Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Air Defence, Terrorism, PAF Airbase

Why did Pakistan request a ceasefire within 80 hours of Operation Sindoor? The Pakistani Operation Bunyan Marsoos, meaning “Wall of Lead”, was abruptly called off, and Pakistan waved a white flag.

The horrendous Pahalgam terrorist attack was the largest after Pulwama, which happened in February 2019. Pahalgam attack was claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a terror outfit working as a front organisation part of the officially banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) but fully supported by the Pakistani establishment.

The entire world condemned these ghastly and horrific terrorist attacks, but neither did Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif feel any remorse, nor did their Chief of Army Staff condemn the terrorist activities.

The precise and perfect attacks carried out with the backing of accurate intelligence have become a hallmark of IAF’s strikes inside Pakistan since the destruction of the terrorist training camp at Jabba Top, popularly known as Balakot. This time, India struck at nine well-known terror locations, including the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist training academy at Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) headquarters at Muridke.

Pakistan sent in drones the next day to avenge the Indian attacks on terror hubs by attacking cities and towns along the border and shelling the border villages, causing casualties of innocent civilians, including women, children and elderly. PAF tried attacking armed forces bases and installations, but all in utter vain.

India was forced to retaliate in kind by attacking various radars, SAM sites, IADS centers and other PAF facilities at 13 locations. All the attacks were carefully calibrated and planned to display India’s technological prowess in controlling the enemy’s reactions.

India has held the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance until Pakistan gives up supporting terrorism. The Indian government has announced that it will stop India’s share of water flowing into Pakistan and has already started cleaning up the dams.

This report takes a look through satellite imagery at only two of more than 25 targets hit by the IAF that broke the back of Pakistan and brought them down to their knees to beg the DGMO for a cessation of hostilities.

Hardened Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs)

Militaries around the world try to safeguard their assets from adversaries. One favourite method is to dig deep to survive from your enemies. Following World War II, most weapon systems underwent massive technological advances in targeting enemy facilities remotely. This prompted all militaries to dig further and provide shelters hardened against aerial attacks, both conventional and nuclear.

Such underground facilities, constructed with special materials, reinforced bars and hardened with multilayered protective covers, are called HDBTs. These facilities feature heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units to maintain a cleaner environment underground.

Pakistan had at least 22 such HDBTs, located mainly around its airbases, with a few in and around Islamabad and Karachi. India, during Op Sindoor, attempted and successfully hit at least two HDBTs, one at Chaklala and the other at Murid airbase respectively.

Both targets were C2 centres for air defence, as per the DGMO (Air), Air Marshal A.K. Bharti. However, the author agrees with the IAF’s assessment but strongly feels that these were used more like C4I Centers.

Every HDBT needs to be studied in depth regarding its soil composition, number of layers, and other relevant factors and then tackled accordingly.

Generally, these are attacked with low-yield nuclear, thermobaric, conventional, or directed energy weapons. All weapons have their advantages and disadvantages.

The choice of weapons depends on the desired effect, what effect is needed at the target end and the underground facility’s construction design and materials used.

Both facilities were constructed by different companies, as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. Very potent and accurate ISR systems are required to study the HDBTs. The intelligence about these HDBTs must be highly accurate and corroborated through multiple sources. A blueprint of the entire facility is always considered the best.

Then, Geologic Assessment Methodology for Underground Targets (GAMUT) must have been adopted to enhance the location and characterisation of the HDBTs.

The IAF also must have been forced to use  conventional, possibly penetrating bombs to destroy these two targets, keeping in mind India’s no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy.

Islamabad Chaklala Airbase

The C2 AD Centre at Chaklala Airbase now known as Nur Khan Airbase, is situated at 33.612222°N 73.096650°E within Islamabad city.

The facility was constructed in the 1990s over an area of 750 sqm, probably by General Electric (GE) Aviation, a US company specialising in underground construction.

The construction technology, along with its blueprints, were shared with Pakistan, possibly in exchange for a promise to stop their cold tests at Kirana Hills. By then Pakistan had already achieved nuclear weapons technology through cold tests and computer simulations, as per A Q Khan’s interview to Kuldeep Nayyar on January 28, 1987.[1]

Most VIPs visiting Islamabad were given a tour of this HDBT and shown the technological advances Pakistan’s air force had achieved.

The US and Chinese generals, after visiting this facility, were always praising it and how the PAF has achieved its integration with other systems indigenously.

The Pakistan Strategic Plans Division’s own Special Works Department (SWD) took over the task of constructing at least 21 more of these underground facilities (UGFs), with the first one starting at Karachi’s Masroor airbase.

The C2 AD Centre, as seen on satellite imagery, had been expanded/renovated twice in 2005 and 2015 after its construction by the GE.

The satellite images from the last fifteen years suggest that this facility was also used as a research and simulation data collection centre for all new radars. It has been observed over the last decade that all aircraft collecting intelligence have been downloading data at this centre for integration with both old and new systems.

The IAF attacked the facility with extreme precision through an HVAC shaft directly leading to the main chamber of the UGF or HDBT. The internal size of the shaft was 45 cm, which is very small, even for measuring on an open-source image, as its single pixel measures 30 cm at the best resolution.

Hence, there was no margin for error, and the task must have been given to the best pilot with all data fed to the missile beforehand, including high-resolution (HiRes) images and pictures of the facility, especially the HVAC shaft.

This is probably the first of its kind, the most unique, and the smallest target hit by any air force in the entire world.

The after-strike imagery, which was released during the DGMO press conference, showed a large chunk of concrete which had risen above the surface, possibly with the explosion below the surface of a penetrating bomb.

The explosion must have been so large as to pulverise everything and everybody inside the HDBT instantly. The effect of the explosion was so significant that the multilayered concrete rebar roof was broken from below and thrown up.

Unlike at other locations, PAF was not in a hurry to remove the debris from this site as it would have confirmed the size and immensity of damage caused by a perfect IAF attack.

However, after a period of four days, a decision must have been made, in consultation with the families of dead PAF soldiers and officers, to bury them in situ as not even shreds of them would have been available to be put in a coffin.

Nobody inside the C2 AD centre available at the time of the strike would have been left alive to tell the story of how the devastation occurred.

After the decision to bury the dead in situ was taken, the broken and destroyed C2 AD Center’s entire structure was seen being levelled on the satellite imagery.

The JCBs, along with concrete paving machines, were observed levelling and cementing the entire area of this HDBT.

As of date, it can be confidently said that the entire facility was obliterated from the face of the Earth.

Chakwal Murid Airbase

The Murid Airbase is located very close to Chakwal on the Pothohar Plateau in Punjab. It is approximately 85km South of Islamabad.

The airbase is located away from the civil population and stands out as a large, lush green  patch in the entire district.

Pakistan’s Special Works Department understood very well the technology either shared or stolen from GE of the USA. And they further improved upon it with minor innovations.

In all the underground facilities, the HVAC ducts have been enlarged in size and pulled away from the facility by at least 10m to a maximum of 100m. This does not permit any penetrating bomb to be effectively dropped on the HVAC ducts/ shaft to destroy the HDBT.

In the case of the Murid C2 AD Centre, too, similar extensions of shafts precluded their use for dropping a penetrating bomb.

Thus, it was possibly decided by the IAF to attack directly at the central section of the HDBT without any pillars resisting the penetration of the missile.

The afterimage of Murid C2 AD Center vividly displays a small rectangular crater of approximately 1.16m X 0.98m size, indicating a deeper penetration. The top layer of the HDBT is composed of compressed earth; a deeper study of satellite images reveals very little compressed earth scattered around. This indicates a deeper penetration of the weapon before it explodes.

The external colour of the crater seen in the satellite image, being very light, is clear evidence that it is only an impact crater and not an explosion crater. This strongly suggests that the penetrating weapon has penetrated the subsurface facility and exploded rather than exploding at the surface.

A possible ten-ton (8m long) truck is observed in the after-satellite image, stationary at the entrance with its rear end partially inside the larger entrance of the underground facility. This suggests that the truck is trying to salvage any material that may be suggestive of the remains of dead officers and airmen.

Only one single possible ambulance has been observed near the entrance of the facility in after-strike imagery, strongly suggesting possibly a lone survivor, indicating considerable casualties of personnel.

This activity, after almost 7-8 hours of the strike, is evidence that a massive effort must have been required to retrieve the possible lone survivor from the debris of the most hardened cement concrete.

Assessment

Pakistan’s efforts at safeguarding their assets by hiding them in HDBTs have failed miserably, by the ingenuity of IAF in striking with impunity.

The latest satellite images procured from Maxar indicate that the two targets discussed in this paper have been completely obliterated from the face of Earth as promised by the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi.

The other locations at Sargodha and Jacobabad targeted by IAF indicate that India has hit PAF’s nerve centres in a very calculated strike and ensured they remain inactive for more than six months at least.

This renders all smaller C2 AD Centres in those theatres defunct, such as the one on the eastern side of Islamabad International Airport, where the PAF Chief of Air Staff (CAS) was hiding during Operation Sindoor. A special HDBT was possibly prepared for the safety and security of the PAF CAS. In the month of March this year, the HDBT was given another protective layer or two, to further strengthen its protective character. The evidence of satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan had prepared for a longer war with India and had prepared hideouts for their Chiefs well in advance of the terrorist act of 22 April 2025.

This entails that any orders given by the PAF CAS would never reach the commands, theatres, or squadrons or be directly issued to the aircraft (for nuclear options).

There would be no coordination between various entities, thus making any air operation untenable in this highly informative warfare in the aerospace domain.

The satellite imagery reveals extraordinary successes achieved by the IAF, far exceeding expectations, even considering the standards of the world’s best air forces.

The entire world, although very quiet about the satellite imagery proofs available for all to see, was indeed all shell-shocked as to how India had pulled this skirmish off against Pakistan within barely 80 hours.

The damages observed on satellite images vividly indicate evidence of wiping out of entire staff at Pakistan’s Air Defence Command Centre at Nur Khan. The airbase, as well as the complete staff at Murid Airbase’s C2 AD Centre, was fully staffed.

The number of officers and airmen would total anywhere from 100 to 200, as the attacks were conducted at the peak of operational alertness when no staff would have been off duty for any reason whatsoever.

However, the discussion of casualties in men and material cannot be compared one to one since our sectoral and national aims were much different than the PAF’s aims.

It suffices to say that the Indian Air Force has displayed its lethality and technological prowess to the most obdurate adversary who wanted only a pretext to use the nuclear arsenal.

The Indian calibrated attacks were extremely restrained yet so lethal that they provided Pakistan with a face-saving option and yet did NOT give Pakistan the face-saving nuclear option.

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥47॥

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The article was uploaded on 30 May & updated on 10 June 2025

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Notes:

[1] Ramindar Singh, Dilip Bobb, “Dr A.Q. Khan’s Pak N-bomb revelation brings prospect of nuke arms race to the subcontinent,” India Today, March 31, 1987, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19870331-dr-aq-khans-pak-n-bomb-revelation-brings-prospect-of-nuke-arms-race-to-the-subcontinent-798697-1987-03-30. Accessed on May 28, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Precision, Perfection and Accuracy have been Hallmarks of IAF Golden Strikes in Pakistan: Targets Obliterated from the Face of Earth appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Integrated Air Defence System, Joint and Integrated Operations, Space based capability, Offensive Air Power, Atmanirbharta.

Introduction

Operation Sindoor, the Tri-Services joint operation, was launched in the early morning hours of May 07, 2025, in response to the dastardly, heinous and religiously provocative terrorist attack on innocent Indian civilians at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025. Op Sindoor was a stupendous success and achieved its laid-down military objectives in less than four days. While the success of Op Sindoor should be celebrated for its decisiveness, highly professional and integrated execution, the Indian Armed Forces also need to do a comprehensive, honest, and unbiased analysis of the entire operation to draw the correct lessons and prepare for future more challenging battles. During Op Sindoor, a disturbing facet was noticed; there was significant military collaboration between Pakistan and its all-weather friend China. Turkey also provided military support to Pakistan not only in the run-up to Op Sindoor but even during the conflict. India needs to be cognisant of the increasingly collaborative approach of China and Pakistan and the possibility of a full-fledged two-front war. A few enduring takeaways from Op Sindoor are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs

Defence Budget Enhancement

The defence budget of India for financial year (FY) 25 is approx. USD 79 billion (fourth largest in the world), which is slightly less than 2% of our GDP. However, it is significantly smaller than the defence budget of our Northern adversary (China) for FY 25, which is USD 245 billion. ^[1] It needs to be enhanced to approximately 2.5% of GDP as there are several critical capability gaps in the technological upgradation and modernisation of our Armed Forces. This enhanced commitment of funds for external security is absolutely essential for expeditiously developing our military capabilities and capacities to deter our adversaries to our West and North. We need to develop disruptive or asymmetric capabilities for credible deterrence. ’Deterrence is costly, but wars are even costlier’ is a well-known military adage. Presently, India cannot afford to get embroiled in an unnecessary conflict that diverts our focus from our nation’s economic growth.  India needs to ensure that national security is embedded into the edifice of financial security, implying that economic growth cannot be achieved in an unstable geopolitical environment.  India has to achieve its goal of becoming a high-income nation before we become old. We need to wisely utilise our demographic dividend to accelerate our technological, economic and military development and achieve our goal of becoming ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047.

Joint and Integrated Operations

Whenever the three Services have planned their operations jointly and executed their plans in an integrated and synergistic manner, they have achieved sensational victories. The only previous example of synergistically executed operations by the Indian Armed Forces has been the 1971 war. One of the most heart-warming features of Op Sindoor was the precise articulation of the national and military objectives and complete synergy was achieved not only amongst the three Services but the Civil-Military fusion as well. Op Sindoor was a jointly planned and synergistically executed operation, wherein the core strengths of the three Services were individually applied towards attaining the common overall military objective. Another feature of Op Sindoor that needs to be stressed is that the overall integrated plans were made under the aegis of the CDS while the individual Service plans were executed under the skilful and professional tutelage of the three Service chiefs. The strengths of this highly successful joint and integrated operations should be thoroughly analysed while finalising and implementing the impending Integrated Theatre Commands. Op Sindoor’s success was also attributable to the ‘whole of nation’ approach – wherein all the diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) measures were synergised to achieve the stated military objective of dismantling the Pakistan military-supported and sponsored terrorist infrastructure and establishing credible deterrence for the future. Any terrorism-related misadventure by Pakistan in the future would incite an even stronger response from India (costs would be higher for Pakistan) is the point that has been made amply clear to Pakistan.

Primacy of Air Power

Op Sindoor’s success has once again very empathetically reiterated the undisputed primacy of air power, which implies that a nation needs to succeed in the air operations to win the war. The same is however not true for land or naval operations. During any conventional or even sub-conventional contingencies, air power is always the fastest to respond and can hit the enemy’s Centres of Gravity simultaneously. In Op Sindoor, air power was used by India in an offensive, unrestrained, precise and calibrated manner for the first time after the 1971 war, and it produced exceptional results wherein the shock and awe of the sustained IAF air strikes forced Pakistan to ask for a ceasefire in slightly less than four days. Op Sindoor is the shortest military operation executed either by India or any other country, wherein the laid-down military objectives were achieved, and operations ceased within a total of 90 hours. The Balakot air strike in the aftermath of the Pulwama incident was the first time that India offensively used air power in pursuit of the national interests in a sub-conventional contingency.  In Op Sindoor, the use of air power in a sub-conventional contingency was taken to the next level with the simultaneous air strikes on nine terrorist training camps/infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Op Sindoor emphatically demonstrated that calibrated, deliberate and focused use of air power in sub-conventional contingency is non-escalatory. Air power can be utilised offensively in both conventional and sub-conventional operations, even under the nuclear overhang. Op Sindoor also unequivocally emphasised air power’s ability to produce strategic effects using long-range precision weapons with minimum collateral damage without crossing the international borders (IB) and remaining within the bounds of escalatory control.

Equipping IAF Appropriately

Op Sindoor demonstrated the precision, lethality and coercive impact of IAF offensive air strikes. The offensive air strikes had a profoundly demoralising effect on Pakistan’s national morale and war-waging capability. It forced the Pakistanis to throw in the towel and ask for a ceasefire. The IAF is presently grappling with an acute shortage of fighter aircraft due to the repeated extended timelines in the indigenous fighter aircraft development programme and the time-consuming, cumbersome and inefficient defence acquisition procedures (with the delays in procurement of 114 x MRFA aircraft). IAF is also facing a crippling shortage of force multipliers (AWACS and AARs) for supporting offensive air operations. IAF’s fighter squadron strength has dropped to a precarious level (31 Squadrons), the lowest level in the past five decades. ^[2] These shortages of fighters and force multipliers need to be addressed on a war footing, which has also been recommended by the high-powered defence committee led by Defence Secretary in March 2025. ^[3] There is an urgent need to build up IAF capabilities expeditiously so as to bridge the large capability gaps with our Northern adversary and also be able to cater for a two-front conflict.

Offensive Air Power – Fighter or UAV Dilemna?

The self-defence capabilities of the modern-day manned fighters combined with the precision, lethality and load-carrying capability; better Situational Awareness and decision-making ability in complex situations mandates that manned fighters would remain the primary aerial offensive platforms in the foreseeable future. In spite of the rapidly increasing capabilities and ranges of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (FPV drones, loitering munitions, swarm drones and UCAVs), UAVs still have problems of survivability in contested air spaces and are capable of carrying out only limited damage to the adversarial weapon systems. UAVs would increasingly take on a lot of roles of manned aircraft but aerial offence would continue to be predominantly the preserve of manned fighters. UAVs would complement manned fighters in offensive aerial operations rather than replace them in the foreseeable future.

Space Based Capability (ISR, PNT & Communication) Enhancement

The limited number of Indian electro-optical and radar imaging, communications, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellites performed creditably and provided accurate targeting data and other support services for the air operations during Op Sindoor. However, we were forced to utilise commercial imagery data (Maxar, etc.) to beef up the layered targeting imagery provided by our domestic satellites or for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). India needs to accelerate the proposed timelines for the launches of our Space-based Surveillance network (SBS-3) satellites to shorten the revisit times to approximately 2 hours (Chinese ISR satellites presently have a revisit time of approximately 30 mts). India also needs to replace the old life-expired NavIC satellites with new satellites expeditiously, strengthen the ground segment and upgrade the NavIC services to NavIC 2.0.

Focus on Defence R&D and Induction of State-of-the-art Technologies

The mil-technological edge of India vis-a-vis Pakistan that was amply visible during Op Sindoor needs to be further enhanced while making all endeavours to narrow down the mil-technological edge that China presently enjoys with regard to India. This needs to be achieved through a dedicated focus on the development of cutting-edge technologies like high-power jet engines, hypersonics, long-range precision weapons and Artificial Intelligence and their rapid induction into the Services. A holistic approach towards technology development must be fostered wherein failure must be accepted as a stepping stone to success. The MoD’s defence R&D budget needs to be enhanced significantly, and guidance and hand-holding must be provided to the private defence industry and start-ups. MoD must encourage and foster collaboration amongst the DPSUs, the private defence industry, the start-ups and the academia.

Strengthen Atmanirbharta

Op Sindoor demonstrated the stupendous success of India’s Atmanirbharta initiatives. The sterling performance and contribution of the indigenous weapon systems and weapon platforms to the success of the operations was indeed commendable and needs to be sustained. Though the gestation period for indigenous development of weapon systems is always much longer, the services must continue to encourage and support the indigenisation process. All the players – the DPSUs, the three services, the private industry, the start-ups and the academia need to be fully involved and supportive of the indigenisation process. The Atmanirbharta initiative needs to be further strengthened with a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach and be made more broad-based. The indigenous development programs of Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk II, AMCA, the 110 kN high-performance jet engine, long-range precision weapons, larger range BVR AAMs (Astra- II, III), Ghatak UCAV, swarm drones, larger range DEW C-UAS systems and the CATS air warrior program need to be focused upon and speeded up.

Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC)

The IACCS and Akashteer were a huge success, the backbone of the Integrated Air Defence network centricity, and they were crucial enablers for air defence operations during Op Sindor. The IACCS and Akshteer Integrated Air Defence System endowed its numerous users with an unmatched Situational Awareness that significantly reduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop, the Sensor-to Shooter time-lag and ensured the protection of the Indian air space. India must further enhance this network by integrating the naval sensors and their C&C network (Trigun) with IACCS. Simultaneously, India needs to start working on upgrading the integrated Tri-Service C&C network to the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC), which would be capable of coordinating and controlling all the sensors and shooters in multiple domains (all five domains) – Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyberspace.

Information Warfare/Cognitive Warfare

Information/Cognitive Warfare has become increasingly critical in shaping the strategic narrative as the perception battle is being intensely monitored and commented upon by the international media. The briefings done by the DGMOs of the three services were comprehensive and done professionally. They were very well received not only by the national but also by the international media. They helped in shaping the strategic narrative. In all future operations, this system of briefings by the DGMOs of the three services should be followed, with interim briefings  by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and MoD representatives.

Conclusion

India needs to prepare for the future and expeditiously build up the capabilities of our Armed Forces as future battles/wars would be appreciably more intense, more widespread (probably two-front) and multi-domain (encompassing Land, Sea, Air, Space, Cyberspace and the Cognitive domains.)  Future wars would have a greater infusion of technology and artificial intelligence and would be increasingly fought in the digital and shadowy grey zones of cyberspace, space and cognitive domains. It would need an integrated ‘Whole-of-Nation’ approach with even greater Civilian Military Fusion for ensuring success.

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Notes:

^[1] “India vs China: Defence Gap Widens as Beijing’s $245 billionMilitary Budget Nears Half of India’s National Outlay,” The Economic Times, March 06, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-vs-china-defence-gap-widens-as-beijings-245-billion-military-budget-nears-half-of-indias-national-outlay/articleshow/118752902.cms. Accessed on May 23, 2025.

^[2] “As Fighter Strength Dips Below 1965 level, Air Chief Vows to Fight with ‘whatever we have’,” The Economic Times,                   October 04, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/as-fighter-strength-dips-below-1965-level-air-chief-vows-to-fight-with-whatever-we-have/articleshow/113992521.cms. Accessed on May 23, 2025.

^[3] Press Information Bureau, India, “Defence Secretary Presents Report of the Empowered Committee to Raksha Mantra for Capability Enhancement of IAF,” March 03, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2107847. Accessed on May 21, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Op Sindoor’s Enduring Takeaway (The Ten Commandments) appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: IACCS, NCW, RASP, Akashteer

During Operation Sindoor, the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) played a significant role successfully managing air operations. On May 07, 2025, these Operations commenced by targeting nine terrorist hideouts, training camps, etc., in Pakistan. Network -centric operations were used to conduct offensive as well as Air Defence operations successfully. Defending its airspace during Operation Sindoor was not a fluke but proof of India’s well-organised air defences. Central to achieving this success was the IACCS, which links information, observational networks, AD weapon systems and decision-making mechanisms from the IAF, Army, and related forces.[1]

As a vital part of Indian air defence, the IACCS has a network that allows it to detect, track, and identify aerial targets as Hostile when they appear. Thanks to the use of the Air Force Network (AFNET), AI, satellite, and a broad range of sensors, the IACCS was able to achieve better air superiority and better coordination with joint operations. All air actions of Operation Sindoor were controlled and co-ordinated from IACCS.

Background on Operation Sindoor

On May 07, between 01:05 am and 01:30 am, India launched a tri-service operation called ‘Operation Sindoor’, targeting nine terror infrastructure sites in Pakistan and PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). This was in retaliation to several terrorist activities and the deadly Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025.  Four terrorists killed 26 civilians, including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. These terrorists were launched by ‘The Resistance Front (TRF)’, a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The air strikes, part of the Op Sindoor, were precise and measured without co-lateral damage. The strikes avoided all non-terrorist targets, including Pakistani military sites, to keep the situation non-escalatory. Also, no civilian locations were targeted. [2]

The Pakistani Government’s propaganda machinery claimed that India was acting aggressively by targeting civilians.  Pakistan decided to extend support to terrorist groups, exposing, once again, their explicit nexus with terrorist outfits. In response, the Pakistani Army launched an offensive by air strikes, drones, missiles, and rockets on Indian vital installations, including Jammu, Pathankot and Udhampur. This forced India to intensify its air defence, and IACCS was at the forefront of this effort.

Understanding IACCS

During Operation Sindoor, IACCS was the nerve centre for not only Air Defence operations, but also for Offensive Operations. IACCS is an indigenously developed Command and Control system provided by the IAF, built to accelerate its activities in air defence and make network- centric warfare possible. The system includes input from all types of radars, whether homogeneous, heterogeneous, two-dimensional or three-dimensional, as well as AWAC (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes, UAVs, airbases, air traffic control radars for civil aviation and observation posts. Using information from ground sensors, airborne sensors, air defence weapon systems and command systems, IACCS makes a ‘Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP)’ to help manage air threats.[3]

With IACCS, commanders at all levels — strategic, operational, and tactical, are able to track and watch every development in the air in real-time. The Akashteer system which has been recently installed by the Indian Army, is a subset of IACCS. Therefore, IACCS is making Air Defence operations comfortable, for both the Land and air forces to work together.

Commanders exploited IACCS to monitor the air situation in real time which allowed them to update their situational awareness. The AFNET, a fast and secure digital grid, launched on September 14, 2010, hosts IACCS. AFNET depends on Internet Protocol (IP) and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) for dependable transmission of data, voice and video over its network.[4]

With the help of IACCS, commanders could react promptly to the developing air activity as their situational awareness was up-to-date. With IACCS, the air defence functions have become quick. Appropriately selecting sensors and interceptor fighter aircraft and surface to air AD weapon systems of varying ranges ensures that there is no duplication of action and the incoming target is being successively engaged in multiple layers from the IB to the VA/VP.

The Role IACCS During Operation Sindoor

During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan attacked Indian military installations and civilians with drones, missiles and rockets. IACCS facilitated the Indian Air Force to deal with these threats efficiently and effectively. The main contributions of IACCS are appended below:

(a)     Detection and Tracking: IACCS presented the integrated air data, obtained from ground radars, AWACS aircraft and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems to detect and track any aircraft in Indian Airspace. The system could even detect Pakistani drones and missiles, with low RCS, before they could reach their destination.[5]

(b)    Real-time Situational Awareness: Commanders could rely on the RASP provided by IACCS, which congregated all necessary air information in one place for rapid action. A picture of the IACCS node displayed at the briefing on May 12, 2025, clearly showed people using an IACCS picture to monitor the air situation.[6]

(c)    Coordination and Command: IACCS enabled the appropriate selection of the weapons available, like the S-400, Akash missiles, and homemade counter-UAV systems to stop and destroy the threats. IACCS architecture works to ensure that assets from the Army, and Air Force are exploited on merits for smooth operations.[7]

(d)    Activation of Akashteer: Integration of Akashteer AD system with IACCS had been achieved a few months prior to Ex Sindoor. Akashteer synergised the joint operations, where ground-based resources and the IAF’s air defence teams could efficiently work together, leading to the best possible solution. Akashteer has led to orders for more than 400 C2C centres, and 107 of them have been delivered so far, with full integration planned by the end of the year.[8]

(e)     Successful Interceptions: With operational assistance from IACCS, Pakistani drones and PL-15 missiles were successfully detected and shot down from May 08 to May 10, 2025. Briefings by military leaders underlined that current battles could only be won because the net-centric operation strategies were successful.[9]

(f)    IACCS prevented Pakistan’s aerial threats from causing damage by quickly neutralising them. The system was so quick and accurate, that the attackers could not penetrate the Air Defence shield and enter the airbases, schools, temples, and civilian places.

Pakistan’s loss was attributed to India’s strong and advanced air defences which were directed from the IACCS. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s failure to use its Chinese HQ-9 system, which could not detect or hit Indian strikes, made the IACCS seem more effective.

Implications

The real-time Command and Control from IACCS ensured that India’s air defence was better than Pakistan’s, as most of the latter’s Chinese systems, had several technical and operational flaws. IACCS with Akashteer have reinforced the Indian Air Defence system in exploiting networks for warfare, improving its response to aerial attacks. India’s achievement in Operation Sindoor reflects its ability to rely on its defence technology and enhance its readiness against nearby rivals.

AI is being used in IACCS to help monitor enemy planes and ensure the best possible use of weapons. During the next decade, IACCS wants to support in-flight movement of missile target assignments to enable changing the type of attack “on the fly. ” Old THD-1955 3D radar equipment will be replaced with modern high-power radars (range at 600 kilometres) to strengthen IACCS.[10]

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Notes:

[1] “India’s shield in the skies: What is the Integrated Air Command and Control System used during Operation Sindoor?,”  The First Post,  May 13,2025, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/india-air-defence-iaccs-operation-sindoor-how-it-works-13888060.html.  Accessed on May 18, 2025.

[2] Sameer Patil, Rahul Rawat, “Operation Sindoor: Understanding Context and Consequences,” Observer Research Foundation,    May 09, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-understanding-context-and-consequences. Accessed on May 18, 2025.

[3] Ibid First Post.

[4] “Op Sindoor: Pivotal Role of India’s Integrated Air Command and Control Sys (IACCS) in Thwarting Aerial Threats,” Resonant News May 13, 2025, https://resonantnews.com/2025/05/13/op-sindoor-pivotal-role-of-indias-integrated-air-command-and-control-sys-iaccs-in-thwarting-aerial-threats/. Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[5] Amrita Nayak Dutta, “Operation Sindoor | How India’s air defence shield works: Inside the IACCS command system”, The Indian Express, May 15, 2025,  https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indias-air-defence-shield-10003549/. Accessed on  May 18, 2025.

[6] Ibid First Post.

[7] “Integrated Air Command and Control System: The heroes behind Operation Sindoor,” The Hindustan Times,

May 12, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/integrated-air-command-and-control-system-the-heroes-behind-operation-sindoor-101747055842040.html. Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[8] Divyam Sharma, “Guardians Of The Sky – India’s Integrated Air Defence That Outfoxed Pakistan,” NDTV, May 12, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/guardians-of-the-sky-indias-integrated-air-defence-that-outfoxed-pak-operation-sindoor-indian-air-force-akash-missile-8395760.  Accessed on May 19, 2025.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post IACCS: Proves Mettle of IAF’s Network Centric Operations appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Cyber warfare, Pahalgam Terror Attack, Cyberattack, Disinformation

Cyberattacks during war and even during peacetime have become the new normal in recent years. Cyberspace is considered as one of the five key distinctive environments of warfare along with land, air, maritime, and space environments. [1] The recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India triggered in a military response by Indian Armed forces against Pakistan (the terrorism backers and planners) with ‘Operation Sindoor’ in which nine major terror camps were destroyed with the onset of operations on May 07, 2025. Subsequently, the armed conflict between India and Pakistan continued till May 10, 2025, wherein Pakistan attacked both the Indian civil and military establishments, though India carried out strikes only on selected terrorist hubs and military facilities aiding terrorism with long-range precision weapons to avoid any harm to Pakistani civilians. [2]

Cyberspace operations:

During this armed conflict, the cyberattacks against India saw a significant rise. The live threat attack maps provided by organisations such as Kaspersky [3] and Radware [4] indicate that India consistently ranks among the top five most targeted countries during and following the period of conflict. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) detected a surge in cyber threats such as ransomware attacks, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements and malware infections for Indian industries and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (MSMEs). [5] The Maharashtra police recorded more than 10 lakh cyberattacks after the Pahalgam attack highlighting a significant surge in cyber threats linked to the ibid geopolitical tensions.[6] Over 500 Indian government and private sector entities were targeted by hacktivist groups, underscoring the growing threat of ideologically motivated cyberattacks against national infrastructure.[7] The hacktivist groups targeted critical infrastructures using different types of cyberattacks, aiming to disrupt and degrade operational efficiency. Some reports suggest that multiple hacktivist groups were engaging in strategic coalition-building, unifying under a single alliance to coordinate and amplify cyber offensive operations against the targeted state.[8]

The DDoS attacks to slow down the server, website, or network by sending malicious traffic were reportedly carried out in both India and Pakistan. The report claims over 500% increase in cyberattacks in India and more than 700% increase in Pakistan. [9] The attackers used DDoS attacks such as NTP (Network Time Protocol) amplification, CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) reflection, NetBIOS reflection and ACK_FLOOD to attack various public and private websites of India and Pakistan. [10] However, Maharashtra Cyber has attributed over 1.5 million cyberattacks on India’s critical infrastructure, following the Pahalgam terror incident, to seven Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, with only 150 breaches reported as successful. [11][12]

The Pakistan based DDoS cyberattacks targeted Indian websites like critical infrastructure (powergrid.in), educational institutions (ncccnews.com), government services (uidai.gov.in, pib.gov.in, pmindia.gov.in, jkgad.nic.in, presidentofindia.gov.in, ns2.nic.in), defence services (mod.gov.in), telecommunication services (bsnl.co.in), Media services(tv9hindi.com). [13][14] These attacks rendered websites inaccessible for an extended period, significantly disrupting the services provided by these respective organisations. Phishing attacks were observed wherein threat actors impersonated Indian government entities, distributing malicious PDF payloads disguised as official documents outlining government response measures.[15] Pakistan suffered DDoS attacks in public, private websites [16] and hacking of several twitter handles. [17] The Indian Cyber Force claimed responsibility for compromising of several Pakistan based webcams across Industrial zones, Private corporations, Government facilities, Police stations, Schools and Banks & ATMs, as well as breaching of government websites (iris.fbr.gov.pk), [18] Pakistan Stock Exchange portal and official Twitter accounts such as (Karachi Port). [19] DDoS attacks were launched against various Pakistan-based websites, including telecommunications services (worldcall.net.pk), educational institutions (qau.edu.pk), emergency services (rescue.gov.pk), and government portals such as the Ministry of Commerce (commerce.gov.pk).[20] The persistence of cyberattacks even after ceasefire agreements highlighted the enduring nature of cyber conflict, with continued attempts to disrupt and steal data in digital infrastructure.

In the wake of escalating India-Pakistan tensions, not only have cyberattacks surged against Indian infrastructure, but a parallel front has opened in the form of aggressive disinformation campaigns. Following India’s precision strikes on terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir under Operation Sindoor, Pakistan launched a sustained disinformation drive, falsely claiming to have inflicted significant damage on key Indian military assets, including the advanced S-400 air defence system and BrahMos missile bases. These claims, widely circulated on social media and amplified by pro-Pakistani accounts, alleged that the Pakistani Air Force’s JF-17 jets had destroyed the S-400 system at the Adampur air base and damaged several other strategic locations. [21] Several disinformation campaigns, such as false allegations of destruction of Indian Air fields/bases such as Adampur, Nagrota, Bhatinda, Jaipur and Delhi [22] aimed to incite public panic and disrupt civil stability within India. Instances of disinformation were observed wherein the adversary’s info warriors were circulating previously leaked data on dark web forums and fabricating old incidents of Indian Air Force flight crashes as newly obtained information with the intent of inciting panic and confusion.[23][24]

India’s Actions & Responses:

As a precautionary measure, Indian stock exchanges restricted access to their websites from foreign IP addresses to mitigate potential cyber threats.[25] The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) issued specific advisories, especially in the wake of increased cyberattacks, to enhance national cyber resilience. Following breaches of defence-related websites, cybersecurity experts implemented more robust protective measures,[26] while  public and private organisations issued threat advisories strengthen overall cyber defence infrastructure.

To counter the disinformation campaign, the Press Information Bureau (PIB) actively issued regular fact-check reports, and government officials issued press releases supported by evidence and official explanations, aimed towards dispelling propaganda campaigns targeting India, and the fabricated stories about India attacking Afghanistan and Iran seeking to isolate India diplomatically and portray it as a regional aggressor. [27] Pakistan leveraged state-backed media and its allies like Turkey and China tried to amplify false claims. Turkish outlets (TRT World, Anadolu Agency) echoed unverified narratives, such as Indian airbase destruction, to sway global opinion.[28]

Conclusion:

The conflict marked a paradigm shift in warfare, where cyber operations and disinformation campaigns became force multipliers for conventional military actions. The strategic recommendations to mitigate future cyber risks, flowing from the lessons of these escalations, are to make a centralised framework that would enable real-time threat intelligence sharing and standardised protocols for critical infrastructure protection, to develop mandatory cyber hygiene protocols for MSMEs and industries. India should build deterrence-through-strength by showcasing offensive cyber capacities, as hinted by unofficial retaliatory breaches of Pakistani banks. [29]  CERT-In can conduct drills nationwide to simulate multi-vector attacks to test resilience. Public-private alliance in sharing real time threat intelligence should be strengthened to facilitate timely detection, coordinated response, and comprehensive protection against evolving cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure. Pakistan’s hybrid warfare strategy with cyberattacks and false narrative campaigns focusing on disruption and confusion should be countered by implementing sustained and periodic public awareness campaigns through education and critical information dissemination. India’s success in limiting breaches to 150 out of 1.5 million attacks [30] highlights growing technical prowess but exposes systemic vulnerabilities in pre-emptive threat detection and interagency coordination. Moving forward, the line between physical and digital battlefields would blur further. India’s priority should be to institutionalise cyber resilience.

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Notes

[1] Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Alabama: Air University Press, 2012), p. 14

[2] Press Information Bureau, India, “Operation Sindoor: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force,” May 12, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=154448&ModuleId=3. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[3] “Cyberthreat Live Map,” Kaspersky, https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[4] “Live Cyber Threat Map | Radware,” Radware, https://livethreatmap.radware.com/ . Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[5] “CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2025-0019,” CERT-In, https://www.cert-in.org.in/. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[6] “Over 10 lakh Cyber Attacks on Indian Systems after Pahalgam Terror Attack: Maharashtra Cyber,” The New Indian Express, May 02, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/May/02/over-10-lakh-cyber-attacks-on-indian-systems-after-pahalgam-terror-attack-maharashtra-cyber. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[7] Abdul Nazeer MA, “500 Indian govt, pvt Entities Targeted by Hacktivist Groups,” The New Indian Express, May 08, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2025/May/11/500-indian-govt-pvt-entities-targeted-by-hacktivist-groups. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[8] Nate Nelson, “After Pahalgam Attack, Hacktivists Unite Under #OpIndia,” Dark Reading, May 10, 2025, https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/pahalgam-attack-hacktivists-unite-opindia. Accessed on                              May 15, 2025.

[9] “Two Battlegrounds: India-Pakistan Conflicts and DDoS Attacks,”  NSFocus, May 08, 2025, https://nsfocusglobal.com/two-battlegrounds-india-pakistan-conflicts-and-ddos-attacks/. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “Pakistan-Allied Hackers Launched 15 Lakh Cyber Attacks on Indian Websites; Only 150 Successful,” Press Trust of India, May 13, 2025, https://www.ptinews.com/story/national/Pakistan-allied-hackers-launched-15-lakh-cyber-attacks-on-Indian-websites;-only-150-successful=/2550835. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[12] “Meet the 7 Pakistani Hacker Groups That Tried to Breach India—and Failed Miserably.” The 420.in, May 13, 2025, https://the420.in/pakistan-cyber-attacks-on-india-failed-apt-groups-exposed/. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[13]

[14] “Two Battlegrounds: India-Pakistan Conflicts and DDoS Attacks,” – NSFOCUS, Inc., May 08, 2025, https://nsfocusglobal.com/two-battlegrounds-india-pakistan-conflicts-and-ddos-attacks/; “India-Pakistan Conflicts Escalating: Military Operations and DDoS Attacks Making Targeted Strikes,”  NSFOCUS, Inc., ,” May 13, 2025, https://nsfocusglobal.com/india-pakistan-conflicts-escalating-military-operations-and-ddos-attacks-making-targeted-strikes/. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[15] Rhishav Kanjilal, “Advisory: Pahalgam Attack Themed Decoys used by APT36 to Target the Indian Government,” Seqrite,            April 30, 2025,https://www.seqrite.com/blog/advisory-pahalgam-attack-themed-decoys-used-by-apt36-to-target-the-indian-government/. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[16] “Two Battlegrounds: India-Pakistan Conflicts and DDoS Attacks,” NSFOCUS, May 08, 2025, https://nsfocusglobal.com/two-battlegrounds-india-pakistan-conflicts-and-ddos-attacks/. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[17] “Pakistan Faces Suspected Cyberattacks as Several Social Handles Post Suspicious Information, Then Retract,” Business Today, May 05, 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/pakistan-faces-suspected-cyberattacks-as-several-social-handles-post-suspicious-information-then-retract-475539-2025-05-09. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[18] Ibid.

[19] “Pakistan faces Suspected Cyberattacks as Several Social Handles Post Suspicious Information, then Retract,” Business Today, May 05, 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/pakistan-faces-suspected-cyberattacks-as-several-social-handles-post-suspicious-information-then-retract-475539-2025-05-09. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[20] “Two Battlegrounds: India-Pakistan Conflicts and DDoS Attacks,” NSFOCUS, May 08, 2025, https://nsfocusglobal.com/two-battlegrounds-india-pakistan-conflicts-and-ddos-attacks/. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[21] Press Information Bureau, India, “Operation Sindoor Factcheck,” https://www.pib.gov.in/factcheckupdates.aspx?lang=1&reg=3. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Pagilla Manohar Reddy, “Brief Disruptions, Bold Claims: The Tactical Reality Behind the India-Pakistan Hacktivist Surge,” Cloud SEK, May 11, 2025, https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/brief-disruptions-bold-claims-the-tactical-reality-behind-the-india-pakistan-hacktivist-surge. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[24] “Breaking down Pak’s Fake Narrative Factory: How it Colluded with “Allies” to Launch “Info War” against India,” Indian Defence Research Wing, May 15, 2025, https://idrw.org/breaking-down-paks-fake-narrative-factory-how-it-colluded-with-allies-to-launch-info-war-against-india/. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[25] Shivendra Kumar, “BSE, NSE Restrict Access to Websites for Overseas users: Reports,” The Economic Times, May 07, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/bse-nse-restrict-access-to-websites-for-overseas-users-reports/articleshow/120955528.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[26] “Indian Army Tightens Cybersecurity after Defence-Linked Websites come under Attack,” The Economic Times, May 05, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-army-tightens-cybersecurity-after-defence-linked-websites-come-under-attack/articleshow/120903126.cms. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[27] “Operation Sindoor, Pakistani Disinformation, Pak Claims, India Pakistan: Propaganda, Outright Lies: How Pak Is Ramping Up Misinformation Warfare,” NDTV, May 10, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/operation-sindoor-pakistani-disinformation-pak-claims-india-pakistan-propaganda-outright-lies-how-pak-is-ramping-up-misinformation-warfare-8379832. Accessed on       May 16, 2025.

[28] “Breaking down Pak’s fake Narrative Factory: How it Colluded with “Allies” to Launch “Info War” against India,” Indian Defence Research Wing, May 15, 2025, https://idrw.org/breaking-down-paks-fake-narrative-factory-how-it-colluded-with-allies-to-launch-info-war-against-india/. Accessed on May 16, 2025.

[29] David Sehyeon Baek, “Cyber Warfare in the May 2025 India-Pakistan Conflict,” May 14, 2025, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cyber-warfare-may-2025-india-pakistan-conflict-david-sehyeon-baek-ygjoc. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[30] “Pakistan-Allied Hackers Launched 15 Lakh Cyber Attacks on Indian Websites; Only 150 Successful,” Press Trust of India, May 13, 2025, https://www.ptinews.com/story/national/Pakistan-allied-hackers-launched-15-lakh-cyber-attacks-on-Indian-websites;-only-150-successful=/2550835. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

The post Cyber Warfare: Dual Operational Fronts in Contemporary India-Pakistan Conflicts appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Operation Sindoor, Pahalgam, Attack, Operation, Terrorist, AD System

Operation Sindoor demonstrated that no place within the boundaries of Pakistan is beyond the  reach of the Indian Air Force (IAF). Right from North of Islamabad to Karachi in the South and Jacobabad in the far West, numerous targets were punitively hit with pinpoint accuracy. However, when operating against a rogue state with military-terror fusion, there are significant costs one pays for being a responsible state. These are the costs you pay for being a professional military of a functional state that operates within legitimate frameworks. This article examines four key factors that impose costs on an air war fought by the good side in such a scenario.

Surprise: Following the heinous attack on tourists in Pahalgam, PM Modi announced during a campaign speech that, “India will identify, trace and punish every terrorist, supporter and conspirator. We’ll pursue them to the end of the Earth. They will be punished beyond their imagination.”[1] Thus, Pakistan knew there was going to be an attack. It was only a matter of when and where. The element of surprise, a fundamental principle of war, was therefore partially lost. To draw a comparison, surprise was a key factor in the spectacular results of the opening attacks in wars like Germany against Poland in World War II, the Pearl Harbour attack by the Japanese during the same war or Israel in 1967. Since Pakistan orchestrated the terrorist attack, it followed it up by increasing its Air Defence alert states on the following days. Additional resources that aren’t deployed during peacetime were possibly operationalised and added. However, it is interesting to note that it is not the side that begins the war that always wins. Japan and Germany lost in the Second World War.

Terrorists Vs Terrorism Sponsor Dilemma: The first Press Release on Op Sindoor released after the strikes on terrorist camps on May 07, 2025, stated that, “Our actions have been focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted. India has demonstrated considerable restraint in selection of targets and method of execution.”[2] While this message conveyed self-imposed restriction of avoiding military targets, it imposed significant operational costs. While the name ‘Air Defence’ (AD) systems may sound innocuous, there is nothing defensive about them. They are potent missiles and guns that can engage and destroy targets as far as they can (a few hundred kilometres). The military operates these in most countries (some non-state actors also have AD systems). On May 07, 2025, the AD systems were out of bounds for targeting due to India’s restraint of destroying only terrorist targets. In the age of long-range AD weapon systems, even the airspace on own side of the border is unsafe. That is why, in any air operation, one of the first sets of actions is to neutralise the enemy’s air defences. Going into an airspace (even one’s own) with the enemy AD effective is comparable to walking into a minefield without destroying it.

Human Shield: The Indian government’s press brief on May 08, 2025 indicated that Pakistan had used civilian airliners as a human shield in the air.[3] Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 51.7, of the Geneva Conventions states that, “The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.”[4] Accordingly, India had shut its airspace to civilian flights during the conflict. However, in Pakistan, civilian airliners carrying passengers of various nationalities were still operating close to the International Boundary. More interesting is the fact that they were being operated deliberately well outside their published schedules, coinciding with the launch of drones and missiles by Pakistan. Pakistan was using these civil airliners as a shield for the launch of its drones and missiles against India. Air Defence systems rely on electronic signatures to determine friend vs foe/military vs civilian. Electronic Warfare (EW) operations are routine in any conflict that disrupts these signals. Thus, the chances of misidentification and hitting a civil aircraft were high. Therefore, for the sake of the safety of the civilians in the airliner, you don’t fire your AD weapons at the cost of losing tactical advantage. When you are good, you don’t hit an enemy hiding behind civil airliners while he can hit you.

Restraint in Scale: On subsequent days, IAF targeted 11 airbases, command and control centres, air defence radars, etc. Some comments on social media questioned the rationale of the choice of targets, especially runways. They argued, “Why waste expensive missiles on something that could be repaired with mud and cement in days?” This can be answered in two ways. Firstly, one may even have sixth-generation fighter aircraft. But without a functional runway, they are useless. Therefore, there is a tactical sense in grounding multiple squadrons of aircraft by destroying the operational surfaces. Secondly, India’s objective was political signaling and not destruction. Pakistan’s operation was named ‘Bunyan-al-Marsoos’, meaning ‘a solid wall.’[5] Indian weapons could defeat layers of air defences in the most heavily defended air bases of Pakistan and land with pinpoint accuracy on the chosen targets right from Rawalpindi to Karachi. It symbolically demonstrated that there was no wall and that their operation was a sham.  “No place in Pakistan is safe” was driven home without resorting to excessive loss of lives. A rogue state would shell civilians, attack places of worship, hospitals, etc, to cause massive loss of lives. A responsible state exercises restraint adequate to achieve its objectives, albeit at an escalated cost to itself.

For all those with the question in mind as to whether it is even necessary to behave well against a rogue state, the answer can be found in the stanza of the Prayer of the National Defence Academy (NDA). It goes like this, “Awaken our admiration for honest dealing and clean thinking, and guide us to choose the harder right, instead of the easier wrong.”[6]  That’s the difficulty of being good.

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Notes

[1] “PM Modi Switches to English in Stern Message to Pahalgam Terrorists: 5 top quotes,” The New Indian Express, April 24, 2025,https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-modi-bihar-english-message-pahalgam-terrorists-9963235/. Accessed on May 13, 2025.

[2] Press Information Bureau, India, “ Operation Sindoor: Indian Armed Forces Carried Out Precision Strike at Terrorist Camps,”  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2127370. Accessed on May 13, 2025.

[3] Republic World, “Pakistan using Civil Planes as Human Shields: Wing Commander Vyomika Singh,” YouTube, May 09, 2025, ,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNISErR1drY. Accessed on May 13, 2025.

[4] International Humanitarian Law Databases, “Article 51 – Protection of the civilian population,” https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-51?activeTab=. Accessed on May 14, 2025.

[5] “Pakistan Launches Military Operation Named ‘Bunyan-um-Marsus’ Against India,”. Samaa TV,  May 10, 2025,  https://www.samaa.tv/2087333229-pakistan-launches-military-peration-named-bunyan-um-marsus-against-india. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

[6]Sandeep Thapar (@sandythapar), “The NDA prayer, read out each morning in the muster. Maybe the Parliament some day will adopt something on these lines for the elected representatives!,” X (formally Twitter), February 28, 2020, 7:15 a.m., https://x.com/sandythapar/status/1233206587055058944?lang=ar. Accessed on May 15, 2025.

The post The Difficulty of Being Good – Air Power Version appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Group Captain (Dr) Rajneesh Kumar, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: Generative Artificial Intelligence, logistics, last-mile delivery, enhancer, IAF, theatre of operations, peace, supply chain.

The post Artificial Intelligence as Force Enhancer in Air Force Logistics appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Op Sindoor.

We have all seen Top Gun, where Maverick responds to all situations with the cool and vivacious dialogue, “Maverick is supersonic, will be there in thirty seconds.” Those were the days of aerial close combat, designed to make the fighter pilot look good. The modern battlefield is a far cry from it. It is more lethal, complex, precarious, dense, and, more importantly, unforgiving.

A pertinent question that comes to the fore is what makes the modern aerial battlefield so different from the earlier one? There are no set patterns or definitions to understand the modern battlefield clearly. However, specific characteristics make it different from what was prevalent in the 20^th Century. In the early days of air combat, there was a sensor and a shooter. The sensor would identify a potential target, and the shooter would decide whether it is hostile or not and shoot it down. The less time the sensor takes to shoot, the more effective the system. As technology improved, so did the sensors and capabilities of the shooter. With time, the number of sensors increased, and the shooter, therefore, had many inputs to work on and decide whether to shoot or not, eventually saturating the mind of the shooter with too much information, often termed as situational overload or SITOL. From one sensor and shooter, the battlefield transformed into multiple sensors and multiple shooters, and finally, there was a humongous network of sensors and shooters linked with each other to achieve the original aim of short sensor-to-shooter time. Technology like computers, complicated algorithms and multiple sensor tracking was introduced to sift through the vast amount of data available, so that a recognised and refined picture would be available for the shooter to take the call. With time, essential decisions started being taken by a series of professionals on the ground, who would identify hostile targets and hand them over to the shooter to do the needful. The aerial battlefield was linear with clearly defined players in the kill chain, and the need of the hour was information superiority, viz., the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Maverick could handle it all and come out with flying colours.

The modern aerial battle space has a huge array of sensors and shooters constituting multiple kill chains spread across multiple of land, sea, air and cyberspace domains. Linear kill chains have transformed into complex kill webs; therefore, plain old information superiority is inefficient. This is where Kelly McGillis’s character of Charlotte “Charlie” Blackwood, Instructor, Top Gun, comes in with the famous dialogue to Maverick, “It takes a lot more than just fancy flying.” Maverick would therefore need to evolve and change because the modern aerial battlefield has also undergone a transformation. Decision superiority is required, viz., the degree of dominance in the cognitive domain an air force must achieve through its decision-making processes that enables it to acquire and maintain an advantage over its adversary. Maverick is just another lethal weapon system available, amongst many other systems which a commander could use to achieve kills. So, does that make Maverick irrelevant? The answer is no. Maverick will always remain relevant because, when used judiciously, only Maverick can deliver lethal and decisive firepower.

Key features of the modern aerial battle field are trans and cross domain operations, network centric architecture, technology ranging from small drones to Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) to Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missiles (QRSAMs), Medium and Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MR and LR SAMs), stealth aircraft, long range and stand-off precision weapons, electronic and cyber warfare; Hypersonic weapons and space-based combat support. All this is being augmented by the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data integration. As a result, the kill web that has been created is far more complex and therefore needs closer evaluation, critical thinking and unmatched decision superiority. Many questions come to the fore when we look at the attributes of war fighting in such an environment. How does one fight a war in such an environment? How will we decide which weapon system to use and when? What response options are available to a developing situation and which is most optimal? Are concepts like Favourable Air Situation (FAS), Air Superiority and Air Supremacy relevant? What doctrinal precepts are to be followed when fighting the modern war? Will the classical Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Air Defence (AD) pan out the way we have seen in the past few years? When do the air, land and sea campaigns begin and end? How does one handle cyber and information warfare, which is spread across the entire spectrum of conflict, affecting the entire continuum? These are just a few questions that must be answered when planning for future warfare.

Certain events that have unfolded in the period following the dastardly terror attacks at Pahalgam give us all a glimpse of what is to come in the future. A lethal attack on innocent tourists by state-sponsored terrorists was the trigger event. The event triggered a response strategy by India against Pakistan, which involved action in the diplomatic, information, economic, and military domains. What was interesting was the way events unfolded in the military domain. In response to the terror attacks, India launched Op Sindoor with precision long-range attacks by the Indian Air Force (IAF) on terrorist infrastructure without physically crossing the International Boundary (IB) or the Line of Control (LoC). The Pakistani armed forces responded in the form of large-scale mass drone attacks with drones ranging from quad copters to large UCAVs on military targets successfully repelled by India’s robust Air Defence (AD) comprising of weapons of differing vintage and capability, including hard and soft kill using Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS). What followed was kinetic action using manned aircraft to target airfields and other critical military infrastructure, albeit from within their own territory by both sides. Under a nuclear overhang, this was a new kind of war, far different from the one between Russia and Ukraine or Hamas and Israel. While the Indian Navy was deployed in a deterrent posture in the Arabian Sea and the land forces were looking eye to eye, no direct ‘conventional’ exchange of firepower took place between the two armies and navies. Tanks did not roll and heavy artillery had not fired, yet, there was significant damage to Pakistani critical military infrastructure and war-waging potential.  No FAS or Air Supremacy was established, yet targets well within Pakistani and Indian territory were taken on. There was no formal declaration of war, nor can this be termed as Responses Short of War (RSOW). Civil defence measures like air raid sirens and blackout measures saw a return after decades of hibernation. Conventional wisdom on how wars between India and Pakistan would pan out has been thrown out of the window, and the war was swift, deadly, modern, sophisticated, and multi-domain; the ceasefire was the only thing that was swifter. In the entire gamut of things as they unfolded, our beloved Maverick was very relevant and instrumental in delivering decisive punches. Yet, he was also ever so vulnerable because our thought process on how to use him had not changed.

This war has brought out certain important lessons that must become inputs for revising our doctrines and helping us fight tomorrow’s wars. This conflict has clearly shown us that, though the nature of war has not quite changed, the character of war has undergone significant changes. As Lt Col Frank G Hoffman wrote in his article on Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, “the most distinctive change in the character of modern war is the blurred or blended nature of combat. We do not face a widening number of distinct challenges but their convergence into hybrid wars.”[1] As we debate the scale and shape of our Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote and remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.[2] The problem will be response strategies to completely newer ways of warfighting—whether kinetic, non-kinetic, lethal, or non-lethal—directed not only at the armed forces but at the country in general. I want to end by bringing out certain takeaways from this war and highlight some facts on air power and its application in modern combat.

(a)   There is and will remain adequate space for conventional and sub-conventional action in wars under a nuclear overhang. This, therefore, calls for recalibration of red lines and response options.

(b)   Use of air power in this conflict has again demonstrated how it  can seamlessly transcend the outer rings of Warden’s model of centre of gravity and hit where it hurts.

(c)   AD operations are inextricably linked to the conduct of OCA operations. The two campaigns will remain symbiotic.

(d)   Air power may not achieve conventional levels of air control like FAS or Air supremacy. Still there will be windows of opportunity for conventional OCA forces to go through, and these must be fully exploited.

(e)   There can never be adequate soft power without credible and adequate hard power. Ultimately, hard power will prove decisive and must be built up.

(f)   There are glaring gaps in our hard power capability. Conventional air power needs a major impetus, especially in a scenario like the one we saw during Op Sindoor. IAF needs adequate squadrons and aircraft to remain relevant and effective because numbers matter. A strong and modern IAF will help deter any future misdeeds by Pakistan.

(g)   Legacy weapon systems have an essential role and will always remain relevant. These systems’ maintenance and life cycle management is essential to maintain the right balance.

(h)   The classical OCA versus AD battle may not play out how it has been envisaged, and Maverick does not need to go through every time. There is a need to change that mindset. Offensive AD can do a lot, especially if one has the longer stick.

(j)    Centralised planning, distributed control, and decentralised execution were amply displayed in this conflict. Integrated application of combat power, irrespective of ownership, is key to success in modern warfare.

(k)   There is a need for a joint planning set-up at the apex level. Joint planning has always been our weak area and must be addressed. Towards this, setting up of Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) is essential.

(l)    Manned aircraft will always remain relevant because no number of unmanned systems can deliver lethal and decisive air power like a manned aircraft. We have seen the vulnerability of drones in a contested environment; therefore the narrative that unmanned systems will replace manned aircraft should be safely discarded. At best, they will augment but not replace.

(m)    The present Japanese Navy Chief had mentioned in his address during Raisina Dialogue 2025 that the battlefield has changed from being platform-centric to network-centric and now to decision-centric. Kill chains have transformed into kill webs. We must invest in AI and big data to suitably handle such a complex battle space to enable decision superiority, which will prove decisive.

This war has been significantly different from previous ones, with many lessons that can be drawn. Air power as an instrument of war will always remain crucial and critical in any conflict and must therefore remain effective and credible. We cannot afford to dwindle air power away in penny pockets, nor can we let it deteriorate. While autonomous unmanned systems have utility, the manned fighter is irreplaceable and essential. Maverick will need to be called in at the right time and place to deliver the decisive blow, and for that we will need decision superiority, and a change of mindset. The fighter pilot is here to stay; wish him away at your peril. When Maverick requests a flyby, the classical Top Gun response, “Negative Ghostrider, the pattern is full”, may be the right response untill that window of opportunity arises and he can go in, guns and missiles blazing.

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Notes:

[1] Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 1^st Quarter 2009,  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA516871.pdf, accessed on May 12, 2025.

[2] Ibid.

The post Air Power Musings: Maverick is Supersonic, will be there in Thirty Seconds… appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Pahalgam attack, terrorist attack, Operation Sindoor, Integrated Air Defence System.

In the aftermath of the barbaric, heinous, religiously targeted killings of 26 innocent civilians in Pahalgam by The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the Pakistan based UN-designated terrorist group, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), PM Narendra Modi on April 24, in a public rally in Bihar, very explicitly announced his intentions to not only extract revenge from the perpetrators of the terrorist strike but their backers as well. He said, ’Today, from the soil of Bihar, I say this to the whole world, India would identify, trace and punish every terrorist, supporter and conspirator. We will pursue them to the end of the Earth. They will be punished beyond their imagination.’^[1]

Towards achieving that aim, the Indian armed forces launched Op Sindoor in the early hours of  May 07, 2025, targeting nine terrorist training centres/camps, five across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and four across the international border (IB) in Pakistan. India’s response to the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist strike was precise, measured and non-escalatory; wherein only terrorist infrastructure was engaged and military or civilian targets were avoided. Pakistan was clearly warned that any follow-up strikes by Pakistan would be considered as further escalation and would be responded by India. Unfortunately, Pakistan failed to heed this sound advice.  It continued to progressively up the ante by firstly carrying out aerial strikes with hundreds of drones, missiles and loitering munitions on religious sites and other civilian targets in Indian cities all along our Western border and subsequently on IAF airfields. The Indian armed forces responded to each of these escalations with precise, measured, calibrated but escalated responses – initiating with precise strikes on terrorist camps, leading to Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) attacks on PAF surveillance and AD radars and finally the massive, precise attack on eleven PAF frontline airbases, which forced Pakistan to wave the white flag and beg for a ceasefire. Each step up the escalatory ladder by Pakistan was responded with a befitting and escalated response by the Indian armed forces.

In barely four days, the Indian armed forces achieved a resounding military victory – obliterating nine Pakistani terrorist training camps/centres and very systematically and professionally decimating the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan’s air defences and their major airfields; leaving all the Pakistani strategic and economic infrastructure targets fully exposed. The Indian Air Force’s and Indian Army’s phenomenal defence of the Indian airspace against repeated, mass aerial attacks by aircraft, missiles, drones and loitering munitions; extending across a border exceeding 3000 kms was a masterful and unmatched performance by the Indian Integrated Air Defence system. The fact that no Pakistani aircraft could enter the Indian air space throughout the period of hostilities speaks volumes of this highly professional performance. A defining feature of Op Sindoor was that the major architects of its stupendous success were the indigenous Indian designed and developed or Indian manufactured weapon systems and weapon platforms – fruits of our Atmanirbharta initiative.

Atmanirbharta Success Story – the Crowning Glory

Though there are several reasons for this stupendous success of the Indian armed forces, the most significant  contributor to the success of Op Sindoor has been the phenomenal performance of the indigenously developed Indian weapon platforms – the indigenously designed and developed Integrated Air Defence System, the indigenously designed and developed Akash Missile system, the Medium Range Surface to Air Missile system (MRSAM), jointly developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and Israel Aerospace Indistries (IAI), the integration by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) of the Brahmos Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) onto the Su-30 MKI, the locally manufactured loitering munition (Skystriker) and the DRDO developed C-UAS system [(D-4) Drone, Detect, Deter and Destroy] system, our Regional Navigation Satellite System (RNSS) – the Navigation by Indian Constellation (NAVIC) providing precise coordinates for our long range precision weapons, the re-engineering of life-expired R-73’s as Surface to Air Missile for Assured Retaliation (SAMAR) weapons, the indigenously upgraded L-70 guns, the Zu-23 mm systems and the Schilka systems.

The other major contributors to the success of Op Sindoor, though not of Indian origin, were the Russian Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) – the S-400, the French Rafale aircraft with its Meteor Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-to-Air Missile (AAM), SCALP and HAMMER long-range precision weapon systems, and the Israeli IAI designed Loitering Munition (Harop).

The development details of a few of these Atmanirbharta success stories are highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs.

IACCS cum Akashteer Integrated Air Defence System

The undisputed star of Op Sindoor’s stupendous success was undoubtedly the indigenously developed multi-layered Integrated Air Defence System – the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System) and the Indian Army’s (IA’s) Akashteer. IACCS has successfully fused all ground-based and the airborne sensors scanning the humongous volume of Indian airspace. IACCS has provided a clear and Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) to the various AD weapon systems for engaging the incoming enemy targets. The IACCS exercised timely and effective control over the numerous AD weapon systems of IAF, from the shoulder-fired QRSAMs like the Igla missile to the LRSAMs like S-400. Likewise, the Indian Army’s component of the Integrated Air Defence System, the indigenously developed Akashteer contributed to the effective monitoring of the airspace over the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and real-time control of all the ground-based AD weapon systems in the TBA. Both the IACCS and Akashteer worked in synergy to ensure that the ‘fog of war’ was dispelled and freedom of operation was provided to the all the AD weapon systems for neutralising the hundreds of incoming enemy targets comprising of armed drones, swarm drones, Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs), loitering munitions and even Air to Air Missiles (AAMs). This ensured that our airspace was practically impregnable to the repeated aerial assaults by our Western adversary throughout Op Sindoor. We can proudly claim that our Integrated Air Defence System is better, if not equal to, the Israeli Iron Dome. A point to be reiterated here is that the airspace volume of Israel is only a minuscule percentage of what the IAF has to defend, and this was done with a resounding success during Op Sindoor.

The decision to develop the Integrated Air Defence System indigenously rather than buy a Commercial Off- The-Shelf (COTS) Air Defence system was indeed a visionary decision of the IAF, which has paid back handsomely in Op Sindoor. The evolution of the Integrated Air Defence System has taken several decades, starting in the early 1960s, with the incremental advancements in Air Defence concepts over the years.^[2] The IACCS was conceptualised to integrate all the radars of the three Services and even the radars of civil aviation. One of the biggest hurdles in developing the IACCS was the need to fuse the radar picture of the various sensors, all of different makes and different vintages. Due to the complexities involved, the development of IACCS was initially restricted to the IAF only. IACCS was jointly developed over slightly more than a decade through continuous hard work, ingenuity, and innovation by dedicated IAF officers (fighter controllers and engineers) and the engineers of Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). IACCS was completed and operationalised across the IAF in 2010.^[3] Even after the operationalisation, it has been undergoing software upgrades and modernisations to further enhance its performance. Building on the experience and success of IACCS, the Indian Army and BEL had successfully developed the Akashteer Project for similar command and control over the IA sensors and the AD weapon systems in the TBA and integration with IACCS.  IA inducted the first phase of project Akashteer into Service on April 04, 2024.^[4] The entire project is scheduled to be completed by early 2027. The Indian Navy’s similar command and control project is named ‘Trigun.’  It is being indigenously designed and developed by the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) in DRDO and is presently in an advanced stage of its development.

It is  indisputable that the IACCS was the backbone of IAF’s network centricity and a crucial enabler for the air operations during Op Sindoor. The system’s phenomenal capabilities endowed its numerous users with an unmatched Situational Awareness that significantly reduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop, the Sensor-to-Shooter time-lag and thereby contributed immensely to the protection of the Indian air space and also the execution of offensive air strikes by IAF.

Akash Short Range Surface-to-air Missile System

One of the AD missile weapon systems that was a major contributor to the success of Op Sindoor and its excellent performance was the indigenously designed and developed Akash missile system, which was developed as a part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). The development of the Akash missile was initiated in 1983 and IAF was intricately involved throughout its development process, through its several variants (Akash Mk-1, Akash- 1S and the latest Akash Prime) and the induction of the first Akash unit into IAF in 2010.^[5] The Akash missile system was inducted into the IA in May 2015.^[6] The Akash missile system is capable of intercepting high speed, agile aerial threats like fighter aircraft, missiles, helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Akash system can track and engage multiple targets simultaneously and relies on its Rajendra Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) 3D radar for guiding the missile to the target. The system also has a built-in Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) capability, enhancing its kill probability even in contested EW environments. The Akash missile system has been designed by DRDO and is being jointly manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and BEL. The missile is a supersonic, short-range SAM with command guidance and an effective range varying from 4.5 km to 30 km and a maximum engagement altitude of 20 km. The Akash missile system can engage multiple targets simultaneously in all weather conditions. It was one of the key AD weapon systems of India’s multi-layered Integrated Air Defence system during Op Sindoor and was successful in neutralising multiple enemy aerial threats. DRDO successfully conducted a flight test of the New Generation Akash (Akash-NG) missile on January 12, 2024 and the missile is now being prepared for user trials. Akash NG would be capable of intercepting high-performance, low-RCS supersonic targets apart from conventional targets. It would have a maximum interception range of 70 kms.

Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM)

The exceptional performance of the MRSAM was another contributing factor  to the success of Op Sindoor. The MRSAM, is an indigenous variant of the Israeli Barak-8 SAM system, has been jointly developed by DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) as an advanced network centric combat Air Defence System. The MRSAM has been a significant step in our Atmanirbharta initiative and has contributed to the ‘Make in India, Make for the world’ program. MRSAM can simultaneously engage multiple aerial threats like fighter aircraft, guided and unguided munitions and cruise missiles, both in single and saturation attacks, up to a maximum range of 70 kms. The first unit of MRSAM was inducted into IAF in Sep 2021^[7] and into the IA in Feb 2023. The IAF and IA variants are slightly different, with the IAF version being semi-static and the IA version being mobile.

Integration of Brahmos ALCM on Su-30 MKI

The successful indigenous integration of the Brahmos ALCM by HAL on the locally centre pylon modified Su-30 MKI in 2017^[8] has been another success story that significantly enhanced the deep strike capability of the IAF. The precise and massive damage inflicted on the PAF airbases by the Brahmos attacks has indeed been highly demoralising to Pakistan. It would be of immense deterrence value in the future. Brahmos missile presently has a maximum range of 290 kms, but this would get enhanced to 800 kms in the Brahmos ER, which is currently under development.

Locally Manufactured Loitering Munition (Skystriker) & DRDO Developed C-UAS system (D-4)

The Israeli Elbit Systems designed, Alpha Design Technologies locally manufactured Skystriker loitering munition and the DRDO designed and developed C-UAS system (D4) were other huge success stories. They had a decisive impact on Op Sindoor. The IA operated Skystriker loitering munitions were instrumental in the precise destruction of the terror training camps and other training infrastructure in POK and Pakistan in the early morning of May 07. The DRDO developed the D4 C-UAS system, with its 3 km engagement zone, which was successful in neutralising the repeated attacks by the enemy drones and contributing to the safety of our VA/VPs.

Conclusion

The most obvious and enduring lesson of Op Sindoor has been that India’s Atmanirbharta initiatives towards the indigenous development of weapon systems and weapon platforms have started bearing fruit, and they contributed massively towards the phenomenal success of Op Sindoor. Even though the gestation period for indigenous development is relatively longer, all the players – from the DPSUs to the three Services to the private industry to the Start-ups need to not only persist with it, but they need to speed up the indigenisation process. The Atmanirbharta initiative needs to be further strengthened with a whole of nation approach and be made more broad-based. The indigenous development programs of Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk II, AMCA, the 110 kN high-performance jet engine, Ghatak UCAV, larger range C-UAS systems and the CATS air warrior program need to be focused upon and speeded up.

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Notes:

^[1] “Pahalgam Attackers, Conspirators will be Punished Beyond their Imagination : PM Modi in Bihar,” The Hindu, April 24, 2025 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-speech-bihar-pahalgam-terror-attack-punish/article69485876.ece. Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[2] Air Mshl VPS Rana, PVSM, VSM, “Invisible Warriors – Scientific Art of Fighter Controlling”, (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), p. 182.

^[3] Air Mshl VPS Rana, PVSM, VSM, “Invisible Warriors – Scientific Art of Fighter Controlling”, (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), p. 176.

^[4] “Army Starts Induction of Akashteer System to Enhance Air Defence Posture,” The Times of India, April 04, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-starts-induction-of-akashteer-system-to-enhance-air-defence-posture/articleshow/109044544.cms.  Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[5]  Ajai Shukla, “First Akash Missile System to Fill Gap in Air Defence,” Broadsword, May 22, 2010, https://www.ajaishukla.com/2010/11/first-akash-missile-system-to-fill-gap.html.  Accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[6]“Induction Ceremony of Akash Weapon System into Army Air Defence,” PIB, May 05, 2015, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=121193, accessed on May 10, 2025.

^[7]   “DRDO Hans over MRSM to IAF in presence of RM Shri Rajnath Singh at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan,” PIB, September 09, 2021, https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1753559. Accessed on May 11, 2025.

^[8] “Inside Story : How Brahmos Missile Got Integrated with Su-30 Fighter Plane,” The Print,  November 29, 2017, https://theprint.in/opinion/inside-story-how-brahmos-missile-got-integrated-with-sukhoi-30-fighter-plane/19329/. Accessed on May 11, 2025.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Op Sindoor Victory (Atmanirbharta Success Story – The Crowning Glory) appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Pahalgam Attack, Operation Sindoor, Terrorist Attack, IAF

The recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam that resulted in the death of 26 innocent lives led to intense speculation and debate on the involvement of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and the action that India as a country needed to take. Public pressure in a democracy for justice and action is indeed understandable and justified, and the day’s government found itself in an unenviable situation to ‘do something.’ Having carried out surgical strikes in the past by special forces in 2016, post the Uri terror attack and by the IAF in 2019, post the Pulwama terror attack, the expectation from the domestic constituency had only increased. While diplomatic steps taken by the government to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, expulsion of military advisors, closing of the border and revoking visas of Pakistan nationals were carried out immediately, these would take time to fructify and take effect. Terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, followed by plausible deniability and the willingness to cooperate for a joint and impartial probe by Pakistan, is a familiar playbook that India had only got weary of listening to. Diplomatic support from the international community has been more than forthcoming, along with the advice for India to exercise restraint.

India exercised restraint, albeit for a period of fifteen days that seemed like eternity, until ‘Operation Sindoor’ was carried out on the night of 06-07 May 2025. In a deliberate and carefully planned attack that was focused, measured and non-escalatory, the Indian Armed Forces struck nine terrorist training camps, indoctrination centres, and staging areas inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. These were targeted based on credible intelligence, ensuring no loss to civilian lives and property and no military targets were struck. Pakistan indeed was taken by surprise and has since then reacted with drone and missile attacks, targeting Indian cities and airfields. The raison d’ être of the Pakistan military, which considers itself the sole guardian of its security, is keeping the threat from India alive. Not reacting to the present situation would only have undermined its credibility and sanctity. India has not been reticent and has responded by targeting the air defence network of Pakistan from Lahore to Karachi. The onus for further escalation now rests with Pakistan, and international opinion is already against Pakistan, with the world having realised that the scourge of terrorism emanates from the country with the tacit support of the state. Any further attack by Pakistan on Indian military targets would be at its peril, as India has already demonstrated that it would respond appropriately.

Having briefed global leaders and envoys from friendly foreign countries who understand India’s predicament and the need to act against terror, India today stands on high moral ground as a responsible nation. The need for ‘just’ action within a specified time was felt by the leadership, which did respond, not only by sending a clear message to Pakistan that acts of terror would not be tolerated but also to its citizens that the nation would do all it could to protect its citizens. The Indian Air Force, which played a significant role in neutralising the targets, is better equipped than it was post Pulwama in 2019. The air defence umbrella that the IAF provides has ensured that the population has remained safe despite relentless attacks by Pakistan. The impregnable air defence system of the IAF, integrated with the smallest unit on the ground, remains ever vigilant and ready to respond with alacrity. Military power and capability take years to build and develop, and crises do not come knocking to give a warning. The nature of airpower is such that nations cannot necessarily buy the airpower they need in good enough time when they need it.

The Indian government has resolutely displayed its will to act against state-sponsored terrorism in bringing the perpetrators of this heinous act to justice. The Indian Armed Forces, which responded in a measured and calibrated manner at the outset, has ensured that the ‘Integrated Air Defence’ put in place by the IAF and controlled by the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) responded in a manner that precluded any damage to IAF bases and cities by the attacks carried out by Pakistan. In addition, the retaliation to these attacks has been carried out by the IAF’s long-range weapons that have caused damage to military targets in Pakistan.

Nations chart their destinies through their polity and actions. Having eschewed violence post partition in 1947, India has emerged as a peaceful and progressive nation that is counted as a growing and responsible power in the comity of nations. Pakistan, on the other hand, has used state-sponsored terrorism as a policy through which it attempted to stymie India’s growth while using its geostrategic location as an advantage to curry favour from the West. While the jury is out on whether the chickens have finally come home to roost as far as terrorism is concerned in Pakistan, both India and Pakistan can ill afford to get drawn into a conflict that could simmer unabated. Intelligence failures have plagued India since Kargil, Pulwama, Doklam and Eastern Ladakh. Having taken a slew of measures since then to plug the gaps, the recent incident serves as a stark reminder that it is not enough, and India needs to take a hard look at the shortcomings within while simultaneously making attempts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.

Building military capability and capacity cannot be neglected, and efforts must continue unabated. The absence or lack of capacity of a national instrument of power cannot be offset by diplomacy or economic means. India’s predicament is unenviable to say the least, as far as its national security is concerned. A strong and capable military will  deter, and a united and cohesive national resolve to act will mitigate such threats from fructifying in the future. While the nation stands united in grief and anger, public sentiment should not get divided on communal lines, or else we would be playing into the hands of our adversary. India’s secular fabric, that is its innate strength, needs to be preserved and protected at all costs.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Pahalgam and Beyond – Operation Sindoor and India’s Options appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Dr Javed Alam, Research Associate, Centre for Air Power Studies

Keywords: Hypersonic, USA, HALO, China.

The post Another Setback for the US Hypersonic Efforts: Goodbye to HALO appeared first on CAPSS India.