Keywords: Gaza Conflict, Hamas, Hezbollah, Ben-Gurion Defence Doctrine, Power Equation of National Security, Abraham Accords, India Israel relations, Global Terrorism

Introduction

India and Israel share similar challenges, although they are different in context. Both are surrounded by hostile adversaries, and affected by terrorism which is one of the prime threats that the world faces today.  In a perfect world, addressing terrorism requires global consensus, and the issue of terrorism can only be solved if all nations agree that a terrorist in one country is considered a terrorist by all countries. However, the world today is plunged into chaos and uncertainty, and every nation prioritises its own national interest when dealing with any situation, particularly when forming its national security strategy and doctrine. Notwithstanding the above, there are many areas where all countries can collaborate, share knowledge, and take appropriate actions.

Current Situation

Over the last year, the security landscape of the world, and more specifically the areas around Israel, has drastically changed. Post the 07 October 2023, Israel has been fighting its longest war since independence. In recent months, many people have begun to question why Israel has taken its current positions regarding Gaza, Hezbollah, or Iran. However, much of it can be related to the threat environment and the perceived existential threat it faces. In past, Israel has been widely recognised for its swift and intense wars which has ensured both quick resolution and continued deterrence. On closer scrutiny, these operations were largely conventional in nature and the situation has changed significantly, with warfare also shifting from conventional towards asymmetric conflict in recent years.

The terrorists of today are much more sophisticated, equipped with advanced weaponry and technology that sometimes surpasses that of regular armies. Neutralising these threats not only requires sustained effort but also a new doctrine and tactics that encompasses hybrid warfare.  Moreover, terrorists do not adhere to international laws, unlike nation-states, which restrict the actions of conventional armies against them. There is also a requirement to address the mentality of terrorists who do not adhere to any known norms accepted by humanity.[1]

The threat today has shifted from primarily Arab countries in the pre-1990 era to non-state actors which are mainly backed by Iran, and act as its proxies. The last significant doctrine in Israel is considered to be the Ben-Gurion Defence Doctrine of 1953 and the last full scale military operation took place in 1982 during the first Lebanon war. Ben-Gurion’s defence doctrine embodied three principles, or pillars: deterrence, early warning, and offensive power, which are also being adhered to today.[2]

Despite the changing nature of hybrid threats Israel’s existing strategies and doctrines are seen to be in line with conventional threats and can also be considered somewhat outdated to fully address the complexities of this new form of warfare. Several aspects related to security planning have also changed due to the induction of new technology or complexities, including, missiles attacks, drones, the Iron Dome system, enhanced surveillance means, tunnel warfare, and dealing with the well-armed Hezbollah on the northern borders. This situation requires a shift in understanding and necessary preparations to counter emerging threats.

Countenance with Ground Reality

Some of Israel’s current actions could be described as what it calls a ‘war between wars.’ referring to the targeted covert operations done by the IDF and Mossad by preventing its enemies, from developing capabilities that will directly affect Israel’s balance of deterrence. It is carried out through detecting and selectively destroying emerging threats. [3] However, the 07 October incidents represent one of the most significant failures of Israeli intelligence and military operations and are being heavily commented upon, but within the broader flow of events, it may be seen as a black swan event.

Previously Israel aimed to locate terrorists, make the war as short as possible, and remove them from the equation. This approach granted Israel 15 years of relative growth, allowing it to develop economically. However, the situation changed with the Arab Spring, the spread of Iran’s influence, and the rise of radical Islam in the resulting void.[4] More so over the years, Israel has reduced strength and invested in a technologically advanced army, but actual conflicts require boots on the ground. This is one reason why, despite being aware of the facts, Israel was unable to prevent Iran from building an army against it in Syria.

Israel is also seen moving away from the two-state solution this is despite the fact that it has tried to give a certain degree of autonomy to Palestinians and does not want to interfere in their daily lives. One may argue that the ground reality reflects NO potent Palestinian leader with a vision or capability to realise peace. Any party that stands up is ultimately defeated by terrorist groups, meaning that Palestinians are being controlled by extremists. A prime example is how Hamas managed to render the Fatah movement non-viable in Gaza. Israel fears the same outcome in the West Bank if it completely removes its forces giving Hamas a free run.[5]

The second and bigger issue is that apart from Israel no other country/ or group is willing to resolve the issue of terrorism from the region. The pragmatic solution is for Israel to work with its neighbours to stop the spread of radical Islam, paving the way for both communities to coexist. Presently six countries in the region seek economic and security cooperation in the region and the way forward is to create a security framework, layered with economic collaboration. However, this can only begin once the terrorists are defeated, semblance of peace returns, and the global community recognises that any actions taken will lead to a positive outcome. Due to the above, the idea of not implementing a two-state solution has gained traction in the past few months.

Strategies, Doctrines and Power Equation

Israel has fought legendary conventional wars, like the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. These wars also gave rise to iconic figures like Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon and their brilliant military strategies and tactics have been widely studied by military professionals worldwide. Apart from conventional operations involving large arrays of forces facing each other, Israel also specialises in covert ops and the use of advanced technologies. Israel has managed to maintain control of the situation for approximately a quarter of a century through these means.

When we discuss strategies to counter threats there are three different levels to consider: At the top, we have the Grand Strategy, followed by the National Security Strategy, and then the Military Doctrine. Most current military doctrines the world over deals with conventional or asymmetric threats separately. However, what the world is now confronting is a fusion of both and accordingly the need for a fresh thought process for the same.

Military doctrine must account for the changes occurring in the region. A nation’s grand strategy should provide the tools to achieve the targets laid out for its military strategy. GDP and technology are a vital part of the same for example; During the Yom Kippur War about 50 years ago, Israel spent approximately 40% of its GDP on national security. Today, those figures have reduced to about 5%. Experts argue that, to achieve success in the current context, this budget needs to be increased to a minimum 7-8%, though this would have some economic consequences for the country.

The power equation of national security in the world today resembles the sides of a triangle: in order to have national security, you need large and potent armed forces. For a large army, you need a strong economy. When you have both a robust economy and a large army, you automatically gain diplomatic strength.

POWER EQUATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

In today’s multipolar world, diplomatic power is essential. Israel has made significant progress in recent years through agreements like the Abraham Accords between Israel and four other countries UAE, Morocco, Bahrain and Sudan in 2020.[6] For quid pro quo gains. As part of the agreement, The United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara,[7] it also removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and gave them a US$1.2 billion loan. In turn these countries have agreed to recognise the legitimacy of Israel’s sovereignty and have established full diplomatic ties with Israel. These actions had a corresponding negative impact on support for Hamas and Hezbollah who do not recognize Israel as a state and continue to advocate all forms of resistance against the country.

On any given day, Israel would prefer to have more stable relationships with its Arab neighbours. However, before that can happen, the security situation in Gaza and the Northern borders must be resolved. This requires a regional approach, including Arab countries affected by terrorism as no single state can manage events like the multiple missile launches by Iran on Israel on its own.

Actionable Insights for India

In the past, India has inducted various Israeli equipment and imbibed few operational concepts while modifying them to suit our local requirements. The Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System or AIOS is one of them for which experts and practitioner made several visits to Israel to understand the dynamics of Israel’s fence system and its applicability. India even established a similar system at a significant cost of approximately ₹2000 Crores in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2004-2005 with large recurring costs subsequently.[8] The goal was to reduce the number of terrorists from about 4000-4500 to fewer than 1000, with approximately 225 terrorists in Kashmir today; the target seems to have been largely met.[9]

There are several lessons; the Indian armed forces can gain from the current situation in Israel. What is visible on the TV screens is just a glimpse of well-planned coordinated and executed military operation, where unprecedented success has been achieved on the ground. One key lesson is the coordinated use of ground, air, and naval forces. The ground commander in Gaza, has boots on the ground, intelligence and strike capabilities in the air, and is capable of acting at the right place and time to neutralise terrorist threats, one target at a time. The second is the use of tunnels and underground warfare with more than 360 km of tunnel network beneath Gaza. These tunnel infrastructure, include command and control centres, weapons storage, and areas for other operations. They have allowed Hamas operatives to strike from civilians houses and then escape into the tunnels. It might be a major issue in case some aspects of it are adopted by terror groups operating in India. Secondly is the strategy to counter the same in terms of detection and neutralisation of the same.

The third issue is collateral damage in terms of human life, during the operations against ISIS the approximate civilian causality figure of 8:1 as opposed to casualties in Gaza, where statistics point to a figure of 1.8:1. Despite the lesser number of casualties, the way it has been projected in media, the global outrage has been tremendous, virtually weaning away a great amount of sympathy and support for Israel. This is an aspect which is required to be considered when you are carrying out last scale operations against terrorist organisation.

Another significant achievement is the protection of tanks. In the Ukraine war, tanks have become easy targets for FPV (first-person view) drones, leading to significant losses. However, Israel has managed to reduce vehicle casualties in Gaza through the use of advanced active and passive defensive measures. It has also been able to fine-tune the Iron Dome system for air defence, especially against drones. The next is cyber defence strategies for monitoring, detection and guiding operations apart from the protection of civilian infrastructure are also major achievements, especially as Israel is one of the most cyber-attacked countries in the world.  Several of these aspects which are applicable to our armed forces should be studied and if required included in our war fighting tactics/ strategies.

At a higher level, India should develop a comprehensive national plan that includes all elements of statecraft and having reliable strategic allies who will stand by you in difficult times. Secondly, future conflicts will likely be a mix of conventional and non-conventional warfare, making the era of short, swift wars a thing of the past. The third challenge is balancing technology with military knowledge. Today, there is an increasing inclination towards technology which in turn centralises command and control at hubs. As seen during the 07 October attack these hubs were targeted resulting in temporary paralysis.

Actionable Insights for Israel from the Indian Example

India has learned valuable lessons in both conventional warfare and anti-terrorist operations from Israel. Over time, warfare has evolved into hybrid conflicts, and the Indian Army has adapted accordingly. Our Armed Forces have been engaged in hybrid warfare since the 1960s, particularly in regions such as Northeast India, Punjab, Sri Lanka, and Jammu and Kashmir, and have fared well in comparison to other armies facing similar challenges. Keeping the Indian experience in mind certain questions on the current situation in Gaza remain. Why was Gaza, a relatively small area surrounded by a fence on one side and the sea on the other, able to achieve a strategic surprise on 07 October? How was Hamas able to build such an extensive network of tunnels beneath Gaza? How did Israel allow them to become armed with heavy rockets and missiles? What is the end state and what would define victory in the present crisis? These questions need to be addressed to improve the counter-hybrid conflict strategy.

Secondly, one of the most difficult aspects of hybrid conflict is to understand that you can never completely eliminate the last terrorist, as new ones keep emerging. The numbers can only be reduced to a certain level. Media also plays a critical role in shaping the perception of what constitutes victory or failure in counter-hybrid conflicts. The support for Israel is taking a sine curve by depiction of success in pin point strikes on terrorist leadership vis-a-vis suffering and death of more than 42,227 people, including nearly 16,765 children and more than 98,464 people injured.[10]

The Israeli state is aware that in hybrid conflicts, there are no set peace solutions available for many situations. Solutions often emerge during the conflict, as you absorb the situation and invent new strategies. In the current conflict, two main objectives need to be achieved: stability and the restoration of deterrence.

Thirdly, India undertook certain action to deal with proxies in Kashmir by targeting their networks, including financial, media, and ideological channels. By neutralising these networks, India realised that the strength of the proxies diminished drastically, and they were unable to recover quickly.  However, all such actions were not kinetic in nature; the political environment in such areas also needs to be managed. Through concentrated efforts, India has made most separatist politicians, irrelevant in the Kashmir Valley today. India also uses a balanced approach of hard and soft power, which has resulted in much-needed success. In contrast, Israel’s tactics are seen as more oriented towards hard power rather than a mix of hard and soft power. This difference is visible when you compare the treatment of Palestinians inside Israel with the treatment of Kashmiri people within Kashmir by the Indian state. The key is knowing when to be hard and when to be soft.

After the killing of Burhan Wani in 2017, India specifically focused on dismantling these networks, especially the financial ones, most notably in the Kashmir Valley, something that had not been done before.[11] On the other hand, Israel has not been as successful in neutralising the financial networks of Hamas, which continues to receive large amounts of money and weapons as was evident from its attacks.

It’s not that Israel has not tried to use soft power, but the balance of power in West Asia is completely different compared to South Asia. The size of Israel is much smaller than its neighbouring countries, many of which are failed states that have been completely taken over by terrorist organisations. The spread of radical Islam in these neighbouring countries makes it more challenging for Israel to deal with such issues.

India has been using its moral ascendancy over its adversaries, demonstrating that it is far ahead of them. This extends to the civilian population of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where, indirectly, India is able to convey that people living in India are happier, more prosperous, and have a brighter future than those in Pakistan.[12]  The mute question remains whether a similar approach be applied in Gaza and the West Bank, where Palestinians could be shown that a future with Israel would be far better than any other governance or rule?

On the flip side, Israel feels that the idea is not new—it follows the doctrine of “Ben-Gurion” where the thought process was that bringing economic prosperity to Palestinians can help resolve conflicts. However, various divisions, such as between Shia and Sunni, radicals and moderates, and the competing interests of nationalist states, have diminished the appeal of such approaches in entire West Asia. In fact, in October 2023, Israel was negotiating with Hamas to grant more work visas to Palestinians for working within Israel when it was deceived by Hamas, which was covertly preparing for attack.

Lastly, failure of Israel’s ability to apply enough international pressure on Iran to stop the supply of weapons and war fighting technologies to Hamas and Hezbollah. If these groups are acquiring such weapons, it won’t be long before other terrorist groups, especially those operating in Asia and near Indian borders, do the same.

Way ahead

The events of the past year have significantly heightened tensions, which were further escalated by Iran’s missile attack on Israeli targets on 01 October 2024, involving approximately 200 Fattah-1 and Kheibar Shekan ballistic missiles. On the other side, the targeted elimination of Hassan Nasrallah and top leadership of Hezbollah, along with the initiation of ground operations by the IDF against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, as well as the killing of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, may represent critical turning points in the conflict. Once the situation stabilises, actions currently perceived as reactive may be more clearly understood and can be analysed in greater depth.

In the end, two key actions are needed in the current situation. First, there must be a clear perception that Israel is no longer under threat from Hamas and Hezbollah. Second, the establishment of civilian governance in Gaza is essential, as most of Gaza is currently controlled by Hamas or other organisations heavily influenced by them. It is necessary to alleviate the fear of Hamas among the people of Gaza and the West Bank. After the conflict, Israel will also need to seek partnerships from its Sunni Muslim neighbours to address the issue of radical Islam in this region. Additionally, greater emphasis should be placed on the education of children, ensuring the next generation is better equipped to foster peace and prosperity in developing nations.

India would also be closely watching the events in the Middle East, as they have a direct bearing on its counter-terrorism strategies and security cooperation with Israel. The evolving dynamics in the region, particularly the countering of threats, will have a definite influence on India’s approach to combating terrorism within its borders.

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Notes

[1] “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” April 29, 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nssall.html .

[2] Jacob Nagel and Jonathan Schanzer, “From Ben-Gurion to Netanyahu: The Evolution of Israel’s National Security Strategy,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2024, accessed October 1, 2024.

[3] Lappin, Yaakov. “‘The War Between Wars’: Israel vs Iran in Syria.” Fathom, n.d. https://fathomjournal.org/the-war-between-wars-israel-vs-iran-in-syria/ .

[4] Aarabi, Kasra. “The Fundamentals of Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” February 11, 2019. https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/fundamentals-irans-islamic-revolution .

[5] Beshay. “Israelis have grown more skeptical of a two-state solution.” Pew Research Center, July 23, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/09/26/israelis-have-grown-more-skeptical-of-a-two-state-solution/ .

[6] United States Department of State. “The Abraham Accords – United States Department of State,” January 13, 2021. https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/ .

[7] Rabat, U.S. Embassy. “Proclamation on Recognizing The Sovereignty Of The Kingdom Of Morocco Over The Western Sahara – U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Morocco.” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Morocco, December 10, 2020. https://ma.usembassy.gov/proclamation-on-recognizing-the-sovereignty-of-the-kingdom-of-morocco-over-the-western-sahara/ .

[8] Institute of Security Studies. “The LoC Fence is bad Strategy.” Observer Research Foundation, December 27, 2004.

[9] Hindustantimes.com. “Kashmir’s disturbing new reality | the young militants of Kashmir,” n.d. https://www.hindustantimes.com/static/the-young-militants-of-kashmir/ .

[10] AJLabs. “Israel-Gaza War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker.” Al Jazeera, October 13, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker .

[11] Singh, Chander Parkash. “ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.” PhD dissertation, Lovely Professional University, 2021. http://dspace.lpu.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/4809/1/AD%20544.pdf .

[12] Pti. “No Need to Capture PoK by Force; Its People Will Themselves Want to Join India, Rajnath Singh Feels.” The Hindu,                             May 5, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-need-to-capture-pok-by-force-its-people-will-themselves-want-to-join-india-rajnath-feels/article68141794.ece .

The post Evolving Dynamics in West Asia: Strategic Insights for India and Israel appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Muizzu and India, First State Visit, Development Cooperation, Indian Ocean

After the election of Maldives’ President, Dr Mohamed Muizzu, in October 2023, analysts and security experts from the region and beyond minimised New Delhi-Malé ties to a ballot. The sceptics were partially true as the incumbent President rode on the ‘India Out’ campaign during the elections in 2023. However, the first state visit of Muizzu to India after the initial hiccups suggests that it is not easy to classify Maldives’ foreign policy either in favour of or against India. Neither would it be a cakewalk for the Maldives to put all its eggs in one basket by choosing India or China. However, after the rocky beginning under the Muizzu administration, the relationship seems to be settling down, and a shift has been noticed from limited engagement to firm commitment. Development, diversification, and decentralisation have emerged as the guiding star of the India-Maldives ties. It remains to be seen how the goodwill generated during the visit, with the MoUs signed, agreements undertaken, and the vision document jointly comprehended, will traverse through the next four years of the Muizzu administration and take the relationship forward amid the drifting regional and global politics.

Although President Muizzu was invited in June 2024 for the swearing-in ceremony of PM Modi, his first state visit from October 06 to 10, 2024, happened exactly a year after he was elected as the eighth President of the Maldives. A closer look at the ties over the past year reveals several moments of uncertainty and unpredictability, marking a shift away from some of the ‘obvious’ aspects of the relationship.[1] Some of such moments include the demand for the return of Indian soldiers operating Indian aviation platforms involved in humanitarian assistance and breaking the norm of making India the first foreign visit.[2] Additionally, the signing of a defence agreement with China that continues to remain shrouded in secrecy while allowing its so-called research vessels to undertake port visits to Maldives, despite being known for engaging in grey zone activities in the Indian Ocean. However, India’s response to such practices by the Maldives remained non-reciprocal, based on strategic patience, which has compounded positively for the India-Maldives partnership. Fresh air is now ventilating the partnership as reflected in the document ‘India and Maldives: A Vision for Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security’ jointly released and agreed upon by PM Modi of India and President Muizzu of Maldives.[3]

The interdependency between development, diversification, and decentralisation of the projects and the areas of cooperation forms the core of the document and is likely to shape the relationship in the years to come. The delivery of projects that have an intergenerational impact (i.e., those that improve the quality of life for generations of Maldives) and stand the test of time, like the big-ticket infrastructure projects as well as small community development projects, is highlighted throughout. The former will enhance and improve inter-island connectivity and Maldives’ connectivity with the outside world, while the latter focuses on uplifting and improving the quality of life for ordinary Maldivians through housing facilities, Jan Aushadhi Kendras, sewerage and water supply facilities across 28 islands (announced during Dr Jaishankar’s visit), among other initiatives. Simultaneously, diversification to incorporate new and emerging areas like women-led development, renewable energy, building on the benefits of financial technology, and leveraging the potential digital public infrastructure in public deliveries has a decentralised impact to ensure holistic development of Maldives that is not limited to the capital city, Male, but also includes other islands.[4]

An important dimension of the visit was, of course, the economic assistance that Muizzu was looking for from New Delhi, especially after extremely low forex reserves, risks of Islamic debt default, and the dwindling number of Indian tourists. Tourism contributes 22.5 per cent to the GDP and remains a quintessential source of income for Maldivians. According to the Ministry of Tourism, Republic of Maldives, the total number of Indian tourist arrivals from January to August in 2023 was 1,35,495, while in 2024, it was 81,505.[5] To this end, New Delhi’s currency swap agreement with the Maldives and the buying of the latter’s treasury bills stand out.[6] Additionally, Muizzu also visited the financial capital of India, Mumbai, and the IT hub, Bengaluru, to explore investment opportunities in various sectors like real estate, business, and information technology. Further, he also invited filmmakers and production houses to shoot films and television serials in the Maldives.[7]

Despite all the symbolism and substance of the visit, as the Indian Ocean becomes increasingly dynamic and re-emerges on the strategic map of both distant and proximate powers, the need for diversification of partnerships will be sought after by both small and big countries. Therefore, any sweet patch in the bilateral relationship must not be seen as a lasting insurance mechanism for the partnership. The changing geopolitical situation requires continuous engagement that is flexible and well-balanced, leading to win-win situations rather than zero-sum games.

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Notes

[1] Radhey Tambi, “Entailment of Maldives’ Actions Against India”, Centre for Air Power Studies, January 19, 2024, https://capssindia.org/entailment-of-maldives-actions-against-india/. Accessed on October 10, 2024.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), “India and Maldives: A Vision for Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership”, October 07, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38384/India+and+Maldives+A+Vision+for+Comprehensive+Economic+and+Maritime+Security+Partnership#:~:text=The%20two%20countries%20agreed%20that,Defence%20Force%20(MNDF)%20’Ekatha. Accessed on October 10, 2024.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ministry of Tourism (Republic of Maldives), “Tourism Statistics”, https://www.tourism.gov.mv/en/statistics/publications. Accessed on October 15, 2024.

[6] Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), “English Translation of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s Press Statement at the Joint Press Conference with the President of Maldives (October 7, 2024)”, October 07, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38383/English_Translation_of_Prime_Minister_Shri_Narendra_Modis_Press_Statement_at_the_Joint_Press_Conference_with_the_President_of_Maldives_October_7_2024. Accessed on October 08, 2024.

[7] Yogesh Naik, “Maldives president Muizzu invites Bollywood to shoot in his country”, Hindustan Times, October 09, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/mumbai-news/maldives-president-muizzu-invites-bollywood-to-shoot-in-his-country-101728414501262.html. Accessed on October 11, 2024.

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Keywords: China, ICBM, PLARF

About the test

On September 25, China launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) carrying a dummy warhead into the Western Pacific Ocean. The official statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) carried out this test as a “routine arrangement” and “not directed against any country or target”.[1] Chinese Defence Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said that the launch was conducted to assess the performance of the troops’ weapons, equipment, and training levels. He said, “China always follows a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy that focuses on self-defence.”[2]

The missile flew almost 12,000 kilometres (7,460 miles) from its launch point on Hainan Island. It travelled over the Philippines and Guam before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean near the French Polynesian Marquesas Islands. Although the type of missile was not revealed, many analysts, through analysis of photos and range, concluded that it was a variant of DF-31 and most likely the DF-31AG.[3]

The DF-31 entered into service in 2006 and can carry a single warhead. It has two variants, the DF-31A and the DF-31AG, with a range of up to 13,200 km (8,200 miles). The DF-31 is a silo-based system, but its models, the DF-31A and DF-31AG, both have a mobile launch system that provides manoeuvrability to operate across a variety of terrains. This test was the first full-range test of the DF-31.[4]

The last time China publicly conducted a test into the ocean was in May 1980, when the DF-5 missile was launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest China and travelled over 9,000 kilometres before hitting a target in the South Pacific. It was the DF-5’s first full-range flight test.[5]

How Countries Responded

China claimed that it had informed neighbouring countries in advance. However, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi refuted this and expressed Japan’s growing alarm at China’s increasing military activity. He also said that the missile did not fly over Japan and did not cause any damage, but Japan will continue to monitor the situation.[6] Australia also raised concern and asked for an “explanation” from the Chinese government.[7] New Zealand termed the test as “an unwelcome and concerning development”. [8] On the other hand, French Polynesian President Brotherson told the AFP that the missile had landed near the Marquesas Islands within its exclusive economic zone.

France[9] and the US, however, reported that they had received notification about the test. The Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh described this prior information as “a step in the right direction, and it does lead to preventing any misperception or miscalculation.” She called for more regular notifications from China about space and ballistic missile launches as confidence-building measures.[10]

Recently, the US and China have taken steps to resume military-to-military communications. In August, during Jake Sullivan’s visit to China, he met with Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia and discussed military communication.[11] After this meeting, PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Yanan and US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo held talks via video conference on September 10.[12] Later, General Wu attended the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Hawaii, where he met with Admiral Paparo again.[13]

China’s ICBM Stockpile and Reasons for the Test

The PLARF currently operates the DF-5, DF-31, and DF-41, all of which are capable of hitting most of the US. The DF-31 and DF-41 are mobile and solid-fueled, with the DF-41 capable of carrying up to five warheads. PLARF is currently working on enhancing radar, satellites and sensors for long-range precision strikes.[14]

There are nine bases under PLARF control. Of these, six bases (Bases 61-66) are responsible for missile operations. Bases 67-69 look after support missions, with Base 67 responsible for managing the central nuclear stockpile and Base 68 handling engineering and physical infrastructure. The newest base, Base 69, is little understood but appears to be responsible for both advanced personnel training and missile tests.[15]

According to an estimate from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, PLARF operates around 350 launchers for land-based missiles, out of which 135 can reach the US continent. China presently operates 134 ICBMs capable of delivering 240 warheads.

In recent years, several corruption cases within the PLARF have undermined its credibility. By conducting this test, the PLARF seeks to restore and reaffirm its standing both domestically and internationally. Last year, a US intelligence assessment found several problems related to the non-functionality of missile silos in western China. This led to a large-scale purge within the military.[16] Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at Carnegie, argues that after a series of corruption scandals and  leadership reshuffling, China, through this test, wants to address international concerns about the effectiveness of its strategic deterrent forces. The internal reason for the test is to boost the morale of the PLARF, and the external factor is to solidify China’s international position as a growing power.[17]

Similarly, Song Zhongping, a former PLARF officer, said full-range flight tests are essential for verifying the performance of new strategic missiles. He said, “Though China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles have good reliability and strong power, we need a certain number of full-range tests to check their operational readiness”.[18]

This ICBM test by China can also be interpreted as a strategic signal aimed at US military deployments in the South China Sea region. In April, the US deployed an intermediate-range ‘Typhoon Missile System’ in the Philippines during their Balikatan Joint Military Exercise. Initially, it was supposed to be withdrawn by the end of September, but there is currently no clarity on how long it will be there. China criticised this move through various statements and termed it as a threat to regional peace. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said it can create “confrontation in the region”.[19]

To sum up, this test intends to signal both domestic and international audiences about China’s capability to conduct full-range tests despite the setbacks of corruption and leadership reshuffling. For the US and other regional powers, it is a ‘deterrence signal’ through showing capability. Ultimately, the larger objective is to reaffirm the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s military reforms and modernisation.

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Notes

[1] Lin Congyi, “The MND: The PLA Rocket Force Launched an ICBM to the High Seas in the Pacific Ocean” , Ministry of National Defense, September 25, 2024, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16340554.html. Accessed on October 1, 2024.

[2] Liu Xuanzun, “China’s ICBM Test Launch Legitimate, Reasonable Routine Training: Chinese Defense Ministry”, Global Times, September 26, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1320419.shtml. Accessed on October 2, 2024.

[3] Ashish Dangwal, “Dong Feng-31: Traveling 12,000 KM, China Likely Fired DF-31 ICBM That Can Carry Multiple Nuke Warheads – Experts.” EURASIAN TIMES, September 29, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/1-what-we-know-about-the-variant-used/. Accessed on October 3, 2024.

[4] Sylvie Zhuang and Seong Hyeon Choi, “What Do We Know About the DF-31 Variant Used in China’s Recent ICBM Test?” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3280264/what-do-we-know-about-df-31-variant-used-chinas-recent-icbm-test. Accessed on October, 4, 2024.

[5] Zhao Lei, “Missile Launch Test Achieved Desired Goals, PLA Says”, China Daily, September 26, 2024, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202409/26/WS66f49ff2a310f1265a1c4da2.html. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[6] The Mainichi, “China’s Growing Military Activity a Serious Concern: Japan Spokesman”, September 25, 2024, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20240925/p2g/00m/0in/036000c. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[7]“Australia Says Seeking ‘Explanation’ For Chinese ICBM Launch”, BARRON’S, September 25, 2024, https://www.barrons.com/news/australia-says-seeking-explanation-for-chinese-icbm-launch-530ba1a9?refsec=topics_afp-news. Accessed on October 1, 2024.

[8]“New Zealand Says China Missile Test ‘Unwelcome and Concerning’”, BARRON’S, September 25, 2024, https://www.barrons.com/news/new-zealand-says-china-missile-test-unwelcome-and-concerning-d19dea21. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[9] “French Polynesia says Chinese missile landed ‘not far’ from its economic zone”, RFI, September 26, 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20240926-france-polynesia-says-chinese-missile-landed-not-far-from-its-eez-in-pacific. Accessed on October 2, 2024.

[10] “US Hails Early Notice of China ICBM Test to Avoid Miscalculation”, Bloomberg, September 26, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-26/us-hails-china-s-advanced-notice-of-icbm-test-as-good-thing. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[11] Li Jiayao, Ed., “CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Youxia Meets US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan”, China Military, September 29, 2024, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CMC/News_209224/16334473.html. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[12] Simon McCarthy, “US And Chinese Commanders Hold Rare Talks to Dial Down Risk of ‘Miscalculation”, CNN, September 10, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/10/china/us-china-military-talks-commanders-intl-hnk/index.html. Accessed on October 1, 2024.

[13] Hayley Wong, “PLA Sends South China Sea Commander to US for First Time in Over 2 Years”, South China Morning Post, September 24, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3279769/pla-sends-south-china-sea-commander-us-first-time-over-2-years. Accessed on October 4, 2024.

[14] “PLA Rocket Force”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Toolkit%20presentations/3%20CASI%20Commanders%20Toolkit-%20PLARF.pdf, pp. 20-21.

[15] MA XIU, “PLA Rocket Force Organization – Executive Summary”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2016, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-01-05%20PLARF%20Organization%20ExecSum.pdf, p. 2.

[16] Peter Martin and Jennifer Jacobs, “US Intelligence Shows Flawed China Missiles Led Xi to Purge Army”, Bloomberg, January 6, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-06/us-intelligence-shows-flawed-china-missiles-led-xi-jinping-to-purge-military. Accessed on October 5, 2024.

[17] Tong Zhao, “Following serious corruption scandals in PLARF,…”, X (Formerly Twitter), September 25, 2024, https://x.com/zhaot2005/status/1838986609301012753. Accessed on October 5, 2024.

[18] Lei, n. 5.

[19] “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi Warns Philippines Over U.S. Missile Deployment”, The Hindu, July 27, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-warns-philippines-over-us-missile-deployment/article68452719.ece. Accessed on October 5, 2024.

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Keywords: Drones, C-UAS, Anti-Drone Systems, LCH

The use of Armed Drones and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) in the ongoing conflicts in the Ukraine and the Middle-East have had a transformational effect on the battlefield, often overcoming traditional Anti-Aircraft Defences and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems. Any future conflict is likely to witness extensive use of Armed Drones and RPVs and there is an urgent need for developing innovative defences against such threats.

Innovative Drone Defence

Israel, already a close defence partner of India, has been undertaking counter-drone operations using its AH-64 attack helicopters for quite some time now. However, on October 1^st, the U.S. Army’s Central Command announced that one of its AH-64 attack helicopters carrying an upgraded AGM-114 Hellfire missile, successfully engaged an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) during the Red Sands training exercise held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The successful use of an attack helicopter using a guided missile to engage a drone threat, marks an important milestone in efforts to develop an effective counter drone weapon system.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) which already operates AH-64 attack helicopters and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles must quickly look to developing a secondary Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) capability with its fleet of attack helicopters. At present, the IAF operates 22 Apache attack helicopters, acquired under a deal worth approximately Rs13,950 crore signed in September 2015. While the IAF’s Apache’s are obviously a contender for undertaking Anti-drone defence duties, they may be better utilised in helping develop tactics for such tasks within the wider Air Force.

Indigenous Contender

In the Indian context, the IAF already has an excellent platform for such a future Anti-drone role, in the indigenously developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), which is now in production with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).  The LCH, which has been named ‘Prachand’ was inducted into service in October 2022 with the newly raised 143 Helicopter Unit, at Air Force Station Jodhpur. The LCH was developed with significant input and participation from the Air Force, which demanded manoeuvrability, agility, lethality, and speed, coupled battlefield survivability and crashworthiness being the other key attributes.

The LCH could potentially fill an important void within the Indian Armed Forces with regards to engaging adversary Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). While the LCH has been inducted into service, primarily as an attack helicopter to engage armoured targets and support the army’s motorized infantry and armoured columns; it can have a more than useful secondary role Countering the drone threats on the battlefield. This is especially the case, when there is a Need to develop and induct counter-drone systems to counter against drones which are either armed or undertaking battlefield reconnaissance/undertaking artillery spotting.

The advanced fighter jets operated by the Air Force are often flying at too high a speed to intercept UAVs, while the utility helicopters presently in service are too slow. The Air Force operates armed versions of the Dhruv utility helicopter (MkIV ‘Rudra’ Weapon System Integrated) and Mi-171V/V5 but these are considered unsuitable for Anti-drone roles due to their lack of manoeuvrability and climb performance.  The LCH is also more survivable in contested environments and also features a Radar Cross Section (RCS), that is 1/3rd that of the Dhruv helicopter. The LCH is also equipped with a Laser Warning Receiver (LWR), Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and a Missile Warning Receiver (MWR). It also has extensive armour protection for its pilots against small arms fire.

Designed to Attack

According to Wg Cdr (retd) Unni Pillai, HAL’s former Chief Test Pilot (Rotary Wing), “the LCH exactly fills this slot with its speed and mix of guns and missiles.” Another important attribute of the LCH, Unni says is its speed and rate of climb. The LCH can fly at a speed of up to 280 kmph and climb to 20,000 feet in only 6.5 minutes during summer in Leh (depending on how it is configured). The LCH’s excellent manoeuvrability also makes it well suited to undertaking anti-drone defence roles.

The tandem-seat LCH is the only attack helicopter in its class with the ability to carry its full weapon load till 14,000 feet and land and take-off from altitudes of 15,000 feet. The LCH will especially be useful for Anti-drone duties at high-altitudes with its proven ability to perform in ‘Hot and High’ conditions at places like Leh, where the temperatures can be as high as 30-34 degrees centigrade during summers.

The LCH has been designed to tackle airborne threats and is armed with MBDA’s Mistral Air to Air Missile (ATAM). These missiles are carried on the on two ‘twin launchers’, one on either side of the LCH; allowing it to carry four Infra-Red (IR) guided, high speed, fire-and-forget Mistral ATAMs. The Mistral ATAMs have a large off-boresight capability, together with the ability to aim the missile seeker very precisely at a given target. It attains a shaped trajectory in order to intercept targets top-down or at long range and the crew can also select the proximity fuze mode.

The LCH is also fitted with a chin-mounted 20mm cannon, which is slaved to the pilot’s Helmet Mounted Display & Sight (HMDS). The Nexter Systems THL20 chin-mounted turret is fitted with Nexter’s 20 mm M621 cannon, which has an average rate of fire of 750-800 rounds per minute and an effective range of up to 2,000 m. The LCH can also carry four 2.75-inch (70-mm) 12-tube rocket launchers with unguided rockets.

Worthy of Consideration

The LCH is heavily armed and highly manoeuvrable. It is already in service and can easily be customized to meet the Air Force’s anti-drone needs. Being an indigenously designed and developed helicopter by HAL, the integration of new sensors and weapons for any future anti-drone defence role for the LCH, can be quickly and cost-effectively achieved by HAL supported by India’s growing defence industry ecosystem.

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Keywords: Air Force, Turmoil, Missile Force, Relief

“Much of a state’s defence planning is obliged to proceed on the basis of anticipation, hope, expectation, and possibly confident beliefs about the future which cannot be tested for their accuracy.”

– Colin Gray^[1]

A mere glance at any newspaper these days would reveal the extent of the current nature of world affairs, often described as VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous). From facing a pandemic to the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, the range of threats surrounding mankind is ever-increasing. Despite tremendous advances in intelligence and communication, not many could forecast the significant events of recent years with satisfactory accuracy. Right from the Chinese actions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Russia-Ukraine war or the Hamas attack on Israel, not many people could predict such an event with reasonable accuracy till it finally occurred. If there is one thing that can be said with certainty about wars, it is that no one has ever accurately predicted them. Whether it was Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of the UK, dismissing the possibility of war with Germany in 1938, or the now-deleted press release from President Zelensky of Ukraine on February 22, 2022, which downplayed the chances of a full-scale Russian invasion, both were proven wrong within a short time.^[2]

Following the Covid-19 pandemic, economies across the globe were stressed. To address these stresses, countries evolved different strategies. Some worked, while others did not. In places where they didn’t work, political parties/leaders exploited social fissures/used illegal means to win elections, leading to significant turmoil. The entire neighbourhood of India experienced this (Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, etc.). Whether it was the Israel-Hamas war or the turmoil in the neighbourhood, all happened without any serious warning. In these cases, a response is required to be formulated and delivered in a short time. Whether it involves striking targets to prevent further offensive action, mobilising resources to strengthen a sector or even moving people out of a conflict zone, time is of the essence. When time is of the essence, air power becomes the dominant instrument of choice. This is explained by Sanu Kainikara as, “rapid responsiveness of a modern military force is almost completely dependent on air power’s core competencies that are derived from its inherent primary characteristics—flexibility, responsiveness, speed, reach, penetration, precision, discrimination and lethality.”^[3]

With the evolution of missiles, a significant role of the air forces has shifted from manned aircraft to missiles. Whether for weapon delivery or establishing air defence, missiles have been increasingly preferred. When nuclear weapons were miniaturised to be able to fit in missiles, aircraft appeared to be losing their relevance for strategic operations. In recent times, drones have started becoming an alternative to missiles. The low cost, minimal launch infrastructure, and near-perfect accuracy of some drones, especially the FPV (first-person view) camera-guided ones, have gained traction. These drones and surface-to-surface missiles are usually operated by the land forces. An undeclared acknowledgement of this evolution is the steady decline in the number of manned combat aircraft worldwide in recent years. Therefore, with a decrease in reliance on combat aircraft, can we say that there is a decreasing role of the air forces? Recent experiences suggest a different picture.

In the ongoing war in the Middle East, the first barrage of Iranian missiles and drones, fired in retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in April 2024, was said to have been intercepted at nearly 99 per cent. In the second significant strike by Iran, involving close to 200 ballistic missiles, nothing of crucial value was claimed to be lost by Israel.^[4] The claim has some merits as per one Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) observer as well.^[5] Therefore, while missiles work during trials and demonstrations (in the absence of the enemy), the results during war tell an entirely different story. Therefore, the countries with large missile inventories are likely to be in for a surprise in a war. Martin Van Creveld, one of the air power theorists of contemporary times, remarked, “With every passing day, the steadily declining number of combat aircraft means that the “core” mission of air forces everywhere is being eroded. Those ignoring this process do so at their own peril.”^[6]

Thus, there are two opposing forces in action. One is the volatile nature of contemporary world affairs, which creates a demand for enhanced use of air power. Another factor is the peacetime perception that air forces are losing relevance since their roles can be performed by missiles and drones. India is also affected by this dilemma. On one side, there is a continuous decline in the strength of combat aircraft. On the other hand, IAF operations have only been expanding in terms of frequency and complexity. Thus, there is a mismatch between the demand and supply. This gap can be offset to a certain extent by improving the human capital. The same was highlighted by former IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari (Retd), on his Air Force day address on October 08, 2023, when he said, “the need to redefine, reimagine and recalibrate ourselves”.^[7] However, a more comprehensive solution is required to make good the shortfall.

Whispers in the corridors suggest that alternate solutions to this capability mismatch are emerging in the form of a proposal for a separate missile force. The arguments in favour of such a force seem to resonate with the theme of ‘Atmanirbharta’. There is no denying that India can indigenously produce missiles and can form a missile force at a rate faster than developing indigenous fighter squadrons. However, what needs to be validated is their utility on the battlefield. The recent global experiences aren’t encouraging enough to merit the development of such a force. This is all the more applicable in India, where both Pakistan and China have good air defence systems that further limit the employability of a missile/rocket force.

So what’s the solution? It is two-fold. The first step is to recognise the need for an increase in air power capability. This is a long-drawn process and is dependent on the country’s industrial capacity and the training of the air warriors. The second is to test their training in crisis. There is adequate room for employment in humanitarian crises arising out of conflicts. Air power can deliver essential aid with force against the wishes of any of the parties in conflict. IAF did it in Sri Lanka on  June 04, 1987, when five An-32s, escorted by Mirage-2000s, air-dropped 24 tonnes of relief material against the wishes of the warring parties.^[8] Such actions can demonstrate both the capability and resolve of India and strengthen its case for securing a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Given the numerous global crises, it is time to take the initiative and back it with competence. The 92^nd IAF Day is an opportunity to once again take the resolve and demonstrate the willingness to defend the values of the IAF and India in the global landscape.

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Notes

^[1] Colin S Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford University Press, 2016).

^[2] The latest on the Ukraine-Russia Crisis. CNN. 22 Feb 2022. Accessed at https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-21-22/index.html on October 07, 2024

^[3] Sanu Kainikara, Seven Perennial Challenges to Air Forces (Canberra, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2009), p. 13.

^[4] David Gritten, Matt Murphy and Patrick Jackson, “What we know about Iran’s attack on Israel”, BBC, October 03, 2024, at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70w1j0l488o. Accessed on October 06, 2024.

^[5] Decker Eveleth, “IMINT: Iran’s Strike on Nevatim Airbase”, Hors D’oeuvres of Battle, October 04, 2024, at https://horsdoeuvresofbattle.blog/2024/10/04/imint-irans-strike-on-nevatim-airbase/.    Accessed on October 06, 2024.

^[6] Olsen A John, ed., A History of Air Warfare (Potomac Books, 2010), P. 370.

^[7] “Address By CAS On 91st Anniversary Of IAF”, SP’s Aviation, October 08, 2023, at https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=3371.  Accessed on October 06, 2024.

^[8] “Operation Poomalai”, Bharat Rakshak, October 12, 2006, at https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/army/history/1987ipkf/operation-poomalai/. Accessed on October 07, 2024.

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Keywords: ISIS, ISKP, Voice of Khorasan, Islamic State, South Asia, Media Propaganda

Just like its motherboard, Islamic State Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Levant, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) suffered the same fate of territorial decline after several highs in territorial conquests in Afghanistan. After the fall of Mosul in 2017, rebuilding the group and securing its global network became a priority for its Caliph, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi concurred that Islamic State (IS) does not require land to live and prosper; instead, they can expand digitally and set up a ‘Virtual Caliphate’ by encouraging lone wolf attacks in their home countries.[1] This phase marked the beginning of ‘Networking Online’, as ISIS shifted from being a proto-state to a transnational terrorist group and began rebranding itself as a ‘Resurrected Caliphate’ in the virtual world.

Similarly, since 2020, ISKP has revised its strategic direction to lone wolf attacks via online recruitment and propaganda. Today, ISKP’s virtual reach has expanded to such an extent that it managed to come in contact with an 18-year-old Chechen man, who they instructed to plot an attack at the 2024 Paris Olympics.[2] While football fans were lucky to escape, ISKP managed to coordinate an attack in Moscow in March 2024, resulting in the deaths of nearly 145 individuals and injuring an additional 551.[3] The Paris and Moscow plot highlights the gradual expansion of ISKP’s scope from regionalism to internationalism. This has serious consequences for regional security in South Asia, particularly beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The digital blitzkrieg in IS’ online propaganda appears to be linked to a well-organised sequence of IS publications. Some of these official media outlets include Dabiq, Al Furqan, Al Hayat, Al Nab, Al Bayan, Maktab Al Hammah, and Ajnad. Each has its own content to focus on.[4] To coordinate its publications for non-Arabic speakers, IS established the Al Hayat Media Centre, which produces media content exclusively in non-Arabic languages, especially targeting younger audiences, in various forms, ranging from minute-long ‘mujatweets’ for X (formerly Twitter) to hour-long, Hollywood-style documentaries with special effects and action scenes.[5]

Taking a cue from its core group, ISKP, the regional tentacle of IS in South Asia, has also incorporated online propaganda as a central part of its operations, especially via its digital magazine Voice of Khorasan. Of late, its contents have begun engaging with larger audiences and diaspora communities beyond its core geographical scope.[6] For example, in September 2024, the ISKP-affiliated Al-Azaim media outlet released a 47-page booklet in Persian, seeking to expand its operations beyond the Khorasan region while promoting lone-wolf terrorism. The booklet highlights Muslims seeking citizenship in non-Muslim countries, labelling all citizens of these nations as “infidels who should be fought against.”[7]

Beyond the Battlefield: Media Propaganda in India

ISKP’s outward look has meant that India has also seen its fault lines being pricked by ISKP digital publications to inflame social tensions. ISKP, in August 2023, published a prominent article in its Voice of Khorasan magazine calling on IS operatives and supporters to carry out attacks against the Hindu population in India.[8] At present, IS has a small and brittle online presence in India. Some of the fledgling IS publications in India include Risalah, an English magazine that was renamed to Sawt al-Hind (Voice of Hind) following the transition from Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) to Islamic State Hind Province (ISHP).[9] In February 2020, ISHP began publishing the Voice of Hind in both Urdu and English, predominantly directing its content towards the Muslim community in India. In 2022, ISHP took further measures to strengthen its media output with the establishment of Nashir al-Hind as its official news outlet.[10] In January 2023, Serat ul-Haq––the inaugural edition of ISHP’s English language magazine—was released by al-Jauhar Media Centre, a new media outlet.[11] India has so far withstood the IS’s online barrage of propaganda; however, Indian security establishment should continue its tight vigil as ISKP’s emergence and sustenance has been marked as the second wave of the Islamic State’s expansion. New Delhi needs to be watchful of the ISKP’s transnational agenda and outreach to guard its frontiers.

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Notes

[1] Robin Wright, J.M. Berger, William Braniff et al., “The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond”, United States Institute of Peace, p. 13, January 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[2] Jérémie Pham-Lê,  Damien Delseny and  Jean-Michel Décugis, “The Worrying Profile of Rokhman B., 18, Suspected of Planning an Attack During the 2024 Olympics”, Le Parisien, May 31, 2024, https://www.leparisien.fr/jo-paris-2024/linquietant-profil-de-rokhman-b-18-ans-soupconne-dun-projet-dattentat-pendant-les-jo-2024-31-05-2024-7VHAEX4FGVEXXDUGFCVH4SS4SM.php. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[3] “Moscow Crocus City Hall Attack: Death Toll Climbs to 134, 551 injured”, Business Standard, March 31, 2024, https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/moscow-crocus-city-hall-attack-death-toll-climbs-to-134-551-injured-124033100032_1.html. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[4] Tantan Hermansah and Nofia Natasari, “The Khilafah Discourse in Online Magazine of ISIS: Dabiq”, International Journal of Progressive Sciences and Technologies, Vol. 19, No.1, p. 134, February 2020, https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/bitstream/123456789/61913/3/The%20Khilafah%20Discourse%20in%20Online%20Magazine%20of%20ISIS%20DABIQ.pdf. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[5] Steve Rose, “The ISIS Propaganda War: A Hi-Tech Media Jihad”, The Guardian, October 7, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-media-machine-propaganda-war. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[6] Riccardo Valle and Lucas Webber, “The Growth and Internationalization of Islamic State Khurasan Province’s Media Operations”, Militant Wire, February 17, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/the-growth-and-internationalization. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[7] Afghan Analyst (@AfghanAnalyst2), “ISKP-Affiliated Media Releases Booklet on Muslims Seeking Citizenship in Non-Muslim Countries…”, X (formerly Twitter), September 22, 2024, https://x.com/afghananalyst2/status/1837881662794793194?s=48&t=sGopDVCp5GewVloGJfLzSA. Accessed on September 30, 2024.

[8] Priyadarshini Baruah, “Growing Threat of ISKP in Afghanistan”, Centre for Air Power Studies, September 15, 2023, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CAPS_IB_PB_15_9_23.pdf. Accessed on September 30, 2024.

[9]Abdul Sayed and Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Growing Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and South Asia”, United States Institute of Peace, No. 520, p. 4, June 2023, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/sr-520-growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-south-asia.pdf. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[10] Riccardo Valle and Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Hind Province Amalgamates Media Branches; Pro-IS East Asia Group Claims Bombing in Thailand”, Militant Wire, April 19, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-hind-province-amalgamates. Accessed on September 29, 2024.

[11] Sayed and Hamming, n. 9, p. 8.

The post Framing Fear: ISKP’s Media Propaganda appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Wg Cdr Amit Gaur, Researcher, Takshashila Institution

Keywords: Air Power, Air Defence, Precision, Urban, Hamas, Hybrid

The post Urban Skies: Israel’s Air Strategy in Gaza and Challenges for the Future appeared first on CAPSS India.