Keywords: Nuclear Energy, small modular reactors,  IAEA, India Nuclear energy, DAE, NPCIL

There is a palpable sense of enthusiasm around the idea of ‘Small Modular Reactors’ (SMRs). These are being seen as a solution to some of the persistent challenges of long construction times and high economic costs associated with traditional nuclear reactors. A race is underway within the nuclear industry, backed considerably by governments, to work on new designs and manufacturing processes that are expected to prove their commercial viability and make them operational within a decade. How realistic is this estimate? What kind of advantages will SMRs offer? What challenges are they likely to face? This issue of the column undertakes an assessment of SMRs, especially in the context of India’s energy mix.

What are SMRs?

As the name suggests, SMRs would have two main attributes– small and modular. In terms of size, they are to be fission reactors with a capacity of about 300 MWe or less. In terms of modularity, they are envisaged to be amenable to being centrally manufactured at a factory and then transportable to the desired site for assembly/installation. Much like a machine, and quite unlike the traditional nuclear reactors that are built on site, SMRs are expected to arrive at a site, be plugged in and start producing electricity. They would also offer the possibility of the addition of multiple similar reactors when desired. Also, these could be placed on land, on ships for off-shore deployment (which are known as floating nuclear power plants), or even in an underground or submerged environment.

Over 70 SMR designs are being developed in different countries around the world today. At different stages on the drawing board, these designs range from slightly modified versions of existing reactors to those involving completely new technologies. Staying abreast of the high level of activity around the new ideas, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has set up the SMR Regulators’ Forum to help countries share information on issues of common concern. It published a Technology Roadmap for Small Modular Reactor Deployment in 2021 that identifies, evaluates and promotes collaboration and knowledge sharing amongst technology developers, industry, users and regulatory bodies.

Expected Advantages of SMRs

Speed of Installation and Cost Savings

One of the main advantages of SMRs is seen in their ability to be manufactured as pre-fabricated and pre-tested modules that can be easily assembled/installed on site after being transported conveniently. Modularity in manufacturing and assembly is expected to reduce construction time. The idea, in fact, is to compress a large technological project into a relatively easy installation of a pre-fabricated product of standardised quality. A study in this regard has suggested that SMRs can reduce construction time by 3.5 years in comparison to the average 6.5 years required as of now.[1] Reduced gestation periods are then expected to reduce capital costs too, thus increase the economic competitiveness of the reactors.

Enhanced Safety and Security Features

Given the new technologies being incorporated by SMRs, these are expected to include enhanced safety and security features. On the safety front, the reactors are being designed to incorporate modern passive safety systems that minimise the need for human intervention in case of emergencies. On nuclear security, they would incorporate the concept of “security by design” to address concerns of sabotage, theft, attacks and proliferation. Since many of these designs are expected to operate for prolonged periods without the need for refuelling, there would be related benefits of reduced risks of transportation of nuclear materials too.[2]

Flexibility of Installation and Siting

SMRs would provide flexibility in siting options, especially their placement in remote, isolated areas that are currently dependent on diesel generators. Given their compactness, they are envisaged to need less land, as well as concomitant emergency zone requirements. Addition or removal of new modules, as considered necessary, would add to the flexibility advantage.

Baseload Power in Support of Renewables

Nuclear power has a major advantage of being a baseload source of electricity. With the current trend favouring a rapid deployment of renewable energy, SMRs could complement these sources to address their disadvantage of intermittency. So, SMRs could supplement solar, wind, small hydroelectric and tidal generation to ensure a continuous supply of electricity and thus help stabilise the grid. This combination would help overcome the challenge of storage that the use of renewables still poses. It would also allow renewable energy to enjoy a low-carbon backup source instead of relying on thermal plants for handling the problem of intermittency.

Better Waste Management

Spent fuel management has been perceived as a major challenge of nuclear plants. SMRs are trying to address this by experimenting with new ideas for dealing with nuclear waste. These include fast reactor designs that would ensure higher fuel burnup and hence a lesser amount of nuclear waste generation or the travelling wave reactor design that could consume the fuel that it breeds, thereby minimising the need to remove spent fuel. Likewise, other SMR technologies have been trying to develop a thorium fuel cycle, which too could reduce nuclear waste.

Better Resource Efficiency

SMRs are also likely to offer better resource efficiency, given their comparatively smaller physical footprint. Requirement of land would be less as compared to a traditional nuclear power plant. The latter needs an emergency planning zone extending up to 16 kms around the plant. In comparison, SMRs would require just about two kms.[3] They are also expected to be time efficient in deployment as well as require lesser maintenance.

Challenges that Persist with SMRs

While SMRs seem promising in addressing the long-standing challenges of traditional nuclear reactors, it needs to be understood that all these promises are currently expectations. The true economic viability of SMRs will be available for appraisal only when some designs have matured, become standardised and gone into factory production. This currently appears on the distant horizon.

Supply Chain Maturity & Price Advantage– Long Way Off

Modularity is being touted as the biggest advantage of SMRs. It is expected that SMRs will reap the benefits of serial factory manufacturing, which would enable optimum standardisation of components. Pre‑assembled modules will simplify on‑site installation. The problem, however, remains that for factories to sink in substantive capital investment to create the infrastructure for such manufacturing, they would need assurance of a sufficient number of orders. Only then will economic efficiencies emerge. Such orders, as of now, appear distant. It will take time before one particular design from the plethora currently being experimented with is sufficiently field-proven and accepted by a large number of companies, operators and regulatory bodies. Therefore, the supply chain maturity of SMRs will take time, even a few decades, to emerge.

Tussle between Industry and Regulators

Given the novelty of the concept, the nuclear industry investing in SMRs is facing challenges ranging from licensing to liability. The current regulatory regimes are designed for traditional nuclear plants. As the industry seeks changes, they are being met with overly cautious regulators who are not only careful about the novel designs being experimented with but also wary of the reality that many players in the SMR space are new to the nuclear industry. Both sides, therefore, are yet to find a level of comfort with each other.

Another challenge in this space would emerge when reactors that have achieved design approval in one country are exported for installation in another country as a pre-fabricated product. As per Current patterns, design approval secured by the regulatory agency of one country does not automatically become acceptable in another, and since different regulators place emphasis on different issues, any demand for design changes would defeat the advantage of modularity and stability of supply chains with pre-fab SMRs. Demands for changes would also drive up the cost of reactors, thereby negating one of the purported advantages of SMRs.

Liability Issues

Liability in case of an accident at a nuclear plant is also a matter of great concern and contention. The maximum concerns in this regard have been raised in the context of Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPPs). The first of these pertains to the very definition of such reactors under the existing conventions. For instance, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) defines a “nuclear installation” as “any land-based civil nuclear power plant under its jurisdiction”. Experts differ on whether a floating nuclear power plant at shore or off-shore could be considered a nuclear installation under the international third-party nuclear liability conventions. Questions have also been raised on what happens when the FNPP navigates through different maritime zones and high seas. The CNS only refers to the carriage of nuclear substances, i.e. nuclear fuel and radioactive products and waste, not a nuclear reactor. A discussion on the liability regime applicable during the carriage and operation of a nuclear reactor, therefore, becomes imperative. This is especially necessary to facilitate the insurance coverage of such installations and protect potential victims in case a nuclear incident occurs during the journey.

India: The Way Ahead with SMRs

Of the 23 nuclear reactors operational in India today, the majority of those indigenously built have a capacity rating of 220 MWe. India also has the experience of having built an 85 MWe reactor for its nuclear submarine. This shows that India has the capability to design, build and operate small reactors. While it has not utilised a modular factory process so far, the industry involved in manufacturing nuclear equipment can be expected to make this possible in case the nuclear establishment is keen to build such reactors.

Cognisant of the potential of SMRs, India’s Department of Energy has design teams working on the technology.[4] Speaking of SMR prospects for the country, K N Vyas, former Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, had stated in 2019, “Carrying out the design of new reactor systems and refinement in the already performed design is an ongoing process, which is always under focus to improve the designer’s capability. SMRs also need some technology development to fill-up gap areas. The process of technology development also needs to be completed before tasks related to SMRs can be taken up in a more serious manner.”[5]

While DAE is keeping abreast of SMR developments, its current priority is technological advances in the current stream of reactors. Having graduated from 220 MWe to 540 MWe to 700 MWe, India has striven to reach higher capacity reactors in order to ensure a rapid expansion of nuclear electricity generation. In fact, one of the primary motivations for the conclusion of the Indo-US agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation was to enable the import of larger-capacity reactors. While these imports have remained embroiled in price negotiations and liability Issues, India’s indigenous efforts have yielded 700 MWe reactors.

Can SMRs be attractive for a country like India, where the demand for electricity is expected to continue growing? Indeed, in such a situation, the rationale for large reactors is loud and clear. However, SMRs too could be useful in a few scenarios. One of these could be to replace old coal plants that need to be decommissioned. In this regard, Srikumar Banerjee, another former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, had rightly stated, “Some of the retiring thermal power plants can be replaced with small modular reactors.”[6] This would also help combat air pollution problems plaguing the country and meet its Paris Agreement goals. In fact, given the high induction of renewable power in a thrust to move towards green technologies, SMRs could supplement this by being a dependable base load and clean source of power. They might also come in useful for providing electricity in remote areas or islands.

However, it still remains unclear whether SMRs will become the force of transformation they promise to be. The buzz around them is certainly strong and fuelled by the urgent need to find low-carbon electricity generation sources. Not surprisingly, this space is being seen as a huge investment opportunity by the nuclear industry. India, too, should find ways, especially through the private industry route, to keep its options open. The DAE/Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) may offer to do some hand-holding for private players to help them build such reactors once a design has been created and proven through a prototype. Thereafter, private players can be incentivised by the government through, as has also been suggested, production linked incentive schemes for manufacturing such reactors. Some of the more recent nuclear cooperation agreements signed with countries such as France, USA,  South Korea and Russia mention possibilities of collaboration on SMRs too.

However, it needs to be emphasised that given the country’s electricity requirements, it need not feature at the top of the DAE’s priority list. Developed countries that are engaged with SMRs are doing so at a stage where their electricity demand and population growth are mostly stable and, in some cases, even stagnant. The new technology development, then, is actually a way for the nuclear industry to keep itself gainfully occupied and with a view to popularise new nuclear build for countries where reactor construction has stagnated or where there is potential to export them to nuclear newcomers. For DAE/NPCIL to divert any large part of its nuclear resources towards such a technology would be a diversion from its focus, which should be on the quick construction of planned nuclear reactors in order to enhance the country’s electricity supply with an environmentally friendly source. Long-term policy support is needed to bring the planned reactors of larger sizes to fruition and to do so within specified time schedules.

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Notes:

[1] Clara A Lloyd, “Modular Manufacture and Construction of Small Nuclear Power Generation Systems”, Research Gate, May 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337937287_Modular_Manufacture_and_Construction_of_Small_Nuclear_Power_Generation_Systems. Accessed on October 03, 2021.

[2] The Department of Energy, USA, “Benefits of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)”, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/ne/benefits-small-modular-reactors-smrs#:~:text=SMRs%20provide%20simplicity%20of%20design,as%20demand%20for%20energy%20increasess. Accessed on October 02, 2021.

[3] “Small Modular Reactors: An Overview”, ANSTO, April 16, 2024, https://www.ansto.gov.au/news/small-modular-reactors-an-overview.

[4] “DAE working on Small Modular Reactors: KN Vyas”, Nuclear Asia, November 21, 2019, https://www.nuclearasia.com/news/dae-working-small-modular-reactors-kn-vyas/3307/. Accessed on October 16, 2021.

[5] Ibid.

[6] “Small modular nuclear reactors are now beautiful for plant makers”, Energyworld.com,

February 25, 2021, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/small-modular-nuclear-reactors-are-now-beautiful-for-plant-makers/81209735. Accessed on August 16, 2021.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

The post Assessing the Promise of Small Modular Reactors from an Indian Perspective appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: India’s nuclear power ambitions, KAPS, German nuclear phase-out, NPCIL

Two contrasting developments in the nuclear energy domain caught public attention last year. In Europe, Germany shut down the last of its 17 nuclear reactors and bid goodbye to nuclear energy in April 2023. Meanwhile, in Asia, India’s 23rd nuclear reactor, Kakrapar 3, began commercial operation in July 2023. Earlier this year, India announced an ambitious nuclear expansion, planning to add 18 new nuclear power reactors with a capacity of 13,800 MWe by      2031-32. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has announced that with these additional units, the total share of nuclear power in India’s energy mix will rise to 22,480 MWe by 2031-32 from the current capacity of 8,180 MWe.

Why is India steadfast on its nuclear power programme, though it is currently contributing only about 2 per cent to the electricity share, while Germany, which was once getting 22 per cent of its electricity from nuclear, decided to dispense with it? The answer to this question lies in the unique circumstances of each country which make it choose the sources of electricity generation in its national energy mix.

Understanding Germany’s Decision to Phase Out Nuclear Energy

Germany took the decision to phase out nuclear energy two months after the March 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, which severely shook public confidence in nuclear safety. Succumbing to the pressure from Green parties, the government announced that all of the 17 operational nuclear reactors in Germany, which were then producing about 22 per cent of the country’s electricity, would be phased out by 2022. By 2020, 11 of the 17 plants had been shut down, and Germany was down to producing only 13 per cent of its electricity from nuclear energy. Thirty per cent was being generated from coal-fired plants and 47 per cent from renewables. To its credit, the country had, in a decade, become a front-runner in the use of renewables for electricity generation. However, several German business and industry leaders argued in favour of nuclear energy for the sake of having a reliable baseload source of electricity. Many expressed concern that the loss of nuclear electricity could end up pushing the country towards greater use of coal, thereby increasing its environmental emissions.

One challenge, though, that Berlin had not accounted for while taking the decision to shut out nuclear energy was the disruption in its energy relations with Russia, a major supplier of natural gas to Germany. The Russia–Ukraine conflict cast an ominous shadow on Germany’s energy scenario, and the country had to push back its planned date of shut down of the last reactor from 2022 to one year later so as to make time for securing electricity from other sources.

The German decision of a nuclear phase-out in 2011 was only in part triggered by the anti-nuclear inclinations of the political firmament of the time. It was also facilitated by several national socio-economic realities. These included a stable population with high per capita energy consumption of above 7000 kWh; a surplus national electricity market that had been exporting electricity to the tune of about 15 billion kWh; a forecast of as low as 1.1 per cent per annum growth of electricity; the option of making up for the loss of electricity caused by the shutdown of nuclear plants by importing more coal from Poland, more gas from Russia, and even electricity from France and Czechoslovakia. Germany, therefore, had the luxury of removing the option of nuclear electricity from its energy basket. Not many others enjoy this situation. India certainly does not.

Understanding India’s Need for Nuclear Energy

India faces a different reality. Some facts peculiar to India need to be understood to answer questions that are often raised about why India should continue to invest in a nuclear power programme when, even after 60 years of having been in the fray, it contributes only a small slice to national electricity generation. Should the focus not be on modern, renewable sources like hydro (including small hydel plants), solar and wind energy? Afer all,  in just the past decade new installed capacities in solar and wind have  taken the share of renewables from about 14 per cent to close to 40 per cent? Today, India ranks fourth globally in Renewable Energy Installed Capacity (including large hydro), fourth in wind power capacity and fourth in solar power capacity.[1] Solar energy has emerged as the star performer in this period, with more than thirty times increase in installed capacity from 2.5 GW in 2014 to 75 GW in 2024. What, then, is the rationale for retaining nuclear power in India’s energy mix?

This question cannot be answered without adequately understanding India’s unique socio-economic realities and energy compulsions. India is a developing nation with a population close to a billion and a half that is mostly young and aspirational. The country’s economy is dominated by the manufacturing and service sectors, which are energy-intensive. The first thing to note, therefore, is a continuous upward demand for electricity in the coming years. India’s power generation capacity has increased phenomenally from the total installed power generation capacity of a mere 1362 MW at the time of Independence to 400,000 MW today.[2] Today, India is the third largest producer of electricity in the world. These are all creditable developments, but India’s per capita electricity consumption is still at a mere 1255 kWh in 2021-22. This compares dismally with Canada’s 17179 kWh, 13338 kWh in the US, and about 5000 kWh even in China.[3]

According to the ‘Economic Survey’ tabled in Parliament in July 2019, India needs to quadruple electricity production to assure a reasonable quality of life to its citizens. To give one example, the World Energy Outlook 2023 predicts skyrocketing consumption of electricity in India based on a surge in air conditioner ownership. As temperatures soar to new highs, electricity demand for cooling registers a surge, with nearly 10 per cent of total electricity consumption attributed to space cooling. With household air conditioner ownership projected to increase nine-fold by 2050, this trend will further exacerbate energy demands and peak electricity requirements.[4] Besides growing ownership of such personal appliances, the Indian economy in general is expected to grow at over six per cent , concurrently increasing the demand for electricity too.

Unlike the situation a few decades ago when the government could have nonchalantly met this demand with the cheapest and easiest available fuels, mostly by quickly setting up coal-fired plants, an increased sensitivity to human and environmental health has changed the focus on kinds of fuel sources now found acceptable. Currently, India draws nearly 63 per cent of its total energy generation from thermal sources. Of this, nearly 55 per cent is met from coal and the rest from gas, with a miniscule amount from oil-fired plants. Such a configuration causes two types of worries. The first of course relates to the greenhouse gases emitted from such use of coal. India’s per capita carbon emissions stand at 1-1.2 tons, compared to the US’ 20 tons per capita. If a growing Indian economy continues to rely on coal, carbon emissions are bound to rise. This will have implications for national expenditure on domestic environmental and health measures and India’s global climate commitments. The second cause for concern comes from the fact that India imports a significant part of its fossil fuels. For a large and rapidly developing country, bulk fuel imports raise economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

Both these concerns explain the current inclination towards increased use of low-carbon sources. Amongst such sources that India has in its energy mix, the most important are renewables such as hydro, solar and wind. Of these, hydroelectricity from large hydel projects was the first to be exploited going back to the decade of the 1890s well before independence. Interestingly, in 1947, of the total installed capacity of 1362 MW, 508 MW came from small and medium hydropower projects. Soon after independence, the focus shifted to building large hydroelectric power stations. Work on the Bhakra Nangal dam and hydroelectricity project, for instance was initiated in 1948 itself.  Over the decades, however, interest in such plants has plateaued and they have become less popular owing to the related large-scale displacement and rehabilitation issues. Micro or small hydel projects are more common today, but these are only expected to meet the needs of a local community or industry.

Evidently, the contemporary focus is on solar and wind energy, and installed capacities of both have grown exponentially in the last decade, as stated earlier. However, their limitations should also be understood. Firstly, solar and wind energy generation is land-intensive. To give a comparison on this front, one can look at Asia’s largest solar park, which was commissioned in 2018 in Rewa, Madhya Pradesh. It is spread over 1590 hectares and produces 750 MWe. In comparison, the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS), which houses two operational 220 MWe units and two 700 MWe reactors, occupies only 959 hectares. Of this area, nearly 500 hectares are covered by the green belt and 200 hectares by a township, with the actual plant site being a minor fraction of the total. In fact, nuclear plants offer the best land utilization factor. As explained by the Nuclear Energy Institute, wind farms require up to 360 times as much land area, while solar photovoltaic (PV) facilities require up to 75 times as much land area, to produce the same amount of electricity as a nuclear energy facility.[5]

Another handicap of solar plants is a high dependence on imported materials such as photovoltaic cells and battery and storage equipment, as compared to the Indian Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) that have become completely indigenous. KAPS 3 and 4, for instance, which are the largest indigenously designed PHWRs and the first to have advanced safety features, “have been designed, constructed, commissioned, and operated by NPCIL, with the supply of equipment and execution of contracts by Indian industries and companies, reflecting the true spirit of Atmanirbhar Bharat,” NPCIL has said. In contrast, India’s domestic solar photovoltaic (PV) module manufacturing has yet to come to the level of meeting the pace of solar capacity growth. While hopes are tied to the Production Linked Incentives programme offered by the government, the nation, for now, remains a net importer of solar PV modules.

Despite these challenges, renewables still merit a place in India’s energy basket. Given the country’s demographic growth, the aspirations of a young population, lack of indigenous fuel resources, and mounting climate change, India needs a long-term vision and commitment to safe generation of electricity that must include all sources. However, it must be recognised that the exploitation of renewables alone cannot take India to meet its net zero commitments because both solar and wind energy would need backup options for the time they are unable to generate electricity for want of sun and wind. Therefore, the advantage of nuclear energy as a baseload source of electricity remains indisputable.

Moving Ahead

It is not surprising, therefore, that India has indicated its plans to move ahead with nuclear energy expansion. At the recently concluded first Nuclear Energy Summit, Dr KK Mohanty, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary Department of Atomic Energy, said that “as a medium-term target, we aim to achieve tripling nuclear power generation capacity by 2030 from around 7.5 GW at present.”[6] In order to meet this objective, the government had approved the construction of ten indigenous new nuclear reactors. As these become operational, built in the fleet mode, there will be a steady increase in the country’s nuclear power capacity. Apart from this indigenous fleet, hopes are also pinned on reactors that are to be built with international cooperation and are at various stages of negotiations. Of course, Kudankulam  (KK) 1 and 2 built with Russian help are already operational, and KK 3 and 4, will be the next among the foreign ones to become operational. Negotiations with France and the US continue but these have not yet reached the stage of construction commencement. However, it needs to be noted that in every new civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that India has recently signed with nuclear supplier countries such as the USA, France and South Korea, the possibility of cooperation on small modular reactors (SMRs) has been mentioned. One of the future issues of NuClealry Put will explore the concept, advantages and disadvantages of SMRs.

For now, a question that is often raised is whether India needs foreign reactors at all, given that the Indian nuclear reactors have now graduated to 700 MW. The answer to this should be yes because imported nuclear power plants of a capacity higher than 700 MW would help India rapidly meet its electricity requirements. It must be remembered that India’s electricity demand remains on the ascendant. The rehabilitation of India into international nuclear commerce with the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal has opened possibilities of newer technology induction for accelerated capacity expansion, and this should not be allowed to go to waste.

Nuclear energy, certainly, will have to remain a part of the country’s electricity mix owing to the vulnerabilities faced with other fuel sources. Fortunately for India, its nuclear programme is mature, and the industry is geared to perform its role, especially with the announcement on construction of a fleet of reactors.Another recent development of significance is the commencement of core loading of the prototype fast breeder reactor that has raised hopes that India’s move into the second stage of its nuclear power programme may be on the anvil.

For the future, a three-pronged approach is recommended to move India’s nuclear power programme up the ladder: firstly, the government must continue to offer its steadfast commitment and support to the nuclear sector including by providing predictability into the policy environment; secondly, the NPCIL must continue to provide safe operations and use of good management practices to ensure rapid induction of reactors to undercut the cynicism that is often expressed at the slow pace of growth of the nuclear sector vis a vis other sources of electricity generation.  In fact, it would be a further shot in the arm if the joint ventures already formed by NPCIL with NTPC and Indian Oil Corporation, as well as the recent reports on possibility of investments by  private firms, such as Reliance Industries, Tata Power, Adani Power, and Vedanta, could come to fruition; and thirdly, there is need for a continuous and proactive public outreach by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to help the public better understand the need for nuclear power as part of the country’s humongous electricity requirement, its environmental advantages and the focus on safety aspects.

India needs every watt it can get from all safe, secure, and sustainable sources, and nuclear energy ticks all the three boxes.

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Notes:

[1] “Creating a Sustainable World”, Invest India, https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/renewable-energy. Accessed on March 21, 2024.

[2] Ganesh Srinivasan, “OPINION: A narrative of the Indian power sector since independence”, The Economic Times, August 16, 2022, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/opinion-a-narrative-of-the-indian-power-sector-since-independence/93580873. Accessed on March 22, 2024.

[3] Daniel Slotta, “Annual per capita electricity consumption in China from 2009 to 2020”, Statista, January 03, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/867590/china-per-capita-electricity-consumption/. Accessed on March 10, 2024.

[4] Trishant Dev, “IEA World Energy Outlook 2023: Fossil fuel demand to peak by 2030, urgent investment shift needed”, Down to Earth, October 30, 2023, https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/climate-change/iea-world-energy-outlook-2023-fossil-fuel-demand-to-peak-by-2030-urgent-investment-shift-needed-92538.

[5] “Land needs for Wind, Solar Dwarf Nuclear Plant’s Footprint”, Nuclear Energy Institute, July 09, 2015, https://www.nei.org/news/2015/land-needs-for-wind-solar-dwarf-nuclear-plants. Accessed March 13, 2024.

[6] Department of Atomic Energy, “India’s Statement at Nuclear Energy Summit Brussels 2024”, March 21, 2024, https://dae.gov.in/indias-statement-at-nuclear-energy-summit-brussels-2024/. Accessed on March 29, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: nuclear energy, Homi Bhabha, KAPS 3&4, India’s nuclear power programme, CLNDA

On February 22, 2024, PM Modi dedicated units 3 and 4 of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) to the nation. The construction of both units had started in November 2010 with a plan to complete it in five years. Eventually, it took double that time for KAPS 3 to go critical on July 22, 2020. It took another three years for some commissioning issues to be sorted out. Unit 4 achieved criticality on December 17, 2023 and was connected to the power grid just two days before the PM’s latest visit.

At 700 MWe capacity, KAPS 3 and 4 are the scaled-up versions of earlier variants of CANDU pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) that India first built with Canadian help. Having graduated from the two 540 MWe that India had upscaled in the 2000s from the 220 MWe, they are currently the largest capacity reactors that India has indigenously designed and built. With these two, India now has 24 operational nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 8,180 MWe.

The target now is to get to 22,480 MWe by the start of the next decade. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL), currently India’s only operator of nuclear reactors, announced in February 2024 that it will add 18 more nuclear reactors to produce another 13,800 MWe of electricity by 2031-32. India wishes to avail advantages of economies of scale by standardising the design of 700 MWe capacity reactors for ‘fleet construction’. Ten of these have already been sanctioned to be built at Gorakhpur in Haryana, Kaiga in Karnataka, Chutka in MP and Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan and are at various stages of construction.

Will India be able to achieve these targets? Will these plants come up as expected, with one new plant being commissioned every year, as was announced by the Minister in charge of atomic energy at the start of this decade? Scepticism is natural given the experience in India of the long gestation of nuclear plants. On many occasions, ambitious targets have had to be revised. Why has India missed targets so often? Why has the perception grown that India’s nuclear power potential is over-promised but under-achieved?

Factors Responsible for the Fits and Starts

Early Initiation into Nuclear Energy

The Indian nuclear programme was amongst the first high-end science and technology efforts to be announced after independence as PM Nehru was laying the foundation of modern India. He had a worthy teammate in Homi J Bhabha, the architect of India’s nuclear programme, who had, in fact, written a letter on March 12, 1944, to the trustees of Sir Dorabjee Tata Trust proposing the establishment of an institute to train nuclear scientists. This was even before the use of atomic bombs by the USA. Bhabha expressed his vision thus, “When nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production, in say a couple of decades from now, India will not have to look abroad for its experts, but will find them ready at hand.”[1] Nehru too acknowledged the importance of atomic energy in his Presidential address to the Indian Science Congress in 1947, where he said atomic energy “may be used for war or may be used for peace. We cannot neglect it because it may be used for war… we shall develop it, I hope, in cooperation with the rest of the world and for peaceful purposes.”[2] Therefore, the initial focus was to tap the civilian potential of the atom. Accordingly, India legislated the Atomic Energy Act on April 15, 1948, leading to the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission on August 10 of the same year.

It may be recalled that internationally, too, this was the period of nuclear euphoria[3] when people believed that nuclear electricity would be so cheaply produced that it would not require to be metered. US President Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace programme in 1953, whereunder the USA entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with many countries. This proved to be timely for India, as was Bhabha’s chairmanship of the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1955. In his opening address, he highlighted the importance of this energy for developing nations: “For the full industrialization of the underdeveloped countries and for the continuance of our civilization and its further development, atomic energy is not merely an aid, it is an absolute necessity.”[4]

Making use of his contacts abroad, Bhabha secured nuclear cooperation for India from a number of sources. In June 1954, he requested Sir John Cockroft, his colleague from Cambridge and an important figure in the British atomic programme, to help India build a low-power research reactor. ‘Apsara,’ a research reactor that he designed with initial fuel from the UK, went critical in August 1956. The second research reactor to attain criticality, in 1960, was CIRUS–a 40 MW reactor built with Canadian help and with the heavy water supplied by USA. Canada also helped India set up its first power reactor, a PHWR, at Rawat Bhatta in Rajasthan. Meanwhile, the US helped India construct two 200 MWe (later 160 MWe) boiling water reactors (BWRs) at Tarapur. Built through a turnkey project, Tarapur Atomic Power Stations (TAPS) went critical in 1969 and provided India with valuable reactor construction and operating expertise, besides electricity to the grid.

It should also be mentioned that Bhabha had conceptualised a three-stage plan for India’s nuclear energy trajectory. After the first phase of construction of PHWRs, he planned the second phase with fast breeder reactors and then the third stage of thorium utilisation. The details of this plan and its relevance in today’s times will be discussed in a future column, but suffice it to say that India’s investment in nuclear energy was with a clear blueprint in mind. Nuclear energy was seen as a long-term commitment to achieve energy self-sufficiency.

First Shock of 1974

The plans, however, began to look shaky once India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974. Washington perceived this as a betrayal of trust by India, for it had used the heavy water supplied for CIRUS and the plutonium produced therefrom in its nuclear explosive device. Hence, under US laws, it ceased all cooperation with India and also reneged on its contractual obligations to supply enriched uranium to fuel the two power plants at Tarapur. India, however, maintains that it violated no contractual commitments in conducting the PNE since these, during the 1960s and 70s, were considered legitimate civil engineering purposes, with the US and USSR themselves conducting several PNEs. [5]

Notwithstanding this argument, India came under sanctions and was denied access to dual-use technology, the list for which went on expanding through the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, India’s nuclear power programme was forced, after 1974, to rely on indigenous R&D and domestic industrial efforts. This resulted in time delays and cost overruns for existing projects. Installed capacity in 1979-80 was about 600 MWe, and it could climb to no more than 950 MWe by 1987. In fact, after RAPS 1 went online in 1973, there was a long gap until 1981 when RAPS 2 started commercial power production. Only two other power plants, MAPS 1 and 2 at Madras, became critical in the 1980s. Four more–NAPS 1 and 2 at Narora & KAPS 1 and 2 at Kakrapar–came online in the 1990s. By 2000, the total nuclear energy generation stood at a mere 2,720 MWe.

So, the PNE impacted the pace of India’s nuclear power programme by putting a hard stop to ongoing nuclear cooperation and compelling India to rely on its own scientific and technological resources. It brought India onto the nuclear proliferation radar and made it a victim of technology denial regimes, many of which were created as a consequence of the Indian action. Thereafter, the power programme struggled over the next two decades.

Second Shock of 1998

It was only by the second half of the 1990s that the nuclear power programme began to get back on its feet. Indigenous efforts led to the construction of the first 540 MWe nuclear reactor. Overall, seven plants were under construction by 1998. That is when India chose to overtly demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability. Though this time, the pace of work on power reactors remained largely unaffected, constraints on further growth of the programme began to be felt in the early years of the new millennium. These were felt not in nuclear technology, expertise or financing but in the availability of uranium as fuel for an expanding power programme. This challenge, and the desire of the DAE to rapidly enhance nuclear power production through the induction of additional imported, larger capacity power reactors, persuaded the government of the day to explore options for international civilian nuclear cooperation.

A window of opportunity opened when President Bush offered the promise of a constructive nuclear engagement with India. His vision was encapsulated in the joint Indo-US statement of July 18, 2005, signed when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington. This was an implicit recognition of India as a rising economic power with substantial energy requirements and as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”. Therefore, from being viewed as an outcast to being chastised for “illegal” nuclear weapons possession, the then Indian PM described it in the Indian Parliament as a step where: “The existence of our strategic programme is being acknowledged even while we are being invited to become a full partner in international civil nuclear energy cooperation”.[6]

Nuclear Accident at Fukushima, 2011

It took three years of negotiations between India and the USA to arrive at an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. Debates within both countries examined the pros and cons of such engagement. Meanwhile, Washington had to amend its own legislation to enable cooperation with India, and New Delhi had to envisage and engage in a separation plan to distance its civil and strategic nuclear programmes. Finally, in 2008, after fixing all the necessary national and international requirements, India and the USA signed the 123 Agreement. Thereafter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted a waiver to India to partake in international nuclear commerce.

Between 2008 and 2011, India signed several MOUs with many countries for the import of uranium as nuclear fuel and also for the construction of large-capacity imported nuclear reactors. Nuclear enthusiasm and dreams of rapid reactor expansion soared, only to be dashed by an accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plants in Japan in 2011. This cast a pall of gloom on nuclear energy programmes worldwide. Concerns about nuclear safety compelled governments to institute safety reviews and scale back expansion plans. India, too, became a victim of this even as it was getting ready to take steps towards opening up its nuclear sector to entry of domestic and international private players.

Nuclear Liability Law, 2011

Fukushima brought attention to civil liability in case of an accident. In the case of India, the NPCIL, created in 1986, had been the sole designer, constructor and operator of all nuclear reactors in India. Accordingly, the liability rested with the government of India. But, as the prospects of entry of private players into the field grew after 2008, it became necessary to enact the required legislation. Influenced by the experience of Fukushima, as also by that of the Bhopal Gas tragedy of 1984, when an accident in a gas plant run by an American company, Union Carbide, had led to the death of 20,000 people, the government drafted a stringent Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act (CLNDA). In fact, at the time that the Act was being debated in India, the verdict for the Bhopal gas leak accident was announced, and the public mood was critical of the inordinate delay in providing compensation to the victims and the inadequacy of the compensation amount. Therefore, the opposition parties then insisted on a strong nuclear liability law.

As it came into being, the CLNDA made both the suppliers and operators liable in case of an accident. While this was done to assuage public concerns, it was seen as a harsh move by the private industry, and it turned away prospective nuclear suppliers from wanting to invest in the nuclear sector. Subsequently, to reassure the suppliers that they would not be held liable and that the NPCIL as operator would be the one in charge, the government provided clarifications through a special notification in 2015. In 2016, it also set up an insurance pool to facilitate confidence by covering suppliers’ risk. A special Nuclear Liability Fund of Rs 2000 Crores was created to cover damages resulting from a nuclear accident in case they exceeded the limit specified at  Rs 1500 Crores for nuclear power operators under the CLNDA. However, private participation in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors in India has yet to see the light of the day. While private industry has long been engaged in supplying equipment to the NPCIL, the hope of their teaming up with NPCIL for a partnership has not yet occurred.

Meanwhile, another public enterprise, the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), did form a Joint Venture Company (JVC) named Anusakthi Vidyut Nigam Limited (ASHVINI) with NPCIL in 2011. Atomic Energy Act was amended in 2015 to enable such joint ventures of Public Sector Units (PSUs) to build, own and operate nuclear power plants in India. Press reports of May 2023 indicated that the JV will build the 2 x 700MW Chutka Madhya Pradesh atomic power project and the Mahi Banswara Rajasthan atomic power project, which has a 4 x 700MW capacity.[7]

Meanwhile, in another attempt to rejuvenate the possibility of private participation, it was reported in February 2024 that India would seek funding from private industries up to the tune of US$ 26 billion to accelerate the nuclear power programme as a way of reaching India’s commitment of 50 per cent electricity from non-fossil fuels by 2030.[8] Under the proposed plan, private companies like Tata Power, Reliance Power, Adani Power and Vedanta, will invest in the nuclear plants, acquire land, and undertake construction in areas outside the reactor complex of the plants since the right to build and run the stations and their fuel management will rest with NPCIL. But, the private companies are expected to earn revenue from the power plant’s electricity sales and NPCIL would operate the projects for a fee. It remains to be seen whether this hybrid model will receive enough traction from the domestic private industry.

The Future

With more than six decades of operational experience and 24 operating nuclear power plants, India’s nuclear establishment has shown its scientific and technological prowess. It is also clear that this experience can come in handy to enable India to meet its climate commitments. The benefit of nuclear energy as a baseload source of low-carbon electricity is unmatchable by the currently popular renewable sources such as solar and wind. But nuclear energy can make a worthwhile contribution to electricity generation only if it can see rapid expansion.

For this, the nuclear sector needs public-private partnerships. This partnership refers not only to NPCIL and private industry but also to a pact of trust between the nuclear establishment and the public. Interestingly, the international mood for providing help to India with nuclear fuel and technology is favourable. Fortunately, India also has the indigenous expertise and engineering experience to make the most of the time. However, domestic outreach to the Indian public is imperative to explain to them the need for nuclear energy as an environmentally friendly source of electricity and the amount of effort put into nuclear safety and security. This could help overcome some of the scepticism.

Several factors are responsible for why the Indian programme has not performed as well as it could have given the early start. This understanding is important to retain faith in this source of electricity generation, whose importance will only grow as climate change concerns require urgent mitigation and a growing economy demands more and more electricity. The value of India’s nuclear power programme should not be underestimated despite its low contribution to overall electricity production at this moment. If all things go right, including the operationalisation of the prototype fast breeder reactor that would herald the start of the second stage of its programme, the sector could yet take off. Further discussions on the opportunities and challenges will continue in future issues of this column.

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Notes:

[1] HN Sethna, Atomic Energy (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1972), p.1.

[2] As quoted by Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 47.

[3] For instance David Dietz, an American journalist and Pulitzer prize winner wrote, “With energy as abundant as air we breather, there will be no longer any reason to fight for oil or coal…” in his Atomic Energy in the Coming Era (Dodd Mead: 1945) pp. 12-23. Glenn Seaborg , adviser to US Atomic Energy Commission in 1950s too described it as a “magician’s potion that could free industrial society permanently from all practical bounds”, in Seaborg and William Corliss, Man and Atom: Building a New World through Nuclear Technology (Dutton, 1971).

[4] United Nations, First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (New York, 1955), vol. 16, p. 33. Emphasis added.

[5] Germany too, in the early 1970s conducted a feasibility study for a project to build a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Western Desert of Egypt using nuclear demolition. This project proposed to use 213 devices, with yields of 1 to 1.5 megatons detonated at depths of 100 to 500 m, to build this canal for the purpose of producing hydroelectric power.

[6] PM’s statement in Parliament on 27 Feb 2006. Full text available in The Hindu, 28 Feb 2006

[7] “NTPC and NPCIL to jointly develop nuclear power plants in India’, Power Technology, May 2, 2023. Available at https://www.power-technology.com/news/ntpc-npcil-nuclear-power-plants/. Accessed on Feb 23, 2024.

[8] Read more at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-seeks-26-bln-of-private-nuclear-power-investments/articleshow/107848710.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst/. Accessed on Feb 26, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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Keywords: Nuclear energy, climate change, GHG emissions, renewable energy, COP-28

Like the tides of the ocean, nuclear energy too has seen its highs and lows from the time that commercial generation of electricity from nuclear reactors started in the mid-1950s. The last ebb came after the accident at Fukushima in 2011 whereafter a phase of scepticism about nuclear safety led many countries to pause or slowdown their nuclear power plans. The mood, however, seems to be changing, largely owing to the recognition of the urgent need for energy transition to low-carbon sources as a way of addressing climate change concerns. Three recent developments indicate this trend.

The first of these was the last UN Climate Change Conference, called the Conference of Parties (COP), that took place in Dubai in November 2023. At this meeting, the 28th since the first COP took place in 1995, nations took the first-ever pledge to phase down fossil fuel use. Towards this objective, more than one hundred countries pledged to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030. But, it is even more interesting that 22 countries[1]  signed a declaration[2] to triple global nuclear energy capacity over the next 25 years to meet climate goals to reach net zero emissions by 2050. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) effectively used the COP to press its idea of ‘Atoms4NetZero’ in support of nuclear energy for climate mitigation. For the first time, the COP-28 final document included support for investments in nuclear energy amongst other low-emission technologies, a privilege earlier offered only to renewable energy technologies.

A second event where the spotlight shone on nuclear energy was the World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos that took place from January 15-19, 2024. An annual assembly of global thought leaders, the forum provides a platform to discuss pressing global issues. Climate, energy and nature were one of the main themes at this year’s meeting which included a discussion on technologies to ensure clean energy transition. In an attempt to broaden the energy focus at WEF, the IAEA director general drew attention to the role that nuclear energy could play in combatting climate crises while ensuring energy security. A lunch session on January 16, 2024, was devoted to the topic of new nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors and fusion technology, and the conditions necessary to make them realise their potential. Drawing the attention of the business leaders to these developments can help channel the flow of investments into the nuclear sector. To further this cause, the IAEA has also teamed up with the government of Belgium to hold a World Nuclear Energy conference in March 2024, particularly to call for providing a level playing field for nuclear energy alongside other low-carbon sources of electricity production.

A third topical development that has raised the buzz around nuclear energy is the release of  ‘Electricity 2024’ by the International Energy Agency in January 2024. This annual publication forecasts electricity demand and supply, and CO2 emissions. This year’s edition provides a forecast up to 2026. It estimates that global electricity demand would grow at a faster rate over the next three years as compared to the reduced electricity demand in 2023 due to falling electricity consumption in advanced economies. Over the next three years, it is expected that electricity demand would jump from 2.2 per cent in 2023 to an average of 3.4 per cent during 2024-2026. China, India and countries in Southeast Asia are expected to lead this demand. In fact, India’s demand for electricity is galloping. It grew by 7 per cent in 2023 and is expected to continue to grow at 6 per cent for the next three years.[3]

It is also anticipated that as these nations prioritise the transition to clean energy, their additional electricity demand would be covered by technologies that produce low emissions. While renewables are expected to make up more than a third of total generation by 2025, nuclear energy too is expected to grow from 40% of global electricity generation in 2023 to 50% by 2026.[4]  In fact, nuclear power generation is forecast to reach an all-time high globally by 2025, “as output from France climbs, several plants in Japan are restarted, and new reactors begin commercial operations in many markets, including in China, India, South Korea and Europe. In fact, the share of Asia’s nuclear generation is expected to reach 30% of global generation in 2026.[5]

The Urgent Necessity for Low-carbon Electricity Generation

The surge in nuclear electricity generation is expected to come from the compulsion to meet the hunger for electricity through low-carbon sources. In fact, unless this is ensured, the world has no chance of meeting the climate change goals that it has set for itself. It may be recalled that in 2015, the international community adopted the Paris Agreement on climate change, pledging to hold the increase in global average temperature to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and if possible, to limit it to 1.5°C. Sadly, this objective appears shaky since the Earth’s global average surface temperature was reported to be more than 2°C higher than   pre-industrial levels in November 2023 for the first time, making it the hottest year on record.[6] Global and North Atlantic sea-surface temperatures too broke records, and Antarctic sea ice reached its lowest daily extent since the advent of satellite data. Interestingly, this news came when COP 28 was in session!

As is evident from the statistics that is pouring in, climate change is here and now. It is a major threat to humanity and the experience of the severity and frequency of adverse natural disasters has made nations sufficiently cognisant of the fact to be persuaded to make ambitious commitments. But, insufficient implementation of commitments owing to geopolitical or economic reasons remains a major hurdle.    For instance, the world invested a record-breaking US$1.7 trillion in clean energy in 2023. But, this was offset by nearly US$1 trillion investment in fossil fuel which countries were unable to avoid for political and economic reasons. In short, current efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remain less than sufficient to arrest climate change. More efforts will have to be devoted towards refashioning activities that are emitting the largest amount of greenhouse gases. And, electricity generation tops this list.

Electricity generation is responsible for close to 40% of the global CO2 emissions produced by the energy sector, the other 60% or so is generated primarily through the use of fossil fuels in industry, heating in buildings and transport.[7] Hence the urgent need for moving away from fossil fuel sources, which are the biggest culprits on this front. In fact, not only is electricity generation from fossil fuels amongst one of the highest contributors to GHG emissions, it is also one factor whose transformation could have a bearing on all other activities. Since modern-day economic growth and development are so tightly coupled with electricity, it becomes imperative that electricity generation takes place not just through safe and secure sources, but also from those that best sustain the environment. This requires ambitious efforts to transform the energy sector from fossil fuel production and use, which is the main source of carbon dioxide (CO2), to carbon-neutral sources.

Renewables and Nuclear

Renewables (particularly hydro, solar, wind) and nuclear fission are amongst the low-carbon sources available for electricity generation. While hydroelectricity has been generated for a long time, it suffers from the handicap of being available only in specific locations. Also, the appetite for large hydro projects has significantly reduced owing to problems of displacement and rehabilitation that have lingered over decades. Meanwhile, solar and wind energy have emerged as the new favourites and the last decade has seen a phenomenal jump in electricity produced using these sources. Heavily subsidised and incentivised by governments, the cost of this electricity too has fallen over the years. However, their biggest drawback is that they are unable to provide electricity grids with stable, resilient and dispatchable power to maintain a  non-stop flow of energy. It has, therefore, been necessary to support fossil fuel plants with backup options to provide this stability. These have mostly been coal, oil or gas-fired plants. Given that they emit GHG emissions, it reduces the possibility of solar and wind energy being able to contribute towards achieving net zero emissions by themselves, even though they would make a substantial contribution.

It is in this context that the importance of nuclear energy as a baseload source of electricity that can effectively meet clean energy transition goals stands out. When comparing the cradle-to-grave journey of sources of electricity, nuclear energy has the lowest carbon footprint,[8] and uses fewer materials and land. To illustrate, solar power needs more than 17 times as much material and 46 times as much land to produce one unit of energy. The power density of nuclear energy beats all other renewables. According to one estimate, “A solar farm needs between 5 and 50 times more land to generate as much electricity as an equivalent  coal-powered plant, and a wind farm needs ten times more than solar.”[9] Put another way, nuclear plants can generate 500-1000 watts per sq meter while solar is at 5-20 and wind at 1-2 watts per sq meter.[10] Bill Gates emphasises that nuclear plants rank the highest in efficiently using materials like cement, steel and glass, which are electricity guzzlers themselves in their manufacturing processes. Nuclear plants use much less material per unit of electricity generated compared to others.[11] In fact, solar photovoltaics are the least efficient followed by hydropower and wind. This is an important consideration when accounting for the GHG emissions produced in the manufacture of this material. As aptly put by Rafael Grossi, Director General of IAEA, “To be pro-nuclear is to take our long-term responsibility to this planet and its future generations seriously.”[12]

Besides decarbonising electricity production, the use of nuclear power can also decarbonise two other processes that use energy: heating in industry and of buildings through direct utilisation of steam, and producing low-carbon hydrogen for transportation. Thus, it is anticipated that nuclear energy can be used to produce hydrogen on a massive scale and at an increasingly competitive cost, which would be a clean heat and transportation source of the future. The potential of nuclear energy for these applications would also be crucial for reaching net zero through the development and deployment of low-carbon options.

In fact, enhancing energy production and sustaining the environment is not an either/or choice. The world needs both. Governments owe it to their citizens to provide them with electricity while also ensuring the best quality of life from their health and environmental perspective. If economic development and decarbonisation have to be simultaneously pursued, nuclear power can offer a viable alternative to fossil fuels that must be prudently built and safely operated.

But, will nuclear energy be able to realise its perceived potential in the coming years? What are the head and tailwinds that it is likely to face? Where is it likely to grow? Which technologies are likely to reach fruition? How can one address public perceptions on nuclear safety? Where does India see nuclear energy in its own energy mix? The forthcoming monthly issues of ‘NuClearly Put’ in the year 2024 will examine these questions one by one to offer some clarity.

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Notes:

[1] Endorsing countries include Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, UAE, UK, and USA.

[2] Department of Energy, “At COP28, Countries Launch Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050, Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero,” December 1, 2023,  https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key#:~:text=Framework%20Convention%20on%20Climate%20Change,1.5%2Ddegree%20goal%20within%20reach.

[3] David Dodwell, “On the climate change front, its not all ‘gloom and doom”, South China Morning Post,  January 28, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3250045/climate-change-front-its-not-all-doom-and-gloom.  Accessed on January 16, 2024.

[4] “Nuclear output to reach new record by 2025, says IEA,” World Nuclear News, January 24, 2024, Nuclear output to reach new record by 2025, says IEA: Energy & Environment – World Nuclear News (world-nuclear-news.org). Accessed on January 17, 2024.

[5] Rachel Millard, “Nuclear power generation to reach record high next year, IEA forecasts,” Financial Times, January 24, 2024, Nuclear power generation to reach record high next year, IEA forecasts (ft.com). Accessed on January 17, 2024.

[6] John Mecklin, Ed., “A moment of historic danger: It is still 90 seconds to midnight,” 2024 Doomsday Clock Statement, Science and Security Board, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 23, 2024, https://thebulletin.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2024-Doomsday-Clock-Statement.pdf. Accessed on January 18, 2024.

[7] IAEA, Nuclear Energy for a Net Zero World, September 2021, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/10/nuclear-energy-for-a-net-zero-world.pdf.

[8] “Life-cycle Assessments of Electricity Generation Options,” Report by UN Economic Commission for Europe Sustainable Development Goals, March 2022, https://unece.org/sed/documents/2021/10/reports/life-cycle-assessment-electricity-generation-options.

[9] Bill Gates, “How to Avoid a Climate Disaster: The solutions We Have and the Breakthroughs We Need (UK: Penguin Random House, 2021), p. 96.

[10] Ibid., p. 58

[11] Ibid., p. 85

[12] Rafael Grossi, “Time to Level the Playing Field and Work Together Towards Net Zero,” speech delivered at the Second International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power 2023: Atoms4NetZero, October 9, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/time-to-level-the-playing-field-and-work-together-towards-net-zero.

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