Keywords: India nuclear strategy, nuclear deterrence, nuclear diplomacy

India marked 25 years as a state with nuclear weapons in 2023. Interestingly, when New Delhi conducted the nuclear tests in 1998, it was accused of blowing a hole into the non-proliferation regime. After all, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had just been granted a consensual, indefinite extension, and the focus was on getting nations to commit to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India’s tests, and the fact that Pakistan too followed suit a couple of weeks later, were dubbed a highly negative development, and the entire region was described as a dangerous nuclear flashpoint. The non-proliferation supporters had convinced themselves that a disaster was waiting to happen between the two new nuclear-armed states.

Fortunately, no such thing has happened in over two decades, despite the two countries having faced several crises. Many factors have been responsible for ensuring that such escalation is contained. Meanwhile, crises with nuclear overtones have erupted in other unexpected regions, pushing South Asia down on the list of contemporary hotspots. It is indeed ironic that the region that seemed to have given sleepless nights to the international community just over two decades ago stood out in 2023 as an island of ‘relative’ nuclear stability, even as nuclear risks have been palpably felt across other theatres.

Indeed, the year 2023 was lived in the shadow of multiple kinds of nuclear risks, the likes of which had not been seen for over the last thirty years. It may be recalled that at the end of 1993, the Cold War was in remission. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the penultimate month of 1989, US-Russia relations appeared more amicable. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II treaty had been signed earlier that year and, among other provisions, it banned multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles on missiles. The United States had agreed to purchase Russian highly enriched uranium from dismantled Soviet nuclear warheads and convert it into lower-grade uranium for electricity production. This became famous as the ‘Megatons to Megawatts’ programme. Also in that year, the US and Russia completed negotiations on a de-targeting agreement whereby both agreed not to directly target each other’s nuclear weapons. Overall, there was a trend towards de-emphasising nuclear weapons in inter-state relations.

Three decades later, the scenario is completely different. Nuclear weapons are back in vogue and being showcased as centrepieces of national security. In 2023, Russia did not hesitate to draw attention to its nuclear weapons as part of its continuing military operations against Ukraine; China has not been shy of the unprecedented expansion of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities or even insinuations of nuclear muscle flexing in contingencies involving Taiwan; American national documents brazenly seek expansion as well as upgradation of national nuclear capabilities to cater for two nuclear threats, Russia and China; there are reports about increasing activity at nuclear test sites of major nuclear countries; North Korea has not been inhibited to continue activity on advancing its missiles for nuclear delivery; and, Pakistan, which saw a relative quiet period with India this year, has nevertheless, as part of its traditional compulsive behaviour to destabilise India, continued to explore new methods of nuclear brinksmanship to support its cross border terrorism.  Meanwhile, there is a near-complete loss of focus on and hope for nuclear arms control.

Amidst such predominant nuclear trends, India looks almost placid on the nuclear front. There has been no visible change in the pace or nature of its nuclear build-up, revision of nuclear doctrine, strategy, or posture. In fact, the country stands out for being a beacon of nuclear stability, even as others are indulging in behaviour that encourages a cycle of hedging strategies and arms racing, thereby causing further security dilemmas.

What should India be doing?

Do the nuclear and missile capability enhancements taking place elsewhere, and especially those in India’s neighbourhood, not matter for India’s nuclear deterrence? How should India cope with these developments? The last eleven issues of NuClearly Put have examined these questions in some detail. This last column of the year pulls together some basic recommendations that are particularly worthy of consideration.

• • Nuclear weapons are not on their way out. Nuclear deterrence is likely to remain an important tool to shape and contain conventional crises. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has only reinforced this belief. But the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence can be relatively modest. Overspending on this capability would entail compromising on other, more effective military capabilities. Such a tendency should be avoided.

  • The credibility of nuclear deterrence is derived most potently from the ability to retaliate in such a manner as to make the first use of nuclear weapons extremely costly in terms of the risks of further escalation and the damage inflicted. India’s future trajectory of capability build-up must keep this as its guide to ensure that the country has the necessary wherewithal in terms of weapons, delivery systems, and command and control structures to retaliate in such a manner. This will minimise the possibility of deterrence breakdown, which is the primary purpose of India’s nuclear weapons.

  • India should not get into the numbers game with nuclear weapons and refrain from feeling compelled to match the arsenals of our adversaries, weapon for weapon. In any case, India has been slowly and steadily increasing its nuclear stockpile as per a plan based on minimum deterrence requirements that are sufficient for signalling credibility. That should continue to be the guiding factor, without any need for a panicky increase in response to the actions of others.

  • The first use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of how they are defined, tactical or strategic, can only bring ruin. The way nuclear escalation might happen remains uncharted territory, and there can be no promised guarantees of any kind. Therefore, deterrence by the idea of retaliation, rather than first use, is more likely to keep the use of nuclear weapons at bay.

  • Massive retaliation is not incredulous. In fact, given the nature of the weapon, this is likely to be the result of the use of even modest nuclear numbers.

  • Some emerging technologies, especially those that enable better intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision targeting, would have implications for the survivability of nuclear arsenals. These will have to be carefully monitored and intelligently countered.

  • Buttressing conventional deterrence capability is important to keep the nuclear threshold high.

  • Improving bilateral and regional security relations must remain a constant effort. While strategic patience will be needed to resolve some of the historical and structural disputes between India-Pakistan and India-China, the creation of crisis management mechanisms must be given due attention.

There is no doubt that nuclear India has charted its own trajectory and marched to its own nuclear drummer, irrespective of the rest of the parade. This ‘India way’ has emerged from its understanding of the basic nature of nuclear weapons and the impact of their use. Consequently, it has been found prudent to practise deterrence through punishment. In contrast, most other nuclear possessors (except China) have opted to establish deterrence by denial. Such a strategy leans towards signalling a capability to fight a war with nuclear weapons and hence requires multiple kinds, and more numbers, of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, besides the adoption of risky nuclear postures.

India consciously eschewed such a nuclear strategy. A sense of restraint or moderation in capability build-up, as well as a sense of responsibility in behaviour, has, therefore, been a natural dimension of its deterrence. The collateral benefit of this has been deterrence stability.

While India has been an ardent champion of universal nuclear disarmament and continues to aspire for the goal, it realises how distant it is in the current circumstances. Till such time as this ideal can become a reality, it is imperative that the possessors of nuclear weapons hold their assets of such high destructive potential with due understanding of the risks involved. India should proactively participate in all efforts aimed at nuclear risk recognition, reduction, and mitigation. In fact, doing so would be useful for India from both deterrence and disarmament points of view. On the one hand, it would reduce the chances of India being sucked into a crisis or arms race instability, and on the other, it could help create conditions that can gradually devalue nuclear weapons to enable their elimination. Therefore, India should step up its nuclear diplomacy at the global level. Today’s nuclear order is devoid of leadership, and India’s voice carries the credibility of good behaviour and responsible practise as a nuclear-armed state now a quarter of a century old.

The Column

NuClearly Put has been an effort to ‘clearly’ discuss complex nuclear issues in the 25th year of India’s existence as a state with nuclear weapons. Since issues around nuclear weapons can often be counterintuitive – such as, how can having fewer nuclear weapons than your adversary still ensure credible deterrence; how can leaving the onus of nuclear first use on the adversary be stabilising; or, why missile defence can be destabilising and retaining a state of mutual vulnerability be good for nuclear deterrence – each monthly column tried to explore and explain a subject and its nuances. All of these are available on the CAPS website.

I cannot conclude the last issue for the year without acknowledging those who helped me refine and sustain this effort over the last 12 months. I first shared the seed of this idea with my husband, Amulpreet, who then helped me hone it, select each topic, and patiently read through each piece to offer critical comments. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, was ever encouraging from the time I presented the proposal to him. Aditya Hazarika, until recently the copy editor at CAPS, painstakingly went through each piece, often under tight time constraints. I am grateful for the hours he must have spent over weekends polishing the pieces, including his offer to continue editing the column despite having moved on to another assignment in October. Lastly, Rohit Kumar and Gautam Kumar at CAPS for their help in formatting and uploading the pieces, always meeting the deadline despite my handing over the articles to them at the last minute. Meanwhile, the encouraging and even critical responses from the readers kept me going, and I remain grateful to all.

Wish each one of you a happy new year. I pray that nuclear clarity and sanity will be our guides in 2024 and beyond. I hope to continue this column in the next year with a primary focus on issues related to nuclear energy. The endeavour shall remain to clearly put in perspective another important dimension of nuclear issues that are so relevant to India and the world.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Nuclear India in 2023: Reflections for the Country and the World appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Nuclear winter, nuclear deterrence, deterrence breakdown, nuclear use

It was 40 years ago, on November 20, 1983, that an American television film, ‘The Day After,’ was released on the ABC television network.[1] It was the peak of the Cold War, and the possibility of a nuclear war between the USA and the USSR was considered a real threat. Both had built large numbers of nuclear warheads that were routinely maintained on hair-trigger alerts, signalling readiness for use. Carl Sagan graphically described this situation as one in which two enemies were living in a room awash with gasoline; one had 9000 matches, and the other had 7000.[2] While both would die in case a matchstick lit up, each was constantly worried about the other gaining an advantage of pre-emption by being the first to set the room on fire, even though neither could escape the consequences!

However, to deal with the perceived risks of nuclear use, the populace, at least in the USA, was acquainted with the idea of nuclear war from the second grade onwards. Building public and private bomb shelters was the norm. Drills were regularly conducted. As sirens went off, people practised rushing into shelters, which were equipped as per set guidelines to ensure survival for a reasonable period.

While, thankfully, none of these were put to a real test, ‘The Day After’ did build a story around a fictional nuclear exchange between the US and USSR. The plot depicted rising tensions between the two countries leading up to the imminence of a nuclear exchange. Even before the actual detonation happens, however, the local situation can be seen quickly slipping out of control as people panic to evacuate to buy essentials, leading to a breakdown of law and order. Once the nuclear detonations take place, the electromagnetic pulse plays havoc with all electronics. So, cars don’t start. TV sets don’t work. Electricity and all related facilities of water, banking, hospital services, etc, come to a halt. In the movie, the city loses all communication with the outside world. All internal systems collapse. Ironically, though, some weeks after the disaster, when the radio crackles to life, the voice of the US President booms, “America has survived. We have not surrendered. Our values remain undaunted. The country is counting on your strength, will and courage to rebuild our great country.” Certainly, nations can rebuild themselves, but at what cost? As a commentator on the movie summed up, “Humanity survives but it does not look good for humankind.”

The subject of the consequence of the breakdown of nuclear deterrence with the use of nuclear weapons requires a revisit today because, even at nearly 80 years of age, nuclear weapons are going strong, immune to all efforts at dislodging them. The world has learnt to live with them in a delicate balance of terror and by building some forms of strategic stability. Mutual vulnerability is supposed to keep nuclear war at bay, and there is a fair bit of confidence that signalling well-considered plans of nuclear retaliation would avert possibility of nuclear use. Even in the movie, as tensions are building up, the view of some American citizens is, “They are crazy; but not that crazy.” There is a sense of confidence that the unthinkable will not happen.

This remains the predominant belief across the multiple nuclear dyads existing today. It is ironical that while nations make worst-case assumptions about their adversaries, there is nevertheless a tendency to accept a certain level of rationality on their part when it comes to nuclear use. After all, what political objective could be worth the cost of imposing and suffering so much damage, each reasons? But, for this question to elicit the answer ‘nothing’, there should be an adequate understanding of the nature and scale of damage that a nuclear exchange could cause. The visualisation of this damage can become fuzzy when militaries think of nuclear weapons in the same vein as conventional ones. Approaches that believe that nuclear deterrence is predicated on parity in warhead numbers and that nuclear warfighting can be conducted to achieve victory reflect a sub-optimal understanding of the effects of multiple nuclear detonations.

Meanwhile, even those that put their faith in the belief that rational, cool-headed thinking may be able to avert the possibility of deliberate nuclear use must nevertheless be mindful of other pathways to deterrence breakdown. The highest probability is that of inadvertent escalation because of miscalculation or misperception. In fact, many factors are exacerbating these risks today, such as stressed nuclear dyads where nations are refusing to hold strategic dialogues with one another, unchecked modernisation of nuclear capabilities, the collapse of arms control, the rise of hedging strategies, and the emergence of new technologies whose intersection with nuclear deterrence is not yet clear. What is even more worrisome is that there is no sense of shared risks among the countries. What we see instead is a swagger that escalation can somehow be controlled and managed.

All of the above developments do not give confidence that nuclear deterrence could not break down at some point. And if that happens, multiple socio-political, environmental and humanitarian crises can be expected.

Effects of Nuclear Use

In theory, the effects of a nuclear explosion are scientifically well understood. Of course, the yield of the warhead, height of detonation, weather, geographical conditions, the time of day or night when the detonation takes place, the amount of material available at ground zero that could fuel the fire, etc., would have a bearing on the extent of the impact. But some things are certain to happen. There will be a blast that will generate immense heat, firestorms, thermal radiation, blast overpressure, and immediate as well as long-term release of radioactivity. Besides, there will be secondary damage from the black soot that gets thrown up into the atmosphere blocks the sun and leads to cooling and variations of nuclear winter. We also know from Hiroshima and Nagasaki that nearly 150,000 people instantaneously vaporised. This happened with the use of only one 12-20 kiloton on each city. Any future nuclear use is unlikely to be restricted to such a singular use.

Military strategists have, of course, propagated the idea that the number of casualties can be reduced by conducting strikes on military targets, especially the adversary’s nuclear forces. But a recent study conducted by Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security has found that even if strategic launch bases were hit, “most of the Midwest would be bathed in a more than lethal dose of radiation, with a worst-case scenario seeing most of the US and Canada becoming uninhabitable. Even after four days of hitting the silos, between 340,000 and 4.6 million people would die—though the average death toll would be 1.4 million. They predicted that 300 million people would be at risk of a fatal dose of fallout.” [3]

Other scientific studies have highlighted many other consequences. These include the “significant economic disruption of the aggressor nation and acute food insecurity for a significant fraction of the population,” leading to the destabilisation of society.[4] Another report shows the possibility of ‘synchronous failure’ owing to the increase in the scale and speed of connectivity between human technological, economic, and social systems that have increased the size of the overall systems, leading to the “emergence of a single, tightly coupled human social-ecological global system for the first time in human history.”[5] So, irrespective of where the nuclear use takes place, the impact, direct and indirect, would transcend the immediate area.

Meanwhile, a renewed focus of research since 2007 on the nuclear winter scenarios has been possible with far more powerful modelling tools than were available in the 1980s when the first such studies were undertaken. Recent studies have shown how the firestorms caused by detonations in cities would generate an enormous amount of soot and particulates. Advanced climate science models developed to study the effects of global warming, volcanic eruptions, and massive wildfires have been used to model the effects of the soot, as it rises into the upper atmosphere and blocks sunlight. Of course, the scale of a possible nuclear winter will be determined by the scale of the nuclear war, the extent of firestorms generated, the amount of material that burns, the amount of soot injected into the atmosphere, global geographic variations, etc. However, some studies have concluded that the smoke in the case of a regional war between India and Pakistan that sees the detonation of even 100 Hiroshima-sized 15kt weapons would remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, block the sunlight, and cool the earth.

Moreover, once the smoke rises to the upper levels of the troposphere and lower levels of the stratosphere, it is expected to remain suspended there in the absence of precipitation, whose chances would be decreased because reduced sunlight would reduce evaporation and weaken the water cycle. Models showed a 10 per cent reduction in precipitation worldwide, drought in the lower latitudes, and a reduction in Asian monsoon rainfall by up to 40 per cent. There is expected to be a global average cooling of about 1.25°C lasting for several years, and even after ten years, the temperature is expected to be 0.5°C colder than normal. Less sunlight and precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more ultraviolet radiation from ozone loss would all reduce or eliminate agricultural production.[6] So, human life will be affected in more than one way.

National and international capabilities to deal with the destruction of this scale and nature are difficult to envision. Coordinating a humanitarian response to nuclear weapon detonation scenarios would require providing assistance in areas of residual radiation. Requisite training of an adequate number of responders and customised equipment for such radiological environments in situations that are likely to have suffered widespread destruction of infrastructure cannot be an easy task for national disaster relief teams, which usually attend to a limited region in cases of natural calamities.

Nations tend to dismiss studies that bring up such uncomfortable findings to the realm of the hypothetical. It makes them double down on steps that they believe will make deterrence even more robust. Many of these steps, however, can create further security dilemmas by causing misperceptions and pulling countries into offence-defence spirals.

The fact remains that the possibility of nuclear deterrence breakdown cannot go away as long as nuclear weapons exist. Be that as it may, the risks of nuclear deterrence breakdown should be part of national and international discussions. In fact, knowledge of the humanitarian disaster that a nuclear exchange of even modest-sized yields and numbers of nuclear warheads would cause should enhance the desire to prevent such an event from happening. Knowledge of the impact of nuclear use should make nations realise the folly of building large numbers, touting the ideas of easy nuclear use, and notions of victory through nuclear war fighting. At the same time, it should underscore the sagacity of nuclear restraint in action and behaviour. Till such time as the elimination of nuclear weapons becomes possible, steps towards nuclear risk reduction must include mandatory education on the effects of the breakdown of nuclear deterrence. This would be in the interest of nuclear deterrence in the near term, and hopefully enable the possibility of universal nuclear disarmament in the long term.

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Notes

[1] Nicholas Meyer,  The Day After, ABC Circle Films, 1983

[2] “Carl Sagan Quote”, LibQuotes, https://libquotes.com/carl-sagan/quote/lbk4o5c. Accessed on November 22, 2023.

[3] David Pavlak, “SPIA Global Science and Security Program Reveals Devastation Linked to US Policy on Nuclear Missiles in Silos in Mid-West”, Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, November 14, 2023. https://spia.princeton.edu/news/spia-science-and-global-security-program-reveals-devastation-linked-us-policy-nuclear-missiles. Accessed on November 24, 2023.

[4] Pearce, J. & Denkenberger D. (2018). A National Pragmatic Safety Limit for Nuclear Weapon Quantities. Available at https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4020025

[5] T Homer-Dixon, B Walker, R Biggs, et al. “Synchronous failure: the emerging causal architecture of global crisis”, Ecology and Society, vol. 20, no. 3, 2015. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270255. Accessed on November 23, 2023.

[6] A Robock, & OB Toon, “Local nuclear war, global suffering”, Scientific American. Vol. 302, no. 1, 2010, pp 74-81. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/localnuclear-war. Accessed on October 12, 2023.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, “Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk”, March 2023, at APLN: https://www.apln.network/projects/nuclear-weapon-use-risk-reduction/humanitarian-impacts-of-nuclear-use-cases-in-northeast-asia.
• Pearce, J. & Denkenberger D. (2018). A National Pragmatic Safety Limit for Nuclear Weapon Quantities. Available at https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4020025.
• Robock, A., Xia, L., Harrison, C. S., Coupe, J., Toon, O. B., and Bardeen, C. G.(2023). Opinion: How fear of nuclear winter has helped save the world, so far. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics. 23, 6691–6701. Link: https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-23-6691-2023.

The post Understanding Consequences of Breakdown of Nuclear Deterrence appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Nuclear deterrence, survivability, SSBNs, mobile missiles, BMD

In earlier issues of the NuClearly Put series, I have often mentioned the importance of the survivability of nuclear arsenals for credible deterrence. I have argued that rather than worrying about nuclear warhead numbers, the focus of India’s capability build-up must be on ensuring the survivability of nuclear assets to let the adversaries know that they have no credible chance of carrying out a decapitating or disarming first strike.

‘Survivability’ involves developing capabilities, establishing systems, adopting procedures, and building organisations that are capable of mounting convincing threats of assured nuclear use even after taking a nuclear hit. This is particularly important for a country with a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine since it must signal the certainty of retaliation, which is possible only if the requisite capability and the resolve to use it can survive a first strike.

Ensuring survivability is a complex and multi-pronged exercise. Intuitively, one would think that the easiest way to ensure survivability would be to build a large arsenal so that some of it would survive a first strike. But, in reality, the calculations of what, how, and how much to make ‘survivable’ must be based on a complex matrix of the strengths and vulnerabilities of self and adversary.

What should be made survivable?

It is natural that a country undertaking nuclear first use would seek to degrade either one or both of the following kinds of targets: first, the adversary’s nuclear forces, such as weapon storage sites, missile silos, submarines, bomber bases, command and control nodes, etc., in order to degrade the country’s ability to mount retaliation; second, the adversary’s political will or determination to retaliate by undertaking counter-value strikes in the hope that the politico-psychological impact of nuclear attacks on population centres would paralyse decision-making, thereby reducing chances of retaliation.

Given the above, it is obvious that many elements need to be made survivable. Of course, the atomic bomb is at the heart of the matter and must survive for ‘nuclear’ retaliation to be mounted. But the survivability of the bomb alone cannot suffice. Credible deterrence demands the survivability of other enabling mechanisms and supporting structures too. For example, the nuclear weapon or its delivery mechanism would mean little in the absence of a living and able decision-maker at each level in a clearly defined chain of succession. Another essential pre-requisite would be a command-and-control system that provides timely and relevant inputs to the decision maker and a communication network that carries the decision down to the man in the field who is to execute the launch, besides providing him accurate targeting coordinates and other supporting logistic elements.

However, most importantly, the will to undertake retaliation must survive. The availability of others would be meaningless in its absence. While mathematical modelling can help calculate the chances of survival of tangible, quantifiable components, nothing can guarantee, or even exactly assess, the survival of political will. For instance, the news of high-level nuclear damage could either send the decision-maker into a state of shock and lead to action paralysis, or it could lead to immense anger and immediate action. Low damage from a nuclear attack could also make the decision-maker more susceptible to external pressures. The nature of the target of the attack could also influence the mental frame of the decision-maker. An isolated nuclear attack on an air base, a surface ship out at sea, or in a remote desert army unit would, in all certainty, affect the decision maker differently from a situation in which the adversary has mounted multiple counterforce attacks coupled with some countervalue ones too. In this context, it becomes extremely important for the political leadership to adequately understand and appreciate the intricacies of nuclear deterrence breakdown. Periodic briefings to those in the command chain are important requirements in this regard.

How to ensure survivability?

Nations make choices on how to ensure survivability based on considerations of their geography, technological capability, political system, and financial resources. While information on the exact modus operandi is mostly classified, some transparency is also important for enhancing deterrence.

An intelligent approach towards survivability would ideally be an optimal mix of measures such as secrecy, deception, dispersion, concealment, mobility, and defences. The determination of how much to conceal and where, or what to make mobile, and how and what to geographically disperse must be based on a cost-benefit analysis that takes the adversary’s and one’sown advantages and limitations into account.

Secrecy

Limiting access to information about the extent and location of nuclear assets by restricting information and hiding the identity of those who know is one of the simpler and low-priced ways to ensure survivability. In fact, this tactic is used to build a level of opacity by keeping  few people ‘in the know’ and by indulging in perception management on matters nuclear.

In the case of India, maintaining secrecy has deep historical and cultural roots. In the caste-based system, monopolising knowledge was the norm. The bureaucratic system developed by the British, as it exists today, also routinely uses secrecy. Most strategic organisations work on a ‘need to know’ principle. While this mode of functioning can hamper the development of a more formal and institutionalised system, it does enhance security. As explained by Ashley Tellis[1], “Since the entire organisational structure places a premium on extreme secrecy… potential adversary has to reckon with the prospect that there could always be some further strategic capabilities or technical resources held in reserve… unknown even to those few individuals otherwise thought to possess ‘perfect’ knowledge about the status and disposition of India’s distributed strategic assets.”

Deception

If secrecy is a passive measure for increasing survivability, deception is an active method to deliberately mislead through the willful communication of false information or by fomenting ambiguity through contradictory statements. For instance, Soviet President Brezhnev contributed to the myth of a ‘missile gap’ in favour of the USSR when he said his country was producing missiles like sausages, even though the reality was different.

Besides verbal misinformation, deception can also be practised by building dummy missiles or launch and storage sites in order to multiply targets and reduce the adversary’s confidence in a first strike that can hit all or even all the correct targets. In fact, this can be an effective and relatively inexpensive way of ensuring survivability, especially for delivery vehicles. China seems to be playing such a shell game of deception with the US by building silos that may or may not be populated by nuclear missiles.

Physical and EMP Hardening

Building customised physical structures with special materials that can withstand nuclear attack is another way of ensuring the survival of critical assets. It entails constructing structures, systems, and components to tolerate exposure to the effects of nuclear detonation, such as air blast, ground shock, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), heat, pressure, and radiation.

Hardened structures, however, are expensive and difficult to build, given the need for special materials and other considerations. In the case of missile silos, it would also involve hardening not only the physical outer structure but also constructing exact spaces for hosting nuclear assets in such a manner that even individual components can withstand violent ground motion. Power supplies, communication, and launch control electronic hardware of the delivery vehicle also need to be protected against thermal effects, ionospheric disruptions, and radiation effects.

Besides nuclear warheads and delivery storage, another component of the nuclear arsenal that requires hardened structures is the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and the Nuclear Command Post (NCP), as well as their alternates. The NCA is the decision-making body comprising the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers tasked with the responsibility of authorising nuclear use. The NCP, meanwhile, is a robust communication centre with the ability to receive information and disseminate it. Gen Sundarji distinguished the two as, “If NCA is the brain, the NCP is the nervous system including the sensory functions.”[2] Obviously, the survival of both is essential for retaliation. In fact, knowledge of the measures taken to ensure survivability of such structures would not only provide confidence to one’s own side but also let the adversaries know that they could not hope to carry out a decapitation strike.[3]

Despite the importance of hardened structures, it must also be recognised that several factors impinge on their efficacy. First, their location has to be carefully considered, keeping the range of the adversary’s missiles/aircraft in mind. Second, the level of hardening would also need to take into account the adversary’s warhead and delivery accuracies. Thirdly, modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that make detection easier and the development of highly accurate missiles that enable accurate counterforce targeting can erode confidence in fixed installations. Therefore, depending only on hardened structures cannot be possible given their cost, complexity, and vulnerabilities, which are likely to increase with incorporation of new technologies.

Mobility

One way of circumventing the vulnerability of nuclear assets in fixed structures is to make them mobile on an elaborate road and rail network. This would complicate the adversary’s ability to constantly monitor and accurately target these forces. This could be made more complex by adding dummies to the actual mobile forces.

However, two technological developments can constrain mobility: first, the ability to reconstitute forces quickly after an attack. If the assets are too widely dispersed, it might prove to be logistically difficult to quickly bring them together for retaliatory launches. This challenge, however, is not insurmountable and can be overcome through detailed pre-planning and the conduct of periodic drills to understand and overcome limitations; the second constraint arises from the need to ensure secure, hardened, and sufficiently redundant communication lines. Their absence or disruption could cripple the retaliatory system by making it difficult for mobile units to link up with one another or the NCA. Therefore, adequate attention must be paid to make these survivable so that the benefits of mobility can be maximised.

In fact, it also needs consideration whether the NCA/NCP should themselves be made mobile, either on an airborne platform or on land transportable vehicles. With the acquisition of an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and with aerial refuelling capabilities, India does have the possibility of making the command post airborne in crisis situations. Meanwhile, mobility on land is also offered by India’s extensive rail and now modern road networks. There would be a requirement for specially constructed camouflaged vehicles (whether rail bogies or road carriers). These will also need sufficient reserves of power to run complex data and communication systems, sufficient fuel for adequate movement, and other logistic requirements to ensure independence of movement. Given India’s variegated terrain of mountains, forests, and the expansive Deccan plateau, air, rail, or road mobility could offer options for the survivability of the NCA/NCP. Pre-planning with adequate forethought can offer possibilities of redundancy, thereby ensuring a sanctuary for the national leadership to survive an attack, assess damage, and exercise retaliatory options.

Dispersion

Dispersal of nuclear assets to ensure their survival can be done in two ways: one, these could be geographically distributed over several locations in such a way that no complete strategic systems exist as transparent targets. In fact, that is the state in which the Indian nuclear doctrine mandates the forces normally be maintained to be brought together as “fully employable forces” only in case of a crisis. This proffers the obvious advantage of multiplying targets to complicate adversary calculations. As was explained by Gen Sundarji, “It is not just a question of [finding] ‘needles in haystacks’ but parts of many needles in many haystacks which might be brought together when required within hours to days, to form full needles in yet many more different haystacks”.[4]

Of course, such dispersal poses the challenge of timely and effective reconstitution of the nuclear force during a crisis. It is normally assumed that any crisis between India and Pakistan or India and China would gradually develop over a period of time. Therefore, components of the nuclear force would have to be brought together in a period of ongoing conventional operations. The movement of nuclear assets during such a time would face challenges of their own. It would call for elaborate planning and coordination among different agencies to remain networked to ensure safe passage on every mode of transportation likely to be used.

A second method of dispersion is by spreading the nuclear assets over a range of delivery platforms. Historically, every state with nuclear weapons has used air delivery as the first option because of its ready availability. However, given the restricted range of aircraft and their limited penetration capabilities in a dense air defence environment, missiles – land-based and sea-based – have evolved as the preferred option. While mobility is an important aspect of land-based missiles[5], the highest level of survivability is nevertheless ensured by placing nuclear-tipped missiles with sufficient ranges on nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs).

Predictably, sea-based deterrence is not without its own set of difficulties. For India, the construction of SSBNs has been particularly challenging given that the country has had to undertake a completely indigenous development of the vessel under technology denials, including dual-use materials and technology. Also, since the country’s nuclear energy programme has been based on the development of pressurised heavy water reactors instead of pressurised water reactors, the technology best suited for nuclear submarines, the country has had to develop a parallel track of technology for the SSBN reactors. Also challenging has been the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles of adequate ranges. Another critical requirement of sea-based deterrence is the development of secure, constant, and reliable channels of communication with the submarine. Normally, underwater communications are possible through the extremely low frequency (ELF) bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. These, however, have a restricted data-bearing capacity and are slow. Also, their transmitting stations are large, fixed, and difficult to harden, making them vulnerable to a first strike. The US resolved this problem by having an airborne very low frequency (VLF) system coupled with satellite communications or by developing ELF communications. India, too, will have to find its own answers to this problem.

Another challenge to SSBNs is seen from improved anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Since SSBNs carry concentrated clusters of strategic capabilities (at least 12-16 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle [MIRVed] missiles, their loss could be substantive. SSBNs are also most vulnerable when in port since they are difficult to hide. In the case of India, this problem is exacerbated by the non-availability of too many ports that could host the SSBNs, making their targeting by the adversary relatively simple. Also, unlike land-based nuclear capabilities that can be maintained in a distributed form, a sea-based deterrent presupposes complete systems on board at sea.

Despite these challenges, sea-based deterrence still offers enough advantages to be a viable and effective option for enhancing survivability. Indeed, for a peninsular nation like India, the vast seas around it provide large areas where SSBNs could remain hidden with a significant nuclear arsenal for long periods of time to mount retaliation if and when necessary. In fact, the credibility of a counterstrike is ensured once an adversary knows that a fully armed SSBN is out at sea.

Active defences

The deployment of air and missile defences around critical points is another way to ensure survivability. Point or area-specific missile defences can intercept incoming enemy missiles and neutralise them before they hit the target, thus ensuring the survival of what they are meant to protect. However, there can be little guarantee that every incoming missile will be intercepted in time. The financial and technological costs and complexities of building defences are not trivial either. Moreover, simple countermeasures can defeat ballistic missile defence (BMD), and it is relevant to point out that in the Indian case, this is especially important since China, over the last decade, has concentrated on developing effective countermeasures to defeat the far more sophisticated BMD of the USA.

For India, erecting point or area defences over some types of nuclear assets such as early warning systems, air bases for nuclear-capable aircraft, command posts, submarine communication centres, nuclear production facilities, and launch or storage sites in cases where mobility is not enabled is a feasible option. However, the erection of BMD over critical points has the disadvantage of exposing locations to the adversary, thereby subverting the advantage of concealment. This trade-off will have to be carefully considered.

Survivability is achievable through a number of measures. The challenge lies in making the right choices based on relevant parameters. The first set of these must be an assessment of the adversary’s ISR, target acquisition, and strike capabilities. For instance, in order to evade the better human intelligence capabilities of the adversary, it would be necessary to maintain a high level of secrecy regarding information about assets and their locations, capabilities, etc. Compartmentalisation of information within government, armed forces, and even strategic organisations would be necessary, besides elaborate and sophisticated personnel reliability programmes in every establishment and at every level.

On the other hand, a higher adversarial capability of peeping into one’s own territory through technical surveillance would entail greater emphasis on deception and mobility. Or, the capability of the adversary to conduct effective electronic warfare would imply placing greater emphasis on making own communication networks more secure and redundant. Evidently, consistent monitoring of the adversary is necessary to tweak one’s own survivability of nuclear assets for the sake of credible deterrence.

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Notes

[1] Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p 422.

[2] Gen K Sundarji, The Blind Men of Hindoostan (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distribution Ltd, 1993), p. 89.

[3] In the case of the USA, it is well known that the National Military Command Centre (NMCC) is situated under the Pentagon and the Alternate NMCC beneath Raven Rock mountain in Pennsylvania. The US also maintains an airborne command center or the National Emergency Airborne Command Post. In the UK, the Primary Command Centre, codenamed Pindar, is located beneath the MOD building in Whitehall and is connected by underground tunnels to Downing Street. The alternate PCC is an underground complex at Hawthorn near Bath.

[4] Gen Sundarji, “Indian Nuclear Doctrine –I: Notions of Deterrence”, as cited in Ashley Tellis, n. 1, p. 426

[5] Interestingly, the USA, given the luxury provided by its geography and the nature of its threat perceptions, has not built any land-mobile missiles.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
• Gen K Sundarji, The Blind Men of Hindoostan (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distribution Ltd, 1993).
• Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March towards Credible Deterrence (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009).
• Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Stike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38, Nos. 1-2, 2015, pp 38-73.

The post Survivability of Nuclear Arsenal – What? How? appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: nuclear testing, CTBT, Pokhran II, nuclear deterrence.

Based on satellite images taken by Planet Labs, an American Earth imaging company, some recent reports seem to indicate that each of the three countries, Russia, the United States, and China, have built new structures such as roads, storage facilities, and tunnels at their nuclear test sites in the last 3 to 5 years.[1] USA has, in fact, been open that it has added nearly 1000 square feet of underground laboratory space for conducting sub-critical nuclear experiments at its nuclear test complex at U1a, Nevada.[2] Meanwhile, expansions are also evident at Lop Nor, China’s test site in the far western region of Xinjiang, and at Novaya Zemlya, the Russian site in an Arctic Ocean archipelago. While one may not directly infer from these developments that a nuclear test by any of them is imminent, the heightened activity can be interpreted as a form of nuclear signalling at a time when relations between the major nuclear nations are highly stressed. Each maintains a state of preparedness to respond quickly in case any of the other were to conduct a test.

Why would the major nuclear powers need to return to nuclear testing? After all, the USA has conducted 1030 tests, Russia has done 715 tests, and China has conducted as many as 45 nuclear tests, which carried on till the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. In fact, the three countries have not undertaken any tests since then. Russia stopped its testing programme in 1990, USA in 1992, and China in 1996. The three signed the CTBT in 1996. But only Russia ratified it. The USA and China are amongst the eight holdouts, and the treaty looks irretrievable at this point in time.

Nevertheless, an elaborate network of monitoring stations and laboratories spread across 89 nations has been built by the CTBT Organization to verify any activity indicative of explosive testing. Over the last two decades, North Korea is the only country to have conducted six underground explosive nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017. Meanwhile, the P-5 countries are known to conduct sub-critical experiments and advanced computer simulations to refine and maintain their stockpiles.

Evidently, the recent buzz around the need for a fresh round of testing is to communicate a political message. Russia may like to undertake such an action to indicate resolve without having to resort to actual nuclear use. In the case of the USA, President Trump had spoken about nuclear testing as a way of putting pressure on Russia and China to join arms control. During his term, additional money was authorised to reduce the time to execute a nuclear test if necessary.[3] President Putin’s response has predictably been that “… if the United States conducts tests, then we will. No one should have dangerous illusions that global strategic parity can be destroyed.”[4] Meanwhile, today’s China, too, yearns for nuclear parity. So, as things stand, if any of the nuclear weapon states were to break the norm on nuclear testing, others are likely to follow, more for political than purely military reasons.

India’s Nuclear Tests and Related Opinions

In contrast to the motivations for nuclear testing by the major powers, if India ever felt the need to conduct nuclear tests again, it might be more for military reasons. In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests. According to information in the public domain, these tests included designs of plutonium-based fission weapons with yields of 10 and 20kT and sub-kiloton weapons of 0.2 and 0.6kT. One of the designs was also that of a 45kT thermonuclear device.

In 2009, a debate broke out on whether India’s thermonuclear test had been successful or not. Some scientists from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is responsible for building missiles for nuclear delivery, and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) claimed that the test had failed and that India did not have a credible hydrogen bomb. Doubts were cast on the veracity of the results announced on the thermonuclear yield of the test. Bharat Karnad, a vocal sceptic of India’s thermonuclear capability, too has opined that the “lone low-yield thermonuclear tests of May 1998 was, for all intents and purposes, a dud, an insufficient data base was created for ‘benchmarking’ computer simulations. And that, this in turn meant that Indian scientists cannot reliably correct tested design, modify or refine it, nor change its power-to-yield characteristics, and even less upscale the design for much higher, leave alone megaton yields.”[5]

Having an arsenal with megaton weapons has been deemed essential for the sake of credible nuclear deterrence, especially against China. In recent times, this argument has been especially pressed by Ashley Tellis in his book Striking Asymmetries. Describing the emergence of China as a “daunting strategic danger” for India, he notes that “India’s biggest nuclear deficiency” is the “absence of reliable high-yield weapons in its inventory”.[6] Citing the data put out by India on its 1998 tests and subsequent expressions of views by some scientists, he questions the weapons design base. He argues that India does not have the “cutting-edge sophistication that would be needed for their reliability in real-world conditions”. He, therefore, argues that India may feel the need to do more explosive testing in order to validate advanced nuclear designs. Tellis even recommends to Washington that when India decides to test, it should indirectly help by not applying sanctions or invoking the suspension or termination of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. For him, this would be “the best US contribution toward enhancing geopolitical stability in the wider Asian region at a time when Chinese assertiveness will be increasingly harder to deter”.[7] Tellis obviously espies American interest in a stronger Indian nuclear deterrent.

The above set of views, however, make up only one part of the story. These arguments have been refuted by scientists involved in the conduct of the tests in 1998. Most notably, Dr. R Chidambram has often reiterated that the thermonuclear test did produce the stated yield through the thermonuclear technique. Proof of this has been proffered in the presence of sodium 22 and manganese 54, both by-products of a fusion rather than a pure fission reaction. Meanwhile, three reasons have been given for keeping a low yield of the thermonuclear weapon: one, the geological structure of the testing range; second, the fact that the existing shafts could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection (a task that would have been necessary if a greater yield was to be obtained); and third, the villages close to the test site had to be protected against possible physical damage or venting of radioactivity. The DAE has claimed that the H-bomb established the efficacy of the design concept. In fact, a Press Statement by Dr. Anil Kakodkar and Dr. R. Chidambaram on Pokhran-II tests was specially released on September 24, 2009 which reiterated the conclusion that “Thermonuclear weapons of various yields up to around 200 kt can be confidently designed on the basis of this test.”[8] Elsewhere, Dr. Chidambram has also stated, “In a large complex system like a nuclear weapon, the performance of an integrated test nowadays is the culmination of a large number of precise laboratory tests of subsystems and validation of individual parts of the computer simulation package through benchmark experimental data.”[9]

Given the opposing views on the credibility of India’s thermonuclear tests, a definitive conclusion for a person outside the system is nigh impossible. However, irrespective of who one chooses to believe, the more important issue is evaluating the importance of hydrogen bombs for nuclear deterrence. Should India’s deterrence not be considered credible in the absence of megaton weapons? Do larger yield weapons deter more?

Appeal of Thermonuclear Weapons and the Indian Context

The appeal of thermonuclear weapons primarily lies in the economy of fissile material, their compact size and relative ease of delivery. According to one assessment, a 200kT fission weapon would require about 60kg of plutonium and 4000 to 8000lbs of chemical explosives. But, with the same amount of fissile material, one could make ten thermonuclear weapons, each of the megaton variety and weighing less than 1000 lbs.[10] Therefore, they provide better yield-to-weight ratios and can be more compact. However, besides these technical considerations, there are other political dimensions that need to be considered before reaching any conclusion on whether India’s deterrent is compromised without such weapons and conduct of more testing.

Firstly, doubts raised on the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence purely on the basis of the difference between fission and fusion or kiloton and megaton weapons tend to overlook the regional reality of high densities of population in today’s megacities. Modern understanding of intelligent targeting based on detonation at optimum heights to cause the desired kind of damage has much improved since 1945. Relatively sparsely populated and built American and Soviet cities may have necessitated thermonuclear weapons to cause unacceptable damage. This is certainly not the case with India’s adversaries.

Let us not forget that the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only 15-20kT in yield. Yet, these fission weapons caused 80,000 deaths immediately and 200,000 later in Hiroshima, and 74,000 deaths and 75,000 casualties in Nagasaki, thereby affecting the lives of two-thirds of the city population. Describing the destructive potential of the nuclear weapons, McNamara wrote, “They indiscriminately blast, burn, and irradiate with a speed and finality that are almost incomprehensible.”[11] It is not surprising that they scarred the human mind enough not to merit a repeat performance. According to one study, the potential fatalities from a single 15kT detonation on the highest-density city of China would be 7,60,000 people with an air burst, 5,92,000 in case of the second highest density city, and 4,50,000 fatalities with ground burst blast and fire.[12]

If these figures look like acceptable damage, more lethality can be added by making the missiles more accurate. As explained by a strategist, “Increasing the warhead explosive yield and decreasing the miss distance both improve the lethality of a warhead.”[13] “Making a weapon twice as accurate has the same effect on lethality as making the warhead eight times as powerful… making the missile twice as precise would only require one-eighth the explosive power to maintain the same lethality. Hence, miniaturisation of warheads and precision of delivery has been the course of US nuclear weapons development.”[14] While this is not easy, repeated testing of missiles for accuracy is more feasible than nuclear warheads testing.

Secondly, it is also a scientifically established fact that a number of strategically dispersed fission weapons can cause higher damage. Multiple warheads mounted on missiles that are capable of carrying multiple independently retargetable vehicles (MIRVed), a capability that India has shown, offer a way of multiplying damage with kiloton weapons.It is also believed that nuclear weapons around 150-200kT would be far more effective than megaton sizes, which would only make the nuclear rubble bounce. Also to be noted is the trend that nations are moving towards lower yields as part of their idea of being able to fight ‘limited nuclear wars’.

Thirdly, over the years, advances in real-time computational power, algorithmic sophistication, and data analysis have aided weapons’ improvements. Further, given India’s three decades of experience in fusion and plasma physics, it is unlikely that an adversary could risk taking its thermonuclear weapons capability lightly.

What if India Were to Test Again?

At the end of its round of nuclear testing in 1998, India offered a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. This was reiterated in 2008 in the context of the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Apart from these voluntary commitments India would not be violating any agreement if it were to decide to undertake fresh round of hot testing. So, legally, it would be within its rights to test.

However, it would be breaching a norm of non-testing that has been in place since 1996. Expectedly, there will be a diplomatic fallout from the action. Of course, if the US, Russia, or China were to reopen the trend of nuclear testing and India were to follow their example, the situation would be completely different compared to if New Delhi were to suddenly take such a call of its own. In the latter case, the Indian action would impact its many strategic partnerships with nations across the world. Economic sanctions and diplomatic backlash are certain, and there is a high possibility that Pakistan will follow suit. Pakistan currently has untested tactical nuclear weapons and would welcome the opportunity to establish their reliability with some more testing. Besides, it may also like to demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, especially since many members of the Pakistani strategic community have rued the fact that they need an arsenal big enough to be able to effectively deter a geographically expansive and materially more secure India.

Finally, it may be said that the question of whether India needs more nuclear tests for credible deterrence is a complex one. While additional tests could bring technical benefits, they would also carry significant diplomatic and geopolitical costs. Meanwhile, alternative means of achieving credible deterrence exist. Given the circumstances, while more tests may be desirable if international circumstances make them possible, they are not essential for the credibility of nuclear deterrence. This rests on a number of other factors besides the yield of the nuclear weapon.

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Notes

[1] Jeffrey Lewis, “Nuclear Test Sites are too Damn Busy”, Arms Control Wonk, September 23, 2023. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1218750/nuclear-test-sites-are-too-damn-busy/. Accessed on October 23, 2023.

[2] For more on U1a complex, Nevada National Security Sites, https://nnss.gov/mission/stockpile-stewardship-program/u1a-complex/. Accessed on September 23, 2023.

[3] Eryn Macdonald, “Is the United States Planning to Resume Nuclear Testing?”, The Equation, Union Of Concerned Scientists, Jul 1, 2020. https://blog.ucsusa.org/emacdonald/is-the-united-states-planning-to-resume-nuclear-testing/. Accessed on September 23, 2023.

[4] Guy Faulconbridge, “Russia’s Putin Issues New Nuclear Warnings to West over Ukraine”,  Feb 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-update-russias-elite-ukraine-war-major-speech-2023-02-21/.

[5] Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005), p. 416.

[6] Ashley J. Tellis, Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transiitons in Southern Asia, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 2022).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Department of Atomic Energy, “Press Statement by Dr Anil Kakodkar and Dr R Chidambram on Pokhran II Tests”, Press Information Bureau, September 24, 2009.

[9] Chidambram, “The May 1998 Tests”, p. 19 as cited in Karnad, n. 5, p. 416.

[10] Karnad, n 5, p. 628

[11] Ibid.

[12] O. B. Toon, et al, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions, April 19, 2007 https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-1973-2007. Accessed on October 1, 2023.

[13] Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike: The Pentagon’s Strategy for Nuclear War (London: Pluto Press, 1983), p. 62.

[14] Ibid, p. 62.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realists Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2005).
• Ashley Tellis, Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022).
• Michael Frankel, James Scouras and George Ullrich, “The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use”, National Security Report , John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2015.

The post Is More Nuclear Testing a Deterrence Necessity? appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: nuclear war, nuclear strategy, limited nuclear war, nuclear posture review

While nuclear weapons are designated as weapons of mass destruction, every now and then, the idea surfaces that the weapons can be custom-made and used in such a way as to restrict damage to limited levels. While there is no accepted definition of ‘limited nuclear war,’ it can be described as one in which a limited number of nuclear warheads with relatively smaller yields are employed to attack a limited military targets to impact a limited geographical space for limited objectives. Its purpose would be to signal deterrence by showing that levels of nuclear violence or the scope of nuclear use can be restricted by choosing military targets instead of cities, thereby making nuclear use more credible and even legally defensible. But can this be a workable proposition?

Origins of the Concept of Limited Nuclear War

The idea of limited nuclear war emerged to address the perceived limitations of deterrence premised on mutual assured destruction (MAD). As the increase in nuclear warhead numbers in the US and USSR established a balance of terror, it led to the view that attacks on cities would make nuclear war an unlimited war. This was seen as degrading one’s deterrence by making nuclear strikes less credible against smaller or less than existential provocations.

So, in an ostensible attempt to make the use of nuclear weapons more rationally feasible, analysts like Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter in the 1960s and 1970s argued in favour of flexible nuclear use to conduct limited nuclear war. They contended that deterrence could be better signalled if a more effective use of nuclear weapons against military targets was made possible. Such thinking was both enabled by and also led to technological advances in the miniaturisation of nuclear warheads and the growing precision and accuracy of missiles that offered counterforce targeting options to conduct a ‘discriminate’ nuclear war. MAD was replaced by these ideas of nuclear utilisation target selection, or NUTS.

The idea of limited nuclear use was presented as taking the war back to the battlefield. US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, in the Annual Report of the Department of Defence to the Congress in 1981, said, “large-scale countervalue attacks may not be appropriate to deter the full range of potential Soviet threats… instead we could attack in a selective and measured way, a range of military, industrial, and political control targets, while retaining an assured destruction capacity in reserve.”[1] It was also argued that a policy of attacking military targets that minimises unintended civilian fatalities would offer incentives for an adversary to reciprocate under similar restraints by attacking military targets, thereby reducing the chances of mass homicide on both sides. The purpose would be to showcase the destruction potential of nuclear weapons to shock and scare the adversary into agreeing to the termination of hostilities on one’s terms, but not unleash the complete fury of strategic use.

These ideas drove US strategy for many decades and even led to capabilities that offered flexible option to the US President. Simultaneously through, these was a pushback by the likes of Bernard Brodie, Robert Jervis, and many others during the same period, which contributed to much churning in nuclear discourse. The idea of nuclear war received a quiet burial once Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev pronounced the uselessness of nuclear war in 1987 and given the subsequent change in political relations with the end of the Cold War.

Return of the Prodigal          

After remaining dormant for about 15 years thereafter, the idea of limited nuclear war to “handle regional conflicts with small nuclear armed powers” [2] again sprung to life in the second half of the 2010s. Such an eventuality was particularly envisaged in the context of “a rogue state” that might not be deterred by thousands of American nuclear warheads and choose to cross the nuclear threshold even in a small, limited conventional conflict. To deter such eventualities, the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2018 announced, “Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression.”[3] The NPR also found merit in threatening the limited use of nuclear weapons to deter possible disruptive activities by Russia and China. Russia’s ambiguity on the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in response to aggression with non-nuclear weapons, widely referred to as ‘escalate to de-escalate,’[4] was cited as the reason for Washington’s search for a “range of limited and graduated options, including a variety of delivery systems and explosive yields.”[5] The US accuses Russia and China of having “introduced limited war techniques…. For Russia, ‘jab and grab’ land incursions; for China, the creeping militarization of maritime zones. Both techniques operate below the threshold of deterrence by punishment and seek to create territorial faits accompli that lower the costs of revisionism.”[6]

The latest US NPR of 2022 has retained the role of nuclear weapons to deter limited nuclear attacks with tailored deterrence. In order to make the threat of limited use look credible, a small number of existing SLBM warheads have been modified to provide a low-yield option so as to have a diverse set of capabilities “for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack; and enhance deterrence by signalling to potential adversaries that their limited nuclear escalation offers no exploitable advantage…”[7] All of this is being justified as being technologically feasible, causing less of a humanitarian disaster, and hence being more legally defensible. But is that true? Can a limited nuclear war be credibly fought and won between two nuclear armed states?

Fighting a Limited Nuclear War

Nuclear war-fighting envisages operations in a logical and controlled manner with the idea of escalation dominance and cool control during a pre-conceived limited counterforce attack. But, wargame after wargame has shown the difficulties in containing nuclear wars that started with calibrated use to run along pre-determined pathways. There are two sets of challenges that can be identified in the case of a limited nuclear war.

Operational Military Challenges

The first of these arises from the uncertainty about the adversary’s willingness to play the game of limited nuclear war. In his 1981 book, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman stated, “It takes two to keep a war limited.”[8] It can never be taken for granted that the adversary will read the signal of limited nuclear use as intended and respond likewise. In fact, the adversary might completely misread the intention, as can be seen in this statement by a Soviet Major General, “the assertion made by supporters of ‘limited’ nuclear war that it could be kept within pre-planned limits and made ‘controllable’ is altogether false.”[9] The Soviets interpreted the American building of counterforce capabilities as a move towards a credible first strike.

Indeed, the adversary can never know or be sure that the intent is to keep the nuclear use limited and that the first volley will not be followed by more, especially since the first user would also be signalling readiness for more attacks to deter the adversary’s retaliation. If the adversary chooses a more elaborate response than had been envisioned by the first user, could this then remain a limited exchange?

In fact, the probability of being able to undertake limited nuclear attacks with no or only limited blowback amounts to wishful thinking. Analytical studies on how to conduct limited nuclear wars can only make educated guesses on matters of critical planning. For instance, such a planner may be able to reasonably determine the physical effects of nuclear explosions based on the yield of weapons, the height at which they would burst, the amount of warning time the adversary may have, the time of the attack, etc. But, whether such calculations can completely factor in more complicated issues, such as the overall impact of the attack on the national psyche, or other immeasurable imponderables, such as “popular panic and administrative disorganisation,” can never be ascertained. That a planned limited nuclear use will remain within expected parameters is virtually impossible to determine, and it would be foolish to base one’s use of nuclear weapons on such an unknown.

A second practical difficulty in keeping the war limited can be seen in the context of the first user himself. Since the basic premise of limited nuclear war is to hit the adversary’s military targets in the hope that he would respond likewise, could result in “battles of great confusion”. Even if the casualties in these cases might be low, there is every chance that the troops would be left isolated, leaderless, with no or contaminated food and water supplies, even fighting equipment and spare parts, and with a low morale.

Political Challenges

The most serious danger that lurks in making the case that limited nuclear wars are fightable, containable, and even winnable is a heightened temptation to use nuclear weapons. It could lead to the belief that worthwhile military or political objectives are achievable through managed nuclear use. But, as stated earlier, there can be no guarantee that a nuclear exchange between two nuclear weapon states will remain limited. It may. But then it may not, and that might prove to be a risk that is too risky. In fact, a perception that the adversary is indicating greater nuclear swagger by getting away with ‘limited’ nuclear use could generate a greater sense of vulnerability and raise the incentives for pre-emption. This would make a nuclear exchange more likely, not less likely. Therefore, the deterrence effects of showcasing limited nuclear use need to be evaluated with care.

In fact, besides increasing the chances of deterrence breakdown, the pursuit of nuclear war-fighting capabilities (even if ostensibly for the purpose of deterrence) through the greater accuracy of nuclear-tipped missiles, elaborate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure, and damage limitation defences would also be a financially exhausting exercise.

A third consequential challenge comes from the harm that limited nuclear war would cause to the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. The conduct of nuclear use in which the first user is able to show a successful ability to keep nuclear war limited could set a precedent that others could be tempted to follow. It would ‘conventionalise’ the use of nuclear weapons and make it appear normal to use small nuclear weapons in ‘limited’ ways. If this were to happen against non-nuclear weapon states, such as Russian nuclear use against Ukraine or Chinese nuclear use against Taiwan, it could spur proliferation. Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) would face a renewed sense of insecurity. In such a scenario, one can expect them to want to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. Meanwhile, a ‘successful’ nuclear exchange between two nuclear-armed states could open another pandora’s box.

Another related danger would be the higher possibility of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors. The availability of nuclear weapons and related material and infrastructure in more states could not only raise risks of nuclear security but also raise the chances that terrorists, too, might feel liberated from the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. If states can find the limited use of nuclear weapons useful, so can non-state actors. Therefore, a limited nuclear exchange is likely to bring about a sense of complacency in nuclear use that could not be conducive for international security.

Evaluating India’s Choices

India has a nuclear strategy based on deterrence by punishment. It does not believe that nuclear war-fighting can be contained with any certainty and, therefore, has refused to go down that path. It deters all kinds of purported uses of nuclear weapons, irrespective of how the adversary describes them, with its own ability to cause unacceptable damage through massive retaliation.

Does this make for an unlawful or immoral strategy? As far as legalities are concerned, it may be recalled that the Advisory Opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice in 1996 in response to whether the use of nuclear weapons can be lawful was unable to take a clear stand on this and had left it to the nations to make the judgement on whether they needed to use these weapons for self-defence. On the second issue of morality, while massive retaliation may conflict with the principles of distinction (of combatants and non-combatants), proportionality, or controllability of international humanitarian law, its articulation in India’s doctrine is premised on creating the maximum chance of non-use of the weapon. This, in fact, is buttressed by two other doctrinal attributes: maintaining a narrow role for nuclear weapons solely to nuclear deterrence and accepting ‘no first-use’ (NFU).

It is the fear of massive damage that is likely to be found more unacceptable by an adversary than the idea that ‘small’ nuclear wars can be tolerated. The latter, in fact, would likely enhance the chances of use. While the first use of the weapon might be carefully calibrated to cause minimal collateral damage, there can be no guarantee that the recipient of such an attack would follow along similar lines. Therefore, even a small use could eventually breach legal and moral constraints.

The world today is grappling with many nuclear risks. These range from stressed inter-state relations to unbridled nuclear modernisations and expansions, the deployment of dual-use delivery systems and nuclear entanglement, and eroding faith in taboos. It would be disastrous if the idea of limited nuclear war as a feasible proposition were to be added to this list. The more nations move towards the idea of being able to contain a small nuclear war, the closer we will move towards routinising their use. Eventually, when a small nuclear use turns into a big one or or a limited use into a little less limited one, would be anybody’s guess.

India should seize this moment to reinforce faith in its own nuclear convictions and remind others that nuclear weapons are not ordinary or even a ‘little more’ than ordinary weapons. These are extraordinary weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence is their main purpose, and that comes best with the ability to cause unacceptable damage. Making that damage acceptable by meting it out in controlled quantities, whether as a first or second user, is a dangerous and foolish idea that is more likely to cause deterrence breakdown.

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Notes

[1]  As cited in Louis Rene Beres, “Tilting towards Thanatos: America’s ‘Countervailing’ Nuclear Strategy” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Power, Strategy and Security (New Delhi: Asian Books, 1987), p. 83.

[2]  Jeffrey A Larsen, “Limited War and the Advent of Nuclear Weapons”, in Jeffrey A Larsen and Kerry M Kartchner ed., On Limited Nuclear War in the 21^st Century (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2014).

[3] Office of the Secretary of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review, Feb 2018. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEARPOSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF, pp. 17-18

[4]  There is much confusion about whether Russia has ever claimed this as its nuclear strategy. For an insight into this debate see Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitsky, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russia De-escalation: A Dangerous Solution to a Non-existent Problem”, War on the Rocks, Feb 20, 2018. Available at https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/

[5]  NPR, n. 3, p. 30-31

[6]  A Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial”, The American Interest, Aug 12, 2015. Available at https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/.

[7]  Office of the US Secretary of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review, October 2022.

[8]  Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 104.

[9]  As cited in Klaus Knorr, (ed.), Power, Strategy and Security, (New Delhi: Asian Books, 1987), p. 85.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (RAND: Santa Monica, California, 1959)
• Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Praeger: New York, 1965)
• Robert Jervis, The Illogic of Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984)
• Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989)
• Walter Slocombe, “The Countervailing Strategy”, International Security, vol. 5, no. 4, Spring 1981

The post Dissecting the Idea of ‘Limited’ Nuclear War appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Ballistic missile defence, nuclear deterrence, DRDO, no first use

Oppenheimer, the movie, has drawn widespread public attention to nuclear issues. This is a timely release since the memory of the death and destruction that rained down on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with just one atomic bomb each has been fading. The movie tells the story of the American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, who led the team that built the first atomic bomb. It has triggered conversations about the effects of these weapons. It would, hopefully, rein in the causal references to nuclear weapons and encourage measures to prevent deterrence breakdown.

Once earlier, a movie had prompted a leader to relook at his country’s nuclear strategy. In October 1983, after watching The Day After, an American television film, the then US President Ronald Reagan noted that it was “very effective and left me greatly depressed.” Determined to protect his country against such fate, Reagan doubled down on his idea of building an elaborate missile defence that he had proposed earlier the same year as a “means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”[1] The movie strengthened his faith in ballistic missile defence (BMD).

This was to mark the start of the end of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, a bilateral agreement that the USA and USSR had concluded in 1972. This instrument had emerged from the offence–defence spiral that raged between the two superpowers during the 1950s-60s. With the maturing of technology for multiple independently retargetable vehicles (MIRV), where one missile could carry several warheads, the balance skewed in favour of offence, making defences difficult and expensive. Consequently, both sides saw prudence in accepting nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability rather than building defences whose efficacy, even in theory, seemed doubtful.[2]

Thus, the ABM treaty was born. It limited the deployment of BMD to only one site each in the USA and USSR, leaving the rest of the country vulnerable to each other’s nuclear attacks. The treaty underscored that nuclear deterrence best functions on the ability to cause unacceptable damage, which in the case of the superpowers meant mutual assured destruction. It was agreed that defences destabilise deterrence by causing insecurities, forcing the adversary towards increasing offensive systems to saturate defence, countermeasures to defeat defence, and provoking counter-countermeasures to enhance defence.

While limiting BMD deployments, the ABM treaty, however, did not prohibit research and development (R&D) on missile defence technologies. With the end of the Cold War, as US threat perceptions changed to the need to defend against limited ballistic missile attacks from states with small missile inventories, advances in BMD technologies offered a viable solution. This encouraged the Clinton administration to legislate the National Missile Defense Act in 1999, which committed the US to “deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective NMD system capable of defending the territory of the US against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate)”.[3]

Moving ahead, President George W Bush Jr., in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU) on May 1, 2001, announced that “deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation”[4] because the world had become “a less certain, a less predictable one”. So, missile defence was included as a major plank of the US national security strategy. On December 13, 2001, Washington gave Moscow formal notice of its withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and six months later, in mid-June 2002, the US abandoned the treaty. Thereafter, the USA has been actively engaged in developing and deploying theatre missile defences for the protection of allies and a limited ground-based missile defence capability for the protection of the mainland. It has often been repeated that US’ BMD is meant to defend against the small arsenals of ‘rogue’ states and not to disrupt Russian or Chinese nuclear deterrence.

American statements notwithstanding, its BMD efforts have, not unexpectedly, evoked concerns in Russia and China about the erosion of the credibility of their nuclear deterrence, especially as technology advances. They fear that the confidence provided by a missile defence, coupled with the availability of highly accurate counterforce missiles, could embolden the USA to undertake a first strike. To avert such a possibility, both have engaged in building countermeasures, as well as their own missile defences. The deployment of MIRVed and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRVed) missiles, hypersonic delivery systems, cruise missiles, and autonomous systems are all responses to BMD. More recently, Russia’s Poseidon underwater autonomous nuclear delivery system is an example of President Putin’s attempt to build an “invincible arsenal”.[5] China’s fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), tested for the first time in 2021, falls into the same category.[6]

Meanwhile, even after spending hundreds of billions of dollars on its BMD capabilities, Washington cannot claim absolute confidence in its missile defence, especially as countermeasures have improved. The BMD has created security dilemmas by pushing adversaries towards capabilities that could saturate or defeat the BMD. Is BMD then a useful capability? Should India be moving in this direction?

BMD Efforts in India

India’s BMD effort came into public view when the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) conducted an exo-atmospheric test 50 km above the earth on November 27, 2006. This involved the interception of a Prithvi ballistic missile by another modified Prithvi interceptor missile. On December 6, 2007, India fired a hypersonic interceptor missile that destroyed an incoming missile in a direct hit over the Bay of Bengal. This endo-atmospheric interception took place at an altitude of 15 km and reportedly used the Green Pine radar purchased from Israel for tracking and cueing. In March 2009, a third interception was carried out of a Dhanush missile (naval version of Prithvi) fired from a ship and intercepted by Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) at a height of 70-80 km. Then, in July 2010, yet another modified Prithvi simulated the enemy missile and was shot down by a supersonic interceptor missile from Advanced Air Defence (AAD) at an altitude of 15 km. Thereafter, in 2012, the first phase of a two-tier BMD, capable of intercepting missiles up to a range of 2000 km in the exo- and endo-atmospheres was announced as ready for deployment to protect “vital” Indian assets. DRDO also claimed that this system was better than the American Patriot system in “interception, range and altitude”.[7]

The second phase of the programme has been undergoing testing since 2017 to build the capability to engage missiles of a range up to 5000 km. On November 2, 2022, India announced the successful flight test of this phase using the AD-1, an interceptor missile designed for low exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interception of long-range ballistic missiles as well as aircraft.

India’s advances in BMD are no mean feat, given that it has built indigenous capability in the face of technology denial. There have also been spin-off benefits for space capabilities, such as anti-satellite testing. But can a BMD be effective against the kinds of missiles, in quantity and quality, that India’s adversaries possess? What kind of BMD would India need? How should the capability be deployed? How should this be communicated to the adversaries to avoid creating security dilemmas? The following sections examine the nature of India’s missile threat environment and the likely best use of the BMD to mitigate these threats effectively.

Nature of India’s Missile Threat

For the USA, the BMD offered a solution to the threat from a handful of missiles from states of proliferation concern whose missile arsenals were expected to be in low, two-digit numbers and of modest capability without any sophisticated countermeasures.

The profile of India’s missile threat, in comparison, is far more complex. Both China and Pakistan have robust missile arsenals of substantive quality and quantity. In fact, both countries have spent the last decade enhancing their missile capabilities in terms of numbers, range, accuracy, reliability, and penetrability. The focus in both has been to move from liquid to solid propulsion technologies to enhance missile mobility. China has also worked on equipping them with countermeasures and making them MIRVed as well as MaRVed in view of its threat perception from the US BMD. Pakistan, too, has tested the MIRVed capability on the Ababeel missile and has indicated an intention to MarRV. China has, in the past, had no compunctions about transferring its nuclear weaponry, designs, and missile technology[8] to Pakistan for strategic gains, and the same applies to the transfer of BMD countermeasures, too, as was evident in China supplying Pakistan with the multiple object tracking radar to assist its MIRVed capability.[9] Both countries have also deployed a growing number of dual-use cruise missiles. Also evident in both nations is a focus on training with mobile missile units, many of which are claimed to possess both conventional and nuclear-capable missiles. China has also progressed on its own BMD.[10]

In view of such a challenging missile threat environment, an Indian BMD will have to be of high sophistication to offer even a modicum of effectiveness. This would warrant liberal spending on the development of a widespread network of early warning systems, the deployment of requisite numbers of interceptors, dedicated cruise missile defences, as well as dogged R&D to move towards boost phase interception given the need to intercept as far away from its own territory as possible. The table below provides a snapshot of some of the capability requirements of an Indian BMD in keeping with the missile threat environment.

Missile Capability Assessment and Implications for BMD.

So, how best can India use a BMD?

It is clear from the above that the technical capabilities of a BMD that can sufficiently defend India are going to be of a high order. Higher, in fact, than what the US had envisaged with its own threat perception. The costs of the system, accordingly, will be significant too.

Therefore, it is critical to have absolute clarity on the role that BMD should play in supporting India’s nuclear strategy. What should it aim to achieve – national missile defence; theatre defence? or point/area defence? Where should BMD be deployed? What kinds of national assets should it defend? What should be the declaratory position on this? These are important issues not just for the assurance of the public in a democracy but also for signalling the nature of the build-up to the adversary so as to shape his responses.

The guide for India’s BMD development and deployment should be its No First Use strategy. Given that India deters by suggesting assured retaliation to cause unacceptable damage, the BMD can best be used to protect retaliatory capabilities to ensure the imposition of such damage. Common sense suggests that BMD should protect the Nuclear Command Authority, the national capital, and the nuclear storage sites, delivery vectors, and communication nodes. Since no amount of BMD can guarantee a hundred per cent success in the interception of every incoming missile into every city, and since India cannot afford astrodome protection of its entire landmass, the effort should be restricted to the protection of assets most needed for credible deterrence. Such a BMD could be for limited, area-specific deployment to provide insurance against pre-meditated, mistaken, or unauthorised launches. It would complement other efforts towards arsenal survivability, such as dispersion, deception, hardening, etc.

India should be clear-eyed about the pros and cons of BMD. Technological advances invoke euphoria. But the right kind of technology build-up based on a considered assessment of threats and requirements is imperative. So is prudent political signalling that explains the limit of the enterprise so as not to get an alarmed adversary to create future security dilemmas. In fact, it might be worthwhile to examine the possibilities of ABM agreements.

Tempering the Lure of the BMD

Undoubtedly, the political and technological lure of the BMD is high. After all, which political leader would not want to assure his populace that he is taking steps to ensure their protection? It sounds politically incorrect and illogical to suggest otherwise. Also, scientists and technologists relish complex challenges. But there are political and financial implications of this exercise. And realistically speaking, there are no guarantees of its robustness!

Given the above, would it not be meaningful to explore a multilateral ABM treaty among all nuclear-armed states? Today’s vexed political relations between major nuclear powers and the conundrum of the extant strategic chains do not support the possibility of bilateral ABM agreements. But BMD could prove to be an issue to bring together the five NWS, alongside India and Pakistan. In fact, an ABM agreement that ropes in all the seven countries can not only be a useful confidence-building measure but also an example of modern arms control in the contemporary multipolar nuclear reality.

Such an ABM treaty could allow all nations to deploy BMD systems on one or two sites of their choice with a fixed number of interceptors. This would help them retain confidence in the survival of their retaliatory assets to cause unacceptable damage to an otherwise vulnerable adversary. Such reassurance could enhance deterrence and reduce the momentum of an offence-defence spiral. Most importantly, it would provide an opportunity for the nuclear-armed states to come together to discuss a win-win solution since BMDs are not fool-proof umbrellas, especially with the newer kinds of missiles on the anvil.

A change in political relations with the building of confidence over a limited, transparent, and, if possible, verifiable BMD would be a better guarantee of defence than a BMD that promises to put locks on the front door of the house but leaves windows open. The idea of a multilateral ABM treaty or agreement could certainly use more exploration.

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Notes

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

[1] “President Reagan’s Ambitious Star Wars Defence Plan”, Groovy History, https://groovyhistory.com/president-reagans-ambitious-star-wars-defense-plan/2. Accessed on 19 Jul 2023.

[2] Keith B Payne, “The Case for National Missile Defense.” Orbis, Vol 44, no. 2, March 2000, pp. 187–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0030-4387(00)00020-x.

[3] ”Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty: A Status Report”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, June 2001. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS0106.pdf. Accessed on Jul 23, 2023

[4] “Remarks by the President at National Defense University”, The White House, May 1, 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html. Accessed on

[5] HI Sutton, “Russia’s New ‘Poseidon’ Super-Weapon: What you Need to Know”, Naval News, March 3, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/03/russias-new-poseidon-super-weapon-what-you-need-to-know/. Accessed on  Jul 12, 2023.

[6] Demetri Sevastopulo & Kathrin Hille, “China Tests New Space Capability with Hypersonic Missile”, Financial Times, October 17, 2021.

[7] G Bharath and Harsh V Pant, “A Step Closer to Missile Defence”, Tribune, December 23, 2007.

[8] WikiLeaks cables amply document this by showing the several occasions on which the US raised the matter of Chinese firms providing Pakistan’s Heavy Mechanical Complex and National Development Complex, both involved in making of missiles, with ring rolling machines, flow forming machines for missile airframes as well as fibre coil winning machines and integrated optical chips.

Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Wiki: China helping Pak Upgrade its Missiles”, Indian Express, September 12, 2011.

[9] “Pakistan Gets Tracking System from China that could Speed up multi-warhead Missile Program”, The Hindustan Times, March 20, 2018.

[10] Manoj Joshi, “Decoding China’s BMD and ASAT Systems Efforts”, ORF Expert Speak, April 6, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-bmd-asat-progress-49578/. Accessed on Jul 24, 2023.

Recommended Readings 

• Ernest J Yanarella, The Missile Defence Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2011)
• Happymon Jacob, “Consider a Trilateral Asian ABM Treaty”, in Michael Krepon et al eds., Off Ramps from Confrontation in Southern Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Centre, 2019)
• Jerome Grossman, “The Politics of Star Wars: The Reagan Legacy and the Strategic Defence Initiative” The Notre Dame School Journal of Legislation, Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol15/iss2/4
• National Research Council of the National Academies, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defence, Consensus Study Report, 2012
• Manpreet Sethi, “Nuclear Strategies in the Age of Missile Defences”, Air Power Journal, vol.2, no.3, Jul-Sep 2005, pp. 159-184.

The post Ballistic Missile Defence in Nuclear Strategy appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Tactical nuclear weapons; nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, Pakistan, massive retaliation

Two developments related to ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons (TNWs) have recently been in the news. The first is Russia’s deployment of TNWs in Belarus as another act of nuclear brinkmanship in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. The second is a reference by Lieutenant General Khaled Kidwai, former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, to his country’s pursuit of full-spectrum deterrence to cover ranges from “zero meters to 2,750 km” and have nuclear weapons of “destructive yields suited for strategic, operational and tactical levels”.[1]

TNWs, evidently, continue to occupy mind space in nuclear-armed countries. This would likely not have been the case if US-Russia relations had not soured in 2014. The elimination of TNWs was supposed to be the next item on their arms control agenda. Unfortunately, that moment has passed, and the fatal attraction of TNWs continues.

What are TNWs?

As yields of nuclear warheads moved into megaton ranges during Cold War competition, TNWs were built as more usable, and hence more credible, deterrent options. Supported by nuclear use theorists (colloquially called NUTs), TNWs or battlefield nuclear weapons, were showcased as a way of reining in ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) scenarios by bringing the war back into the battlefield with low-yield warheads against military targets. The inventories included nuclear artillery, atomic demolition munitions, nuclear mines, torpedoes, and short-range missiles.

There is no one accepted definition of TNWs. In the context of the European theatre, these refer to low-yield nuclear warheads (from 1 to 100 kilotons) on short-range missiles (less than 500 km) to hit targets on the battlefield. But, in South Asia, where Pakistan has declared possession of TNWs, it projects them to be of sub-kiloton or low kiloton yields deliverable from zero to 60 km.

In order to put the yields in perspective, it merits recalling that the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were around 12 and 20 kilotons, respectively. While they would be ‘tactical’ by contemporary standards, they had profound strategic effects. By way of another comparison, the biggest non-nuclear bomb, the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), or the ‘mother of all bombs’, that the US dropped on Afghanistan in 2017 was a mere 0.011 kiloton. So, even the smallest TNW would be orders of magnitude higher than the largest conventional bomb. Additionally, it would leave lingering ionising radiation and radioactive fallout. It is for this reason that nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction.

India, which did test sub-kiloton weapons in 1998, maintains that there can be nothing tactical about their use. China, too, upholds the same philosophy, though its nuclear capability and positions are changing fast in contemporary times, and it chooses to remain silent on TNWs.

Why do Nations Covet TNWs?

Militaries perceive a utility in TNWs for providing more ‘usable’ and hence more credible options. This is particularly true for countries professing first-use nuclear doctrines. TNWs deter by projecting a resolve to use nuclear weapons to take the conflict into the nuclear realm, but in a manner that contains damage and allows the adversary to off-ramp.

NATO believed that deploying such weapons “near the front makes their use virtually automatic and therefore denies the opponent the option of conventional war. He is left with the choice between not attacking or setting off a nuclear war that would be likely to get out of hand.”[2] For NATO, TNWs magnified the risk of an uncontrollable nuclear war and thus deterred Soviet conventional superiority.

Pakistan has adopted the same logic. Inspired by NATO’s strategy, it seeks to raise the spectre of nuclear escalation to deter India from using force at the conventional level, even as it indulges in cross-border terrorism. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai described the purpose of Pakistan’s TNW as “pour cold water on Cold Start.”[3] The threat of the use of TNWs through the forward deployment of Nasr batteries is held out to deter any Indian ingress into Pakistani territory.

Today, Russia is playing the same game. The threat of the use of TNWs is allowing it to shape the contours of the war. In each case, the obvious purpose of the weapons is to threaten to create a psychological impact through the novelty of the act and the apparent brazenness to escalate to the nuclear level. The military effectiveness of the weapon on the battlefield may not be the driver. As admitted by a Pakistani strategist, “The ability of low yield nuclear weapons to destroy Indian tanks is limited to the extent of being inconsequential because to cause substantial damage to a well-dispersed attacking armoured formation a large number of 15-20 kiloton yield weapons would be required.”[4]

Indeed, the loss of a few troops or tanks would matter little in an overall battle scenario. But three important purposes are perceived to be met by merely posing the threat of TNWs. One, it appears more credible than using larger-yield weapons; second, it is likely to get the international community rushing in to mount pressure to halt conventional operations and search for de-escalation; and third, even if the TNWs were used, they would cause little damage of military significance, which an adversary might prefer to absorb rather than escalate the situation towards more nuclear exchanges.

Hence, TNWs are seen as adding an additional layer of deterrence to the overall nuclear strategy. But is that so? Can there be a guarantee around these assumptions? A former National Security Advisor to the government of India does not think so.

“If Pakistan were to use tactical nuclear weapons against India, even against Indian forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening the door to a massive Indian first strike, having crossed India’s declared red lines. There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan…. Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”[5]

While this may have been said in the context of India-Pakistan, it could be applicable to other nuclear dyads too.

What are the TNW Use Dilemmas?

The apparently simple logic of greater usability of TNWs and hence better deterrence is challenged by the uncertainty about the adversary’s willingness to play the game only with TNWs. Noted nuclear strategist Lawrence Freedman wrote, “It takes two to keep a war limited.” It could never be taken for granted by the user of TNWs that the adversary would choose to respond in the same manner. In fact, most lessons from simulation exercises in nuclear-armed states do not show that wars that began with the use of TNWs ended at that level.

Besides, an effective TNW strategy needs a sufficiently large number of such weapons with delegated command-and-control and battlefield management. This requires financial and fissile material resources, besides top-grade security and safety processes. And yet, irrespective of the detailed planning involved in stockpiling and using TNWs, a strategic reserve arsenal is nevertheless necessary for any eventuality. So, TNWs impose additional burdens in terms of cost of build-up, maintenance effort, human resource requirement, and command-and-control processes.

While countries that possess TNWs like to signal the inevitability of their early use, this has not happened in over seven decades. All through the Cold War, even as hundreds of TNWs were deployed by both sides in Europe, neither found it easy to use them. Even in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict, despite suffering several military and political setbacks, Moscow has still not found it worthwhile to use its TNWs. Pakistan, too, which has now had TNWs for almost a decade, has absorbed a surgical strike and an air strike but has not resorted to the use of TNWs. In fact, once the Indian action took at Balakot in 2019, Pakistan chose not to overplay its nuclear capabilities, including the TNWs. Obviously, there are dilemmas around TNW use, just like any nuclear use, especially owing to the unknowns that the action may create.

TNWs are meant to achieve limited destruction. This is the attribute that appeals most to military planners, buoying their perception of being able to execute nuclear operations in a controlled climb up the escalation ladder. They can make educated guesses on the physical effects of nuclear explosions based on yield, the height of the burst, the time of the attack, etc. But they cannot completely factor in incalculable imponderables such as the overall impact on the nation, the leadership, and the people. Therefore, despite a planned TNW use, the situation could quickly become unstable. As cautioned by Freedman, “Tactical nuclear war, by the very nature of the weapons, has a built-in escalation mechanism. It is hardly consistent to argue that…, once nuclear combat begins, both sides will be content to employ only the least efficient nuclear weapons.”[6]

The fear of the unknown has not allowed these weapons to be used until now. India has no reason to enter this game. It has steadfastly maintained that its nuclear weapons are for deterrence through the promise of unacceptable punishment or massive retaliation (MR).

Is Massive Retaliation Less Credible vis-à-vis TNWs?

It is often argued that MR is an impractical strategy. After all, even the US, which had adopted massive retaliation in the 1950s, dropped it in favour of a flexible response less than a decade later. Why did the US not find MR a credible deterrent strategy? And why does it make sense for India?

Two basic differences in the US and Indian nuclear articulations stand out. The first relates to their dissimilar nuclear doctrines. The US had a first-use nuclear doctrine, which implied that its MR had to be in response to any provocation, anywhere, including a conventional attack far away from the US mainland. This posed several difficulties and did not appeal to the American domestic constituency or its allies. In contrast, India has a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine. So, its massive retaliation would be in response to a situation in which its own territory or troops had suffered a nuclear attack. Retaliation to cause punishment after a nuclear attack would be credible and, arguably, even legitimate.

The second difference lies in their practice of nuclear deterrence. The USA deters by demonstrating its ability to fight with nuclear weapons. Therefore, a flexible response to execute and prevail in a nuclear war has greater appeal. Contrarily, India upholds deterrence through the threat of punishment or disproportionate response. The purpose of India’s nuclear strategy is not to let nuclear weapons be used, and it does so by evoking the threat of an unimaginable catastrophe. It deters by maximising the fear of extreme nuclear escalation. India’s MR signals a one-rung nuclear escalation ladder.

Robert Jervis wrote in 1984 that states “increase the chance of peace only by increasing the chance that war if it comes, will be total. To decrease the probability of enormous destruction may increase the probability of aggression and limited wars.”[7] So, attempts at decreasing the horrors of nuclear war may tempt states to attack under the mistaken assumption that the costs of the resulting war would be tolerable. This cannot be guaranteed and is a risk not worth taking.

Another criticism of MR is that by suggesting such retaliation, India could end up inviting a massive first strike and suffering more in the process. This argument, however, does not factor in the difficulty in taking the decision to use nuclear weapons. National leaders are likely to be weighed down by not just the consequences of their choice but also by a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons that has been in force since 1945. The unacceptability of nuclear use has only strengthened over time, as is also evident in the progressive constraints on nuclear testing. Nations have collectively walked a fair distance from the time when nuclear tests were routine. So, a decision that flouts these norms cannot be taken easily. Even to approve the use of a TNW is unimaginable, and to believe that a large-scale, pre-meditated nuclear strike could be ordered by a rational leader, is even more so. So, India’s MR is actually pushing away the possibility of nuclear use and thereby strengthening the case for deterrence, which is the stated objective of its nuclear weapons.

Finally, two more issues plague MR. The first relates to the perceived credibility of a proportionate response vis-à-vis massive retaliation. Would it not be more ethical, legal, and politically justifiable to inflict proportionate punishment? While this sounds logical, the difficulty lies in the determination of what is proportionate in the case of nuclear weapons – the use of the same number of weapons? Use of the same yield of weapons? Use on the same number and type of targets? Or, an equal number of people were killed in the immediate fireball and then later due to surviving radioactivity? Establishing and inflicting proportionality with nuclear use is not easy. In fact, the more nations delude themselves into believing that they can fight small, neatly contained, proportionate nuclear wars, the further they advance towards a slippery slope that could quickly slide from proportionate to obliterative.

The second set of questions can be built around ‘what if’ scenarios. What if a TNW was used on a naval carrier battle group? Or on a few tanks in enemy territory? Or on a military airfield? Would the Indian leadership respond with counter value attacks against the cities of the adversary? Some strategic analysts see this as a “serious decision dilemma” since “it could make it hard for Indian leaders to find justification for infliction of disproportionate damage to avenge against what limited damage the TNWs could inflict.”[8] So, it is argued that the asymmetry between TNW use and massive retaliation adversely impacts the credibility of India’s deterrence.

The answer to this dilemma lies in understanding the difference between a nuclear deterrence doctrine and a military strategy to handle a deterrence breakdown. In signalling massive retaliation as a doctrinal response to any kind of nuclear use, India is deterring the possibility of such an occurrence. It is letting the adversary know in advance that it will respond with a heavy nuclear hand in case nuclear weapons are used against its troops or territory. However, if deterrence does break down for any reason, advertently or accidentally, the nation’s response could span a spectrum from non-nuclear to nuclear, depending on many factors.

Staying straightforward with its nuclear deterrence strategy, India deters all use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether the adversary calls it tactical or otherwise, with the threat of unacceptable damage, complemented with a show of firm resolve and operational preparedness. There has never been anything tactical about nuclear weapons. Irrespective of the yield, range, or target, the effects of nuclear use can only be calamitous with these extraordinary weapons. They may be touted as more usable, but they are as difficult to use as nuclear weapons. The artificial distinction is a case of fatal attraction.

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Notes

[1] Special Message by Lt Gen Khaled Kidwai, at Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, May 25, 2023. Accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3oOXOk3G1k.

[2] Thornton Read, “Limited Strategic War and Tactical Nuclear War”, in Limited Strategic War, edited by Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p. 96.

[3] Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 396.

[4] A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, “The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large-Scale Indian Conventional Attack”, Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief, No. 61, University of Bradford, November 11, 2010.

[5] Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, (Penguin Random House India, 2016) p. 174

[6] Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (Saint Martin’s Griffin, 1983) p. 77

[7] Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)

[8] Gen. N.C. Vij, “Strengthening India’s Nuclear Deterrence”, in Securing India, VIF Perspective: Issues and Trends, Wisdom Tree, (New Delhi, 2017), p. 7. Similar views may be found in Ajai Shukla, “After a Pakistani TNW Strike, India Can Go for Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: Former NSA Shivshankar Menon”, Broadsword, March 18, 2017, http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2017/03/after-pakistani-tnw-strike-india-will.html, accessed on May 15, 2018 and Arka Biswas, “Incredibility of India’s Massive Retaliation: An Appraisal on Capability, Cost and Intention”, Comparative Strategy, vol.36, No.5, pp 445-456.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria eds., Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Conflict Redux (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2014)
• Feroz Hassan Khan, Subcontinent Adrift: Strategic Futures of South Asia (New York: Cambria Press, 2022)
• Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989)
• Manpreet Sethi, “Pakistan’s TNWs: The Signal and How it Should be Received”, in Shalini Chawla and Rajiv Nayan eds., Pakistan’s Security Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2023)
• Manpreet Sethi, “The Idea of Limited Nuclear War”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol.14, no.3, Jul-Sep 2019, pp. 235-247.

The post The Fatal Attraction of ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords:  Nuclear strategy, NFU, nuclear weapons, first use

Having focused on nuclear warhead numbers in the context of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ in last month’s NuClearly Put, we continue with the individual examination of attributes of India’s nuclear doctrine. This month, the lens is on ‘no-first-use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed states, a strategy currently maintained by China and India.

After its nuclear test in 1964, China was the first country to state, “it will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons”. India, meanwhile, had endorsed this approach even before it acquired nuclear weapons. In the early 1980s, a committee consisting of General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and K. Subrahmanyam recommended that India be “guided by a strict doctrine of no-first-use and dedicated only to retaliating against a nuclear attack in India”.[1] In 1994, India even proposed NFU to Pakistan in a non-paper. Having given much thought to the value of the NFU strategy even before the tests in 1998, this policy was enshrined in the nuclear doctrine in 1999.

However, the strategy has generated much debate. Western strategists have dismissed it as an unverifiable declaratory position. They are inclined towards deterrence by showcasing nuclear weapons for warfighting, and find it difficult to accept that nations can eschew pre-emption. Within India, too, many have dubbed NFU a passive or reactive strategy since it cedes the initiative to the adversary, tying its own hands to retaliation only. Much angst is expressed by the military and strategic community that India has not been able to deter Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism and China’s attempts at salami slicing at the border. The blame for this is placed on NFU, the assumption being that a ‘hard-nosed hawkish’ first-use strategy would be better at deterring such aggressions.

Is this true? In a situation where every nuclear dyad faces an adversary equipped with a robust second strike capable of assured retaliation, can a nation undertake nuclear first use, suffer nuclear damage, and yet come out better in a conflict? If the answer to this is negative, as it should be given the damage that modern megacities will suffer from even modest fission weapons, then can the threat of first use be credible? And, if it is not, then why should it deter? But if first-use does not deter, then why do nuclear-armed countries have a first-use strategy? The answer lies in their specific compulsions. Pakistan prefers first use to deter India’s conventional superiority, as do Russia (after briefly maintaining NFU between 1982 and 1993) and North Korea against the US. Washington, in turn, is hemmed in by its extended deterrence commitments and forced to retain NFU by its allies.

Despite the fact that seven nuclear weapon countries have first-use strategies, no nuclear use has taken place. This is because many dilemmas confound a first user.

When to Use a Nuclear Weapon?

Unlike a country with NFU, whose only use of nuclear weapons is when these have been used against itself, a first user must define ‘redlines’ on when to employ these weapons – early in conflict; when facing military reversals; or an existential crisis? Militaries instinctively prefer offensive strategies. They like to seize the initiative, use surprise, execute their own pre-deliberated plans, and compel the adversary to follow their moves. As Barry Posen, a well-known military strategist, said, “A military organization prefers to fight its own war and prevent its adversary from doing so….” [2]

This approach, however, is not the best for nuclear weapons. The first use of nuclear weapons against an adversary that has a secure second-strike capability cannot ensure the ability to fight as per one’s own plans. The pathways such a war may take are many, most of them likely to negate the benefits that the first user hoped to achieve.

It is often argued that a possessor of nuclear weapons is likely to use them if faced with  the prospect of conventional defeat since it would then be left with no option. However, this assumption of nuclear use inevitability fails to evaluate how a country that was conventionally down could revive its prospects by using nuclear weapons. In fact, after having used these weapons, its fate would shift from being ‘defeated now but living to fight another day’ to one of severe damage or annihilation depending on its geographical, material, and human capacities. Jonathan Schell articulated this dilemma: “For how can it make sense to ‘save’ one’s country by blowing it to pieces? And what logic is there in staving off a limited defeat by bringing on unlimited, eternal defeat?”[3]

Secondly, it is often questioned whether it would make sense to stick with NFU when the adversary is evidently preparing for a nuclear strike. Should not nuclear pre-emption then be an automatic response? The answer to this lies in understanding that espying preparation can still not be a guarantee of an imminent nuclear strike. The preparations could be part of the adversary’s strategy of ‘coercive diplomacy’. After all, many incidents involving the threat of the use of nuclear weapons actually intend coercion.[4] Therefore, despite an apparent show of readiness, there is a chance that nuclear weapons do not come into use. But by striking first in the face of apparent readiness, a country would certainly end up inviting retaliation. Can this be beneficial?

Where to Use a Nuclear Weapon?

Can there be a ‘right’ target for nuclear first use? Militaries express preference for counterforce targeting of adversaries’ nuclear assets and related infrastructure to minimise their retaliatory options. So, the first strike should aim to disarm or decapitate. However, this would require an elaborate strike with good intelligence to know the adversary’s arsenal locations, targeting with accurate missiles, and sufficient capability to defend oneself against the adversary’s response with leftover assets. Not only is such capability difficult to build and logistics complex to execute, but the problem also lies in the proximity of military bases to civilian centres. Therefore, the distinction between counterforce and countervalue can be quite artificial, especially when using a weapon of mass destruction.

How to Use a Nuclear Weapon?

Can there be a ‘right’ kind of first use? Would it suffice to use a small number of low-yield weapons against battlefield targets, largely to indicate resolve and signal further action if the adversary were to continue his offensive? Can a controlled nuclear first use halt ongoing military operations and help escape the possibility of retaliation? Or, would it be better to undertake large-scale first strikes on military and civilian targets that cripple a country materially and politically? Can this rule out the possibility of retaliation?

There can be no definitive answers to these questions. If a country has paid adequate attention to building a survivable, robust retaliatory force, there can never be a guarantee of no retaliation, irrespective of how the first use happens. The victim of first use may then choose to continue the conventional onslaught or escalate to a nuclear level. Thus, by introducing nuclear weapons, the first user enters the uncharted territory of nuclear war-fighting, which would now be determined by the adversary’s response. By seemingly seizing the initiative, the first user has ended up inviting the spectre of nuclear retaliation. As pointed out by George Perkovich, an American nuclear analyst, “The escalatory implications of first use are at least partly why no state has tried to use nuclear weapons against a state that could retaliate in kind”[5].

What Kind of Nuclear Arsenal to Build?

Even a modicum of chance, let alone a guarantee, of a successful first strike requires a technologically and financially demanding slew of capabilities: a large arsenal of first strike weapons, such as accurate missiles with real-time navigational aids to ensure high precision, multiple independently retargetable vehicles to degrade hardened targets, sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to ensure real-time information on the adversary’s arsenal, elaborate and delegated command and control to undertake simultaneous launches against dispersed forces, and a high level of active and passive defence capabilities to handle nuclear retaliation.

In contrast to the challenging demands of a credible first-use, NFU requirements can be relatively smaller and easier, focused on ensuring survivability. This means building hardened nuclear storage sites, ensuring deception, mobility, and dispersal over delivery vectors, and building redundancy into nuclear command, control, and communications. Of course, these are not easy or inexpensive by any means. Nothing in the nuclear domain is. But there is a difference in the quantitative and qualitative requirements of first-use and NFU.

Why Use a Nuclear Weapon?

The USA confronted this question in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.[6] The country then had the nuclear wherewithal and a comprehensive targeting strategy to ‘prevail’ with the first use of nuclear weapons. Yet, President Kennedy’s military leaders could not assure him that there would be no Soviet nuclear retaliation. And in the absence of such assurance, he dismissed every option of first use as “a hell of an alternative.”[7] Therefore, despite an offensive nuclear strategy, neither victory could be assured nor the extent of retaliatory damage could be considered acceptable.

In nearly all circumstances, the first use of nuclear weapons is likely to end up destroying, not protecting, the first user. In fact, with nuclear weapons, the first user’s advantage can prove to be elusive. The objectives of killing the adversary’s resolve to fight through counter value or killing the adversary’s capability to fight through counterforce are both fraught with suffering damage to oneself too.

Benefits of NFU

Leaving complex questions to the first user, the military of an NFU country can adopt a relatively relaxed posture that does not strain the nuclear leash of a system at hair-trigger alert. It also eliminates the need for forward deployment or pre-delegation of authority. These reduce the possibility of accidental or unauthorised use, as well as nuclear use based on miscalculation or inadvertence.

The leadership, too, is freed from the pressure of making difficult decisions demanded by first use while simultaneously being weighed down by a nuclear taboo. In fact, the decision to retaliate could be relatively easier, seemingly legitimate, and guilt-free to make. Moreover, by placing the onus of escalation on the adversary while retaining the initiative of punitive nuclear retaliation, NFU lessens the possibility of deterrence breakdown and thus encourages the possibility of ‘no use’ instead of ‘sure use’.

NFU offers the additional advantage of alleviating the adversary’s sense of insecurity about losing his nuclear arsenal, or a part of it, to an adversary’s first use. A country living under the constant fear of an imminent nuclear strike would be tempted to use its nuclear force first. NFU helps to mitigate this ‘use or lose’ pressure and thereby lessens crisis instability. Counterintuitive though it may sound, removing the adversary from the edge and making it feel reassured by one’s NFU can be beneficial for oneself too. As Robert McNamara had explained, “I had no desire to face, in a period of tension, an adversary who felt cornered, panicky and desperate and who might be tempted to move irrationally.”[8]

The value of this reassurance is evident in the Sino-Indian military stand-off that has continued for over three years now, and yet the nuclear word has not been uttered since both sides profess NFU. This is an example that could be emulated by other nuclear dyads as a nuclear risk reduction measure. Indeed, NFU makes for a credible, militarily defensible nuclear deterrence strategy that also contributes to regional stability and international security.

NFU Vs Ambiguity

In recent times, strategists and military planners have highlighted the growing risks to nuclear forces from precision strikes by conventional missiles, cyber-attacks on nuclear command and control, and the use of artificial intelligence. These are expected to compromise the survivability of retaliatory forces. It is being argued that these developments would/should move NFU countries to more ambiguous postures to deter by keeping the adversary guessing rather than by offering the assurance of NFU.

While these developments are worrisome, do they merit abandoning the NFU or attaching conditionalities to it? Would the threat of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional attacks on nuclear assets enhance deterrence? Would not the same dilemmas of first use arise, as already mentioned in the earlier part of the article? To arrive at some answers, it is first imperative to undertake a considered evaluation of the damage that the adversary’s conventional missiles or cyber-attacks can cause to one’s nuclear capability. In the case of India, China’s conventional missiles currently do not have the necessary accuracy or kinetic power to overwhelm India’s nuclear assets. Nor does it have the defences to shield itself from a retaliatory attack meant to cause unacceptable damage. Of course, China might acquire such capabilities over time. But then, India, too, would have moved ahead in its own survivability measures.

Secondly, the dilemmas of first use can be avoided by enhancing the credibility, effectiveness, and reliability of NFU by building strength in retaliation. It is the promise of assured retaliation that deters, not the technological ease of first use. This logic of deterrence is immutable. Therefore, the credibility of the NFU mandates building sufficient forces for retaliation and prioritising their survivability, a subject on which future issues of NuClearly Put will dwell more. Additionally, it would also be beneficial to negotiate arms control measures such as limiting the deployment of missile defence systems, agreements prohibiting cyber-attacks on nuclear command and control architecture, and reinforcing the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons. The value of the nuclear taboo should not be underestimated.

Finally, it needs to be said that the NFU does not make India a dove. K. Subrahmanyam wrote 20 years ago, “A nuclear hawk in charge of Indian nuclear button will be a disaster. One hopes there are no nuclear hawks among the leaderships of any of our major political parties.”[9]

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[1] George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 274).

[2] Barry R Posen, “The Sources of Military Doctrine”, in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz ed. The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p 24.

[3] Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (Stanford, CA,: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 54

[4] For a comprehensive list of incidents until 1996 see Jasjit Singh, “Why Nuclear Weapons”, in Jasjit Singh ed., Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), pp 12-13.

[5] George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Towards a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2013), p.10

[6] In 2015, the US National Archives and Records Administration released a detailed list of the US targets in the USSR called “Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959”. It was produced by the Strategic Air Command in 1956, identifying bombers as the primary means of delivery. See Scott Shane, “1950s US Nuclear Target List Offers Chilling Insights”, The New York Times, December 22, 2015

[7] Cited by Daryl G Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 120.

[8] Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (London: Bloomsbury, 1987), pp. 13-14

[9] K Subrahmanyam, “Politics of Security: When Vajpayee said ‘No’ to Going Nuclear”, Times of India, Apr 10, 2004

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Towards a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, 2013)
• Prakash Menon and Aditya Ramanathan eds., The Sheathed Sword: From Nuclear Brink to No First Use (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2022)
• Barry Blechman, Unblocking the Road to Nuclear Zero: Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations – China and India (Washington DC: Stimson Center,
• Steven Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal, “No First Use and Credible Deterrence”, Journal for Peace and Disarmament, 1, issue 1, 2018.
• Pan Zhenqiang, “China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Tong Zhao and Li Bin eds., Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016)
• Manpreet Sethi, “Using Nuclear Weapons First: ‘A Hell of an Alternative’”, Air Power Journal, vol.8, no.5, Winter 2013.

The post The Logic of No First Use Strategy appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: credible minimum deterrence, nuclear arsenals, fissile material, BMD

If nuclear deterrence is the primary purpose of nuclear weapons, then how many does one need to deter? What is that magical number for credible nuclear deterrence? Why did China, at one stage, think six weapons were enough, while the USA and USSR went up to 30,000 and 40,000, respectively? Why has India chosen ‘credible minimum deterrence’ as the guide for its arsenal while Pakistan seeks ‘full spectrum deterrence’?

Issues pertaining to the ‘right’ size of one’s arsenal continue to be deliberated in every nuclear-armed state. The spotlight shines on the subject every time a report is published on the nuclear holdings of a country. While the USA, Russia, UK, and France have been officially furnishing their warhead numbers, in the case of China, India, and Pakistan, the figures in the public domain are guesstimates based on their assumed fissile material production and missile launchers.

Every nuclear-armed country determines the size and pace of growth of its nuclear arsenal based on an assessment of a number of factors, such as its approach to nuclear deterrence, the availability of fissile material, its assessment of the adversary’s damage tolerance capacity, and other relevant technological capabilities. As these change, so can arsenal sizes.

Own Factors Determining the Size of Nuclear Arsenal

Practice of Deterrence

Countries that choose to deter by showcasing their ability to fight and win a nuclear war obviously require a large and variegated arsenal. Practising this approach the USA accumulated tens of thousands of nuclear warheads of varied yields atop different delivery systems, improved accuracies for counterforce targeting, and built damage limitation capabilities in the form of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The first two commanders of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), the American nuclear force, Generals Curtis LeMay (1949-1956) and Thomas Power (1957-1964), planned to win a nuclear war. General Power said, “At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win.”[1] Indeed, nuclear use theorists (jocularly known as NUTS) held sway over US nuclear thinking for many decades and pushed it towards a large arsenal. So did American extended deterrence commitments towards NATO and some Asian countries.

The USSR, US’ main adversary during the Cold War, pretty much mirror-imaged the US build-up. Rough parity between the two was considered necessary for deterrence so that neither could enjoy the advantage of launching a first strike without bringing about ‘mutual assured destruction.’ In 1985, the combined total of the two countries was 61,000 nuclear warheads.

The realisation that such large numbers were not needed for deterrence and that they rather increased concerns about warheads’ safety and security, including risks of inadvertent escalation, led to efforts towards reciprocally coordinated reductions, albeit keeping numerical symmetry intact. The last such agreement to be negotiated, the New START treaty, concluded in 2021, allows both sides to deploy 1550 nuclear warheads and 700 delivery systems. As per the latest available figures, Russia has 1674 deployed nuclear warheads and keeps an additional 2815 in reserve;[2] the USA has 1770 deployed and 1978 nuclear warheads in reserve.[3] Even at reduced numbers, parity has been maintained as a prerequisite for credible nuclear deterrence.

None of the other states that acquired nuclear weapons during and after the Cold War have opted for maximalist nuclear arsenals. Basing their deterrence strategies on the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, the UK and France, as well as China, India, and Pakistan, have built much smaller warhead holdings. As per current estimates, the UK has around 200-225 nuclear warheads, though in 2021, it announced that it would increase its nuclear inventory to 260 warheads in the coming years.[4] Despite this change, the arsenal would still be a small one. As is the case with France, which has remained stable for a decade now at 300 warheads.[5]

Of the other nuclear-armed states in southern Asia, when China first tested nuclear weapons in 1964, its Premier Mao Zedong directed his country to steer clear of excessive nuclear build-up in favour of an arsenal that would be just enough to inflict unacceptable damage. Beijing followed the minimalist philosophy, as its nuclear numbers remained roughly around 250-300 during 1980-2020. However, in 2021, the construction of hundreds of silos were reported. Current estimates of China’s nuclear arsenal indicate an increased number of 410 warheads.[6] According to the latest annual Pentagon report on military and security developments related to the People’s Republic of China, the country could have 1000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1500 by 2035.[7]

India’s draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 articulated the concept of credible minimum deterrence, which abjured large-scale accumulation of nuclear warheads or the need to match those of the adversary. With a view to building enough to be able to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary, the doctrine offered a “dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security”. The force size was directed to be “effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive” to the requirements of deterrence, while the numbers would be the minimum necessary for signalling credible deterrence. According to unofficial estimates, India’s nuclear stockpile is the smallest in southern Asia, at 160 weapons in 2022.[8]

Pakistan started its nuclear journey by following the Indian lead of credible minimum deterrence. However, over the last quarter century, it has moved the goalpost to full spectrum deterrence. This is supposed to “comprise of a large variety of strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons on land, air and sea.”[9]  It was estimated to have 165 nuclear warheads in 2021, with projections that it could grow to 200 by 2025.[10]

Material Availability & Delivery Reliability

The availability of weapon-grade fissile material is a primary requirement for building nuclear warheads. The pace at which a nation can produce enriched uranium or plutonium, and their quality, determine the numbers a nation can build. Another important consideration is confidence in the reliability of the yield of one’s warheads. While no nuclear detonation has been seen to be yieldless, credible nuclear deterrence rests on the confidence to cause damage of a kind that has been calculated as necessary for a particular target. In case of low reliability of warheads, the size of the arsenal may need to be larger, as more numbers may be necessary per target.

Similarly, the accuracy and reliability of delivery systems are factors to be considered. While counter-value targets do not require highly accurate delivery systems, the same is not true of counterforce systems that demand precision delivery since they are meant to neutralise hardened targets such as silos or command and control structures. Finally, besides all the technological considerations, fiscal resources are an important determinant of the size of the arsenal.

Sophistication of Survivability Measures

Given the centrality of the assuredness of being able to cause unacceptable damage, the survivability of warheads for retaliation is an important consideration for determining the size of the total inventory. The greater the confidence in the survivability of one’s own arsenal, the smaller it can be. Therefore, besides numbers, a nation needs to focus on measures such as mobility, deception, and dispersal, including taking the arsenal out to sea on SSBNs. The level of sophistication of survivability impacts the size of the arsenal.

Linkage with Status

In the conduct of international relations, nuclear weapons tend to be seen as harbingers of respect and status. So, several analysts have linked China’s recent nuclear expansion to its aspiration for great power status. In an apparent desire to ‘beat’ the US on every parameter, Beijing has felt the need to do so on nuclear stockpiles too. Xi Jinping himself had designated the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) as “the strategic support for the country’s status as a major power”.[11] China appears to believe that a big arsenal will help it win the respect of the US and get it to accept mutual vulnerability with China.

Factors of Adversary Affecting the Size of Nuclear Arsenal

Adversary’s Threshold of Unacceptable Damage

Credible deterrence rests on the promise of being able to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary. This requires an accurate calculation of the damage threshold of the adversary. For example, during the Cold War, in order to arrive at an empirical calculation of its arsenal, the USA propounded that if it could destroy 50 per cent of Soviet industry and 25 per cent of its population, it would cause unacceptable damage to the USSR. But this figure could be different for different countries. In the case of the US itself, President Kennedy’s hesitation to lose even one American city during the Cuban missile crisis revealed America’s low damage threshold.

Among the many factors that can help calculate the damage tolerance levels of a nation, five are particularly relevant. The first is to understand the historical experiences of a country, since those have a bearing on the number of losses it can take. For example, a country that has been through more wars and experienced more damage would have a higher damage tolerance threshold. Secondly, damage acceptability depends on the nature of the political system, with the assumption being that a closed, authoritarian system would be able to take more damage than a democracy. A third factor is the level of national economic development, since an economically well-off and materially aspirational society would likely have a weak stomach for destruction. Fourthly, the threshold would depend on the value a country places on the objective it seeks. The more a country is politically, economically, and emotionally invested in an objective, the greater its willingness to bear damage. Lastly, the nature of the leadership can push the threshold up or down. For example, highly nationalist, risk-prone leaders could motivate a nation to accept greater damage. An objective analysis of these aspects can help calculate the ‘right’ size of one’s nuclear arsenal.

Adversary’s Defences

Another important factor in determining one’s ability to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary is one’s air and missile defence capabilities. If a country can protect itself against incoming vectors, then the numbers required to saturate the missile defence would have to be higher. Thus, even an apparently defensive measure such as deploying BMD can lead to an offensive build-up on the other side (besides equipping the arsenal with other penetration aids) due to a reassessment of the numbers necessary to cause enough punishment to deter.

Adversary’s Technological Capabilities

Two other technological developments affect one’s determination of nuclear force size. The first relates to the technological sophistication of the adversary’s capability, which may threaten one’s retaliatory capability. For instance, if it has highly accurate conventional delivery systems that may be used to neutralise one’s nuclear forces, and if this is further coupled with a BMD for its own protection, it would inevitably lead to a need for increasing one’s own stockpile to ensure the survivability of enough to cause retaliatory damage. China’s resizing of its arsenal in current times is happening precisely due to this factor. Moreover, given the advancements in US BMD capabilities, and its focus on conventional global prompt strike (CGPS), including the development of conventional hypersonic missiles that can potentially destroy nuclear assets, China has perceived an erosion in its ability to cause unacceptable damage. Therefore, numbers are expanding to signal better survivability of its retaliatory capability.

A second development that may cause numbers to expand is the adversary’s acquisition of a high level of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability that makes one’s own nuclear forces more transparent and hence vulnerable to first strike. In such a scenario, there is an inevitability of force size changes to ensure redundancy for credible retaliation.

Nuclear Numbers – A Complex Calculation

As is evident, national nuclear arsenals are determined by a complex calculation of many factors. It is not a simple case of matching the adversary’s arsenal. Transformations in other capabilities matter too. In fact, in the game of nuclear deterrence, national stockpiles do not have to match warhead for warhead because, even in the case of numerical asymmetry, nuclear deterrence exists. More than the large size of the arsenal, its survivability is essential. Even small arsenals can deter owing to the distinct nature of nuclear weapons. Therefore, overspending on building large arsenals is not only unnecessary but also increases safety and security burdens. Prudence demands due consideration of all factors identified above to get the nuclear numbers right.

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Notes:

[1] As cited in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 246.

[2] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons 2022,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 78, no. 2, pp 98-121.

[3] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Weapons 2023,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol 79, no.1, pp 28-52.

[4] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons 2021,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 77, no.3, 2021, pp 153-158.

[5] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: French Nuclear Weapons 2019,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, no., 2021, pp 51-55,

[6] Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda and Eliana Reynolds, “Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 79. No.2, pp 108-133.

[7] Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF, Accessed on

[8] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 78, no.4, pp. 224-236.

[9] Khaled Kidwai, “Deterrence Stability”, in Feroz Hassan Khan, Subcontinent Adrift: Strategic Futures of South Asia (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2022).

[10] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 77, no.5, pp. 265-278

[11] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Speech delivered at the 19^th Party Congress, October 2018.

[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

• Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (Pantheon, 1986)
• Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Knopf, 2007)
• SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
• Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
• Keir A Liber and Daryl Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence”, International Security, 41, no.4, Spring 2017, pp 9-49

The post The Nuclear Numbers Game: Getting it Right appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords:  Nuclear doctrine, K Subrahmanyam, NSAB, Kargil.

Nuclear tests by India in May 1998 triggered international criticism and imposition of sanctions by nations that believed that the cause of nuclear non-proliferation had been grievously injured. New Delhi felt the need to explain the security compulsions behind its decision to test and the manner in which it would operationalise its nuclear deterrence. The articulation of a nuclear doctrine emerged as one way of doing so.

The first task handed over to the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) set up in December 1998 as a subsidiary body of the National Security Council was to prepare a nuclear doctrine. Shri K Subrahmanyam, a well-known nuclear strategist, was appointed the Convenor of this body that comprised of retired military and civilian officials, and distinguished academics.

The NSAB prepared a draft doctrine and presented it to Mr Brajesh Mishra, India’s first national security advisor (NSA). A career diplomat, he is remembered for his strategic astuteness. He decided to make the draft public, an action that appeared contrary to the prevalent nuclear opacity. But, while putting out the doctrine on Aug 17, 1999, he emphasised the need to stimulate domestic discussions before the general elections scheduled later that year. To recall, Prime Minister Vajpayee was then heading a caretaker government, having lost confidence of the parliament in April 1999 by one vote.  The PM too stressed that the draft was not a final policy. “We want that document to be properly studied before it attains finality.”

Besides fostering a domestic nuclear debate, Mishra’s action likely had other motives too. First, it signalled India’s resolve to retain its nuclear capability in face of the US-led clamour to denuclearise. The act of declaration of a nuclear doctrine underscored India’s serious consideration of the role and arsenal requirements of its nuclear deterrence. Secondly, it projected India as a ‘responsible’ nuclear state that had voluntarily placed its nuclear cards on the table. And, they showed a moderation in force build-up and support for non-proliferation and disarmament.

It is also significant that the doctrine was announced within a month of the end of the Kargil conflict on July 26, 1999. The 90-day ‘war’ had been fought to evict soldiers of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry who, in garb of the Mujahideen, had intruded across the line of control to occupy the heights from where they could threaten India’s arterial national highway connecting Srinagar and Leh. It was an attempt at territorial salami slicing by Pakistan Army. Pakistan presumed that the international community, fearful of a conflict between two nuclear armed nations, would force India not to escalate and accept the fait accompli. This turned out to be a faulty assumption. Pakistan’s action was dubbed as a case of nuclear blackmail by the international community. Eventually, Indian military action and international pressure coerced Pakistan to withdraw.

Of course, the world did despair at the prospect of two nuclear states going to war, but, Pakistan’s reckless behaviour stood out in sharp contrast to India’s military restraint evident in its decision to not expand the conflict into other theatres, while also circumscribing the area of action of the Indian Air Force to within the Indian side of the LoC. This further contributed to building India’s image as a mature nuclear state.

The announcement of the nuclear doctrine at this stage added to India’s reputation. It was showcased as a commitment that had been undertaken under the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that PM Vajpayee had boldly concluded with Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, in February 1999. The document contained many progressive nuclear confidence building measures, one of which was that both countries would offer transparency around their nuclear doctrines. India honoured its commitment despite Pakistan’s act of imposing a conflict on it within weeks of Lahore bus diplomacy.

The responses that followed

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister described the Indian move of announcing its nuclear doctrine as an attempt “to score points and present itself as a more responsible nuclear power in the region.” He said that Islamabad too was engaged in giving finishing touches to its own doctrine. However, no such document has yet been declared.

Meanwhile, the immediate international response to India’s declaration of the nuclear doctrine was negative. US State department was categorical “we don’t find it an encouraging document. We find it a document that describes the desire to develop a nuclear arsenal and that is something that we think is not in the security interests of India, the subcontinent, or the United States, or the world.” Other countries, such as Russia, Japan and China too expressed varying degrees of concern and urged constraint.

Gradually however, with India’s diplomatic outreach to major capitals, the perception changed. The transparency offered by India came to be seen in a positive light. The unambiguous declaration of a political role for the nuclear weapons along with minimum deterrence and a counter-strike policy that ruled out nuclear pre-emption showed that India was willing to impose restraints and checks on itself.

In fact, it was this restraint that invoked disquiet amongst some in the Indian strategic community. While the arguments merit a detailed assessment, as will be undertaken in forthcoming articles of NuClearly Put, suffice it to say here that the formulation of India’s nuclear doctrine so early in its journey served several important purposes. It provided a much-needed coherence for building nuclear capability at home; it also introduced the contours of nuclear India to the world and thus smoothened its diplomatic reintegration.

The document produced by the NSAB has remained a draft to this day. But, on January 4, 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security issued a press note on operationalization of the nuclear doctrine. This is the publicly known official doctrine for India. It retains the major attributes of the draft, and has further outlines some operational arrangements around command and control.

Doctrine as guide

In doing so, the nuclear doctrine has played its role to offer a set of guiding principles. These reflect the philosophy behind one’s nuclear weapons and answer the fundamental questions of how, when and where the weapons would be used for national security. Thereby, the doctrine helps India determine its force structure and force posture. But, it is not meant to describe the cost of this capability build-up or proffer an operational strategy. Rather, staying at a higher conceptual level, it offers the foundational principles that can be used to determine arsenal size and type, the necessary command and control infrastructure, survivability measures, and deployment status etc.

The doctrine can also guide the nation towards an ideal that it desires. For instance, India’s nuclear doctrine identifies global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament as a national security objective and contends that “India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon free world at an early date.” While aspiring for this ideal, it nevertheless also fleshes out the concept of nuclear deterrence for India. For instance, in accepting the principle of no first use, the doctrine directs India’s nuclear forces to be “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets.”

The doctrine indicates intention and thus offers a certain predictability in capability build-up and its use to the adversary. For the purpose of establishing stability in a nuclear dyad, such reassurance can be most beneficial. Accordingly, India’s nuclear doctrine has provided the advantage of letting the adversary know how it envisages the role of its nuclear weapons, thereby also giving a glimpse into the capability trajectory. Countries that tend to maintain vague or ambiguous nuclear doctrines miss out on this aspect and create room for misperceptions that may prove to be costly in conflict.

A nuclear doctrine emanates from the strategic culture of a country and reflects its cultural background, historical experiences, societal norms and worldview. Seen thus, a doctrine can afford to be enduring, unlike a nuclear posture that would change with external threats and own capability. In fact, the reason that despite many reviews of India’s nuclear doctrine, the need for revision has not been felt, at least upto now, is because the principles that it purports are anchored in the basics of nuclear deterrence. The doctrine captures the true nature of this weapon of mass destruction to guide India on how to ‘use’ it.

Obviously, a doctrine cannot be cast in stone and may need to be amended. Changing capabilities and contingencies do matter. For this reason, it is sensible to keep the doctrine under periodic reviews while remaining conscious of the fact that this document is meant to be a higher order guide to strategy and posture.

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[Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)]

Recommended Readings:

Arvind Gupta, How India Manages its National Security (New Delhi: Penguin, 2018)

Raju GC Thomas and Amit Gupta, India’s Nuclear Security, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000

PR Chari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions”, Non-proliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000.

The post The Making of India’s Nuclear Doctrine appeared first on CAPSS India.