Keywords: West Asia, East Asia, Strait of Hormuz, United States

Introduction

On February 28, 2026, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in a decapitating strike by a joint United States (US)-Israel military operation code-named Epic Fury.^[1] Following this attack, Tehran initiated a series of retaliatory missile strikes on the US bases in West Asia, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan. These rapidly unfolding events suddenly plunged the world into chaos when Iran blocked the critical Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway that carries one-fifth of global oil exports and connects the Gulf of Persia with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.^[2] This has left the US allies in East Asia, from South Korea to Japan, scrambling over the situation as they rely heavily on this passage for their energy security.

In response, the US President Donald Trump called on his social media platform, Truth Social, on March 15, 2026, for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies like the United Kingdom (UK) and France, and for non-NATO allies such as Japan and South Korea, to secure the Strait of Hormuz by deploying their naval assets to the Strait. Having received lukewarm response from his allies, he hastily announced that he didn’t need his allies, citing America’s military superiority. Amid this crisis in West Asia, which remains uncertain at the time of writing, it becomes imperative for the US allies in East Asia, such as South Korea and Japan, to recalibrate their foreign policies. This piece tries to put forth two questions:

(a)   How the crisis in West Asia is impacting the US allies and their strategic responses?

(b)   What lessons the US’s strategic rivals, like North Korea, are deriving?

America’s Allies’ Strategic Interpretation and Military Support to the US

South Korea, a highly industrialised economy, remains dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for its energy needs, accounting for around 70 per cent of its crude oil imports and about 20 per cent of its liquefied gas imports.^[3] In addition, there have been reports of the US relocating its anti-missiles from South Korea to West Asia in order to protect its bases from Iranian attacks, raising concerns amongst its allies. With continuous and immediate threats from North Korea, such steps by the US put South Korea’s security in a vulnerable position. In the aftermath of the Korean War of 1950-1953, South Korea became reliant on the US security umbrella to protect against threats emanating from North Korea and to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula. In recent times, South Koreans have not been convinced enough by the US’s extended deterrence and have been debating acquiring nuclear weapons for their security.^[4] Such concerns are compounded due to the impulsive and transactional nature of the President Trump administration’s transactional approach and inconsistent behaviour towards its allies, demanding a payment of five per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for its troop deployment on South Korean soil.^[5]

In Japan’s case, it initially outrightly denied the US’s request to send military assistance to the Strait of Hormuz. However, during Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Washington on March 19, 2026, she reaffirmed the strength of the US-Japan alliance and signalled her intent to assist the US, despite Japan itself being constrained by its pacifist constitution from engaging overseas militarily.^[6] Later issuing a Joint Statement, the leaders from the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan expressed a “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait” and welcomed “the commitment of nations who are engaging in preparatory planning.”^[7] These efforts by allies came on the heels of surging oil prices that are destabilising the global energy market.

However, US allies in East Asia remain worried about the nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea, and thus cannot afford to divert their resources completely to the US war in West Asia at this critical juncture. Many of the US allies have been reluctant to provide active support because they believe that the US initiated the escalation. Therefore, in the short to long term, this conflict is going to shape the strategic outlook of states that do not possess nuclear weapons, making them vulnerable to powerful, nuclear-armed states. This would also reignite debates regarding nuclear acquisition and proliferation amid an increasing security dilemma in this region.

North Korea- A Nuclear Threat in East Asia

On March 14, 2025, North Korea fired ten ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan in response to the US-South Korea annual exercise, Freedom Shield, held at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, raising concerns for neighbouring Japan and South Korea.^[8] Such near incursions of adventurism are not new for North Korea, as it has been engaging in such practices of firing missiles at regular intervals. Such frequent actions from North Korea solidify its image as a rogue nuclear power. Its regular testing of missile systems and stockpiling of weapons reflect its evolving military strategy, thereby putting other regional nations at a significant disadvantage. North Korea’s external engagement with other countries is also perceived as an area of concern. In the past, its relations with Iran in terms of providing missile defence, with shared animosity towards the US.^[9] There have been reports as well of North Korean weapons being used by Hamas in its war with Israel.^[10] These nations have been under economic sanctions for a long time, often resorting to engaging in clandestine business activities. One significant conclusion that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has withdrawn from the Iran-Israel-US ongoing conflict is that nuclear weapons provide real protection and are the ultimate source of his regime’s survival.^[11] With an analysis of the challenges for US air superiority in its attack on Iran, North Korea would bolster its drone and counter-drone capabilities, along with the stockpiling of conventional missiles.^[12]

In early January of 2025, North Korea declared that any talks of stalling North Korea’s nuclear programme should be off the table if future negotiations are to take place. Such actions by North Korea put the US and South Korea in a dilemma vis-à-vis North Korea and on North Korea’s preemptive demands for engagement. North Korea’s continuous expansion of its nuclear arsenal is becoming an immediate problem for states like South Korea and Japan, which they perceive as impacting their regional stability. Moreover, the US becoming entangled in West Asia following its attack on Iran raises apprehensions among these nations about their strategic survival.

Evaluating Outcomes

The Strait of Hormuz crisis ought to make the US realise that its alliances are not globally transferable security instruments; instead, they are regionally bounded partnerships shaped by domestic priorities, energy dependence and strategic prioritisation. The ongoing war in West Asia only exposes US allies to strategic risks. Thus, they need to reflect on recalibrating partnerships and engaging with global mechanisms grounded in multilateral frameworks.

The multiple interstate rivalries in the Indo-Pacific, including India-China, India-Pakistan, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-Japan, China-Taiwan, and Thailand-Cambodia, make the region highly volatile amid the receding US hegemony. Alongside this, if the war continues for a long period in West Asia, US losses will be manifold:

(a)   It will be distracted from China’s strategic ascendance in the Indo-Pacific.

(b)   Moving defence assets from South Korea and Japan might give rise to China’s and North Korea’s overtures, making US’s allies like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan vulnerable.

(c)   The crisis is turning in Moscow’s favour in improving its revenue deficit as countries are resorting to buying Russian oil despite sanctions. President Trump must reckon with these outcomes and recalibrate by choosing the path of diplomacy rather than putting its allies at risk of entrapment on the global security stage.

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Notes:-

^[1] Sanam Vakil and Bronwen Maddox, “US and Israel attack Iran, killing Khamenei. Tehran launches counterstrikes: Early analysis from Chatham House experts,” Chatham House, March 02, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/us-and-israel-attack-iran-early-analysis-chatham-house-experts. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[2] Shekhar Gupta, “Why Strait of Hormuz is critical oil chokepoint & how Iran is weaponising it | Cut The Clutter” The Print, March 12, 2026, https://theprint.in/world/why-strait-of-hormuz-is-critical-oil-chokepoint-how-ir,an-is-weaponising-it-cut-the-clutter/2876983/. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[3] Aurelia Schlosser, “Iran War Highlights South Korea’s Vulnerability,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, March 13, 2026, https://www.freiheit.org/north-and-south-korea/iran-war-highlights-south-koreas-vulnerability. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[4] Jennifer Ahn, “The Evolution of South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/evolution-south-koreas-nuclear-weapons-policy-debate. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[5] Kim Eun-joong and Kim Seo-young, “U.S. urges S. Korea, Asian allies to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP,”  The Chosun Daily, June 20, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/06/20/LDZQFQZREZCBVN5WYCLE3FYJZE/. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[6] Tim Kelly, “Explainer-How Trump’s Hormuz push tests Japan’s pacifist limits,” The Print, March 18, 2026, https://theprint.in/world/explainer-how-trumps-hormuz-push-tests-japans-pacifist-limits/2882175/. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me2/pageite_000001_01536.html. Accessed on March 20, 2025.

^[8] Belinda Culley, United Nations Command, “Multinational Forces Arrive for Exercise Freedom Shield 2026 – Reaffirming Commitment to Stability”, U.S Indo-Pacific Command, 9 March 2026,” https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4429492/multinational-forces-arrive-for-exercise-freedom-shield-2026-reaffirming-commit/. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[9] Mehmet Kılıç, “A Dangerous Partnership: The Iran-North Korea Nexus,” TRT World Research Centre, November 2024, https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Iran-North-Korea.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[10] Gabriela Bernal, “Trouble together: How North Korea sees its growing interests with Iran,” The Interpreter, April 30, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trouble-together-how-north-korea-sees-its-growing-interests-iran. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[11] Vann H. Van Diepen, “Eight Lessons for North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Forces From the Ongoing Iran Conflict,” 38 North, March 16, 2026, https://www.38north.org/2026/03/eight-lessons-for-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-forces-from-the-ongoing-iran-conflict/. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[12] Ibid.

The post West Asia’s War Reaches America’s Allies in East Asia appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Pakistan, Iran Crisis, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Strait of Hormuz, US-Israel, Energy Crisis

The ongoing Iran crisis and the escalation of hostilities have spilt over the wider Gulf region, which has largely been seen as a bastion of stability and peace. The current conflict has affected oil and gas supplies in the region (and beyond) and has created an atmosphere of uncertainty. Pakistan is feeling the ripples of the conflict and is facing the dilemma of complex strategic choices. The conflict and intensifying tensions in the region have been disturbing for Pakistan. Instability in Iran would invariably have repercussions for Pakistan.

Pakistan and Iran continue to have a strained relationship, and past initiatives to stabilise this relationship have not yielded results. Approximately 15 to 20 per cent of Pakistan’s population is Shiite Muslims, and news of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death, led to violent protests in Pakistan. Thousands of people gathered to condemn Israel and the United States (US) strikes on Iran. On March 19, 2026, Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, Asim Munir, issued warnings against pro-Iran demonstrations, which sparked outrage.[1] Pakistan would not risk sectarian tensions at this point in time, when the country is under massive pressure with ongoing conflict on the border with Afghanistan.

Tensions have escalated between Islamabad and Kabul, and Pakistan continues to blame the Taliban for patronising and sheltering the militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The deadly terror organisation has been emboldened post August 2021, mounting relentless attacks against the security personnel in Pakistan. The military leadership, despite their efforts, has been unable to deter the group. In response to this escalating threat, Pakistan has tried to pressure Kabul by implementing a series of punitive measures. These include closure of the border check posts, which restrict movement and trade, and repatriation of Afghan refugees living for decades in Pakistan to Afghanistan. In recent months, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have escalated, marked by a series of cross-border strikes. The latest and most concerning incident was Pakistan executing a devastating air strike on a drug rehabilitation centre in the heart of Kabul in mid-March. This tragic attack killed hundreds of civilians, further deepening the rift between the two nations.

Pakistan’s economy is heavily dependent on remittances for its sustenance. The economy is barely managing to stabilise, and the growth figures are projecting a positive trend. Pakistan managed to avert the risk of economic default in 2022 and 2023 with assistance from its friends and traditional donors. China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) extended approximately USD 5 billion in assistance through debt rollover, which helped Pakistan stabilise its foreign reserves. Remittances play a significant role in Pakistan’s economy and amounted to 9.4 per cent of the GDP in 2024. [2] The government has been trying to encourage the inflow, and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has reported a significant increase in remittances in 2024. The inflow grew by 31 per cent, rising from USD 26.4 billion in 2023 to USD 34.6 billion in 2024. [3] Interestingly, around USD 20 billion of remittances come from the Gulf, and instability in the region will dissuade Pakistani nationals from going to the Gulf for work.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan is in a challenging spot and is juggling complex choices. In an attempt to foster peace and stability, Pakistan attempted to be a mediator between Iran and the US prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Additionally, Pakistan has been striving to rebuild its relationship with the US, which was strained during Imran Khan’s tenure. For Islamabad, its relationship with the US is extremely crucial given the strategic and economic dimensions of the relationship. Pakistan credited US President Donald Trump for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan during the four-day conflict in May 2025 and also nominated President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize later in the year. Pakistan’s decision to participate in the controversial US-led Board of Peace, to address the Palestine issue, has faced criticism domestically. Given its desperation to manage its goodwill with the White House, Pakistan is not in a position to oppose the US and Israel strikes in Iran, even though it doesn’t want the conflict to continue in its neighbourhood.

Pakistan has tried to maintain a neutral stance in the Iran crisis till now, but certainly its relationship with the Gulf has become complicated at this point in time. In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which includes a clause on a collective defence framework. One of the critical dimensions of the agreement is that an attack/strike against either of the partners (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) would imply an attack on both. Pakistan rejoiced in the signing of the agreement post-May 2025 conflict in the wake of heightened tensions vis-à-vis New Delhi. Now, with Iran’s strikes against Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s commitment comes under scrutiny.

Pakistan has been facing strategic complexities and security challenges from all sides of its borders. The likelihood of a Kabul-Islamabad truce is extremely bleak, looking at the Taliban’s reluctance to contain the TTP and the Pakistan military’s continued conviction to opt for kinetic measures against Afghanistan. Continuation of the crisis in Iran will have serious strategic, financial and sectarian repercussions for Pakistan. There are reports of Islamabad trying to mediate peace talks between the US, Iran, and Israel. The record of Pakistan’s mediation efforts has not shown any success. Pakistan-India tensions continue, and Pakistan’s projected threat perceptions seem to have intensified with the growing vulnerabilities within the state and strategic challenges it encounters. In the current crisis, Pakistan seems to be exploring multiple options of being a peacemaker and also issuing occasional immature statements targeting India to balance its domestic pressures, strategic ambitions, and threat perceptions.

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Notes:-

[1] Sibghaullah Saber, “Pakistan Signals Shift Away from Iran towards  Stronger Support for Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, March 23, 2026, https://www.newarab.com/news/pakistan-signals-shift-away-iran-towards-saudi-arabia. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[2] “Personal Remittances- Received (% of GDP-Pakistan),” World Bank Group,  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=PK. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[3]  “Snapshot: Remittance Inflows to Pakistan, Jan 2020 – May 2025,” International Organisation for Migration United Nations (IOM UN), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/Remittance%20Inflows%20to%20Pakistan_2025.pdf?iframe=true. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post Iran Crisis and Challenges for Pakistan appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Strait of Hormuz, US-India, Energy Crisis, Iran

Triangular Pressure

This is a story of how India’s strategic autonomy has managed to astutely survive a period of unprecedented American volatility. For now.

Earlier this year, Washington attempted to selectively dismantle the energy trade architecture that connects New Delhi to Tehran and Moscow, most visibly via aggressive punitive tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to force India into a more bilateral alignment with the United States (US). [1] The US President Donald Trump’s plan was rather simple in its objective: continue to secure US energy dominance through whatever deal could be struck, instil a total embargo on Iranian and Russian oil, and make tanker-loads of cash while doing it. Hubris would put an end to this wishful Washingtonian thinking in the form of the recent de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.

In the span of mere three days, the US mocked its allies and partners for not joining the war, [2] and then, started begging and grovelling for international assistance. from both  the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members and its non-NATO allies to keep the strait open. [3] Equally silly, after telling tanker fleets to man up , “show some guts” and simply sail through potential minefields, [4] presumably causing a floating disaster unseen since the Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon, the US President reversed his most pressing demand on India: begging India to use its “unsanctioned” diplomatic channels and Russian oil connections to save the global market from a price shock that Washington’s own policy had set in motion.

India could realistically play the role of Emperor Commodus, leaving the Americans’ energy objective at the mercy of New Delhi, giving a thumbs-up or down.

The Politics of Compulsion

Our story begins with the US President’s favourite blunt instrument of economic force, reminiscent of pre-Second World War American economic policy making: the tariff. Washington began to attempt to use plans for adjusting its domestic market as a weapon of international trade alignment, essentially trying to use pressure on foreign markets to fight the flatlining of its internal market. For Indian exporters to the US, this reality was cemented when Washington abruptly revoked India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status and wielded Section 232 tariffs as a cudgel to force New Delhi into bilateral alignment.[5]

As Russia’s economy shifted more into a war production structure [6] and depended even more on being an 11-timezone petrol station, the deal continued to be quite beneficial to India’s voracious power grid. The threat of secondary US sanctions targeting Iran loomed, however, not only in regard to oil, but in the valuable flow of nitrogen fertilisers and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), the fuel for India’s agricultural heartland, and in return a fundamental source of revenue commonly traded back to Iran. [7] A “Basmati for Oil” relationship, neatly circumventing the petrodollar, one might add. Washington would ideally have none of that: the price of future access to the US market was the total abandonment of India’s historical energy partners.

The Briton’s Parting Gift

The foundation of the India-Iran energy partnership was forged in a shared sense of solidarity, a survival mechanism against British imperial extraction habits. While the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company systematically drained Persia’s petroleum wealth to fuel the Empire, the Raj stunted India’s industrialisation, [8] leaving the subcontinent critically energy-starved in 1947. When Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh’s Tehran finally moved to nationalise its oil in 1951 in an attempt to chip at London’s suffocating monopoly, the British called for their thuggish brother to put Iran in its place, [9] namely under a Western-puppeteered Shah’s thumb.

In this miserable crucible, a post-colonial synergy emerged: Tehran and New Delhi both recognised that true sovereignty meant circumventing Western corporate gatekeepers. Formative oil agreements in the 1950s led to joint ventures like the Madras refinery in the mid-1960s, [10] amounting to a fundamental act of defiance against the Anglo-American way of dealing with petroleum. Never again would former imperial masters be able to easily meddle in this South-South energy lifeline, up until very recently.

Death of a “Special Relationship”

This brings us to the current era. Before the US sanctions hammer fell in 2019, Iran stood as India’s second-largest oil supplier in spite of its iron-fisted, theocratic yet pragmatic regime. The aforementioned Rupee-Rial trade mechanisms in place functioned relatively smoothly, benefiting both nations. Chahbahar in particular was functioning as a hub of Indian trade connections conveniently bypassing Pakistan and reaching further North and Northwest, to anchor the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). [11]

However, rather than functioning swimmingly, the port has spent years in a suffocating sanctions limbo. While Washington originally granted a waiver in 2018 to allow humanitarian supplies to reach Afghanistan, the US State Department has since aggressively reversed course, formally revoking that exemption in late 2025 as part of a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign. Despite India signing a defiant 10-year operational lease in May 2024, the subsequent sanctions threat forced New Delhi into a troublesome scramble, transferring its entire USD 120 million commitments upfront [12] to avoid frozen assets, while state-run Indian directors resigned en masse to shield themselves from U.S. Treasury penalties. [13]

Trump I, as one would call it, in 2019, brought an end to SREs (Significant Reduction Exceptions), pushing India towards zeroing out Iranian oil imports. [14] Bilateral trade between Tehran and New Delhi plummeted from USD 17 billion to hovering around USD 2.5 billion by 2025. [15]The timeline of it all is a good example of the power of secondary sanctions: In the 2018–2019 fiscal year, bilateral trade totalled a robust USD 17.03 billion, driven almost entirely by India’s massive appetite for Iranian crude. When Washington abruptly pulled the SRE waivers in May 2019, New Delhi capitulated to protect its broader access to the US financial system. By the 2020–2021 fiscal year, bilateral trade cratered to a mere USD2.1 billion. [16] Stripped of its petroleum lifeblood, the relationship was reduced to a trickle of Indian rice, tea, and pharmaceuticals paid for through rapidly depleting rupee reserves.

The transition from a USD 17 billion peak to a stagnant agricultural floor highlights the efficacy of secondary sanctions in dismantling South-South energy lifelines, a decay now exacerbated by the 2026 Hormuz blockade’s near-total logistical halt.

This economic chilling effect bled directly into the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). [17] Without the underlying crude-oil volume to justify further large-scale infrastructure investments, and with Indian private firms wary of landing in the US Treasury’s crosshairs, development and cargo throughput at Chabahar Port slowed to a safer yet glacial, bureaucratic crawl for the next half-decade.

The war in Ukraine presented New Delhi with an excellent opportunity to financially and energetically secure its strategic autonomy. By acquiring massive volumes of Russian petrochemicals no longer headed Westwards, India became Russia’s second-largest customer, leveraging Moscow’s geopolitical isolation into a key economic advantage for New Delhi. In Fiscal Year 2024, India saved roughly USD 7.9 billion by securing Urals crude at steep markdowns.[18] With strategic reserves filled, India has navigated the crisis with strict economic self-interest, successfully insulating its energy market from global shocks in the long-term whilst maintaining a calculated distance from the conflict. While New Delhi’s UN abstentions and crude purchases have tested Kyiv’s patience, Ukraine has largely opted for continued diplomatic engagement over outright hostility.

Ripple Effect

In August 2025, Trump accused India of “financing the Russian war machine” and “profiting by selling much of its Russian oil purchases on the open market,” with the trademark transactional tone we have all grown accustomed to. [19] Thus, the 25 per cent punitive surcharge on Indian imports followed on August 6. Categorised as a “security levy”, [20] intended to offset the perceived benefits India was gaining from discounted Russian energy, one should understand this less as a move in support of Kyiv, and more as one of punishing India for dodging the US oil market. Washington cares not from where the oil flows, but it certainly cares about ensuring nations use billions of petrodollars to acquire the delicious black gold.

New Year, New Slap

The current year barely started, and here came a secondary tariff of 25 per cent targeting any nation maintaining trade with Iran, [21] perhaps an early Rosh Chodesh Shevat gift from President Trump to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Charming for them, not so for New Delhi: between maintaining vital agribusiness export lifelines to Tehran and trying to salvage its strategic investments in the Chabahar port, [22] this raised the total potential tariff burden on India’s trade to the US to a chunky 50 per cent, effectively pricing Indian goods out of the US market.

Rather swiftly thereafter, in February, President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a summit, resulting in a framework for an interim trade agreement. Washington could have its energy-dominant cake and eat curry, too, normalising Indian market access. The US agreed to lower the effective tariff on Indian goods from 50 per cent down to 18 per cent. This 18 per cent figure was not entirely pulled out of thin air, but established as a “reciprocal base”, [23] matching India’s average applied tariffs on American industrial products. India agreed to lower trade barriers for US speciality crops, particularly on almonds, walnuts and other nuts and fruits, much to the joy of farmers on the US West Coast. Not all was sunshine and roses on the subcontinent: a key condition for the tariff reduction was a commitment to wind down Russian oil imports. While private refiners completely halted orders to comply, overall Russian crude imports dropped from a peak of 40 per cent to less than 25 per cent of India’s total supply, though state-run refiners have been far more reluctant to fully cut the cord. [24]

The US effective tariff rate reflects a broad, macroeconomic levy applied indiscriminately across the majority of Indian industrial and manufactured exports as a punitive baseline, a big, blunt instrument. Conversely, the Indian rate represents a blended, weighted average of highly targeted “surgical” duties (some even going above 100 per cent) specifically engineered to inflict maximum political pressure on vital American agricultural and manufacturing constituencies, while leaving unaffected sectors at the 15 per cent baseline.

The Supreme Court Intervention

In Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump, the US Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the President exceeded his authority under the IEEPA by imposing his broad-based “reciprocal tariffs” without Congressional authorisation. [25]

Bottom Line: the ruling invalidated the use of the punitive surcharges as legal mechanisms used as a bargaining chip between Washington and New Delhi. [26] Promptly, India paused the formal signing of the February deal, waiting instead for Washington to restore its global tariff architecture before finalising the agreement, as the underlying leverage had vanished overnight. [27] With typical but predictable Trumpian pettiness, three weeks after the ruling, his administration completely shifted tactics, launching section 301 investigations into India’s “structural excess capacity” in the petrochemical, steel, and solar module sectors. [28] This is explicitly a manoeuvre to circumvent the US Supreme Court: Section 301 empowers the executive branch to unilaterally penalise “unfair” trade practices without relying on emergency powers, providing an alternative, court-insulated legal basis to replace the invalidated tariffs before temporary stopgap measures expire in July. [29] In plain English: Trump gets to keep tariffing while the Supreme Justices trip over their robes, failing to keep up.

The Ironic Kicker: just days ago, the US administration announced a USD 300 billion energy partnership backed by India’s largest private-sector behemoth, Reliance Industries. ^[30] While Washington fast-tracked the permits, it is ultimately Indian private capital, not the US, funding the construction of the first major new US refinery in half a century at the port of Brownsville, Texas. Texas cowboys playing with Indian-bought concrete is further relevant to us due to what the refinery is engineered to process: US light shale oil, thus nudging the US further from dependence on Middle Eastern grades. More importantly, this megaproject is the ultimate punchline to New Delhi’s quest for strategic autonomy: the USD 300 billion figure represents a massive 20-year off-take agreement where an Indian conglomerate is directly locking in American crude supply, [31] effectively hedging against the chaos of the Strait of Hormuz while handing Washington a massive domestic manufacturing win to potentially alleviate the very same trade tensions that came with the tariff war.

“آب از سر گذشت” (“Âb az sar gozasht” – The Party’s Over)

We now finally come to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf on February 28, 2026. The fragility of the “no Russian oil” pledge is laid bare, with Iran (perhaps predictably) using its control over the Strait of Hormuz as an economic weapon to leverage its position. It certainly has been felt in the market: 21 million barrels of oil per day [32] have been halted. As other defence economics analysts have thoroughly documented, a maritime blockade doesn’t just stop ships; it creates a massive queue upstream of increasingly Kafkaesque logistical bottlenecks.

With the tanker fleets physically unable to leave the Gulf, onshore storage facilities rapidly hit maximum capacity, forcing a hard halt to both Kuwait’s crude extraction and Qatar’s LNG liquefaction operations, and prompting East Asian countries to immediately dig into their petroleum reserves. Befitting a tragicomic situation as this, the US never bothered to fully refill its own Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), deciding to start the conflict with only 60 per cent of fuel in the spare tank. [33]

Facing nearly USD120 per-barrel oil, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, executing a rapid about-face after months of the administration’s tariff assaults on New Delhi based on its appetite for Russian petrochemicals, issued a 30-day emergency waiver [34] on March 6, graciously “authorising” India to purchase approximately 30 million barrels of Russian crude currently “stranded at sea” to prevent domestic fuel shortages. How generous of him to grant the rest of the world permission.

“Pragmatic Bilateral Coordination” in Tight Spaces

Another paradox in this crisis is that India’s ties with Tehran went from being the pecked-at target of the US sanctions to becoming a singularly rare functional tool for maritime safety around the strait for the time being. On March 15, a convoy of Indian-flagged commercial crude carriers, including the SCI Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) Desh Vaibhav, transited the Hormuz blockade without incident. [35] External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar downplayed the geopolitical optics, describing the safe passage as a matter of “pragmatic bilateral coordination,” emphasising the ad-hoc nature of this interim arrangement with Iranian MFA Abbas Araghchi. [36] One can hope that bypassing the need for US-led naval ops like “Operation Epic Escort” does not attract the ire of US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Pete Hegseth; such sober diplomacy might get in the way of his evangelical dispensational postmillennialist plans for the region.

India’s Strategic Autonomy Gambit

As of mid-March 2026, the US-India partnership is in the pickle we currently find it in: Washington forced itself to sanction, then waive, then beg for the same energy flow it sought to prohibit. To stabilise a market that is stubbornly refusing to bend itself to the reality imagined by a presidential administration that thought itself clever by attacking on a weekend (with Wall Street oh-so-conveniently closed for the weekend), the hangover after the explosive party will pulsate stronger and stronger, leaving a lot of what’s in store in the immediate future in the fateful hands of India.

The crisis has revealed that India’s unique, valuable position lies in its geographic and diplomatic connections and, above all, in being on speaking terms with everyone involved. The Americans certainly can issue mandates from the gold-plated lounge chaises in the Oval Office as much as they like, but the logistical realities of the Indian Ocean remain the realm of people far more capable of handling the spice of international tension. No side needs to be picked per se by India; one can easily imagine New Delhi as the fulcrum around which everyone from Washington to Tehran needs to hinge.

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Notes:-

[1] Aaron Klein, Ben Harris, Daniel S. Hamilton, et al., “Brookings Experts on the Supreme Court’s Tariff Decision,” Brookings, February 24, 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/brookings-experts-on-the-supreme-courts-tariff-decision/. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[2] Peter Beaumont,  “What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Can the US Stop Iran from Blocking It?,” The Guardian, March 16, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/16/what-is-the-strait-of-hormuz-can-us-stop-iran-blocking-it. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[3] Yashraj Sharma, “Trump Seeks Naval Coalition to Open Strait of Hormuz: Is Anyone Joining?,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/15/trump-calls-for-naval-coalition-to-open-strait-of-hormuz-can-it-work. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[4] Mandy Taheri, “Hormuz Strait Attacks Follow Trump Saying Crews Should ‘Show Some Guts,’” Newsweek, March 11, 2026. https://www.newsweek.com/hormuz-strait-attacks-follow-trump-saying-crews-should-show-some-guts-11660339. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[5] United States Trade Representative, Congressional Research Service (CRS), “United States Will Terminate GSP Designation of India and Turkey,” March 04, 2019, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/march/united-states-will-terminate-gsp. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[6]  Daraya Korsunskaya, and Alexander Marrow, “‘Everything for the Front’: Russia Allots a Third of 2024 Spending to Defence,” Reuters, October 2, 2023., https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/everything-front-russia-allots-third-2024-spending-defence-2023-10-02/. Accessed on Marc h 25, 2026.

[7] Krzysztof Iwanek,  “India and Iran: A Sanctioned Waiver Amid a Wave of Sanctions,” The Diplomat, November 9, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/india-and-iran-a-sanctioned-waiver-amid-a-wave-of-sanctions/. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[8] Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India (Melbourn: Scribe, 2018).

[9] Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Nashville: Turner Publishing Company, 2008).

[10] “Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL),” Indian Oil, 2026, https://iocl.com/chennai-petroleum-corporation-limited. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[11] Ayjaz Wani, “India-Iran Chabahar Port Agreement: A New Era of Regional Connectivity,” Observer Research Foundation, May 15, 2024, https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-iran-chabahar-port-agreement-a-new-era-of-regional-connectivity. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[12] P. Manoj, “India’s turbulent involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port all but collapses,” Economic Times Infra, January 18, 2026, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ports-shipping/indias-strategic-withdrawal-from-chabahar-port-as-us-sanctions-loom/126541523. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[13]  “IPGL directors resign, website taken down as US sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port bite,” Economic Times Infra, October 01, 2025, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ports-shipping/ipgl-directors-resign-website-taken-down-as-us-sanctions-on-irans-chabahar-port-bite/124261478. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[14] Library of Congress, United States of America, “Iran Sanctions,” March 20, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS20871. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[15] “India Cuts down Dependence on Iran Oil,” Business Line, July 22, 2014. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-cuts-down-dependence-on-iran-oil/article23122418.ece. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Darshana M. Baruah, “India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 21, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/08/indias-answer-to-the-belt-and-road-a-road-map-for-south-asia. Accessed on March 25, 2026

[18] Sanjay Dutta, “India saved $7.9 billion by buying more Russian crude in FY24,” The Times of India, April 30, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/india-saved-7-9-billion-by-buying-more-russian-crude-in-fy24/articleshow/109736144.cms. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[19] Rezaul H Laskar, “India welcomes Trump-Putin summit, backs peace in Ukraine,” Hindustan Times, August 16, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-welcomes-trump-putin-summit-says-world-wants-end-to-conflict-in-ukraine-101755344046566.html. Accessed on march 25, 2026.

[20] Shyam Gowtham, “The Delhi-Washington Rift: Can the US and India be friends again?,” CrossDock Insights, August 14, 2025, https://crossdockinsights.com/p/us-india-trade-tariff. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[21] Koh Ewe, “Trump Threatens Tariffs on Countries ‘Doing Business’ With Iran,” TIME, January 13, 2026.

[22] Ilkhan Ozsevim, “Iran: US’ fresh tariff threats throw global production into turmoil,”   January 19, 2026, https://www.automotivemanufacturingsolutions.com/analysis/iran-us-fresh-tariff-threats-throw-global-production-into-turmoil/2588914. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[23] Yashraj Sharma, “Modi, Trump announce India-US ‘trade deal’: What we know and what we don’t,” Al Jazeera, February 03, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/modi-trump-announce-india-us-trade-deal-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[24] Chietigj Bajpaee, “Despite reset in India–US relations, New Delhi retains commitment to strategic hedging,” Chatham House, February 17, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/despite-reset-india-us-relations-new-delhi-retains-commitment-strategic-hedging. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[25]  Learning Resources, Inc et al. v. Trump, President of the United States et al., 24-1287 (2026).

[26] Womble Bond Dickinson, “Supreme Court Tariff Decision & Second Term U.S. Trade Deals,” JD Supra, 2026, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-tariff-decision-second-8894615/. Accessed on March 25, 2026

[27] “India-US Trade Deal to Be Signed after New US Tariff Framework Is Finalised,” Economic Times, March 17, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-us-trade-deal-to-be-signed-after-new-us-tariff-framework-is-finalised/articleshow/129618250.cmm. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[28] “US initiates Section 301 probe against India, China, 14 others,” The Indian Express, March 12, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/business/us-initiates-section-301-probe-against-india-china-14-others-10579085/. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[29] Ravi Dutta Mishra, “US Initiates Section 301 Probe against India, China, 14 Others,” The Indian Express, March 13, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/business/us-initiates-section-301-probe-against-india-china-14-others-10579085/. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[30] “Reliance to invest in first new US oil refinery in 50 years, says Trump; calls $300 billion Texas project ‘historic deal’,” The Economic Times, March 11, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/reliance-to-invest-in-first-new-us-oil-refinery-in-50-years-says-trump-calls-300-billion-texas-project-historic-deal/articleshow/129429489.cms. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[31] “Reliance-backed refinery project in Texas: All about the ‘$300-billion deal’ Trump announced,” The Indian Express, March 10, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/all-about-reliance-backed-texas-refinery-project-by-trump-10575784/. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[32] United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), “The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” March 20, 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[33]  Department of Energy, United States of America, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve,” 2026. https://www.energy.gov/ceser/strategic-petroleum-reserve. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[34] “Indians had been very good actors, says U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent on Russian oil waiver,” The Hindu, March 07, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/we-had-asked-india-to-stop-buying-sanctioned-russian-oil-this-fall-they-did-says-us-treasury-secretary-bessent/article70714581.ece. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[35] Maziar Motamedi, “Iran grants rare Strait of Hormuz transit exception to Indian commercial fleet,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/15/iran-grants-rare-strait-of-hormuz-transit-exception-to-indian-commercial-fleet. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

[36] Suhasini Haidar, “Safe passage in Gulf a result of ‘pragmatic bilateral coordination’, says Jaishankar,” The Hindu, March 16, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/safe-passage-in-gulf-a-result-of-pragmatic-bilateral-coordination-says-jaishankar/article70732891.ece. Accessed on March 25, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post The Hedging Hegemon: India’s Victory in America’s Hormuz Oil Gambit appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Vayushakti, Air Power, SEAD/DEAD, Operation Sindoor

Introduction

To read and discuss Air Power is one thing, but to be in the spectator gallery and witness the largest Fire Power Demonstration (FPD) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) unfold before one’s own eyes offers a unique depth of appreciation that isn’t easy to put into words. It was exhilarating to witness the skies alive with the thunderous roars of fighter jets piercing the clouds with precision and helicopters hovering with purpose. The air crackled with tension as surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles were launched, creating a powerful spectacle of sound and light. As each missile soared through the sky, it left trails of smoke in its wake, while the ground trembled beneath as bombs detonated with ferocious intensity, shaking the earth as the targets were struck.

This spectacle of military power was engrossing. Transport aircraft soared overhead, their engines roaring with power, as the ground trembled beneath the thunderous blast of bombs striking designated targets. This extraordinary display unfolded in an area just a few kilometres from where India had previously conducted its nuclear test, creating a surreal atmosphere for all who witnessed it. That’s the distinguished experience of the five civilian researchers of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS) at Vayushakti 2026, and it was nothing short of extraordinary. Against the backdrop of the vast blue sky that stretched endlessly above and the earthy hues of the terrain below, the scene unfolded an impressive showcase of the nation’s air assets. These capabilities, honed through rigorous training and strategic deployment, have demonstrated their effectiveness in swiftly and accurately addressing regional conflicts. Additionally, they have played crucial roles in conducting humanitarian operations worldwide, successfully evacuating individuals from perilous conflict zones and providing a lifeline to those in distress.

The Demonstration of Resolve

Vayushakti 2026 took place on February 27, 2026, at the Pokhran Air-to-Ground Firing range, Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. The event was attended by noble dignitaries, including the President of India, Smt. Droupadi Murmu, Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh, and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh. ^[1] Guided by the core values enshrined in the Hindi phrase, Achook, Abhedya aur Sateek, ^[2] the IAF showcased exceptional capabilities and operational readiness through various day and night missions. A significant highlight of this year’s event was the emphasis on structured storytelling, particularly focusing on Operation Sindoor. The event also included coordinated Multi-Domain Operations, an integrated combat theatre, and simulated wartime scenarios.

The present form of Ex Vayushakti dates back to 1999, when the demonstration of India’s Aerial firepower, human skills, and tri-service integration was displayed at Pokhran, and has continued since then. But the roots of the air power spectacle that displayed the entire range of the IAF’s aerial platforms go back to 1954, in Tilpat near Delhi, which was witnessed by the then Prime Minister of India, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. The importance of the event grew immensely with the historic attendance of the Supreme Commander of the Indian Armed Forces, the President, N. Sanjeeva Reddy, who graced the occasion for the first time in 1978. His presence not only underscored the event’s importance but also highlighted the connection between the military and the nation’s leadership, marking a memorable moment in the annals of India’s history.

The afternoon sun was low over the sands of Pokhran Firing Range when the silence was suddenly shattered by a sharp sonic boom. A Dassault Rafale streaked across the skies, marking the commencement of Vayushakti-26. From the viewing area, it appeared that a live operation was taking place in stages. Vayushakti-26 was just not a simulated exercise, but it was also a strategic signaling as the international border is barely 125 km from Jaisalmer. The exercise was a mesmerising display of the IAF’s prowess, showcasing its ability to seamlessly integrate a diverse array of platforms in a harmonious and synchronised manner. A total of 77 aerial platforms took part in the operation, including state-of-the-art fighter jets, agile combat helicopters and versatile transport aircraft, each playing a vital role in the unfolding drama above. The initial phase launched with an array of surveillance drones, which soared high, expertly pinpointing simulated ground targets. These drones diligently relayed real-time intelligence to the IAF’s sophisticated Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) network, making sure that every move was calculated and strategically aligned.

The tempo quickly increased as strike aircraft moved in to suppress enemy air defences. The formations targeted mock radar sites and missile batteries, and used Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) missions, loitering munitions, and fighter aircraft, the formations targeted mock radar sites and missile batteries, and created the way for the main strike package. This was followed by the coordinated attack runs. Fighters like the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, and SEPECAT Jaguar unleashed precision air-to-ground munitions on simulated terror camps, bunkers, and logistics nodes.

While the offensive phase began overhead, the defensive grid on the ground also came to life. Surface-to-air missiles from the Akash and the SPYDER air defence system soared swiftly into the sky, demonstrating how a layered air defence network responds to aerial threats. Akash and SPYDER are just the tip of the icebergs of how India seeks to build its future-ready air defence systems. Mission Sudarshan Chakra and Project Kusha will definitely supplement the existing air defence capabilities.

As the dipping sun cast a warm glow over the expansive desert, the atmosphere shifted from the frenetic pace of the high-speed aerial acrobats to the quiet precision of special operations. In a phenomenal display of tactical innovation, Chinook helicopters gracefully soared through the twilight sky, deftly airlifting M-777 Ultra-light Howitzers in an underslung mode of operation. The message: when required, such methods can be used to rapidly deploy combat assets, and with an impressive blend of strength and agility. Mil Mi-17 helicopters flew low over the area, inserting Garud Commando Force commandos and Para Special Forces men for a mock rescue mission. Transport aircraft, including the Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules and the Airbus C-295, then made assault landings on a forward runway, delivering and evacuating troops in minutes. The darkness didn’t matter. Fighters returned to the range to display precision strikes in low-visibility conditions, while armed helicopters such as the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Prachand and HAL Dhruv assisted ground forces below. The exercise came to a halt when a single Boeing C-17 Globemaster flew overhead in a symbolic ceasefire fly-past.

Automation in Action: The Drone Show

In the climactic stage of the exercise, the sky erupted into a breathtaking display as hundreds of precisely coordinated drones filled the air, creating a silent but powerful spectacle. Their synchronised movements painted patterns against the sky, casting an enchanting glow that transcended the usual noise of the world below, transforming the scene into a silent yet profound, powerful spectacle. The massive drone formation transformed the desert sky into a digital canvas, with each drone moving in perfect synchronisation to create dynamic shapes and images. The choreography displayed the precision and coordination that swarm technologies require, each drone maintaining exact distances from the others, guided by algorithms that ensured smooth formations despite the desert winds. For the audience, the display was captivating; whereas for strategic observers like us, it clearly signalled something deeper: the increasing role of automation, artificial intelligence (AI), and networked systems in modern Air Power. However, what elevated the drone show from spectacle to strategic storytelling was the narrative it presented. The formations followed the theme of the IAF’s journey “from inception to execution,” visually recounting key milestones in the force’s history. As the drones shifted across the sky, they recreated moments that have shaped India’s air power identity, operations from the 1965 war, the bombing of Tiger Hill during the Kargil conflict, to the most recent Operation Sindoor. Each formation reminded the audience that the Indian Air Force’s current capabilities are rooted in decades of operational experience and strategic evolution.

In luminous formations across the night sky, the drones depicted the sequence of an air campaign planning, precision targeting, and coordinated execution. This symbolised how modern air operations are increasingly shaped by intelligence, surveillance, digital networks, and rapid decision-making cycles. The narrative clearly conveyed that contemporary warfare is no longer defined solely by platforms but by the integration of data, technology, and speed.

The show came to a spectacular close with a vibrant map of India glowing radiantly against the night sky, the contours of the nation beautifully outlined. The crest of the Indian Air Force was illuminated proudly and showcased the iconic tricolour of saffron, white, and green. Accompanying this stunning display was the exercise motto, adding an inspiring touch. Witnessed by hundreds, the moment carried both symbolism and intent. The display of the drone show successfully showcased that the Indian Air Force is not only proud of its legacy but also firmly focused on the future. The exercise’s display before the sunset highlighted the destructive precision of modern air power, and the second part of the exercise, after sunset, the drone show emphasised its evolving technological backbone. Together, they conveyed a decisive message: the Indian Air Force is undergoing a significant transformation into a multi-domain force. This evolution encompasses not only the traditional roles of pilots and aircraft but also advanced technologies such as algorithms, integrated networks, and autonomous systems. Together, these elements create a synergised operational environment where human skill and cutting-edge technology come together to enhance agility and effectiveness in modern aerial warfare.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor highlighted India’s resolve in air power to thwart its adversaries, but Vayushakti-26 demonstrated the IAF’s capabilities and future roadmap. The exercise over a three-hour period dropped approximately 120 tonnes of ordnance over a 2-square km area, and showcased the lethality and precision with which the IAF operates. Vayushakti 2026 was far more than a display of firepower—it was a captivating display of the IAF’s transformation into a modern force projecting aerospace power in all domains. From high-intensity strike missions and integrated air defence operations to precision night and special operations, the exercise displayed operational readiness. The continuous coordination among aerial platforms, ground systems, and digital networks reflected a force increasingly defined by flexibility and versatility. The exercise also displayed the unity of command, effective control, and seamless communication, which help shorten the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, leading to effective warfighting and the winning of wars. The grand drone display symbolised the shift towards automation, artificial intelligence, and network-centric warfare. At the same time, the narrative of past operations embedded in the display reinforced the idea that this technological evolution is firmly grounded in decades of combat experience. Ultimately, through Vayushakti 2026, the IAF made it clear that as a force it honours its legacy, but is ready to embrace the future, to project power, safeguard national security, and respond swiftly across the full spectrum of aerospace.

*****

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Notes:

[1] Press Information Bureau, President’s Secretariat, Government of India, “President of India Witnesses the ‘Vayu Shakti–2026’ Exercise at the Pokhran Firing Range,” February 27, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233725&reg=3&lang=2#:~:text=PRESIDENT%20OF%20INDIA%20WITNESSES%20THE,combat%20strength%20and%20operational%20readiness. Accessed on March 12, 2026.

[2] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Curtain Raiser Exercise Vayushakti 2026,” February 11, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2226479&reg=3&lang=1#:~:text=Ministry%20of%20Defence,day%2C%20dusk%20and%20night%20missions. Accessed on March 12, 2026.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS ].

The post Precision, Power, and Preparedness: Vayushakti 2026 appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Dr Javed Alam, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies & Mr Prahlad Kumar Singh, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: Nuclear Testing, Decoupling, CTBT, US, China

The post The Return of Nuclear Testing: US Allegations and China’s Perspectives appeared first on CAPSS India.

Introduction

This is a joint paper written by scholars of CAPSS and CHPM on the ongoing conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States of America. With an emphasis on the employment of air power and the strategic context with implications in the region, the scholars give their perspective on the conflict as it unfolded during the first two weeks. AVM Anil Golani in his introductory remarks discusses the employment of air power as a coercive tool to achieve political objectives. Adrien Fontanellaz has given his analysis on the Iranian strategy in its employment of air power while Gp Capt VP Naik has analysed the campaign as carried out by both the United States and Israel. Dr Shalini Chawla and Dr Anu Sharma write about the strategic context in West Asia with implications in India’s immediate neighbourhood.

Elusive Peace in West Asia

by Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani (Retd), DG, CAPSS

February 28, 2026 witnessed the start of another conflict that was a long time coming. The deployment of USS Gerald Ford and Abraham Lincoln, two of the most powerful and sophisticated aircraft carriers of the United States in the Persian Gulf region earlier during the year signaled the intentions and resolve of the country. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw the present window of opportunity that aligned with American President Donald Trump’s proclivity to use force towards regime change, as a ‘now or never’ moment to decimate the regime in Iran. The twelve-day Operation ‘Rising Lion’ and ‘Midnight Hammer’ carried out by both Israel and the United States in June 2025 to neutralise Iran’s nuclear capability and infrastructure along with the elimination of its nuclear scientists and military leadership now seems to have been in vain. The process of dialogue between the United States and Iran, with mediation by Oman was apparently close to fruition when Operations ‘Epic Fury’ and ‘Roaring Lion’ were launched concurrently by both the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026. These operations, unprecedented in scale and magnitude, have engulfed the entire region with strategic implications that could well lead to greater instability reducing the chances of any rapprochement between Iran and the United States and Israel.

As this conflict enters its fourth week, it has become an existential crisis for Iran which will continue to leverage everything at its disposal to increase the cost for the United States, its allies in the region and Israel. For Israel, it seeks nothing less than total decimation of Iran and its military capability along with a regime change. For the United States, the most powerful nation in the world both in terms of military might and technological superiority, it sought a capitulation of the regime by using brute force through the instrument of air power. Even as the jury is out on the conflict there are major lessons that need to be learned not only by the nations directly engaged in conflict but also for those who seek to use military power to achieve political outcomes.

The proclivity to use air power by nations which can afford to do so has only increased in the recent past for a variety of reasons. Air power has become the most readily available instrument of military power that can deliver outcomes at the speed that only this medium provides with precision and accuracy that remains unmatched. Air power also has the unique ability to increase the intensity and scale of operations along with an ability to control the escalation matrix as deemed appropriate. While offensive air power with manned aircraft can effectively be used for counter force and counter value targeting, the ability of drones and missiles along with ground-based air defence systems that are mobile can also wreak havoc on a superior adversary. Iran, with its ability to launch missiles and unmanned aerial systems, despite pounding by the U.S. and Israel, has been able to cause a significant dent in the operations of the United States and Israel. Iran has also attacked more than eleven countries in the region that have U.S bases, closed the Hormuz Strait and dealt a severe blow to energy production and transportation.

The salience of a clear and unambiguous selection and maintenance of aim as one of the most important principles of war cannot be undermined. From regime change, to destruction of the Iranian Air Force, Navy and the IRGC, destruction of its missile and drone production facilities to the elimination of its political leadership, the goalposts have continually been changing. The visceral hatred between the Iranian regime and the state of Israel which seeks total annihilation and nothing less, borders on being delusional to say the least. This hatred would only get worse by the unmitigated use of force that leads to civilian casualties on either side as the conflict progresses. Even as the USA realises the limitations of the use of force it would only find itself in a predicament that becomes even more difficult to handle as the effects of the conflict begin to roost at home with body bags and increasing inflation. While scenarios would have been gamed by the United States and Israel before the conflict, a clear end state and political objectives appear to have been given the short shrift. In addition, the resilience of the Iranian regime and its ability to sustain missile production and launch capabilities is something that had apparently not been bargained for.

The consensus of allies and partners when an operation such as this is launched cannot be ignored. Unilaterally carried out by the United States and Israel, all their allies in the region find themselves being drawn into this conflict with unintended consequences. With inherent and impending danger to the lives of their citizens, adverse effects on their economies, trade and the vulnerability of the oil and gas production infrastructure the efficacy of protection by the United States that harbours bases in the region would increasingly be questioned.

The use of air power as a military instrument of force has several advantages that cannot be undermined. However, unbridled use of this instrument without clear objectives that include a political end state would invariably lead to unintended consequences, as is clearly evident from the present conflict in West Asia. The jury is still out whether West Asia would return to peace or continue to stay embroiled in a prolonged conflict that only exacerbates existing hostility between Iran, Israel and the United States. In addition, the utility of force as employed by the United States, Israel and Iran in this conflict would need a critical analysis of the use of air power in isolation, to achieve political objectives.

Precision, Paralysis and Persistence Multi-Domain Targeting in the Iran Imbroglio

by Gp Capt VP Naik VM, Senior Fellow, CAPSS

Introduction

Contemporary warfare has seen a radical change in the last decade, with attrition-based campaigns increasingly being avoided, and an effects-based approach making a comeback. Air power has become an instrument of choice and also an effective tool for controlling escalation. Increasingly, modern warfare is becoming a mélange of John Warden III’s model of Centre of Gravity (CoG) targeting, David Deptula’s concept of parallel warfare and John Boyd’s theory of dominating the decision cycle. Wherever air power has not been used correctly, warfare has become attritional, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is a stark example. The moment it becomes a war of attrition, asymmetric technology like drones and loitering munitions (LMs) assumes tremendous significance. What emanates from here is that technology like drones becomes more effective when forces become static, which is very typical of attrition warfare. Drones have therefore not really changed the tenets of application of air power, but have significantly redefined the conduct of terrestrial warfare.

In the US-Israel versus Iran conflict, overwhelming technological superiority is being used by their combined force; however, resilience and innovative thinking have kept the Iranian system afloat, even after three weeks of relentless attacks. Neither the US nor Israel share land borders with Iran, and therefore, landing boots on the ground will always remain a challenge.

America primarily aims to end the Iranian nuclear dream because the world is witness to the strategic restraint that the US has to live with when faced with a nuclear-armed adversary. The woes of strategic miscalculations and underestimation of an adversary have returned to haunt the US. A moot question that emerges is, “If Iran had the capability to target mainland US, would this war have started?” This question has increasingly become synonymous with US strategic thought and a wider reflection of risk aversion and unacceptability of large-scale attrition.

Israel, on the other hand, sees this war as decisive in nature, driven by Iran’s cry for death to the Zionist regime and death to Israel. It is far more existential for Israel as compared to the US, and therefore, Israel has a greater appetite for risk. Israel seeks a West Asia safe for Jews, and Iran seeks a West Asia safe for an Islamic Republic, largely emanating from the years of dissonance between the Islamic nations and Israel in the region.

Iran has prioritised systemic resistance over capitulation. In spite of losing its strategic leadership on the very first day, the Iranian system did not collapse and has lately shown a distinct resolve. Use of a large number of drones and surface-to-surface missiles to saturate defences while simultaneously targeting US bases across the Middle East, Iran has also created the larger strategic narrative that the promised ‘US defence umbrella’ has multiple holes.

This paper seeks to understand the broad strategy of the combined US-Israel force and also looks at the targeting philosophy during the war. In Multi Domain Operations (MDO), air power theories of John Warden, David Deptula, and John Boyd can be brought together to create a distinct air power operational paradigm that would be useful for prosecuting future wars.

US-Israel Targeting Philosophy

What we see in the strategy adopted by the combined US-Israeli force is a congruence of John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, creating an overarching scaffolding for adaptation of John Warden’s systemic approach to warfighting and David Deptula’s Effects-Based Operations (EBO). The core targeting philosophy adopted by the Americans and Israelis can be put into three distinct phases: –

Phase I: Shock and Awe

The main Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for this phase was to outthink and outpace the enemy’s decision-making cycle and affect its OODA loop. [1] The US and Israeli forces operated at a much higher tempo than the Iranians and forced them into a reactive mode. The end state of the phase appeared to be the creation of adequate disorder and uncertainty to be able to launch parallel attacks on the Iranian leadership. John Boyd had prioritised that psychological victory must precede physical victory and therefore, Schwerpunkt[2] (Focus of effort) was on decisive points, viz., strategic leadership, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Early Warning (EW) networks. The first 96 hours saw the US expend around 532 GBU-31/32/38 JDAMs and 375 TLAMs. [3] In the same period, 325 US Patriot PAC-2, PAC-3 missiles, 618 of the Gulf partner countries’ Patriots (18 months of production) and 310 SM-2/3/6 Navy Aegis systems were used in defensive operations. [4] On the other hand, Israel used 450 Spice 2000/1000 guided bombs and 230 JDAMs during the first 96 hours. [5] The Iranians traded their cheaper mass-produced munitions for the West’s expensive, finite interceptors in that time period, a rather interesting trade-off. The Iranians expended 1,300 Shahed drones and 565 ballistic missiles, as reported by the Payne Institute’s proprietary analysis. [6]

• Systemic Paralysis. Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion began with systematic degradation of the Iranian OODA loop by targeting the internet, communication systems, surveillance radars and associated networks to keep the Iranians in the Observe and Orient phase and not permitting them to make a decision. The Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) campaign has continued ever since, primarily to gain information and decision dominance. The Iranian Command and Control (C2) grid was sufficiently degraded by striking the Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to create the requisite degree of control of air for furtherance of operations. This targeting philosophy is in line with John Warden’s five rings model (Figure 1), where leadership is a CoG and air power must be used to directly target it.

• Leadership Elimination. Having achieved the requisite degree of control of air and decision paralysis, the first day also saw long-range precision strikes on Iranian leadership and the elimination of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with the elimination of other top Iranian officials in their hierarchy. This targeting philosophy is in line with John Warden’s five rings model (Figure 1), where leadership is a CoG and air power must be used to directly address it. The main aim was to target the inner rings first and simultaneously strike critical infrastructure and decision-making ability to cause functional paralysis.[7] By targeting leadership and system essentials, a systemic collapse of Iran was envisaged.

Phase II: Suppression of Military Capability.

This phase adopted David Deptula’s concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), where classical sequential campaigns were replaced with parallel warfare and simultaneous strikes by continuously attacking leadership, infrastructure, armed forces and networks. The desired outcome was the creation of a strategic shock and causing a system overload. The main aim of this phase was not ‘what to hit’ but ‘what is the desired effect’. The targeting philosophy was directed at overwhelming the adversary quickly before resistance formed. However, this was the phase where the desired effects had not quite manifested according to plan. A systems-based intelligence analysis is critical to the application of effects-based operations. Without adequate information about what an adversary relies upon to exert influence and conduct operations, parallel warfare cannot be effective. [8] The Iranians were able to react, respond and retaliate with renewed vigour, which caused the combined force of the US and Israel to rethink their targeting philosophy. In spite of the Iranian leadership being wiped out, the Iranian military system continued to function. Linearity in combat is no longer relevant, and because it is all about adopting a ‘system-of-systems’ approach, the initial part of the phase did not yield commensurate results.

• Air Dominance. In their quest for air dominance, the Americans and Israelis continued hitting Iranian air defence (AD) and networks to blind them. Whilst Iranian airfields and AD elements were constantly targeted, Iranians themselves were able to target US and Israeli air-fields in the region. Use of kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles further created chaos in the US and Israeli operations. This saw the focus of targeting shift from purely Offensive Counter Air (OCA) to suppression of Iranian missile infrastructure. Missile launchers, drone launch sites and missile storage dumps were constantly targeted but have not quite proved to be effective. Iran also started using asymmetric means to target US assets from the sea by using fast attack crafts and boats.

• Response Suppression. Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) coupled with drones and fast-attack boats caused Americans to rethink their targeting strategy, and their focus shifted to the source of these attacks. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Iranian response mechanism appears to be a well-knit system with adequate resilience. While technology gives credibility, effectiveness is measured by the correct use of that technology. As a consequence, the US forces have now shifted focus to an attrition-based targeting philosophy by addressing economic targets and energy infrastructure. This appears to be a turning point in the conflict where initial coherence in strategy has degraded, and desperate measures to cripple the Iranian will to fight have come to the fore. This also seems to be a stage where the initially envisaged Conflict Termination Criteria (CTC),  Desired End States (DES) and use of ‘off-ramps’ appear to have changed, contradicting an endearing Principle of War, i.e., Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

Phase III: Pressure Campaign.

This phase saw the US and Israeli forces shift targeting to logistics and energy infrastructure. Fuel storage, military logistics and transportation networks have now begun to be targeted with the aim of weakening the regime’s sustainment capability. The shift from counter-force to counter-value signals a reactive strategy not quite anticipated by the planners. The Strait of Hormuz has been closed by Iran, and the conflict seems to be entering another phase where the stark realities of modern warfare are clearly visible. Cyber warfare may not have crippled Iranian networks, Information and Cognitive Warfare may not have impacted the Iranian people and more importantly, what has emerged is that the Iranian system has been able to take on the combined might of Israeli and the US forces, dragging the conflict into its fourth week.

• Economic Strangulation. US and Israeli forces had started targeting Iranian oil production and storage facilities, thereby escalating the conflict. However, over the past three weeks, Iranian oil has flowed freely and more importantly, Iran has been able to target oil infrastructure in all other neighbouring countries, causing widespread disruption. With Iran practically controlling the Strait of Hormuz, economic strangulation of Iran at this stage seems to have had little effect on the Iranian will to fight.

The Convergence of Air Power Theorists.

Warden, Deptula and Boyd have all focused on a system-of-systems approach to warfare, using kill webs to counter kill webs. The first two weeks saw coherence in strategy where air power was used well; however, the resilience and response of the Iranians was not anticipated by both the Americans and Israelis. As a result, the next two weeks have shown a lack of strategic congruence in their targeting philosophy. This takes us back to what lies at the core of MDO, i.e., decision dominance and creating functional paralysis. Warden brings out the constituents of the system and clearly demarcates the five target rings (Figure 1), he tells us where and what to strike. Deptula tells us how to strike, how to carry out parallel operations and importantly, how to create the desired effects. Boyd gives us a glimpse of cognitive warfare and how to create decision dominance. Together, these three theorists form the backbone of MDO and targeting philosophy. The ‘where’ and ‘how’ of the equation are known, the ‘when’ part of it is left to the planners, and that is where a pragmatic approach rather than an euphoriant approach may have yielded better results. The essence of EBO is how time and space are exploited in terms of the effects desired. [9] That is where the crucial question of ‘when’ gets answered. Perhaps parallel counter-force and counter-value targeting, from the word go, would have resulted in desired results with greater rapidity and lesser mass.

Putting Two and Two Together.

The first press briefing conducted by the White House on March 02, 2026, revealed that in the first 24 hours of the operation, more than 1,000 targets were struck. The targets included Iranian leadership, C2 nodes, ISR infrastructure and ballistic missile sites in coordination with cyber and space operations to disrupt communication and sensor networks. [10] The very next briefing held on March 04 brought out that the Americans had moved over 90 per cent of their troops from their bases in the region to safer locations out of Iranian weapon ranges. [11] By March 05, the briefings claimed that Iranian missile launches had reduced by 90 per cent and drone attacks by 83 per cent since the first day. [12]  The briefing also mentioned the use of B-2 bombers striking over 200 targets inside Iran, including ballistic missile sites, using 2000-pounds penetrator bombs. [13] The March 10 briefing brought out that the combined force had struck over 5,000 targets since the beginning of the war, and also said that the strikes have significantly reduced the response options of the Iranians. [14] Around the same time, a Reuters report dated March 10, 2026, reported that the number of ballistic missiles fired by Iran from February 28 onwards was in excess of 500, and the number of drones launched was in excess of 2,000 over 10 days. [15] Though the numbers had seen a reduction, it has not been very substantial and even after three weeks, Iran has continued to fire ballistic missiles and launch drones across multiple targets in the region. By March 13, the Americans claimed that the combined force had struck over 15,000 targets across Iran, averaging over 1,000 targets per day. The briefing on March 13 also brought out that only one per cent stand-off munitions were being used by the Americans. [16]

Analysing open-source information and juxtaposing the White House briefings from the first three weeks of the conflict, what emerges is the stress on the number of targets struck and not what effect was desired and created. As usual, rhetoric tended to rule the roost, and the briefings were designed to overwhelm the world with numbers! Iranian retaliation did not see too great a reduction, and ballistic missiles as well as drones continued to be fired with a fair amount of effectiveness. Yes, they were intercepted, but at what cost?

Another factor that emerges is that even a country like the US has a limited long-range precision arsenal, and eventually conventional weapons will come into play. Therefore, the use of precision weapons must be done with extreme caution to create the desired effects early in the operation and the congruence of ‘where, how and when’ would have yielded better results. Logistics stamina, especially for overseas operations, will remain critical. Warships and submarines will have a limited arsenal, especially with respect to weapons like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), and replenishment cycles will not necessarily be able to keep pace with the utilisation rate. Based on the numbers launched by the Americans and targets taken on, this factor has definitely resulted in the Americans being forced to significantly reduce stand-off weapon utilisation.

The briefings also brought out that preparation for this operation was going on for many months. The Americans were fully aware that most of their operating bases were within reach of the Iranian SSMs and drones. In spite of that, they launched operations from those bases and were forced to evacuate personnel within the first four days. What emerges is surprising. Either the Americans severely underestimated the Iranian response, or the effects desired from the initial volleys of attacks were not achieved. Either way, the fact that comes to the fore is that the plan that looks very good on paper may not necessarily be effective when executed. After the first two days, the targeting philosophy of the Americans and Israelis appeared to constantly shift focus and appeared to be random, rather than well thought out. Reading between the lines, what appears to be a shift of targeting focus from counter force to counter value may be signalling that the Iranian AD was not fully destroyed, and the transition from precision to mass bombing only reinforces that fact. The coming days might give us a glimpse of the operational status of Iranian AD weapon systems and either substantiate or refute claims of the US and Israel having destroyed all AD weapons of Iran.

Parting Shots.

Air power is a critical enabler for the conduct of MDO and is perhaps an instrument of choice, as can be seen from all major conflicts occurring around the world. While a systems approach to targeting is effective and causes functional paralysis, it does not guarantee victory. Parallel warfare, decision dominance and CoG targeting are realities which must be addressed across multiple domains. Adversaries may be numerically and technologically inferior; however, the effectiveness of asymmetric response capabilities has the potential to offset the effectiveness of technology. Future warfare will be a healthy mix of non-kinetic and kinetic options, including dominance in the cognitive domain.

In the absence of accurate empirical data, open-source inputs from both sides offer a fairly accurate glimpse into what must have happened, and one can safely predict what might happen in the future. This war is far from over, and the longer it lasts, the more serious global ramifications will be. Boyd, Deptula, and Warden have given us a framework for conducting MDO; however, sequencing and prioritising operations will forever remain a challenge, and it is only after the war that introspection can be done. Rhetoric will forever mar realistic assessments, and narratives will always add to the fog of war. The Iran-US-Israel conflict, however, poses a very pertinent question to everyone researching this war: “To what extent can a technology-driven, system-of-systems approach to targeting produce decisive outcomes against a resilient and adaptive adversary?” The jury is out.

Notes:-

[1] Davis S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden, Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” School of Advanced Air Power Studies, February 1995, pp. 16-20, https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/27/2001861508/-1/1/0/T_0029_FADOK_BOYD_AND_WARDEN.PDF#:~:text=In%20his%20theory%20of%20conflict%2C%20Boyd%20highlights,OODA%20loops%20and/or%20“loosening”%20enemy%20OODA%20loops. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

[2]  John R. Boyd, “Discourse on Winning and Losing,” US Marine Command and Staff College, April 25 – May 3, 1989, p. 100, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5497331ae4b0148a6141bd47/t/5af842f8758d4615555d3f6d/1526219514965/Patterns+of+Conflict+Transcript.pdf. Accessed on March 15, 2026.

[3] MacDonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek, “Over 5000 Munitions Shot in the First 96 Hours of the Iran War,”  Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), March 16, 2026,  https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/03/over-5000-munitions-shot-in-the-first-96-hours-of-the-iran-war/. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7]  John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Air Power Journal,  vol IX, no 1, Spring 1995, pp. 41-55, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-09_Issue-1-Se/1995_Vol9_No1.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

[8]  Brigadier General David A. Deptula, “Effects Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare,” February 2001, p. 19, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/DocumentFile/Documents/2005/EBO_deptula_020101.pdf. Accessed on March 17, 2026.

[9] Ibid., p 5.

[10] US Department of War, “Transcript, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” March 02, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4418959/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/. Accessed on March 14, 2026.

[11] US Department of War, “Transcript, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” March 04, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4421037/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/,  Accessed on March 14, 2026.

[12] US Department of War, “Transcript, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of U.S. Central Command, Hold a Press Briefing at Central Command Headquarters on U.S. Military Operations in the Middle East,” March 05, 2026,

https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4425459/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-admiral-brad-cooper-commander-of-us-central-c/, Accessed on March 15, 2026.

[13] Ibid.

[14] US Department of War, “Transcript, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” March 10, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4429953/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/, Accessed on March 18, 2026.

[15] “Number of Iranian Missiles and Drones Fired at Gulf Countries,” Reuters, March 03, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-missiles-drones-fired-gulf-countries-2026-03-10/. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

[16] US Department of War, “Transcript, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” March 13, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4434484/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

True Promise 4: the Iranian Counter-Strikes

by Adrien Fontanellaz  Military Historian and Analyst Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaire

Despite being targeted by a series of highly successful decapitation strikes against their headquarters during the early hours of the war— the latter killing at least 40 senior officials, including the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi; the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Major General Mohammad Pakpour; the Secretary of Iran’s Defence Council, Ali Shamkhani; the Iranian Minister of Defence, Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh; and foremost the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei— the Iranians began to retaliate within minutes, thus initiating Operation “True Promise 4,” which mostly consisted of successive waves of missiles and drones.[1]

The pace of the Iranian attacks slowed down markedly after the first three days of the war, but has continued unabated ever since, even though the country is on the receiving end of a pounding of an intensity unheard of for decades. By March 07, 2026, the Israeli Air Force had already dropped 6,500 bombs, whilst the Americans had struck a staggering 3,000 targets, according to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the American Central Command (CENTCOM), respectively. These numbers continue to grow at the same pace, with CENTCOM claiming to have struck a further 2,000 targets by day 10 of Operation Epic Fury, out of which a major portion was related to the Iranian offensive drone and missile array. The present article aims to explore why the Iranians are able to continue running their drone- and missile-centric retaliation operations under such adverse conditions, how their campaign is conducted, and finally what lessons might be drawn from their operations.[2]

The Sepah: An Overview

Iran has the particularity of maintaining two distinct armed forces, both operating under the umbrella of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. The Artesh is the regular army inherited from the time of the Shah. Its primary mission is the defence of Iranian territory, and it encompasses ground forces, a navy, an air force, and an air defence force. The IRGC, on the other hand, also known as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran commonly known as Sepah, answers directly to the Supreme Guide of the Revolution and is tasked with defending the regime against both external and internal threats, as well as conducting military interventions abroad. Like the Artesh, it includes ground forces, a navy, and an Aerospace Force, as well as the Jerusalem Force, which is responsible for its external operations. Unlike the Artesh, however, asymmetric warfare has been deeply ingrained in the IRGC’s institutional culture since its inception. Many of its founding members had already been trained in guerrilla warfare prior to the Revolution. This strategic culture persisted thereafter, even as the Corps expanded significantly and conducted numerous large-scale conventional operations during the Iran–Iraq War.[3]

In the early 2000s, Tehran faced the threat of an invasion of Iran by American forces in the aftermath of the Iraq War. In response to this perceived threat, General Mohammad Ali Jafari—who served as a senior figure within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) before becoming its commander in 2007—developed the so-called “mosaic doctrine.” After assuming leadership of the IRGC in 2007, he proceeded to implement this doctrine. It was designed to enable the IRGC to confront a vastly superior adversary such as the United States (US). Under this framework, the IRGC was reorganised into thirty-one provincial commands intended to operate with a high degree of autonomy. These units were structured to conduct both symmetric and asymmetric operations simultaneously, thereby allowing the force to continue fighting even if the regime’s principal command centres were neutralised.

To ensure operational continuity under such conditions, both geographic and unit-level commands were granted pre-delegated authority to act independently if they became isolated from central command. In addition, military assets were dispersed and fortified in order to reduce their vulnerability to enemy strikes. Iran’s drone and missile arsenals were also significantly expanded to strengthen deterrence against potential aggression, and these were stockpiled into massive underground complexes, the so-called “Missile cities.” Finally, this strategy was complemented by the development of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” a network of alliances with various armed movements operating across the region, which Tehran sought to leverage as an additional means of strategic deterrence. [4]

The Long Swords of Persia

Iran, unable to modernise its air force after the Iran–Iraq War, invested heavily in its ballistic missile program starting in the early 1990s and supported initially by North Korea. Early developments included short-range missiles such as Shahab-1 (300 km) and Shahab-2 (500 km), derived from North Korean designs, followed by the solid-fuel Fateh-110 in 2002 and the medium-range Shahab-3 (1,000 km). Iran has since focused on improving missile accuracy, deployment speed, and the ability to evade missile defences, introducing technologies such as manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, submunition warheads, and decoys. Newer systems include the Khorramshahr (2017), Khaybar Shekan (2022), and the Fattah-1 hypersonic missile (2023). In parallel, Iran developed cruise missiles, notably the Soumar (2015), based on the Soviet Kh-55 design obtained from Ukraine. Estimates suggest Iran possessed over 3,000 medium-range ballistic missiles by 2022, and about 2,500 by early 2026, despite combat losses and expenditure in June 2025, alongside much larger numbers of short-range missiles.[5]

Similarly, Iran began developing its domestic drone industry during the Iran–Iraq War, initially with modest results. Over time, the program expanded significantly, leading to the production of a wide range of drone types. These include Medium Altitude Longe Endurance (MALE) combat drones like the Mohajer-6 and Shahed-129, as well as low-cost one-way attack drones such as the Shahed-101, Shahed-107, Shahed-136 and the newer Hadid-110, designed with reduced radar signatures and jet propulsion. Iran has also exported these drones, notably to Russia, where the Shahed-136 is produced as the Geran-2 and has been widely used in the war in Ukraine since late 2022.[6]

The IRGC Aerospace Force

The drones are widespread among the entire Iranian military apparatus. Both the regular air force and the IRGC Navy are known to possess them in high numbers, whilst the latter is also known to operate short-range ballistic missiles. The bulk of the Iranian long-range capabilities fell, however, under the precinct of the 15,000 to 20,000-men-strong IRGC Aerospace Force. It is divided into five commands. The air defence command is equipped with a wide range of air defence systems of national or Russian designs and operates in coordination with the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force under the umbrella of the Khatam-al Anbiya Air Defence Headquarters. The air operations command oversees the Corps’ small fleet of airplanes and helicopters, but its offensive capabilities remained limited, with a handful of operational Su‑22M4s and Tucano. A third command is responsible for spatial activities and has been credited since 2009 with the successful launch into orbit of several observation and telecommunications satellites. The drone command oversees the operation of the IRGC drone array, whilst the Missile command is in charge of the short- and long-range ballistic missiles. In turn, the latter is organised into five main units: the 5^th “Raad,” the 7^th “Al-Hadid,” the 16^th “Qaam,” the 19^th “Zulfiqar,” and the 23^rd “Al-Towhid” missile brigades. These units operate from at least two dozen underground, fortified missile bases, which are clustered and interconnected by tunnels. As a rule, longer-range missiles are deployed from central Iran, whereas shorter-range missiles are launched from the western and southern regions of the country. Some bases are equipped with reloadable underground launch silos, although most missiles must be transported and launched using truck-based transporter erector launchers (TELs).[7]

True Promise 4

Following initial American and Israeli strikes, the Iranian Armed Forces launched its counterattack under Operation “True Promise 4,” mainly involving the IRGC Aerospace Force and Navy, with support from the Iranian Air Force. Early actions included several airstrikes until March 02, 2026, when two Iranian Su-24s were reportedly shot down by a Qatari F-15QA near Al Udeid Air Base while flying at very low altitude. [8]

Consequently, Iran’s principal means of retaliation consisted of missiles and attack drones. However, the exact number of weapons deployed remains difficult to determine with any precision, as Iranian authorities have not disclosed specific figures. Furthermore, the targeted infrastructure is dispersed across a vast geographical area spanning eleven countries. Several of these states, as well as the United States, have not released data regarding the number of weapons directed at their territory. Consequently, any assessment can provide only a partial view of the total quantity of weapons employed in these counterstrikes. Nevertheless, a Reuters review of available sources suggest that, at a minimum, 605 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,987 attack drones were launched against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait between February 28 and March 10, 2026. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defence acknowledged that by March 13, the UAE alone had been targeted by 285 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,567 attack drones. For its part, the IDF stated on March 10 that more than 300 medium-range ballistic missiles—approximately half of which carried cluster warheads—had been launched against Israel since February 28.[9]

However, the Iranian forces operated under increasingly intense pressure from the American and Israeli air forces, which allocated a significant proportion of their sorties to targeting missile and drone units and interdicting missile sites by striking the entrances of their underground facilities, while Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) continuously monitored the areas used for weapon launches. The missile TELs were particularly vulnerable in this context, as they are relatively easy to detect via satellite during launches due to the substantial infrared signature generated by engine ignition. Consequently, although the IRGC conducted comparatively large missile volleys in the initial days of the conflict, the launch rate of its units declined markedly thereafter, especially for those based in western and southern Iran, where enemy air forces had greater freedom of operation.  According to the IDF, 90 missiles were fired at Israel on February 28, followed by approximately 60 on March 1, and then roughly 20 per day until March 10. These attacks were conducted in small salvos, or even as single launches spaced several hours apart, resembling artillery harassment fire in their pattern and tempo. Similarly, 541 attack drones and 165 ballistic missiles were launched against the UAE during the first two days of the war. The pace of drone attacks against this country subsequently declined, falling to between 112 and 148 per day between March 2 and 8, before decreasing further to between 18 and 39 per day between March 9 and 14. In contrast, the number of ballistic missiles fired at the UAE remained relatively stable from March 2 onward, fluctuating between three and 16 missiles per day.[10]

Facing the Onslaught

The effectiveness of IRGC missile and drone attacks is limited by the dense and advanced air defence networks in the region. Israel has a multilayered system—including Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems—designed to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have invested heavily in Patriot, THAAD, and other systems, supplemented by American batteries. While these networks also include short-range systems against drones, their primary vulnerability is the depth of interceptor stockpiles.

The United Arab Emirates, for instance, is assessed to have procured 192 MIM-140 Talon interceptors for its two THAAD batteries, 1,270 PAC-2, PAC-3, and PAC-3 MSE interceptors for its 13 Patriot batteries, and 400 missiles for its four Cheongung batteries. Between 28 February and 14 March 2026, Iran reportedly launched approximately 300 ballistic missiles against the country, and it can be estimated that between 600 and 900 interceptors may have been expended during these engagements. Other Gulf states possess similarly limited interceptor inventories relative to the scale of potential missile attacks. Kuwait, for example, reportedly acquired 504 interceptors for its eight Patriot batteries, while Qatar purchased approximately 1,125 interceptors for its 11 Patriot batteries. Compounding this vulnerability is the limited capacity to rapidly replenish interceptor inventories. Manufacturers are currently struggling to keep pace with the surge in global demand that has followed the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By December 2025, only 534 MIM-140 Talon interceptors had been delivered to the US Armed Forces, highlighting the broader production constraints affecting the global supply of advanced missile defence interceptors. In the meantime, however, these sophisticated air defence systems successfully intercepted most Iranian missiles, with no more than one in ten of the latter penetrating the regional air defence network. The expenditure of air defence missiles related to the interception of drones is much more difficult to gauge because the first line of defence of the targeted states consists of Barrier Combat Air Patrols (BARCAP) flown by their jet fighters and combat helicopters, which shoot down a significant number of them, while the number of types of air defence systems able to counter the drone threat is much higher than the one able to counter ballistic missiles.[11]

Iranian Targeting

The Iranian air offensive followed both counterforce and countervalue lines of operation. From the outset, the campaign incorporated a significant Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) component, with particular emphasis on targeting enemy long-range radar systems and the fire-control radars associated with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries. By March 13, visual confirmation indicated that one American AN/FPS-132 long-range early-warning radar had been damaged at Al Udeid Air Base, while the AN/TPY-2 long-range surveillance and fire-control radar of a US THAAD battery deployed at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base had been destroyed. In addition, at least three other radars of a similar type appear to have been targeted. Iranian forces also sought to degrade enemy command-and-control capabilities. This effort included strikes against the IDF General Staff headquarters in Tel Aviv, as well as US military headquarters facilities in Bahrain and Qatar. Alongside these attacks, satellite communications terminals were deliberately targeted. As of March 13, two such systems located at the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama were visually confirmed destroyed, as were two similar installations at Camp Arifjan. Operation True Promise 4 also featured a substantial counter-air component, with multiple American and Israeli air bases subjected to repeated strikes. Satellite imagery revealed numerous impact points on the latter as well as the destruction of multiple hangars and other supporting infrastructures. Nevertheless, the full extent of the damage inflicted remains uncertain at the time of writing. According to leaks from US officials reported in the American press, five aerial refuelling tankers were damaged by Iranian strikes at Prince Sultan Air Base. Finally, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh appear to have targeted elements of the Israeli intelligence apparatus as repeated strikes were conducted against facilities associated with the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman), the Internal Security Service (Shin Bet), and Unit 8200, the latter being responsible for signals intelligence and electronic warfare operations. [12]

Counter-value targeting, on the other hand, follows two distinct logics. The first seeks to increase the overall cost of the war against Iran to such an extent that the adversary is compelled to cease hostilities and concede to Iran’s demands. In this sense, these operations serve a broader strategic objective. Other strikes, however, appear to be primarily retaliatory in nature and reflect the IRGC’s established tit-for-tat approach, whereby facilities similar to those targeted in Iran are struck in response. For instance, the IRGC claimed responsibility for an attack on the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 1, presented as retaliation for the February 28 strike that resulted in the death of Ali Khamenei. Additional counter-value strikes targeted several US diplomatic representations, international airports, and data centres across the Gulf states, as well as, most notably, major oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.[13]

Conclusion 

Several airpower-related lessons can already be drawn from Iran’s operations in the conflict. First, although piloted aircraft were employed only marginally and operations were conducted within an asymmetrical strategic framework, Iranian commanders nonetheless followed a pattern familiar to airpower practitioners. From the outset, they committed substantial resources to suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and counter-air operations, in a manner broadly comparable to the opening phases of conventional air campaigns. At the same time, multiple symbolic and economic targets were struck, enabling Tehran to exert pressure on the global economy and thereby raise the strategic cost of the conflict for Washington.

At the operational and tactical levels, the use of missiles and drones allowed Iran to project offensive airpower through systems developed and produced domestically at a fraction of the cost associated with acquiring and sustaining a modern combat aircraft fleet and its enabling capabilities—assets that remain largely beyond Iran’s reach due to its international isolation. At the same time, the proliferation of such systems has compelled neighbouring states to invest in extremely costly defensive architectures. Operation True Promise 4 also underscores the critical importance of magazine depth in air and missile-defence interceptors. In this respect, the Gulf states and the United States appear to have erred by concentrating their acquisitions on systems designed primarily to counter high-end threats, thereby forcing them to expend expensive interceptors against extremely low-cost drones.

Notes:-

^[1]  “IRGC Begins Retaliatory Missile, Drone Strikes following US, Israeli Aggression,” Tasnim News Agency, February 28, 2026; “Top Iranian Generals Confirmed Martyred in US, Israeli Strikes, Tasnim News Agency, March 01, 2026.

^[2] Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian @manniefabian X account, 7 March 2026; U.S. Central Command@CENTCOM X account, March 07 2026; US Central Command, “Operation Epic Fury, First 10 Days”, infographic.

^[3]  Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Defending Iran. From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles, (Cambridge University Press, 2021), p.103; Alma Keshavarz, The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Defining Iran’s Military Doctrine (Bloomsberg Academic, 2023), pp.40-42, 47.

^[4] Marek Brylew, “Basiji-Iranian Militia as an element of “Mosaic Defence” and the Guarantee of the Islamic Regime”, in Journal of Modern Science, 2/62/2025; “Iran’s Mosaic Defence. Strategic Doctrine, Prox Networks & Asymetric Warfare” Commandeleven intelligence, March 2026.

^[5] Adrien Fontanellaz, “Proche-Orient et Moyen-Orient: missiles dans la nuit.” in DSI hors-série no 97, August-September 2024.

^[6] Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Game of Drones”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy watch no 3585, March 02 2022.

^[7] Gawdat Bahgat, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Defending Iran. From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles, (Cambridge University Press, 2021), p.106; Adrien Fontanellaz, “Promesse véritable 3: les frappes iraniennes de la guerre des douze jours” in DSI no 179, September-October 2025; Boaz Shapira, “Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF)”, Alma research and education center, November 2024.

^[8] “Iran Air Force Bombs US’ Regional Bases” Tasnim News Agency March 01 2026; Mostafa Salem, “Exclusive: Iranian bombers were “two minutes” from striking US air base before Qatari planes shot them down” CNN World, March 05 2026.

^[9] Andew Mills, Anna Hirtenstein, Muhammad El Gebaly, “Number of Iranian missiles and drones fired at Gulf countries”, Reuters, March 03 2026, revised March 10 2026; United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defense, infographic released March 13 2026; Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian @manniefabian, X account, March 10 2026.

^[10] Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian @manniefabian X account, March 06 and March 10 2026; Infographics released by the Emirates MoD from March 01 to March 14 2026.

^[11] SIPRI database, consulted March 14 2026. https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/; U.S Department of War, “Department of War Establishes New Acquisition Model to More than Triple PAC-3 MSE Production in Partnership With Lockheed Martin”,  January 06 2026; Wes Rumbaugh, “The Depleting Missile Defense Interceptor Inventory”, CSIS Brief, December 2025.

^[12] “General Staff of Israel Targeted by IRGC”, Tasnim News Agency, March 01 2026;   “IRGC Strikes Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport with Khoramshahr-4 Missiles”,  Tasnim News Agency, March 05 2026;  “Iranian Army Announces Wave of Drone Attacks on US Military Sites in Kuwait”, Tasnim News Agency, March 06 2026;   “IRGC Conducts Drone Swarm Attack on Al Dhafra Air Base”, Tasnim News Agency, March 07 2026; “IRGC Annihilates Tel Aviv Satellite Communication Center”, Tasnim News Agency, March 10 2026; “Iranian Army Launches Drone Operation against Israeli Military Intelligence Targets”, Tasnim News Agency, March 11 2026;  “Iranian Army Launches Drone Operation against Israeli Military Intelligence Targets”, Tasnim News Agency,  March 11 2026;  “Iranian Drone Strike Hits Israeli Shin Bet Headquarters”, Tasnim News Agency,  March 12 2026;  “American FP-132 Radar in Qatar Destroyed in IRGC Attack”,  Tasnim News Agency, February 28 2026; Elmustek, “Operation Epic Fury – Documenting Equipment Losses during the 2026 Israel/USA – Iran War”, substack account, consulted  March 15 2026; Efe Ozkan, “Two weeks in, Iran strikes inflict nearly $4B in US military losses”, Anadolu Ajansı,  March 13 2026; Lara Seligmand and Shelby Holliday, “Five Air Force Refueling Planes Hit in Iranian Strike on Saudi Arabia”, The Wall Street Journal,  March 15 2026.

^13] Sivam Pratam Singh, “Iran says it targeted Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu amid escalating war, fate ‘unclear’: Report”, The Hindustan Times, March 02 2026; Daniel Boffey, “It means missile defence on datacentres: drone strikes raise doubts over Gulf as AI superpower”, The Guardian, March 07 2026;  Alia Chughtai, “Which oil and gas facilities in the Gulf have been attacked?”, Al Jazeera, March 04 2026.

The Iran Crisis: Challenges for the Gulf and Pakistan

by Dr Shalini Chawla, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies and Dr Anu Sharma, Assistant Professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, Noida

The crisis in West Asia, which began with the large-scale offensive of the United States (US) (Operation Epic Fury) and Israel (Operation Roaring Lion) against Iran in February 2026, entered a more volatile phase with Iran’s aggressive action against the neighbouring states. This has resulted in the rapid expansion of confrontation beyond traditional bilateral rivalries. What initially appeared as a localised escalation involving Iran and its adversaries has gradually transformed into a wider regional crisis with significant geopolitical implications. The immediate trigger for this escalation was a wave of joint US–Israeli airstrikes targeting key Iranian military and government installations. These operations targeted a range of strategic Iranian infrastructure in cities like Tehran, Isfahan, Minab, Kermanshah, Qom, Tabriz, Ilam, Karaj, Lorestan province, Zanjan, Urmia, Bushehr, Damavand, and Shiraz. The strikes also targeted missile production facilities, air defence systems, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sites, and key command-and-control centres. The strikes had two key objectives: (1) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, which underpin Tehran’s deterrence strategy and pose threats to regional military bases, infrastructure, and maritime routes; and (2) they aimed to weaken Iran’s regional influence by disrupting the logistical and operational networks supporting its partnerships with non-state actors across West Asia.

Iran’s response was swift and carefully calibrated to demonstrate both deterrence and strategic resolve. Tehran launched a series of retaliatory missile and drone strikes targeting American military bases across the Gulf states, Israeli strategic installations, and critical infrastructure in several Gulf states hosting American military infrastructure. These attacks showcased the operational reach of Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial capabilities, many of which were specifically designed to penetrate advanced air defence systems. Military facilities, energy infrastructure, and logistical hubs linked to the American military presence became primary targets, reflecting Iran’s strategy of increasing the costs of direct confrontation for Washington and its regional partners. The strikes and counterstrikes quickly transformed what initially appeared to be a limited military exchange into a wider regional crisis.

At the core of the present crisis lie tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, which was initiated in 1957. Over time, the programme evolved under changing security concerns and increasing international scrutiny. Although Iran consistently maintained that its nuclear activities were intended for peaceful energy purposes, disputes over reporting obligations and uranium enrichment prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare Iran in non-compliance in 2005. In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1696 in 2006, demanding the suspension of enrichment activities and imposing sanctions that significantly affected Iran’s economy. A diplomatic breakthrough emerged with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which restricted Iran’s enrichment programme in exchange for sanctions relief. However, disagreements over missile development, compliance issues, and America’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 revived the tensions. These unresolved disputes escalated into confrontation between Iran, the US, and Israel, culminating in a twelve-day military escalation in mid-2025 after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The 2026 Escalation: From Strategic Rivalry to Regional Confrontation

Unlike the 2025 crisis, the February 2026 confrontation has quickly spilt beyond a narrow Gulf-centric framework, drawing in a wider network of regional and extra-regional actors. Several Gulf states, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Qatar, host major American military bases and strategic logistical infrastructure that are integral to Washington’s broader security architecture in the region. Air bases in Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait and Iraq and a naval base in Bahrain were attacked by Iranian missiles. As tensions escalate, the presence of these installations has expanded the geographic and strategic scope of the crisis, transforming Gulf states from peripheral stakeholders into potential theatres of confrontation.

The current escalation of hostilities in the region has widespread implications for the Gulf states, involving Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure or American military assets. Gulf economies remain deeply dependent on hydrocarbon exports, making critical infrastructure highly vulnerable. Targeted attacks have significantly disrupted production and export capacity, triggering volatility in global energy markets and raising insurance premiums. A more severe scenario involves the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial portion of global oil and gas trade happens. Iranian blockade of this chokepoint has created energy supply shocks, increased global prices and forced Gulf states to rely on limited alternative export routes. In the longer run, such a disruption would also generate a broader logistical crisis, affecting shipping lanes, port operations, and supply chains across the region. Continuation of the crisis/conflict is likely to place the Gulf states in a highly precarious position, compelling them to navigate between their security dependence on the US and the need to avoid direct confrontation with Iran. Eventually, the scenario would intensify regional instability and strategic uncertainty.

This evolving situation indicates a critical shift in the geography of conflict. Rather than remaining confined to the Persian Gulf or the immediate West Asian theatre, the confrontation is gradually intersecting with broader geopolitical dynamics that extend towards South Asia. Iran’s historical, political, and economic linkages with countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India have created a wider arc of instability that connects the Gulf region with the subcontinent. Maritime routes, energy flows, diaspora networks, and security partnerships increasingly link developments in West Asia with political and strategic dynamics in South Asia. The current conflict has acquired cross-regional implications, extending its security impact on Pakistan. Historically, West Asian conflicts have influenced South Asia through ideological narratives and sectarian mobilisation. Pakistan faces particular vulnerabilities due to its delicate diplomatic balance with Iran, the Gulf states, and Western partners, alongside domestic sectarian sensitivities that could intensify amid regional polarisation. Escalation may also generate pressures along the Iran–Pakistan border, where militant networks operate.

 Pakistan: Walking a Tightrope

The conflict and intensifying tensions in the region have been unnerving for Pakistan, especially because Pakistan has been struggling to recover from its domestic instability, economic crisis and diplomatic challenges which it faced over the last few years. Pakistan shares a strained relationship with Iran, and the sectarian and strategic tensions have not allowed for a sustained phase of stability in the bilateral relationship. In January 2024, Pakistan and Iran exchanged missile and drone strikes and the conflict was diffused without too much damage for both sides. There have been ineffectual efforts from both sides to negotiate and settle the tensions. The current conflict, where the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and oil storage depots and missile sites are targeted, is a matter of deep anxiety for Pakistan. The news of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death, led to violent protests in Pakistan. Approximately 15 to 20 per cent of Pakistan’s population is Shiite Muslims, and instability in Iran is bound to have repercussions for Pakistan. Thousands of people gathered to condemn the US and Israeli strikes in Iran. There were protests around the US mission in Pakistan, and protesters attempted to storm the US consulate in Karachi, leading to 10 deaths.

Pakistan’s southwestern province, Balochistan, which has remained restive with raging insurgency, will feel the ripples of instability and tensions in Iran. Balochistan shares around 900 km long border with Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The neighbours share ethnic and cultural ties. In this respect, two issues are critical:

Insurgency and militancy remain a major concern. Iran-based Sunni separatist militant group Jaish-al-Adl (Army of Justice), composed mainly of Baloch. The group has seemingly been  drawing support and emulating the war tactics of the separatist groups in Balochistan in Pakistan, including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). There have been reports of the cross-border nexus between the two groups.

The second issue, which is closely related to this, is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a USD 60 billion investment from China and a strong reflection of China’s long-term commitment to Pakistan. The CPEC projects in Baluchistan have been frequently targeted by the BLA and the deadly military group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The economic impact of the crisis is serious on Pakistan, given the fact that Pakistan imports around 85 per cent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The oil is imported through the maritime route passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran crisis has further impacted energy prices in Pakistan, which have already surged to fulfil the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

Remittances are a crucial part of Pakistan’s economy, and those from Pakistanis working in the Gulf stand at around USD 20 billion every year. Unrest in the Gulf and Iranian attacks on the Gulf countries will create an atmosphere of uncertainty, which is likely to dissuade Pakistani nationals from working in the Gulf.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan is caught up in a precarious situation, and the ongoing conflict compels it to make some difficult choices. Before the conflict, Pakistan also tried to act as a mediator to diffuse the intensifying tensions between the US and Iran. The conflict raises some difficult questions for Islamabad. Pakistan has been trying hard to mend its relationship with the US after the Trump administration came into power. The leadership not only credited President Donald Trump for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan during the May 2025 conflict but also nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Pakistan’s participation in the controversial US-led Board of Peace, to address the Palestine issue, expresses its desperation to be in the good books of Trump and leverage strategic dividends. Pakistan is facing domestic pressure to withdraw from the Board of Peace. Even though Pakistan is upset with the US and Israel’s strikes on Iran, it will be a challenge for Pakistan to raise its voice against American actions in Iran.

Although Pakistan is trying hard to remain neutral in the conflict, its relationship with the Gulf is complicated by the ongoing geopolitical and strategic shifts in the Gulf.  In December 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which includes a clause on a collective defence framework. This indicates that any aggression against either country will be seen as aggression against both. Pakistan projected the agreement as a force multiplier and a strategic win in the wake of heightened tensions vis-à-vis New Delhi in 2025. But now, how far Pakistan will uphold its commitments following Iran’s strikes against Saudi Arabia remains to be seen. Given the fact that it is engulfed in an intense cross-border conflict with Afghanistan. The core issue between the two neighbours has been Pakistan’s claims that the Afghan Taliban regime has been sheltering and providing safe havens to the TTP, which has been responsible for conducting relentless terror attacks targeting the security personnel in Pakistan. Tensions have been high, and Pakistan is now conducting air strikes on the civilian targets. Surely, it would not be feasible for Islamabad to open another front in the Gulf, with the ongoing conflict with Kabul and persistent tensions vis-à-vis New Delhi.

India’s Challenges and Concerns

The current conflict in West Asia marks a significant escalation in the long-standing strategic rivalries surrounding Iran. Since February 2026, tensions that had historically remained confined to proxy conflicts and covert operations have moved into the realm of direct military confrontation. The crisis has heightened vulnerabilities in key maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of global energy supplies pass. As a result, international energy markets have experienced volatility, insurance premiums for commercial shipping have increased, and concerns over supply chain disruptions have intensified. The conflict has also contributed to political uncertainty across the broader West Asia, prompting regional states to reassess their security postures and raising fears of wider escalation that could affect global trade and economic stability. This escalation has heightened vulnerabilities in global energy supply routes and increased risks to maritime security across the Persian Gulf and surrounding shipping corridors. Beyond the immediate military dimension, the confrontation generated widespread political uncertainty, compelling regional governments to reassess their security postures and raising fears of broader escalation. However, the present events indicate the breakdown of this uneasy equilibrium.

For India, the crisis presents a complex diplomatic and strategic challenge. New Delhi must balance its strong partnerships with Israel, the US, and Gulf states while maintaining important economic and geopolitical ties with Iran, including projects such as the Chabahar port and broader connectivity initiatives with Central Asia. Escalating tensions also threaten India’s energy security and maritime trade routes, compelling policymakers to navigate the conflict with careful diplomatic calibration while safeguarding national economic interests.

The impact of the continued Iran crisis on Pakistan is likely to intensify, leading to instability at the domestic level and strategic challenges for it at the international level. The terror groups in Pakistan would be the direct beneficiaries of the instability on Pakistan’s borders. India needs to closely monitor developments and assess its options vis-à-vis Pakistan to safeguard its security and strategic interests.

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 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS ]  & CHPM)

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Keywords: Indian Defence Manufacturing, Aatmanirbhar Bharat, Unmanned Aerial Systems, Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), Defence Industry Perspectives

What is Bharat Aero?

Bharat Aero 2026 is a premier defence and aerospace conference co-organised by Centre for Aerospace Power & Strategic Studies (CAPSS), Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). It was held at V.N. Ghatge Auditorium in Bengaluru on Wednesday, March 11, 2026. The conference was a high-level summit dedicated to advancing India’s military aviation ecosystem by building strong collaboration amongst the defence manufacturing industry and developing an understanding between the industry and the end users (the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force). The event consisted of a series of panel discussions featuring insightful contributions from armed forces leadership, defence industry executives, and government agencies regarding the pursuit of strategic autonomy and technological self-reliance.

Key themes of the conference included the transition from licensed production (“Make in India”) to indigenous design (“Design in India”), modernisation of the combat aircraft fleet through the induction of platforms like the LCA Tejas Mk.1A/MK.2, AMCA and TEDBF, and integration of artificial intelligence and unmanned combat systems.

The panellists highlighted the critical need for collaborative Research & Development, streamlined Quality Assurance certification processes, and increased private sector participation to address not just the contemporary operational gaps, but also ‘future-proof’ India’s war-making and fighting capabilities. The event aims to create a national roadmap intended to transform India into a global hub for aerospace manufacturing and innovation by 2047.

Events of the Day

The welcome address was delivered by Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani (Retd.), DG-CAPSS, who highlighted how Air Power has been playing a leading role in the recent and ongoing conflicts across the globe, and why it is necessary for India to indigenise its defence manufacturing complex. This was followed by the inaugural address by the guest of honour, Air Marshal Seethepalli Shrinivas, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, AOC-in-C, HQ Training Command, IAF, who reemphasised the IAF’s commitment to indigenisation and advocated for a “whole-of-nation approach” towards technology-intensive warfare. He also stated that indigenisation is not a luxury, but a ‘national imperative’.

The first session also included addresses by Mr Arun T. Ramchandani, President of SIDM, who delivered the opening remarks, Mr Jayakrishnan S, Chief Executive Officer, HAL (Bangalore Complex), who delivered the keynote address, and the Vote of Thanks, delivered by Mr Neeraj Gupta, Vice President of SIDM and Managing Director of MKU Limited.

Following the high tea, the Industry Exhibition was inaugurated by the guest of honour. This was followed by the second session of the day, which focused on the IAF’s Fixed Wing Aircraft Manufacturing and Upgrades Ecosystem. The session was moderated by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd.), former DG-CAPSS and Advisor (Aerospace), SIDM. The session started with the moderator emphasising India’s need to shift toward indigenous design and intellectual property ownership. Air Marshal Chopra highlighted the critical shortage of aircraft in the IAF, currently operating at 29 squadrons, and emphasised the need for surge production capabilities.

Air Vice Marshal Tejpal Singh, AVSM, VM, provided a user-perspective on how defence manufacturers can augment the IAF’s multi-pronged strategy to address current and future challenges in induction, indigenisation, and innovation. Mr A.P.V.S. Prasad, representing CEMILAC (Centre for Military Airworthiness & Certification), and Mr Nagaraja RB, representing DGAQA (Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance), in separate speeches, addressed various procedural changes brought about in Quality Assurance and Certification procedures over the past years, and highlighted measures that manufacturers could take to overcome these hurdles

Dr Amitabh Saras, Program Director, ADA, DRDO (Aeronautical Development Agency, Defence Research & Development Organisation), set the ground for the expectations in the percentage of indigenous components on the upcoming Tejas Mk.2 and AMCA platforms, and revealed plans to involve a private-sector Lead System Integrator (LSI) to work alongside HAL, creating a more robust domestic manufacturing ecosystem. Dr Naresh Palta, Former Chair SIDM, Karnataka State Chapter, touched upon India’s gap in indigenous design competencies for critical components such as aeroengines and avionics. His address covered the industry perspective and advocated for a ‘collaborative’ outlook between Foreign OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and Indian manufacturers, rather than a ‘competitive’ outlook.

At the end of the session, Mr Jeetendra Gavankar, CEO of Safran India, provided the perspective of foreign OEMs in the Indian manufacturing domain, particularly in the years following the adoption of the “Make in India” policy. He stated that the policy has enabled the growth of the Indian defence manufacturing industry. He also stated that such developments would make it easy for collaboration between foreign and Indian firms in both R&D and manufacturing.

Helicopters, UAS, and Counter-UAS Systems

The next session was centred around the induction and integration of new technology in the domain of Helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Systems. This session was moderated by Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd.), former Chief of Air Staff of the IAF and an experienced test pilot. The first two addresses were made by officers from the IAF, Air Vice Marshal Ashish Singh, VM, VSM [ACAS Ops (Remote) and Air Vice Marshal Sanjeev Vashishth, VM [ACAS Ops (T&H)], who, in detail, laid out the expectations of the IAF from the manufacturing sector regarding the capabilities of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T).

Group Captain Harsh Vardhan Thakur (Retd.), HAL Test Pilot, made a presentation on various UCAV and MUM-T systems that HAL is currently pursuing, and provided an idea of how the Public Sector Undertaking aims to meet the IAF’s expectations. Mr Sameer Joshi and Colonel Aravind Mulimani (Retd.) provided an industry perspective regarding employment of UAS and Counter UAS systems, and how private defence manufacturers would meet the IAF’s requirements. They also reassured that the private sector is adequately prepared to meet any challenges/requirements posed by the armed forces of India.

The final address of the session was by Mr GVS Bhaskar, who provided perspectives on Helicopter MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) and insisted that the User, OEMs, and third-party suppliers must align their goals to foresee MRO requirements beforehand and meet the requirements accordingly.

Maintenance of Legacy Fleets

The final session of the day was chaired by Air Marshal Vikram Singh and covered user and industry perspectives on maintaining the IAF’s legacy fleets, such as the Chetak helicopters and SEPECAT Jaguar fighter aircraft. Representing the IAF’s perspectives were Air Commodore Jino George (Commodore Maintenance Planning) and Air Commodore Ashutosh Shrivastava (Commodore Eng H). This was followed by an address by Air Vice Marshal K Sundaramani on the maintenance of legacy Air Defence systems of the IAF. The industry perspective was provided by Mr S Balasubramani. The discussion covered issues related to the operation of said fleets and how the IAF and Industry Manufacturers could work together to sustain them through streamlined supply chain efforts and maintenance planning.

The closing address for the event was delivered by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, which was followed by B2G Discussions between CAPSS, SIDM and the various attending organisations.

*****

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Keywords: One Nation-One Theatre, Strategic Coherence, Whole-of-Nation Approach, Modern Warfighting, Theatre Commands

In continuation of a series of articles on Higher Defence reforms, this article sheds light on the need for India-specific structures for modern war fighting. The first article was about whether Theatre Commands were required or not. Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands – To Be or Not to Be (published in CAPSS Journal, Defence and Diplomacy, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/7-VP-Naik.pdf. The second article primarily explained the differences between Theatres and fronts and brought out the employment philosophy of the India Air Force. Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands Redux (Published on CAPSS website, In Focus, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-theatre-commands-redux/). The third article carried out a joint AI and human analysis of the need for reforms and what was wrong with the way India plans to fight, and articulated a problem statement. The fourth article recommended possible structures for the reforms and brought out certain lacunae at the apex level. India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/ published as an Expert View article on CAPSS’ website. The fifth article brought out certain facts about modern war fighting and how the theatre construct was already an old concept. Air Power Musings: When Structure Lags Strategy, The Theatre Command Fallacy, https://capssindia.org/air-power-musings-when-structure-lags-strategy-the-theatre-command-fallacy. The aim of the series was to build a coherent argument towards higher defence reforms in India and bring out possible actionable options in the national security construct.

Introduction

India’s unique geostrategic problem of having two contiguous adversaries, who may act simultaneously, makes the threat manifest as a single entity on multiple fronts. The emerging geopolitical landscape in Myanmar and Bangladesh also merits strategic considerations, however, does it mean that India will need to create additional theatres to cater for Bangladesh and Myanmar?

The problem lies not in the number of threats, which would vary, but in how to handle the manifesting threat. The Iran imbroglio has further reinforced the need for a unified command. The United States (US) and Israeli forces operate under their own, independent commands, where plans are made and executed. However, for the ongoing Iran operation, in spite of being a joint operation, there have been instances of bombing by Israel which the Americans were not aware of.[1] This brings out the need for unity of command to ensure integrated execution of operations. The Iranians, on the other hand, have a single unified command structure; however, execution is decentralised and left to the 31 autonomous provincial commands without any systemic coherence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh (the Islamic Republic of Iran Army) are two parallel and independent armed entities of Iran operating within the same geography and with their own forces. The Artesh has its integral Army, Navy, Air Force and Air Defence (AD) Force, while the IRGC has its own Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force (missiles and drones), Quds Force (supporting the axis of resistance and associated militia) and the Basij Organisation (Information Warfare). These are two forces fighting independently and without strategic guidance.

India is uniquely placed because its threats are geographically contiguous and strategically intertwined. China’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) independently deals with India. Pakistan does not have a separate Theatre Command (TC) to handle contingencies in its West and East. However, the Indian thought process, seemingly in the final stages of reforms, is still looking at the creation of TCs to enhance war-fighting capability. While there is no denying the fact that reforms are required in India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO), the solutions being discussed appear to be in a desperate search for a problem. This article argues that the threat faced by India is singular in nature and could manifest either simultaneously or sequentially, forcing India to fight a two-front war within the same battle-space continuum. Thus, dividing the country into TCs based on a happy compromise of threat and geography risks fragmenting strategic planning for what is essentially one strategic problem.

Creating Artificial Boundaries

The concept of Theatres originated before the Second World War, when forces had to be allocated and operated on separate continental fronts and across vast oceans. Geography forced these structures because that was what was required in those times. In India, we are trying to force geography, and that can prove detrimental in the long run. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are contiguous and operationally connected, having a direct impact on each other. If dealt with by separate theatres, strategic prioritisation will become a major problem and be contested. A single national TC construct preserves the principle of Unity of Command and permits decentralised execution. More on that later. Thus, the need of the hour is to use geography to one’s advantage rather than making it an excuse for fragmenting forces. We should not create artificial boundaries and further complicate the issue.

Two Front Contingency

India is one contiguous Theatre of War. Contingencies may arise with any of its neighbours, and each would constitute a separate front. We should not confuse Theatres of War with fronts and Theatres of Operations. Therefore, the opening of a front does not require an independent force structure to be activated. Additionally, India cannot assume that conflicts with either China or Pakistan will remain geographically isolated. Threats could very rapidly become national conflicts rather than remaining regional campaigns. This further reinforces the need for a single, integrated operational theatre of war.

Multi Domain Operations (MDO) involving land, sea, air, space, and cyber forces will require synchronisation and will be carried out across the entire country simultaneously, because MDO transcend conventional domain-specific war-fighting. If cyber, space and information campaigns are all pervasive and scarce resources like force multipliers remain centrally controlled, why then should war fighting become fragmented? Fragmenting would only create parallel systems, undermining effective Command and Control (C2). A single theatre construct would instead better align with modern warfare, enabling a system-of-systems approach to war-fighting.

Theatre Commands are a purely military reform, and rather than addressing the elephant in the room and appreciating the situation, India is trying to situate the appreciation. Modern war fighting will not purely be a military construct. Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas and US-Israel versus Iran show that national resilience, resolve, and most importantly, capability will differentiate between the victor and the vanquished. It is easy to say that the armed forces need to be reformed, but very difficult to say that the problems are systemic and at the apex level. To develop a comprehensive capability, reforms in HDO must first take place at the highest level.

India’s Legacy HDO: The Need for Apex-Level Joint Planning

India’s current C2 architecture is a legacy inheritance still being retained. What India needs is force-reconfiguration rather than force restructuring because the problem is not about how we fight, it is about how we plan. In India’s past wars, when have the Army and the Navy been used to gain control of the air? Traditionally, the Air Force has been providing air support and shaping the battlefield for the Army and Navy; however, have the land forces ever been used to take on air force tasks like radar busting, artillery and rocket fires on airfields, and destruction of C2 nodes by their special forces? Control of the air is a prerequisite for advancing the land offensive and must be achieved jointly. Op Sindoor, the Ukraine-Russia war and the US-Israel war with Iran have shown the importance of gaining requisite control of air for the furtherance of all operations. Therefore, gaining and retaining control of the air becomes a national imperative to be achieved jointly, requiring centralised planning. Two or three independent theatres are not likely to achieve strategic coherence because their operational imperatives would significantly differ.

MDO requires a ‘Whole-of-Nation’ approach to war-fighting, and that ‘whole’ cannot further be broken down into western theatre, northern theatre or a maritime theatre. Selection and Maintenance of Aim is one of the most enduring Principles of War. Having multiple aims at the grand strategic or the military strategic level will go against the principle. Russia did not adhere to it in the early days of the war, and the result is there for everyone to see. In addition, modern weapons have trans-geography reach. What if an adversary’s weapon hits a target in a different Theatre Command which has not been activated? Will that theatre now respond, or will only the theatre that is supposed to deal with that particular threat respond to the event? For example, in a conflict with Pakistan, Vishakapatnam is targeted, so who will respond to it and how? The unfolding problems are myriad, and the cascading effects will be counterproductive. These issues complicate effective decision-making and further add to the confusion, and in MDO, if decision-making is compromised, the battle will be lost. To take the argument further, Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks on critical infrastructure will happen across the nation and call for a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic responses. Space, the ultimate high ground, does not distinguish between theatres, and more importantly, India’s adversaries also consider India one theatre of operations. Then Why should India not respond as one integrated entity?

Realigning Operational Regional Commands

If planning needs to be done centrally at the apex level, the same is also true at the operational level of execution. The Indian Army has seven regional Commands; the Navy has three, and the Air Force has seven. A total of 17 Commands are spread across the entire country. If India were to operate as one integrated command, the existing regional commands would need to be merged and, more importantly, co-located, keeping geography and threats in mind. Strategic guidance must lead to operational coherence; therefore, we need to change the process of execution of kinetic operations at the operational level, and that is what is meant by force reconfiguration. This can be done by creating Joint Forces Commands (JFC) based on geography, which would exercise C2 at the operational level. Merger of regional commands would enable unity of command and permit decentralised execution. These JFCs would remain operationally subordinate to a single national Theatre and an associated Joint Forces Head Quarters (JFHQ) in order to remain strategically coherent.[2]

In 2016, China realigned its forces from seven Military Regions to five Theatre Commands, each dealing with a specific threat. China’s threat landscape differs from that of India because it has geographically dispersed threats and a mix of continental as well as maritime domains. The Central Theatre Command (CTC) of China defends Beijing and acts as a strategic reserve for other commands. India’s strategic landscape is more concentrated and geographically contiguous, making a single integrated theatre construct more suitable.

The Single Point Advice of Matters Military

Establishing the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and creating the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) is a step in the right direction. The issue causing dissonance is that war fighting and Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) functions have been merged, thereby creating additional reform hurdles. Clearly mandated Allocation of Business (AoB) rules by the Government of India must thus become the first reform. Subject Matter Experts must be able to render ‘single point advice’ to the Government of India (GoI) on all matters related to the armed forces. This advice is single-point and not necessarily single-person. A single person makes the chain linear and susceptible to disruptions, and the same has been seen during Op-Epic Fury, where the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran adversely affected its apex decision-making ability.

With increased offensive capability to address strategic Centres of Gravity (CoG), targeting leadership across all levels has now become fair game. In the present construct, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is an efficient organisation, functionally effective and brings about strategic coherence. The single point advice, therefore, must be a collegiate function by the CDS and the three Service Chiefs (experts in their respective domains). War fighting and RTS functions, both must remain the mandate of COSC, performed by the JFHQ (war fighting) and HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) for RTS functions headed by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff and Secretary to the Chairman COSC (CISC) heading the DMA.

The Future of Warfare

In modern wars, kill chains have evolved into kill webs. There are no independent operations ,and cyber and space are overarching capabilities capable of affecting all other domains. These form the bedrock of Multi-Domain Operations and are therefore not just the mandate of the armed forces. A national ‘nervous system’ is therefore the best way forward. The ability of a nation to demonstrate and adopt a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach will prove decisive in the future. The vision document, ‘The Defence Forces Vision 2047: A Roadmap for a Future-ready Indian Military’, unveiled by the Honourable Raksha Mantri (RM) on March 10, 2026, also speaks of the need for integrating military strength with diplomatic, technological and economic power to ensure national security. [iii] The writing on the wall is clear; it is not just about the armed forces. The armed forces are an important cog in the wheel of a nation, but they are not the only cog. All cogs need to work together to strengthen and support the wheel and serve their own distinct purposes. The armed forces function best when C2 is simple, clear and unified. The soldier on the battlefield, the sailor in a submarine and the pilot in the cockpit of an aircraft require clarity of instruction to enable correct tactical actions. A One Nation-One Theatre approach would align India’s strategy with geography, reduce bureaucratic lethargy, enhance jointness and most importantly, translate synergy into a coherent strategy for integrated operations.

India’s security challenges demand a fundamental rethink of the existing C2 structures. We must embrace our geopolitical landscape and geographical context to adopt a framework specifically tailored to India’s strategic reality. Given the possibility of simultaneous pressure from both China and Pakistan, multiple theatres will only fragment war-fighting capability. A One Nation-One Theatre architecture, supported by streamlined regional commands and an integrated network for MDO, would enable India to reduce the teeth-to-tail ratio, preserve national character and strengthen national response in arising contingencies.

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Notes:

[1] “White House Sent ‘WTF’ Message to Israel After Iran Oil Field Strike: US Report,” NDTV, March 09, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-israel-war-us-wtf-message-israel-attacks-iran-oil-fields-oil-prices-rise-brent-crude-price-today-11188848, Accessed on March 11, 2026.

[2] VP Naik, “India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), November 29, 2025, https://capssindia.org/indias-higher-defence-reforms-tactical-brilliance-or-strategic-coherence/. Accessed on March 11, 2026.

[3] Surendra Singh, “Rajnath Singh Unveils Vision Document to build Future-Ready Military Force,” The Times of India, March 11, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/rajnath-singh-unveils-vision-document-to-build-future-ready-military-force/articleshow/129420609.cms, Accessed on March 11, 2026.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Keywords: Drones, TTP, Pakistan, ISKP

Introduction

The age of modern technology has eluded not even the Pakistani Taliban, which is increasingly integrating social media platforms, artificial intelligence (AI), and drones into its operations, with these tools becoming hallmarks of the group’s resurgence following the Afghan Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index identifies the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), formed in 2007, as having emerged as the fastest-growing terrorist group globally.^[1] The scale of its revival can arguably be attributed to the TTP’s willingness to adapt to contemporary realities and absorb the concomitant technologies to enhance its tactical efficacy. Remarkably, such developments are occurring at a time when states themselves are exploring not only how emerging technologies can advance their national security objectives, but are also increasingly concerned about the risks posed by their diffusion to violent non-state actors (VNSAs). In light of this, the use of sophisticated techniques such as drones – once exclusively and legitimately regarded as being under the jurisdiction of a ‘state’ – by the TTP and its affiliates warrants closer analysis, specifically as it accords them an aerial presence that mirrors a makeshift air force of their own.

Nascent Adoption of Drones

As opposed to other conflict-prone regions, militant groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre have been rather slow to adopt new and emerging technologies for operational purposes, owing to three conceivable reasons. First, they have traditionally relied on cost-effective, easily accessible, and highly lethal methods such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers. Second, the predominantly rural and open terrain of the Af-Pak region makes drones easier to detect and therefore more vulnerable to being shot down contrary to urban spaces.^[2] Third, a dearth of technical know-how, as well as the absence of foreign fighters facilitating the acquisition and use of drone technology, may also have contributed to this trend. This, however, is beginning to change.^[3]

This pivot in the TTP’s case can be attributed in large part to its emir, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, whose efforts to unify the group’s previously fragmented modus operandi have resulted in more calculated strategies. For instance, the TTP dispensed with the policy of attacking non-combatants, instead focusing on targeted attacks against government personnel, and has abandoned any transnational jihadi agenda in favour of localised operations confined solely to Pakistan. Moreover, the TTP in its present form has expanded its media operations, circulating propaganda in multiple languages to reach diverse ethnic groups within Pakistan, and at times, leveraging AI tools to translate content into regional languages, which is subsequently disseminated across various social media platforms, particularly Telegram.^[4] The nascent use of drones, then, is emblematic of the TTP’s trajectory, reflecting its increasing familiarity with, and adaptation to, modern technologies.

While the TTP had already acquired sophisticated weaponry left behind in Afghanistan by the United States, its use of drones for both attacks against security forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) highlights its evolving repertoire of tactics. One such drone variant identified is the relatively low-tech, Chinese-manufactured, DJI Matrice.^[5] The ready availability of commercial quadcopter drones has enabled not just the TTP, but also its affiliates, such as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) Group and Lashkar-e-Islam to deploy them. For instance, the HGB Group was suspected to have used drones six times between July and September 2024, primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s North Waziristan district.^[6]

In July 2025, Reuters was among the first to report on Islamist militants in Pakistan beginning to use “commercially acquired quadcopter drones to drop bombs on security forces”, citing several incidents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bannu district.^[7] Indeed, this was corroborated through an investigative report by Pakistan’s leading newspaper, Dawn, in November 2025, which spotlighted the growing use of drones by militants in Bannu. With over 200 attacks involving the use of commercial, low-cost drones since June, one senior police officer quipped that the police now have “one eye on the barrel of the gun and another on the sky”.^[8] The report further revealed the kind of munitions fitted in these quadcopters: improvised explosives, mostly GP-25 grenade launchers and small calibre mortar rounds.^[9] Some quadcopters are even reported to be equipped with thermal cameras, enabling night-time surveillance and attacks, with militants trying to stay ahead of security forces by frequently changing drone frequencies, so as to evade jamming systems.^[10]

Both Militants and the Military Turn to Drones

However worrying, the use of drones by militants has not only given them an edge over the Pakistan military, or at the very least narrowed the gap, but has also introduced new layers of ambiguity for locals. Because the military also uses drones for ISR, locals cannot identify whether drones sighted in the sky belong to the militants or the military.^[11] In May 2025, for instance, a suspected quadcopter strike in Mir Ali tehsil of KP’s North Waziristan district killed four children and injured several others, precipitating a weeklong sit-in protest, with thousands of locals, who condemned the strike as a transgression of human rights, demanding transparency and accountability.^[12] As no militant group claimed responsibility, aspersions cast on the Pakistani authorities were promptly repudiated by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, which said that the security forces had been “falsely implicated” and that the TTP had carried out the attack.^[13] Similar unclaimed drone strikes occurred in 2025, injuring over dozens and prompting Amnesty International to exhort Pakistani authorities to conduct investigations and provide appropriate compensation.^[14]

Now that drones have become a part of militants’ arsenal, the Pakistan Army’s own use of unmanned aerial vehicles in counterterrorism operations is likely to become more complicated. For residents of KP’s tribal areas, drones already have a disquiet historical precedence, since they were subjected to deadly American drone strikes during the height of U.S. Global War on Terror and in the years that followed. Resultantly, the political sensitivity surrounding drone strikes has led the Pakistan government to not officially acknowledge the role of drones in its current counterinsurgency toolkit. In June 2025, The New York Times reported precisely on this, with a piercing headline, highlighting a striking irony: the very tactic that Pakistani officials used to censure America for is now being embraced as part of the country’s counterinsurgency strategy.^[15]

That said, the government has begun adapting to this developing threat. In some regions, the KP police has successfully used anti-drone guns against the machinations of militants. And this appears to have had an effect insofar as the number of drone attacks and night-time attacks has declined in areas where militants know the police possess counter-drone and night vision technologies.^[16] Yet still, the KP police remain over-stretched and under-equipped to deal with the changing nature of militancy. Security analysts have flagged the possibility of more lethal and frequent drone attacks as militants continue to experiment and improve their drone capabilities, and with the fusion of AI into drone technology, these concerns are likely to deepen. In the future, the likelihood of the Pakistani Taliban staging drone swarms cannot be ruled out; this looming threat remains true for many VNSAs,^[17] necessitating governments to invest significant capital in counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS).

How Drones Could Destabilise the Region

Given that the Af-Pak theatre’s militant landscape is competitive, the Pakistani Taliban’s reliance on drones could drive others like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Baloch insurgents to incorporate drones into their attacks to prove their credentials. That terrorists and militants have historically sought to emulate one another’s best practices, especially when new methods prove to be effective in terms of both cost and impact, further bolsters this possibility. In this regard, pertinent examples of drone diffusion are instructive: several African states have seized manuals on drone use, indicating knowledge transfer among African non-state armed groups as well as from the Middle East to Africa.^[18]

ISKP’s expressed intent in weaponising drones is noteworthy, as evidenced by Islamic State-affiliated channels having circulated manuals, outlining how commercially available drones can be morphed into tools for terrorism.^[19] Parallelly, there are preliminary reports of Baloch insurgent groups using drones for ISR, albeit evidence remains, at best, limited; nonetheless, this has raised the spectre of them eventually employing drones for offensive operations.^[20] There is a past pattern of tactical adaptation. Baloch militants, once opposed to suicide bombing, have now embraced the tactic, likely drawing inspiration from the TTP, leading analysts to believe that their adoption of drone attacks may be less a question of if than when. Although militant drone warfare in Pakistan remains in its rudimentary stages, its implications could make a dent in the region’s stability. The likes of the TTP, ISKP or Baloch militant organisations are unlikely to deploy drones with the sophistication seen among other VNSAs, such as Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah, which benefit from a large degree of state sponsorship. While there is some speculation that the Afghan Taliban or al-Qaeda may be facilitating access to drone technologies for the Pakistani Taliban, such support would doubtfully match the level of assistance that groups like Hezbollah receive from benefactors like Iran.

Nevertheless, this marks a critical juncture in Pakistan’s threat landscape. To guard against spill over effects and avoid the further erosion of trust between locals and the state, the Pakistani government would have to ensure that dual-use technologies like commercial drones are properly regulated, and that the smuggling of drones into Pakistan is reined in. This is especially critical given that drone technologies are progressing more rapidly than CUAS systems. However, Pakistan’s patchy record of implementing basic but critical counterextremism policies calls into question the state’s ability to respond decisively to this emerging, advanced-level threat. How Islamabad manages the spread of militant drone capabilities remains to be seen and will go on to shape the broader trajectory of militant adoption of emerging technologies.

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Notes:-

^[1] 2025 Global Terrorism Index, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/.

^[2] Abdul Basit and Rueben Dass, “Tech and Terror: Why Have Drones Not Penetrated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Militant Landscape?,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, April 29, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/04/29/tech-and-terror-why-have-drones-not-penetrated-the-afghanistan-pakistan-militant-landscape/. Accessed on February 3, 2026.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Abdul Basit, “Evolution, Expansion and Diversification: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Umar Media,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, September 15, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/09/15/evolution-expansion-and-diversification-tehreek-e-taliban-pakistans-umar-media/. Accessed on February 3, 2026.

^[5] Rueben Dass and Abdul Basit, “Nascent Adoption: Emerging Tech Trends by Terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Global Network on Extremism and Technology, June 18, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/06/18/nascent-adoption-emerging-tech-trends-by-terrorists-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/#. Accessed on February 3, 2026.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Mushtaq Ali and Asif Shahzad, “Pakistani Islamist militants use drones to target security forces, officials say,” Reuters, July 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistani-islamist-militants-use-drones-target-security-forces-officials-say-2025-07-21/#:~:text=PESHAWAR%2C%20Pakistan%2C%20July%2021%20%28,development%20in%20the%20volatile%20region.  Accessed on February 16, 2026.

^[8] Ismail Khan, “‘One eye on the barrel, the other on the sky’: How police in Bannu are dealing with evolving militant tactics,” Dawn, November 26, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1957290. Accessed on January 25, 2026.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Muhammad Amir Rana, “The drone challenge,” Dawn, August 10, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1929884/the-drone-challenge. Accessed on February 17, 2026.

^[12] Tahir Khan, “Mir Ali sit-in over alleged drone strike comes to an end as agreement reached,” Dawn, May 27, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1913645. Accessed on February 17, 2026.

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] “Pakistan: Recurrent drone strikes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa signal alarming disregard for civilian life,” Amnesty International, June 24, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/pakistan-recurrent-drone-strikes-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-signal-alarming-disregard-for-civilian-life/. Accessed on February 17, 2026.

^[15] Zia ur-Rehman, “Quietly, Pakistan Wages a Deadly Drone Campaign Inside Its Own Borders,” The New York Times, June 19, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/19/world/asia/pakistan-drones-militants.html. Accessed on February 13, 2026.

^[16] Khan, n. 8.

^[17] For more information on how VNSAs may weaponise drones, see: Jake Dullugan et al., “The Rising Threat of Non-State Actor Commercial Drone Use: Emerging Capabilities and Threats,” CTC Sentinel, Volume 18, Issue 3, March 2025, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-of-non-state-actor-commercial-drone-use-emerging-capabilities-and-threats/.

^[18] Maria-Louise Clausen, “Non-state armed groups in the sky,” Danish Institute for International Studies, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/non-state-armed-groups-in-the-sky. Accessed on January 18, 2026.

^[19] Dass and Basit, n. 5.

^[20] Abdul Basit and Rueben Dass, “Why Have Baloch Separatists Not Weaponized Drones Yet?,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/why-have-baloch-separatists-not-weaponized-drones-yet/. Accessed on January 20, 2026.

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Keywords: Decapitation, Iran, Israel, Epic Fury, Indian Air Force

Introduction

On February 28, 2026, the United States (US) and Israel jointly targeted the Iranian leadership, wiping out a large number of top leaders. Soon, the media started giving out details of how the operation was meticulously planned and executed. Militaries, at times, blow out of proportion the details of any operations. The media carried several such stories of exceptional intelligence and tactical brilliance. To put things in perspective, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the head of a state. Unlike heads of terrorist organisations like Osama Bin Laden or Mullah Omar, who needed to hide for a living, Khamenei wasn’t hiding. He wasn’t targeted in any secret bunker, but at his regular office. The reason that the entire buildings had to be reduced to rubble also possibly hints at a lack of real-time intelligence regarding the exact position of the target. Otherwise, there is no reason why the entire complex was targeted, resulting in the death of his family members as well. Therefore, the claims that this was some superior intelligence-led operation are highly exaggerated.

More importantly, the success of any operation depends on the achievement of desired objectives. There have been constant changes in the stated objectives of this conflict. While the tactical success of dropping the weapons on target has been achieved, the constant shifting of objectives makes any estimate of success difficult. Therefore, a quick detour to history is useful at this moment to learn from the wisdom of the past.

Till the twentieth century, targeting the political leadership of an adversary was seldom considered a viable military option. The political leadership was far from the battlefield. It was air power that made it possible to directly reach for the political leadership, bypassing the entire fielded forces.^[1] It will be interesting to note that India carried out the world’s first air attack on a political leadership.^[2]

In February 1919, the new Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, declared full independence, and this led to the Third Afghan War. Nasrullah Khan, brother of the former Emir, sent an envoy to the Government of India. He wrote that he was the rightful heir to the throne, and would remain loyal to the British. He suggested that India should bomb Amanullah Khan’s palace to achieve a decisive surrender.

On May 24, 1919, a single aircraft, a Handley Page heavy bomber, bombed Amanullah Khan’s palace in Kabul. It didn’t reduce the place to rubble. The bombing proved instrumental in making Amanullah call for a ceasefire on June 03, 1919.

While this could be treated as the first instance of a strike against the political leadership, the most successful globally was the strike on the Government House in Dacca by the IAF during the 1971 war. On December 14, 1971, a MiG-21 formation of four aircraft from 28 Squadron IAF, led by Wing Commander Bhupendra Kumar Bishnoi, was tasked to strike the Government House at Dhaka at the precise time when a high-level meeting was taking place.^[3] This was to be followed by another package of 02 X MiG-21s and 02 x Hunters. They were deliberately armed with rockets and not bombs, as the objective was psychological and not physical destruction. Starting at 1255 hrs, the first four aircraft hit the target. An UN Official who was present in the meeting noted that Mr AM  Malik, the Governor, scrambled for a piece of paper and wrote his resignation just before the second wave of weapons hit. The whole cabinet resigned immediately. Within two days, the war ended with the largest surrender of troops.

Several aspects of this 1971 mission are relevant to the ongoing Op Epic Fury. Firstly, the intelligence was timely and accurate. The location of the meeting was changed when the aircraft were taxing out, and the target was updated accordingly. Secondly, the reader should imagine how exceptionally the intelligence apparatus was functioning, that, over fifty years ago, such real-time updates were possible in enemy territory. There were no satellites, mobile phones, datalinks, internet, CCTV, etc. Thirdly, the desired outcome was achieved with minimal loss of life. A noteworthy aspect was that IAF enjoyed air superiority after wiping out the entire PAF in East Pakistan in the initial days of the war. Yet the targeting was never reckless and was intended to cause as little loss of enemy life as the ends of military necessity demanded. There was no shortage of ammunition. Only the previous day, IAF had dropped 40 tonnes of bombs at a single target – Joydebpur Ordnance Factory^[4]. Lastly, in spite of the absence of precision-guided munitions, direct hits were achieved on the target. No debates in the media, including India, seem to have compared both these operations despite their similar objectives and employment. This aligns with the arguments in a recent article about the limited knowledge of Indian Military History despite its richness.

Success in any war is not measured in tonnes of bombs dropped, numbers of ships sank or numbers of enemy killed. It is in the achievement of objectives. At this moment, it is worth reproducing a conversation between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army, and Colonel Tu, North Vietnamese Army, Hanoi, on April 1975 following the US defeat in the Vietnam War.

American: “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield”

Vietnamese: “That may be so”….” But it is also irrelevant”

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Notes:-

^[1] Though clandestine assassinations were still planned and executed in the past as well.

^[2] 08 Squadrons of the RAF were based in India at this time and were under the authority of the Government of India and paid from the Indian budget.

^[3] P. C. Lal, My Years with the IAF (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986) pp 205 – 206

^[4] History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Official History of the 1971 War: pp 364 – 366

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