Keywords: MAHASAGAR, Mozambique Channel, Island Countries, Western Indian Ocean, India’s Maritime Engagement

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as a contested space among various nearby and distant players, and this trend is expected to continue in the future. India has historically maintained strong ties in the region and must continue to exert its influence while adapting to changing circumstances. A review of India’s interactions with the island countries of the Indian Ocean reveals a disjointed approach to collaboration with the East African island nations, particularly with Madagascar and the Comoros. However, the expansion of India’s maritime approach from Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across the Regions (MAHASAGAR) appears to adopt an integrating approach. A significant increase in defence engagements, including visits and exercises, reflects this reality and suggests a more promising and comprehensive future for India as it seeks to balance asserting its influence and leadership role while being the first responder in the Indian Ocean.

Resurgence of the Mozambique Channel in the Twenty-First Century

The location of the East African Islands in the vicinity of the Mozambique Channel amplifies their geostrategic and geoeconomic significance. Until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which reduced the distance between Europe and Asia, the Mozambique Channel was the primary facilitator of trade between the East and the West. The resurgence of this important chokepoint, located between Madagascar to the East and Mozambique to the West in the twenty-first century, is attributed to several factors, including economic, strategic, and ecological.

First, the continuously evolving nature of challenges at sea and the consequential traction it has generated among different players in the IOR to make sure the region remains free and open. Not that the issues were previously absent. However, the advancements in technology have altered the nature, intensity, and scale of these challenges. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since October 2023 exemplify a growing threat, as the use of missiles and drones to target global shipping is intensifying the need for increased presence, attention, and interest from various regional and distant powers whose goods pass through the region. Iran’s threat warnings to disrupt shipping through the Straits of Hormuz have added another layer to the disruption of both trade and trust. To this end, a scholar from an American think-tank noted that Iran has naval mines, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and missiles in its arsenal to disrupt global shipping from the Straits of Hormuz. [1] While the possibility of it remains low, it cannot be sidelined. Any disruption to the vital chokepoints in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), like the Bab-el Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea or the Straits of Hormuz, will divert traffic to the third and less critical channel, the Mozambique Channel, until now. This means more countries, more struggle, in less geographical space.

Second, the Mozambique Channel is rich in hydrocarbon reserves and various rare earth minerals. Although some resources, like the swathes of natural gas deposits in the northern section, have been identified — where India also has interests — many areas, particularly in the southern part, remain largely unexplored. Madagascar has the sixth-largest reserves of rare earth elements, which are the foundation of many cutting-edge technologies. Minerals like dysprosium, neodymium, and europium are among the most sought-after minerals found abundantly in Antananarivo, after Beijing. China has already made significant inroads in this sector, alongside other Western players, including Singapore, Russia, the US, Australia, Brazil, and others. Some Indian industries have also invested, while others are exploring opportunities to enhance cooperation in this regard further.

Third, the WIO is also a fertile and favourable ground for fisheries due to the meeting of the cold Benguela Current and the warm Agulhas Current. However, this has led to the problem of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing by foreign vessels in the region. It has further disturbed the symbiotic relationship between fisheries and corals, thereby leaving the larger ecosystem under stress. According to the Red List of Ecosystems, the reefs in East and South Madagascar, the Comoros, and the Mascarene Islands are classified as critically endangered and require improvement in local fisheries management. [2] This is in addition to the other challenges that the region is infested with, like piracy, drug smuggling, and others.

The three factors underscore the region’s significance not just for India but also for other countries whose involvement may influence the outcome in the region. In this backdrop, the expansion of India’s maritime policy from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR is a signal towards inclusivity and mutuality, and a step in the right direction. For a long time, New Delhi took a fragmented and scattered approach to its relations with the island countries. However, recognising that the region is increasingly vulnerable to external pressures and is likely to be entangled in the broader competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific, as well as India and China in the Indian Ocean, India is now moving decisively to advance its ambitions.

To this end, India’s timely initiatives, such as conducting the first edition of the Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) exercise, which brings together all four East African island countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles), along with other countries, are an example of a collaborative effort to address maritime challenges and ensure interoperability. [3] Further facilitating cohesion between the navies of all the island countries in the IOR, New Delhi deployed INS Sunayna for its Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR initiative that includes joint training and surveillance, and port calls. [4] While India now attempts to evenly spread its gaze across the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean, as it takes the island countries together, it is likely to meet many distant and proximate powers on the way with both divergences and convergences. Choosing the right set of friends and navigating the path of MAHASAGAR will shape the next decade of India’s maritime engagements in its backyard.

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Notes

[1] “Four questions (and expert answers) about Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz,” The Atlantic Council, June 23, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/. Accessed on July 20, 2025.

[2] “Coral reefs in the Western Indian Ocean at high risk of collapse,” Red List of Ecosystems, December 06, 2021, https://iucnrle.org/news/coral-reefs-in-the-western-indian-ocean-at-high-risk-of-collapse. Accessed on July 15, 2025.

[3] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) 2025 Inauguration,” April 13, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121521#:~:text=by%20PIB%20Delhi-,The%20Africa%20India%20Key%20Maritime%20Engagement%20(AIKEYME)%202025%20was%20inaugurated,regional%20cooperation%22%20beyond%20military%20affairs. Accessed on April 10, 2025.

[4] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiatives of Indian Ocean Ship Sagar (Ios Sagar)        and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME),” March 24, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2114491#:~:text=A%20large%20scale%20multilateral%20maritime,Arms%20firing%20and%20Helicopter%20Operations. Accessed on June 10, 2025.

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Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Sweida, Druze

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 08, 2024, Israel has been upping-the-ante on Syria to prevent the new government from gaining power. Their aim includes stopping chemical weapons from being acquired by the new government, destroying all modern military equipment and maintaining control over the Golan Heights. Over the past six months, Israel has destroyed most of Syria’s Air Defence (AD) assets, key missile infrastructure and networks, a so-called stockpile of chemical weapons, Scud weapon systems, Syrian military infrastructure and Syrian naval assets. The Israeli attacks aimed to establish a “sterile defence zone” in Southern Syria, which would be enforced without a permanent troop presence. The objectives included the destruction of strategic weapons and military infrastructure to prevent their use by rebel groups associated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. ¹ As a result, Israel had gradually managed to increase the amount of territory under its control in Syria and weaken the new government.

Since July 14, 2025, Israel has launched a series of fresh attacks on Syria, striking the Headquarters of the Syrian Army in Damascus, a compound that also houses the Ministry of Defence. They also struck the Presidential Palace and continued to demolish military infrastructure. This has primarily been in support of the Druze population inhabiting the Golan Heights and the city of Sweida.

The Druze are a religious sect that originated as a 10^th century offshoot of Ismailism, a branch of Shia Islam, and comprise a minority community in Syria. ^[1] Roughly half of its one million followers live in Syria, in a province called Sweida (Suwayda) and makeup about three per cent of the Syrian population. The Sweida province is located in south and south-west Syria, adjoining the Golan Heights and is considered loyal to Israel. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, around 1,52,000 Druze people live in Israel and the Israel-occupied Golan Heights and serve as an effective buffer between Israel and Syria. ^[2] In response, Israel intensified its airstrikes and called for the complete withdrawal of Syrian forces from Druze areas.

What started as a skirmish between Bedouin tribes and the Druze population on July 13, 2025, soon escalated into a clash, killing over 200 Druze people. In response, Israel intensified its airstrikes and called for a complete withdrawal of Syrian forces from Druze areas. ^[3] After three days of relentless attacks, the Syrian government has unequivocally agreed to halt all military operations, commence withdrawal from Sweida and also agreed to form a committee comprising government representatives and Druze spiritual leaders to supervise the ceasefire agreement. ^[4]

The Israeli attacks have brought out certain interesting observations that can be juxtaposed with other scenarios and lessons drawn. Whilst enjoying complete air superiority in Syria, the latest series of attacks have primarily been on Military Headquarters (HQ) and the Presidential Palace. What does this show? What can be drawn from such attacks? What is the effectiveness of such attacks? Can such attacks be replicated across other war zones? These are only a few questions this paper seeks to analyse.

(a)          Strategic Targeting for Tactical Results:          While Israel has an underlying motive in ensuring a peaceful Southern Syria, a seemingly innocuous skirmish like the one in Sweida made Israel attack strategic targets to get tactical results. This is possible when one enjoys complete freedom of operations and unopposed air superiority. However, what is of interest here is that a tactical action may have strategic ramifications. In Israel’s strategic calculus, Sweida is significant enough to warrant strategic targeting.

(b)          Urban Warfare and Escalation Control:           Urban warfare is here to stay, and therefore, there is a need for specialised weapons and aircraft for the same. Long-range, standoff precision munitions in large quantities will need to become a part of the conventional arsenal. The large-scale use of unguided area bombing may not yield the required results. However, high-value urban targets such as political and military leadership, critical infrastructure and strategic targets can have debilitating effects on the adversary when struck. The threat of targeting them can also demonstrate the capability to control the escalation matrix.

(c)          Importance of Continued Suppression/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD):          The Israeli Air Force has repeatedly been hitting Syrian Air and Missile defences and has practically neutralised Syrian AD capability and gained air superiority over Syrian airspace. This has given the IDF multiple options for responding to situations and enabled freedom of operation for air, sea, and land forces. The practically non-existent AD also allowed Israel the use of Syrian airspace during its strikes on Iran in June 2025.

(d)          Political Signalling and Coercive Diplomacy:        Syrian strikes, as well as operations like Op-Sindoor, have increasingly demonstrated the efficacy of air power as a tool for Political Signalling. The Syrian air strikes were meant to force the Syrian government to withdraw from Southern Syria, demonstrating inherent coercive capability, forcing them to the negotiating table and restoring peace.

(e)          Air Superiority and the need for Constant Presence:          Israel has been systematically targeting Syrian AD for six months, but not continuously. With effective Electronic Warfare (EW), a well-planned SEAD plan, and good Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Counter Air Operations (CAO) can be carried out without relying on traditional methods. They could be parallel or simultaneous, need-based and carried out using precision, long-range, standoff weapons, thereby not requiring constant presence and significantly reducing sortie generation rates.

(f)           Short and Swift Wars:       While the world is witnessing long-drawn conflicts in Russia and Israel, the world has also witnessed short, intense, and swift conflicts like the Indo-Pak skirmish and the Sweida imbroglio. Therefore, drawing templates would not be correct as the duration of the conflict would be decided by many interlinked factors. One factor that emerges is that a well-planned and graduated air campaign has the potential to shape adversarial behaviour without triggering escalation into a full-blown conventional conflict.

(g)          Importance of Information Dominance:           The timing, effects, and results of aerial attacks must be a part of the information dominance matrix. Building narratives and shaping perceptions are essential for success in all domains of warfighting. Therefore, air strikes must be leveraged to get the desired effect in the information domain. The latest live stream showing a Syrian newsreader shaken up by Israeli strikes on the Syrian Ministry of Defence sends an important message, also showcasing Israeli precision strike capability. Modern air operations must incorporate information dominance as part of their overall plan to achieve maximum effect.

A peaceful South Syria is beneficial to Israel in the long run, warranting strategic action in response to tactical issues. As Robert Kaplan has very succinctly said in his book ‘The Revenge of Geography’, “This means that a small state in the midst of adversaries, such as Israel, has to be particularly passive, or particularly aggressive, in order to survive. It is primarily a matter of geography.” Geography will ultimately determine the actions a nation takes to safeguard its interests; therefore, if a tactical action warrants a strategic response, it must be done. What does India’s geography teach us, and what more needs to be done is food for thought because, as they say, “Maps, in other words, can be dangerous tools. And yet they are crucial to any understanding of world politics.” ^[5] To take a leaf out of the book and adapt our strategy around it would help us understand the nuances of war fighting in the West and North of us, and also bring out instances or areas of interest where strategic actions would be called for in response to tactical actions.

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Notes

^[1] “Syria vs Druze: How did Israel get involved?” Firstpost,  July 17, 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/syria-druze-israel-bombings-ceasefire-explained-13907782.html. Accessed on July 17, 2025.

^[2] Tess Mallinder Heron,  “Who are the Druze and Why is Israel Attacking Syria?,” BBC, July 17, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70xyv4z74go.  Accessed on July 19, 2025.

^[3] Ibid. Accessed on July 17, 2025.

^[4] Ibid. Accessed on July 18, 2025.

^[5] Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012), p 5.

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Keywords: Russia, Afghanistan, Taliban, Recognition

On Christmas Eve in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, dramatically altering the global and regional balance of power. To counter the Soviets, America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), created the mujahideen to wage jihad against the Soviet Union. After nearly a decade of conflict, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving prominent mujahideen groups to battle among themselves. This internecine fighting paved the way for the rise of the Taliban movement. Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, did not stay away from Afghanistan for long. It began supporting the Northern Alliance, a conglomeration of anti-Taliban groups, primarily to counter the Taliban’s financial, diplomatic, and weapons support to Chechen fighters. Fast forward to today, on July 03, 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan, sparking fresh debate over what this act symbolises and whether other countries would follow in its footsteps. ^[1]

Moscow‘s Gradual Rapprochement with the Taliban

Although the news of Moscow’s decision may have arrived earlier than anticipated by the global community, it was hardly surprising. This had been in the making for a while. In December 2024, Russia’s lower house of Parliament, the State Duma, approved a bill to delist the Taliban from the country’s federal list of terrorist organisations, a status the group held since 2003. ^[2] President Vladimir Putin then approved this bill. Subsequently, following a petition by Russia’s Prosecutor General, the Supreme Court lifted the more than two-decade-long ban on the Taliban on April 17, 2025. ^[3] Ultimately, these developments culminated in Russia legitimising the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and accepting the credentials of a Taliban ambassador, with the ‘Shahada‘ flag being hoisted at Afghanistan’s embassy in Moscow. ^[4]

Even before officially delisting the Taliban and legitimising their rule, Russia was already engaging with them in multifarious ways. It was one of the few countries to keep its embassy in Kabul open during the Taliban takeover in August 2021. By September 2022, Russia had signed an economic deal with the Taliban (the first nation to do so), agreeing to supply oil, wheat and gas to Afghanistan. ^[5] Expectedly, there are hopes that Russia’s latest move will boost bilateral trade volume with Afghanistan, which, according to the Taliban’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce, amounted to USD 12.42 billion in 2024. ^[6] Besides, since their return to power, the Taliban have marked their attendance at several Russia-led forums, from the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), with the latest being the 16^th Kazan Economic Forum in May 2025. ^[7] Consequently, Russia emerged as a key interlocutor for deliberations on Afghanistan, a role formerly held by the United States (US); the West’s weariness with Afghanistan-related issues only allowed Moscow to increase its influence in the region.

It is worth noting that although Russia’s purported aims include collaboration on infrastructure, energy pipelines and agriculture projects, and while these are no doubt true to some extent, its primary driver for recognition is to address the threat posed by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), which was implicated in the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack. Russia seeks to prevent any spillover from Afghanistan’s narcotics trafficking and the presence of various transnational terror groups therein into Central Asia, a region that has historically fallen within its natural sphere of influence. In this context, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has expressed interest in arming the Taliban. ^[8] Notably, rumours of Russia arming the Taliban had surfaced as early as 2017, evidenced by statements from General John Nicholson, then-commander of the US-led international forces. ^[9] However, doubts persist regarding the Taliban’s capability to effectively counter ISKP, raising questions about the utility of Russia’s decision. This scepticism is not without merit. Nevertheless, Russia may be aiming to gain more stakes in the Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts against the ISKP. Additionally, Russia’s broader objective of regaining its lost global and regional influence—especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and in light of Western sanctions imposed due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war—possibly played a role in the Kremlin’s calculations while recognising the Taliban.

Will Others Follow Suit?

During their first stint in power (1996-2001), the Taliban were recognised by only three countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Although no country other than Russia has taken the significant step of formally recognising the Taliban’s second term, many maintain diplomatic relations with its regime. For instance, the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have removed the Taliban from their lists of proscribed terrorist organisations. Meanwhile, China, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates have officially accepted ambassadors appointed by the Taliban. Reportedly, the Taliban have sent their diplomats to numerous other countries and are believed to be overseeing Afghanistan’s embassies abroad, although further clarity on this matter remains pending. Pakistan, whose intelligence agency had facilitated the Taliban’s return to power but whose relations with the group have since soured due to its support for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), only recently upgraded its Chargé d’Affaires in Kabul to the rank of Ambassador. ^[10]

India has deployed a technical team in its Kabul embassy, and in May 2025 (post Operation Sindoor), its Foreign Minister spoke with his Taliban counterpart, marking the first ministerial-level engagement between Afghanistan and India since August 2021. ^[11] On the other hand, the West, particularly the US, has made progress in women’s rights and greater inclusivity within the Taliban’s rank-and-file a prerequisite for some degree of high-level engagement and recognition, even as it continues to engage with the group to deliver humanitarian aid, which has notably witnessed a steep decline. ^[12] However, Russia’s recent actions may prompt the West to recalibrate its strategy toward Afghanistan, perhaps even find a delicate balance between pressuring the Taliban to improve human rights and engaging with them to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people.

Although Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi is hoping that Russia’s recognition will serve as an example for other countries, it remains to be seen whether regional states will follow suit. Beijing welcomed Moscow’s decision, stating that it “has always believed that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community”, while Pakistan cautiously described it as “a matter between two sovereign states.” ^[13] Given Pakistan’s strained ties with the Taliban, Islamabad may dangle the carrot of recognition until the group takes concrete steps to rein in the TTP—a factor Beijing will likely weigh in its decision matrix. Still, recognition from regional players cannot be ruled out.

Broader Implications

Notwithstanding Russia’s underlying rationale for taking this step, it unarguably signifies a breakdown of the international consensus that no state would recognise the Taliban without concessions on human and women’s rights. Recognition remains one of the few levers vis-à-vis the Taliban, and this move risks setting a precedent for other countries to pursue self-serving foreign policies at the expense of Afghans. This is not to suggest states should avoid the Taliban. In fact, experts caution against isolating the Taliban, since this could vindicate their perception of the world being against them, potentially leading them to impose harsher restrictions on the Afghan populace. Instead, pragmatic engagement, especially with relatively moderate Taliban leaders, has been advocated as a means to gradually encourage the Taliban to adapt to contemporary governance norms. This becomes especially significant given the existing chasm between Taliban leaders in Kabul and Kandahar; the former are less in favour of the latter’s hardline edicts on women’s rights, leading some to suggest that this internal divide can, indeed, be strategically leveraged.

Remarkably, there are signs that today’s Taliban differs from their mid-1990s iteration: they are less reclusive, have embraced the Internet, and are keener on international engagement, seeking to boost trade and diplomatic relations with several countries of their own volition. These factors, coupled with their rule being a hard reality, make it increasingly difficult for the world to ignore them, rendering some form of engagement vital. As states look toward deepening their engagement with the Taliban, it might be worthwhile to clearly outline the expectations and deliverables they seek from the group. Equally crucial here is conducting a dispassionate assessment of the Taliban’s ability and willingness to fulfil these commitments.

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Notes

^[1] Mark Trevelyan, “Russia becomes first country to recognise Taliban government of Afghanistan,” Reuters, July 04, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-becomes-first-country-recognise-taliban-government-afghanistan-2025-07-03/. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[2] Aleksei Zakharov, “Delisting the Taliban: What’s Driving Moscow’s New Afghanistan Policy?,” Observer Research Foundation, April 28, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/delisting-the-taliban-what-s-driving-moscow-s-new-afghanistan-policy. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[3] Ibid. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[4] Habib Mohammadi, “Taliban flag raised in Moscow as Russia grants formal recognition,” Amu TV, July 03, 2025, https://amu.tv/184365/. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[5] Mohammad Yunus Yawar and Charlotte Greenfield, “Afghan Taliban sign deal for Russian oil products, gas and wheat,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/exclusive-afghan-taliban-sign-deal-russian-oil-products-gas-wheat-2022-09-27/. Accessed on July 08, 2025.

^[6] Setara Qudosi, “Afghanistan’s trade volume surpasses $12 billion in 2024: Statement,” Amu TV, January 05, 2025, https://amu.tv/148780/. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[7] “Mullah Baradar Leads Taliban Delegation to Kazan Economic Forum in Tatarstan,” Afghanistan International, May 14, 2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202505143808. Accessed on July 09, 2025.

^[8] Hayatullah Rahimi, “Kabulov: Russia Should Arm the Taliban Against ISIS,” TOLOnews, July 02, 2025, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-194855. Accessed on July 06, 2025.

^[9] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Russia is sending weapons to Taliban, top U.S. general confirms,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/04/24/russia-is-sending-weapons-to-taliban-top-u-s-general-confirms/. Accessed on July 05, 2025.

^[10] Tahir Khan, “Kabul also levels up to its Pakistan diplomat to ambassador as ties see ‘normalisation‘,” Dawn, May 31, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1914506. Accessed on July 08, 2025.

^[11] Kallol Bhattacherjee, “In a first, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar talks to Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi,” The Hindu, May 16, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-a-first-external-affairs-minister-jaishankar-talks-to-talibans-acting-foreign-minister-muttaqi/article69580713.ece. Accessed on July 08, 2025.

^[12] Graeme Smith, “Rethinking Talks with the Taliban,” International Crisis Group, April 18, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/rethinking-talks-taliban. Accessed on July 16, 2025.

^[13]  Anwesha Ghosh, “Taliban Gains First Official Recognition as Russia Steps Forward,” Indian Council of World Affairs, July 10, 2025, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=13229&lid=8064. Accessed on July 16, 2025.

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Author: Ms Radhey Tambi, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: India and Maldives, China and Maldives, Neighbourhood First and Maldives, MAHASAGAR, Free Trade Agreement.

The post Lessons from ‘India Out’ to ‘India In’ appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Axiom-4, Shubhanshu Shukla, Mission Gaganyaan, Covid-19

The Mission Axiom-4’s long-awaited journey to the International Space Station (ISS) began on June 25, 2025, at 2:31 am (Eastern Time). The mission lifted off using the SpaceX Falcon-9 rocket and the Dragon Spacecraft. The precise venue for the launch was Launch Complex 39A at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Kennedy Space Center, situated in Florida. ^[1]

From India’s perspective, this mission launch was extremely crucial as it marked the first time in 41 years that an Indian had the opportunity to travel to outer space. Although astronauts like Kalpana Chawla and Sunita Williams had been to outer space, it is worth noting that they were not representing India in their respective missions. So, in that sense, India’s Shubhanshu Shukla has become the second Indian after Rakesh Sharma to go on a crewed mission to outer space and the first to reach the ISS. During Rakesh Sharma’s voyage to outer space, the ISS hadn’t come into existence, as it only became operational in 1998.

For India, this mission is seen as a prequel to the much-awaited Mission Gaganyaan– India’s first human spaceflight mission to outer space. This mission was announced by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, on India’s 72^nd Independence Day in 2018 from the Red Fort in his address to the nation. Then, the launch date for the mission was set for August 15, 2022. The reason for choosing this specific date was that on this day, India would complete 75 years as an independent nation-state. The policymakers must have thought that if Mission Gaganyaan were to be launched on that day, it would enhance the feelings of patriotism among citizens and give them a new reason to cheer and smile.

As they say, life has different plans than one’s own. Unfortunately, this plan was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic brought systemic disruption on a global scale, affecting global supply chains, thereby leaving its impact across various industries. In such difficult circumstances, it was but natural that the Mission Gaganyaan would get delayed. Multiple waves of COVID-19 from the start of 2020 until 2022, along with new variants of the virus, continued to push back the timelines for the Mission Gaganyaan. In hindsight, this might have been a blessing in disguise, as there is now no set launch date for this mission, unlike earlier.  Although 2027 is earmarked for the launch, the timeline is subject to change depending on prevailing circumstances.

India’s participation in Mission Axiom-4 was a result of a collaboration between India and the United States. The mission was envisaged during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the United States in 2023. During his meeting with Joe Biden, the then-President of the United States, it was agreed upon to send an Indian astronaut to the ISS as part of a broader Indo-US bilateral partnership. Last month, an Indian delegation led by the Indian Space and Research Organisation (ISRO), chairman visited the United States, traveling to the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at Merritt Island, Florida, and various facilities of SpaceX, Axiom Space, and Blue Origin.

As per ISRO, “The larger purpose of this visit was to meet with the senior leadership of multiple agencies to oversee the progress and preparation, and to facilitate and enable India’s participation in the Axiom-04 mission, as well as explore new cooperation opportunities in the space sector”. The timing of this high-profile delegation’s visit coincided with the launch of Mission Axiom-4, which had been delayed multiple times over a four-week period, starting from May 29, when the launch was initially scheduled.

India’s two astronauts, Shubhanshu Shukla and Prashanth B. Nair, selected for this mission, underwent extensive training exercises at multiple simulator facilities. These training modules prepared them to be ready for each and every aspect of this mission. Although this is just a two-week mission for Shubhanshu Shukla, the sheer experience gained from this will hopefully help India in its preparations for Mission Gaganyaan. Outer space requires intensive physical training and considerable physical and mental effort. This mission will be a massive learning experience in that pursuit. No number of simulation exercises on the ground can match a live experience in outer space.

India has never been a participant in the space race, nor does it intend to participate in it now. However, space exploration has been a part of India’s space policy since the Cold War era. The Axiom-4 mission is precisely a pursuit of that step. When Shubhanshu Shukla returns home, it will be a good time to assess and reflect on the lessons learnt from this mission.

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Notes

^[1] Mark A. Garcia, “Axiom’s Fourth Private Mission Launches to Station Aboard Dragon,” NASA, June 25, 2025, https://www.nasa.gov/blogs/spacestation/2025/06/25/axioms-fourth-private-mission-launches-to-station-aboard-dragon/. Accessed on June 30, 2025.

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Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Bunker Buster, B2 Bombers, Operation Midnight Hammer

Introduction

Operation Midnight Hammer, was launched jointly by the United States Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN) attacking the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center in Iran on June 22, 2025. The American bombers flew for 18 hours from mainland USA, joined up with 4^th and 5^th generation fighters acting as sweeps and escorts and delivered their load on the intended targets before returning to the US.

Suppression/destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) operations, deception and decoy attacks, and Electronic Warfare (EW) were carried out prior to the main attack. Remarkably, throughout the entire mission, the potent Iranian Air Defence (AD) remained inactive, with not a single Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) being launched either during ingress or egress. Either the Israelis paralysed the entire AD system of Iran during Operation Rising Lion (most probable), or the USA caught them by surprise (a remote possibility, especially with the Israel-Iran War going on), or the Iranians chose not to fire. Whatever the reason, it is certainly something that warrants further discussion and analysis.

Historical Timeline

Iran’s armed forces consist of two separate, parallel militaries – the Artesh (established in 1921), which is the regular force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), formed from armed militias during the 1979 revolution. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, under the Artesh, evolved into the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF), the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN). ^[1] The Artesh, which pre-dated the revolution, focused on defence against external threats. At the same time, the IRGC was created to defend the Islamic regime and Islamic system of government from foreign and domestic threats. In 1985, the IRGC was divided into the IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF), the IRGC Air Force (IRGCAF) and the IRGC Navy (IRGCN). In 2008, the Khatemolanbia Air Defence Headquarters (KADHQ) was established within IRIAF to oversee the Air Defence requirements of Iran. In 2009, IRGCAF was renamed the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF). In 2019, the KADHQ was elevated to the Artesh HQ, with the Artesh Air Defence Force subsequently renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force (IRIADF). ^[2]

The IRIADF

The IRIADF consists of approximately 15,000 active personnel and features a mix of legacy and modern equipment. The IRIADF is responsible for protecting the Iranian airspace from aircraft, drones and incoming missiles. While less advanced than Western or Russian systems such as the US Patriot and Russia’s S-400, Iran’s domestically developed systems have shown significant progress over the last two decades. Some key elements of IRIADF include the Arman Long-Range Air Defence System, the Azarakhsh Low-Altitude Air Defence System, the Khordad-15 Air Defence System, the Bavar 373 Missile Defence System, and the S-300 Missile Defence System. ^[3] These systems are integrated into the C2 architecture for quick response to any emerging threat. Details of a few newly inducted systems available in the open source are as follows: –

(a)        Arman, Long Range Air Defence System: Unveiled to the world on
February 17, 2024, it is a long-range air defence system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. In English, Arman means “Aspiration”. The system can simultaneously engage six targets at a range of 120 to 180 km. ^[4] The system utilises Iran’s indigenously manufactured Sayyad-3 class of missiles and has two versions: one with a passive radar and the other with an active radar.

(b)        Azarakhsh, Low Altitude Air Defence System: Unveiled to the world on
February 17, 2024, Azarakhsh (lightning) is a low-altitude AD system that can simultaneously use radar and electro-optic systems to detect and intercept targets. The system utilises heat-seeking missiles (IR) to lock onto targets, including missiles and aircraft. ^[5]

(c)        Khordad-15 Air Defence System: The Khordad-15 was developed by the Iran Aviation Industries Organisation (IAIO) and unveiled to the world in June 2019. The system was designed to detect and intercept a range of aerial threats, including fighters, stealth targets, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and Cruise Missiles using Sayyad-3 missiles. ^[6]

(d)        Bavar-373 Missile Defence System: The Bavar-373 represents a significant advancement in Iran’s air defence capabilities. It is a long-range, road-mobile SAM system developed in August 2016. The name Bavar-373 carries a symbolic meaning, translating to “Belief”, with 373 representing a numerical equivalent to “O, Messenger of Allah” in Abjad numerals. ^[7] It is believed to be an Iranian equivalent of the S-300 system of Russia and also has an upgraded version believed to be equivalent to the S-400 system.

(e)        S-300 Missile Defence System: The S-300 missile defence system is a formidable asset in Iran’s arsenal. Capable of tracking and intercepting airborne threats 300 km away, the system can also engage ballistic missiles. The Iranian configuration features a surveillance radar for search, a command vehicle for target identification and launch orders, an engagement radar for missile guidance and six launch vehicles capable of firing two missiles each. ^[8] Russia delivered the system to Iran in November 2016, marking a significant milestone in the development of Iran’s AD network and infrastructure.

(f)         Radar and Command Systems: Iran’s missile defence network relies on an extensive array of radars and sensors. Indigenous radars like Ghadir and Sepehr can detect targets up to 1,000 km and are integrated into a centralised Command and Control (C2) system, enabling real-time coordination of air and missile defences. Coordination of national-level AD is the responsibility of KADHQ, which controls Iran’s AD C2, surveillance radars, SAM systems and a network of visual observation posts. While C2 is centralised during peacetime at the National Air Defence Operations Centre, it can become decentralised for operations, transferring decision-making authority down to a network or the regional Sector Operations Centres (SOCs), which may be either static or mobile. SOCs manage AD operations within their areas of responsibility and coordinate with adjacent sectors to ensure seamless integration and continuity of operations.

(g)        Analysis: The Iranian AD system is a small and potent organisation capable of taking on a wide variety of threats. A mix of legacy and modern systems, on paper, the AD system appears to be very capable but has not been battle-proven. The system also has limited capabilities when compared to the modern Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) due to severe technological constraints resulting from various sanctions imposed on Iran over the last few decades. Iran primarily relies on Russia and China for the import of technology. The airborne AD assets of Iran are “few and far between”. Being one of the few countries still operating the F-14A/AM Tomcat, the IRIAF also has the vintage MiG-29 in its arsenal, making its airborne AD a relatively underdeveloped and ineffective system. The system may not be fully capable of withstanding a strike of the magnitude and scale of the US’s Operation Midnight Hammer. However, it will have the capability to inflict limited damage on the attacking forces. Iran should have extensively used its indigenously developed AD systems during the strikes but failed to fire even a single shot. The S-300 is a reasonably potent system with long-range capability. Why did this system also fail to fire?

The main reason for the failure of AD appears to be the systematic dismantling of the entire AD network by Israel from the time the war started. Since June 12, 2025, Israel has established air supremacy over Iran with very little prohibitive interference, and the Israeli forces have been enjoying complete freedom of operations in Iranian air space. Israel destroyed all major Iranian AD systems (80 batteries) in the first two days of the Israel-Iran War (Operation Rising Lion), and Iran was left with only passive measures like camouflage and concealment, dispersion and hardened underground structures to defend itself. ^[9] With the Iranian AD system paralysed, why would the US forces fly in with a force structure as large as 125 aircraft??

Challenges and Limitations

The Iranian AD system faces many significant challenges and limitations. The system is quite old, with newer technology being slowly introduced. The system lacks a comprehensive, multi-layered architecture, a hallmark of modern AD and C2 systems. Iran faces a severe constraint in accessing modern technology, primarily due to the numerous sanctions imposed on it. These technological constraints have limited their system’s ability to meet global standards, significantly affecting its range, response, and effectiveness. Iran has significant dependencies on foreign suppliers, mainly Russia, which has limited its autonomy and delayed upgradations. Spare support and supply chain management have also deteriorated over the years, thereby affecting the overall capability of the AD network. The system could easily have been saturated due to the inherent architecture of the network. Overall, the system is highly reactive but may not be able to engage a large-scale strike using modern weapons and aircraft. In addition, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the system had already been targeted by Israel in the preceding days, making it more vulnerable, almost non-existent, on the day of the main attack by the US forces.

Lessons Learnt

There are many important takeaways from this operation, both in terms of AD and C2. Some key takeaways are being listed and discussed.

(a)       Requirement of a Modern IADS: There is no denying the fact that a robust and effective modern IADS is required, one that can detect and engage the entire gamut of targets, ranging from small drones and quadcopters to ballistic and hypersonic missiles. However, no system has yet been developed which can take on the entire spectrum of threats. Ingenuity, innovativeness and smart integration have the potential to create a system close to a utopian one. A mix of legacy and modern systems with varied capabilities would need to be networked to create a system of systems capable of addressing the majority of perceived threats.

(b)        Indigenous Development: AD systems often have very niche technology embedded into them. From detection and identification to decision and action, there is a need to develop this technology in-house. The four key processes of AD- namely, Detection, Identification, Interception, and Destruction- need to be infused with indigenous technology to avoid compromising effectiveness in times of need. Modern systems utilise Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data for each of the four functions, and the roles of the indigenous industry and academia have become increasingly crucial.

(c)        Mass, Mix and Mobility: Smart and modern AD systems are an amalgamation of different calibres of weapons in terms of range and altitude of engagements (mass). The system must also incorporate a mix of varied guidance and homing capabilities to mitigate the effects of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Attack (EA). The system must also be a mix of different vintages because no country can afford to have only modern weapons in its arsenal. This mix would ensure that the adversary is always thinking of a suitable counter to a varied inventory, which may be difficult to carry on limited platforms. The network also needs to have a healthy combination of mobile, transportable and fixed elements to provide the necessary flexibility for operations.

(d)        Vulnerability of Long Range LRSAMs: Modern Long-range SAMs are essential components of an IADS. However, they have their associated issues. Most LR SAMs are transportable but not inherently mobile. Their associated systems and support infrastructure is fairly large making them almost static. This makes them vulnerable. Choosing alternate sites, providing the LRSAM intrinsic cover using other weapons systems and transporting them to alternate sites for operations are a few key elements that must be thought of and exercised regularly.

(e)        Airborne Elements: Airborne elements like AD fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&C), Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and Special Mission Aircraft (SMA) for EW operations are essential ingredients of the IADS and cannot be ignored. The Iranian AD system severely lacks airborne assets, making it more vulnerable and less effective.

(f)         The Longer Stick: There is no denying the fact that possessing the longest stick has tremendous inherent advantages in terms of first-shot capability; therefore, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) must be developed to counter them. Additionally, there is a need to integrate long-range aerial weapons on a wider variety of aircraft to ensure multiple threats to airborne targets. Developing the first shot capability is essential in the modern AD environment, and countering it even more so.

(g)     Survivability of C2: The modern battlespace increasingly relies on information and decision superiority. The survivability of C2 infrastructure will undoubtedly give the defending force a significant advantage. All strikes will be preceded by Counter-Air Operations (CAO); therefore, one must create robust, redundant, and survivable infrastructure to maintain effective C2.

(h)       Stealth: Low-observable technology is here to stay. Conventional radars may struggle to cope with this new trend in aerial warfare; therefore, there is a need to develop technology, such as VHF radars, to counter the use of stealth by an adversary. Due to their longer operating wavelength, VHF radars have been known to detect stealth platforms. Interestingly, some of the oldest radars have been VHF radars and the time may be right to resurrect this technology for use in the modern battlespace to counter 5^th and 6^th generation aircraft.

(j)         Developing anti-Hypersonic Capability: Hypersonic weapons are the latest class of weapons that have already invaded the modern battlespace and counters are yet to be developed. Counter-hypersonic technology would be very niche and once developed, no country would want to share it. Therefore, indigenous counters to hypersonic weapons must be developed.

(k)        Integrated Application of Combat Fire Power: The Iranian forces have been arrayed into very rigid verticals with very little or no overlap. Each silo operates independently, thereby reducing their overall effectiveness. Ownership of assets is not important; what is important is the integration of assets. The C2 organisation must have the most appropriate weapon system at its disposal at the right time to be effective and timing is crucial. One cannot afford to act in silos; therefore, the creation of integrated systems, irrespective of ownership, is crucial for winning tomorrow’s wars.

(l)         Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Iran faces numerous challenges in terms of access to spares and modern technology due to sanctions and a lack of indigenous industry. Despite this, Iran has made significant strides in developing a vibrant in-house drone manufacturing industry. Iran has been utilising them for a wide range of missions, including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and air-to-ground strikes. While they may not have access to high-end technology, they are making a constant effort to develop the same within Iran. Regular upgrades, spare support, and effective logistics supply chain management would go a long way in enhancing a nation’s war-waging potential.

Parting Shots

The Iranian Air Defence was known to be a potent system in its arsenal, and yet it failed miserably. Why did Iran not fire a single SAM? How was the S-300 silenced? Who silenced the S-300? How did all the 125 aircraft involved go unnoticed? Why did China or Russia not warn Iran of the incoming strike? The bombers were in Iranian airspace for twenty minutes, and the support aircraft were within/in proximity of Iran airspace for nearly ninety minutes, yet no SAMs could be fired. The reasons for failure could be many, and some of them have been discussed in this paper. However, the “Silence of the SAMs” is surely very deafening …

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Notes

^[1] Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S Government, “Iran Military Power, Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,” https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf.   Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[2] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[3] Shamsuddoza Sajen, “Inside Iran’s Missile Defense Systems (2025),” Foreign Affairs Insights and Review,                    June 23, 2025, https://fairbd.net/inside-iran-missile-defense-system/.  Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[4] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[5] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[6] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[7] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[8] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

^[9]  Lt Gen H S Panag (retd.), “Israel-US air power chose regime survival over war,” The Print, June 26, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/idrael-us-air-power-iran-regime-survival-war/2670944/?amp. Accessed on June 26, 2025.

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