Keywords: Pakistan, NSP, Security, Economy, NSA.

Pakistan’s federal cabinet approved the countries first-ever National Security Policy (NSP) on 28^th December. The same was announced by the National Security Adviser (NSA) Moeed Yusuf^[1]. Just a day earlier, the NSP had been approved by the National Security Committee, after years of deliberations. It is supposedly a comprehensive, citizen-centric, policy and was applauded by the Pakistan establishment as a historic achievement. The document draws out a five-year plan between now and 2026. It will act as a guidance for nation’s foreign, defence and economic policies and overall decision-making. The economic security is considered the core. There are guidelines for various sectors. The achievement of economic security, in turn, will help achieve the national security objectives.

National Security Policy Evolves

National Security Committee is Pakistan’s top security coordination and decision-making body. It is headed by the Prime Minister. The meeting to clear the NSP was reportedly attended by federal ministers for foreign affairs, defence, information and broadcasting, interior, finance and human rights, the national security adviser, services chiefs, and some other key officials.

In an Army dominated country, the NSA was quick to acknowledge, and thank, the military leadership, and others, for supporting the exercise through valuable inputs and suggestions. He also thanked Prime Minister Imran Khan for leadership and guidance. The policy currently remains closed-door, and is for access by key functionaries of the Pakistan government only. An open-to-public version, perhaps an abridged one, would be released in due course. Meanwhile, the military spokesman confirmed the Army’s stamp of approval, and said that the armed forces would fully cooperate and participate in achieving the vision and path enumerated in the policy.

The policy had taken seven years to evolve and was reportedly based on inputs and discussions with people from various walks of life and strata. It is supposed to have factored the changing times, and implementation will be monitored at the highest level on regular basis.[2]

 Pakistan’s Economic Challenges– a Policy Driver  

As per World Bank report^[3], Pakistan’s economy is currently under serious stress. The consumer price inflation is still at nearly 9 percent. Food prices are sky-rocketing, and disproportionately affecting the poor. And, even at 7.0 percent, the interest rates effectively give a negative return to the ordinary saver. Pakistan Rupee is nearing the all-time low of 180 to a US Dollar. Foreign direct investment has been decreasing, and the country is surviving mostly on remittances. Foreign exchange reserves at US$18.7 billion are just equivalent to 3.4 months of total imports. As of October 2021, Pakistan remains of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey-list^[4] for not acting sufficiently to investigate and prosecute senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terror groups involved in terror financing.

Pakistan’s Security Concerns

Pakistan is simultaneously facing many security challenges. After U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the security situation on Pakistan’s Western border has become very complex. No country has “recognised” the Taliban as Afghanistan’s new government since it took power in August 2021^[5]. The flow of drugs and illicit arms are the immediate worry. Pakistan is facing internal strife and very active separatist movements. Many internationally recognised terrorists and extremist groups are seeking political concessions, and the government has had to bend to accommodate them. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) that was meant to devise and implement a counter-terrorism strategy, had become defunct and victim to turf-wars and sectional pulls and pressures. Pakistan’s relations with India continue to be strained. Clearly Pakistan is facing multiple national security challenges.

Pakistan Military On-board

The NSP is also meant to gives hope to the otherwise demoralised public. Centrality of economic issues is an important feature as the military power and the standards of living, and in turn, national security flow from there. A critical aspect will be human resource development which will be crucial for economic development. It is also hoped that the policy would improve coordination between various agencies and stake holders. More importantly it is meant to overtly signal that Pakistan military is willing to work towards nation building under the purported civil lead. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Maj Gen Babar Iftikhar said that the policy was an important milestone in strengthening Pakistan’s national security.

It encompasses both traditional and non-traditional internal and external security threats, challenges and opportunities. NSP will be an umbrella document to guide formulation policies and approach for other sectors. The document also suggests a cautious foreign approach to avoid getting pulled into global geostrategic alignments that are still evolving. The NSP is expected to be dynamic enough and will be subjected to annual reviews that will allow to factor changing regional and global environment.

Human Prosperity Linkage

The policy that has been drafted by the National Security Division, tries to generate formal linkages among human prosperity and safety, and nation’s economic and military security. Views of several federal institutions and all the provisional governments were reportedly ascertained through repeated discussions. The figures released by the NSA suggested that over 600 academics, analysts, civil society members and students had been consulted to make the policy all inclusive. The policy also takes into account Pakistan’s cultural and ethnic diversity and brings in policy framework to promote cohesion. The Policy is also meant to give direction to social and legal approach which are both critical for security. Of course, the basic tenants of Islam will remain the basis of all decisions. Many in Pakistan were happy that in a complex country like theirs, where it is fairly difficult to devise policies, they were finally able to release the NSP with reasonable broad consensus. The draft policy had earlier been shared with the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, but the opposition parties had boycotted the same.

The policy has been cleared by the cabinet. The document will now have to be tabled in both Houses of parliament. The real challenge would be the threadbare debate and discussion among a fractured polity. Legislators and political parties may find some provisions that could curb opposition or dissent. Senators belonging to the Opposition parties in Pakistan have already begun protests over the government’s decision to bypass the Parliament in the making of the NSP^[6]. Will the Army arrange to get the opposition on-board?

Impact and Implications for India

The policy hints at peace with other countries, especially in the neighbourhood. Strategic establishment in India would need to look at the policy with a fine-tooth comb. How will the policy impact Pakistan’s approach to India is an open-ended subject. Would the economic pressures and primacy in the policy make Pakistan review its trade policy towards India and take advantage of better economic dynamics? Will they be able to make a distinction between geo-politics and geo-economics? The policy is unlikely to bring any change in Pakistan’s active support to cross-border terrorism and position on Kashmir.  Surely all this and more would need to be understood and assessed.

India’s National Security Strategy

India too has not had a clearly articulated and defined National Security Strategy (NSS). Many governments had ventured to define the same, but apparently not sufficient push had been given to it. A fresh move had been initiated by the Modi government. A Defence Planning Committee^[7] (DPC) was created in April 2018 under the chairmanship of the National Security Adviser (NSA). Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff, the three Service Chiefs, and expenditure secretary were the members. The Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) was the member-secretary. In the initial meeting, the broad mandate was discussed.

The mandate^[8] of DPC was to look at the entire gambit of defence planning, including national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, and operational directives and associated requirements, relevant strategic and security-related doctrines, defence acquisition and infrastructure development plans, including the 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), defence technology and development of the Indian defence industry and global technological advancement. In addition, the DPC had been asked to prepare the National Security Strategy^[9] (NSS) and the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Perhaps the future operational directives of the Defence Minister would have emerged from the doctrine and strategy worked out by the committee. It would also evolve the roadmap to build defence manufacturing eco-system^[10]. Four sub-committees were formed for covering policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy and defence manufacturing ecosystem.

India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat too was making a fledgling attempt to evolve military aspects of the NSS and was trying to take further, with upgrades, the 2007 draft NSS prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff, that had not been approved by the Cabinet Committee of Security. The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020^[11] does make reference to the “National Security Strategy/Guidelines, as and when promulgated. It is imperative that India have its own all-encompassing National Security Strategy.

Notes

[1] ‘Historic achievement’: NSA announces cabinet’s approval of Pakistan’s first National Security Policy, Dawn News, December 28, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1666294 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[2] Pakistan Economic update and outlook, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview#1 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[3] Pakistan Economic update and outlook, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview#1 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[4] Rezaul H Laskar, FATF retains Pak on its ‘grey list’, Hindustan Times, October 22, 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/fatf-retains-pak-on-its-grey-list-101634841990164.html Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[5] Ben Saul, “Recognition” and the Taliban’s International Legal Status, International Centre for Counter Terrorism, December 15, 2021. https://icct.nl/publication/recognition-talibans-international-legal-status/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[6] Sentinel Digital Desk, Pakistan Opposition protests government bypassing Parliament on security policy, The Sentinel, December 30, 2021.  https://www.sentinelassam.com/international/pakistan-opposition-protests-government-bypassing-parliament-on-security-policy-570447  Accessed on 31 December 2021.

[7] Laxman Kumar Behera, Creation of Defence Planning Committee: A Step towards Credible Defence Preparedness, Manohar Parikkar-IDSA, April 19, 2018, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/creation-of-defence-planning-committee-lkbehera-190418 Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Manoj Joshi, Scraping the bottom of the barrel: Budgets, organisation and leadership in the Indian defence system, ORF, August 22, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/research/43496-scraping-the-bottom-of-the-barrel-budgets-organisation-and-leadership-in-the-indian-defence-system/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[10] Shishir Gupta, India to create super-committee for defence planning, Hindustan Times, Apr 19, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-create-super-committee-for-defence-planning/story-PQSPeTpZ8Xm2QKjINXzxnK.html Accessed on 30 December 2021.

[11] Laxman Kumar Behera, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020: Imperatives for Further Reforms, ORF, February 04, 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/defence-acquisition-procedure-2020-imperatives-for-further-reforms/ Accessed on 30 December 2021.

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India Must Fine Tune A Range Of Options To Respond To Pakistani Terror Strikes

StratNews Global, The Gist, Dr Manpreet Sethi in conversation with Surya Gangadharan, 22 December 2021

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The Tribune,Tuesday, 21 December 2021

Dr Shalini Chawla, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Stdues

The India-Pakistan relationship has gone through phases of intense hostility and tensions, and the two nuclear-armed neighbours have fought four conventional wars and dealt with the challenges of the threat of nuclear weapons (in their respective ways). While the bilateral relationship has been strained for most years, the terror attack on January 2, 2016, on the Pathankot Air Force Station led to the complete suspension of diplomatic dialogue. India’s decision to revoke Article 370 on August 5, 2019 came as a complete surprise for Pakistan, and since then, there have been a series of strong reactions/actions focusing on targeting India on the international front, attracting global attention and seeking mediation on Kashmir.

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Source: The Tribune

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Thursday, 08 December 2021

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Keywords: China’s Nuclear Strategy, Stability-Instability Paradox, Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation, Hypersonic missile.

In both Washington and Beijing, a consensus seems to be emerging over why China is building up its nuclear arsenal. Analysts agree on the general argument that China intends to develop survivable and assured second-strike nuclear capability, pushing the US into a state of mutual nuclear vulnerability, thus enhancing deterrence stability. While technically it is a positive development, some western analysts argue that nuclear stability and reduced risk of nuclear blackmail might encourage China to challenge the US and its allies conventionally. Thus, increasing the risk of a conventional great power war, possibly over Taiwan. However, any such conventional war, irrespective of its origin and intention of the warring states, involves the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. This article analyses China’s nuclear build-up from the perspective of escalation risk and underlines why a conventional conflict cannot with certainty be segregated from nuclear confrontation.

Recent Developments

It is well known that China is expanding, diversifying, and modernising its nuclear forces. An array of media reports indicated that China carried out a hypersonic missile test in July that circumnavigated the globe before hitting its target[1], demonstrating PRC’s ability to incorporate a hypersonic glider into a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)— “a nuclear-weapons delivery system that places warheads into low-earth orbit prior to de-orbiting them on to their targets”.[2] Earlier, commercial satellite imagery has shown that China is building hundreds of missile silos that would add over 200 new silos to the Chinese arsenal.[3] China is reportedly constructing new submarines and modernising its air-based deterrent. Pentagon projects that China’s nuclear build-up might enable it “to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027” and at least 1000 warheads by 2030.[4] Recent developments in China’s nuclear force posture has raised questions about its objectives and emerging nuclear strategy.

China’s Quest for Survivability and Assured Second Strike Capability

China’s nuclear doctrine of no-first-use preordains it towards an assured retaliation strategy.[5] For the strategic deterrence to be credible and effective, China must survive the first blow and launch a massive retaliatory strike with the remaining strategic forces. However, the advanced US counterforce capabilities (both conventional and strategic) and sophisticated missile defences have long been a concern for China due to its small nuclear force.

The large-scale construction of geographically scattered silos, plausibly at a higher state of readiness, would boost China’s capability to retaliate against nuclear attack and “would leave China better equipped to deter any nuclear attack its adversaries might be tempted to initiate”.[6] The recent hypersonic missile tests signal China’s capability to penetrate US missile defences. They demonstrate that even if US pre-emptive first strike was to eliminate a majority of China’s strategic forces, it would still have the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the US homeland without worrying about missiles defences.

In essence, China’s nuclear modernisation efforts enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces and boost its capability to launch a retaliatory second strike. This strengthens mutual nuclear vulnerability, the fundamental principle of nuclear deterrence. Thus, recent developments in China’s nuclear force posture are stabilising, at least from the perspective of deterrence theory and from China’s perspective.

China’s Nuclear Build-up and Stability-Instability Paradox

Some western experts have argued that stability at the nuclear level might instigate instability at the conventional level.[7] With its modernising conventional force and declining US conventional advantage in the East and the South China Sea, China would be more confident to challenge the United States and its allies conventionally to further Chinese rejuvenation by integrating Taiwan with mainland China. Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge expressed the underlying concern in an analysis on Foreign Affairs. They argue that “by limiting the vulnerability and increasing the numbers of its nuclear forces, Chinese strategists may grow more confident that the Chinese military can challenge the United States or its allies conventionally, with little fear that the United States would resort to nuclear escalation.”[8]

The concept underpinning the above concern is the stability-instability paradox. The central argument is that nuclear and conventional military balance interact in a manner such that the stability at the strategic balance of terror lowers the stability at the conventional level of violence and vice-versa.[9] In other words, nuclear stability creates conventional instability, and conventional stability creates nuclear instability. While the concept was introduced in the initial decades of the Cold War by Glenn Snyder and has been extendedly employed to explain the dynamics of India-Pakistan nuclear and sub-conventional military balance[10], it erroneously assumes that conventional and nuclear conflicts could be hermetically separated from each other, omitting the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.

Appreciating the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation

The danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation was highlighted by Barry Posen in his seminal work titled Inadvertent Escalation.[11] He argued that since great powers closely identify their security with the maintenance of survivable strategic deterrence, any unintended conventional operation that might threaten strategic forces, nuclear command and control assets, or early warning systems might lead to a nuclear escalation. The risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation is further amplified by military organisations’ offensive inclinations and the difficulty distinguishing between offensive and defensive operations during the crisis (worsened by the security dilemma).

The possibility of employing strategic weapons in the event of “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks… on US or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” was highlighted by the 2018 US nuclear posture review.[12] The risk of inadvertent escalation in a non-nuclear operation is catalysed by the entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear systems (dual-use nature of C3I assets and missile delivery systems).[13] The increasing dependence of C3I assets and strategic forces on the digital communication system has created new vulnerabilities and has increased the risk of inadvertent escalation.[14]

From the perspective of deterrence stability, inadvertent escalation can have both positive and negative consequences. For instance, the risk of nuclear escalation might deter the determined CPC from starting a conventional war over Taiwan since US conventional intervention on behalf of Taiwan can escalate into nuclear warfighting. On the other hand, it could also encourage China to start a conventional campaign, possibly to integrate Taiwan, thinking that the risk of inadvertent escalation would deter the United States from conventionally interfering on behalf of Taiwan in the first place, thus paving the way for unhindered Chinese occupation of the island territory. Which side the dice of inadvertent escalation would roll depend on the Chinese determination to integrate Taiwan, US commitment towards the security and survival of Taiwan, and effective signalling by both actors towards their desired goals and obligations.

Nonetheless, the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level is real. Any conventional war between the US and China, irrespective of the origin and intention of the warring states, involves the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. Strategists and policymakers should fully appreciate the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation to strengthen nuclear deterrence and avoid the catastrophic consequences of fighting a nuclear war.

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Notes

[1] Demetri Sevastopulo, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile”, Financial Times, October 17, 2021,  https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. Accessed on October 19, 2021.

[2] Timothy Wright, “Is China gliding toward a FOBS capability?” International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 22, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/10/is-china-gliding-toward-a-fobs-capability. Accessed on October 25, 2021.

[3] Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 new missile silos in its western desert, analysts say”, The Washington Post, June 30, 2021,https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021/06/30_story.html. Accessed on July 4, 2021; Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field”, Federation of American Scientists, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/. Accessed on August 17, 2021; Rod Lee, “PLA Likely Begins Construction of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Silo Site near Hanggin Banner”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, August 12, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2729781/pla-likely-begins-construction-of-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-silo-si/. Accessed on August 20, 2021.

[4] US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021”, p. 92, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on November 8, 2021.

[5] M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure”, International Security, vol. 35, no. 2 (2010), pp. 48–87, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/35/2/48/11999/China-s-Search-for-Assured-Retaliation. Accessed on October 11, 2021.

[6] Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?”, The Washington Post, November 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-is-growing-what-does-that-mean-us-china-relations/. Accessed on November 21, 2021.

[7] Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why China Wants More and Better Nukes”, Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-11-19/why-china-wants-more-and-better-nukes. Accessed on November 21, 2021. For a similar explanation, see, for example, Vipin Narang’s Twitter thread available at: https://twitter.com/NarangVipin/status/1451019849820422150; “Nuclear Pieces on the Asia Chessboard: US, China, and Extended Deterrence”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 25, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-pieces-asia-chessboard-us-china-and-extended-deterrence. Accessed on November 9, 2021; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?”, The Washington Post, November 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-is-growing-what-does-that-mean-us-china-relations/. Accessed on November 21, 2021. Tong Zhao, “Why Is China Building Up Its Nuclear Arsenal?”, The New York Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/opinion/we-need-to-pay-attention-to-chinas-nuclear-build-up.html. Accessed on November 30, 2021.

[8] Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why China Wants More and Better Nukes”, Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-11-19/why-china-wants-more-and-better-nukes. Accessed on November 21, 2021.

[9] The concept was introduced initially in Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror”, in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power, (San Francisco: Chandler). For a general understanding of the concept, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “What Stability-Instability Paradox? Subnational Conflicts and the Nuclear Risk in South Asia”, South Asian Strategic Study Unit, Research Paper No. 4 (2006), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/2004.pdf. Accessed on April 11, 2021.

[10] Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia”, Stimson Center, January 1, 2005, https://www.stimson.org/2005/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia/. Accessed on April 20, 2021.

[11] Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991); Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’S Northern Flank”, International Security, vol. 7, no. 2 (1982), pp. 28-54.

[12] US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018”, p. 20, February 2, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. Accessed on October 17, 2021.

[13] James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement”, International Security, vol. 43, no. 1 (2018), pp. 56-99, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec. Accessed on July 20, 2021.

[14] James M. Acton, “Cyber Warfare and Inadvertent Escalation”, Daedalus, vol. 149, Issue 2 (2020), at https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/149/2/133/27317/Cyber-Warfare-amp-Inadvertent-Escalation. Accessed on July 24, 2021.

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As per a contract signed between India and Russia in October 2018, Russia has begun delivery of the first of the five S-400 air defence missile systems to India. Reportedly the delivery of the first division of the missile system will be completed by end of December 2021^[1]. Once deployed, India would essentially have a missile defence system capable of engaging up to 36 targets at a time within a range of 400 km and able to intercept most medium and short-range ballistic missiles. Given the limitations of India’s indigenous BMD system and threat perception at present time, this will contribute significantly to reduce rising concerns about the steady development of varied ranges and number of ballistic missiles by its nuclear neighbours.

Rationale of India’s BMD Programme

A number of factors have made India interested in developing and procuring ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems: China’s development of BMD and a growing number of ballistic missiles, its close strategic partnership with Pakistan, including significant Chinese assistance in developing Pak strategic missiles and MIRV programme, tactical nuclear weapon development by Pakistan and growing influence of non-state actors in the country.

The S-400 Deal

In a press release on 02 January 2019, the Press Information Bureau (PIB) mentioned that “A contract has been signed on 05 October 2018 for delivery of S-400 system from Russia… The deliveries will commence from October 2020 and will complete by April 2023.”^[2]. The process to procure the air defence system began much earlier. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), India approved the purchase of up to five S-400 air and missile defence systems in December 2015, at an estimated cost of between $4.5 to $7 Billion. On 15 October 2016 at the side-line of the eighth BRICS summit, India and Russia signed an inter-governmental agreement to procure the S-400 systems^[3]. An analyst noted that “the India military is slated to deploy three S-400 regiments in the west facing Pakistan and two regiments in the country’s east near Sino-Indian border.”^[4]. It was further mentioned that the S-400 outperforms India’s advanced air defence (AAD) on nearly all parameters, including flight speed when fitted with an upgraded 48N6 interceptor^[5].

The S-400 Air Defence System

The S-400 is a three-tier air defence system equipped with the surface to air missile system (SAM). The system is claimed to have the capability to intercept cruise and ballistic missiles, aircraft and UAVs having a range up to 3,500 km and a speed of up to 4.8 km per second at the terminal phase^[6]. In the Russian military, a regiment of S-400 consists of two battalions; two batteries make up a battalion. An S-400 battery consists of four large Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) or 16 smaller TELs or a combination of both and each TEL can carry four long-range or up to 16 medium and short-range missiles. Reportedly the S-400 can be equipped with various kinds of advanced missiles including SAM interceptor the 40N6E, in addition to the 48N6E3, as well as the 9M96E and 9M96E2” ^[7].  The 40N6E is Russia’s most advanced interceptor for the system. The exact configuration of what will be available with India is not in the public domain. The first S-400 system is expected to be operational by early 2022 after completing its assembly and trials by the IAF under Russian supervision. The remaining four systems are expected to be delivered by April 2023^[8].

India’s Indigenous BMD System

Although India looked abroad to procure BMD systems for more efficient and precise defence, India’s indigenous effort to develop both mid-course and terminal phase BMD has made significant strides too.  India’s BMD architecture is limited in nature and it does not seek a nationwide missile defence system.

Presently, India has a two-tier ballistic missile defence system developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The first layer of the BMD system consists of Prithvi Air Defence (PAD)/Pradyumna and Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) interceptors that can intercept a missile at an exo-atmospheric altitude of 50-180 km. The second layer consists of a single staged solid rocket-propelled Advanced Air Defence (AAD)/ Ashin interceptor missile that can destroy an incoming missile in the endo-atmospheric altitude of 15-40 km. The BMD system is designed to primarily intercept medium-range missiles. PAD and PDV are designed for mid-course interception of a ballistic missile and AAD is designed to intercept missiles at the terminal phase. In their present configuration, these systems are designed to counter missiles with a range up to 2000 km and a speed of Mach 3 to Mach 8^[9]. To augment the capability to track incoming hostile missiles, India has also imported two phased array Green Pine Radars in 2002 and 2005 from Israel that was used in Israel’s Arrow missile defence system^[10]. Apart from this, the system also consists of Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) capable of tracking missile launches at 600-800 km and Swordfish -2 LRTR that has a range of approximately 1500 km^[11]. The Swordfish LRTR is based on Green Pine radar technology.

Since 2006, India has been actively testing components of its missile defence programme. The first Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system test was conducted in November 2006 and AAD was tested in December 2007. The latest interceptor was test fired in September 2018 under Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) that is being mooted to replace the existing PAD system in near future. The PDV was first tested in April 2014. During a recent series of tests, DRDO demonstrated its capability to intercept multiple targets using both AAD and PAD systems. However, it is uncertain at this time when the indigenous BMD will be deployed. Indeed, claims have been made by some media report that the BMD development has been completed and seeking government approval for activation near New Delhi^[12]. But there is no such confirmation by the DRDO or the government. There is also some dispute over the claimed accuracy of 90 per cent of India’s indigenous system. The claim is debated especially compared to the interception accuracy of around 70 per cent for other advanced technology states^[13].

Conclusion

India’s quest for developing new military technology is influenced by the myriad security challenge it faces in the nuclear domain by China and Pakistan. Acquisition of S-400 systems from Russia is a stride towards that direction. While the indigenous BMD development is still at the research and development stage, procurement of the advanced missile defence system will fulfil India’s immediate requirement of a functional BMD to provide adequate protection.

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Notes

[1]       Rahul Bedi, “Russia begins S-400 deliveries to India”, Janes, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russia-begins-s-400-deliveries-to-india, 15 November 2021. Accessed on 18 November 2021.

[2]       Press information Bureau, “Missile Defence System”, Ministry of Defence at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1558148, 02 January 2019. Accessed on 18 November 2021.

[3]       Press information Bureau, “Defence agreements with Russia”, Ministry of Defence at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1495957, 18 July 2017. Accessed on 18 November 2021

[4]      Franz-Stefan Gady, “India and Russia Ink S-400 Missile Air Defense System Deal”, The Diplomat, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/india-and-russia-ink-s-400-missile-air-defense-system-deal/ , 20 October 2016. Accessed on 19 November 2021

[5]      Ankit Panda, “India Tests Supersonic Advanced Air Defense Missile”, The Diplomat, at https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/q-pop-a-musical-expression-of-kazakhstans-national-and-global-identity/ ,23 November 2015. Accessed on 19 November 2021

[6]      Anand Sharma, “Missile Defence Systems”, Ballistic Missile defence Frontier of the 21^st Century, KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2010. Accessed on 18 November 2021

[7]     Ibid.

[8]     Rahul Bedi, “Russia begins S-400 deliveries to India”, Janes, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russia-begins-s-400-deliveries-to-india, 15 November 2021. Accessed on 19 November 2021 

[9]     Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’donnell, “India in Nuclear Asia: Evolution of Regional Forces, Perceptions and Politics”, ed. Harsh V. Pant, Orient BlackSwan, pp. 39, 2018. Accessed on 17 November 2021

[10]    See Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’donnell.

[11] “India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Phase-I deployment starts in 2022-23”, Indian Defence Research Wing at https://idrw.org/indias-ballistic-missile-defence-phase-i-deployment-starts-in-2022-23/, 04 October 2020. Accessed on 17 November 2021

[12]    SNEHESH ALEX PHILIP, “India’s ballistic missile shield ready, IAF & DRDO to seek govt nod to protect Delhi”, The Print, https://theprint.in/defence/indias-ballistic-missile-shield-ready-iaf-drdo-to-seek-govt-nod-to-protect-delhi/345853/, 08 January 2020. Accessed on 20 November 2021

[13]    Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’donnell, “India in Nuclear Asia: Evolution of Regional Forces, Perceptions and Politics”, ed. Harsh V. Pant, Orient BlackSwan, pp. 42, 2018. Accessed on 20 November 2021

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Keywords: ASAT, Debris, Weapons, Satellite, UN, Russia, LEO

Close on the heels of the 76^th session of United Nations General Assembly, in which the First Committee approved a draft resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors” on November 01, 2021[i] – to address a widespread concern against any debris creating activity in space – the world witnessed yet another Anti-Satellite Test (ASAT), this time by Russia. The global space community is outraged and anguished with Russia for violating the norms of behaviour in space and a total disregard for sustainability of the space environment.  India too faced a similar situation when it conducted an ASAT test in March 2019, albeit at a lower altitude with much less debris fallout.

         In the early hours of November 15, a new debris field was detected in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) by the United States space surveillance network and Leo Labs (a commercial space tracking entity). The new debris field which was observed at altitudes of 400 – 450 km, was identified as a split up of a Russian dead satellite – Cosmos 1408 – which orbits at an altitude of around 480 km.[ii]  This event posed an imminent risk of collision with the International Space Station (ISS) which orbits at an altitude of 419 km and forced a debris avoidance action by the crew onboard. A day later, the Russian news agency announced an ASAT missile test that targeted an old Russian satellite with precision and denied allegations by the US and UK that the test had been dangerous for orbiting spacecraft.[iii]  Media reports have indicated that Cosmos 1408, a satellite which had been in orbit since 1982, was deliberately struck by an A-235 PL-19 Nudol ‘satellite killer’ missile fired from the Plesetsk cosmodrome. 1500 pieces of debris have been reported from this ASAT event. [iv]

          There is widespread shock and condemnation for this deliberate act by Russia. Some even termed it as a reckless act which will de-stabilise outer space and lead to weakening the efforts at arms control in space. More countries could follow suite as there are no legal regulations that could prevent weapons proliferating into outer space. Russia on the other hand defended its action. A Russian defence ministry official was quoted saying that Russia was forced to strengthen its defence capabilities because of weapons tests by the US and the formation of a Space Force.  He also denied that the test could pose any risk to the ISS.[v]  The fact that US, China and India have conducted similar tests in the past could not possibly be a justification for any country to create more debris in space, let alone Russia.

         The Americans seem to be more concerned about the risk to the ISS than about the addition of more debris in space.  Russian cosmonauts are also onboard the ISS and it is very unlikely that Russia would do anything that could harm this harmonious joint working arrangement. There are speculations though, that Russia perhaps timed the ASAT test to raise tensions in region and alarm US prior to a possible military action on the Uzbekistan border where Russian troops and military equipment are deployed[vi].  The weapon used for the ASAT test is said to be the PL-19 Nudol, which has been launched several times in the past successfully. However, this is the first successful physical impact with a satellite. It can thus be said that the test was a requirement to validate the PL-19 Nudol’s ASAT capability. This also means that the Russian ASAT is a likely weapon to be used in any future conflict, debris notwithstanding. It calls into question Russia’s commitment to their proposals for long term sustainability of outer space and their inclination to prevent an arms race in outer space. It may be recalled that Russia and China had together drafted the treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) in 2008 which could not gather a consensus amongst member states. Also, in the response submitted to UN General Assembly following Resolution 75/36 on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, Russia had expressed a strong desire for prohibition on ASAT testing and on proliferation of debris creating weapons into space.

          On the issue of space debris, it is certainly a setback for every space aspiring nation. The worry is not much about the 1500 pieces of debris that have been added to the existing debris count, but it is the spread of debris cloud which ranges from 300 km to 1100 km [vii] which is a matter of serious concern. Though most of the debris will re-enter the atmosphere in time durations varying from months to years, some of the debris may stay in orbit for many decades. The uncertain nature of the debris gives rise to many complications. Firstly, this height band has the highest density of satellites and many more satellites in constellations are planned to be inserted. SpaceX has already inserted 1584 Starlink satellites in a 550 km orbit against the planned 12000. One Web has already inserted 358 satellites in a 1200 km orbit. Many more companies are entering the LEO arena, and existing constellations are set to expand. By 2030, it is projected that the active satellite count will reach 100,000[viii]. Even today, 83% of all satellites are orbiting in LEO which makes it a very dense environment.  Any additional debris creating event will only make the LEO environment more complicated to operate in.  Secondly, collision events in LEO may be seen more often due to the absence of any regulations towards space traffic management. Also, most small satellites are not manoeuverable or have limited collision avoidance capability. Any collision will increase the debris count manifold, making space traffic management more complicated. Thirdly, the existing space observation capabilities have severe limitations, which precludes visibility of small objects with size less than 10 cm. Also, vast portions of outer space remain unscanned. This means that the uncertainty quotient will always remain. We need to develop ways to operate in such an environment.

          Russia has taken the world a step backward in their efforts towards reducing threats in space. Though it is not clear as to why they had to do this test, the event may have presented another opportunity to make a push towards banning kinetic ASAT tests through a test ban treaty. Gathering a consensus on a ban treaty may take time. In the meanwhile, the proposed ‘Guidelines for ASAT tests’ could be revisited. In 2018, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) had suggested three ASAT guidelines which could not be implemented due to a lack of consensus. The guidelines were[ix]:

• States testing ASAT capabilities should not create any space debris.

• If debris is inevitable during an ASAT test, it should be carried out at an altitude sufficiently low so that debris is short-lived.

• Notification needs to be issued prior to an ASAT test, to avoid misidentification.

          Notwithstanding the rationale, Russia’s action of deliberately creating orbital debris in the most crowded region of Earth orbit is extremely irresponsible. Orbital debris poses a risk of loss of space services and contamination of the space environment, an issue as serious as the global warming phenomena.  The reading on the wall is very clear.  If we disregard the sanctity of the space environment, space will defy us. Exploitation of outer space needs to be regulated with a firm space governance mechanism. Transparency in space operations and punitive actions for defaulters are the need of the day.  The issues brought out need to be viewed dispassionately to resolve them in a time bound manner. The UN mandated establishments can play a proactive role in gathering consensus amongst member states.

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Notes

[i] Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, at https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gadis3676.doc.htm, accessed on November 19, 2021.

[ii] Eric Berger, ‘New images and analyses reveal extent of Cosmos 1408 debris cloud’, web article at https://arstechnica.com/science/2021/11/new-images-and-analyses-reveal-extent-of-cosmos-1408-debris-cloud/ , accessed on November 17, 2021, and Satellite orbital data for cosmos 1408 at n2yo.com

^[iii]  Tom Balmforth, ‘’Razor-sharp precision’: Russia hails anti-satellite weapons test’, web article on November 18, 2021, at  https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-dismisses-us-criticism-anti-satellite-weapons-test-2021-11-16/

[iv] By Chris Pleasance, Ross Ibbetson for Dailymail news article at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10208207/Dramatic-recording-captures-moment-ISS-crew-scramble-evacuate-Russian-missile-blast.html

[v]  Ibid, n-3

[vi]  By Alexander Ward and Quint Forgey , ‘Russia’s anti-satellite test launches debris and sparks tensions’ web article on November 15, 2021, at https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2021/11/15/russias-anti-satellite-test-launches-debris-and-sparks-tensions-495105, accessed on November 19, 2021

[vii]  Ibid, n-2

[viii]  Irene Clotz, ‘Burgeoning Satellite Industry Paving Way To $1 Trillion Space Economy’, August 24, 2021, web article at https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/program-management/burgeoning-satellite-industry-paving-way-1-trillion-space-economy

[ix]  ‘Russia earns global ire over anti-satellite missile test: How these tests create problem of ‘space junk’, web article at https://www.firstpost.com/world/russia-earns-global-ire-over-anti-satellite-missile-test-how-these-tests-create-problem-of-space-junk-10140511.html, accessed on November 19, 2021

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India TV News Desk, Monday, 19 November 2021

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Uttar Pradesh’s Mahoba and Jhansi districts on Friday and launched multiple development projects. The Prime Minister inaugurated multiple projects in Mahoba and then visited Jhansi to dedicate to the nation multiple initiatives of the Defence sector at ‘Rashtra Raksha Samparpan Parv’, which commenced here on November 17 as part of ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahaotsav’ celebrations. 

To give a thrust to Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector, the Prime Minister formally handed over indigenously designed and developed equipment to Armed forces Service Chiefs. These include handing over of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) designed and developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) to Chief of the Air Staff; drones/UAVs designed and developed by Indian startups to Chief of the Army Staff; and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) designed and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) manufactured Advanced Electronic Warfare suite for naval ships to the Chief of Naval Staff.

The LCH incorporates advanced technologies and stealth features for effective combat roles. The deployment of Indian UAVs by Indian Armed Forces is also a proof of the growing maturity of the Indian drone industry ecosystem. 

The Advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) System ‘Shakti’ has been designed and developed by Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) Hyderabad a laboratory of DRDO for Capital Warships of the Indian Navy for the interception, detection, classification, identification and jamming of conventional and modern Radars. The Shakti EW system will provide an electronic layer of defence against modern radars and anti-ship missiles to ensure electronic dominance and survivability in the maritime battlefield. 

This system will replace the earlier generation EW Systems of the Indian Navy, the Ministry of Defence said in a statement. The system has been integrated with the wideband Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) for the defence of Indian Navy Ships against missile attacks. The ESM of the system helps in finding accurate direction and interception of modern radars. The system has a built-in radar fingerprinting and data recording replay feature for post-mission analysis.

First Shakti system has been installed on-board INS Visakhapatnam and is being installed on-board Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, INS Vikrant. Twelve Shakti Systems are under production at Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) supported by more than fifty MSMEs at a total cost of Rs 1805 crores. These systems are scheduled to be installed on-board capital warships under production, including P-15B, P-17A and Talwar class follow-on ships. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh congratulated DRDO, Indian Navy and Industry Partners for the development of the Shakti EW System.

PM also launched the National Cadet Corps (NCC) Alumni Association and become first member of the association. The PM also inaugurated the National programme of simulation training for NCC cadets with the aim to scale up simulation training facilities for all the three wings of NCC. 

Modi also dedicated to the nation augmented reality powered electronic kiosks at the National War Memorial, New Delhi which will enable visitors to pay floral homage to martyrs through the simple click of the button

The Prime Minister also inaugurated Atal Ekta Park in Jhansi. Named after former Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the park has been built at a cost of over Rs 11 crore, and is spread across an area of about 40,000 square metres. It will also house a library, as well as a statue of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The statue has been built by the renowned sculptor Ram Sutar, the man behind the Statue of Unity.

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Author: Col Sushil Kumar Tanwar
Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

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