Keywords: Strategic Coherence, OODA Loop, Op Sindoor, Higher Defence Organisation, Modern Warfighting

Introduction

Reforms in the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) of India have been an ongoing process for many years, yet nothing substantial has come its way. In 2019, after many years of procrastination, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was established, and a post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was sanctioned. The CDS was to serve as the single-point adviser to the Government of India (GoI) on all military matters. While revolutionary, these reforms have not quite reaped the benefits that should have accrued with such path-breaking changes. Both these steps are welcome measures and are in the right direction; however, India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) continues to run in independent silos without any significant cross-domain interaction. These reforms have not brought about any meaningful measures to enhance integration of the armed forces; civil-military relations have not quite improved, and jointness in war fighting has still not materialised. These inadequacies have arisen primarily due to ambiguity in the laid-down charter, leading to structural paralysis.

The Allocation of Business (AoB) Rules of MoD spell out the charter for both the Department of Defence (DoD), headed by the Defence Secretary and the DMA, headed by the CDS.  A closer look at the charter reveals several interesting observations. The first rule in the DoD charter is, “Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy and preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation.”[1] The DoD is responsible for the entire gamut of military operations, starting from mobilisation, to the conduct of operations, followed by demobilisation. The DoD is also responsible for all matters concerning defence policy, preparation for defence, Research and Development (R&D), and all capital procurement. The moot question that arises is, “Why was the DMA created when everything pertaining to India’s defence was to be handled by DoD?” The Allocation of Business Rules pertaining to DMA appears to be more like ‘Terms of Reference’ for a ‘Board of Officers’ rather than articulating responsibilities for the defence of the nation.[2]  One cannot help but think that the DMA was created in haste, without giving much thought to the actual charter and how the DMA (as part of MoD) should have been the department entrusted with the defence of India and all substantial matters pertaining to operations. Further scrutiny of the AoB rules also brings out the fact that the setting up of Theatre Commands, in quick time, appeared to be one of the main aims and mandates of DMA.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the problem statement, examine India’s defence priorities and recommend a possible HDO structure to plan and fight future wars.

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence: What is Wrong with the Way the Indian Armed Forces Fight?

There are many papers and scholarly articles on jointmanship, the need for integrated application of combat power, Multi-domain Operations (MDO), a ‘whole of nation’ approach towards national security and transformation of the Indian Armed Forces. Having gone through a substantial number of such writings, when dealing with the modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces (IAF), it was felt that Artificial Intelligence (AI) should also have a say to identify problem areas, bring out key criticisms of the Indian Armed Forces’ approach to combat and find out what was wrong with the way the Indian Armed Forces fought? Two independent questions were posed to AI chatbots, Grok and ChatGPT. The question presented to Grok was ‘Identify key criticisms of the Indian Armed Forces’ approach to combat’ and ChatGPT was asked ‘What is wrong with the way the Indian Armed Forces fight?’ The AI-generated responses (bulleted) have been collated below to provide additional inputs when arriving at the all-important ‘problem statement’.

Grok processed the inputs and brought out the following problem areas, drawing on expert assessment and historical analyses: –

(a)    Outdated and Rigid Doctrine Skewed Towards Large-Scale Conventional Offensives.

(i)       Emphasis on massive, autonomous ground formations for deep incursions and territorial gains to impose post-war leverage.

(ii)       Orthodox approach, ill-suited for modern wars.

(iii)      Calls for support by other arms if and when considered necessary.

(iv)     Unwieldy and large formations attempting high-speed manoeuvre warfare in obstacle-ridden terrain.

(v)      Tactics prioritising mass mobilisation and firepower over precision and agility, leaving the forces vulnerable.

(b)       Chronic Lack of Jointness and Inter-Service Coordination.

(i)      Services operating in silos due to historical rivalries and a lack of a unified command structure at the apex level.

(ii)     Disjointed responses highlighted during recent conflicts like Balakot operations, Galwan clash, Doklam imbroglio and Eastern Ladakh contingency.

(iii)   Lack of a common Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) grid encompassing both the HDO set-up as well as the fighting forces.

(iv)    Resort to static infantry heavy defences against drones, Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and hybrid threats.

(v)  Political micro-management and bureaucratic inertia risking irrelevance against agile forces.

(c)       Intelligence and Surveillance Failures.

(i)     Repeated lapses in human and electronic intelligence, allowing surprise incursions like Kargil and Galwan.

(ii)     Without adequate early warning and battlefield transparency, troops end up fighting reactively rather than adopting a pro-active strategy.

(d)   Equipment Shortages, Outdated Arsenal and Procurement Inefficiencies.

(i)    A bloated manpower focus starves modernisation, resulting in reduced ammunition stockpiles, obsolete equipment and platforms and chronic delays in induction of modern equipment.

(ii)     Forces compensate for quality by quantity, leading to high attrition tactics being adopted, which is unsuitable for modern conflicts. The Navy and Air Force severely lag in capability and technological upgrades.

(e)       Limited High-Intensity Combat Experience and Training Gaps.

(i)    No major wars since 1971, experience skewed towards Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

(ii)   Doctrinal Mismatch and emphasis on defensive holding over fluid manoeuvres.

(iii)  Fostering a ‘promotion over performance’ culture, making the organisation resistant to innovation.

ChatGPT looked at it from another angle by analysing how the Indian Armed Forces fought wars (operational art, doctrines and command structures) vis-à-vis how they were prepared to fight (institutional structures, procurement mechanisms and integration of the three services) to arrive at a candid assessment often echoed by military thinkers, veterans and strategic scholars: –

(a)       Fragmented Warfighting and Lack of Jointness.

(i)      Siloed planning and conduct of operations by the three services leading to fragmented warfighting.

(ii)      Joint targeting and ISR integration are severely lacking.

(b)       Doctrine-Technology Gap.

(i)    Reactive doctrines, especially for land warfare, leading to large-scale attrition.

(ii)    Limited infusion and exploitation of technology in the actual conduct of operations.

(iii)    Very little focus on enabling technology.

(c)       Centralised Decision Making and Lack of Flexibility.

(i)     Culture of close control by senior leadership resulting in a lack of latitude for junior commanders.

(ii)     Minimal decision-making at the junior leadership level affecting flexibility in the tactical environment.

(iii)     Both  close control and lack of latitude to junior leadership resulting in slower tempo, reduced initiative, and difficulty in adapting to fluid battlefield dynamics, especially in hybrid or grey-zone scenarios.

(d)       Overemphasis on Manpower, Underemphasis on Capability.

(i)     Land Power-centric mindset rendering naval and air assets as support providers rather than independent sources of firepower.

(ii)    Neglect of air and naval modernisation is crucial for strategic deterrence and power projection.

(e)       Bureaucratic and Procurement Bottlenecks.

(i)        Civil-Military divide in MoD, with service headquarters having limited autonomy in procurement and planning.

(ii)        Delayed modernisation and capability enhancement.

(iii)       Lack of accountability of the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) leading to lethargic indigenisation, delayed R&D, deferred manufacturing and wastage of precious funds.

(f)        Weak Integration of Strategy, Policy and Operations.

(i)     No clarity on ‘Theory of Victory’. No articulation of how military means achieve political ends. This leads to wars being fought for limited tactical gains without strategic clarity.

(ii)    Civil-Military disconnect wherein political leadership does not involve military leadership for advice on integrated national security frameworks combining diplomacy, economy and defence.

(g)       Training and Simulation Deficits.

(i)        Limited realism in training with more emphasis on drills rather than realistic combat simulation and joint exercises in multi-domain warfare environments.

(ii)      Very few large-scale tri-services war games simulating high-intensity combat against a peer adversary in a multi-domain setting.

(h)       Adaptation to the Changing Character of War.

(i)     Slow in the information domain: China’s concept of intelligentised warfare, combining AI, cyber, EW, and space, has no equivalent Indian concept.

(ii)     India’s response to low-intensity conflicts is reactive rather than pro-active or pre-emptive.

(iii)  Severe shortage of ‘informatisation’ within the armed forces, especially the Army, affecting flexibility at the tactical level.

(iv)     Lack of technological expertise for hybrid and grey zone situations.

(j)         Limited Learning Culture.

(i)      Indian armed forces have a weak after-action analysis ethos. There is a lack of an open culture of institutional introspection and bringing out doctrinal lessons.

(ii)     Western militaries conduct extensive after-action reviews and bring out strategic, operational and tactical lessons. The Indian system tends to keep failures under wraps by giving high security classifications, thereby preventing effective scrutiny and analysis.

ChatGPT further added that the ‘Indian armed forces do not fight badly, they fight bravely, but neither jointly, efficiently or strategically. Their character of fighting is professional but their system of fighting is structurally inefficient. The challenge therefore is not courage or competence; it is integration and innovation with strategic clarity.’

Key Takeaways

Artificial Intelligence has provided certain inputs that resonate with inputs from scholarly articles, newspaper reports and academic discourse in various seminars and for national defence. Certain significant issues and associated inferences from them are being collated below for ease of comprehension: –

(a)     Outdated and rigid doctrines skewed towards large-scale conventional action.

(i)       Strategy prioritising mass mobilisation and conventional war fighting.

(ii)        More stress on individual service capability and less on integration.

(iii)       Infantry heavy defences are ineffective against drones, PGMs and swarms.

(iv)       Fragmented war fighting.

(b)        Chronic lack of integration and operations in silos.

(i)         Inter-service rivalries.

(ii)        Lack of unified command and control structures.

(c)      Repeated failures of intelligence and surveillance, creating large gaps in battlefield awareness.

(d)     High attrition tactics focusing on mass rather than a healthy mix of technology and mass.

(e)   Limited combat experience in modern conventional operations. Significant focus on Counter Insurgency (CI) and Counter Terrorism (CT) operations.

(f)       Equipment shortages, outdated arsenal and procurement inefficiencies.

(g)    Weak integration of strategy, policy and operations with a focus on limited tactical gains without strategic coherence.

(i)        Very high bureaucratic inertia.

(ii)       A missing whole-of-nation approach to war fighting.

(h)   Reactive strategy primarily responding to situations rather than preempting/anticipating developments due to limited battlefield transparency and situational awareness.

(j)        Over-emphasis on manpower and under-emphasis on capability.

(k)       More stress on ownership of assets and less stress on collective war-fighting capability.

(l)        Doctrine-technology gap. The vision exists, but capability development lags far behind.

(m)     Lack of common communication protocols further promoting operations in silos.

(n)       Limited learning culture with very little after-action review.

The points listed above are just a few pointers and by no means exhaustive; however, they do bring out certain inadequacies and deficiencies that need to be addressed. These issues, though deliberated in various defence forums, do not gain the necessary traction at the apex level and thus remain unaddressed. Capability development plans lack the required budgetary support, and in India’s quest for self-reliance, many times, existing capability gaps go unnoticed and ignored.

Continental and Maritime Powers

Before discussing the problem statement, it would be interesting to understand where the dominant threat to India would emerge from. Between the end of the Civil War in the USA and the Spanish-American War of 1898, the American economy quietly chugged along with high annual growth rates.[4] Consequently, as America traded more with the outside world, it developed, for the first time, complex economic and strategic interests in far-flung places that led to, among military actions, Navy and Marine landings in South America and the Pacific.[iv] Another factor that allowed America to focus outwards was its consolidation and stabilisation of internal issues. As a result, the USA embarked on the development of a large Navy along with a Marine Force to project power far away from its shores. Over the next century, the USA became a dominant maritime power, able to traverse the world’s oceans and dominate from the seas. An interesting supposition is that the continental USA faced no external threats for over two centuries, allowing the USA to develop its Navy and exercise military might all across the world. Post World War II and during the Cold War, Russia emerged as a threat to American hegemony and also posed an existential threat to the continental USA through long-range bombers and ballistic missiles. After the disintegration of the USSR, the USA again became the sole super-power and continued its forays across the world, especially in West Asia and Western Pacific regions, including the South China Sea. The US Navy became stronger with the advent of supercarriers and nuclear submarines. American strategic interests continue to lie far from its own shores, physically isolating the country from any threat, Black Swan events like 9/11 being more of an exception rather than a norm. Therefore, it would be appropriate to tag the USA as a dominant maritime power with global aspirations.

China, on the other hand, has primarily been a Continental Power with regional aspirations. Having consolidated its land borders (barring a few), it has now begun to focus outwards. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest standing Army in the world, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) are still slowly expanding their strength and capability. Having dominated the region on land, what drives China beyond its official borders is its core national interest, economic survival and growth.[5] China has also begun expanding its presence across the world in search of oil, minerals and proximity to Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) to safeguard its energy needs. China is also blessed with an extensive coastline and is the largest littoral nation on the Western Pacific Coast. The East and South China Seas are China’s backyard and the USA’s playground. Herein lies the contest where we can see Chinese land power pitted against American sea power, with Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula as the main focal points.[6] Therefore, we see Chinese strategies such as Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) being played out to safeguard continental China and also prevent incursions by the USA into the First Island Chain. For decades, China was preoccupied with land, where America, particularly since its misadventure in Vietnam, has no appetite to go. America, even today, has no such appetite in Asia, especially after its ordeals in Iraq and Afghanistan.[7] China is in the early stages of transforming from a predominantly continental power to an aspiring maritime power, and that is the biggest change occurring in the Asia-Pacific region.

From the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the USA is a dominant Maritime Power with global aspirations, and China remains a dominant Continental Power with maritime ambitions. Where does that leave India? Is India a continental power or a maritime power? Such questions are better answered after seeing how geography plays a significant role in determining India’s priorities.

The Stopping Power of Water and India’s Options

John J. Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, speaks of the stopping power of water and how it serves as an effective barrier. He further adds that, “When great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that pose significant power projection problems for attacking armies. For example, the stopping power of water helps to explain why the United States has never been invaded by another great power. It also explains why the USA has never tried to conquer territory in Europe or North East Asia. Great powers located on the same land mass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.”[8] One may say that the Britishers and other colonial forces came from the seas and occupied India; true as it is, the fact that India in those times was not united but rather fragmented under various rulers and kingdoms, making it vulnerable to external influence and subjugation. Today’s India is a far cry from that, unified and centrally controlled.

What emerges is an interesting fact that Indian policymakers may wish to dwell on further. The geography of India is such that the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal give India the inherent safety provided by the stopping power of water and also give valuable access to some of the most important SLOCs in the world. The seas and oceans not only provide dividends and bounty but also protect the Indian subcontinent from external aggression. However, juxtaposing what Mearsheimer said, the larger threat emerges from the continental borders to India’s west and north. Traditionally, India has been a continental power and has developed capabilities and capacities to safeguard itself against land-based external aggression. Therefore, the predominant threat to India continues to be from Pakistan and China in the continental battlespace. China’s growing naval power is primarily aimed at countering the USA in the South China Sea and at safeguarding its maritime trade and energy supplies. Similarly, while it needs to maintain strong and capable forces to thwart threats emanating from the land borders, it must also develop a credible naval capability to be able to project military power from the maritime domain to affect the battle on land significantly. As an adjunct to this theory, India must develop both the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands to serve as credible military outposts and first lines of defence against any threat emanating from the maritime domain. However, it is important to note that the main threat to Indian sovereignty will continue to be from the continental domain, and the armed forces of India need to be prepared, equipped and trained for fighting in this domain as a primary front. Growth and capability enhancement of the Navy must continue, but definitely not at the cost of the land and air forces.

The Problem Statement

There are multiple issues that need to be addressed when it comes to the Indian Armed Forces and their fighting methods. Op Sindoor has provided India with an opportunity to introspect and arrive at tangible solutions. There is a lot of banter going on about how many aircraft India shot down and how many Pakistan shot down. Modern warfare is not just about targeting individual aircraft, tanks and ships; it is about crippling the war machinery of the adversary, which in today’s parlance amounts to targeting and destroying C2 nodes and communication centres to achieve information and decision dominance. One must be able to affect the adversary’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop to gain the upper hand. Unlike yesteryears, in a highly connected and networked battlespace, decision-making takes place further and further away from the actual battle. The inherent safety that distance from the battlefield provided earlier is no longer available today. Modern weapons permit precision targeting from large distances, and leadership can be threatened from the word go. The aim is to destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight. It is the ability to cripple the enemy’s war-waging potential that will prove to be decisive, and aircraft, tanks and ships are the means to get to the ends, not an end by themselves. Without going into the bean count, suffices to say, Pakistan was forced to stop kinetic action in just four days because India managed to target important communication nodes and affect their C2 capability. Additionally, targeting runways like Sargodha and Chaklala and destroying early warning radars sent a clear message to the Pakistan leadership of possible repercussions, directly affecting their will to fight. Some key takeaways from Op Sindoor are as follows: –

(a)        A whole-of-nation approach to war fighting is essential. The entire weight of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) must be brought to bear on an adversary for decisive victory.

(b)         Centralised planning, distributed control and decentralised execution.

(c)          Need for a joint planning establishment at the apex level.

(d)            Need for integrated application of combat power, without worrying about ownership of assets.

(e)      Importance of networking air defence assets for ensuring a comprehensive and coherent response.

(f)         Future wars may not necessarily be long drawn out like what is being seen between Russia and Ukraine. They could also be very short, swift and intense, giving very little time for conventional response mechanisms to activate. Wars could be over well before the completion of mobilisation by conventional land forces.

(g)        Primary threat to Indian sovereignty will continue to be continental, and therefore India needs to be prepared for the same.

(h)       Air Power as an instrument of choice proved to be decisive. India cannot afford to let its air power capability diminish. While indigenous programmes need impetus and support, the war-waging capability of the country cannot be held to ransom for want of indigenous products. It is not about acquiring 42 squadrons or three aircraft carriers. It is about retaining an edge over India’s adversaries because, as of now, with respect to Pakistan, that gap is rapidly reducing.

(j)      Modern technologies like AI, drones, Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS), and smart Air Defence philosophy need to be invested in to retain effectiveness.

(k)      Modern combat is all about systems and ‘system of systems’. Networking and ‘informatisation’ are key enablers and must become a priority for all planners. Akashteer of the Army, Trigun of the Navy and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) of the Air Force need to have a handshake at appropriate levels to ensure decision dominance.

(l)         Importance of operational logistics, robust and secure supply chains cannot be over-emphasised.

(m)       Hybrid wars and multi-domain operations (MDO) are the way forward, and capability development plans must factor these requirements.

(n)    Large unwieldy force structures need to be replaced with agile, networked and adaptive force structures. There is a need to remove silos and create structures more suitable for fighting in multiple domains.

(o)      Information warfare and the battle of narratives are as important as kinetic action and must be embedded as part of the overall strategy.

(p)      One must develop technology and weapons to target an adversary’s critical infrastructure while simultaneously ensuring the protection of one’s own critical infrastructure.

(q)     The adversary will not always respond in the way it has previously done. There will never be any precedence to template own plans. This calls for agile forces, effective ISR, swift decision making and most importantly, a changed mindset.

(r)       The importance of long-range, precision stand-off weapons cannot be ignored. The ability to hit the enemy well inside his territory with precision can win wars.

(s)        While the West may have done away with concepts like Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Centre of Gravity (CoG) targeting, in the Indian context, their relevance will always remain.

(t)        To be able to deliver decisive firepower in a short time is the rasion-de-etre of contemporary forces. See first and see the farthest; reach first and reach the fastest; hit first and hit the hardest will continue to be the ‘mantra’ of success.

Op Sindoor showed that the Indian Armed Forces have the capability to demonstrate tactical brilliance and arrive at strategic coherence. This was not the case in previous wars and conflicts, where tactical brilliance often outshone strategic coherence. For once, India demonstrated a whole-of-nation approach to war fighting, and it worked! Silos were forgotten, planning was undertaken jointly, and the three Service Chiefs were given a clear mandate with adequate freedom to prosecute the war. Clarity in the political aim and a well-articulated Conflict Termination Criteria (CTC) made things easier for the armed forces. In a nutshell, the problem is not joint fighting; it is joint planning. If joint planning is done meticulously, the Indian armed forces have the capability and wherewithal to prosecute modern wars.

Another problem that emerges is the ‘informatisation’ of the armed forces. In modern wars, adequate ‘informatisation’ at the tactical and operational level is a pre-requisite. The air and ground situation in modern wars is very fluid, and there will be situations when tactical and operational commanders will have to undertake time-sensitive targeting to gain immediate advantage and waiting for a decision from higher headquarters may be too late. Therefore, there is a need to create specialised, agile, adaptive and all-arms forces to deliver when and where it counts. The Indian borders continue to be hostile and hot. Post Op Sindoor, India has drawn its red lines, which, if crossed or transgressed, would lead to punitive action by India. Therefore, India does not have the luxury of going through the long-drawn process of force restructuring while still retaining the capability to respond to threats and win wars. In such a situation, force reconfiguration becomes a viable option.[9]

The problem statement, therefore, needs to take into account the need for joint planning at the apex level, a whole-of-nation approach to war fighting, force reconfiguration rather than restructuring and most importantly, integrated application of combat power.[10] Interestingly, none of these issues classically requires the setting up of Theatre Commands.

Having examined inputs from AI, considering the nuances of geography and blending them with political constraints and looking at the likely threats to Indian sovereignty, a suggested problem statement is as follows. “In the future, the Indian Armed Forces will be faced with high-intensity, hybrid and multi-domain threats in the region. There is a need to operationalise an Indian Concept of War Fighting, which fuses sound doctrine with dynamic leadership, joint planning with decentralised execution, modern technology with capability-driven acquisition programmes, mission-specific operational logistics with robust and redundant supply chains and adaptive C2 with a changed mindset to prosecute and win future wars.”

Recommended Structures at the Apex Level

Success in combat largely depends on sound leadership, adaptive decision-making and effective C2. In the Indian context, most problems have emanated not at the tactical or operational level but at the apex level. As Clausewitz famously said, war is a continuation of politics by other means; therefore, in order to align military strategy with national objectives, the armed forces must be part of the national decision-making process. Strategic guidance cannot be over-emphasised, and therefore, there is a need for the creation of joint apex structures in India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) to bring about tactical and operational coherence. For force reconfiguration, it would be prudent to have a ‘top-down’ approach rather than a ‘bottom-up’ approach. India’s service-specific planning structures are a relic of the industrial age. In the information age, unity of effort, speed and interoperability will determine success or failure.

At the apex level, under the MoD, a new vertical, the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ), is needed for joint planning. For a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to warfighting, all essential functionaries of relevant ministries and organisations must have representatives in the JFHQ. To ensure the JFHQ is sufficiently armed, it is proposed that representatives from various ministries and organisations be at the level of Additional Secretaries (AS), with essential staff placed under them. It is important to create a fresh mandate for DoD, DMA and the proposed JFHQ, clearly allocating responsibilities, roles and tasks without ambiguity. While the DoD would continue to operate under the Defence Minister, the DMA and the JFHQ are recommended to be placed under the COSC to have coherence between RTS functions and war fighting.

Figure 1.

For a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach, there is a need for the CDS and three Service Chiefs to be a permanent part of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and not on an invitational basis. The CDS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) must continue to remain the single point of advice on defence matters to the Defence Minister. For Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to be exercised, representatives from all elements must form a part of CCS.

Figure 2.

 It is recommended that the COSC have two verticals placed under it. The first would be the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), recommended to be headed by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff and Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC). It is recommended that the present system of dual-hatting by the CDS as Chairman COSC and Secretary DMA be discontinued to ensure equivalence in protocol with other Secretaries in various ministries. Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) would continue to be placed under the CISC. The current role of IDS includes managing policy, doctrine and procurement, facilitating joint training with special focus on modernising defence by integrating emerging technologies which would further be divided into three verticals, namely Raise. Train and Sustain (RTS). As Secretary to COSC, the CISC would have the essential know-how on all operational plans and contingencies, based on which tri-service functions of RTS would be undertaken.

The other vertical under COSC is proposed to be the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) for apex-level planning of operations. The existing dichotomy of responsibility for war fighting must be addressed on priority. The DoD’s mandate for warfighting must be withdrawn and handed over to the COSC and the JFHQ. [11] The JFHQ must have representatives from all elements concerned with military operations, including those from relevant ministries and organisations involved in national security. It would be prudent to have representation from the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) as part of the JFHQ for the conduct of hybrid and multi-domain operations.

Figure 3.

The Indian Army has seven regional Commands; the Navy has three, and the Air Force has seven. A total of 17 Commands, spread across the entire country, handle various contingencies and safeguard the territorial integrity of India. Joint planning organisations will need to be created not only at the apex level but also at the level of Command HQs. For effective C2, it is proposed that India be divided into two threat zones/fronts, i.e., Western Front (threat from Pakistan) and Northern Front (threat from China) and be named Joint Forces Command (West) and Joint Forces Command (North), respectively. It is also proposed that for retaining unity of command, a Regional JFHQ be created in each of the two threat zones [JFHQ(W) and JFHQ(N)], headed by a three-star officer. Below the Regional JFHQs, two options are possible: either merge all relevant regional commands or let the regional commands remain. The main aim is to synergise operations at the combatant command level to ensure strategic and operational coherence.

Figure 4.

In both the regional JFHQs, there is a need for representation from all elements involved in MDO, including the cyber and space domains. The focus of the regional JFHQ would primarily be warfighting. The process of modernisation of the armed forces is a slow and long-drawn process, and it may not be practically possible to make all elements of the armed forces fully ‘intelligentised and informatised’. Therefore, it is essential to create specialised battle groups which are fully modernised and trained for MDO. The Indian Army has been in the process of creating Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) for some time now. Rather than a service-specific battle group, it is recommended to create Joint Task Forces (JTFs) on the lines of the IBGs, consisting of all arms and services, to ensure effective application of combat power. The JTFs created could be specialised battle groups equipped and trained for specific tasks and roles. They could be either terrain-specific or role-specific. But it is essential that they are highly ‘informatised’ and consist of all three services (wherever applicable). The main task of JTFs would be to synergistically undertake multi-domain operations in an ‘intelligentised and informatised’ environment and act as force multipliers, augmenting the rest of the conventional forces.

The Training Commands of the three services [Army Training Command (ARTRAC) of the Army, Southern Naval Command (SNC) of the Navy and Training Command (TC) of the IAF] are recommended to be placed under HQ IDS as part of the RTS effort and ensure joint training for the armed forces, optimising resources and training effort. The role of the Maintenance Command of the IAF could be merged with the role of the Air Officer-in-charge Maintenance (AOM) branch at the level of the Air HQ, with parallel representation at the regional JFHQs.

Parting Shots

The Indian Armed Forces have demonstrated brilliant tactical acumen in every war India has fought since independence. As first responders, the armed forces of India have also distinguished themselves during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations within India and around the world. Their professional acumen, patriotism, perseverance and courage are, without doubt, of a very high order, and the armed forces are looked up to by all Indians.  However, tactical and operational brilliance must be backed up by strategic coherence, and this is where gaping voids have emerged. From Kargil to Galwan and from Uri to Balakot, there have been instances of intelligence failures, a lack of understanding of operational philosophies of other services, and inter-service turf wars that have affected the conduct of operations. This paper has adopted a blended approach by amalgamating various scholarly articles with AI inputs to arrive at a problem statement to address key issues that impact the effective employment of the armed forces.

The geo-political situation in India is quite different from what we can see across the world, and therefore, lessons from current conflicts cannot be directly implemented in the Indian context. Force reconfiguration or restructuring cannot be templated from other countries, nor can reforms be directly replicated. Concepts and ideas from across the world must be studied in detail, but what is essential is that India develops a nuanced, well-thought-out Indian Concept of War Fighting. The absence of a suitable joint planning mechanism at the apex level has emerged as a major lacuna in the Indian context and must be addressed as a priority. Op Sindoor has given a glimpse of what India is capable of when an optimal process for the employment of CNP is undertaken. Clarity of political objective, well laid down rules of engagement, operational freedom and clear conflict termination criteria make employment of the armed forces more coherent and in-sync with the political aim. The starting point for this to happen is the setting up of an apex joint planning organisation comprising all elements of CNP. Other issues like service-specific silos, procurement inadequacies, civil-military divide, lack of clear political directions and most importantly, integrated application of combat power will all fall into place.

Another major issue identified in this paper is the limited learning culture prevailing in India. India must develop an open culture of institutional introspection by conducting extensive after-action reviews. These reviews must be conveyed to all concerned to ensure mistakes made earlier are not repeated, and gaps/voids are suitably plugged. There is a great deal of talk about reducing the strength of the armed forces, primarily focused on being able to cut down on the revenue budget. In the Indian context, it must be understood that mass has its own inherent advantages. Against both Pakistan and China, mass has a very important role to play, and the same needs to be respected. Even in the Russia-Ukraine war, along with modern technology, mass has played a crucial role. While technology offers tremendous advantages, it cannot completely replace mass, and attempts to do so may jeopardise both offensive as well as defensive capabilities. India must endeavour to balance quality with quantity to arrive at optimal force structures without compromising either.

The way India’s Armed Forces fight is a product of history, institutional customs and traditions, and a strategic culture deeply rooted in India’s colonial past. There is a need to take a leaf out of our pre-colonial past to revive India’s original strategic culture and thinking. India has always prioritised territorial defence over developing an ability to project power, which has resulted in outdated structures, organisations and doctrines. India needs to shed these inadequacies and transition from attrition warfare to warfare that is agile, multi-domain, adaptive and most importantly, joint, so that military potential can be converted into decisive strategic outcomes.

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Notes:

[1] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Allocation of Business Rules,” https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DODall141220.pdf.  Accessed on November 12, 2025.

(2) Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Allocation of Business Rules,” https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DMAall141220.pdf. Accessed on November 12, 2025.

[3] Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (Gurugram: 2013 Random House Publication), pp. 198-199.

[4] Ibid., p. 198.

[5] Ibid., p. 199.

[6] Ibid., pp. 213-214.

[7] Ibid., p. 214.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 2003, Norton Paperback), p 44.

[9] V P Naik, “Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands- To be or not to be?,” Defence and Diplomacy Journal, Vol 14, No. 2, 2025 (January to March), pp. 77-86, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/7-VP-Naik.pdf. Accessed on November 13, 2025.

[10] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[11] Ministry of Defence, n. 1.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Keywords: Air Power, Proof, Operation Sindoor, Narrative, Strategic Communication

Introduction

It is said in Judiciary circles that Justice must not only be done, but also seem to be done. This article aims to draw a similar analogy to the employment of Air Power, especially in the backdrop of Operation Sindoor. The highest echelons of the Indian Air Force (IAF) repeatedly acknowledged that during the 2019 Balakot air strike, there was insufficient visual proof to demonstrate its success.[1][2] In stark contrast, an ample number of videos/photographs have been provided to the electronic/digital media to validate the likely extent of damage caused by the successful strikes by the Indian Armed Forces during Operation Sindoor.[3] This suggests fundamental implications for doctrines prescribing the employment of Air Power moving forward.

Analysis

Traditionally, the analysis of strike damage formed part of the broader sequence of battle damage assessment (BDA) that feeds into subsequent mission planning.[4] It has been a vital mission-planning tool for decision-makers, especially in the military, revealing the extent of damage to the target and the need for additional waves of attack to neutralise its operational capabilities. However, it had never attained the stature of a prerequisite for proving the success of an operation. The times have changed drastically from when acknowledging damage was considered part of the military ethos.

This phenomenon has become even more acute, given the lengths to which nations and civilisations go to control the strategic narrative. While the latest technologies have brought greater visibility through satellite and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) inputs, they have also enabled digital media to spread like wildfire. The case of “Doosra banda”[5] reeks of motivated social media campaigns to engineer a narrative directed at a domestic media and fallible international audience that is keener on what comes first than on what is correct.[6] In this environment, how is the employment of Air Power affected? It gets affected in a multitude of  ways: –

(a)       Operational Choices:        It is beginning to fundamentally influence target selection. The Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), Air Marshal Narmdeshwar Tiwari, reflected on how the armed forces narrowed down to selecting nine targets out of many identified during strike preparation.[7] This suggests that some evidential priorities were factored into target selection, leading to the selection of targets on whom damage could be unambiguously documented. Traditionally, targets have been chosen solely on operational considerations, such as the concentration of terrorist training infrastructure and their headquarters. Parallel arrangements were made to plan BDA missions to obtain the requisite assessment. Increasingly, these missions are likely to provide documentary evidence of the damage to the international and national media. As far as Operation Sindoor is concerned, the targets specifically for IAF were the terror headquarters at Muridke and Bahawalpur, a good 30 km and 100 km inside Pakistan territory, respectively.[8] Targeting these sites offered the dual advantage of military strategic value and demonstrable visual proof of damage against legitimate targets, satisfying military requirements for both strategic value and proof generation. The contrast with Balakot is instructive for all to see.

Choice of Weapon has evolved beyond the traditional criteria of lethality, precision and cost-effectiveness. The VCAS, while displaying live strike footage, demonstrated how the use of weapons with integrated sensor packages enabled real-time documentation.[9] Another manifestation of this aspect is the inclusion of unmanned systems specifically for strike documentation, beyond those mandated by BDA considerations. Moving forward, this is likely to affect the entire procurement process, force structuring, mission planning, and execution.

(b)       Phase and Timing of Campaign:           The proof-driven employment structure must be considered in the context of the campaign’s phase. Since it had to be a surprise strike with a limited window for targeting, every weapon had to deliver what it meant to. More than that, every weapon hit should be comprehensively proved to have made an impact. The same cannot be said of campaigns elsewhere, such as in Ukraine and Gaza. However, for such short and swift conflicts with limited objectives on the part of at least one of the belligerents, the need to factor in provability, especially in Air Power employment, needs to be considered.

(c)       Strategic Communication Architecture:          Despite the efforts of the Indian armed forces, this aspect still requires further institutional refinement. As observed during engagements spanning the last two decades[10], the Indian follow-up to a military action has been nuanced, relying on accurate data collection and formal public communication through media briefings. This reflects how a civilised nation behaves; however, what has changed recently is the promulgation and consumption of social media outlets. The IAF, on its part, has made considerable efforts to release strike videos, pre- and post-satellite images, and detailed damage assessments for public consumption.[11] This is not to say that the Indian system is ineffective, but there is room for improvement, especially regarding institutionalised mechanisms for narrative management. Cognitive warfare demands systemic integration of communication into operational design.[12] The enemy, meanwhile, is openly demonstrating how it managed the narrative in its favour during the conflict.[13]

To manage a coordinated, effective, and timely follow-up, it is imperative to institutionalise communication procedures and systems.[14] Training and simulations can only thrive in a system mandated and designed to support them. It would require a flow of aural, visual, and digital information to vantage points that can further decide and regulate its flow to the requisite avenues. This would improve the efficiency and viability of communication; otherwise, it is likely to grow stale and appear to be a manufactured response to enemy propaganda.

(d)       Operational Viability:         The most significant factor affecting a military planner is the operational viability of undertaking such an operation. While it does affect the employment of Air Power in ways it never has till now, provability must not come at the cost of operational effectiveness. The damage caused by long-range surface-to-air weapons has been unprecedented.[15] As noted earlier, this would require subtle changes and inclusions at the procurement stage, while balancing economic considerations. Training would need to align with these weapons and their respective procedures. The most crucial aspect planners need to understand clearly is that this is another factor to be managed and must in no way offset operational effectiveness. Especially as AI-enabled and autonomous weapons rise, it is prudent to maintain positive visual feedback to address legal and ethical concerns. A calculated percentage of weapons with such capabilities would need to be factored in, especially given the likelihood of short, swift conflicts in the neighbourhood. This remains true for India, considering the nuclear dimension unlikely to yield a protracted contest.

Conclusion

The burden of proof has now transcended the realm of BDA and is now an essential consideration for Air Power employment. Operation Sindoor thus highlights a larger paradigm shift in military doctrine, suggesting provability as a crucial operational parameter in the modern information environment. Thomas Schelling describes communication as an essential aspect of deterrence along with capability and intent.[16] The same is true of military actions today, as communications come out into full public glare. For this to remain relevant, it would need timely, authentic visual proof to support the narrative.

In this regard, Operation Sindoor demonstrated the systematic integration of proof generation into operational structures, including target prioritisation, weapon choices, campaign phasing, visible escalation control, optimal communication mechanisms, and limited social media engineering. Moving forward, it would require a revisit to institutionalise this aspect into military planning, which would demand modifications to procurement procedures, training curricula, and operational procedures. Procurement would require a deeper analysis to arrive at the optimal percentage of such weapons and equipment. Communication systems for a ready flow of information with inbuilt regulatory provisions need to be conceived and operationalised at the earliest. A broader introspection would be required to integrate communication mechanisms into operational structures. Training and Simulation would need to follow up.

It has been repeatedly stated that Sindoor has laid to rest the ghost of Balakot, but what remains a concern is perception management, especially in the age of social media. The enduring lesson remains that in contemporary conflict, perception shapes reality and damage as an operational objective must not only be done but also seem to be done.

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Notes:

[1] “Ghost of Balakot’ laid to rest: Air Force chief on why videos of Operation Sindoor mattered” Times of India, August 9, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ghost-of-balakot-laid-to-rest-air-force-chief-on-why-videos-of-operation-sindoor-matter-watch/articleshow/123204862.cms. Accessed on November 21 2025.

[2] Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), “Three Years After Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory”, Stimson, February 28, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/three-years-after-balakot-reckoning-with-two-claims-of-victory/, Accessed on November 21 2025.

[3] “Op Sindoor | Very Easy to Start a War…,”, NDTV Defence Summit video footage, August 29, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yeh1UR-jJ4w, Accessed on November 21 2025.

[4] “Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States of America, January 31, 2013, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Targeting_20130131.pdf. Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[5] “3 Years of Balakot Airstrike: Exclusive Eyewitness Account”, Indian Defense News, February 23, 2022; https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/02/3-years-of-balakot-airstrike-exclusive.html, Accessed on November 21, 2025, Pakistan initially acknowledged capturing two pilots via a DG ISPR briefing, but quickly retracted.

[6] Ibid

[7] “Less than 50 weapons to end conflict’: IAF on Op Sindoor”, Times of India, August 30, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/less-than-50-weapons-to-end-conflict-iaf-on-op-sindoor-details-why-pak-asked-for-ceasefire/articleshow/123600869.cms, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[8] “Vice Air Chief Reveals Details Of Op Sindoor, Shows New Footage”, ABP Live, August 30, 2025, http://news.abplive.com/news/india/within-48-hours-vice-air-chief-reveals-details-of-op-sindoor-shows-new-footage-1797466, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[9] NDTV, n. 3.

[10] For historical context on India’s evolving military response patterns, see Ministry of Defence press releases “2016 Uri surgical strikes”, Press Information Bureau, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151242, “2019 Balakot airstrike”, Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl%2F31090%2FStatement+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+26+February+2019+on+the+Strike+on+JeM+training+camp+at+Balakot, and “2025 Operation Sindoor,” Press Information Bureau https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2149356, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[11] ABP Live, n. 8.

[12] Christoph Deppe, Gary S. Schaal, NATO Allied Command Transformation, “Cognitive warfare: a conceptual analysis,” Frontiers, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/big-data/articles/10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129/full, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[13] “The Current Life with Information Minister Attaullah Tarar”, The Current, YouTube, June 7, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcFvH9GPSkY . Minister Tarar describes the room as “where we won the narrative war from.”, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[14] “Commander’s Handbook – Strategic Communication,” US Joint Forces Command, United States of America, DTIC, October 27, 2009, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA544861.pdf;
“Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, AJP-3.9,” 2021, NATO, November, 2021 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/618e7da28fa8f5037ffaa03f/AJP-3.9_EDB_V1_E.pdf, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[15] “‘Could look deep inside’: IAF chief reveals ‘longest kill’ during Op Sindoor; shares losses suffered by Pak” Times of India, October 3, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/4-5-f-16s-destroyed-iaf-chief-on-what-turned-tables-in-op-sindoor-calls-pak-narrative-manohar-kahaniya/articleshow/124285354.cms, Accessed on November 21, 2025.

[16] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 34-47. Schelling argues that deterrence requires three elements: capability, intent, and credible communication.

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Keywords: Multi domain Operations, Modern Warfare, Cyber Security, Battle Supremacy

Introduction

The United States (US)Army marks its 250^th year in 2025, and places Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as the vision for warfighting in the future. Despite this, MDO remains more of a concept than a concrete strategy, filled with aspirations but enmeshed with institutional constraints and the abstraction of doctrines. Hence, unless the Military grounds MDO in strategic clarity, joint operational design, and realistic resources, it risks repeating the mistakes of earlier doctrinal overreaches that weighed form over function.

General Mark Milley heralded the US Army’s conceptual pivot toward the MDO with his remarks that the future conflict will be “fundamentally different” because of the convergence of informational, cognitive, and physical domains.[1] The doctrine of MDO was officially codified in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s documents in 2018, and aims to address the loopholes in the existing legacy concepts like Air-Land Battle and the counterinsurgency-centric doctrine.[2]  With the Army celebrating its 250^th anniversary, MDO reflects a mix of strategic anxiety and institutional ambition, namely the hope of remaining relevant in an era of great power competition, hybrid threats, and technological upheaval. However, despite its elaborate, conceptual promise, it falls short of structural and operational merit, raising speculations about its viability.

The Strategic Assurance of MDO

The central idea of MDO is to enable US forces to converge effects across all domains – land, sea, space, air, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, in order to create overmatch and unleash multiple attacks and dilemmas on the adversary. As per the US Army Concept for Manoeuvre in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028-2040 concept, the US must prepare to penetrate and break down the sophisticated anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) systems developed and deployed by enemy states like China and Russia. MDO envisions the Army in the role of an integrator within the larger ambit of joint operations, providing long-range fires, expeditionary logistics and tactical manoeuvres in critical and contested environments.[3]

Changes in the international system largely shape MDO’s current strategic relevance. While the United States is losing its military dominance, MDO enables it to adapt to the speed and complexity of multiple domains. Michael Mazarr and Frank Hoffman emphasise the importance of grey-zone competition and hybrid warfare- areas where MDO, in theory, provides an integrated solution.

MDO still lacks the articulation of a political theory of victory, even though it is theoretically appealing. In terms of political outcomes, the Army claims that convergence has created operational advantages; however, it is still unclear how these advantages form a political outcome. Unless the Army defines strategic success as measurable goals in terms of deterrence, control escalation, or the termination of a conflict, MDO runs the high risk of becoming a solution still searching for a problem.[4]

Administrative Restraints and Institutional Inertia

There is a misalignment between theory and practice. The MDO is still doctrinally underdeveloped and operationally untested. The Army’s organisational culture is predominantly driven by decades of platform-centric procurement and service-based planning. The integrative approach of MDO encounters a bureaucratic quagmire. Outdated conventional systems like Patriot missile batteries and Abrams tanks, still dominate budgets, leaving little room for investment in cyberspace, electronic warfare, and autonomous systems.

Furthermore, the Army’s personnel system, especially its talent management model, has not fully adapted to the demands of MDO. As has been remarked by LG (Retd.) David Barno and Dr Nora Bensahel[5] argue that the structure of the Army still remains conservative, prioritising conventional career paths over cultivating leaders that possess in-depth technical expertise in cyber, space and information operations.

Another aspect that further constrains MDO’s trajectory is budgetary policies. The Army’s modernisation must increasingly compete in a joint environment that is sliding in favour of naval and air power projections, especially in the case of the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the establishment of the Army Future Command to fast-track innovation, its integration with other services and allies remains largely uneven.

Inter-service rivalries are often the least addressed among the barriers hindering joint planning and progress. MDO assumes full integration with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Space Force, as well as allied militaries. However, the services continue to follow separate, uncoordinated, and parallel modernisation pathways. Without cross-institutional design tools to ensure joint synchronisations, as with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, MDO will forever remain an Army-centred aspiration.

Scenario Disconnect: Is MDO Waging the Wrong War?

MDO appears to be tailor-made for high-end conventional conflicts against peers, particularly in the European theatres and the Indo-Pacific Region. Since, at its core, MDO is shaped by potential confrontation with and challenges posed by peer competitors like China and Russia, it requires the United States to develop a force capable of penetrating and disintegrating layered anti-access/area-denial systems, operating across contested domains, and integrating joint and allied capabilities to achieve convergence at decisive points. Such networks- comprising integrated and disparate elements of air-defence, precision-strike, electronic warfare (EW), and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems configuration- are predominant in the Indo-Pacific and European operational theatres. Therefore, the fundamental components of MDO- long-range precision fires, deep sensing, joint domain convergence, cyber-EW integration, and tiered decision making- are designed for major, high-tempo, high-technology, and large-scale conflict against advanced large state militaries.

In contrast, these requirements are not central to grey-zone, proxy, or irregular conflicts, where ambiguity, deniability, political signaling, and attrition- not cross-domain penetration- drive outcomes. Thus, MDO naturally aligns with peer-level, conventional scenarios and is less inherently adaptable to the low-intensity competition that dominates real-world military usage.

However, this creates a risk of over-investing in scenarios that might never materialise. Experts like T.X. Hammes[6] have shown caution against a force structure best suited for high-end warfare while being underprepared for proxy, protracted and grey zone conflicts.[7]

Furthermore, many of the technological tenets underpinning MDO, assuming resilient communications in denied environments, seamless cross-domain data integration, and uninterrupted sensor-to-shooter networks, seem out of place given the current realities of the battlefield. The basis of this assessment stems from the current Ukraine conflict, where one can observe Russian electronic warfare successfully disrupting Ukraine’s ISR networks while jamming GPS, degrading drones, and interfering with precision-guided fires. The warfare demonstrated how quickly sophisticated digital networks can be routed in a contested electromagnetic environment. US government evaluations and GAO reports similarly highlight persistent vulnerabilities in American tactical networks, difficulties in maintaining secure communications under electronic attack, and incomplete joint data interoperability[8]. When peer adversaries like China and Russia possess mature capabilities explicitly designed to degrade or deceive these networks, any MDO concept that presumes information dominance, continuous connectivity, or flawless real-time data fusion risks becoming strategically brittle. If these systems cannot survive or function under high-end combat conditions, the operational logic of MDO gets weakened at its core.

What remains most worrying is the MDO mismatch with the political use of military force. When rivals operate below the threshold of a declared war, the ability to create cross-domain fires to “dilemma” the enemy is tactically constructive, but strategically useless. The Army’s strategic planner faces the question: how does MDO situate itself within the national policy objectives in the event of an imminent conflict?

Onto a Real Strategy

To implement the ambitious goals of MDO, there needs to be a major focus on the underlying theory of victory and design of the force structure to create strategies that are realistic and credible. Simply advocating political support for MDO is not enough. It is a concept that needs grounding. For MDO to work as envisaged, it needs to be incorporated into a real joint and coalition environment. This requires purposeful alignment with NATO’s doctrine in Europe and close synchronisation with Indo-Pacific allies, particularly in the areas of intelligence sharing, domain awareness, secure communication networks, and combined operational fires. Without these political and military interoperabilities, MDO is destined to remain an Army-centric aspiration rather than a consolidated operational construct.

 There are also parallels with the technological ‘human capital’ that the Army needs to invest strategically. Without leaders who think and operate in different domains, MDO will find itself with unachieved objectives. Structural redesigns will be required for flexible educational pathways and career systems. MDO should be treated with caution. It should not be treated as a simplistic justification for spending. Instead, ‘spending’ should come from an informed consideration of what capabilities to allocate, enhance, or eliminate.

Conclusion

At the striking age of 250, the US Army stands at a conceptual crossroads. Multi-Domain Operations offer a compelling vision for fighting and winning wars in an increasingly complex war space. However, history perpetually reminds us that without strategic clarity and institutional commitments, concepts often devolve into doctrinal mirages. For the MDO to achieve success, it must be more than a catchphrase and evolve into the Army’s organising purpose. Only then can the Army remain not just operationally relevant, but also strategically decisive in its next 250 years.

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Notes:

[1] Huba Wass de Czege, “Commentary on ‘The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028’,” US Army War College, April 2020, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/909/.. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[2] United States Army, United States of America, “United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Administrative Publications,” October 01, 2025,https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[3] “The U.S. Army Concept for Maneuver in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028-2040,” U.S. Army Futures Command Futures and Concepts Center, July 07, 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1118627.pdf. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[4] Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.us/reports/19-reports/1163-conflict-in-the-21st-century-the-rise-of-hybrid-wars. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[5] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “America is Not Prepared for a Protracted War,” War on the Rocks, December 04, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/12/america-is-not-prepared-for-a-protracted-war/. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[6] Dmitry Filipoff, “Force Structure Perspectives: Col. T.X. Hammes (ret.) on Experimenting for Adaptation,” CIMSEC, October 28, 2020, https://cimsec.org/force-structure-perspectives-series-col-t-x-hammes-ret-on-experimenting-for-adaptation/.Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[7] Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” Orbis, Vol.3, No. 2,  https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438709000106. Accessed on October 30, 2025.

[8] Government Accountability Office, United States of America, “Contested Information Environment: Actions Needed to Strengthen Education and Training for DOD Leaders,” 05, 2025.

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Keywords: Ex Garuda, Garuda-2025, India-France Defence Relationships

Introduction

A bilateral Exercise Garuda-VIII (2025) is ongoing from November 16 to 27, pitting the Indian Air Force (IAF) against France’s Air and Space Force (FASF) in a simulated combat.  This exercise features the IAF’s Su-30MKI aircraft manoeuvring alongside French multirole fighters in complex air combat situations. The primary focus will be on air-to-air combat, air defence, and joint strike operations. In addition, ‘Garuda-VIII’ provides a platform for the two forces to interact professionally, exchange knowledge, and share best practices, reinforcing the strong Indo-French strategic partnership.[1]

The exercise is a building block on previous versions, as it lays stress on interoperability and sharing of tactics, which will strengthen India-France defence relations in the context of joint ventures such as Rafale procurement and co-development of military hardware. It will provide a platform for IAF Rafale pilots to enhance their general employability and the exploitation of aircraft in peculiar conditions.

Exercise Garuda is a tactical bilateral air exercise aimed at enhancing interoperability, sharing of best practices and strengthening defence cooperation between the IAF and the FASF. The exercise is usually complex, incorporating complex air defence and ground attack missions with often sophisticated fighter aircraft, aerial refuelling and joint tactical operations. The locations have slipped back and forth between India and France, with the memorable First edition held at Gwalior Air Force Station (India) and Mont-de-Marsan Air Base (France).

Brief History (from 2003-2024): The ‘Garuda’ Legacy of 22 years

The exercise “Garuda” has a 22-year history and offers forward-looking strategic and doctrinal advantages to the IAF.  The Garuda exercise series, which was inaugurated in 2003, has been carried out in phases. It was initially focused on the basics of interoperability (2003-2010); later moved on to critically pre-inducting the Dassault Rafale and its operational systems (Garuda VI, 2019); and finally became a top-notch platform for demonstrating the validity of India’s indigenous combat systems, like the LCA Tejas and LCH Prachand (Garuda VII, 2022).

The genesis of Exercise Garuda is explicitly linked to the Indo-French strategic partnership, which started on January 26, 1998. This partnership made defence and security principal pillars of the bilateral relationship. To make this cooperation dynamic, the two countries introduced a set of regular triennial training exercises for the collaborating Armed forces of both countries. These exercises are:

(a)          Ex Varuna, for both Navies,

(b)          Ex Shakti, for both Armies, and

(c)          Ex Garuda, for both Air Forces.

The first five editions focused on creating basic-level interoperability. During the exercise, the IAF and the FAF flew various air combat missions both by day and by night. These missions included 1 vs 1 and 2 vs 1 visual air combats.  Large Force Engagement (LFE) in a near-realistic environment were the attraction of air combat training missions. Both Air forces exchanged best practices to enhance their operational capabilities. The objective of the exercise was to enhance professional engagements and interoperability between IAF and FAF through the exchange of operational knowledge and experience, besides the solidification of bilateral relations between the two air forces.[2] The focus areas of previous versions of exercises were:

(a)     The first edition, Garuda I (February 2003), was held at Air Force Station Gwalior, India, and was attended by the Chief of Staff of the FASF.

(b)      Garuda II (June 2005) was held at Istres Air Base, France. It was the Indian Air Force’s first exercise in Europe.[3]

(c)       IAF hosted the FASF for the Garuda III (February 2007) at Air Force Station Kalaikunda,

(d)     Garuda IV (June 2010) was organised at Istres Air Base, France and saw the participation of Singapore Air Force with its F-16s and some of the impressive paratrooper jumps of Indian Garud and French Special Forces from Indian IL-76s. It was an opportunity for IAF IL-78 MKI tankers and FASF KC-135 Stratotankers to practise and validate cross-refuelling procedures.

 (e)    The IAF hosted exercise, Garuda-V (June 2014), at its air base in Jodhpur. It was to solve the complicated “East-West” doctrinal and technical equation. Historically, a major user of Russian-origin platforms, the IAF used the exercises to operate the Su-30MKI heavy fighter alongside FASF’s Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters. This integration involved the standardisation of communication procedures, air combat tactics, and the acquisition of complex technical procedures such as air-to-air refuelling (AAR). The IAF contingent had four Su-30 MKIs, one IL-78 AAR, and two C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft.  The C-17, the strategic lift aircraft, flew with 134 air warriors, ground equipment and the logistic support for the IAF contingent during its induction and later de-induction after the exercise. The FAF had deployed Mirage 2000, Rafale, and Alpha Jet fighter aircraft, E-3F Sentry AWACS, C-135 flight refuelling aircraft, and C-130 and CN-235 transport aircraft, with 94 personnel.[4]

(f)      Garuda-VI (July 2019) was held at Mont-de-Marsan Airbase 118. The IAF contingent, of seven Indian aircraft – 4 Sukhoi Su-30, 2 C17s and 1 Ilyushin 78, landed at the southwest of France at Mont-de-Marsan Airbase 118 on June 28. This exercise saw the deployment of a great number of French Air Force aircraft: Rafale, Alpha Jet, Mirage 2000, C135, E3F, C130, and Casa. [5]

(g)     Ex Garuda VII (November 2022): The LCA Tejas and the LCH Prachand were part of any kind of international exercise for the first time. The exercise incorporated four FASF Rafale fighters and one A-330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft. The IAF contingent was besides the LCA and LCH, Su-30 MKI, Rafale, and Jaguar fighter aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters. Combat Enabling Assets that constituted a part of the IAF contingent were Flight Refuelling Aircraft, AWACS, AEW&C, and Garud Special Forces.[6] The Exercise witnessed the combined flying of Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of IAF, in an IAF Rafale fighter, and the Chief of the Air Staff of FASF, General Stephane Mille, in an IAF Su-30MKI fighter.[7]

Garuda 2025: Doctrine Refinement 

The eighth edition, Garuda-VIII (16-27 November 2025), marks a new doctrinal phase. The IAF contingent, which arrived in France on November 10, 2025, consists of six Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets, supported by an IL-78 mid-air refueller and a C-17 Globemaster-III transport aircraft, for the exercise.[8] FASF is employing 10 Rafales, six Mirage 2000s;  andon an ad hoc basis, one H225M Caracal, one A330 MRTT Phénix and one A400M Atlas.[9]   The focus of this exercise is the optimum level of operational synergy between the IAF’s mature and heavyweight Su-30MKI force and the FASF’s  Rafale-centric force. This objective is accomplished through stress testing of IAF tactics in complex, high-intensity simulated scenarios, including joint strike operations, in an unfamiliar “away game” environment at Mont-de-Marne, France.[10]

IAF’s Tri‑Level Benefit 

The strategic benefits granted by the IAF are threefold. From the doctrinal point of view, the exercise was of invaluable value as it resulted in IAF pilots gaining exposure to Western combat methodologies and subsequently incorporating the same into the training and operational syllabus of the IAF. Tactically, it perfects the integrated “potent combination” of its Su-30MKI and Rafale fleets. Strategically, it wants to validate IAF’s transcontinental power-projection capability by rigorously testing its IL-78 tanker and C-17 Globemaster III transport assets.

Strategic Cornerstone for Multilateralism 

The deep, high-level trust and technical interoperability between the two sides achieved through the bilateral Garuda series has become the foundation for India’s larger multilateral air power ambitions. This is proven by the fact that France was part of India’s first multinational exercise -Tarang Shakti exercise in 2024 as an anchor participant, a multilateral event with a stated intention of being “broadened from Garuda”. Consequently, Garuda has helped IAF transform from a participant in foreign exercises to a global convenor of air power.

Significance of Ex Garuda

These exercises have gone through a prolonged process starting from MiG-21 to Mirage-2000 and more advanced ones such as Su-30 MKI, Rafale, and the indigenous Tejas aircraft, which reflects the upgrade in technology for both air forces. Early editions included basic air defence, while recent ones included SEAD, electronic warfare, night ops and multi-domain integration. Aerial refuelling, AWACS coordination and joint planning have become the norm, increasing operational synergy. Exercises have coincided with India-France defence deals (e.g. the Rafale purchase) and with security issues in the region (e.g. Indo-Pacific security, China).

Conclusion

The IAF participates in ‘Garuda-VIII’ at Mont-de-Marsan, France, with the FASF until November 27, to ensure better exploitation of tactics and interoperability. This exercise is characterised by complex combat situations, with an emphasis on air-to-air BVR combat, air defence, and joint strike operations, thereby strengthening a long-standing strategic partnership.

*****

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Notes:

[1] “Indian and French Air Forces Collaborate in ‘Garuda 25’ Air Exercise,”   Devdiscourse, November 15, 2025, https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/3699884-breakthrough-arrest-in-red-fort-car-bomb-attack-case. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[2] S.B.P. Sinha, “Exercise Garuda-VI: Sukhoi 30 MKI & Rafale, A Formidable Combination,” SP Aviation, August 1, 2019, https://www.sps-aviation.com/experts-speak/?id=410&h=Exercise-Garuda-VI-Sukhoi-30-MKI-and-Rafale-A-Formidable-Combination. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[3] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda V,” April 21, 2022, https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-V. Accessed on November 15, 2025.

[4] Ibid.

[5] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda VI,”, July 2019, https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-VI. Accessed on November 18, 2025.

[6] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF and FASF Chiefs fly as part of Ex Garuda VII,” November 8, 2022,  https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1874508. Accessed on November 16, 2025.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Press Information Bureau, n. 6.

[9] French Embassy in India, “Indo-French Air Exercise Garuda VI,”, November 18, 2025, , https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Air-Exercise-Garuda-2025-Exercise-20756. Accessed on November 18, 2025.

[10] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Exercise Garuda 25: Indian Air Force Participates In 8th Edition of Bilateral Air Exercise With French Air And Space Force,” November 15, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2190299. Accessed on November 16, 2025.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Keywords: Fighter Pilots, Aircraft, Professionalism, Indigenisation, Courage

Fighter pilot is an attitude. It is cockiness. It is aggressiveness. It is self-confidence. It is a streak of rebelliousness and it is competitiveness. But there’s something else- there’s a spark. There’s a desire to be good. To do well, in the eyes of your peers and in your own mind.

Robin Olds

Introduction

If you are hearing about this now, probably you have all gathered to remember me, not as your friend, colleague or acquaintance, not as a name on an old squadron photograph, but as an individual who once lived, laughed, cried, made mistakes, learnt, and flew. That is why I choose to speak to you frankly, honestly and with humility and dignity that a lifetime in uniform has taught me.

Let me take you back in time and tell you something interesting. I was not born a fighter pilot. Like everyone else, I was born into a loving family, with my feet firmly planted on the ground and my eyes looking upwards, vaguely aware of the distant sky. I had the exact same childhood as all of you had, and I had my share of successes and failures as I grew from a child to an adult. It was during this journey that the distant skies beckoned; perhaps it was the sound of aircraft flying overhead or movies like Top Gun that inspired me. Perhaps inspiring stories from World War II or tales from the Kargil War got me hooked, or perhaps it was just a simple book like Jonathan Livingston Seagull, by Richard Bach, that channelised my dreams. Something changed in me, and the sky became less of a medium and more of a destination. I wanted to fly!

Like all of you, I had bright sparks in my eyes as I went after my dream. There was no arrogance or overconfidence; there was just pure passion, desire, and determination. The journey was long, arduous and dangerous, because let’s face it, humans aren’t naturally designed to fly and do not possess any aerodynamic characteristics. There were days when I almost gave up. Academic rigour and the physical strain both challenged my mind and body, yet I bashed on regardless. I learned to endure pain and think on my feet under duress because these attributes were essential to being a pilot. I learned to have faith in my mentors and instructors because they were not only teaching me how to fly, they were teaching me how to survive. Through it all, I persevered, because somewhere down the line, I realised I was meant to fly!

My first tryst with fighter flying was a humbling experience. Strapping into a single cockpit, the assuring hum of the engines and the sheer power of propulsion were very terrifying yet mystically mesmerising. It also drove home an important lesson of life as a fighter pilot, where life-altering decisions need to be made in microseconds, where mistakes can make craters and where the line between triumphant return and silent obscurity is razor thin. Flying is not just about getting airborne and landing back safely. It is the thrill and challenge that accompany every moment that I am in the sky. It is the metaphorical freedom that brings a smile on one’s face, and it is a swan song that rides on one’s lips if things don’t quite go down well. Up in the sky, it is in these moments when an eerie silence prevails, allowing deep thought, making us realise that the sky is infinite. It is something sacred and safe. It is also something challenging and unforgiving. I understood my shortcomings and limitations as well as the unforgiving nature of flying.

Flying fighters is not just about the thrill; it is about self-discipline, self-confidence and above all, a mastery born out of repetition and practice. It is this mastery that is both supreme yet very humbling. You develop a respect for the machine, and the machine becomes a partner. The machine will take you where you want to go and do what you want it to do, provided you learn to respect both your own limitations and the machine’s. The skies become your second home, and the aircraft your life partner in that home. However, the skies have no favourites and do not necessarily care about reputation and past performance. Each day is new and each sortie is novel. The skies only care for discipline, precision, preparation, and mutual respect.

Over the years, the machines changed, and so did I. I became better not only at reacting to situations but also at anticipating them. My perceptions of life also changed, and I no longer took life for granted. The arrogance and overconfidence of youth matured into humility and assured self-confidence. I lost many friends and colleagues to the hazards of flying, and that made me appreciate the fragility of life. More importantly, their passing made me a better pilot. I learnt from their mistakes and mine. I learnt that an aircraft was, after all, a machine, a mechanical invention, which, like all mechanical inventions, could fail. One leaking valve, one misjudged angle, and one moment of indecision could end everything. This knowledge made me better, sharper and also, if I may add, a kind of perfectionist.

Through it all, I matured, I learnt to live life by laughing loudly, crying intensely, loving passionately and forgiving easily. I developed empathy not just for my juniors but also towards mankind in general. I cherished the small joys of life and began to value relationships. As the popular saying goes, there are either old pilots or bold pilots, but no old and bold pilots. Courage is not the absence of fear, and fear is omnipresent. It is this fear that manifests as mutual respect between the man and the machine, the pilot and his aircraft, the ship and its crew. That sense of respect stayed with me every time I walked towards my aircraft; it made me do my checks more diligently and strapped up with me in the cockpit. The fear transformed into quiet confidence when the engines roared to life and whispered to me whenever something went wrong. It is that fear that kept me alive all these years, and I always said a quiet ‘Thank You’ after every sortie.

Military flying is not just about the enemy. It is about professionalism, patriotism, pragmatism, and most importantly, passion. We fight because we fight for our country and our people. We fight for strangers who will never know us but who rely on us to save them. We fight for the larger cause. It is this cause and calling that makes me get up every day and take to the skies with the same intensity and professionalism day in and day out. This is what makes me a responsible citizen, a better colleague, a good mentor and a good fighter pilot.

My entire life revolved around aircraft and the squadron. The squadrons are not just a workplace; they are family. Forged by a shared sense of purpose, common ethos and work culture and a tightly knit environment, the squadron has always been my ‘go-to’ place. From grueling briefings to trying debriefs, from parties to picnics, and from birthdays and anniversaries to funeral parades, the squadron stands with you through thick and thin. The camaraderie tends to numb that ever prevalent, silent fear and assures you with that feel-good R/T call, “your tail is clear.”

That, in a nutshell, has been my life. A life full of action, adrenaline and professionalism. A dream turned into reality, and a man who became a fighter pilot. Over the years, I flew many aircraft and achieved many milestones. I became a valued member of the fighter pilot clan and was very fortunate to have been chosen to fly the first indigenous fighter aircraft developed by my country. The aircraft was the pride of the nation, a technological marvel and a pilot’s dream. The aircraft was a testimony to the nation’s quest for self-reliance, and I was proud to have been selected to fly it. I soon qualified in all roles of the aircraft and was also chosen to demonstrate the capability of the aircraft to the whole world in air shows across the globe. The aircraft was the cynosure of all eyes whenever it took to the skies. With an enviable safety record, way better than most other aircraft in the world, the aircraft was a joy to fly and jaw-dropping to watch. As a harbinger of indigenisation, the aircraft represented technological achievement as well as confidence in my nation’s manufacturing capacity. I could not have asked for a better machine to take to the skies.

On that fateful day, when I flew my last sortie, nothing was different. I prepared like I always did, I ate what I always ate, I attended the morning briefing like I always did, I wore the same flying clothing that I wore yesterday, and I strapped in with the same confidence, respect and calmness that I have always done for the many years that I have been a fighter pilot. I did everything the way it was meant to be done, and yet something happened. There are some things beyond one’s control. Murphy’s law states that anything that can go wrong will go wrong. I have lived by it my entire life and been well prepared, but that, ladies and gentlemen, is life. My journey ended suddenly, violently and with many unanswered questions, but I did not for one moment fear this ending because all fighter pilots make peace with this fact of life long before their name shows up as part of statistics.

What is hard to understand is the frenzy created by social media platforms, news channels and various online forums to arrive at conclusions before the official court of inquiry has even started investigating into the accident. My message to all the self-proclaimed aviation experts is that You do not know what went wrong. You weren’t there when it happened. Then why are you judging what happened and how?

Remember me not for what went wrong. Remember me for what I did right. Remember me with pride and not with sorrow. Remember me for my spirit and enthusiasm, and remember me not just as a peaked cap atop a coffin but as a human who dared to dream big and ‘Touch the Sky with Glory’. I am truly where I always belonged.

*****

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Keywords: India-US, Chagos archipelago, Diego Garcia, MAHASAGAR, Indian Ocean

Introduction

Despite all the talk about India and the United States (US) falling out over tariffs and trade, the ongoing cooperation between the two nations, observed in Diego Garcia and the larger Chagos archipelago, stands out even more. From October 22 to 28, navies of India and the US conducted joint training in the Chagos area, focusing on anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, involving P-8 Poseidon aircraft. The drills served as a reminder that, despite the recent downswing in India-US ties, the partners are willing to collaborate on the broader, evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the narrow opening in Chagos is a ‘goldilocks moment for India’ to not only seek cooperation and build trust with like-minded partners and friends, but also a chance to redefine its role and responsibility under the revised and expanded vision of Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR).

Diego Garcia is a pivotal US military base, but its location in the contested Chagos archipelago had made it politically sensitive. This was recently resolved via a deal between the United Kingdom (UK) and Mauritius, which will see Port Louis regain control of the Chagos. At the same time, the US continues its presence on Diego Garcia.

India has been an ardent supporter of Mauritius’ sovereignty over Chagos since the 1970s, and its backing of the recent agreement is a testament to that. Recently, on the eight-day visit of the Mauritian Prime Minister, Dr. Navinchandra Ramgoolam, to India, the latter has agreed to develop the marine protected area around Chagos. To further strengthen its presence in the area, where it is welcomed as a preferred security provider, India has also been allowed to conduct a hydrographic survey and develop a satellite station at Chagos to track and receive data. Information sharing and cooperation at sea have been the major highlights of recent engagement. It has brought the interests of New Delhi and Washington closer geographically, in a way that is unprecedented in their relations.

Involvement in the Chagos has also given India a chance to do some heavy lifting, including developing the infrastructure required to address emerging military and non-military challenges such as piracy, drug smuggling, maritime terrorism, and to swiftly conduct humanitarian and disaster relief operations in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, it will allow India to increase its reach and presence in the Central Indian Ocean, where the bulk of maritime traffic passes, and further assist in monitoring the surrounding area by conducting underwater surveillance through sensors and drones. As India becomes a pioneer investor in deep-sea research and exploration, and the only country in the world with two polymetallic sulphides (PMS) exploration contracts with the International Seabed Authority, one in the Central Indian and the Southwest Indian Ridge and the other in the Carlsberg Ridge, its physical presence will add to its resource utilisation in the times to come.

While the deal regarding the return of sovereignty of Chagos to Mauritius from the UK is awaiting ratification, trepidation about the future of the soaring Chinese presence is already colouring policymakers’ minds in the West. “Mauritius is a close ally of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and if Diego Garcia is lost, Chinese power projection will reach the heart of the Indian Ocean,” as warned by the former US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. Another defence expert observed, “A British default would hand China a propaganda victory, give Mauritius justification to expel the United States and the United Kingdom from the islands, and could unravel the entire security architecture of the Indian Ocean. It would be the single greatest strategic blunder of the century.”

Although Chinese diplomatic and economic presence has seen a consistent climb in the Indian Ocean since the beginning of the century, and in particular after the launch of its Belt and Road initiative (BRI), it is now making headway in the security architecture by increasing its institutional and military footprint across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). To this end, a stable and secure presence in the vast geography of the IOR will give Beijing and its military the reach it currently lacks.

As the dynamics of the Indian Ocean become more fluid and volatile, it is in India’s interest to capitalise on every opportunity to sustain its presence while maintaining peace and stability in this region of interest.

*****

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Keywords: Nyoma, Line of Actual Control, Galwan, Tibet Autonomous Region, Indian Air Force.

Introduction

On November 12, 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, arrived on board a C-130J transport aircraft, accompanied by C-in-C Western Air Command, at one of its northernmost airfields, Mudh-Nyoma.[1] The landing was part of the inauguration ceremony that declared the airfield fully operational, making it the third of its kind in the Eastern Ladakh region, alongside Leh and Thoise.[2] The Mudh-Nyoma airstrip was developed initially as an Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) during the 1962 conflict. In 2009, an AN-32 carried out a landing at the base, thus bringing it into focus after years of neglect.[3] The airfield is another step in the series of infrastructure push undertaken since the Galwan clash of 2020.[4] The article aims to identify the likely operational significance of the said airfield and its manifestation during an operational scenario.

Build to Compete

At an elevation of 13,700 feet above mean sea level, Nyoma is India’s highest[5] and the fifth-highest airfield in the world, capable of undertaking fighter aircraft operations.[6]^,[7] It is situated just 30-35 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Other airfields, such as Leh and Thoise, are significantly farther from the LAC and hence result in increased deployment and reaction times. In recent times, there has been significant progress in the development of infrastructure at high altitudes, especially in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where China supports multiple bases to support transport and fighter operations. However, what distinguishes Nyoma is the scale of terrain gradient and topographic complexity involved in its construction.[8] Although most TAR airfields are located at an altitude of 13,000-14,000 feet, the entire TAR region has relatively flat terrain that permits convenient movement and the faster development of such airfields. It is essential to acknowledge this remarkable achievement, as it has taken just about two years from initialisation to operationalisation. This began when the Minister of Defence, Rajnath Singh, laid the foundation in September 2023.[9] This suggests the urgency and operational requirement that the IAF felt for the airfield to be operational at such short notice. The Galwan incident triggered large-scale actions known as “Rebalancing 1.0“, which involved the permanent forward positioning of approximately 50,000 troops, the emergency procurement of surveillance and weapon systems, and the accelerated completion of border infrastructure projects. The operationalisation of this airfield provides for a limited reaction time and associated deterrence. The broader action set suggests a combination of deterrence by denial and punishment. Denial by sustaining the ability for rapid forward deployment and punishment by placing fighters at the airfield with such capabilities.

Operational Significance

While there are several operational scenarios where the airfield can support the IAF in particular and the Indian military operations in general, some have been suggested below: –

1. Proximity. Nyoma’s proximity to the LAC suggests that it was felt that Western airfields, such as Leh and Thoise, were either inadequate or too far inland to pose an effective deterrent. The IAF swung into action during the Galwan crisis and was able to muster adequate combat capability to deter any Chinese misgivings. Over 68,000 troops, 90 tanks, and 330 BMP infantry combat vehicles were airlifted during these operations.[10]^,[11] Operationalising an airfield near the LAC significantly reduces reaction time. It enhances forward mobility and facilitates the evacuation of personnel and supplies during emergencies.

2.  Operability.   Regarding the operational strengths of the airfield, it features a long runway (~2.7-3.0 km) that supports the movement of fighters and heavy transport. It manifests in multiple operational possibilities, including an increased presence of fighters in an operational readiness state and the availability of a forward landing base to position  troops en masse. Movement of troops and equipment requires a substantial period of time, a luxury that one may not have in a time of conflict. Additionally, it would also facilitate routine movement in and out of the area expeditiously. All of this amounts to savings of time and money due to reduced costs of sustenance. This forms part of the triad of airfields at Leh and Thoise that translates into redundancy and enhanced combat capacity.

3.  Intent. The infrastructure development at Nyoma is part of a broader effort to enhance border areas in Ladakh and the northeastern states. Multiple projects aimed at increasing connectivity are indicative of a shift in mindset that has alleviated the operational lethargy. Historically, India followed a “Scorched Earth Policy,” which argued that any infrastructure development in these areas would likely assist the adversary in the event of a conflict.[12] This argument was flawed and lacked supporting evidence. The recent undertakings have communicated a clear intent of breaking the myth of adversarial supremacy in these sectors.

4.  Terrain. A comparative analysis of the airfield infrastructure on both sides of the LAC indicates that both forces face a similar dilemma when weighing the aspect of altitude of operation and its manifestations. All three airfields in India and multiple airfields in TAR are restricted in supporting aircraft operations with heavier payloads, thereby reducing the operational viability of their use. However, India has an edge in the proximity of these bases to its inland bases, which are located at much lower altitudes.[13] Therefore, an operational scenario can enable aircraft to take off with heavier payloads from lower airfields[14] and recover at these bases, resulting in a longer combat period.[15] The Chinese case is complicated because their lower-altitude bases are located much farther away, and they are dependent on these local airfields for support. Hence, Nyoma, in conjunction with Leh and Thoise, aims to balance the large capacity that the Chinese have built up over the years in TAR.

Conclusion

The rapid operationalisation of Nyoma suggests a fundamental transformation in the strategic thinking towards border defence. It indicates a shift from dependence on terrain barriers to creating a deterrent posture based upon infrastructure-backed operational capability.  Tactically, Nyoma translates to reduced reaction time, longer loitering periods and an operational recovery facility for aircraft with higher payloads. Operationally, it provides a troika of airfields that offer redundancy and distributed asset management. Strategically, it conveys to the adversary that we are here to compete and that India does not concede to any belligerent intentions.[16] Achieving infrastructural parity is a long way off; however, it suggests intent and translates to deterrence, stability, and control of escalation. It does not topple the operational capability that the adversary has built up over time, but it does increase the cost of any misadventure manifold.

*****

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Notes:

[1] Mayank Singh, “Nyoma Air Base Near LAC in Ladakh Operationalised, Air Chief Makes Inaugural Landing,” The New Indian Express, November 11, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Nov/12/nyoma-air-base-near-lac-in-ladakh-operationalised-air-chief-makes-inaugural-landing#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20The%20operational%20Capability,Actual%20Control%20in%20Eastern%20Ladakh. Accessed on November 13, 2025.

[2] Shivani Sharma, “At 13,700 Feet Near China Border, India’s Highest Airfield Gets Fully Operational,” India Today, November 11, 2025, At 13,700 feet near China border, India’s highest airfield gets fully operational – India Today. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[3] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “AN-32 Aircraft Lands at Nyoma Advanced Landing Ground in Ladakh,” June 21, 2010, https://archive.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=62489. Accessed on                  November 11, 2025.

[4] Shivani Sharma, “5 Years Since Galwan, How India Has Fortified Border with China,” India Today, June 15, 2025. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/galwan-5-years-how-india-fortified-border-with-reforms-roads-2740912-2025-06-15, Accessed on November 14, 2025.

[5] Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) is an airfield located at a higher altitude; however, it does not support fighter aircraft operations and serves as an advanced landing ground (ALG) only.

[6] “Nyoma Airbase Near China Border in Ladakh Now Operational,” Money Control, November 12, 2025, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/nyoma-airbase-near-china-border-in-ladakh-now-operational-13672672.html. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[7] “Nyoma Airbase Becomes Operational at 13,700 Ft, Breaking a World Record: A New Battlefront Advantage Against Kargil-like Situations,” Indian Masterminds, https://indianmasterminds.com/news/nyoma-airbase-worlds-highest-fighter-base-india-159506/,  November 13, 2025.

[8]  Rajeswari Rajagopalan, “How Is China Expanding Its Infrastructure to Project Power Along Its Borders?” CSIS ChinaPower, November 8, 2023, How Is China Expanding its Infrastructure to Project Power Along its Western Borders? | ChinaPower Project. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[9] Rahul Singh, “IAF chief lands C-130J, inaugurates Nyoma airbase in Ladakh,” Hindustan Times, November 12, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/iaf-chief-lands-c-130j-inaugurates-nyoma-airbase-in-ladakh-101762952103449.html , Accessed on November 14, 2025.

[10] “IAF Airlifted Over 68,000 Soldiers to Eastern Ladakh After Galwan Clashes,” Business Standard, August 13, 2023. https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/iaf-airlifted-over-68-000-soldiers-to-eastern-ladakh-after-galwan-clashes-123081300337_1.html, Accessed on November 14, 2025.

[11] “IAF Airlifts Dozens of Tanks to Ladakh,” Indian Military Review, July 21, 2020, IAF Airlifts Dozens of Tanks To Ladakh | IMR. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[12] Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s Worrying Border Infrastructure Deficit,” The Diplomat, June 19, 2014, India’s Worrying Border Infrastructure Deficit – The Diplomat. Accessed November 13, 2025.

[13] Sumit Mukharjee, “Application of Air Power in High Altitude Areas,” India Foundation, September 01, 2020, Application of Air Power in High Altitude Areas – India Foundation. Accessed November 13, 2025.

[14] “Factors That Affect an Aircraft’s Payload,” Air Planning, February 02, 2024, Understanding the Complex Variables that Affect an Aircraft’s Payload. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[15] Anil Chopra, “How Nyoma Airfield in Ladakh Marks a Military Aviation Milestone,” Firstpost, November 10, 2025, How Nyoma airfield in Ladakh marks a military aviation milestone for India – Firstpost. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

[16] Ravi Shankar, “India’s Silent Surge: Massive Infrastructure Overhaul Along LAC to Deter China Post-Galwan,”

Bharat Shakti, June 24, 2025, Infrastructure Overhaul Along LAC to Deter China Post-Galwan. Accessed on November 11, 2025.

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Keywords: Burevestnik, Cruise Missile, Nuclear Reactor, Russia

As the United States (US) is scrambling in its diplomatic outreach to find a solution to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the Russian Federation is readying all its conventional and nuclear weapons with new tests and deployment. Ever since the war started in February 2022, Russia has deployed and tested a variety of weapons. These include the deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles, such as the Kinzhal, an air-to-air nuclear-capable missile variant of the R-37M long-range air-to-air missile, and hypersonic weapons, such as Oreshnik. The tests include the launch of the Bulava Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the test launch of a modified Topol-M ICBM called Topol-ME, and the test launch of the MIRV-capable Yars ICBM. Along with these developments, Russia has also managed to reequip itself with 88 per cent of modern weapons, which are of Russian origin instead of being developed during Soviet times. Unsurprisingly, Russia is now testing new weapons of different classes to make sure that its nuclear and conventional capacities remain at par, if not more, with those of its adversaries. Under this thinking, Russia has recently tested a long-range nuclear-powered cruise missile and now plans to deploy it at the earliest. This article examines the new nuclear-powered cruise missile, its significance, and the repercussions it has for the global nuclear order.

The Missile 

On October 27, 2025, it was reported that Russia successfully tested its nuclear-powered cruise missile, Burevestnik. Russia’s Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces stated that the missile travelled 14,000 km and was airborne for approximately 15 hours. The missile, officially known as 9M730 Burevestnik (Storm Petrel) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-designated SSC-X-9 Skyfall, is described by Russia as “invincible” at penetrating current and future missile defences. The significance of the missile can be understood from the point that Russian President Vladimir Putin touted it as “a unique weapon which nobody else in the world has.”

The test, which was announced as successful, has, however, had its fair share of failures over the year. The 9M730 Burevestnik was revealed in March 2018. The missile typically features cruise-missile capabilities at subsonic speeds. The development of the missile, however, goes back to 2011. In 2018, Russian President Putin stated that Burevestnik “is a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries.” The information essentially explained the significant features of the missile, which can be attributed as follows:

1. 1. 1. Low-flying altitude suggesting cruise capabilities

      2. Stealth design meant for survivability

      3. Nuclear warhead signifying strategic missions

      4. Unlimited range, intended for intercontinental targeting

      5. Unpredictable trajectory aiming for counter-air-defence capability.

One of the essential features of the Burevestnik, highlighted in 2018, was its unlimited range. To fulfil the said requirement, Russia has ensured the integration of a nuclear power engine as the necessary propulsion. The concept on which Burevestnik is based is not new and has been explored during the early phase of the Cold War. The US worked on two plans, known as Project Pluto and Project Rover, from 1956 to 1973. The Pluto Project included tests of two open-loop propulsion reactors — Tory-IIA and Tory-IIC — intended for developing a supersonic nuclear ramjet. Accordingly, the Tory reactors had dimensions of less than ten feet in length and diameter. However, to make a nuclear-powered missile work like the Project Pluto cruise missile, chemical rockets were required to provide the velocity the nuclear ramjet needed.

Regarding the technical parameters of the Burevestnik, no conclusive information is available in the public domain, nor is there any information from the Russian side. Russia conducted four tests of the Burevestnik between November 2017 and February 2018. In February 2018, a test of the missile was reported to have crashed somewhere in the Barents Sea, but the observation yielded only technical details about the missile. It was reported that the reactor of the missile was “very small in size, [and] is likely using highly enriched uranium-235 as fuel. The core diameter is less than half a meter.” In 2021, the United Kingdom (UK) Chief of Defence Intelligence, James Hockenhull, reaffirmed that Burevestnik is a subsonic nuclear-powered cruise missile with a global reach. The other technical considerations that can be proposed are as follows:

1. 1. A ramjet design, which essentially works efficiently above Mach 2, can also operate subsonically and thus Burevestnik can be both subsonic and ramjet at the same time. The following image shows the conceptual arrangement of a nuclear ramjet.

1. 2. An unlimited range of the missile, as claimed by Russia, is more on the lines of a symbolic threat than the actual threat the missile can pose. Yes, indeed, the nuclear ramjet propulsion systems can have a long cruising range, but it is not infinite. Fuel consumption imposes a stricter limit on the range.

1. 3. While it is still unknown what kind of reactor the missile uses, studies have proposed at least two types of systems which the Burevestnik can utilise to heat the incoming air for acceleration. The first one is an Open-loop system where the “incoming air flows straight through the reactor to extract the heat and propel the missile.” The second is a Closed-loop system, “where the reactor is isolated from the airflow by a heat exchanger that transfers the reactor’s heat to the air.”

In addition to the features mentioned above, this missile system must also overcome issues related to inertial forces and atmospheric turbulence while airborne. Both inertial forces and atmospheric turbulence can pose challenges to the reactor’s heat generation. Besides these issues, since the missile is touted as a stealth platform, the onboard platforms which require running the reactor need to be autonomous. Any form of communication during the flight will compromise the missile’s stealth characteristics. Since the missile is subsonic in nature, it won’t be able to outrun the incoming adversaries.

Is Missile Technology Too Risky to be Pursued?

While it is still unknown how Russia has managed to integrate this technology and whether it is working as projected, what can be put out is the technology’s ramifications. The first concerns the accidental launch or loss of the system during a heightened crisis. To date, 32 nuclear weapon accidents have occurred, which are more commonly known as ‘Broken Arrows.’ The concept of Broken Arrows only explains “an unexpected event involving nuclear weapons that result[s] in the accidental launching, firing, detonating, theft, or loss of the weapon.” Perhaps, now that the development of Burevestnik is complete, the time has come to expand the definition of Broken Arrows and involve accidental launch or loss of airborne nuclear reactors. A lesser but related risk of this kind of platform is accidental loss of the nuclear reactor during an exercise or test launch. This kind of accident can result in airborne radioactivity. This happened in September 2017, resulting in a cloud of Ru-106 radioactivity. Besides the problem of accidental launch or loss, this type of missile system is essentially a first-strike platform with a dual-use configuration. The dual-use configuration has its own advantages and disadvantages. Still, when a nuclear reactor-powered missile is involved, it introduces additional risks—the risk of interception, which would result in the dispersion of radiation.

So, What Military Objective Could Russia Achieve?

There are essentially three military objectives Russia seems to achieve from this platform. The following are the three military objectives:

1. 1. Cruising ahead of the Ballistic Missile Defence: Since Burevestnik is a cruise missile, it is meant to evade any existing ballistic missile defence technologies that Russia’s adversaries possess. While it may seem like a self-fulfilling prophecy for Russia, given that the US is now pursuing its Golden Dome system, Russia has been wary of US ballistic missile defence technology since the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Over the years, Russia has managed to build platforms such as hypersonic weapons, which can help evade ballistic missile defences.

   2. A second-strike capability beyond sea-based deterrence: Another important military objective, which Burevestnik can fulfil, is to provide an assured second-strike capability to Russia. Fundamentally, it is the sea-based nuclear capabilities which provide such capabilities. However, a platform like Burevestnik, which can remain airborne for an extended period due to its nuclear propulsion, can play the same role as a sea-based platform.

1. 3. An offensive platform with a political undertone: While Burevestnik is essentially an offensive military platform, it is also a political weapon. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia has managed to showcase to the world the weapons which once seemed too difficult to develop, integrate, and utilise. For example, in the ongoing war, Russia has managed to field its hypersonic weapons quite extensively. These hypersonic platforms may not have helped Russia end the war on its own terms, but they have also played on the fears of Western powers. At the same time, the nuclear sabre-rattling by Russia has, on more than one occasion, helped negate the export of military technology to Ukraine. Announcing the success of Burevestnik is as much a political as a military achievement, sending signals to Western and NATO powers.

Conclusion

The announcement of Burevestnik has come at a time when Russia is in the midst of a war with Ukraine and modernising its defence structure, where nuclear modernisation is a primary goal. The proclamation has also come at a time when Russia is developing more advanced nuclear platforms, such as Poseidon, which can carry nuclear weapons that can cause radioactive tsunamis, wiping out huge coastal areas. Both Burevestnik and Poseidon are nuclear-capable platforms and add to Russia’s sea and air-based nuclear triad. Both developments are also significant for Russia, as its new land-based nuclear platform has experienced several major failures in recent testing. Besides military objectives, Russia would not want to lag in integrating these platforms before Russia and the US again sit down for an arms-control agreement, which, as of now, seems a distant dream.

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Keywords: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Bayraktar TB2, Shahed-136, First-Person View (FPV) drones, Kamikaze Drones, Loitering Munitions, Air Power, Lancet Drone, Electronic warfare.

Introduction: War in the Drone Age

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the world anticipated that tanks, fighter planes, and guns would come to characterise the battlefield. Instead, ‘Drone’, a new actor, moved into the limelight. Within months, the skies of Eastern Europe became a battlefield not for bold pilots, but for quiet, unmanned devices that could observe, attack, and go where manned aircraft could not.

From Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2s obliterating Russian air defences and even sinking the Moskva warship, to Russia launching waves of Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drones to cripple Ukrainian infrastructure, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become much more than support tools; they are now game-changing weapons. They attack deep within enemy lines without putting their pilots at risk, target artillery with precision, and reveal enemy movements in real-time.

This war has demonstrated a profound change; air superiority no longer requires expensive fighter planes or gallant pilots. Rather, cheap, small, and stubborn drones are rewriting the very definition of air power. What was science fiction not so long ago is now a matter-of-fact aspect of war, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the most unambiguous indication yet that the era of the drone has officially started.

Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 and Russia’s Shahed-136 and Lancet Drones: A Game-Changer

One of the most recognised drones of the conflict is the Bayraktar TB2, manufactured in Türkiye and used by Ukraine.[1] The Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone can fly for up to 27 hours, has a ceiling of approximately 25,000 feet, and can carry laser-guided missile weapons. At the outset of the war, the TB2s were instrumental in the destruction of Russian air defence systems and Russian convoys.[2] They even sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva.[3] The TB2 also provided real-time targeting data for artillery strikes. As the conflict continued and as Russia improved its air defences, the TB2 shifted from conducting attacks to fulfilling the role of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).[4]

Russia has employed Iranian-manufactured Shahed-136 drones, which they refer to as Geran-2, a type of “kamikaze drone” designed to fly into a target and explode.[5] The Shahed-136 is relatively cheap and can be launched in swarms. Russia is using them for strikes on everything from power stations to military facilities to cities. Often, Russian forces send them at night to overwhelm air defences. In this way, the Shahed-136 has taken the place of long-range bomber missions by aircraft, which would be much more expensive to use and riskier to send on distant missions.

The Lancet drone by Russians is a precision-guided loitering munition which is utilised to destroy tanks, artillery pieces, and radar stations. Lancet was used in the wake of a Shahed attack to hit targets that survived the first wave. The Lancet has undertaken missions that would have been carried out by Su-25 ground-attack aircraft or an attack helicopter. Although these assets are now often forced to operate from greater distances because of the threat of portable air-defence systems.[6]

Commercial UAVs on the Frontline

Both Russia and Ukraine heavily utilise First-Person View (FPV) drones, which are often adapted from commercial drones.[7] These are small, fast, and manually piloted using a live camera feed, allowing operators to guide them with extreme precision. FPV drones are perfect for trench warfare and urban fighting. They are inexpensive, hard to shoot down, and ideal for missions.

Commercial drones, such as the DJI Mavic series and Matrice series, have also become a standard tool on the battlefield.[8] On the front line, drones are used for artillery spotting, reconnaissance and even light bombing by attaching small explosives. In some cases, these drones have replaced scout helicopters and observation planes. They are inexpensive, readily available, and simple for soldiers to use and operate. A front-line unit can unpack, launch, and fly a drone in just minutes, providing them with instantaneous situational awareness.

Shift from Manned Aircraft to Drones

Why this shift from manned aircraft to drones? Safety is the most obvious factor. If one is shot down, the loss is a machine, not a human life.[9] Price is yet another significant factor. Although a new fighter plane will cost an enormous amount of money, a drone can be constructed and piloted for a fraction of that price.[10] Another benefit is endurance; most drones can remain aloft much longer than manned planes, as pilots get tired and run out of fuel are the only limitations for them.[11] The mere ability of drones to provide real-time video and images means that they can deliver precision strikes or guide artillery fire to the precise location.[12] And since they have no human aboard, they can be launched into deep-defended territory where a manned aircraft would stand little chance of survival.

Vulnerabilities of using Drones

However, drones have certain disadvantages. Even after using fewer munitions, their speed is invariably slower.[13] Many of them are also susceptible to adverse weather conditions.[14] Electronic warfare also poses a significant threat. Signals can be jammed or hacked, or they can crash.[15] There will be obstacles in coordinating airspace for simultaneous use by drones and manned aircraft, as avoiding collisions beyond visual line-of-sight will rely on sensing and control systems with advanced capabilities. And finally, there are ethical questions. Drones can often be deployed with ease and inexpensive redundancy, which leads to questions of whether this would cause the military and others to lower the threshold to use lethal force.[16] Civilian casualties created by the use of drone strikes are still a hotly contested public debate, as is the potential for autonomous targeting against humans without human intervention. The availability of drones in the open market creates a risk to national security if technologically advanced UAVs are obtained by non-state actors and used in coordinated attacks.[17]

Key Lessons for India from the Drone Era

India must respond to the drone era with strategic and intelligent adaptation rather than mindlessly copying others. Accelerated investment in domestic counter-drone technologies is the first step. For example, the D4 system, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), neutralises small UAVs by combining hard-kill options, such as lasers or kinetic interceptors, with soft-kill techniques, like jamming.[18] In addition to government initiatives, private companies are also developing innovative projects. For example, Bhargavastra, a micro-missile solution for swarm drones, demonstrates that India can lead the world in specialised counter-UAS technology.[19]

Second, India must implement a layered air defence system, combining drones, electronic warfare, radars, and missile systems at various ranges.[20] Experience from the Ukrainian employment of drones for artillery ranging and precision targeting emphasises the need for training in networked, joint operations where drones are not only used for reconnaissance but also for fire control, intelligence gathering, and logistics support.[21]

Third, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict revealed fundamental supply-chain risks. To prevent similar threats, India needs to minimise import dependence by creating local ecosystems for vital components, such as sensors, chips, payloads, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) software.[22]

Lastly, India should ready itself against the emerging threat of low-cost commercial drones being used atrociously by non-state actors, especially in the border regions, and safeguard civilian infrastructure as well.[23]

Essentially, the most critical takeaway for India is to shift from a reactive to an anticipatory posture: build indigenous counter-UAS capabilities, integrate them into multi-layered defences, reinforce domestic supply chains, and actively confront asymmetric drone threats across all domains.

Way Forward: The New Face of Air Power

Although there are challenges, the war in Ukraine has shown that drones are not merely backup systems anymore; they are now part of military strategy and capable of taking over missions formerly attended by belligerents with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. In Ukraine, drones have been used to identify targets for artillery fire, adjust artillery rounds to targets, engage direct strikes against targets, and induce psychological effects on enemy forces by always ensuring they know they are being monitored.[24] For Russia, drones allow long-range attacks deep into Ukrainian territory without risking pilots or expensive aircraft. This represents a profound shift in how drones are applied in modern warfare.

In the future, the experiences of this war are likely to influence military planning globally. Military forces will allocate more resources to drone manufacturing, pilot training, and anti-drone systems.[25] The ratio between human-crewed and unmanned systems will continue to evolve, with unmanned planes increasingly handling perilous and routine assignments.[26] Though manned aircraft will not become extinct, they do retain an edge in speed, payload, and specific mission types. Their domain will diminish in wars where the airspace is contested, and the threats are real. The ethics, strategy, and technology surrounding this transformation will haunt us for decades to come, but one thing is sure: the age of the drone has arrived.

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Notes:-

[1] Gary Mortimer, “The History and Effectiveness of the Bayraktar TB2 Drone in Ukraine,” sUAS News, June 2023, https://www.suasnews.com/2023/06/the-history-and-effectiveness-of-the-bayraktar-tb2-drone-in-ukraine/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[2] “The Bayraktar TB2 and the Role of Affordable UCAVs in Modern Warfare,” Army Technology, March 17, 2022, https://www.army-technology.com/analyst-comment/bayraktar-tb2-modern-warfare/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[3] Valius Venckūnas, “Bayraktar Drone Used to ‘Distract’ Russian Flagship in Missile Attack: Reports,” Aero Time, April 14, 2022, https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/30757-reports-indicate-that-bayraktar-helped-to-attack-moskva. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[4] Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Are the Once-Vaunted Bayraktar Drones Losing Their Shine in Ukraine?” Defense News, October 31, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/10/31/are-the-once-vaunted-bayraktar-drones-losing-their-shine-in-ukraine/. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[5] “Exclusive: Russia Develops New Drone‑Warfare Tactics with Unveiling of Truck-Mounted Geran‑2 Loitering Munition Launcher,” Army Recognition, April 18, 2025, https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/defence-security-industry-technology/exclusive-russia-develops-new-drone-warfare-tactics-with-unveiling-of-truck-mounted-geran-2-loitering-munition-launcher. Accessed on October 15, 2025.

[6] Ingvild Bode and Tom F.A. Watts, “Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability: Autonomy in Weapon Systems and Challenges to Human Control,” Center for War Studies, May 2023, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371351342_Loitering_Munitions_and_Unpredictability_Autonomy_in_Weapon_Systems_and_Challenges_to_Human_Control. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[7] Ahmad Ibrahim, “Employment of FPV Drones in Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons and Future Outlook,” Modern Diplomacy, December 14, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/14/employment-of-fpv-drones-in-russia-ukraine-war-lessons-and-future-outlook/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[8] David Hambling, “DJI Consumer Drones Are Still Russian Soldiers’ Favorite,” Forbes, March 10, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/03/10/dji-consumer-drones-are-still-russian-soldiers-favorite/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[9] Joseph Noronha, “UCAV: Airborne Without a Pilot,” Indian Defence Review, October 5, 2013, https://indiandefencereview.com/ucav-airborne-without-a-pilot/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[10] Muhammad Saleem, Furqan Syed, and Aun Muslim Zaidi, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” (Bachelor’s thesis, National University of Science and Technology, 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337559508_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[11] David Axe, “Refueling Gear Makes Navy’s Next Drone Even Deadlier,” Wired, November 4, 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/11/navy-killer-drone-refuel/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[12] Rajneesh Singh, “Drones for Surveillance to Strikes: Assessing the Impact through the Lens of Russia–Ukraine War,” Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 24, 2024, https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/Drones-for-Surveillance-to-Strikes-RSingh-241024. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[13] Harrison Miller, “Fighter Jets vs. Elon Musk: What U.S. Military Drones Mean for Defense Stocks,” Investor’s Business Daily, March 28, 2025, https://www.investors.com/news/fighter-jets-elon-musk-us-military-drones-defense-stocks/. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[14] Maja Kucharczyk, Chris Hugenholtz, Mozhou Gao, Paul Nesbit, Thomas Barchyn, and Thomas Fox, “The Weather’s Effects on Commercial Drones May Hinder Their Widespread Use,” The Conversation, June 20, 2021, https://theconversation.com/the-weathers-effects-on-commercial-drones-may-hinder-their-widespread-use-162581. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[15] Tereza Pultarova, “How Ukraine’s Killer Drones Are Beating Russian Jamming,” IEEE Spectrum, June 2, 2025, https://spectrum.ieee.org/ukraine-killer-drones. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[16] Chris Cole, “Drones’ Lower Threshold of Lethal Force’ Academic Study Finds,” True Publica, February 15, 2016, https://truepublica.org.uk/united-kingdom/drones-lower-threshold-lethal-force-academic-study-finds/. Accessed on  October 16, 2025.

[17] Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell, “Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age,” Center for a New American Security, September 10, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-the-swarm. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[18] “Anti-Drone System,” Bharat Electronics Limited,  https://bel-india.in/product/anti-drone-system/. Accessed on  October 16, 2025.

[19] “What Is Bhargavastra? India’s Indigenous System to Counter Drone Swarms,” Hindustan Times, May 14, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/all-about-bhargavastra-indias-indigenous-system-to-counter-swarm-drones-threat-101747224636058.html. Accessed on October 16, 2025.

[20] “Indian Army Discusses Future Air Defence and Counter-Drone Strategy,” India Strategic, March 2, 2025, https://www.indiastrategic.in/indian-army-discusses-future-air-defence-and-counter-drone-strategy. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[21] Rakesh Sharma, “The Ukraine-Russia War: Military Lessons for India,” NatStrat, April 26, 2024, https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/ukraine-russia-war-military-lessons-and-legacies-for-india-133.html. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[22] Twinkle Sharma, “Russia–Ukraine Drone Warfare: Strategic Lessons for India,” Defence Research and Studies, August 11, 2025, https://dras.in/russia-ukraine-drone-warfare-strategic-lessons-for-india/. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[23] Vivek Gopal, “Developing an Effective Anti-Drone System for India’s Armed Forces,” ORF Issue Brief No. 370 (Observer Research Foundation, June 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/developing-an-effective-anti-drone-system-for-indias-armed-forces-68001. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[24] Stacie L. Pettyjohn, “Drones Are Transforming the Battlefield in Ukraine, but in an Evolutionary Fashion,” War on the Rocks, March 5, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-are-transforming-the-battlefield-in-ukraine-but-in-an-evolutionary-fashion/. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[25] “Surge in Global Defense Budgets Having Significant Impact on the Global Military UAS Drone Market,” GlobeNewswire, April 10, 2025, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/04/10/3059427/0/en/Surge-In-Global-Defense-Budgets-Having-Significant-Impact-On-The-Global-Military-UAS-Drone-Market.html. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

[26] Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Army Plans Massive Increase in Its Use of Drones,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/us-army-drones-shift-20cc5753. Accessed on October 17, 2025.

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