The post Nuclear Security Vol 16, No. 11 appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Mahima Duggal, Research Associate, CAPS
28 March 2022

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war, Indo-Pacific, India, Japan, Korea, China, ASEAN

The post Geopolitical Fallout of the Ukraine Crisis for India and the Indo-Pacific appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Taiwan, Japan, India, Kishida, economic cooperation Picture source: Livemint

India and Japan have been strengthening their ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ which started under the leadership of former Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Narendra Modi^[1]. Japan’s incumbent PM Fumio Kishida, visited India on March 19, 2022, and his visit was quite significant as the two countries marked the 70^th anniversary of their diplomatic relations^[2]. His visit to India is the first bilateral visit ever since he became PM in October 2021, which shows the importance of the relationship between India and Japan.

         Kishida’s visit to India is the 14^th annual summit meeting between the two leaders, wherein, a wide range of issues were discussed, such as the Indo-Pacific concern, the Ukraine crisis, economic cooperation, and others.

Indo-Pacific

One of the fundamental outcomes of the summit was focusing on the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ region (FOIP). Japan’s vision of FOIP was established under Shinzo Abe, and Kishida too aims to further strengthen this vision. At this summit, Kishida and Modi highlighted their commitment to work towards a peaceful and stable rules-based order and also reaffirmed their common stance towards the vision of FOIP. The two countries have also discussed the potential of partnering with other like-minded countries of the Quad for a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific. Kishida has expressed his keen desire to work towards the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and support ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific. India and Japan also focus on continuing bilateral as well as multilateral exercises of ‘Dharma Guardian’ and ‘Malabar’^[3]. Both countries focus on maintaining the security of the maritime domain and the freedom of navigation. They also reaffirmed their desire to prioritise the role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to cooperate against the rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea and the East China Sea^[4].

Economic Cooperation

Regarding the economic ties between India and Japan, the two nations have successfully achieved the target of 3.5 trillion yen in public and private funding investments in India^[5]. There are around 1455 Japanese companies in India. Japan is known to be the 5^th largest source of FDI and the largest supplier of Official Development Assistance (ODA)^[6]. Several Indian infrastructure projects are also underway with the help of Japanese assistance, for instance, the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and metro projects. Furthermore, India and Japan have also collaborated on startups, and Tokyo has also invested in technology startups in India. Kishida aimed to invest 5 trillion Yen in a span of over five years, which implies that Japanese companies view India as a profitable investment destination. Kishida also believes that his plans for $42 billion in investments would prove to be beneficial for industries in India, especially in the development of urban infrastructure and green energy. Moreover, the investments would also boost Japanese investments, build resilient supply chains, and skill Indian labour.

        The two leaders expressed their serious concern over the Ukraine crisis. Kishida strongly condemned the Russian attack, while India focused on resolving the issue through peace and dialogue. Japan feels that the Russian attack was a violation of international law and the attempt to change the status quo unilaterally is condemnable. Both Modi and Kishida feel that due to this situation, it is crucial to make efforts towards maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.

         The two nations also discussed China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific and its encroachment on India’s borders, the most recent one being the Ladakh standoff. Regarding the peace in the international community, both India and Japan condemned Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks and also reaffirmed their commitment to work towards ensuring peace in Afghanistan.

           Kishida and Modi discussed the signing of an energy cooperation document that includes carbon reduction and also recognised the importance of tackling climate change. Both nations aim at achieving global net-zero emissions and have also embraced the launch of the India-Japan clean energy partnership for sustainable economic growth.

         The next Quad summit meeting is likely to be held in Japan in the coming months, which will further shape the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. Kishida’s visit has marked the reaffirmation of the economic and strategic ties between the two nations and also displayed the prospects of further cooperation between the two.

************

CLICK TO VIEW PDF

NOTES

[1]“Japan-India Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html , Accessed on March 23, 2022

[2] Shubhajit Roy, “Explained: 5 reasons why Japanese PM Fumio Kishida’s India visit is important”, Indian Express, March 20, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-japan-pm-fumio-kishidas-india-visit-narendra-modi-7826828/ , Accessed on March 23, 2022

[3] “Exercise Dharma Guardian-2022 Culminates at Belgaum (Karnataka)”, Ministry of Defence, March 10, 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=180480 , Accessed on March 24, 2022

[4] “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, UN Official Website, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, Accessed on March 25, 2022

[5] “Japan announces investment target of Rs 3.2 trn in India in next five years”, Business Standard, March 19, 2022, ​​https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/japan-announces-investment-target-of-rs-3-2-trn-in-india-in-next-five-years-122031900758_1.html , Accessed on March 25, 2022,

[6] “India-Japan Summit Joint Statement Partnership for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Post-COVID World”, Ministry of External Affairs, March 19, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34991/IndiaJapan+Summit+Joint+Statement+Partnership+for+a+Peaceful+Stable+and+Prosperous+PostCOVID+Worl , Accessed on March 25, 2022.

The post PM Kishida’s Maiden Visit to India appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Ms Mahima Duggal, Research Associate, CAPS

Keywords: Taiwan, defence, Chinese invasion, Ukraine conflict, Russia, US, NATO

The heightening of tensions in Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent (and still ongoing) invasion of the country has spurred a popular and strategic debate on what the event could mean for Taiwan. The US and Japan remain particularly concerned that China will use the precedent set by the Ukraine assault to launch its own military action aimed at forcefully unifying with Taiwan. Although Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has played down such concerns[1] – and China has also argued that the case of Taiwan is entirely separate from that of Ukraine – she simultaneously put the island on high alert by bolstering military activities (including surveillance and early warning systems around the Taiwan Strait) in response to the crisis.[2] What is the likelihood that Beijing will follow Russia’s suit? How does the situation in Taiwan differ from that in Ukraine?

          Comparing Ukraine and Taiwan to draw parallels is an attractive endeavour. Especially since both face adversarial and militarily powerful autocratic neighbours that threaten their existence as peace-loving democratic states under a policy of “belligerent irredentism”[3]. The fact that Beijing and Moscow share a strategic alignment partnership of great import, driven by mutual derision of the West,[4] only adds credence to such a parity. However, closer analyses of the historical and contemporary comparisons between the Russia-Ukraine and China-Taiwan case studies show several distinct geographical, historical, geo-economic, geopolitical, and strategic differences.

         Firstly, in terms of geography, while Ukraine shares a land border with Russia, China and Taiwan are separated by the 160 km wide body of the Taiwan Strait, a natural barrier that makes Taiwan less vulnerable. In the absence of a contiguous border, any assault by China would be necessarily air-based or sea-based, against which Taiwan stands well-prepared.[5] While China cannot guarantee that it can bring its troops across the sea to successfully defeat Taiwanese defences, Beijing is unlikely to take direct military action beyond grey zone warfare tactics aimed at intimidation, such as frequent sorties into Taiwanese air defence identification zone.

         Secondly, in terms of historical connotations, although both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping employ historical justifications and nationalistic narratives in laying claims to Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, China and Russia stand vastly apart from each other. Most importantly, perhaps, while China claims Taiwan as a historically inalienable part of its territory and therefore, any military action would be measured and ultimately be aimed at unification. Russia’s goal is arguably to deter the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to its border, which it viewed as imminent.

           Furthermore, Russia boasts of a considerably experienced armed force that has previously conducted several combat missions in neighbouring former Soviet satellite states, such as Georgia and Ukraine (with the Crimean annexation of 2014), as well as regional hotbeds like Syria. On the other hand, China has had very little military experience in large-scale combat situations in recent history. Therefore, despite its historical claims to the territory and Xi Jinping’s robust desire for unification (even if through a military invasion) to establish “one China”, Beijing’s capacity and capability to launch a full-scale invasion are limited. Beijing has not hesitated in employing its military power as a tool for coercion within its borders, such as against ethnic minorities of the Xinjiang province and on the periphery, such as in remote frontier regions in the Himalayas via clashes with India and in building military installations in the highly-disputed South China Sea. However, such activities are far from an all-out invasion that Beijing has eschewed and will have to endure should it attack Taiwan.

         Thirdly, geopolitically and geo-strategically speaking, Taiwan and Ukraine have significantly different policies and strategic postures towards China and Russia, respectively. Ukraine has repeatedly and publicly declared its interest in joining the NATO, despite a wary Moscow seeking assurances that the alliance will not expand further into Eastern Europe to its immediate border. In contrast, Taiwan has been much more cautious to ensure it does not unnecessarily provoke China even as it stands up against Beijing’s military adventurism. The US has similarly been careful in its deliberate adherence to a policy of strategic ambiguity as a way to avoid compounding actions and stumbling into an unwanted war, therefore ensuring stability and maintaining the status quo.[6]

         Notably, while Ukraine enjoys a greater diplomatic status, Taiwan’s statehood remains a matter of debate; it is yet to be recognised by the United Nations. Therefore, while Ukraine can amass its diplomatic partners to mobilise international support, Taipei will be somewhat limited in any such endeavour. Taiwan only shares formal diplomatic relations with 15 states, and these are unlikely to come to its aid militarily. However, this realisation has only served to make Taipei more cautious and employ deft statecraft to integrate itself within the international order through unofficial ties and robust economic relations.

         Where the Ukraine and Taiwan cases are similar is their lack of a formal military alliance with NATO and the US, respectively. Nevertheless, unlike Kyiv, Taipei enjoys a clear intention of support from the US, as well as major regional powers like Japan. Putin’s decision to invade was a calculated risk: Ukraine is not yet a member of NATO, which instilled confidence that NATO allies would refrain from directly entering the fray and comprising Russia’s chances of victory. In fact, Biden’s public declaration that the US would not send troops to support Ukraine and limit its support to military weapons[7] likely strengthened Moscow’s risk calculus and resolve. In contrast, successive American administrations have indicated support for Taiwan, including under the ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’[8] while maintaining their policy of strategic ambiguity. Biden, in particular, has been exceedingly vocal on the issue and has explicitly and categorically stated that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid should China attack.[9] He has also spurred alliance partner Japan to declare support for Taiwan. Because Taiwan’s fate is directly tied to that of the disputed Senkaku Islands, Tokyo will view an attack on Taiwan as an existential threat to Japan and thus have a vested interest in coming to Taiwan’s aid.

       For this reason, China is convinced that despite the absence of a formal military alliance, Taipei-Washington share a consequential security partnership and the US (regardless of the administration in place) will come to Taipei’s aid; unlike with Putin’s risk assessment, China must hence calculate its Taiwan strategy and contemplate any potential invasion considering the US’ readiness to engage. Rather, China would prefer to use its many other strategic options – like imposing economic and financial embargoes, cyber-bullying, enforcing a maritime blockade, or even provoking a regime change – to pressure Taiwan into surrendering without military coercion.[10]

          Furthermore, Russia and China’s geopolitical imperatives stand apart as well. While Putin has actively constructed and promoted a strongman, and grandiose image in criticising the West, his goal has not been to offer any real alternative to US leadership or even build a Cold War-like sphere of influence. International condemnation is thus of little concern to Putin. In contrast, China’s ambition is to build an international order rooted in its ideology. Much of Beijing’s efforts under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and diplomatic tactics have been accordingly aimed at gaining influence and cultivating the image of a responsible global power capable of replacing the US as the global leader. Xi has invested much in rhetoric like ‘win-win’ strategies and ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ ideologies to further his “statesmanlike image” on the global platform.[11] Hence, although unifying Taiwan is a core goal Xi has all but staked his political legitimacy on, the use of armed force for this purpose will be the last resort – if that – as China looks to the bigger picture of building itself as a global leader. The swift and harsh international condemnation of Russia over Ukraine – and failed disinformation efforts to blame the West – will only make China reconsider such a course on Taiwan.

           Lastly, in geoeconomics terms, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan plays a pivotal role in global trade and supply chains – especially in the semiconductor industry that is vital to any electronic product – which accords it much greater soft power globally. It is the US’ ninth-largest trading partner (above India and France), which gives Washington a deeper vested interest in Taiwan compared to Ukraine (ranked at 67).[12] Moreover, as supply chain security and resilience become a critical priority issue for states post-COVID-19, Taiwan’s economic importance and integration with the global value chain networks are further emphasised. Unlike Russia-Ukraine, Beijing is also deeply invested in the Taiwanese economy. A potential crisis in the region would thus also severely impact the Chinese economy.

         Therefore, although drawing parallels in the two cases suffer from gross pitfalls, the Ukraine crisis will have some spill-over effect. It will, in fact, force China to re-evaluate its Taiwan strategy and take notes on the risks and costs of escalation. Ukraine’s strong resistance in the face of Russia will only give China pause as it evaluates the strength of the response from both Taiwan and the US and the international community at large. Taiwan has long faced the possibility of an invasion by China. Since coming into power in 2016, President Tsai has employed shrewd diplomatic advances to expand its limited international space, build unofficial relations with key powers, integrate itself in the global economy and bolster its asymmetric capabilities for defence preparedness. It, therefore, stands strong-willed and prepared to push back against a Chinese invasion.

************

CLICK TO VIEW PDF

NOTES

[1] “Taiwan dismisses concern Ukraine crisis could spill over to Asia,” Times of India, February 25, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/taiwan-dismisses-concern-ukraine-crisis-could-spill-over-to-asia/articleshow/89820313.cms. Accessed March 19, 2022.

[2] “China says Taiwan is ‘not Ukraine’ as island raises alert level,” Reuters, February 23,2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-must-raise-alertness-over-ukraine-crisis-2022-02-23/. Accessed March 19, 2022.

[3] Andrew Scobell and Lucy Stevenson-Yang, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.,” United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine. Accessed March 19, 2022.

[4] Mahima Duggal, “The Limits to Sino-Russian Cooperation,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 6, 2021, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5750. Accessed March 20, 2022.

[5] Nitin J Ticku, “Taiwan ‘Exposes Chinese PLA Blueprint’ To Invade The ‘Wanderer Island’ Without Giving The US Much Time To Respond,” Eurasian Times, December 20, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/taiwan-exposes-chinese-pla-blueprint-to-invade-the-wanderer-island/. Accessed March 21, 2022.

[6] Michael Clarke and Mathew Sussex, “Why ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Trumps ‘Strategic Clarity’ on Taiwan,” Royal United Services Institute, November 24, 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan. Accessed March 20, 2022.

[7] Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the Assistance the United States is Providing to Ukraine,” speech, White House, March 16, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-assistance-the-united-states-is-providing-to-ukraine/. Accessed March 20, 2022.

[8] Jake Sullivan, interview by Richard Haas “A Conversation With Jake Sullivan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 17, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-jake-sullivan. Accessed March 21, 2022.

[9] Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks by President Biden in a CNN Town Hall with Anderson Cooper,” speech, White House, October 22, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/. Accessed March 20, 2022.

[10] Harlan Ulman, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/. Accessed March 20, 2022.

[11] Scobell and Stevenson-Yang, n. 3.

[12] Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Taiwan,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china/taiwan. Accessed March 21, 2022.; Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Ukraine,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/ukraine. Accessed March 21, 2022. On Taiwan’s economic importance, see Stephen Ezell, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Trade Linkages With the US and Global Economies,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, October 25, 2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/10/25/evolution-taiwan-trade-linkages-us-and-global-economies. Accessed March 21, 2022.

The post Why Taiwan Will Not Be Another Ukraine appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Ukraine Crisis, Geo-Economics, Foreign Policy, Minerals

The increasing significance of critical minerals in the clean energy transition and technological advancement has been shaping the new variant of geopolitical tension among countries. In the past decade, countries with such critical minerals have emerged as the investment centres for the world, around which all the geostrategies get going. The ongoing Russian-caused crisis in Ukraine is being seen as a geopolitically driven event, but the logic of commerce (geo-economics) is a more determining factor here than the logic of conflict. The geo-economic magnitude of Ukraine has been central to the US-Russia post-cold war interaction, making it the buffer zone of influence between these two cold war protagonists. This article is an analysis of the geo-economic significance of Ukraine in terms of critical minerals and how the ongoing crisis will affect its geo-economic interaction.

Ukraine as the Geo-Economic Buffer Zone

Due to its strategic and geopolitical position, Ukraine is currently the major buffer point in the crisis between Russia and the West. However, the economy and rich resources of Ukraine are being seen as the hidden driving factors of the crisis. The geo-economic significance of Ukraine is intrinsically reflected in its industrial capabilities that serve aerospace, shipbuilding, and other military hardware needs; its advanced high-technology, IT sector, and cybersecurity; and its large reserves of several rare and critical minerals.[1]

         Besides the geopolitical factors, Russia has a major reliance on the Ukrainian transit route for its commercial purposes, which has started facing a risk with European access to Ukrainian resources. The US, Europe, and other western allies chose Ukraine to maintain their effective presence and block Russian assertiveness in a geo-economic strategy that continued to be driven by NATO deterrence. In fact, Denys Shmyhal, Ukrainian PM, said, “Ukraine can work with the European Union to harness Ukraine’s potential in the extractive industry to build the globally competitive value-added production chains”.[2]

Minerals and Resources in Ukraine

According to the Energy Information Administration analysis, Ukraine is an important transit country for all Russian supplies of natural gas and oil from Russia to Europe and other countries. The Dnieper-Donetsk region in the east, the Carpathian region in the west, and  the Black sea of the Azov region in the south area of Ukraine have a high amount of hydrocarbon resources. Ukraine has more than 400 million barrels of proven oil reserves as of 2021.[3]

        Despite having the second-largest natural gas reserves in Europe, Ukraine’s export capacity is limited and insufficiently developed. The gas reserves have been remained unexplored due to the disturbance by the USSR in Serbia during the 1970s, as a result of which all the exploration and gas production were transferred to Russia, leaving Ukraine’s resources untapped. The Ukrainian gas transit system constituted an important corridor for Soviet energy expansion into Europe, which continued to be used by Russia and Central Asian countries for the same purpose. Besides gas, the hydrogen capacity of Ukraine is also underdeveloped, along with its biogas and biomethane sector, which have high energy potential but low development.[4]

       Researchers have speculated that over 50,000 tonnes of lithium oxide are available in the eastern region of Ukraine, and if this assessment is proven correct, then Ukraine will have the world’s largest lithium reserves. In terms of critical minerals, Ukraine has a large untapped concentration of rare minerals in the subsoil of the earth’s crust, that requires financial assistance to reach its producing and exporting potential. The National Atlas of Ukraine, World Data Center, reported that “Ukrainian resources of rare minerals are unique and the largest in Europe.” The most significant is the Ukrainian Shield with its 22 rare metal formations and deposits like Perha (Beryllium), Azov (Zirconium), rare earth series in Polokhivka, Stankuvate, Lithium (Shevchenko), and Tantalum-niobium-zirconium (Mazurivka).[5] Besides geopolitical tensions, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis is affecting the rare earth market, semiconductors, electric vehicles manufacturing, and gold industry, leading to hike in their prices.[6]

Figure 1: Total Energy Supply by source, Ukraine 1990-2019

Geo-Economic Engagements of Ukraine with Russia and the West

In 2019, Moscow and Kyiv signed a transit agreement to facilitate a smooth transfer of Siberian gas to the European Union using Ukraine’s large gas transportation system. The two major pipeline systems that carry Russia’s natural gas through Ukraine to Western Europe are:

1. The Bratstvo (Brotherhood) pipeline that originates from Urengoy natural gas field- crosses from Ukraine to Slovakia, and splits into two directions to supply northern and southern European countries;

2. The Soyuz (Union) pipeline originates from Orenburg natural gas field that links Russia’s pipelines to natural gas networks in Central Asia, and supplies countries such as Slovakia, Hungary and Romania;

3. A third pipeline from Russia via Ukraine to Balkan countries and Turkey.[7]

           Russia, being a mineral powerhouse, has a great influence over the global supply chain of oil, gas, and even critical minerals. In comparison, the US is heavily dependent on critical minerals import for its defence use, clean energy transition and critical infrastructure. It even imports titanium, palladium, chromium, niobium, germanium, and scandium from Russia. The supply chain import of the US is going through a high struggle as a result of its trade war with high exporting China and now with high critical mineral source Russia, which is adding to the US’s vulnerability. This made US President Biden announce new measures to strengthen and secure the mineral supply chain.[8]

         The resources of Ukraine are perceived as one of the hidden driving factors of the Russian invasion that is geo-economic in nature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also said, “The Russian invasion came when Ukraine’s critical minerals industry was trying to develop into a major player in the clean energy transition.” The Russian action spurred majorly after “Ukraine beginning to the auction of the permit for exploration of its lithium reserves and other critical minerals, which can enhance the strategic importance of Ukraine on the global stage” as said by Roman Opimakh, head of state geological service of Ukraine. Moreover, the rising global attention to Ukraine’s mineral deposits is also a concern, as Australia’s European Lithium started securing rights in two promising lithium deposits in Ukraine, such as the Donetsk region (Eastern Ukraine) and Kirovograd (Central Ukraine). Even Chinese company Chengxin Lithium also applied to get its rights in these deposits.[9] According to a Ukrainian survey, 20% of proven world reserves of titanium ores are located in Ukraine. In fact, China was the largest importer of titanium iron ores from Ukraine, followed by Russia and Turkey in 2021.[10]

Way Ahead

The logic of commerce in determining the logic of politics in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis represents the growing role of geo-economics as a determinant of international relations and foreign policies. Does this mean a country with critical minerals and resources invites both investments and geopolitical tensions at the same time? The instances of Venezuela, Iran, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine are proving the case.

************

CLICK TO VIEW PDF

NOTES

[1] Anatoliy Amelin, Andrian Prokip and Andreas, “The Forgotten Potential of Ukraine’s Energy Reserves”, Harvard International Review, October 10 2020. https://hir.harvard.edu/ukraine-energy-reserves/. (Accessed on March 4, 2022).

[2] Stefan Sigaard Weichert, “The World needs rare materials for the green energy transition: Ukraine got loads of them”, Ukrainenu, May 13 2021, https://ukrainenu.com/the-world-needs-rare-minerals-for-the-green-energy-transition-ukraine-got-loads-of-them/. (Accessed on March 4, 2022).

[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Ukraine Overview”,  https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/UKR. (Accessed on March 5, 2022).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Abizer Shaikhmahmud, “Rare earth metal prices will skyrocket as Ukraine-Russia tensions continue”, Future Market Insights E&T. https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2022/03/rare-earth-metal-prices-will-skyrocket-as-ukraine-russia-tensions-continue/. (Accessed on March 6, 2022).

[7] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Ukraine Overview”, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/UKR. (Accessed on March 5, 2022).

[8] Sharon E. Burke, “Russia is a mineral powerhouse- and its war with Ukraine could affect global supplies”, Boston Global Opinion, March 9, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/03/09/opinion/russia-is-mineral-powerhouse-its-war-with-ukraine-could-affect-global-supplies/. (Accessed on  March 10, 2022).

[9] Hiroko Tabuchi, “Before invasion, Ukraine’s lithium wealth was drawing global attention”, The New York Times, March 2, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/climate/ukraine-lithium.html. (Accessed on March 5, 2022).

[10] Geeta Mohan, “Ukraine: The economic significance for Russia and the West”, India Today, February 22 2022. https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/ukraine-the-economic-significance-for-russia-and-the-west-deep-dive-1916525-2022-02-22. (Accessed on March 6, 2022).

The post Ukraine’s Geo-Economic Significance: Critical Minerals and Resources appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Anubhav Shankar Goswami, Research Associate, CAPS
20 March 2022

Keywords:  Indian Ocean Region, Indian Navy, Submarines, AUKUS, QUAD

The post Is New Delhi Prepared for a Nuclear Submarine- Crowded Indian Ocean? appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: India, UAE, CEPA, West Asia.

Referred to as the ‘early harvest deal’, India’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in February 2022 could become a game-changer for India in West Asia. Considered to be the most significant trade agreement between India and the UAE, mostly in non-oil products, this deal is also the first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two nations. Further, this deal is significant as its major thrust rests on increased non-oil trade. It is noteworthy here that the negotiations for this trade deal were initiated in September 2021. Therefore, this becomes a major bilateral trade agreement signed by India in the record minimum time of 88 days which will  become effective from May 1, 2022. This can serve as a milestone for India to follow in negotiating ambitious trade deals with the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union (EU) in the future. Through this precedent, New Delhi signals that its bureaucratic system, which is infamous for dawdling over decisions, is trying to reshape its systems.

         India’s relations with the UAE are significant as they form part of India’s ‘extended neighbourhood.’ The UAE is the third-largest trading partner of India and the second-largest export destination after the United States. Also, India is the UAE’s second-largest trading partner and the largest in terms of exports. With this FTA, both nations aim to increase non-oil trade to $100 billion in the next five years, which was $45 billion in 2021.[1] The significance of the UAE for India stems from the shared economic visions and compatible regional geopolitical outlooks. In addition, Abu Dhabi’s ‘Vision 2030’ plans specified an economic diversification strategy to move beyond the revenues earned from the oil trade. In this context, India can play a significant role to become a dependable partner of the Emirates as well as to harness the benefits from this deal.

         Moreover, the UAE’s Centennial 2071 plans outline the Emirates’ plans to develop a diversified, knowledge-based 21^st century economy with special emphasis on technological advancements. These plans significantly dovetail with New Delhi’s blueprint for harnessing India’s economic potential. So, in the quest for the realization of mutual developmental agendas, the promotion of economic engagement has become a vital component of Indian foreign policy in the present scenario. Furthermore, in all of this, Indian comprehension related to its role in the ‘extended neighbourhood’ and the policies related to it form the bedrock of Indian policymaking to pursue this engagement. Added to this is the large Indian diaspora in the UAE, forming a pivotal aspect of its policy in the region.

        With this trade agreement, it is anticipated that the benefits to Indian products would be around $26 billion, which are at present subjected to almost 5 percent import duty by the UAE. The UAE will remove customs tariffs on nearly 80 percent of the goods, which account for almost 90 percent of India’s total exports to the West Asian region. Another significant aspect of CEPA for India is the creation of jobs—almost 10 lakhs—in various sectors such as textiles, gems & jewellery, leather, footwear, pharma, agriculture products, medical devices, sports goods, and automobiles. Besides this, CEPA also encompasses 11 service sectors and more than 100 sub-sectors, including business services, telecommunications, construction, education, tourism, nursing, finance, etc. This FTA between India and the UAE also comprises an extensive array of subjects, including sectors of the digital economy and government procurement. It is significant as the collaborations and partnerships have remotely found a presence in the bilateral agreements that India has negotiated so far. This also makes a deviation from India’s scepticism related to the signing of bilateral CEPAs due to New Delhi’s hesitation arising because of its three CEPAs signed with its East Asian partners, viz., the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea and Japan. These three CEPAs failed to yield the benefits that the Indian government was anticipating. In 2019, India also exited the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—a trade agreement between members of ASEAN and its six FTA partners. This step back of New Delhi from RCEP invariably presented a view that India was trying to back away from the process of global economic integration. So, this FTA between the UAE and India could change this perception.

         Even though this is one of the swiftest signed FTAs by New Delhi, it is not devoid of challenges to achieve the desired results from this trade agreement to facilitate India’s desires and aspirations in the region. Considering that the UAE is at the core of global redistribution channels, especially with exports to Africa being re-directed through it; through this agreement, there are chances that it will drive the warehousing and distribution centres in the UAE for Indian exporters. To achieve the desired results, it will be necessary to remove tariff limitations as minor margins can lead to major changes in large trading circles, which might become troublesome for Indian traders. Moreover, there is a need for the implementation of Rules of Origin (RoO) as a way forward in order to safeguard Indian companies from feeling discomfiture due to the undue advantage that third parties/nations can get as part of lowered tariffs in this FTA. Also, India needs to make sure that goods and products from outside the UAE are not allowed to enter duty-free into India as part of this treaty. There is the challenge of treaty abuse arising because of UAE being a global transshipment hub. Therefore, India needs to be vigilant against these duty-free imports of transshipped products. While the sectoral effects would differ, it is necessary to protect India’s interests in service sectors, which have been difficult to safeguard in the past.

         Globally, India is amongst the few nations with major economies that have not signed any big regional trading agreements with any big economy, making this FTA significant for India. Further, being part of the “early harvest” mechanism, India is more concerned about allowing imports of raw material, minerals, or mineral components. This means that there remains an important value addition post-import for India. This free trade agreement between India and the UAE, being the first one in the West Asian North African (WANA) region, is anticipated to provide momentum to its exports not only to the Emirates but also to the larger West Asian region, establishing India as a credible trading partner. New Delhi expects that this CEPA could help in increasing the bilateral trade value to more than $100 billion in the next five years.

************

CLICK TO VIEW PDF

NOTES

[1] Sunainaa Chaddha, “FTA boost: All you need to know about India-UAE trade deal”, The Times of India, February 18, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/trade-benefits-explained-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-india-uae-trade-deal/articleshow/89658408.cms. Accessed on March 01, 2022.

The post India-UAE Trade Deal: Why is it Significant for India’s West Asian Policy? appeared first on CAPSS India.

The post Nuclear Security Vol 16, No. 10 appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Radio frequency, Interference, Military, GPS, Starlink, Ukraine.

Space has long been an enabler of military functions, and it goes without saying that modern wars cannot be fought without utilising space assets by the land, sea, and air forces. The Gulf War (Op Desert Storm) demonstrated how the US forces could make use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) to have an advantage in unfamiliar overseas terrain. The air war over Kosovo is perhaps a fine example of how satellites played a vital role in intelligence gathering and targeting, which improved the precision factor in aerial strikes and reduced collateral damage. Successive military conflicts since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 have seen a rising component of satellite usage. Military satellites can be employed for multiple tasks that have a direct bearing on operational capabilities, such as early warning, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), communication, data relay, navigation, and weather prediction.

         As for the Russian special military operations in Ukraine, it was expected that military operations would be preceded by cyber-attacks, electronic warfare, and space support prior to any movement of military troops and equipment across the borders. How much of that has happened is still to be discovered, though there is evidence of some electronic interference and cyber activity from both sides and disruptions in the use of space resources.

Disruption of Communications

The initial evidence of loss of data services and communication in some parts of Ukraine surfaced when Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, appealed to Elon Musk on Twitter, saying, “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”[1] There was a sense of desperation in the tweet, which called for an urgent action. The response from SpaceX CEO Elon Musk was swift, and the Starlink satellite internet service was extended to the Ukraine region within a day. The satellite terminals required to make the data service operational were also shipped to Ukraine to restore essential communication and data services. However, end-users in far-flung areas will still remain blacked out unless they import Starlink satellite dishes or improvise with locally available dish antennae to receive signals from the service. Even though additional consignments of satellite receiver equipment have been sent by SpaceX, it is unclear how those supplies will reach the Ukrainian people when the battle has reached the streets. The Ukrainian government has made innovative use of the messaging application Telegram, to keep its citizens informed of various information required during the war. The availability of the internet is the backbone of their messaging services.[2]

        With the Starlink network being the only non-Russian communications system operating in Ukraine, there are high chances of it being targeted. Despite the robust Starlink satellite network and the use of the latest software update to bypass the jamming, some Starlink terminals near conflict areas have experienced jamming for several hours at a time. Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite in geostationary orbit, which provides broadband service to Ukraine and other parts of Europe, has suffered service disruptions since the military operations started on February 24, 2022, which has been attributed to cyber-attacks.[3]

           Prior to the war, connectivity in Ukraine was provided by the Inmarsat and Iridium satellite constellations. Many of these services are still intact but may be unreliable due to outages. Terrestrial mobile connectivity has still eluded the Russian forces in some areas. Starlink remains the only non-Russian communications system still working in some parts of Ukraine affected by military operations.[4]

GPS Interference

Given the dependence on it for navigation and targeting, interference of GPS signals is perhaps the simplest of all means of disrupting adversaries’ tactics. It has become a ubiquitous military action towards shaping the battlefield since the conflict in Kosovo. It was anticipated that Russia would undertake GPS interference, given its wide-ranging capability to jam and/or spoof GPS receivers. The Russian military is known to have routinely jammed GPS in Eastern Ukraine since the Crimean conflict in 2014 and often spoofs GPS. As enumerated by Brian Weeden of Secure World Foundation, Russian soft kill counter-space capabilities are fully integrated into their warfighting tactics at the doctrinal and operational levels.[5]

          A US-based radio frequency spectrum geo-analytics company, HawkEye 360 Inc, which has the capability to detect and geolocate GPS interference, claims to have examined Ukraine through space-based geo-analytics over the months preceding the Russian special military operations. They discovered a high level of GPS interference across the region. The data analysis indicated extensive GPS interference in November 2021 in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. It was later confirmed through open-source intelligence that Ukrainian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) operating in the area faced disruptions due to erroneous GPS signals. Later, in February 2022, the company detected GPS interference along the border between Ukraine and Belarus (near Chernobyl), shortly before the Russian military operations started. These inputs further confirmed the integration of electronic warfare and counter-space tactics into Russian military operations, which degraded Ukraine’s defences.[6]

What Next!

Besides the SpaceX Starlink network support for internet and data services, Ukraine is dependent on western sources for imagery intelligence on Russian troop movements. This real-time tactical intelligence has been a vital link in bolstering Ukraine’s military counter-offensive operations, which has resulted in heavy losses for the Russian forces. There are speculations that these satellites could be targeted by Russian anti-satellite weapons, but that would be an act of escalation. Russia may not resort to the targeting of NATO’s space infrastructure unless provoked. In contrast, the head of Russia’s space agency made a statement to caution that Russia will treat any hacking of its satellites as a justification for war.[7]

         Russia has significant counter-space capabilities like kinetic ASAT weapons, laser directed energy weapons, electronic interference, and cyber warfare tactics. These could be used in full measure to blunt the space support to Ukrainian armed forces. However, Ukraine enjoys space support of American and European origin. Any attempt to disrupt this space support would invoke a collective response from NATO in terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 2019, NATO allies adopted a space policy recognising space as a new operational domain, alongside air, land, sea, and cyberspace. Therefore, any escalation of the war over Ukraine is certain to extend into space.

************

CLICK TO VIEW PDF

NOTES

[1] Emma Tucker, Melissa Alonso and Jackie Wattles, “SpaceX Starlink user terminals arrive in Ukraine, officials says” CNN report, March 1, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/27/business/starlink-activated-ukraine/index.html, accessed on March 13, 2022.

[2] Eamon Barrett, “Elon Musk says Starlink has expanded its internet service to Ukraine, but it’s unclear if anyone can actually use it”, Fortune, February 28, https://fortune.com/2022/02/28/elon-musk-starlink-station-ukraine-internet-russia-spacex/, accessed on March 13, 2022.

[3] Jeff Foust, Brian Berger, “SpaceX shifts resources to cybersecurity to address Starlink jamming”, Space News, March 05, 2022, at https://spacenews.com/spacex-shifts-resources-to-cybersecurity-to-address-starlink-jamming/, accessed on March 05, 2022.

[4] Ibid

[5] Theresa Hitchens, “Russia could target American space firms to blind Ukraine”, Breaking Defense, February 15, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/in-ukraine-conflict-russia-could-go-after-american-commercial-isr-providers/, accessed on March 06, 2022.

[6] Press Release, “Hawkeye 360 Signal Detection Reveals GPS Interference In Ukraine” HawkEye 360, March 04, 2022, https://www.he360.com/hawkeye-360-signal-detection-reveals-gps-interference-in-ukraine/, accessed on March 05, 2022

[7] Alexander Smith, “Russia space agency head says satellite hacking would justify war -report”, Reuters, March 03, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-space-agency-head-says-satellite-hacking-would-justify-war-report-2022-03-02/, accessed on March 09, 2022.

The post Counterspace Efforts in Russia’s Military Action in Ukraine appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Ukrainian crisis, Sanctions, Indo-Russia, Energy security.

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Putin, in a televised address, highlighted Russia’s concern over – the eastward expansion of NATO, the U.S. policy of containing Russia, and defending Russia and its people.[1] Three days later, on February 24, 2022, he launched a “special military operation” in Ukraine.[2] In response, the United States and European countries announced a series of sanctions on Russia. President Biden announced the cut off of Russian banks from the international financial system, blocking Russia from gaining technological access for its economic and military development, targeting Russian oligarchs, and providing military and economic aid to Ukraine.[3] The European Union, meanwhile, aims to target Russia’s energy sector by preventing European companies from transferring technology that Russia requires for its refineries. Germany has also halted the approval process for the Nord Stream-2. Despite these actions, Ukraine is asking for tougher sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.[4] Sanctions on Russia’s energy sector were slow to start with, apart from some isolated examples such as the suspension of the Nord Stream-2 certification process; and BP, Equinor, and Shell pulling out of Russia.[5] However, on March 8, 2022, the U.S. announced a ban on oil and gas imports from Russia.[6] In the upcoming days, there is a high possibility that E.U. members, and allies in Asia and the Pacific region will follow suit. Amidst this predicament, India needs to be prepared for possible pressure from the West.

       Amidst the ongoing crisis, the fate of Russia’s energy sector remains uncertain. Though, European countries are currently a major market for Russian energy exports, this situation will change as the former is already reconsidering its foreign energy policy in the backdrop of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.

Anticipating Challenges for India

Energy resources form one of the main pillars of the bilateral relationship between India and Russia. According to India’s Ministry of Petroleum & Gas, oil and gas account for 35.7% share of India’s energy mix. India imports 83.7% of its overall oil consumption and imports 45.7% of its natural gas.[7] In its huge energy basket, “India import approximately 1% of overall its imports; and India accounts for approximately 0.2% Russia’s gas exports.”[8] It is unfortunate that despite India’s bonhomie with Russia, the former is rather slow in expanding its footprint in the latter’s energy sector. India has made gradual strides with some Indian energy companies investing in Russia, estimated to be around $16 billion. Some of the examples are Sakhalin-I, Imperial Energy, Vankorneft, etc., and the signing of a “first-term contract” in 2020.[9]

         As energy exports constitute a major portion of the revenue for the Russian economy, Russia will endeavour to diversify its energy flow towards friendly Asian countries amidst the mounting Western sanctions. This point was highlighted by Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov in case sanctions are imposed on Russia’s energy sector.

          Due to the considerable amount of investment India has made in Russia, the former needs to gear up and find measures to bypass any kind of Western sanctions. If sanctioned, Indian companies would not be able to open new accounts, and would face restrictions on loans, licenses, and Export-Import Credit.[10] India quickly needs to consider protecting its assets and firms by employing countermeasures such as, “…non-recognition of foreign judgments, blocking statutes, invoking foreign compulsion.”[11] Even though the share of Russia’s energy imports is less, under the sanctions, its huge energy reserves will remain inaccessible and possibly delay India’s cooperation with Russia in their oil and gas exploration endeavours. In the present context, India should recall the similar predicament it faced during U.S. sanctions on Iran, which consequently led to the suspension of crude oil imports from Iran.

         In the near future, China will emerge as the biggest beneficiary of Russia’s energy sector due to its geographical proximity, and growing strategic relationship. For instance, amidst ongoing tension and sanctions, Russia agreed to sell an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas to China, at par with 5% of Russia’s exports to Europe from Russia’s Far East.[12] If severe sanctions are imposed, then both countries will witness an increase in energy infrastructure development under Russia’s energy diversification plan towards Asia. The present growing closeness in Russia-China energy relations should be concerning for India as China would do its utmost to maximize its gain from Western companies’ pull-outs amidst the Ukrainian crisis by fueling capital in various pending projects. China most likely will try to establish itself as a dominant investor in Russia’s energy sector, which is not favourable for India’s interests in the long run. In the past, for instance, China has used its financial muscle in its energy dealings in Latin America and Africa.[13] Though the sanctions are evolving, India needs to monitor developments and undertake proactive measures to mitigate possible ill effects. As India has minimal but notable investments in Russia’s energy sector, it needs to convince the Western partners about its growing energy requirements. As an oil and gas deficit country, India should not devalue its ties with Russia, which could jeopardize or undermine India’s national interest. With the possibility of more sanctions on Russia’s energy and allied sectors, this article anticipates that India will face two-fold challenges in the future. It needs to be prepared to think ahead to address these.

************

NOTES

[1]“Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine,” Bloomberg News, February 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24.  Accessed on March 2, 2022.

[2]“Timeline: The events leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Reuters, March 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/. Accessed on March 2, 2022.

[3]“Remarks of President Joe Biden -State of the Union Address as Prepared for Delivery,” The White House, March 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2022/. Accessed on March 2, 2022.

[4]Ciara Nugent, “Why Sanctions on Russia Aren’t Targeting Oil and Gas,” TIME, February 25, 2022, https://time.com/6151493/russia-oil-gas-embargo-sanctions-ukraine/. Accessed on March 2, 2022.

[5] Darya Korsunskaya and Katya Golubkova, “Russia ready to re-route energy flows of hit by new sanctions,” Reuters, February 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ready-re-route-energy-flows-event-sanctions-2022-02-16/. Accessed on March 3, 2022.

[6] Chidanand Rajghatta, “Biden bans Russian oil imports as gas prices hit record high in US,” The Times of India, March 8, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/biden-bans-russian-oil-import-as-gas-prices-hit-record-high-in-us/articleshow/90084552.cms. Accessed on March 9, 2022.

[7]Ministry of Petroleum & Gas, Government of India, Annual Report – 2019-20, https://mopng.gov.in/files/TableManagements/2020-12-08-115045-xyd7b-AR_2019-20E.pdf. Accessed on March, 04, 2022.

[8]“How dependent is India on Russia for oil, gas, and coal?” The Economic Times, February 17, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/how-dependant-is-india-on-russia-for-oil-gas-and-coal/articleshow/89634954.cms. Accessed on March, 04, 2022.

[9] Suhail Nathani and Ambarish Sathianathan, “Russia Sanctions: An Overview of the Impact on India,” Mondaq, March 2, 2022, https://www.mondaq.com/india/export-controls-trade-investment-sanctions/1167214/russia-sanctions-an-overview-of-the-impact-on-india. Accessed on March 4, 2022.

[10] Faraza Alam Sagar and Samiksha Pednekar, “US Sanctions on Iran and Their Impact on India,” Mondaq, August 08, 2019, https://www.mondaq.com/india/export-controls-trade-investment-sanctions/834158/us-sanctions-on-iran-and-their-impact-on-india. Accessed on March 05, 2022.

[11] ibid.

[12] “Putin unveils new gas deal with China’s Xi as Moscow locks horns with the West,” France24, February 4, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220204-putin-unveils-new-gas-deal-with-china-s-xi-as-moscow-locks-horns-with-the-west. Accessed on March 5, 2022.

[13] Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, Chinese and Indian engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually reinforcing strategies? (Journal of International Affairs, 2011), Vol.64, No. 2, p.102.

The post Sanctions on Russia: Anticipating Challenges for India’s Energy Security appeared first on CAPSS India.