbit-from-starliner-problems-confident-boeing-will-get-them-home-safely/. Accessed July 20, 2024.

[6] Stephen Dowling, “What are the odds of a successful space launch?” BBC News, May 19, 2023, at https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230518-what-are-the-odds-of-a-successful-space-launch. Accessed July 18, 2023.

[7] Ibid

[8] Radu Weiss, “What is the success/failure ratio of space bound rockets?”, Stack Exchange: Space Exploration, at https://space.stackexchange.com/questions/8566/what-is-the-success-failure-ratio-of-space-bound-rockets. Accessed July 21, 2024.

[9] “In space, failure is an option — often the only one”, Nature, May 09, 2023, at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-01547-3. Accessed July 21, 2024.

The post A Season Marred by Setbacks in Space Missions appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Gp Capt (Dr) DK Pandey (Retd), Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: Operation Safed Sagar, Air Strike, ISR, CAS, KRC

The post Kargil Vijay Diwas Rajat Jayanti IAF Demonstrates the Decisive Capability of Airpower appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Operation Safed Sagar, Kargil, Air Operations, Communications

Introduction.

Operation “Safed Sagar” was a unique example of the conduct of Aerial operations at High Altitudes and Mountainous regions. It was also the first large-scale use of Air Power by IAF since the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Participation by the IAF proved to be the cutting edge and shaped the course of the battle, resulting in a famous Indian victory. I had significantly participated as a junior pilot in the Air operations from a Mirage-2000 Squadron and have a first-hand account of the innovativeness, efforts, sheer professionalism and the aggressive determination, which went into ensuring this unparalleled performance by the IAF. Despite the passage of twenty-five years, due to the firsthand experiences and successes enjoyed, the activities are very vividly etched in the memories.

Build Up.

From an operational Squadron perspective, the initial incursion reports were followed on newspaper but as an Insurgency incident. The Squadron was heavily committed with a multitude of roles and incessant participation in exercise and workshops during the month of May, plagued by the excessively high temperatures and very small flying operating windows. The gravity of the situation began to emerge with the news that IAF help was requested during a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting on 18 May 99.

The news of a Canberra reconnaissance aircraft being hit by a Stinger missile triggered aggressive emotions and anger amongst the Squadron personal. Subsequent news of the crashing of a Mig-27 aircraft in POK, capture of the pilot, Flt Lt K Nachiketa, shooting of the Escort Mig-21 aircraft by a Stinger missile, the murder of its captured pilot Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja in cold blood and the shooting down of a Mi-17 again by a stinger missile, resulting in death of all the crew members, enraged all. I was personally further enraged, since Nachi was my course mate and he had stayed in my room during TDs, Exercises and Workshops.

Induction      

The deployment of IAF was sequential in nature and in line with the incremental buildup of a situation.  During the afternoon of 29 May 99, we were suddenly told of our deployment from the same evening onwards. In line with wartime deployment philosophies, we took recourse to tactical routing, masking of aircraft within the ATS traffic routes and landing by night to avoid visual identification. Due to our excessive deployment routines and participation in many exercises throughout the year, the deployment, even though momentous, seemed very routine. All our families naturally knew of our induction but nothing beyond that. Security of information aspects and precautions were repeatedly briefed to all personnel and maintained strictly thereafter. Those were the days of STD booths and nil mobiles, wherein proliferation could be easily conserved.

Weather Conditions.   The months of May-July are amongst the worst in the Indian Sub-Continent for the conduct of Air Operations, especially with modern systems intensive aircraft. The weather varied from extremely hot and dry climatic conditions, unstable pre-monsoon weather phenomenon of thunderstorms, gale, increasingly humid conditions and large spells of rain with extensive clouding. However, as the missions became increasingly synergized with the Ground Operations being conducted by the Army, the missions were needed to be launched compulsorily, till the time launches became impossible.

Temperament.  The philosophy of IAF, as should be with any professional organisation, is to train in peace so that at the moment of reckoning, the combatants are able to give their best shots. It was that moment for the Squadron and all personal were extremely pumped up and willing to put in the extra bits; whenever it mattered and wherever called for. We were in a very aggressive but professionally tempered state of mind; and greatly hoped to get the chance to shoot down the adversary. While emotions were high but due to our high levels of professional indoctrination, we were extremely focused and alert in the cockpits. All Radar pickups, RWR indications, Cockpit indications and Mission objectives were well sorted and segregated in our minds. We were flying missions with live weapons and in fully operational weapon configurations and felt further responsible for the lethality entrusted to us. At the time of switch off after return from missions, I would notice the maintenance crew eagerly looking at the weapon hardpoints of the aircraft to see if any weapons were fired. Such was the enthusiasm and josh at that time!!!

Tempo of Missions

Following the initial losses by the IAF, the initial missions thereafter, were reshaped towards extensive reconnaissance (Recce), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Ground Intelligence gathering, to build up a comprehensive picture of the Air and Ground situation. Various platforms were pressed into service including IAF Fighter aircraft for ELINT, Recce and Photo Missions; Transport aircraft for Communication Intelligence (COMMINT), ELINT and Photo Recce missions; special aircraft from other Govt organisations and Satellite Imagery. This phase also saw the innovative use of the Lase Designation Pod (LDP); which is essentially a laser targeting pod for drop of Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs); as a Photo Intelligence gathering/ confirmation tool for achieving immediate clarity on targets which could not be clearly ascertained through other sources or for requirements of immediate nature. Throughout the phase, a watch was also made on PAF AD aircraft movements, envisaged intentions, Ground AD deployments as well as the probable stinger locations. Once adequate intelligence was gathered, the live bombing missions started. Reconnaissance and Int gathering missions, however, continued concurrently.

Achieving Flexibility in Operations

From mid-June onwards, the intensity of missions increased. At times, the missions were tasked at extremely short notices of 30 minutes and in certain cases launched within 40 minutes of the landing of the previous mission, where there was not enough time for planning prior to the missions. The Squadron came up with flexible concepts, which enabled CATO mission planning even in the air, enroute to the target areas. Likewise, the Squadron evolved a Pan-Command Diversion system; enabling freedom of operations across the entire and vast geographical span of Western Air Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing the states of Rajasthan (northern part), Haryana, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab and Jammu & Kasmir including Leh and Thoise Airfields. The Squadron also devised a system of duty + spare pilots roster to man the 24 hour cycle. The expectations and the confidence levels of the ability of the Squadron and the Mirage platform to reliably deliver mission success 24 x 7, amongst Command planning Staff became extremely high.

Mission Briefing Codes

During those days, the only medium of communications was the Tropo and open BSNL lines. Both could be monitored. However, both the Mirage Squadron youngsters devised briefing codes to coordinate the bare essential mission details. The brief was only for time, RV place and the general sector and due to our flexible navigation and R/T plans, we were able to achieve full mission success. The lingual diversity of India was utilized to the fullest during these mission briefings, especially languages of West and South India.

Air Opposition

During the operations, it became evident that PAF AD aircraft were airborne, but maintaining standoff distances well within their own territory. Through Radar and RWR inputs, we picked up F-16 aircraft confined to within 20 Kms of Skardu Airfield. Picking up the F-16 aircraft pumped us up even further and we were hoping for an engagement by them, so that we could shoot the F-16 down. Unfortunately for us, the aircraft stayed confined to within 20 Kms of their Base.

Spotting of Stinger Missile Plumes

As per the Stinger missile threat generally prevalent in the area, an elevation floor limit was defined per mission, as per the max terrain of operations. During one of the Escort missions, I noticed a strike aircraft carrying out a dive and a white plume emanating from the ridges. On warning call of “Missile plume 1 clock low”, I saw the strike aircraft discharging flares and the Stinger missile going astray.

Synergised Operations with Indian Army

The System enabled bombing capabilities of the Mirage-2000 proved very effective during the conventional bombing missions. A GPS assisted manual drop of bombs was evolved by 17 Sqn using Target co-ordinates, when targets were not visible due to cloud cover. IAF operations were concentrated during the day and Army operations during the night, This led to incessant and synergised operations throughout the 24 Hr cycle by both IAF and the Indian Army, which reportedly sapped the morale of the intruders despite being very tactically entrenched in favourable ridge positions.

Directing of Bofors Fire

A necessity arose to evolve a methodology towards directing and improving the accuracy of the Bofors Firing. It was natural that only an airborne platform could provide this input and direct fire. However, there were only meager LDP pods in the IAF inventory. Consequently, a methodology was evolved in the Squadron to use the waypoint depiction on the HUD as the Target position mark and thereafter use R/T to relay the approximate accuracy to the Ground Forces. We flew the mission in a trainer aircraft (CO & self) at 0130 hrs in the morning. The snow-clad mountainous terrain, which looked picturesque during the day, looked very eerie, cold and desolate by night. On reaching the calculated standoff point and establishing orbit pattern in the target area, we found that the methodology was workable as the sequence of firing by the Bofors Guns was not continuous and gave the necessary time interval to be able to correlate the firing with respect to the target waypoint and relay approximate accuracies to the ground. Unfortunately, we did not get any response from the Ground agencies.

Flying at 45000 Feet

During Escort Missions to the other Government Agency special aircraft, we flew missions at 45000 feet. This was an altogether new experience for us as aircraft and aeroengines behave excessively sluggishly at those altitudes. We also practically got to see the effects of crossing the Myntra levels, which resulted in the formation of contrails. To avoid visual detection, the altitudes had to be lowered till the contrails stopped. In one mission, I encountered pressurisation failure, wherein I was not able to find my voice, till I descended to an altitude close to 30,000 feet.

 Change of Mission after Getting Airborne

There was a peculiar instance of a mission which got changed in the air which show cases professional flexibility and operational mind set. Our formation was to escort a Recce mission from our base. Another Mirage Recce formation from Adampur was to be escorted by aircraft from Adampur. We got airborne, but our Reconnaissance aircraft had to abort the mission. In the meantime, the Mirage Recce aircraft got airborne, but the Escort aircraft could not get airborne. While the distance between our formations was 200 Kms and missions unknown to each, we did chance upon the situation on the common AD recovery frequency. R/T contact was established between the formations. “Feasible to provide Escort and join up” was the request from the Mirage-2000 Recce leader. “Yes” we responded. Despite the enroute leg being straight with only one turn involved and without knowledge of the area of Ops of the missions; through Radar pick-ups, pre-fed way points and with minimal R/T, we joined up with the formation as they reached the target area and thereafter provided Air Space sanitization for the entire mission. When the same was debriefed to the Command Ops Staff on return, they were both enormously amazed and respectful of the professionalism of the Squadron and the operational commitment levels.

 Full Force Escalatory Strike Mission

During one of the days of extreme political heat up, we got a tasking of a full force ingress into Pakistan with the possible escalation of a full-blown Conventional war. The mission was to launch at dusk. I considered myself fortunate to be amongst the members chosen for this mission. We came into the full war mode of Aircraft preparation, mission preparation, Int briefing including escape and evasion procedures, civil clothes and Pakistan currency collection. Unfortunately, on reaching the aircraft and strapping up, we got the news of the mission being called off. We were very pumped up by then and were disappointed at this news.

End of the Deployment

Post the recapture of Tiger Hill on 04 Jul 99 and key peaks in the Batalik sector by 11 Jul 99, the tempo of operations had weakened. Missions now came by the trickle. One evening, one Officer jokingly mentioned that the ladies back home were talking of returning the next day. We all had a hearty laugh as the end seemed nowhere in sight and missions were still being given. The wry smiles continued till the next morning as we had a mission to fly. However, things rapidly changed and we found ourselves at our homes by lunch; and were now laughing at ourselves. An enjoyable laugh though, after the culmination of a very professionally satisfying and successfully conducted operations by the Squadron.

Conclusion

The conflict officially came to an end on 26 July 1999 when the Indian Army announced the complete eviction of the Pakistani Forces. Innovative application of Air Power was a key enabler during this conflict which significantly contributed to the eventual success. The experiences, thought processes, effective actions leading to the eventual success, enormously enhanced the confidence levels and sense of belief in the conduct of fighter operations for the IAF, leading to successes and the premier reputation of the IAF in the various subsequent international exercises such as Cope India, Cope Thunder, Ex Indradhanush and the Red Flag exercises. Last but not the least; nothing tastes, feels or smells better than the sweet smell of success, especially if it comes on the battlefield.

                                            “When the Situation Evolves……..So Must You”.

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Keywords: Pich Black, Air Operations, IAF, Air Force Exercise, Interoperability

The Indian Air Force (IAF) detachment is at the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base in Darwin, Australia, to participate in the multi-national Exercise Pitch Black 2024. Ex Pitch Black is the Air Force’s premier flying operation for reinforcing international engagement. Held every two years, it is a testament to global cooperation, focusing on large-force employment missions involving large numbers of international aircraft.

This edition of Ex Pitch Black, with an unprecedented scale of two hundred aircraft and associated military personnel from a variety of air forces, is expected to be the largest in more than four decades of the exercise’s history, demonstrating the magnitude and impact of the operations. The RAAF is the host organisation for this exercise, which runs from July 12, 2024, to August 02, 2024. Ex-Pitch Black is part of Ex-Pacific Skies 24, a combination of several Air Force exercises.[1]

Dimension of the Operations

The edition of the exercise is a truly international affair, with participation from 20 nations. Together, they’ll operate from three major RAAF air bases. This year’s exercise will primarily be conducted from AF Base Tindal and AF Base Darwin in the Northern Territory, with additional aircraft operating from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland. These Bases—Darwin, Tindal and Amberley —will be the hubs for large-force employment missions in military airspace over the Northern Territory for three weeks.

Air Commodore P Robinson is leading Exercise Pitch Black 24 as the Officer Conducting the Exercise. “It is a tangible example of how the Air Force contributes to stability in the region,” Air Commodore Robinson said. “Especially in how we engage in multilateral defence partnerships.”[2]

The exercise includes first-time participation by aircraft from the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Italy, and Spain and teams from Fiji and Brunei, marking an important milestone for Australia’s key Indo-Pacific partners.[3]

Objectives

The primary emphasis of the exercise will be the large-scale employment of warfare strategy. It will also attempt to improve international collaboration, strengthen relationships, and enhance interoperability with overseas partners.

The exercise is a good opportunity to increase the capabilities of the participating nations to deploy across wide distances, support coordinated operations in the Indo-Pacific area, and develop strong aviation associations in an environment that is considered to be extremely demanding. It is assessed to promote international cooperation and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.

Exercise Pitch Black has to be well planned and requires the involvement of many pilots from different countries and a lot of assistance from the supporting workforce. Large packages of fighters will fly over the Australian territory away from cities and densely populated areas, following the strictly defined controlled airspace while avoiding various obstacles during the day and at night.

This embraces the high level of cooperation among the participating countries and further cements the importance that has been accorded to security at the regional level, hence enhancing cooperation at the regional and international levels throughout the Indo-Pacific region and the rest of the world.[4]

Exercise Pitch Black 24 involves some of the most advanced air combat capabilities in the world, flown and supported by a highly skilled workforce in a challenging training environment. Once they arrive, international participants conduct force integration with other nations and their capabilities and work first-hand with their foreign counterparts.

This exercise provides an environment for training and integration that directly supports the training requirements of international participants and their ability to support operations in the Indo-Pacific. At the individual level, the exercise builds strong relationships between aviators and personnel from across the Indo-Pacific region and further abroad in Europe.

It also recognises the strong relationships among participating nations, reinforces the value placed on regional security, and fosters closer ties throughout the Indo-Pacific region and around the world.

IAF Detachment

Ex Pitch Black exposes the IAF and other participants to intricate scenarios while using modern means of aircraft and tactical space in one of the largest military training airspace zones in the world. Therefore, the IAF Su-30 MKI fighters combating advanced fighter aircraft like the F-35, Gripen, and Typhoon enhance the productive training value. The IAF has previously participated in this exercise in the years 2018 and 2022.[5] International participation in Exercise Pitch Black provides a unique opportunity for the participating nations to experience mutual cooperation and strategic understanding.

The IAF fleet consists of the C-17 Globemaster and the IL-78 Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft in combat-enabling roles. Over 150 highly skilled Air Warriors of the IAF contingent, including pilots, engineers, technicians, fighter controllers, and other domain experts, will operate the formidable Su-30 MKI multirole fighters. The exercise would offer the International Air Force a chance to integrate its forces with those of the participating nations and share and learn from each other’s best practices.[6]

IAF’s partnership with NATO partners will allow the Air Forces to broaden their horizons and build trust and respect with these other nations. The exercise will provide a number of important lessons to the participants, including an awareness of interoperability with foreign partners and a knowledge of employment philosophy in a global setting through a collaborative effort. Especially for the younger crew members, the experience of ferrying great distances while engaging in air-to-air refuelling operations along the way is enlightening and fascinating.

Conclusion

Ex Pitch Black 24 exercise provides a great opportunity for the participating nations to coordinate their strategies and achieve common strategic objectives. This is an opportune moment for air forces to synchronise their Concept of Operations (CONOPS), mobilising and maintaining detachments at distant locations.

For the IAF, the exercise is one more occasion to hone their capabilities in different environments with a new CONOPS. The exercise lessons included interoperability with foreign partners and a collaborative employment philosophy in a global workplace. Ferrying great distances while air-to-air refuelling has been stimulating and exhilarating, especially for the younger crew.

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Notes:

[1] Yuvraj Tyagi, “European Air Forces Unite for Landmark Pacific Skies 24 Deployment”, The Republic, June 30, 2024, https://www.republicworld.com/defence/global-defence-news/european-air-forces-unite-for-landmark-pacific-skies-24-deployment. Accessed on July 13, 2024.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Flight Lieutenant Imogen Lunny, “Philippines lands a first at Pitch Black”, Australian Govt Defense, July 12, 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2024-07-12/philippines-lands-first-pitch-black. Accessed on July 12, 2024.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Indian Air Force Ex Pitch Black 2024 At Darwin, Australia”, PIB, July 11,  2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2032522#:~:text=An%20Indian%20Air%20Force%20(IAF,exercise%20hosted%20by%20the%20RAAF. Accessed on July 13, 2024.

[6] Ibid.

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Keywords: Refueling, Acquisition, Capability, Flexibility, Missions, Exercises, Agreement

The Indian Air Force (IAF) being globally the fourth largest Air Force, has evolved into a formidable national security constituent and is equipped with myriad advanced capabilities in terms of tactical defence and strategic deterrence power projection or political signalling besides being a tool of Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HADR) globally.

As the IAF continues to augment its operational readiness and extend its strategic depth and tactical reach, the necessity for in-flight refuelling capability becomes progressively vital. The Flight Refueller Aircraft (FRA) plays a crucial role in extending the range, endurance and the operational flexibility of fighter jets like the Su-30 MKI, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, Jaguars and the recently acquired Rafale fighter jet and other new generation aerial platforms.

The IAF is supposed to hold a larger number of FRAs on its inventory while till date it is constrained to manage with a complement of mere six IL-78 class refueller aircrafts. There have been efforts by the IAF in the past two decades or so to fill up the shortfall through global procurement. The first Request for Proposal (RFP) for six Refueller aircrafts was floated under Direct Cost of Acquisition (DCA) mode in 2003, which was withdrawn by MoD for the reason that there was a requirement to float the new RFP based on Total Cost of Acquisition (TCA) model[1].

While the DCA model envisaged the cost of the green (raw) aircraft minus the costs of maintenance and operations, the TCA model comprehensively takes into account also the cost of the green aircraft, cost of the maintenance spares for the prescribed lifetime of the aircraft besides the operating cost in terms of fuel consumption. The RFP based on TCA model was floated by MoD somewhere around 2011 but was withdrawn sometime in 2016 due to some ambiguities in the response of the two bidders, i.e. Joint Stock Company (JSC) RosoboronExport offering IL-78 platform and Airbus offering the Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) A-330 aircraft. However, both the times the process of acquisition failed due to various price related and other issues[2].

India is realising the urgency of meeting the shortfall and therefore, IAF is looking forward to temporarily lease an Airbus MRTT A-330 Refueller aircraft from French Air Force. Alongside, HAL in consultation with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is planning to convert a domestically developed Boeing 737 aircraft equipped with Israeli refuelling kits[3].

Strategic and Tactical Significance of Tanker Transport

The vast geographical expanse of India and its strategic interests beyond its borders necessitate the capability to project air power over long distances. In view of this, FRA enables fighter jets like the Su-30 MKI, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, Jaguars and Rafale to extend their operational reach without the need to land enroute for refuelling[4].

Besides this, the aerial refuelling acts as a force multiplier by virtue of enhancing the endurance and mission capabilities of the combat aircraft, allowing the fighter jets to remain airborne for longer durations providing persistent presence with capability to conduct multiple sorties and tactical inter-theatre diversions without having to return to the base.

The ability to project air power over extended ranges contributes to strategic deterrence by demonstrating the IAF’s capability to respond swiftly and effectively to external threats. Aerial power enhances the credibility of India’s conventional and strategic deterrent forces, providing the flexibility to swiftly deploy the air assets where and when needed.

The in-flight refuelling also supports India’s power projection goals by enabling the IAF while participating in the international exercises, humanitarian missions and sometimes coalition operations, as witnessed while operating in the UN missions away from Indian skies. Needless to say that it enhances India’s capability to effectively contribute to regional stability and response to crisis situations, thus reinforcing its role as an effective and responsible global force.

Operational Advantages

As stated above, the AAR capability by virtue of being not only strategic but also a tactical force enhancer, allows the combat aircraft to carry out extended missions without the need for frequent landings to refuel the bird. This increases the aircraft’s endurance and operational efficiency, allowing for continuous operations during critical phases of a mission, such as air superiority, reconnaissance, and close air support.

Seen in this view, the FRA provides operational flexibility which is crucial for dynamic battlefield scenarios, where aircraft may need to adjust their mission profiles based on evolving threats and objectives. It allows for rapid redeployments as required to facilitate the sustained air operations in contested environment.

Aerial refuelling also enables fighter jets to take off with full weapon loads and minimal fuel, thereby increasing their payload capacity for air armament and sensors. This is particularly beneficial for strike missions where maximizing the payload and its tactical reach at the target is critical for mission success.

The FRA provides operational independence by reducing reliance on Forward Base Support Units and land-based refuelling infrastructure installed in some of them. This is especially important in scenarios where access to bases may be restricted or if the supporting bases happen to be located amidst contested environment.

Current Fleet Limitations and Future Requirements

As of 2024, the IAF operates a limited number, six to be precise, of aerial refueller aircraft i.e. the Ilyushin Il-78MKI. These aircraft have provided valuable in-flight support for various operations and exercises but they do have limitations in terms of numbers, operational availability and serviceability constraints. The Il-78MKI is known to maintain just satisfactory serviceability due to older technology and therefore restricts the IAF’s ability to support multiple operations simultaneously[5].

To meet the growing operational demands, the IAF is exploring the acquisition of modern aerial refueller aircraft. Potential options include platforms like the Airbus A330 MRTT and Boeing KC-46 Pegasus[6]. These aircraft offer advanced capabilities, increased fuel capacity and interoperability with various aircraft, making them suitable for the IAF’s diverse operational requirements.

It is also relevant to mention here that, the present day FRAs available worldwide enable efficient and precise compatibility with different types of aircraft. Additionally, modern tanker aircrafts score an additional point by virtue of incorporating advanced avionics, advanced communication systems and self-protection suit, that enhance their operational capabilities and survivability.

Advanced aerial tankers equipped with secure communication links and data sharing capabilities would provide real-time information to enhance mission coordination and situational awareness. These aircrafts would support IAF’s broader goals of achieving seamless connectivity and interoperability in today’s theaterised battle environment.

It would also be prudent to feature the requirement of specialized training for FRA aircrew and support personnel. Developing robust training programs by the OEM and revised operational doctrines by IAF are crucial for maximizing the benefits of AAR. The training curriculum may include training on refuelling techniques, mission planning and coordination with various aircraft platforms operated by IAF.

Significantly enough, active collaborations with friendly air forces that possess AAR capabilities can provide valuable insights into FRA operations hrough joint exercises. Participation in international exercises and ongoing strategic partnerships with advanced countries like the United States, France and Australia would enhance the IAF’s proficiency in aerial refuelling operations and foster interoperability with allied forces.

Need for Modernization and Way Forward for Acquisition of FRA

To address the present capacity constraints and functional limitations, there is a pressing need to modernize the IAF’s AAR capability. It may be considered strategically desirable to enhance the operational effectiveness by acquiring the advanced FRAs providing improved range and faster fuel off take capability. India needs to go in for acquisition of new generation aerial tankers equipped with state-of-the-art systems and sensors to enhance the IAF’s operational efficiency and mission effectiveness.

Sometimes it has been found difficult to finalise the contracting action by MoD for acquisition of FRA in the past mainly due to the OEM not responding or not cooperating with MoD. The failure to ink the acquisition contract for FRA by MoD has led to not only prolonged non availability of the reliable FRA and shortages against the requirement, but also cost escalations with every postponement of the acquisition action. It would be worthwhile to address the issue of inadequate response by the OEMs through Government to Government (G-to-G) route, as done in case of acquisition of Rafale fighter jet fighters in 2014-15.

Summing Up

The need for FRA in the IAF is driven by the strategic imperative to extend operational reach, enhance mission endurance and support the strategic need for power projection. Aerial refuelling acts as a force multiplier, enabling sustained air operations, rapid response to threats and enhanced operational flexibility. While the existing fleet of aerial refueller aircraft provides inadequate AAR capability, there is a pressing need to modernize and expand this capability to meet evolving operational requirements.

Acquiring modern flight refueller aircraft, integrating them into network-centric operations and developing robust training and doctrine are essential steps for enhancing the IAF’s aerial refuelling capabilities. Collaboration with friendly Air Forces and participation in international exercises will further enhance proficiency and interoperability.

The strategic and operational benefits of aerial refuelling extend beyond immediate mission requirements, contributing to India’s broader defense, deterrence and strategic power projection goals. A robust aerial refuelling capability will strengthen the IAF’s operational readiness, support expeditionary operations, and enhance India’s role as a responsible global actor in maintaining regional and international security.

It would therefore be worthwhile to expedite the process of acquisition of the FRA circumventing the bureaucratic red tape and undertaking the complete exercise in the mission mode through G-to-G route.

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Notes:

[1] Rajat Pandit, “India eyes direct purchase of six refuelling aircraft”, The Times of India, July 31, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-eyes-direct-purchase-of-six-refuelling-aircraft/articleshow/53471222.cms, Accessed on July 1, 2024

[2] Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “IAF starts process for procuring six tanker aircraft”, The Economic Times, January 25, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iaf-starts-process-for-procuring-six-tanker-aircraft/articleshow/62654532.cms?from=mdr, Accessed on July 1, 2024

[3] Raunak Kunde, “Aerial Refuelling Frenzy: US and Europe vie for India’s Tanker Deal”, Indian Defence Review Wing (IDRW), https://idrw.org/aerial-refueling-frenzy-us-and-europe-vie-for-indias-tanker-deal/ , Accessed on July 15, 2024

[4] Ranjan Brothers, “Indian Hunt for a 6 Flight Refueller Aircraft (FRA)”, Indian Defence Analysis, August 31, 2023, https://indiandefenseanalysis.wordpress.com/2023/08/31/indian-hunts-for-6-flight-refueler-aircraft-fra/, Accessed on July 1, 2024

[5] AK Sachdev, “IAF Quest for Flight Refueller”, SP’s Aviation, 6/2018, https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=2230&h=IAFs-Quest-for-Flight-Refueller, Accessed on July 1, 2024

[6] BK Pandey, “More Aerial Tankers for Indian Air Force”, SP’s Aviation, 5/2021, https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=2932&h=More-Aerial-Tankers-for-the-Indian-Air-Force, Accessed on July 1, 2024

The post Need for Flight Refueller Aircraft (FRA) and Way Forward appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Commonwealth, Khalistan, Partnership, Terror, Diaspora, Nijjar, Trudeau, Dynamics

Historically, India and Canada share a relationship marked with a mixed dynamics marked by cooperation as well as tension. The bilateral ties between the two democracies have seen significant vacillations in recent years in the geopolitical, economic and socio-political domains. India and Canada have since long enjoyed cordial relations based on shared democratic values, multiculturalism and cooperation in various multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth besides the residency of a large cross-section of Indian diaspora in Canada. But in 2024, the relationship has been found to be navigating through complex waters shaped by diplomatic disputes arising out of Canada’s open support to Khalistan. The recent trigger for bringing the relationship down has been some undesirable statements made by the Canadian Prime Minister in the Canadian House of Commons, following which an advisory for Indian nationals and Indian students in Canada was issued on September 20, 2023 and the visa services for Canadian nationals were temporarily suspended on September 21, 2023[1].

Ironically enough, while there was a need for Canadian government to make conscious efforts to improve the constantly deteriorating relations, the Canadian parliament put another nail in the coffin by observing two minutes silence on June 18, 2024 to commemorate the one-year death anniversary of Khalistani separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar[2]. This actually gave a big jolt to the process of whatever positive thinking could have gone towards improving the deteriorating Indo-Canadian ties.

Economic Relations

The Economic engagements remained one of the significant cornerstones of Indo-Canadian relationship. However, the bilateral trade of goods between India and Canada valued at approximately USD 10.50 billion in 2022 with India’s exports being USD 6.40 billion and India’s imports being a worth USD 4.10 billion sharply declined to USD 7.65 billion with India’s exports pitched at mere USD 4.70 billion besides India’s imports also declining to USD 2.95 billion in 2023, which is considered below the actual potential of business between the two countries [3]. Range wise, India exports pharmaceuticals, textiles, and machinery to Canada, while Canada exports lentils, fertilizers and aerospace products to India. Efforts to diversify the trade algorithm led to negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA)[4]. But no significant progress has been made in respect of these initiatives mainly owing to the constantly deteriorating relations between the two countries.

In the past, on the Energy and Natural Resources front, Canada’s vast natural resources and India’s growing energy needs created a complementary economic partnership with Canada supplying uranium to India’s nuclear energy program, and both countries having explored collaboration in renewable energy sectors such as solar and wind power[5]. Additionally, Canadian companies have been keen on investing in India’s infrastructure projects under initiatives like Smart Cities and Make in India[6].

It is also important to note here that the technology sector has been a significant area of partnership between the two countries. The Canadian tech companies were found investing in India’s burgeoning IT and start up ecosystem, while Indian IT firms established a strong presence in Canada. Initiatives like the India-Canada Innovation Partnership aim to foster joint research and development in fields like artificial intelligence, fintech and clean technology[7]. But the entire spectrum of ties between the two nations is experiencing a downtrend due to various anti-India sentiments voiced by Canadian government in one way or the other.

Diplomatic and Political Ties

The ongoing diplomatic strains have periodically overwrought India-Canada relations, particularly over issues related to the Sikh diaspora and Canadian government’s alleged support to the Khalistani separatist movement in Canada. As a nail in the coffin, the allegations of Indian involvement in the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Khalistani separatist leader in Canada in 2023, led to a significant diplomatic fallout[8]. The world community witnessed the ugly expulsion of the diplomats by India and Canada leading to significantly deteriorating relations.

The political interactions between India and Canada also have been influenced by the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s approach towards India having fluctuated between engagement on one hand and caution on the other, given the influence of the Sikh community in Canadian politics[9]. However, India’s earnest gesture to improve the ties with Canada amidst ongoing tension, needs to be reciprocated by Canada by seizing its support to Khalistani sentiments within its territory.

The Indian diaspora in Canada, constituting one of the largest Indian communities abroad, plays a crucial role in bilateral relations. With over 1.4 million people of Indian origin, the diaspora contributes significantly to Canada’s multicultural fabric through cultural exchanges, academic collaborations and even political lobbying.

Educational exchanges between India and Canada have been healthy in the past, with over 230,000 Indian students having been enrolled in Canadian universities and colleges as of 2023. But the number of Indian students seeking registration in the Canadian universities and colleges has significantly declined by around 40% if the reports in public domain are to be believed[10]. Some sections of print media hinted at decline in the strength of Indian students seeking admission in academic institutions to the tune of even 86% due to the present decline in bilateral relations between India and Canada[11]. This trend further strengthens the belief that the ties between the two nations need a definite improvement.

However, notwithstanding the ongoing deterioration in the ties, the Indian festivals, Tollywood films’ screenings and academic conferences still have a significant fan following in Canada amongst the Indian diaspora.

Security and Strategic Relations

The undesirable and avoidable involvement of Canadian government alongwith some sections of Indian diaspora in issues like the Khalistan movement has subjected the bilateral relations to testing situations.

Therefore, the security cooperation between India and Canada needs to focus upon countering the terrorism and extremism. Infact, both the countries have in the past, expressed concerns about the activities of extremist groups, and there was also an ongoing dialogue to enhance intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism strategies with the joint working group on counter-terrorism providing a platform for deliberating upon the security concerns and coordinating efforts to address them[12]. But the recent developments emanating from Canadian government’s support to ant India activities have created an air of uncertainty in the ties.

The defence cooperation, though limited in scope due to deterioration in the ties, offers opportunities for improvement. India and Canada have engaged in dialogues on defence and security issues, including maritime security and peacekeeping. The potential for collaboration in defence technology and defence trade is being explored, but it remains an underdeveloped area in the bilateral relationship, primarily due to present downtrend in the ties. An MoU between Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) for development of military and defence related technology, infrastructure, training and services was signed in October 2016 which was renewed in 2021[13]. But the progress on the execution of the said MoU needs to be explored and ascertained.

Way Forward

Resolving the irritants related to the Sikh diaspora and Khalistani separatism is beyond any doubt crucial for improving the bilateral relations between India and Canada. Towards this, both the governments need to engage in active dialogue to address the concerns while respecting each other’s sovereignty and legal frameworks.

Besides improving the diplomatic relations, it would also be desirable to strengthen the economic ties through the revival and effective execution of agreements like Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) focusing on sectors like technology, renewable energy and infrastructure which can create mutually beneficial opportunities and make the frameworks for boosting trade and investment between the two nations even stronger.

Further, it would also be desirable to enhance the educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy and mobility programs to foster deeper mutual understanding and collaboration. Initiatives to support the integration of the Indian diaspora in Canadian society while promoting India’s cultural heritage to help improving the bilateral relations.

This apart, balancing the geopolitical interests of India and Canada in context of their respective relationships with major powers like the United States, China, and Russia is essential too. With a cautious approach, both the countries need to navigate these dynamics duly being careful to avoid conflicts so as to enhance their strategic partnership.

Last but not the least, leveraging the multilateral forums to address global challenges and promote shared values possesses the potential to strengthen the deteriorating India-Canada relations.

Conclusion

But any effort in the direction of improving the mutual ties will be subject to cessation of the Canadian government’s support to Khalistan, due to which the India-Canada relationship has already witnessed a downtrend in light of ongoing disputes and controversies. But while the diplomatic tensions, particularly over diaspora-related issues, pose significant hurdles, there also exist numerous opportunities for collaboration in areas such as trade, technology, education, and security. But to improve the ties, Canada first needs to clear its stand by staying away from its support to Khalistan while both the countries engaging in constructive dialogue addressing the contentious issues and building the relationships based on shared interests.

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Notes:

[1] “Brief on India-Canada Bilateral Relations”, MEA Portal, December 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Canada_bilateral-December-2023.pdf, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[2] “Canada Parliament honours Khalistani separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar with Moment of Silence”, The Times of India, June 19, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/canada-parliament-honours-khalistani-separatist-nijjar-with-moment-of-silence/articleshow/111100598.cms, Accessed on June 21, 2024

[3] ibid

[4] “Canada’s 2021 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Model”, Government of Canada, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[5] “Nuclear cooperation between Canada and India”, Government of Canada, https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/resources/news-room/feature-articles/nuclear-agreement-canada-india/, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[6] India Global Business Staff, “Canadian Investors at the forefront of India’s Private Equity and Infrastructure Investment landscape”, January 10, 2020, https://www.indiaglobalbusiness.com/igb-archive/canadian-investors-at-the-forefront-of-indias-private-equity-and-infrastructure-investment-landscape-india-global-business, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[7] Dharmendra Kumar, “Role of foreign investments in India’s thriving startup ecosystem”, Business Standard, June 14, 2024, https://www.business-standard.com/companies/start-ups/role-of-foreign-investments-in-india-s-thriving-startup-ecosystem-124052901562_1.html, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[8] Kallol Bhattacharjee, “Hardeep Singh Nijjar killing | No official communication but Canada informed about arrest of 3 Indian nationals: Centre”, The Hindu, May 9, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/hardeep-singh-nijjar-killing-no-official-communication-but-canada-informed-about-arrest-of-3-indian-nationals-centre/article68157353.ece , Accessed on June 12, 2024

[9] “Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sees shift in India relations after US plot revealed”, The Economic Times, December 20, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/canadian-prime-minister-justin-trudeau-sees-shift-in-india-relations-after-us-plot-revealed-cbc/articleshow/106159978.cms?from=mdr, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[10] “Number of Indian Students applying to study in Canada sees sharp decline, says the report”, Economic Times Education, February 7, 2024, https://education.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/number-of-indian-students-applying-to-study-in-canada-sees-sharp-decline-says-report/107495048, Accessed on June 26, 2024

[11] Saurav Pandey, “Canada lost 86% Indian students in 2023: Which countries could be their next best study destinations abroad?”, Times of India, January 17, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/canada-lost-86-indian-students-in-2023-which-countries-could-be-their-next-best-study-abroad-destinations/articleshow/106920406.cms, Accessed on June 26, 2024

[12] “Framework for Cooperation between India and Canada on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism”, MEA Media Brief, February 14, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29513/Framework+for+Cooperation+between+India+and+Canada+on+Countering+Terrorism+and+Violent+Extremism, Accessed on June 12, 2024

[13] “Brief on India-Canada Bilateral Relations” MEA Brief, December 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Canada_bilateral-December-2023.pdf, Accessed on June 12, 2024

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Author: Colonel PMS Kohli, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: Inflatable Decoys, Deception, Threat Emitters, Russia-Ukraine war

The post Inflatable Decoys: Enhancing Battlefield Survival and Deception appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Strategic Investment, Debt, Economic Crisis, IMF Bailout

Pakistan’s newly elected Prime Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, made his first official visit to China from June 4-8, 2024. As Pakistan is struggling with a dire economic crisis and is in urgent need of a new IMF package, the visit was not just ceremonial. The Pakistani PM hopes to leverage his country’s “higher-than-Himalayas and deeper-than-the-ocean” friendship with China for an even stronger relationship. His delegation included key cabinet ministers like finance and foreign affairs. More than 100 Pakistani business leaders joined PM Sharif on the trip, which featured a convention with Chinese enterprises. Army Chief General Asim Munir was also part of the delegation, which was justified by his position on the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), a group tasked with luring international investments to Pakistan.^[1]

The Pakistani establishment is expecting to include three projects worth 12 billion USD in the CPEC. These include two railways and one hydroelectric power plant. Pakistan has also approved the activation of an escrow account to pay its dues to Chinese power suppliers.^[2]It has also agreed to increase security measures for Chinese nationals in the country. China’s investment in Pakistan, represented by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is motivated by strategic goals. The joint statement issued during the visit reveals a substantial discrepancy that favours China. However, the timing of the visit was curious as it happened in the middle of Pakistan’s budget preparation.

Pakistan’s Escalating Economic Woes

Pakistan’s economy is staggering on the brink of collapse. Inflation has hiked the cost of living unprecedentedly. The situation has become even worse with the failure of bailout talks in February 2023 with the IMF. IMF wants to ensure that the infusion of new funds into Pakistan’s economy is not just utilised to settle China’s debts. This necessitates a Chinese commitment to carry over existing loan payments. The IMF wants this done not just until the end of the year but also until the conclusion of the three-year loan facility that Pakistan is seeking. China has emerged as Pakistan’s largest lender, with a US $30 billion credit to the country. However, there is no transparency in China’s financing scheme. Therefore, the IMF’s scepticism is appropriate.

Pakistan’s current year’s budget is based on a 3.5 per cent growth assumption. The country’s budget cycle runs from July to June. The GDP growth rate in the first quarter (July-October 2023) was 2 per cent. This reduced to 1 per cent in the second quarter (November-February 2023). A falling growth rate indicates that it will be hard to fulfil the target, resulting in a revenue shortfall and a rising fiscal imbalance. Borrowing is required not only to close the balance-of-payments shortfall but also to fund the budget.^[3]

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Shehbaz Sharif’s media briefing before his visit to China held out the likelihood of starting the second phase of the CPEC. The bulk of this financing was extended on commercial terms in exchange for sovereign guarantees. This has worsened Pakistan’s repayment issues. Pakistan would like China to fund the second phase. The joint statement is quiet on China’s response to Pakistan’s request.^[4] For the Pakistanis, the CPEC is a desire to change their lives, and for the Chinese, it’s just another project of the Belt and Road initiative, the big investment scheme China has set up to extensively amplify its trade sphere. According to the Chinese account, CPEC is just a corridor that links Gwadar with Xinjiang. The Pakistani establishment considers the CPEC groundbreaking, but to what degree it can change Pakistan’s ground reality, can only be answered when the project is finalised. The CPEC project might leave Pakistan heavily indebted, and domestic enterprises might be hit hard. This cognisance of the project in the Pakistani society might lead to the anti-China movement in the future. Also, there are significant points of caution for China as well, as Pakistan faces high political risks, and the country ranks notably below the world average in terms of corruption and governance.^[5] Even the long-term planning document of the CPEC drawn up a decade ago by the governments of China and Pakistan said nothing about a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Instead, the document always referred to a Xinjiang-Pakistan Economic Corridor, emphasising its role in linking Pakistan’s economy with one of China’s provincial economies. The document talks about agriculture as a field for cooperation, and that’s only because Xinjiang needs agricultural imports, being a high-altitude area. However, there is no mention of information technology or the energy sector, which are the two priorities mentioned by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. This shows that the Chinese interest is somewhat different from that of the Pakistanis.

From 2015 to 2018, CPEC inflow contributed to a rise in Pakistan’s economic growth, which culminated in a growth rate of approximately 5.8 per cent in the 2018-19 fiscal year. However, it brought some structural variances in the economy. For instance, there was a sharp rise in imports, which led to a balance of payment crisis. Between 2021-22, 80 per cent of Pakistan’s bilateral debt service went to Beijing.^[6] This has been aggravated by the Chinese way of doing business. For instance, Chinese companies, in particular, do not like partnering with local companies, which limits the emergence of new employment opportunities from CPEC projects. Moreover, being duty-free, these companies prefer to import everything from China, including labour, leading to minimal integration with Pakistani business.^[7]

If Pakistan wants money from the IMF, it needs to persuade China to defer the colossal Chinese debt that Pakistan is holding. Even if China does that, it has other problems to think about. Countries across Africa and other parts of the world are facing similar problems. China fears that granting Pakistan a substantial debt reduction could set a precedent for other countries to demand write-offs on loans for economically unviable projects.^[8] China will likely give Shahbaz Shareef some relief but will probably not invest significantly more money into the existing bad investments that are not generating any returns. As nation-states seek to use investments and trade as instruments of their national power, they need to be aware that cold commercial calculations will eventually catch up with fantasy.

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Notes:

^[1]  Aneesh P., “Shehbaz Sharif’s Chinese Treasure Hunt”, Observer Research Foundation, June 29, 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/shehbaz-sharif-s-chinese-treasure-hunt.

^[2] Sarah Zaman, “Key Takeaways from Pakistani PM’s Visit to China”, Voice of America, June 10, 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/key-takeaways-of-pakistani-pm-visit-to-china/7650244.html. Accessed on July 01, 2024.

^[3] D P Srivastava, “Shehbaz Sharif’s Visit to China Amid a Worsening Pak Economy Is Not Just About Convention”, The Wire, June 20, 2024, https://thewire.in/south-asia/shehbaz-sharifs-visit-to-china-amid-a-worsening-pak-economy-is-not-just-about-convention. Accessed on July 02, 2024.

^[4] Abid H., “Sharif’s Beijing Trip: Can China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Be Revived?” Aljazeera, June 03, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/3/sharifs-beijing-trip-can-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-be-revived. Accessed on July 02, 2024.

^[5] Osama Ahmad, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan Has Met Roadblocks in Development and Has Heightened Longstanding Tensions in the Region”, Stimpson Center, August 18, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/ten-years-of-cpec-a-decade-of-disappointments/.

^[6] Abdul Khaliq, “Pakistan’s Debt from China Becomes Burden as CPEC Does Not Generate Enough Growth”, Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, May 16, 2023, https://www.cadtm.org/Pakistan-s-debt-from-China-becomes-burden-as-CPEC-does-not-generate-enough.

^[7] Bhaswar K., “No CPEC 2.0? China Gives Pakistan Cold Shoulder on New Major Investments”, BusinessStandard, May 16, 2023, https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/no-cpec-2-0-china-gives-pakistan-cold-shoulder-on-new-major-investments-124061100975_1.html. Accessed on July 02, 2024.

^[8] SOUMYA B., “Forgotten Promises: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, Observer Research Foundation, June 15, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/forgotten-promises-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor.

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