Keywords: Pakistan- Bangladesh, Chittagong Port, India- Bangladesh, Neighbourhood, North Eastern Region, Muhammad Yunus, AMAN-25, JF-17.

Pakistan has been struggling with domestic instability and the diminution of its strategic relevance. The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Washington’s focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy, increasing strains in the US-China relations, and India’s economic growth and diplomatic rise have challenged Pakistan’s strategic relevance, which it has cherished for decades. On the domestic front, there have been continued crises on multiple fronts, and the all-powerful military seems to be constrained by options.

Recent months have witnessed Pakistan’s desperate efforts to expand its presence, build up new relationships, strengthen its existing partnerships, and revive its strategic relevance. Its recent outreach to Bangladesh with promises of trade and potential military assistance indicates its urge to expand its strategic network and presence. Relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh have improved at an accelerated pace after the fall of the former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the rise in anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh. The change in the Pakistan- Bangladesh ties is critical as Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh have been, by and large, at a low level, and Islamabad did not enjoy any leverage in Dhaka. There have been severe restrictions on Pakistan nationals’ visas in Bangladesh. There are commonalities of objectives between the two nations, with the most crucial one being dealing with the anger and anxiety against India. Pakistan’s hostility with India has shaped its internal power dynamics, and India-Pakistan relations are at their lowest point at present. The interim regime in Bangladesh has been unhappy with India giving shelter to Sheikh Hasina, whom they see as a corrupt and hegemonic leader.

In December 2024, Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, met Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during the D-8 Summit in Egypt. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, is scheduled to visit Bangladesh in April 2025. In a significant development, a direct maritime connection between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been established, and a cargo vessel from Karachi was docked at the Chittagong Port, marking a crucial shift in the strained bilateral relations. For the first time since 1971, Bangladesh has resumed trade ties with Pakistan, and Dhaka agreed to import 50,000 tonnes of rice from Pakistan through the Trading Corporation of Pakistan.

There have been some interesting developments in the two countries’ military-to-military relationship. A high-level delegation from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), led by Major General Shahid Amir Afsar, visited Dhaka, marking one of the first high-level engagements between the ISI and Bangladeshi officials. Lieutenant General S M Kamrul Hassan, Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division of Bangladesh, travelled to Pakistan and held talks with the Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir. According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the two sides “underscored the importance of a stronger defence relationship, emphasising that the enduring partnership between the two brotherly nations must remain resilient against external influences.” Dhaka’s participation in Pakistan’s multilateral naval exercise— AMAN-25—  is a significant step in bolstering military cooperation between the two nations. Reports suggest that Bangladesh has expressed keenness to acquire the fourth-generation fighter aircraft, the JF-17 (earlier called the FC-1). The JF-17 is designated to be a low-cost combat aircraft and is co-developed by Pakistan and China. It is being built by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC).

India-Bangladesh relations, on the other hand, have severely deteriorated following the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government’s inability (or unwillingness!) to control the attacks on minorities, specifically Hindus in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s relationship with Bangladesh is being watched by India very cautiously. The evolving relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh underscores the desire of both countries to expand alliances and is a deliberate effort to position the two nations against India. Ashraf Qureshi, a former Pakistani envoy to Bangladesh, said, “Certainly, if you are Bangladesh, you would weigh your options, and with the state of their relationship with India, Pakistan comes into the equation, leading to better ties than before.”

The evolving dynamics have raised security concerns in India as the Chittagong port, in the past, has been used by the militant groups of North East India, specifically the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), to smuggle lethal weapons. Opening the port for Pakistani vessels has the potential to aggravate security challenges for India. New Delhi has always been watchful of Pakistan’s activities in Bangladesh as they have had a bearing on India’s North Eastern region. Reports suggest that the Pakistan-based anti-India terror groups could benefit from the increasing radicalisation in Bangladesh and also establish/revive links with Bangaldesh-based radical groups to conduct anti-India activities. While Pakistan’s military modernisation remains dependent on imports from China, Dhaka’s potential acquisitions of the JF-17s from Pakistan would also increase its reliance on China.

There are speculations about how long the cordial exchanges of visits and military and economic cooperation between the two countries will be sustained, given their bitter history. This raises the question of whether the anti-India sentiment is enough to sustain and grow the evolving bilateral relations. For Dhaka, Pakistan cannot be a substitute for India given the economic cooperation and development partnership India and Bangladesh have shared. Nevertheless, India must be watchful of these developments to guard its strategic interests.

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Notes:

¹ “Bangladesh and Pakistan Resume Direct Trade After More than 50 Years” Reuters, February 24, 2025, https://www. reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-pakistan-resume-direct-trade-after-more-than-50-years-2025-02-24/. Accessed on March 01, 2025.

²   APP, “Pakistan, Bangladesh Underscore ‘Enduring Partnership’ for Resilience Against External Influences,” DAWN, January 14, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1885175. Accessed on March 02, 2025.

³ Abid Hussain, “ Pakistan Pulls Closer to Post-Hasina Bangladesh Amid Shared India Concern”, Al Jazeera, January 17, 2025,     https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/17/pakistan-pulls-closer-to-post-hasina-bangladesh-amid-shared-india-concerns. Accessed on March 10, 2025.

⁴ Sahidul Hasan Khokon, “Trucks of Arms Seized at Chittagong in 2004 Meant for ULFA: India’s Ex-Intel Officer | Exclusive”, India Today, February 23, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-defense-intelligence-agency-india-bnp-awami-league-major-general-gaganjit-singh-arms-consignment-2338411-2023-02-23. Accessed on March 12, 2025.

⁵ For details see, Ministry of External Affairs of India, “Brief on India-Bangladesh Bilateral Relations”, https://www.mea. gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Bangladesh2024.pdf. Accessed on March 20, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations- Friends in Need? appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Group Captain (Dr) Rajneesh Kumar, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: drone logistics, Swiggy, medicine, spares, post and telegraph

The post Drones in Civil and Air Force Logistics appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: North Korea, Nuclear-powered Submarine, Korean Peninsula

The current global nuclear order is witnessing a significant transition. All nuclear weapons states are now in the process of modernising their weapon inventories and the associated systems. Amongst the modernisation, all nuclear weapon states are ensuring that their sea leg of nuclear deterrence should be prioritised. So, while the N5[1] is investing in the sea leg of nuclear deterrence, the same is now being witnessed within the states that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this course of development, North Korea, which has harboured its ambition to develop advanced nuclear submarines, is finally showing the world its progress.

On March 08, 2025, Kim Jong-un visited some unidentified shipyards and made sure to be photographed with a large vessel, which North Korea has termed a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.[2] This was the first such occurrence when North Korea had exposed an indication of its first nuclear-powered submarine. The visit and the subsequent statement require further analysis in the context of the geo-strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula.

The Ambition

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been working on its nuclear submarine ambition for some time now. The goal to have a nuclear-powered submarine was first announced in January 2021. However, the seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held on May 08, 2016, which first referred to building a “powerful nuclear deterrence.”[3] In January 2021, Kim Jong-un referred to a five-year weapons development plan at the eighth Congress of the WPK, which established ambitious national defence goals for 2021-2025. While announcing the National Defence Policy at the eighth Congress of the WPK, Kim Jong-un referred to the “strengthening of strategic nuclear deterrence and war-fighting capabilities, including the development of new strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.”[4] In the same vein, Kim Jong-un hinted towards the completion of modernisation and remodelling of a medium-sized submarine and the continuous research on the design of a new nuclear-powered submarine, which was in the final stage.[5] Kim also mentioned that while the research and development will continue on a nuclear-powered submarine, “an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon”[6] would also be developed to enhance nuclear long-range strike capabilities.[7] Keeping in mind the modernisation and remodelling of a medium-sized submarine, North Korea on September 06, 2023, launched its new ballistic missile submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok. The submarine numbered 842, is diesel-powered and capable of carrying nuclear-armed missiles.[8] More importantly, in January 2024, North Korea test-fired its submarine-launched cruise missiles and once again reiterated the desire for the nuclear submarine.[9]

The Rationale

Over the years, North Korea has made sure to invest in its land-based nuclear forces. In doing so, North Korea has made sure to develop all kinds of ballistic missiles. As recently as October 2024, North Korea has demonstrated its ICBM capabilities. In October 2024, North Korea tested its Hwasong-18 ICBM, which can fly as far as 15,000 km when fired in a non-lofted trajectory.[10] More importantly, unlike other ICBMs such as Hwasong-17which is a liquid-fuelled missile, the Hwasong-18 is a solid-fuelled missile, which is safer and easier to launch as it does not require on the spot fuelling, thus also reducing extra logistical support. The Hwasong-18, with solid-fuelled propellants, can help North Korea field more survivable ICMBs during heightened periods of crisis. Another critical dimension of North Korea’s ICBM development is that all its current inventories of such a range of missiles are based on road-mobile platforms. The following table provides further information about North Korea’s ICBMs;

Source: “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, November 22, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/, Accessed on March 13, 2025.

Erin Hale, “What we know about North Korea’s ICBM programme,” Al Jazeera, October 31, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/31/what-we-know-about-north-koreas-icbm-programme, Accessed on March 13, 2025.

Road mobility essentially provides a hedge against constraints placed on silo-based missile systems. The dispersion through road-mobile basing provides more strategic depth and complicates the adversaries’ targeting and planning process.  However, road-mobile platforms also carry certain disadvantages. The road-mobile ICBM needs heavy launchers for longer-range missiles, which could limit movements in off-road terrains. North Korea in the past have sourced its launchers from Russia, Belarus, and China. However, most recently, North Korea has shown significant success in its indigenous production of heavy launchers.[11]

The ambition to develop nuclear-powered submarines also refers to the changes made by the DPRK in its nuclear doctrine. North Korea maintains a nuclear doctrine of first-strike ambiguity. While the 2013 Law focused more on the retaliatory nuclear strike, the conditions for a first nuclear strike have expanded over the years. The 2022 Law, while keeping uncertainty to its core, maintained an expanded list of conditions under which the DPRK may go ahead with a first strike. The conditions are as follows:

1. 1. In case an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction was launched or drew near is judged;

   2. In case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command organisation of the state’s nuclear forces was launched, or drew near is judged;

   3. In case a fatal military attack against important strategic objects of the state was launched or drew near is judged;

   4. In case the need for an operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of war and taking the initiative in the war in contingency is inevitably raised;

   5. In another case, an inevitable situation in which it is compelled to correspond with a catastrophic crisis to the existence of the state and safety of the people by only nuclear weapons is created.[12]

Within these broad parameters, North Korea also separately inserted the provision which stated that “the DPRK shall be regularly ready for action so that if an order to use nuclear weapons is issued, it can immediately execute it in any conditions and circumstances.”[13] Given the fact that North Korea is by number a smaller nuclear power, the choice to have a first-strike seems logical. Currently, North Korea possesses around 50 nuclear warheads and fissile material, which can be used to build up to 90 nuclear weapons.[14] Compared to its primary adversary, the USA, which has 5,177 warheads.[15] However, a first strike can only make sense when it helps deprive the enemy of the ability to retaliate, in this, the US. North Korea by no means can deprive the US of not retaliating after exercising its first strike option. The case of building a nuclear-capable submarine arose from the fact that North Korea seeks an assured second-strike capability in the near future.

Regional Naval Competition

The Korean Peninsula is also undergoing a major transformation in offensive naval capabilities. The DPRK in 2023 tested Haeil-1 and Haeil-2 underwater unmanned attack vehicles, which the DPRK termed as “underwater nuclear strategic weapons” capable of making “radioactive tsunami through underwater explosion to destroy naval striker groups and major operational ports of enemy.”[16] The Hero Kim Kun Ok diesel-powered submarine has the capacity to carry 10 missiles of the Pukguksong series SLBMs, Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-3, with ranges of 1,200 km and 2,000 km respectively, and the Hwasal cruise missiles. South Korea, on the other hand, in September 2021 revealed a new supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.[17] Besides this, South Korea, in September 2021, became the first non-nuclear weapon state to develop and test a submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Hyunmoo-4-4.[18] Japan has also made sure to enhance its naval capabilities. It is now looking forward to the emplacement of long-range cruise missiles on its diesel-powered submarines.

Conclusion

The DPRK’s nuclear-powered submarine ambition is still in its nascent stage and will take some more time to be fully functional. However, it seems that the DPRK is now moving on a path where its status as a nuclear-weapon state becomes more and more irreversible. More importantly, a nuclear-powered submarine will help the DPRK to have a credible nuclear retaliatory posture, at least in the regional context. This development might also help North Korea to have some strategic leverage if and when the dialogue resumes between the US, North Korea, and South Korea. The nuclear-powered submarine development also brings forth the problem of advanced technology transfer to North Korea by Russia. It has been alleged by the US in its annual threat assessment that Russia “potentially could be dropping its long-held nonproliferation norms in its interaction with North Korea.”[19] The Russia-DPRK strategic cooperation will only provide the latter more incentives while keeping the US and the regional context at less consideration.

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Notes

[1] Nuclear 5 refers to the five countries officially recognised as possessing nuclear weapons by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[2] Colin Zwirko, “North Korea releases first photos of new nuclear-powered missile,” NK News, March 08, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/03/north-korea-releases-first-photos-of-new-nuclear-powered-missile-submarine/. Accessed on March 11, 2025.

[3] “Decision of Seventh Congress of WPK Adopted,” KCNA, May 8, 2016, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201605/news08/20160508-14ee.html. Accessed on March 11, 2025.

[4] Katsuhisa Furukawa, “The 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (1),” Open Nuclear Network, p. 5, February 09, 2025, https://opennuclear.org/open-nuclear-network/publication/8th-congress-workers-party-korea-1. Accessed on March 11, 2025.

[5] Ibid, p. 11.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “North Korea Launches New Ballistic Missile Submarine,” Beyond Parallel: CSIS, September 11, 2023, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-launches-new-ballistic-missile-submarine/. Accessed on March 12, 2025.

[9] Jack Kim, “North Korea tests submarine-launched cruise missiles, KCNA says,” Reuters, January 29, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-tests-submarine-launched-cruise-missile-kcna-says-2024-01-28/. Accessed on March 12, 2025.

[10] Erin Hale, “What we know about North Korea’s ICBM programme,” Al Jazeera, October 31, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/31/what-we-know-about-north-koreas-icbm-programme. Accessed on March 12, 2025.

[11] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , Vol. 80, Iss. 4, July 14, 2024, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2024.2365013#abstract. Accessed on March 13, 2025.

[12] “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA Watch, September 09, 2022, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662687258-950776986/law-on-dprks-policy-on-nuclear-forces-promulgated/. Accessed on March 13, 2025.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 80, no.4, p.251, July 14, 2024, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2024.2365013#abstract. Accessed on March 14, 2025.

[15] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “United States nuclear weapons, 2025,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 81, no. 1, p. 54, January 13, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-01/united-states-nuclear-weapons-2025/.  Accessed on March 14, 2025.

[16] Anastasia Barannikova, “Nuclear Strategy of the DPRK in Modern Conditions,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, p.7, March 06, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2025.2475569?src=#abstract. Accessed on March 13, 2025.

[17] Daehan Lee, “South Korea Unveils New Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile,” Naval News, September 24, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/south-korea-unveils-new-supersonic-anti-ship-missile/. Accessed on March 13, 2025.

[18] Hyonhee Shin, “S.Korea says it successfully tests submarine-launched ballistic missile,” Reuters, September 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/skorea-successfully-tests-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-blue-house-2021-09-15/. Accessed on March 14, 2025.

[19]  Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “North Korea Announces Nuclear-Powered Submarine Development,” CSIS, March 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-announces-nuclear-powered-submarine-development. Accessed on March 14, 2025.

The post North Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Programme: An Overview of the Recent Developments appeared first on CAPSS India.

Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, PVSM AVSM, CAS (Left to Right): Air Vice Mshl Anil Golani, Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja AVSM VSM (Retd) , Ms Kalpana Shukla

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Keywords: Nuclear Energy Mission, SMRs, energy security, legislative amendments

India’s Union Budget 2025 has announced a new Nuclear Energy Mission, setting the stage for a major shift in the country’s energy landscape. This ambitious initiative, backed by an allocation of INR 20,000 crore (approximately USD 2.4 billion), aims to operationalise five Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) by 2033 and achieve 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047[1]. In addition to positioning nuclear power as a key pillar of India’s energy mix, this move will also strengthen energy security, reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and support India’s ability to meet its international climate commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement, which India ratified in October 2016 [2].

Currently, India’s installed nuclear power capacity stands at 8,180 MW, spread across 24 nuclear reactors [3]. Achieving the new target is a bold challenge, requiring the addition of 91.82 GW of nuclear capacity over the next 22 years.

Push for SMRs

At the heart of this mission is a focus on the research, development and deployment of SMRs. SMRs are advanced nuclear reactors characterised by their compact size and modular design, typically generating up to 300 MW per unit, about a third of the generating capacity of conventional nuclear power plants. Their small and modular design allows for scalability, making them ideal for regions where large plants may not be feasible, as well as faster installation and lower construction costs [4].

The government’s plan to commission at least five indigenously designed SMRs by 2033 reflects a strategic focus on indigenous technology development, with the Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs) expected to play a central role. India’s nuclear operator, Nuclear Power Cooperation of India Ltd (NPCIL), defines BSRs as compact 220 MW pressurised heavy water reactors designed specifically for ‘captive use’. In January 2025, NPCIL invited proposals from the private sector to finance a fleet of 220 MW BSRs to expand the country’s use of green energy and replace existing coal-fired thermal power plants [5].

With 20 pressurised heavy water reactors operating, India has the necessary expertise in this technology. This could provide a basis for the development and possible export of SMRs. In addition, SMRs could also incorporate the technology used to develop advanced thorium-based reactors, which are already being pursued, given the country’s vast thorium deposits [6].

Opening the Nuclear Sector

Perhaps the most ground-breaking aspect of the Nuclear Energy Mission is the proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. These legislative reforms aim to remove barriers that have restricted private and foreign investment in India’s nuclear sector.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 currently prohibits private investment in nuclear power plants [7]. Under this Act, India’s nuclear sector operates as a state monopoly, restricting all nuclear-related activities to the central government and its designated companies or corporations. This monopoly creates significant barriers for India to realise its ambitious nuclear energy expansion plans. An amendment to the Act could pave the way for private sector players to operate nuclear reactors, reducing NPCIL’s position as the sole operator of nuclear reactors in the industry.

The strict liability provisions of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 have deterred foreign suppliers due to concerns that nuclear suppliers could be held liable alongside operators in the event of an accident [8]. Global norms require that all liability for a nuclear accident be assigned to the plant operator to ensure prompt compensation to victims. However, India’s strict liability law gives the operator the right to seek legal redress from equipment and component suppliers in the event of an accident. C. Raja Mohan argues that without changes to the civil liability law, it will remain difficult to expand nuclear power in India and achieve a smooth green transition [9]. The nuclear liability law has also hampered the implementation of the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal by preventing foreign partnerships with US suppliers such as GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy and Westinghouse.

The proposed amendments are expected to open new avenues for private sector participation, allowing companies to invest in, develop and potentially operate nuclear facilities. It will also be possible to align with the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage [10], a multilateral treaty that establishes an international liability regime and increases the amount of compensation available in the event of an accident. This shift could be a game changer, reassuring and attracting both domestic and international investors.

Challenges and Opportunities

While the Nuclear Energy Mission marks a significant policy shift, it also invites cautious optimism. India’s historical track record of nuclear expansion has been mixed, with several announced reactors still not operational years after their original timelines [11]. Achieving the ambitious target of 100 GW by 2047 will require not just policy reforms but also efficient execution, adequate infrastructure and sustained political will.

There are also concerns about how the private sector will take up a technology that has yet to achieve commercial success [12]. It will be necessary to communicate transparently with the private sector on the progress of proposed changes and the regulatory process so that they can better plan for implementation and potential obstacles.

Despite these challenges, the positive momentum is undeniable. The focus on SMRs is in line with overall international trends towards more flexible, efficient and safer nuclear technologies. The inclusion of private players could drive competition, innovation and cost efficiency, while international cooperation could bring in newer technologies and best practices. The expansion of India’s nuclear programme is expected to create highly skilled jobs across the industry, boost employment, drive innovation and create a vibrant nuclear ecosystem with a healthy public-private partnership.

India’s Nuclear Energy Mission is more than an energy policy – it demonstrates the nation’s commitment to a sustainable and secure future. While the journey may not be without challenges, the potential rewards – in terms of energy security, economic growth and environmental sustainability – make it a journey well worth taking.

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Notes

[1] Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, “Nuclear Power in Union Budget 2025-26,” February 03, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2099244#:~:text=A%20key%20highlight%20of%20the,and%20operational%20SMRs%20by%202033. Accessed on February 06, 2025.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, “India’s Installed Nuclear Power Capacity to Triple by 2031-32: Union Minister Dr Jitendra Singh,” July 25, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2037046. Accessed on February 06, 2025.

[4] Joanne Liou, “What Are Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)?,” International Atomic Energy Agency, September 13, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/what-are-small-modular-reactors-smrs. Accessed on February 04, 2025.

[5] “India’s NPCIL Seeks Proposals for Privately Funded Small Reactor Projects,” World Nuclear News, January 02, 2025, https://world-nuclear-news.org/articles/npcil-seeks-proposals-for-privately-funded-small-reactor-projects. Accessed on February 04, 2025.

[6] PK Vijayan et al., “Role of Thorium in the Indian Nuclear Power Programme,” Progress in Nuclear Energy 101, part A (2017): 43–52, November 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnucene.2017.02.005. Accessed on February 04, 2025.

[7] Sethuraman N R and Sarita Chaganti Singh, “India Proposes to Open Up Guarded Nuclear Sector to Private Firms,” Reuters, February 01, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-budget-india-proposes-open-up-guarded-nuclear-sector-private-firms-2025-02-01/. Accessed on February 04, 2025.

[8] “India’s Nuclear Energy Budget 2025: A Bold Leap Forward,” Nuclear Business Platform, February 03, 2025, https://www.nuclearbusiness-platform.com/media/insights/india-nuclear-energy-budget-2025. Accessed on February 05, 2025.

[9] C. Raja Mohan, “The Story of India’s Atomic Slide – and an Opportunity to Bounce Back,” Indian Express, February 05, 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/c-raja-mohan-writes-the-story-of-indias-atomic-slide-and-an-opportunity-to-bounce-back-9817764/. Accessed on February 06, 2025.

[10] “Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,” International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-liability-conventions/convention-supplementary-compensation-nuclear-damage. Accessed on February 06, 2025.

[11] Gopalika Arora, “Budget 2025: Powering India’s Green Energy Future,” Observer Research Foundation, February 03, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/budget-2025-powering-india-s-green-energy-future. Accessed on February 05, 2025.

[12] Anushree Pratap, “Nuclear Energy Mission on a Long Road to Fruition: Experts,” Deccan Herald, February 03, 2025. https://www.deccanherald.com/business/union-budget/nuclear-energy-mission-on-a-long-road-to-fruition-experts-3386345. Accessed on February 06, 2025.

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