Keywords: Multi domain Operations, Modern Warfare, Cyber Security, Battle Supremacy

Introduction

The United States (US)Army marks its 250^th year in 2025, and places Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as the vision for warfighting in the future. Despite this, MDO remains more of a concept than a concrete strategy, filled with aspirations but enmeshed with institutional constraints and the abstraction of doctrines. Hence, unless the Military grounds MDO in strategic clarity, joint operational design, and realistic resources, it risks repeating the mistakes of earlier doctrinal overreaches that weighed form over function.

General Mark Milley heralded the US Army’s conceptual pivot toward the MDO with his remarks that the future conflict will be “fundamentally different” because of the convergence of informational, cognitive, and physical domains.[1] The doctrine of MDO was officially codified in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s documents in 2018, and aims to address the loopholes in the existing legacy concepts like Air-Land Battle and the counterinsurgency-centric doctrine.[2]  With the Army celebrating its 250^th anniversary, MDO reflects a mix of strategic anxiety and institutional ambition, namely the hope of remaining relevant in an era of great power competition, hybrid threats, and technological upheaval. However, despite its elaborate, conceptual promise, it falls short of structural and operational merit, raising speculations about its viability.

The Strategic Assurance of MDO

The central idea of MDO is to enable US forces to converge effects across all domains – land, sea, space, air, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, in order to create overmatch and unleash multiple attacks and dilemmas on the adversary. As per the US Army Concept for Manoeuvre in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028-2040 concept, the US must prepare to penetrate and break down the sophisticated anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) systems developed and deployed by enemy states like China and Russia. MDO envisions the Army in the role of an integrator within the larger ambit of joint operations, providing long-range fires, expeditionary logistics and tactical manoeuvres in critical and contested environments.[3]

Changes in the international system largely shape MDO’s current strategic relevance. While the United States is losing its military dominance, MDO enables it to adapt to the speed and complexity of multiple domains. Michael Mazarr and Frank Hoffman emphasise the importance of grey-zone competition and hybrid warfare- areas where MDO, in theory, provides an integrated solution.

MDO still lacks the articulation of a political theory of victory, even though it is theoretically appealing. In terms of political outcomes, the Army claims that convergence has created operational advantages; however, it is still unclear how these advantages form a political outcome. Unless the Army defines strategic success as measurable goals in terms of deterrence, control escalation, or the termination of a conflict, MDO runs the high risk of becoming a solution still searching for a problem.[4]

Administrative Restraints and Institutional Inertia

There is a misalignment between theory and practice. The MDO is still doctrinally underdeveloped and operationally untested. The Army’s organisational culture is predominantly driven by decades of platform-centric procurement and service-based planning. The integrative approach of MDO encounters a bureaucratic quagmire. Outdated conventional systems like Patriot missile batteries and Abrams tanks, still dominate budgets, leaving little room for investment in cyberspace, electronic warfare, and autonomous systems.

Furthermore, the Army’s personnel system, especially its talent management model, has not fully adapted to the demands of MDO. As has been remarked by LG (Retd.) David Barno and Dr Nora Bensahel[5] argue that the structure of the Army still remains conservative, prioritising conventional career paths over cultivating leaders that possess in-depth technical expertise in cyber, space and information operations.

Another aspect that further constrains MDO’s trajectory is budgetary policies. The Army’s modernisation must increasingly compete in a joint environment that is sliding in favour of naval and air power projections, especially in the case of the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the establishment of the Army Future Command to fast-track innovation, its integration with other services and allies remains largely uneven.

Inter-service rivalries are often the least addressed among the barriers hindering joint planning and progress. MDO assumes full integration with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Space Force, as well as allied militaries. However, the services continue to follow separate, uncoordinated, and parallel modernisation pathways. Without cross-institutional design tools to ensure joint synchronisations, as with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, MDO will forever remain an Army-centred aspiration.

Scenario Disconnect: Is MDO Waging the Wrong War?

MDO appears to be tailor-made for high-end conventional conflicts against peers, particularly in the European theatres and the Indo-Pacific Region. Since, at its core, MDO is shaped by potential confrontation with and challenges posed by peer competitors like China and Russia, it requires the United States to develop a force capable of penetrating and disintegrating layered anti-access/area-denial systems, operating across contested domains, and integrating joint and allied capabilities to achieve convergence at decisive points. Such networks- comprising integrated and disparate elements of air-defence, precision-strike, electronic warfare (EW), and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems configuration- are predominant in the Indo-Pacific and European operational theatres. Therefore, the fundamental components of MDO- long-range precision fires, deep sensing, joint domain convergence, cyber-EW integration, and tiered decision making- are designed for major, high-tempo, high-technology, and large-scale conflict against advanced large state militaries.

In contrast, these requirements are not central to grey-zone, proxy, or irregular conflicts, where ambiguity, deniability, political signaling, and attrition- not cross-domain penetration- drive outcomes. Thus, MDO naturally aligns with peer-level, conventional scenarios and is less inherently adaptable to the low-intensity competition that dominates real-world military usage.

However, this creates a risk of over-investing in scenarios that might never materialise. Experts like T.X. Hammes[6] have shown caution against a force structure best suited for high-end warfare while being underprepared for proxy, protracted and grey zone conflicts.[7]

Furthermore, many of the technological tenets underpinning MDO, assuming resilient communications in denied environments, seamless cross-domain data integration, and uninterrupted sensor-to-shooter networks, seem out of place given the current realities of the battlefield. The basis of this assessment stems from the current Ukraine conflict, where one can observe Russian electronic warfare successfully disrupting Ukraine’s ISR networks while jamming GPS, degrading drones, and interfering with precision-guided fires. The warfare demonstrated how quickly sophisticated digital networks can be routed in a contested electromagnetic environment. US government evaluations and GAO reports similarly highlight persistent vulnerabilities in American tactical networks, difficulties in maintaining secure communications under electronic attack, and incomplete joint data interoperability[8]. When peer adversaries like China and Russia possess mature capabilities explicitly designed to degrade or deceive these networks, any MDO concept that presumes information dominance, continuous connectivity, or flawless real-time data fusion risks becoming strategically brittle. If these systems cannot survive or function under high-end combat conditions, the operational logic of MDO gets weakened at its core.

What remains most worrying is the MDO mismatch with the political use of military force. When rivals operate below the threshold of a declared war, the ability to create cross-domain fires to “dilemma” the enemy is tactically constructive, but strategically useless. The Army’s strategic planner faces the question: how does MDO situate itself within the national policy objectives in the event of an imminent conflict?

Onto a Real Strategy

To implement the ambitious goals of MDO, there needs to be a major focus on the underlying theory of victory and design of the force structure to create strategies that are realistic and credible. Simply advocating political support for MDO is not enough. It is a concept that needs grounding. For MDO to work as envisaged, it needs to be incorporated into a real joint and coalition environment. This requires purposeful alignment with NATO’s doctrine in Europe and close synchronisation with Indo-Pacific allies, particularly in the areas of intelligence sharing, domain awareness, secure communication networks, and combined operational fires. Without these political and military interoperabilities, MDO is destined to remain an Army-centric aspiration rather than a consolidated operational construct.

 There are also parallels with the technological ‘human capital’ that the Army needs to invest strategically. Without leaders who think and operate in different domains, MDO will find itself with unachieved objectives. Structural redesigns will be required for flexible educational pathways and career systems. MDO should be treated with caution. It should not be treated as a simplistic justification for spending. Instead, ‘spending’ should come from an informed consideration of what capabilities to allocate, enhance, or eliminate.

Conclusion

At the striking age of 250, the US Army stands at a conceptual crossroads. Multi-Domain Operations offer a compelling vision for fighting and winning wars in an increasingly complex war space. However, history perpetually reminds us that without strategic clarity and institutional commitments, concepts often devolve into doctrinal mirages. For the MDO to achieve success, it must be more than a catchphrase and evolve into the Army’s organising purpose. Only then can the Army remain not just operationally relevant, but also strategically decisive in its next 250 years.

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Notes:

[1] Huba Wass de Czege, “Commentary on ‘The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028’,” US Army War College, April 2020, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/909/.. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[2] United States Army, United States of America, “United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Administrative Publications,” October 01, 2025,https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[3] “The U.S. Army Concept for Maneuver in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028-2040,” U.S. Army Futures Command Futures and Concepts Center, July 07, 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1118627.pdf. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[4] Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.us/reports/19-reports/1163-conflict-in-the-21st-century-the-rise-of-hybrid-wars. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[5] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “America is Not Prepared for a Protracted War,” War on the Rocks, December 04, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/12/america-is-not-prepared-for-a-protracted-war/. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[6] Dmitry Filipoff, “Force Structure Perspectives: Col. T.X. Hammes (ret.) on Experimenting for Adaptation,” CIMSEC, October 28, 2020, https://cimsec.org/force-structure-perspectives-series-col-t-x-hammes-ret-on-experimenting-for-adaptation/.Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[7] Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” Orbis, Vol.3, No. 2,  https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438709000106. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[8] Government Accountability Office, United States of America, “Contested Information Environment: Actions Needed to Strengthen Education and Training for DOD Leaders,” 05, 2025.

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Keywords: VUCA world, Leadership, Modern Warfare, Air Power, OODA Loop, Deterrence

“True leadership lies in building systems that outlast uncertainty.”

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd)

Introduction

On October 08, 2025, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) turns 93 years young, it stands at a defining juncture in its institutional evolution and development into a modern, future-ready, and strategic air force with power projection capabilities across continents. The past nine decades have seen the Indian Air Force (IAF) grow from a fledgling force to a force to reckon with, the fourth-largest air force in the world, and a professional outfit capable of taking on the myriad challenges that come its way in the 21^st Century. From combat in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the jungles of Burma (World War II), from pioneering feats of courage and valour to save Srinagar to landing at the highest airfield in the world and from targeting bunkers in Kargil to carrying out stand-off precision attacks from own side of the International Boundary (IB) during Op-Sindoor, air power has always been the first responder, IAF an instrument of choice and a force capable of delivering decisive firepower when and where it counts.

The contemporary security environment is significantly different from what IAF has seen over the past nine decades and is characterised by increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). The VUCA environment presents its own unique set of challenges and opportunities for IAF and air power. India’s strategic environment is volatile, marked by uncertainty in the multi-polar world, complexity in modern warfare and ambiguity created by hybrid threats. While technology, information and doctrines matter, the ability to interpret, analyse, predict outcomes and take timely decisions largely depends on sound leadership; therefore, leadership will remain the decisive variable in this VUCA world. The paper aims to understand the intricacies of a VUCA world from an air power perspective and analyse leadership challenges that must be addressed for success in future wars.

Air Power in a VUCA World

Volatility classically refers to the speed and amount of change. Uncertainty denotes unpredictability of events and outcomes. Complexity implies a non-linear, interwoven geo-political landscape where events seemingly unrelated to one another create direct, indirect, or cascading effects on one another, and ambiguity highlights the decision dilemmas that are likely to arise due to prevailing uncertainty and opacity. As a technologically driven, decision-sensitive force, air power is largely affected by the interplay of the elements in a VUCA world. Technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) have significantly changed the way air power is being applied. Unmanned systems, such as drones, quadcopters, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), are altering the battlefield landscape, creating unique conditions not previously experienced. Hypersonic weapons and the use of space have exacerbated the quagmire and information has become weaponised to such an extent that narratives are deciding who the victor is and who is vanquished. In such an ambiguous and uncertain environment, it is not easy to arrive at decisions; therefore, there is a direct impact on the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, which is the cornerstone of air power application, posing unique challenges for leadership.

For India, the VUCA framework is a strategic reality, primarily due to a revisionist and uncertain China and an unpredictable Pakistan, which creates a significant amount of entropy. This high degree of disorder and randomness has been further compounded by America’s newfound love for Pakistan and apparent animosity with India. The Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflicts have shown the world that in today’s multipolar, intensely divided world, no one is willing to take a step back, resulting in highly destructive and long-drawn conflicts. On the other hand, Op-Sindoor has shown that conflicts could also be very short and intense, especially if one’s military and political objectives are clearly outlined. The conflict termination criteria are well articulated. The bottom line is that there is perpetual disruption. Amidst that disruption, air power must learn to retain its centrality and provide speed, precision and flexibility to mitigate volatility and uncertainty.

Yom Kippur Moments

On October 6, 1973, the Arab alliance of Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish holy day of atonement. The attack resulted in heavy casualties and equipment loss in both the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The surprise factor was very high as the Israelis did not expect anything to happen, especially on a holy day like Yom Kippur. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a coordinated attack on Israel on Shemini Atzeret, a Jewish holiday. Many Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers were on leave, and Israel was focused primarily on its Northern borders rather than the Gaza Strip. The assault began at around 0630 AM with a barrage of over 2200 rockets launched into Israel in just 20 minutes.[1] The barrage of rockets reportedly overwhelmed the Iron Dome system. As this was happening, at least 1,500 militants of Hamas infiltrated Israel at dozens of points using the land, sea and air mediums (para gliders). They caused a large number of Israeli casualties. About 1,200 people were killed in the assault, which included many civilians. [2] If one were to analyse the two attacks, a conclusion that can be drawn is that both attacks took place on a holiday, surprise was a key element, and it was a failure of intelligence. Most importantly, the Israelis were not prepared for it.

The VUCA world is similar. Amidst all the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, are we as a nation adequately prepared for a ‘Yom Kippur Moment’? Kargil, Pahalgam, Galwan, and Pulwama are some of India’s intelligence failures that have led to India’s Yom Kippur moments. Are we prepared for a multi-domain attack simultaneously targeting not only our military installations but also our critical civilian infrastructure? Are we ready for an unconventional attack using weapons and equipment that we have not thought of, like the use of paragliders by Hamas? Is our intelligence apparatus examining the right markers for such an event to unfold? When analysing intelligence data, are we correlating inputs in different domains, or are we still looking in silos? Do we have the wherewithal to response to surprise attacks on multiple fronts and in multiple domains? If the answer to any of these questions is no, then it is time to start introspecting. As a nation, we need to be prepared for our ‘Yom Kippur Moment’ without waiting for it to happen and then reacting.

Managing the VUCA World: Paradigm Shifts

Doctrinally, volatility requires a paradigm shift from conventional planning to adaptive and associative planning. Technology must be leveraged to simulate unpredictable scenarios and uncontrolled escalation, testing the agility of our Command and Control (C2) structures and readiness postures. Gone are the days of lethargic large-scale mobilisation of the armed forces and 30-day war packs. Volatility does not only mean disruption and interruption, but it is also a counter-strategy and must therefore become a part of our planning assumptions.

In a volatile world, uncertainty is inevitable; therefore, the way events unfold cannot be second-guessed when they start unfolding. To stay one step ahead, we must harness technology such as Generative AI and big data analysis to explore nuanced possibilities that can then be war-gamed. While using the full potential of Generative AI is still some years away, we must make a start now. Deterrence will suffer when events and outcomes are unpredictable. Yom Kippur Moments can be avoided by harnessing technology to bring credibility and intent to our deterrence capability.

Modern warfare is inherently complex, primarily due to its multi-domain nature. The land, sea, and air domains have now become interlinked with cyber and space domains; information has become a weapon and operations in one domain inevitably affect operations in other domains. We must learn to manage complexity through doctrines, realistic training, education, and integration of systems to create a system of systems that can undertake multi-domain operations.

Ambiguity affects information and perception, and it cannot be removed from modern conflict. Decision dilemmas arising from ambiguity will increasingly determine the outcome of a war. The side that has the fewest decision dilemmas will have the upper hand. A shorter OODA loop may not be the only solution, because in modern conflict, multiple OODA loops will interact with each other. There will be an overload of information, and the ability to sift through volumes of data to arrive at meaningful deductions will eventually become more important than a shorter OODA loop.

The bottom line is that there is a need to re-evaluate our doctrines, operating procedures, response mechanisms, intelligence apparatus and capability development plans, which would cater to warfighting in a VUCA world.

Leadership Challenges

Military leadership, primarily characterised by hierarchy, close control, and strict, enforceable discipline, faces an existential threat when confronted with a VUCA world. Attributes like tradition, centralised control and strict adherence to precedent can impede agility in an environment where change is constant. The essence of leadership in the future will lie in the ability to sense, decide and act faster than changes in the operational environment.

Outdated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), tactics and techniques will become serious hurdles. For example, switching off the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) during rejoin and within airfield control zones due to inadvertent activation of the Counter Measures Dispensing System (CMDS) may prove dangerous during a ‘No War, no Peace (NWNP)’ scenario, as the enemy may have weapons which can target their own aircraft at launch and during recovery for landing. It is essential to remember that India is constantly in an NWNP scenario. Similarly, just because a particular tactical action worked in an earlier situation does not mean it will work in the future as well. Smart enemies will not do what you expect them to., In a VUCA environment, the most essential task confronting leaders is to figure out what the enemy is likely to do and accordingly update SOPs, tactics, and techniques.

Technological volatility must be addressed by technologically fluent leadership. Leaders who cannot fully comprehend the capabilities of systems placed under their command risk irrelevance. Professional competence, continuous education and cross-domain exposure are essential for effective C2 in modern warfare.

Uncertainty, unlike volatility, stems from the unpredictability of events and outcomes and therefore poses a direct challenge to a leader’s confidence in available information and the reliability of established assumptions. Making sound decisions amid imperfect knowledge will hence become essential. The more variables there are, the greater the uncertainty, and given the nature of air operations, this will only increase with increased fog of war. Leaders must therefore learn to interpret evolving patterns rather than expect the normal to take place. Pre-set plans may not work in uncertain situations, and flexibility, adaptability, and the ability to think beyond one’s own domain will go a long way. This would require institutional changes, such as training in a VUCA environment, introducing uncertainty into routine activities, and creating entropy in seemingly mundane tasks. Disruptive training, which fosters cognitive flexibility and encourages out-of-the-box solutions, will help develop future leaders. Disruptive training is not training at odd hours; that is just a tiny part of it. Disruptive training is training by disrupting routine patterns and the usual way of doing things. For example, in combat scenarios, there may be a situation that allows landing only in tail winds. How many times do our trainees practice this? Answers to questions beginning with ‘What if?’ are essential to deal with combat planning and execution in a VUCA world. A leader must be able to picture multiple ‘What ifs?’ to create effective and doable plans. They must also be war-gamed to arrive at tangible and implementable courses of action. Adversaries of the future will try to outthink their opponents at every stage, making it a significant leadership challenge.

When faced with complexity, effective leadership must view modern military operations as interconnected occurrences rather than isolated missions. For example, when Blue Land launches its Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions, the entire Red Land would undertake Air Defence (AD) missions, and the pattern would reverse when Red Land launches its OCA forces. In reality, OCA and AD will co-occur in multiple domains and spread across the entire front. There is a need to revamp our training regimen to align with operations in a VUCA world. Leaders of tomorrow must change their mindset and reimagine training paradigms to make them more realistic and contemporary. Operations in an environment of denial are far more complicated than those undertaken when all systems are functioning properly. To be able to do that, leaders of tomorrow should have been trained in such environments. Capability development plans must address the challenges inherent to operating in such environments. For example, what if GPS is made unavailable in the next war? How are we going to undertake stand-off precision attacks? Do we have an alternative system? Are our aircraft and weapon systems equipped with alternative technology? Most Western surface-to-air weapon systems rely on a GPS fix to initialise. What happens if that GPS fix is not available? Another major issue facing us is the so-called peace-time attitude. Most personnel in service may not see combat throughout their careers. But, when it actually happens, our peace-time training needs to take over and aid in dealing with the arising uncertainties and complexities. While we would be expected to adopt war-time procedures, peacetime procedures would largely prevail because they would have become a habit and second nature. Our training during peace -time needs to be “train in peace as you fight in war,’ or as close to war fighting as possible and feasible, only then will they become second nature. By having two separate sets of procedures, we are adding to the already existing complexity of the situation. Examples of this situation include the carriage of personal arms during peace-time training missions, the use of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) during take-off and rejoin, night operations with minimal lighting, no radio telephony (R/T) missions, and simultaneous activation of ground defence and air defence measures at a base.  These are some institutional challenges that future leaders must address as soon as possible.

Ambiguity cannot be eliminated, but can definitely be out-thought and out-led. Multi-domain warfare, hybrid warfare, and information warfare are three types of warfare adding to the ambiguity quotient. In ambiguous environments, leaders are likely to face ethical dilemmas, decision paralysis, shifting rules of engagement and large-scale information distortion. The first casualty of ambiguity is effective communication. If a leader is unable to communicate effectively with their subordinates, orders may be misinterpreted, leading to total disarray. Training in an environment of denial, redundancy in communication and clarity of thought are a few tools modern leaders must develop to remain relevant in ambiguous situations.

Conclusion

As IAF approaches its centenary in 2032, leadership will determine whether it remains a reactive force or evolves into a proactive aerospace power. IAF@100 will demand leaders who can effectively navigate a VUCA world. Leadership is an institutional competency and not just a personal trait. The IAF must nurture younger generations in a VUCA environment, because sound and effective leadership will remain the IAF’s greatest weapon system, far more enduring than aircraft and way more resilient than technology. Leadership in a VUCA world is not about predicting the future, but rather about preparing for it. We must institutionalise adaptability through doctrine, training, education and culture. The future demands leaders who can handle volatility with alacrity, uncertainty with flexibility, complexity with equanimity and ambiguity with dexterity.

*****

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Notes

[1] Encyclopaedia Britannica, “History and Society, Israel-Hamas War,”  October 04, 2025,  https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War. Accessed on October 04, 2025.

[2] Ibid. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

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