Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act

Introduction

The first part of this discussion looked at why jointness matters — the habits and mindsets that must precede structure. This part turns to how those ideas might evolve in practice. Having observed the Air Force’s journey from both maritime and joint vantage points, I find its caution doctrinally sound — not defensive, but disciplined. What appears to some as resistance is, in fact, professional logic: the instinct to preserve flexibility, unity, and clarity of command as one enters significant efforts at integration. Understanding why the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does is essential before judging what must change — and how the Service can, in fact, lead the process.

The Air Force Perspective

The IAF’s position is rooted in doctrine, not defensiveness. Indeed, air power is, by design, a single, flexible national instrument. Aircraft and sensors can shift across fronts within hours, concentrating effect where it matters most. Dividing those assets among multiple theatre commanders could fragment effort and dilute unity. Command of the air, therefore, must remain a national responsibility.

Such caution reflects professional discipline. Air power thrives on agility, but agility depends on coherence. As Brigadier General J. D. Hittle observed in The Military Staff: Its History and Development, the true strength of command lies in firm direction from the top combined with initiative at every level.[1] Centralised planning and decentralised execution remain the bedrock of effective operations.

Recent Air Chiefs have consistently urged that doctrine, networks, and training must come before structure.[2] That sequence is sound. It reminds policymakers that integration should enhance agility, not erase it. From my own experience in joint planning environments, this emphasis on sequencing is professional caution rooted in operational realism.

Historical Models of Balance

History offers lessons in how strong commanders and strong staffs can rationalise the contradictions that are the military.

South East Asia Command (SEAC): Admiral Lord Mountbatten relied on his Chiefs of Staff — Brigadier Francis Festing and later Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning — to knit together Army, Navy, and Air operations across a vast, under-resourced theatre. As Arthur J. Marder notes in Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–1945, even Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s clashes with Admiral Sir James Somerville showed that shared Service identity cannot replace structured oversight.[3]

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF): In Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder turned coordination into unity. Drawing on lessons from the Middle East, Tedder urged a unified air command and direct access for ground commanders to call air support.[4] It was this blend of central planning and frontline flexibility that made SHAEF an exemplar of joint command.

Patton and Weyland: The partnership between General George Patton’s Third Army and Brigadier General Otto Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command demonstrated real jointness. Their staff shared maps, radios, and urgency. As David N. Spires notes in Air Power for Patton’s Army, their effectiveness came from shared education, mutual trust, and a clear divide between central planning and decentralised execution.[5]

Montgomery and de Guingand: General Bernard Montgomery’s close partnership with his Chief of Staff, Major General Francis de Guingand, showed how command and dissent can coexist productively. De Guingand tested assumptions, filtered information, and ensured that plans aligned with the commander’s intent — precisely the role envisaged by Scharnhorst and Moltke, two military geniuses who offer many lessons two centuries later.[6]

From these cases flows a consistent truth: empowered staff strengthen, rather than weaken, command.

The Modern Staff Logic

As Charles Edward White notes in The Enlightened Soldier, Scharnhorst conceived of the General Staff as “a system of brains” — a collective intellect designed to ensure that strategy was tested by logic rather than driven by personality. Scharnhorst created the General Staff as a professional counterweight to command officers trained to test plans, challenge assumptions, and ensure that decisions followed logic, not impulse.[7] Moltke refined this idea: staff officers were to think, not just assist, and to exercise independent responsibility within the commander’s intent.[8] This institutionalised professional dissent makes it a form of discipline rather than disobedience.

Institutional Balance through Staff Design

For the Indian Air Force — operating alongside an Army of far greater size and presence — balance must come from institutional design, not numerical equivalence. Mass cannot be matched, but structure can offset scale. The Prussian reformers Scharnhorst and Moltke demonstrated that intellect could compensate for numbers: a “system of brains” where analysis, critique, and command coexisted in productive tension.

India can adapt that principle through a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) supported by an empowered Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS–VCDS axis could serve as an institutional counterweight — one focused on direction, the other on disciplined dissent — ensuring that strategy benefits from dialogue, not deference. For the IAF, this balance may be necessary to preserve its culture of procedural precision and doctrinal clarity within a joint framework that values questioning as much as compliance.

The Commonwealth Legacy and Its Limits

The Indian military did not inherit the Prussian model; it inherited the British one — efficient, orderly, but wary of internal debate. In Britain (and in colonial India), aristocrats and senior officers long commanded not just with strategy but with rank and class, treating staff as advisers rather than partners.

At Waterloo, Prussian liaison to the headquarters of Wellington General von Müffling urged two British commanders to seize a fleeting opportunity against Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. Both agreed, but refused to act without written orders, fearing court-martial if they did. Wellington later confirmed that such an initiative would indeed have been punished. It was a system built on control, not trust.[9]

That instinct would carry into the Royal Air Force (RAF) through its Army lineages, and from there to the Indian Air Force. The RAF headquarters were organised by functional branches — operations, plans, maintenance, and administration — without a system of an empowered Chief of Staff. The design delivered efficiency but discouraged institutional challenge. The IAF inherited this form almost intact: precise, methodical, and professional, yet inclined toward compliance rather than contest.

Managing Large Air Formations vs All-Domain Forces

The IAF’s centralised command model is highly effective within the air domain. Large formations drawn from different bases can be tasked as a single instrument, with tight vertical control ensuring precision and responsiveness. From personal experience, such centralisation works superbly in air operations, where speed and concentration are decisive.

But managing an all-domain force is a different challenge. Air operations shift in hours; land and maritime campaigns unfold over days; cyber and space effects operate on entirely different temporal scales. A Commander responsible for land, sea, air, cyber, and space must orchestrate effects, not simply allocate sorties. That requires a lateral staff structure where domain specialists plan together, share data, and challenge each other’s assumptions in real time.

Air component planning thrives on centralisation; joint command thrives on collaboration. The task before the IAF is not to abandon its precision but to extend it — to translate air-power discipline into a joint habit of dialogue and co-design. Only when staff from every Service can think, argue, and decide together will India’s theatre commands move from intent to effect.

From Coordination to Command

The relationship between command and staff is, as noted earlier, not just structural but also symbolic. Rank conveys authority, but how command interacts with staff reveals the maturity of that authority. Before the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee reforms, hierarchy made this distinction clear: the staff advised, command decided. After rank parity blurred those lines, the Army has notionally reintroduced clarity through distinct command and staff streams — reaffirming that direction, not designation, defines authority.

As India now attempts to design integrated commands, this semiotic balance becomes critical. Theatre commands will require staff who can question without overstepping, and commanders who can decide without silencing debate. That equilibrium — advice without rivalry, command without insularity — is what will turn integration from structure into strategy.

India’s reform journey — from the Kargil Review Committee (1999) to the Group of Ministers (2001), the Naresh Chandra Task Force (2012), and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) — culminated in the creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (2019). The Inter-Services Organisations (ISO) Act (2023) added a legal framework, but one primarily administrative; it governs people and discipline, not missions or operational direction.

Five years on, we have coordination without command. Authority is dispersed among four coequal Chiefs, leading to caution when decisiveness is required. Theatre Commanders remain three-star officers, junior to the four-star Service Chiefs whose forces they must lead. In a hierarchy-sensitive military, this imbalance weakens confidence and clouds authority.[10]

The Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986) in the United States resolved the same issue by raising theatre commanders to four-star parity, aligning rank, responsibility, and remit. India can learn from the logic of that Act— consistent with the Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act (1955)[11] — without creating a politically sensitive “supreme commander.” Aligning rank, responsibility, and remit is not cosmetic; it is the foundation of credible command.

Toward a Balanced Joint System

There are glimpses of what this could look like. Air Marshal K. K. “Timmy” Nohwar’s tenure as Chief of Staff at the Andaman and Nicobar Command — the only time an Air Officer has held that post — proved that when officers step outside Service silos, the quality of joint planning improves. This is as told to me by his Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN).

Building on such precedent, India could:

(a)         Get the post of CDS, like so much else in defence reform, to be rotational. Jointness isn’t rocket science — it’s just common sense, applied consistently.

(b)          Appoint a four-star VCDS from another Service as the CDS’s counter-ego, safeguarding diversity of perspective;

(c)         Transform HQ IDS from a coordinating secretariat into a Joint Staff HQ, the analytical and doctrinal core;

(d)         Legally distinguish Administrative Control (ADCON) from Operational Control (OPCON);

(e)       Create a Permanent Joint Operations HQ under the CDS with regional hubs (pilot projects could be a maritime command and possibly the Central Command);

(f)     Establish a Joint Operations Fund, ring-fenced under parliamentary oversight, to finance ISR, cyber, logistics, and training, gradually pooling Service budgets.

Such steps would shift reform from paperwork to purpose — where law provides the foundation, structure provides direction, and funding provides the muscle.

Conclusion — From Clarity to Coherence

As a person who has pushed Critical Thinking from about 2015 till recently at the faculty and students of DSSC, Wing Commander Raja’s work is valuable in helping restore factual clarity to a debate too often clouded by sentiment. But clarity is only the beginning. Five years after creating the CDS, we still have coordination without command — structure without synthesis.

For jointness to mature, India must separate ADCON from OPCON, build a permanent operational core, align rank with responsibility, and embed joint education early in Service careers.  The IAF, with its tradition of disciplined planning and mission precision, is best placed to lead this evolution.  If it can carry its internal coherence into the joint arena, India’s Armed Forces will move decisively — from coordination to command, and from clarity to coherence.

*****

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Notes:-

[1] J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1961; Kindle ed.), p. 2.

[2] Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, remarks at Ran Samvaad, Mhow, August 2025.

[3] Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–45 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

[4] Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

[5] David N. Spires, Air Power for Patton‘s Army (Washington, DC: USAF History and Museums Program, 2002).

[6] Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947); Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981).

[7] Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805 (New York: Praeger, 1989; Kindle edition).

[8] Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed. Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993; Kindle edition).

[9]White, n. 7.

[10] Sudhir Pillai, “Theaterisation Reform Is Stuck on Ranks and Roles — India’s Military Needs Clarity,” The Print,  September 25, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/theaterisation-reform-is-stuck-on-ranks-and-roles-india-military/2750307/. Accessed on October 27, 2025.

[11] Ministry of Law, Government of India, “The Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act, 1955. Act No. 19 of 1955,”   May 03, 1955,  https://www.indiacode.nic.in/repealedfileopen?rfilename=A1955-19.pdf. Accessed on October 28, 2025.

The post From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part II: From Coordination to Command — Designing India’s Joint Future appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act

Setting the Stage

Among the many contributions to India’s debate on jointness are two essays on the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS) portal by Wing Commander A. Pichipoo Raja. His earlier piece, “Revisiting the Eight-Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,” [1] traced the evolution of India’s inter-service integration. His later article, “08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command,”[2] builds on that foundation—trying to bring discipline to a discussion that has often been shaped more by sentiment than by evidence.

Both essays mark a welcome maturity in professional debate and, in an oblique way, remind us that the Air Force’s caution is often misread. What some see as reluctance is, in truth, doctrinal logic: a concern for coherence, unity, and agility. Before judging what needs to change, it is essential to understand why the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does—and how it could, in fact, lead India’s transition to genuine jointness.

Early Roots of Jointness

In his first of the two articles referred to here, Wing Commander Raja suggests that the idea of theaterisation arose to address India’s “lack of jointness,” tracing its roots to 1944, when he links the origins of jointness to the founding story of the National Defence Academy (NDA), using the Sudan Block donation as a symbolic anchor. That is partly right, though the deeper roots lie in Britain’s wartime experience.

The campaigns of 1939–45 showed how badly the Services faltered when they operated in silos. The setbacks in France, North Africa, Greece, and the Far East were not just tactical defeats—they were failures of coordination between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Only after repeated reverses did joint planning and staff education become central to success. By the time of Normandy and Burma, integration had matured: General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Europe and Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command demonstrated how air-land-sea cooperation, properly institutionalised, could turn friction into synergy.

As an alumnus of the NDA, I still remember quiet Sunday mornings spent in the library after breakfast—hours lost in military history that gave us our first authentic taste of joint thinking. Has that early exposure in jointness at the NDA fully percolated to the echelons of the Indian Military?

The DSSC and Its Limits

India established the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington even before the National Defence Academy (NDA) came up at Khadakwasla. Its core focus, however, has mainly remained single-service — given the Army’s central role under an Army Commandant and its mission, much like Quetta before it, to prepare junior staff officers for mid-level formations.

This was not for lack of vision. The second Commandant, Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne, had to take it up with the then Governor-General, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, to convince the Defence Minister that the new college had to be tri-Service — a move the Army initially resisted but one that made DSSC India’s first real step toward integrated professional education.[3]

Over time, DSSC has evolved into a respected postgraduate, mid-career institution, yet its joint curriculum remains more a conversation than a culture. General Lentaigne himself once remarked, “I only wish the Army could cut down its syllabus and also get more time for research and discussion.”[4] The college’s history notes that as Army subjects multiplied, the Naval and Air Wings pressed for greater combined and joint instruction to balance their programmes.

It is not the aim of this submission to get into the subtleties of words used, like training and education, but readers would benefit if they read through the author’s writings on the subject.[5]

Personal Ties and Professional Distance

Wing Commander Raja notes the personal bonds among recent Chiefs — NDA coursemates and Sainik School Rewa classmates — as examples of natural synergy. These connections are real, but they do not automatically create operational integration. If friendship alone could guarantee jointness, India would have achieved it long ago.

When the government accepted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and Group of Ministers’ (GoM) recommendations to establish the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the three Chiefs then in office were all my own NDA contemporaries. Yet that did not by itself deliver integration. At the highest levels, professionalism outweighs personality. Structures, doctrine, and accountability—not nostalgia—bind the Services together.

I saw this clearly as Chief of Staff at the Andaman and Nicobar Command. One Commander-in-Chief and the Lieutenant Governor were, coincidentally, classmates at Sainik School Rewa—the very school Wing Commander Raja mentions. Yet their conduct was always defined by role, not relationship. Professional distance kept both focused on duty. Familiarity can ease communication, but it never substitutes for institutional design.

Revisiting the “Eight Myths”

Raja’s 08 Myths article aims to clear the fog that surrounds the theaterisation debates. It succeeds in re-centering the argument on evidence rather than emotion. But the real task is to link these “myths” to the broader history of reform—from the KRC and GoM to the Naresh Chandra Task Force and the Shekatkar Committee. Together, they form India’s official reform continuum. Once accepted in principle by the government, their recommendations gain directive weight even if implementation remains uneven.

Seen that way, the debate should not be about whose view prevails but about how to build common purpose. The aim here is not to impose a non-IAF perspective, but to offer, for an Air Force audience, a structured way forward—a method amid the noise.

Lessons from Kargil and Sindoor

Readers seeking a deeper anchor might look to my chapter “Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command” in Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective. It recalls the winter of 1998–99, when Pakistan’s Operation Badr led to the Kargil War and to two separate Indian responses—Operation Vijay by the Army and Operation Safed Sagar by the Indian Air Force.[6]

As AVM Arjun Subramaniam notes, had the Army involved the IAF from day one, a single integrated plan could have exploited both Services’ strengths and covered their weaknesses. That insight remains strikingly relevant. Operation Sindoor again showed individual brilliance within each Service but exposed the absence of a unified design. The lesson from Kargil and Sindoor alike is not about our people or platforms, but about how we plan together. True jointness requires shared understanding, confidence, and a structure that aligns authority with purpose.[7]

Myths and Realities of Reform

Wing Commander Raja’s effort to separate fact from belief is valuable, but facts must be translated into design. Major General Alok Deb makes this point in “Kargil and its Impact on India’s National Security.” [8] His reading of the KRC and GoM reports shows that, even if the term “theatre command” wasn’t used, the intent toward integration was clear. The committees’ reforms—the Integrated Defence Staff, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Strategic Forces Command, and the Andaman & Nicobar Command—were all steps toward jointness. The CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) represent a significant political step that places the onus on the militaries to get their act together.

For a fuller view, readers should explore the Journal of Defence Studies special issue “National Security since Kargil,” which offers a 360-degree review of India’s progress two decades after the conflict.[9]

Raja is also correct that reform in India has evolved through context and experience, not declarations. Our path to jointness has been deliberate, incremental, and built through learning rather than slogans.

The claim that India’s jointness “problem” lacks empirical proof confuses the absence of audit with adequacy. Without a structured review, neither strengths nor gaps are known. India still lacks cross-service mechanisms to analyse operations collectively. Lessons remain trapped within individual Services and seldom shape doctrine or training. A Joint Operations Review Board (JORB) under the National Security Council Secretariat—or the CDS—could fill that gap, turning anecdote into evidence.  The Army’s Headquarters Army Training Command (HQ ARTRAC) has a Lessons Learnt system, but do we have a joint Lessons Learnt system?

Learning from Others

Raja’s reading of the United States (US) experience is broadly correct but incomplete. Unified Commands existed well before 1986; what the Goldwater–Nichols Act changed, as Gordon Nathaniel Lederman explains in Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, was alignment, not architecture.[10] The Act enforced clarity—who commands, who is accountable, and who advances for joint performance. It linked professional reward to joint competence and turned what had been an organisational chart into a living system.

The caution that theaterisation alone cannot deliver jointness is well-taken. Structures succeed only when supported by doctrine, education, and incentives. The lesson from abroad is not imitation but adaptation—building systems that fit our realities while preserving each Service’s ethos and aligning all to a common strategic purpose.

Beyond Structure

Theatre commands are meant to unify command—to bring planning, resources, and execution under one operational authority. That purpose is sound and long overdue. But unity of command is not the same as unity of purpose. Real jointness grows from shared education and professional incentives that make officers think and act as one, even when they wear different uniforms. Without that intellectual and doctrinal foundation, theatre commands risk becoming hollow frameworks—united in form but divided in spirit.

The final myth—that theaterisation is politically driven—needs nuance. In China, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2015 reforms certainly strengthened Party control, yet they also produced real operational integration.[11] Under Xi Jinping’s centralised leadership, structural change combined with a genuine “military intellectual revolution” born of debate, international study, and relentless field experimentation. Political will can push reform, but professional depth must sustain it.[12]

The Way Ahead

Taken together, these insights repair the record but leave open the core question: how do we turn factual clarity into functional reform?

If the first part of this debate has explained why jointness matters—the habits of thought, education, and incentives that must underpin reform—the next must ask how those principles can work in practice. Understanding the IAF’s reasoning is essential here. Before prescribing change, one must first appreciate the logic behind its caution: a perspective shaped not by reluctance, but by doctrine, experience, and operational prudence.

*****

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Notes:-

[1] A Pichipoo Raja, “Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 03, 2025, https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[2]A Pichipoo Raja, “08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 10, 2025, https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[3] R. D. Palsokar, A History of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1997), pp. 56-58.

[4] Ibid., p. 90.

[5] For earlier discussions on this subject, see Sudhir Pillai, “Faculty at DSSC – A Necessity of Professional Military Education,” Trishul Journal 17, no. 2, Spring 2015; Sudhir Pillai, “Schooled to Think,” Force Magazine, January 2018; and Sudhir Pillai, “Change with Times: Indian Professional Military Education System Needs Urgent Reform,” Force Magazine, November 2020.

[6] Sudhir Pillai, “Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command,” in Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective, ed. Arjun Subramaniam and Anil Chopra (New Delhi: National Defence College and KW Publishers, 2021), pp. 283–305.

[7] Ibid., p. 285.

[8] Alok Deb, “Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security,” Journal of Defence Studies, vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[9] National Security Since Kargil, Journal of Defence Studies vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 2019 – MP-IDSA. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[10] Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999).

[11] Brian Lafferty, “Civil Military Integrations and PLA Reforms,” National Defence University Press, February 05, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748777/civil-military-integrations-and-pla-reforms/. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[12] Sugiura Yasuyuki, “The PLA’s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities,” NIDS China Security Report, 2022,  https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_A02.pdf. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

The post From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part I: The Idea of Jointness: Beyond Structure and Slogan appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Armed Forces, Combat Readiness, Rafale, Symbolism, Regional Power

“Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.”

Leonardo Da Vinci

Introduction

The Rafale sortie by President Droupadi Murmu, the Supreme Commander of the Indian Armed Forces on 29 October, 2025 at Ambala AF Station was not just a ceremonial event but a highly symbolic event showcasing the pride, prestige and power of the Indian Air Force. It was another significant milestone in President Droupadi Murmu’s journey, showcasing her indomitable courage and confidence in IAF’s prowess. It was a testimony to the decisive role played by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Operation Sindoor and a befitting occasion to declare the commencement of Ex Trishul, India’s tri-services training military exercise, on the Gujrat border.

The flight was symbolic because it represented India’s coming of age in its defence capabilities, displays faith in India’s quest for strategic autonomy and, more importantly, reflected the confidence that the Supreme Commander had placed in the nation’s armed forces in general and the IAF in particular. Incidentally, she is the only President to have flown in a fighter aircraft on two occasions, including a Su-30 MKI in 2023.

Ceremony and Substance

While such flights by Heads of State are not unprecedented, for India, it was a full-fledged ceremonial event, keeping with the finest traditions of the armed forces. The Supreme Commander would have experienced what very few heads of state in the world ever do: the immense exhilaration, agility and awe of modern aerial combat— the tip of the spear and the pure joy of fighter flying. There is also a tremendous amount of substance associated with this flight. The flight reflects civilian leadership deeply engaged with the military’s operational arm, bridging the gap between symbolism and substance.

Wide-spread anarchy in the world, narcissistic leadership, sycophancy across Governments and a rapidly changing world order are largely a reflection of the instability prevailing in the world order today.  Casting aside all concerns of a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) world, the President got a unique opportunity to strap up in a fighter and take to the skies to experience the pure and exhilarating joys of flying. The event was not only about optics, it was also a statement highlighting the intricate integration of air power in India’s strategic milieu, reaffirming the nation’s faith in the IAF personnel, who operate these complex machines and ensure the safety of the Indian airspace. It was also a firm and thumping acknowledgement of the IAF’s ‘First Responder’ role in India’s Neighbourhood during both natural and man-made disasters and other contingencies. It was also a reaffirmation of the confidence in IAF’s readiness posture across the entire battle space, transcending all domains.

Symbolism from the Cockpit

For a President to take control of a fighter aircraft, albeit even for a brief period, is a symbolic reaffirmation of civil-military fusion and mutual respect. In a democratic set-up like India, the armed forces operate under civilian control. Yet, such authority gains its moral legitimacy from understanding and empathising with the lives and missions of the men and women in uniform. Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, Mrs Pratibha Devisingh Patil and President Murmu have all flown in a Su-30 MKI earlier, and this sortie marks a first for the Rafale fleet. Dr Zakir Husain (HT-2 basic trainer) and Dr APJ Abdul Kalam (HJT-16 Kiran) have flown in trainer aircraft earlier. This sortie is different because the Rafale represents something more contemporary, reflecting India’s rise as a confident regional power capable of holding its own amongst the comity of nations. It shows the world that India’s leadership is not distant from those responsible for its defence and it also reassures Indians that India’s safety and sovereignty is in safe hands.

Operational Readiness and Strategic Messaging

Presently, India faces an ever-increasing complex security environment; from its contested borders, on-going tariff issues and turbulence in the Indo-Pacific region to a volatile and highly polarised world. The President flying in a fighter aircraft drives home a message of reassurance for all Indians and emphasizes India’s credible deterrence capability to the entire world. India needs to be prepared for all contingencies, spanning from short and swift wars to long drawn-out wars. These high-profile ceremonial and symbolic events serve as a huge source of inspiration, not only for all the armed forces personnel but the nation’s ordinary citizens as well. These events also help in reposing faith in the national leadership. The President would have experienced first-hand the professionalism, the extraordinary skills and the courage of the IAF personnel. She would have also witnessed the highly efficient and impeccably maintained Indian Air Force machinery at work, highlighting the professionalism and determination of the IAF personnel.

Air Power and National Prestige

The armed forces of a nation are symbolic of its military prowess and prestige. In recent times, the IAF has been chosen as the preferred ‘instrument for application of force’ during various contingencies on account of its speed, responsiveness, reach, precision and lethality. The President’s sortie is symbolic of IAF’s technological prowess and power projection. IAF has the capabilities and the capacities to deliver a strong and unambiguous statement of India’s resolve for maintaining its territorial integrity and sovereignity. The sortie also highlighted the sterling role played by IAF in nation-building and serving as the first responder in various global crises, over the years. From Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions and peace keeping operations with the United Nations to providing timely aid and succour for victims of natural disasters across the world, IAF has always delivered, on time and on target.

Indian leadership has regularly been flying fighter aircraft, sailing on aircraft carriers and visiting forward areas in the highest battlefields of the world. The same is however not true with India’s adversaries. One has never seen Pakistani leadership taking to the skies, probably due to a lack of confidence and trust in their own armed forces. President Murmu has done it not once but twice!

The Indian armed forces are a symbol of modernity, sovereignty and autonomy, reflecting India’s ability to absorb as well as indigenise advanced technologies. The sortie would also give an impetus to India’s ‘Make in India’ programme, wherein the acquisition of foreign technologies serves as a conduit for future indigenous design, development and manufacturing, not just a mere substitute for it.

The sortie comes at a time when the political rhetoric has been heating up. Encouraged by America’s new found friendship with them, Pakistan has unfortunately once again started nuclear sabre-rattling with renewed vigour. Pakistan has also reportedly started upping the ante in the Sir Creek area, probably emboldened by Chinese support. During such tense and volatile situations, the conduct of military training exercises not only convey the determination but the intent of a nation as well. Ex Trishul-2025, a tri services exercise is aimed at enhancing the operational readiness of the three services through joint planning and integrated application of combat power. The Exercise was scheduled to commence along the International Border, in the Gujrat area from October 30, 2025. It is not just a military training exercise, it is also a statement of India’s resolve, innovation and force-integration.

Conclusion

The Supreme Commander’s sortie in the Rafale aircraft was a reassertion of the President’s confidence in the professionalism and the might of the IAF. The event would be forever enshrined in IAF’s glorious history. The Rafale aircraft is symbolic not just for its technological advancement and fire power, but it is also a metaphor in India’s long and arduous journey for strategic autonomy. The President’s sortie in Ambala also sends the unambiguous message that Indian airspace and sovereignty are inviolable and secure. The IAF air warriors are always ready and willing to take on the adversary.

*****

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Keywords: Warfare, Airspace Management (ASM), Tactical Battle Area (TBA), Air Littoral, Op Sindoor

“Future warfare is all about air, space and sub-surface domains.

The conventional land and sea domains will restrict to holding territories.”

–Author

Group Captain Swaim Prakash Singh, PhD

Introduction

Warfare is an inherently complex and serious business that cannot be conceptualised or executed on the flawed premise of the primacy of a single warfighting arm. The long standing assertion that ‘the nature of warfare remains same, while its character evolves with time’ warrants nuanced deliberation, structured reasoning and a contextually grounded understanding especially in the light of a few western narratives being built on the topic of Air Littoral. As expected, like others, this term has also been picked up by few land warfare enthusiasts trying to embed into the Indian context.

In this regard, the proposition of delineating fixed geographical limits under the construct of Air Littoral and advocating for its control under a land forces-led command structure[1] reflects a myopic view with borrowed and ill-conceived unprofessional arguments. Such construct[2] not only risks diluting the core integrated Airspace Management (ASM) but also contravenes the doctrinal imperatives of jointness and integration across Services by diluting the basic tenets of air power.

This approach appears counterproductive and potentially regressive in the context of contemporary and future warfare especially when the Indian Armed Forces are making concerted efforts to overcome legacy challenges and institutional frictions in pursuit of a genuinely integrated battle management architecture.

Essentially, the stated narratives focus on two distinct issues of defining the term ‘Air Littoral’ and the concept of its ‘Control by the land forces.’ This paper aims to highlight the drawbacks in the philosophy behind the control of the air littoral, using source based, conceptual and contextual arguments. It will also underscore the critical importance of ASM in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and why it must continue to remain under the control of the Indian Air Force (IAF) within the integrated battle management framework.

Air Littoral: A Conceptual Misfit

Militarily, the term ‘Maritime Littoral’ is broadly defined worldwide as “the portion of land and sea adjacent to the coast that is susceptible to influence or control from the sea and to influence or control the sea from the land.” Operationally, this zone demands specialised capabilities such as amphibious operations, coastal defence, mine countermeasures and the integration of naval gunfire and air support with land operations through an integrated tri-services mechanism.

Drawing a simile with this, a few academicians have coined the term Air Littoral, though it does not appear in any doctrinal publications globally. In reality, Air Littoral is an inconsiderate borrowing[3] from Western narratives and lacks conceptual validity.

In the air domain, there is no equivalent physical or geographical feature. Airspace is a continuous, three dimensional medium defined by altitude, range and threat environment. It is in no case by fixed boundaries like a shoreline. Both Indian and global air doctrines already classify airspace by altitude bands (very low, low, medium, high etc), threat environment (permissive, contested, denied) and mission type (Counter Air, Coordinated Operations, Air Defence (AD) etc).

The proposed concept of Air Littoral adds no doctrinal clarity. Rather, it risks creating artificial silos and confusion over command and control (C2) responsibilities. The low altitude fight is not a distinct ‘special zone’ requiring separate service ownership as envisaged by land warfare enthusiasts. It is simply a segment of airspace within the Joint Air Defence System managed through layered AD Systems, counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) measures, Close Air Support and Rotary Wing Operations through Joint Air Defence Centre (JADC) under centralised command of the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

Furthermore, the Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine, the IAF Doctrine and the Joint Services Study Group (JSSG) documents make no reference to Air Littoral as an independent operational construct. Likewise, leading air forces such as the United States Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force (RAF) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) do not recognise the term in their doctrinal lexicon. It just remains an academic expression without operational relevance.

Source Based Arguments

Borrowed Western Narrative: Not Suited for Indian Context

The core argument of Air Littoral is largely based on foreign doctrinal experimentation and recent conflict-specific adaptations (eg Ukraine, Israel, USA) from couple of foreign literatures. These examples emerge from unique geopolitical, technological and command structure environments. Attempting to replicate these foreign constructs especially regarding the C2 of the air littoral without contextual adaptation, amounts to simply force fitting foreign models into India’s vastly different strategic, organisational, and doctrinal ecosystem.

India’s battle management philosophy is shaped by the following realities:

• • India is not expeditionary in nature, like the US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

  • Joint operations are driven by sovereign geographical imperatives, not global force projection requirements.

Within this framework:

• • India already operates under established joint doctrines and procedures governing air-land cooperation, including the so-called Air Littoral zone in form of TBA.

  • JSSG is the master document which unambiguously brings out the detailed coordination and operating procedures for all aerial platforms in the highly contested and congested TBA.

Reviewing Foreign Literature

Foreign literature on the subject is largely academic or opinion-based and cannot be applied to the Indian context either selectively or in entirety without due consideration of India’s doctrinal outlook, geography and capabilities. In most cases, the Indian Joint Doctrine and the IAF’s existing capabilities already address the stated vulnerabilities thereby negating the case for creating a new concept of an ‘Air Littoral’.

Various doctrines and documents such as the Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (2017), IAF Doctrine (2012, 2022), JSSG and the précis of Staff and War Colleges categorically negate the validity of this borrowed construct in its entirety. The following table, however, brings out opposing statements from Western literature itself, thereby validating the inadequacies of these arguments.

Table 1: Air Power Doctrinal Stand against Imported Quotes

Interestingly, the Air Littoral concept mentioned in the above-referred documents has been notably downplayed by USAF airpower practitioner Lt Col Grant Georgulis in his article “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia”, published in Air & Space Forces Magazine on 25 July 2025.[15]

The aforesaid paper presents several arguments which seem to accord considerable emphasis to the perceived impact of drones on land warfare. The bottom line is that the loosely used term ‘Drones’ for UAS, now being projected as a revolution in land warfare had already evolved within air forces at least two decades ago. Consequently, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) including ASM in the TBA have long been in practice. The devastating effect of such technology has been widely witnessed during Operation Sindoor in May 2025.[16]

In the Indian context, particularly for drones of nuisance value (eg Swarm drones), a chain of counter-UAS (CUAS) systems with both soft and hard kill capabilities already operate under the centralised command of IACCS with decentralised execution with full operational freedom meeting the requirements of the IA, thereby eliminating the need for a separate structure. Further, the wide variety of UAS spread over the flight envelope in terms of height and speed of operation makes any separate structure needless. Nevertheless, it requires further strengthening and it has to be both joint and integrated effort.

Notably, NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy of 26 June 2018 negates all aforesaid imported quotes. Also, USAF Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations published in 22 Jan 2025 provides a self-explanatory paragraph on ‘Fires’ and ‘Air Space Control.’  An excerpt is mentioned below:

“The fire’s function is supported by the airpower tenets of synergistic effects and concentration as airpower masses and maneuvers to surprise adversaries by creating effects at the times and locations of the JFC’s choosing. USAF contributions to fires are primarily captured in AFDP 3-01, Counter Air Operations, AFDP 3-03, Counter Land Operations, AFDP 3-04, Counter Sea Operations, AFDP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, AFDP 3-14, Air Force Space Support, AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack, and AFDP 3-72, Nuclear Operations. In addition, for long-range fires considerations, see AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control, and AFDP 3-60, Targeting”.

The Fallacy of Drawing Lessons from Ukraine

• • The literature has also tried to draw inferences from Ukraine as a template for battlefield air control which is rather problematic.

  • OSINT indicates Ukraine operates under a ‘weapons free’ environment characterised by minimal restrictions on engagement within contested zones, primarily because the protracted conflict has not manifested as a classical air war in the conventional sense.

  • Indian Rules of Engagement (RsOE) are more controlled, disciplined and politically calibrated. Airspace is a regulated battlespace, especially given proximity to nuclear thresholds with both adversaries and escalation management.

  • Drawing conclusions from a unique warzone with permissive engagement and applying them to a structured Indian context or TBA is operationally dangerous with flawed foundation.

  • Operation Sindoor has clearly reminded that joint and integrated warfare is the only key to success in the Indian context.[17]

Conceptual & Contextual Arguments in the Indian Context

Understanding the Tactical Battle Area (TBA)

The TBA refers to a geographically defined zone of military operations that is dynamically flexible and horizontally fluid. While land operations form its core air operations conducted by both manned and unmanned platforms are an integral component of the TBA. These flying platforms vary significantly in speed, ranging from slow movers to high-speed and very high-speed systems and operate across a wide vertical envelope from terrain hugging altitudes to high altitude flight levels thus making it Multi-Level Multi-Domain (MLMD) warfare.

Given this multi-layered tactical environment, all aerial platforms within the TBA operate under a complex, multi-level threat scenario, often from friendly weapon systems. To prevent fratricide and ensure the optimal employment of the most suitable weapon systems, a designated authority must regulate the use of airspace. This function is known as Airspace Management. This aims to provide freedom of action to all operators through defined and dynamic procedures while avoiding fratricide and simultaneously denying the use of the air medium to the enemy.

In the Indian context, the responsibility of Air Defence of the country lies with the Air Force as mandated by the Union War Book. The Control and Reporting (C&R) element of the IAF as the designated authority through IACCS exercises the entire air space management 24x7x365, be it during peacetime, wartime and No War No Peace (NWNP).

With the advancement of technology and the availability of longer-range weapon systems, it has been necessary to reassess vertical boundaries within the TBA. As a result, it was revised once in late 2000. However, such reassessment must not infringe upon the operational freedom of other combat elements within the same space in increasing the vertical limits manifold, as envisaged in the said concept. It is to be ensured that C2 continues to be centralised irrespective of the number of users in the TBA.

In light of the narrative of the proposal to allocate a vertical limit of coordinating altitude of 3 km (10,000 feet) exclusively to land forces[18] is a tall claim lacking not only operational rationale but also conceptual and contextual application.

Conceptual Divergence Vs Conceptual Overreach

The proponent of Air Littoral who claim the concept to be the so-called ‘Conceptual Divergence’ with air forces is less an innovative doctrinal breakthrough and more a case of ‘Conceptual Overreach’ under a borrowed maritime metaphor that has no intrinsic significance in the air domain.

The contribution of UAS to warfare is substantial and complementary but not transformational. Drones can observe, harass or even sting, but they cannot control. Air power is characterised by control of the airspace, strategic reach and decisive impact.

In the Indian context the divergence between the need of land and air forces is already doctrinally resolved in existing joint documents and related SoPs through integrated C2, layered engagement and shared situational awareness via IACCS. By ignoring these established mechanisms and importing a non-doctrinal term like Air Littoral, the argument is creating an artificial fault line between Services where joint doctrine already provides the solution.

Therefore, the assertion of Air Littoral as a key imperative needs correction in light of established doctrinal considerations. A few of the critical questions that merit introspection by the land forces are mentioned below:

• • What is the rationale for setting a vertical limit of 3 km (10,000 feet)? Are only guns, artillery, AD guns, and UAVs intended to operate below this altitude?

  • Will the land forces not also be controlling the Short, Medium and Long Range Surface to air Guided Weapons (SAGWs) of Army units deployed in the TBA or in adjacent areas falling within their engagement ranges?

  • Will Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO) be restricted to altitudes above 3 km, and would that be tactically and doctrinally viable?

  • Will fighter aircraft be permitted to ingress and egress within the TBA only above the 3 km ceiling?

  • How will the land forces ensure that fighter aircraft can switch from subsonic to supersonic speeds and change altitudes rapidly during BVR hot/cold patterns, in order to optimise missile performance while remaining outside enemy radar coverage within the 3 km altitude band?

  • The IAF inventory of 4.5-generation aircraft achieve optimal engine performance at around 3 km altitude, while deep-penetration aircraft require even lower altitudes for maximum effect. How would the land forces effectively control and coordinate the operations of such aircraft?

  • What mechanisms will ensure effective deconfliction of multi-domain operations, particularly in high-threat and high-tempo scenarios?

  • Would interdiction missions under coordinated air operations be excluded from TBA or fall under land forces control within it?

  • How will air-landed and air assault operations transition between outside and inside the TBA?

  • What measures will protect aircraft operating within the TBA from aerial threats and standoff weapons originating outside this envelope?

  • What would be the implications for air operations near forward airfields or Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), often located within or adjacent to the TBA?

  • How will land forces manage airspace across the International Border (IB), Line of Control (LoC), Line of Actual Control (LAC), and rest of the sectors during peacetime, wartime and in the NWNP scenarios near/ adjacent/ within TBA?

These few questions out of many underscore the need for a balanced and integrated approach to airspace control, rather than adopting vertical limitations and seeking command and control that risk operational friction and tactical incoherence affecting strategic outcomes.

Lack of Doctrinal Merit

In another work, the notion of an ‘‘Air-Surface Littoral’’[19] has been introduced. This reflects a divergence in the understanding of doctrinal nuances related to integrated operations in the TBA. The following arguments indicate that the proposed construct of an Air Littoral or Air-Surface Littoral does not align with established doctrinal principles.

• • Joint document on the subject exists both at the joint level and Service specific level.

  • It clearly defines roles & responsibility, C2 structures and deconfliction procedures in the TBA.

  • There is no doctrinal void per se, only a need for adherence is missing.

  • There is a need to trust the process and adhere to the joint document for better interoperability, strengthening air-ground coordination mechanisms and not command takeover or Army ownership.

  • Elevating a threat perception into an argument for Army-led control of the airspace dilutes the very purpose of jointness which is meant to synergise not override the inter Service roles.

  • Unity of Command is essential to ensure optimal employment and freedom of action for all weapon systems (land or air, manned or unmanned, across multiple operational levels) in TBA.

  • The fundamental doctrinal tenet of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution remains non-negotiable and sacrosanct for implementing dynamic ASM within TBA.

  • The stated joint document stands as one of the most comprehensive operational documents for integrated battle management. However, its utility remains under leveraged due to limited understanding and non-ratification by the land forces.

Air Littoral is not about Control but Efficiency and Safety Issues

Though the term Air Littoral is undefined, is inherently a shared battle space, it is not about one that must be ‘controlled’ solely by one Service. While the Army is the primary user in the TBA especially with the advent of drone swarms and loitering munitions, this does not logically lead to the Army ‘owning or leading’ the air littoral. This remains applicable globally.

Instead, existing and time-tested JADC structure need to be further strengthened by trained manpower and digital communication from land forces for both voice and data in the Indian context. The very fact that most of the air domain threats to land forces now emerge from the low altitude envelope makes it more imperative for the IA to be familiar to the nuances of air power and its utilisation in MLMD warfare. It needs to be internalised that the Air Force retains:

• • Generation of Integrated Air Picture through feeding by Army and Navy networks (Digital/Manual) as well.

  • Building up of Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) in indispensable congested airspace through sensor fusion, real-time data links, and air deconfliction.

  • Battlefield air strike coordination and execution.

  • Control of air traffic, deconfliction and dynamic management of weapon fire areas/zones (WFA).

Instead of displacing the IAF, Army integration can be enhanced through:

• • Empowered Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) and embedded TACs with enhanced operational training.

  • Need based shared access to IAF’s ISR and C2 pictures.

  • Creating/Strengthening Joint battle planning cells at Corps HQs through effective implementation of procedures in Corps Area Control Centre (CACC).

  • Integration with the proposed Drone Airspace Management Cells (DASM) at airbases.

  • Immediate operationalisation of Akashteer at the unit level and seamless integration into the IACCS architecture.

  • To ensure fratricide-free airspace management, enhance war-footing training of IA operators in C&R digital reporting and in executing orders received from IACCS.

  • Participation of IA troops in the realistic tactical and operation exercise/war gaming in TBA.

Trust in the Joint Process is the Real Need

A recurring theme in such arguments is the perceived trust deficit concerning timely decision making, execution of orders, responsiveness and communication latency. These concerns however, can be effectively mitigated, if IA acknowledge that ‘Unity of Command’ is a non-negotiable principle in the regulation of airspace especially in an environment where a diverse range of aerial platforms (manned-unmanned, slow-fast and hypersonic) operate simultaneously.

The land forces’ apprehensions regarding responsiveness are best addressed by Tactical Air Centers (TACs), Forward Area Controllers (FACs), and enhanced IA-IAF integration at lower echelons which need to be further institutionalised, not bypassed. Also the land forces coercing the concept of ‘persistent presence’ and ‘under command’ must be examined within the bounds of available technology, capability and survivability, which the Air Force is best equipped to manage for an effective integrated battle management.

Operation Sindoor: A Contextual Reality Check

Future warfare is increasingly shifting its centre of gravity towards the air, space and sub-surface domains where speed, precision, stealth and information dominance are decisive. As technology redefines the character of conflict, these domains offer strategic advantages far beyond the physical occupation of land or sea. Air and space provide unparalleled reach, surveillance and rapid strike capabilities while sub-surface operations ensure stealth, survivability and disruption of critical infrastructure.

In contrast, the traditional land and maritime domains are progressively being relegated to roles focused on holding ground and securing strategic chokepoints rather than initiating or shaping the battle. This statement is not an off-the-cuff remark but requires a serious, impartial, and futuristic professional brainstorm that rises above the arguments of structures, notions of victory, etc. The essence of future war lies in mastering the intangibles such as electromagnetic spectrum, cyber space, orbital dominance and deep sea superiority where control equates to deterrence, denial and domination.

Operation Sindoor, with clearly defined conflict termination criteria, has redefined this argument within the Indian context. The punitive impact delivered through the medium of air achieved in less than 30 minutes during each wave of targeting has reaffirmed that contemporary conflicts are increasingly being shaped in the vertical dimensions rather than solely on the ground.

While the primacy of land and maritime domains remains undisputed, it is time to acknowledge a significant shift. The traditional roles are reversing with air power now taking a decisive lead and surface forces assuming more supportive functions in shaping and concluding conflicts.

Before advocating for the Control of Air Littorals, it is important to recall the operational realities witnessed during Op Sindoor. The air operations were orchestrated in a manner that enabled tactical freedom of action for all types of weapon systems (manned, unmanned aircraft and surface weapons) based on real-time threat assessments and the required response. However, classical airspace management, wherein both aircraft and surface-based weapons operate with full freedom, remained limited.

The prevalence of mass unarmed drone saturation, often deployed as a nuisance and harassment wave, necessitated prioritising surface based weapon engagement in most scenarios. Fighter aircraft were thus employed primarily for offensive missions and maintaining air defence (AD) watch beyond the effective envelope of surface based weapons. This operational arrangement dictated by situational constraints cannot be misconstrued as a precedent for reshaping or rewriting an Air Littoral doctrine under the primacy of Indian Army.

Op Sindoor demonstrated the IAF’s operational acumen and responsiveness to an unprecedented situation. A robust joint AD and CUAS grid was rapidly put in place, utilising existing procedures and coordination arrangements to excellent effect.

The operation was conducted with de-novo operating procedures for the first time while dealing with such scenarios that already exist in the joint operating mechanism. It is just a matter of how best and timely it is orchestrated. The forward looking planning and careful planning facilitated unproblematic utilisation of available platforms, networks and procedures.

The success highlighted the power of jointness, agility and innovation within real-time battlefield scenarios. Notably, the operation also produced valuable lessons and the process of consolidating tactics, techniques and procedures continues to be an ongoing effort to improve future readiness.

In fact, it is to be internalised by the land forces that such smooth conduct of operations could take place only because of Unity of Command with the principle of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution through IACCS of IAF.

Conclusion

In contemporary and future warfare technology plays a pivotal role in shaping capabilities enabling new forms of engagement and offering enhanced situational awareness. However, the formulation of military doctrine must remain a product of strategic foresight, operational logic and historical military wisdom and not of reactionary impulses triggered by emerging technologies under the trap of ‘technological panic.’

The discourse advocating for the creation of new C2 structures redefining air domain boundaries ostensibly to accommodate unmanned systems and slow movers risks distorting the fundamental principles of joint warfare.

The proposal to give land forces command over the air littoral is an agenda based conceptual overreach based on foreign models, false doctrinal gaps and misapplied conflict lessons. Building narrative of Control of Air Littoral is operationally risky and counterproductive leading to mass fratricide scenario. Rather than questioning the IAF’s primacy in airspace management and gaining control of airspace by the IA, efforts must focus on the following:

• • Airspace remains centrally controlled for safety, deconfliction and tactical flexibility for achieving operational and strategic effects.

  • Land-Air synergy is achieved through joint training, empowered liaison and procedural reforms not structural domination.

  • Strengthening joint structures for air-ground integration.

  • Joint planning and execution of operational fires.

  • Avoiding doctrinal fragmentation in pursuit of temporary tactical convenience.

  • Operationalisation of Akashteer and enmeshing into IACCS without any more delays.

Army to devise and revise the ground tactics in view of emerging technological challenges in multi domain scenario.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Notes:

[1] Maximilian K Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco. “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (2021): 67-80, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3092, United States Army war College Press.       https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/ Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel “Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the US Air Force” War on the Rocks, 7 March 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-the-air-littoral-and-the-looming-irrelevance-of-the-u-s-air-force/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[3] “Control of Air Littoral by Land Forces: A Key Battle Imperative” An Indian narrative in circulation. Accessed on 31 July 2025.

[4] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[5] Airpower in Joint Operations: Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations (AFDP3.0) https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/AFDP3-0Operations.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[6] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[7] Ibid N2. Barno and Bensahel.

[8] Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 30, Number 2, Summer 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1018276.pdf. Accessed on 20 Aug 2025.

[9] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[10] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[11] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[12] Posen Barry. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” Summer 2003, Harvard                             Kennedy School – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/command-commons-military-foundation-us-hegemony. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[13] Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-03, Counterland Operations, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AFDP-COUNTERLAND.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[14] “India’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS): A NCW Milestone”, ANALYSIS, IndraStra Global, 5 October 2015. https://indrastra.medium.com/analysis-india-s-integrated-air-command-control-system-iaccs-a-ncw-milestone-e1f4fea09f2b. Accessed on 12 Aug 2025.

[15] Grant Georgulis. “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 25 July 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-airpower-amnesia/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[16] “Operation SINDOOR: The Rise of Aatmanirbhar Innovation in National Security: India’s growing technological self-reliance” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 14 May 2025.               https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128746#:~:text=Loitering%20munitions%20also%20known%20as,minutes%2C%20demonstrating%20India’s%20technological%20edge. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[17] “Operation SINDOOR: Forging One Force- The Synergy of India’s Armed Forces” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 18 May 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[18] Ibid N3. Control of Air Littoral……

[19] Abhishek Singh, “The Air-Surface Littoral: Tomorrows Kurukshetra (Battleground)” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 4 March 2025. https://cenjows.in/the-air-surface-littoral-tomorrows-kurukshetra-battleground/. Accessed on 09 Aug 2025.

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Keywords: Kargil Review Committee, Theatre Command, Indian Armed Forces, Jointness

‘Post-truth’ is an adjective defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. [1] The debates in India around jointness and theatre commands have largely followed the post-truth trajectory. They are more based on individual experiences, hearsay, personal beliefs and not rooted in facts.  This article is aimed at providing objective facts derived from government sources to help the readers form their informed opinions.

Myth 1 – The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) commented adversely on jointness during Operations in the Kargil War

If there is one document that is widely misquoted, that is the KRC Report. Despite the report being declassified, it was only available in print. This may have led people to use Google search, which delivered incorrect secondary sources. The actual terms of reference are reproduced below:

The mandate of KRC excluded the actual conduct of operations during the Kargil War, and the Committee stuck to its mandate. It did not examine events beyond May 26, 1999, when air power was employed.

Myth 2- KRC recommended the creation of integrated Theatre Commands

Countless authors have mentioned this. It is factually incorrect and does not appear in the KRC. The recommendations were for a National Defence Headquarters.

KRC recommended better civil-military integration and did not mention any integration of the three services.

Myth 3- There is a serious problem of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces

There has been no government-led high-level review of military operations since the 1962 Sino-India War. KRC also examined what led to the war, and not how it was fought. Only a thorough, in-depth enquiry into Indian military operations from the operational records by a suitable committee would reveal the prevalence/extent of the issue. In the absence of this, any arguments regarding the lack/abundance of jointness are either anecdotal or hearsay and devoid of factual evidence.

Myth 4- The Goldwater-Nichols Act led to the creation of Theatre Commands in the US

The Theatre Commands in the United States (US) were created in 1946 as a result of the implementation of the Unified Command Plan. [2] The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) was the first to be established as a unified command on January 01, 1947. [3] Therefore, any argument that the creation of theatre commands in the US as a direct outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is factually incorrect.

Myth 5- Creation of Theatre Commands automatically leads to jointness

A popular argument is that the creation of theatre commands automatically results in jointness. If the creation of theatre commands leads to jointness, then the US should not have experienced disasters in Vietnam, Operation Eagle Claw, etc. They would not have had any reason to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to resolve the issues in jointness, as the theatre commands were initially established in 1947. Therefore, this argument lacks empirical support.

Myth 6- In the US, the commands of all the armed forces are co-located. In India, 17 single-service commands of all three services are located in different areas, resulting in a lack of jointness.

This is another popular misconception. The table below shows the location of each Component Command Headquarters (HQ) in the US geographic Combatant Commands (Space Command is not shown).

The table clearly shows the dispersed locations, with some even spread across multiple continents. Therefore, this too is post-truth. However, in the past, during Operations, some component commanders were occasionally co-located at a forward headquarters, although not always.

Myth 7 – Most countries have Theatre Commands; therefore, India must too

During the post-World War II era, the world was divided into two camps. The popular choice was between the two. However, India declined both and adopted the Non-Alignment Movement. Thus, India has never fallen for following the crowd, even when it was weak and poor. Many countries have an obligation to align their doctrines and structures due to their commitment to fight as an alliance. India has no reason to follow this approach without careful consideration. It must do what suits best in the national interest.

Myth 8- China created Theatre Commands to bring in jointness in the Armed Forces

The primary aim of the Chinese military is to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). [5] The threat to CPC leadership also comes from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as it serves as an alternate power centre. Following the reforms in 2015, which involved the creation of theatre commands and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), among other measures, President Xi also carried out a reduction of 300,000 personnel in the Army. [6] Since the 1970s, the PLA has reduced the size of its forces by 4 million and altered the ratio of its forces. It has reduced the Army while increasing the Navy and Air Force. The Army now accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total armed forces. [7] These reforms are primarily meant to spread the distribution of power that was concentrated in the Army through the erstwhile Military Regions. [8] PLASSF’s growth as a centre of power is also presumed to be one of the reasons that led to Xi disbanding it in 2024. During the announcement of the new Information Support Force creation, Xi’s statement read, ‘ordered to resolutely obey the Party’s command, and make sure it stays absolutely loyal, pure and reliable’. [9]

Today, the primary go-to source for information is Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and videos on social media. LLMs curate data from the internet and produce results. Thus, if the data on the internet is incorrect, the results the LLMs generate are bound to be false as well. There is a renewed rigour in the debate on the creation of theatre commands in the country. As a result, there has been a surge in misleading articles and discussions. These invariably populate the database of LLMs and further reinforce false data.  Informed debates are essential for the healthy functioning of democracy. One of the most critical military reforms in India must be based on facts, not post-truths. The issue must be objectively debated beyond the military by civilians as well. This article aims to provide an authentic basis to the citizens for such discussions.

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Notes

[1]  “Word of the Year 2016,” Oxford Languages, 2016,https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

[2] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Government of the United States of America, “The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993. Report No. ADA313508,” 1995, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA313508.pdf. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[3]  Department of Defence, Government of the United States of America, “History of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,” https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/.  Accessed on October 05, 2025.

[4] United States Department of War, “Combatant Commands,” Combatant Commands | U.S. Department of War. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[5] Ministry of National Defence, The People’s Republic of China, “China’s Military Strategy,” 2015 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[6] “Full text: Xi’s speech at commemoration of 70th anniversary of war victory,” China Daily, September 3, 2015, < https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015victoryanniv/2015-09/03/content_21783362.htm>. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[7] Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China, “Graphics: China’s military reform in past 5 years,”                               August 01, 2020, https://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/ News_213114/TopStories/4869047.html. Accessed on October 07, 2025

[8] Ashish Singh, “The Two Forms of Reform,” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). October 6, 2018, 100-copy_The-Two-forms-of-Reform_06-10-2018.pdf. Accessed on October 5, 2025.

[9] “Xi presents flag to PLA’s information support force,” Qiushi, April 20, 2024, https://en.qstheory.cn/2024-04/20/c_981035.htm. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

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Keywords: VUCA world, Leadership, Modern Warfare, Air Power, OODA Loop, Deterrence

“True leadership lies in building systems that outlast uncertainty.”

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd)

Introduction

On October 08, 2025, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) turns 93 years young, it stands at a defining juncture in its institutional evolution and development into a modern, future-ready, and strategic air force with power projection capabilities across continents. The past nine decades have seen the Indian Air Force (IAF) grow from a fledgling force to a force to reckon with, the fourth-largest air force in the world, and a professional outfit capable of taking on the myriad challenges that come its way in the 21^st Century. From combat in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the jungles of Burma (World War II), from pioneering feats of courage and valour to save Srinagar to landing at the highest airfield in the world and from targeting bunkers in Kargil to carrying out stand-off precision attacks from own side of the International Boundary (IB) during Op-Sindoor, air power has always been the first responder, IAF an instrument of choice and a force capable of delivering decisive firepower when and where it counts.

The contemporary security environment is significantly different from what IAF has seen over the past nine decades and is characterised by increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). The VUCA environment presents its own unique set of challenges and opportunities for IAF and air power. India’s strategic environment is volatile, marked by uncertainty in the multi-polar world, complexity in modern warfare and ambiguity created by hybrid threats. While technology, information and doctrines matter, the ability to interpret, analyse, predict outcomes and take timely decisions largely depends on sound leadership; therefore, leadership will remain the decisive variable in this VUCA world. The paper aims to understand the intricacies of a VUCA world from an air power perspective and analyse leadership challenges that must be addressed for success in future wars.

Air Power in a VUCA World

Volatility classically refers to the speed and amount of change. Uncertainty denotes unpredictability of events and outcomes. Complexity implies a non-linear, interwoven geo-political landscape where events seemingly unrelated to one another create direct, indirect, or cascading effects on one another, and ambiguity highlights the decision dilemmas that are likely to arise due to prevailing uncertainty and opacity. As a technologically driven, decision-sensitive force, air power is largely affected by the interplay of the elements in a VUCA world. Technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) have significantly changed the way air power is being applied. Unmanned systems, such as drones, quadcopters, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), are altering the battlefield landscape, creating unique conditions not previously experienced. Hypersonic weapons and the use of space have exacerbated the quagmire and information has become weaponised to such an extent that narratives are deciding who the victor is and who is vanquished. In such an ambiguous and uncertain environment, it is not easy to arrive at decisions; therefore, there is a direct impact on the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, which is the cornerstone of air power application, posing unique challenges for leadership.

For India, the VUCA framework is a strategic reality, primarily due to a revisionist and uncertain China and an unpredictable Pakistan, which creates a significant amount of entropy. This high degree of disorder and randomness has been further compounded by America’s newfound love for Pakistan and apparent animosity with India. The Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflicts have shown the world that in today’s multipolar, intensely divided world, no one is willing to take a step back, resulting in highly destructive and long-drawn conflicts. On the other hand, Op-Sindoor has shown that conflicts could also be very short and intense, especially if one’s military and political objectives are clearly outlined. The conflict termination criteria are well articulated. The bottom line is that there is perpetual disruption. Amidst that disruption, air power must learn to retain its centrality and provide speed, precision and flexibility to mitigate volatility and uncertainty.

Yom Kippur Moments

On October 6, 1973, the Arab alliance of Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish holy day of atonement. The attack resulted in heavy casualties and equipment loss in both the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The surprise factor was very high as the Israelis did not expect anything to happen, especially on a holy day like Yom Kippur. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a coordinated attack on Israel on Shemini Atzeret, a Jewish holiday. Many Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers were on leave, and Israel was focused primarily on its Northern borders rather than the Gaza Strip. The assault began at around 0630 AM with a barrage of over 2200 rockets launched into Israel in just 20 minutes.[1] The barrage of rockets reportedly overwhelmed the Iron Dome system. As this was happening, at least 1,500 militants of Hamas infiltrated Israel at dozens of points using the land, sea and air mediums (para gliders). They caused a large number of Israeli casualties. About 1,200 people were killed in the assault, which included many civilians. [2] If one were to analyse the two attacks, a conclusion that can be drawn is that both attacks took place on a holiday, surprise was a key element, and it was a failure of intelligence. Most importantly, the Israelis were not prepared for it.

The VUCA world is similar. Amidst all the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, are we as a nation adequately prepared for a ‘Yom Kippur Moment’? Kargil, Pahalgam, Galwan, and Pulwama are some of India’s intelligence failures that have led to India’s Yom Kippur moments. Are we prepared for a multi-domain attack simultaneously targeting not only our military installations but also our critical civilian infrastructure? Are we ready for an unconventional attack using weapons and equipment that we have not thought of, like the use of paragliders by Hamas? Is our intelligence apparatus examining the right markers for such an event to unfold? When analysing intelligence data, are we correlating inputs in different domains, or are we still looking in silos? Do we have the wherewithal to response to surprise attacks on multiple fronts and in multiple domains? If the answer to any of these questions is no, then it is time to start introspecting. As a nation, we need to be prepared for our ‘Yom Kippur Moment’ without waiting for it to happen and then reacting.

Managing the VUCA World: Paradigm Shifts

Doctrinally, volatility requires a paradigm shift from conventional planning to adaptive and associative planning. Technology must be leveraged to simulate unpredictable scenarios and uncontrolled escalation, testing the agility of our Command and Control (C2) structures and readiness postures. Gone are the days of lethargic large-scale mobilisation of the armed forces and 30-day war packs. Volatility does not only mean disruption and interruption, but it is also a counter-strategy and must therefore become a part of our planning assumptions.

In a volatile world, uncertainty is inevitable; therefore, the way events unfold cannot be second-guessed when they start unfolding. To stay one step ahead, we must harness technology such as Generative AI and big data analysis to explore nuanced possibilities that can then be war-gamed. While using the full potential of Generative AI is still some years away, we must make a start now. Deterrence will suffer when events and outcomes are unpredictable. Yom Kippur Moments can be avoided by harnessing technology to bring credibility and intent to our deterrence capability.

Modern warfare is inherently complex, primarily due to its multi-domain nature. The land, sea, and air domains have now become interlinked with cyber and space domains; information has become a weapon and operations in one domain inevitably affect operations in other domains. We must learn to manage complexity through doctrines, realistic training, education, and integration of systems to create a system of systems that can undertake multi-domain operations.

Ambiguity affects information and perception, and it cannot be removed from modern conflict. Decision dilemmas arising from ambiguity will increasingly determine the outcome of a war. The side that has the fewest decision dilemmas will have the upper hand. A shorter OODA loop may not be the only solution, because in modern conflict, multiple OODA loops will interact with each other. There will be an overload of information, and the ability to sift through volumes of data to arrive at meaningful deductions will eventually become more important than a shorter OODA loop.

The bottom line is that there is a need to re-evaluate our doctrines, operating procedures, response mechanisms, intelligence apparatus and capability development plans, which would cater to warfighting in a VUCA world.

Leadership Challenges

Military leadership, primarily characterised by hierarchy, close control, and strict, enforceable discipline, faces an existential threat when confronted with a VUCA world. Attributes like tradition, centralised control and strict adherence to precedent can impede agility in an environment where change is constant. The essence of leadership in the future will lie in the ability to sense, decide and act faster than changes in the operational environment.

Outdated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), tactics and techniques will become serious hurdles. For example, switching off the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) during rejoin and within airfield control zones due to inadvertent activation of the Counter Measures Dispensing System (CMDS) may prove dangerous during a ‘No War, no Peace (NWNP)’ scenario, as the enemy may have weapons which can target their own aircraft at launch and during recovery for landing. It is essential to remember that India is constantly in an NWNP scenario. Similarly, just because a particular tactical action worked in an earlier situation does not mean it will work in the future as well. Smart enemies will not do what you expect them to., In a VUCA environment, the most essential task confronting leaders is to figure out what the enemy is likely to do and accordingly update SOPs, tactics, and techniques.

Technological volatility must be addressed by technologically fluent leadership. Leaders who cannot fully comprehend the capabilities of systems placed under their command risk irrelevance. Professional competence, continuous education and cross-domain exposure are essential for effective C2 in modern warfare.

Uncertainty, unlike volatility, stems from the unpredictability of events and outcomes and therefore poses a direct challenge to a leader’s confidence in available information and the reliability of established assumptions. Making sound decisions amid imperfect knowledge will hence become essential. The more variables there are, the greater the uncertainty, and given the nature of air operations, this will only increase with increased fog of war. Leaders must therefore learn to interpret evolving patterns rather than expect the normal to take place. Pre-set plans may not work in uncertain situations, and flexibility, adaptability, and the ability to think beyond one’s own domain will go a long way. This would require institutional changes, such as training in a VUCA environment, introducing uncertainty into routine activities, and creating entropy in seemingly mundane tasks. Disruptive training, which fosters cognitive flexibility and encourages out-of-the-box solutions, will help develop future leaders. Disruptive training is not training at odd hours; that is just a tiny part of it. Disruptive training is training by disrupting routine patterns and the usual way of doing things. For example, in combat scenarios, there may be a situation that allows landing only in tail winds. How many times do our trainees practice this? Answers to questions beginning with ‘What if?’ are essential to deal with combat planning and execution in a VUCA world. A leader must be able to picture multiple ‘What ifs?’ to create effective and doable plans. They must also be war-gamed to arrive at tangible and implementable courses of action. Adversaries of the future will try to outthink their opponents at every stage, making it a significant leadership challenge.

When faced with complexity, effective leadership must view modern military operations as interconnected occurrences rather than isolated missions. For example, when Blue Land launches its Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions, the entire Red Land would undertake Air Defence (AD) missions, and the pattern would reverse when Red Land launches its OCA forces. In reality, OCA and AD will co-occur in multiple domains and spread across the entire front. There is a need to revamp our training regimen to align with operations in a VUCA world. Leaders of tomorrow must change their mindset and reimagine training paradigms to make them more realistic and contemporary. Operations in an environment of denial are far more complicated than those undertaken when all systems are functioning properly. To be able to do that, leaders of tomorrow should have been trained in such environments. Capability development plans must address the challenges inherent to operating in such environments. For example, what if GPS is made unavailable in the next war? How are we going to undertake stand-off precision attacks? Do we have an alternative system? Are our aircraft and weapon systems equipped with alternative technology? Most Western surface-to-air weapon systems rely on a GPS fix to initialise. What happens if that GPS fix is not available? Another major issue facing us is the so-called peace-time attitude. Most personnel in service may not see combat throughout their careers. But, when it actually happens, our peace-time training needs to take over and aid in dealing with the arising uncertainties and complexities. While we would be expected to adopt war-time procedures, peacetime procedures would largely prevail because they would have become a habit and second nature. Our training during peace -time needs to be “train in peace as you fight in war,’ or as close to war fighting as possible and feasible, only then will they become second nature. By having two separate sets of procedures, we are adding to the already existing complexity of the situation. Examples of this situation include the carriage of personal arms during peace-time training missions, the use of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) during take-off and rejoin, night operations with minimal lighting, no radio telephony (R/T) missions, and simultaneous activation of ground defence and air defence measures at a base.  These are some institutional challenges that future leaders must address as soon as possible.

Ambiguity cannot be eliminated, but can definitely be out-thought and out-led. Multi-domain warfare, hybrid warfare, and information warfare are three types of warfare adding to the ambiguity quotient. In ambiguous environments, leaders are likely to face ethical dilemmas, decision paralysis, shifting rules of engagement and large-scale information distortion. The first casualty of ambiguity is effective communication. If a leader is unable to communicate effectively with their subordinates, orders may be misinterpreted, leading to total disarray. Training in an environment of denial, redundancy in communication and clarity of thought are a few tools modern leaders must develop to remain relevant in ambiguous situations.

Conclusion

As IAF approaches its centenary in 2032, leadership will determine whether it remains a reactive force or evolves into a proactive aerospace power. IAF@100 will demand leaders who can effectively navigate a VUCA world. Leadership is an institutional competency and not just a personal trait. The IAF must nurture younger generations in a VUCA environment, because sound and effective leadership will remain the IAF’s greatest weapon system, far more enduring than aircraft and way more resilient than technology. Leadership in a VUCA world is not about predicting the future, but rather about preparing for it. We must institutionalise adaptability through doctrine, training, education and culture. The future demands leaders who can handle volatility with alacrity, uncertainty with flexibility, complexity with equanimity and ambiguity with dexterity.

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Notes

[1] Encyclopaedia Britannica, “History and Society, Israel-Hamas War,”  October 04, 2025,  https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War. Accessed on October 04, 2025.

[2] Ibid. Accessed on October 05, 2025.

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Keywords: Theatre Commands, Force Reconfiguration, Warfighting, Joint War Fighting

Introduction

Operation Sindoor was the first significant armed conflict after the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in August 2019. Since the establishment of CDS, there has been a consistent focus on jointness and shedding of single-service interests. Thus, over time, it has become almost sacrilegious to speak of individual service interests. Jointness is now the accepted convention. While the actions of the Indian Air Force (IAF) during Op Sindoor resulted in spectacular outcomes, many of which were caught on camera, there have been no attempts by the IAF to boast about their achievements. Likewise, considering the damage observed on the Indian border villages inflicted by Pakistan, it would be safe to assume that the Indian Army’s response would have been far more devastating on Pakistan. Similarly, no attempts were made to showcase them either. The tri-service press briefs have been well-coordinated and included the actions of the Navy, which were out of public sight. Another key aspect is the visible synergistic action of the Ministries of External Affairs (MEA) and Defence (MoD). In 2019, the initial press brief, following the Balakot strikes, was delivered by the Foreign Secretary with no MoD representation. Whereas in Op Sindoor, both MEA and MoD representatives participated in all press briefings. Thus, this operation could be studied in future as a textbook case of synergy in national security.

The concept of ‘theaterisation’ has been popularised as a solution to a perceived lack of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces. Various authors have proposed several models. However, in the absence of theatre commands, what explains the synergy during Op Sindoor? I attempt an explanation.

The results for this synergy can be traced back to 1944, when the original seeds of jointness were planted in India. The Government of Sudan, recognising the valour and sacrifice of Indians in the Second World War in the defence of Sudan, gifted an amount of £ 1,00,000 for the construction of an Indian national war memorial. The Indian National War Memorial Committee of Council was constituted.

This committee, after a thorough debate, recommended the construction of a tri-services military academy as the most suitable form of a war memorial.

Following this decision, another subcommittee was formed to study and make recommendations for the Indian Military Academy. The Subcommittee thus recommended the creation of what is now known as the National Defence Academy (NDA) with the iconic Sudan Block as its central structure.

The Subcommittee included Vice-Chancellors from universities, the principal of a school, and members of all three services, including then-Wing Commander Subroto Mukerjee, who later became the Air Chief. They toured eleven military academies across the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Canada, studying in detail the training, syllabus, moral code of conduct, general orientation, and other aspects

Indian Armed Forces officers, fresh from the experience of the Second World War, understood the significance of integration. None of the countries across the world then had a joint military academy. Thus, their proposal for a joint academy was novel.

In terms of integration, considerable thought and discussion went into the design of the training. To date, NDA follows this model of common training for all three services in the first two years, followed by the introduction of service-specific training in the third year.

The training was also designed to foster a deeper appreciation of each other’s perspectives. All cadets were supposed to have sufficient exposure to aviation to make them ‘air-minded’. A lack of air-mindedness is often cited as the key cause by proponents of air power when issues of jointness are argued. Unfortunately, paragraph 148(d) is no longer part of the NDA training.  It is perhaps worth revisiting this recommendation from 1945. The formation of the National Defence Academy (NDA) laid the groundwork for jointness among the Indian Armed Forces (the first seed of jointness).

Admission into NDA was to be purely based on merit and devoid of any form of reservation, including that for the wards of ex-servicemen.

This gave rise to a new problem: How could independent India generate a pool of suitable candidates to meet the annual requirement of an intake of 700 officer cadets from across the country’s diverse locations and varying income statuses when the educational setup in India was inferior? This led to the creation of Feeder institutes. Thus, the second seed for jointness — the feeder institutes was planted. These institutes offer joint military training right from class six onwards. The students go on to occupy leadership positions across various fields beyond the military as well.

Returning to the key question of this article, what explains the synergy during Op Sindoor? The answer lies in the bonhomie between the service chiefs. Army and Navy chiefs are classmates from Sainik School Rewa, and the Air Chief and the Army Chief are course mates from NDA.[2] These are lifelong relationships with the equivalent of a family-level bond characterised by depth and strength. People go to great lengths for each other. Both feeder institutes (schools) and NDA are Indian investments in jointness, even before independence and were pathbreaking in the world at the time of their inception. To put it differently, India has been a pioneer of jointness in the world. Therefore, if any shortcomings in jointness are perceived, it would be prudent to examine the training, staffing and culture at NDA and similar institutes as the source. Deviations from the core founding principles of any institution are possible as it evolves over time.

Finally, Colin Gray wrote, “Joint, which is to say multi-service, doctrine should express a judicious melding of beliefs among culturally distinct institutions, but often it comprises more of a brute force stapling together of unlike elements than a coherent whole. So-called joint military plans and performance similarly can have the character of a shotgun marriage than of anything resembling harmony.”[3] Neglecting one’s own history and pursuing solutions from foreign models can lead to a stapled model of jointness or a ‘shotgun marriage’. It is worthwhile to revisit the history of jointness in India, in depth, to avoid such a situation.

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Notes

[1] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Feeder Schools for the National War Academy,” January 27, 1947, https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/ArchiveSecondPhase/DEFENCE/1947-JULY-DEC-MIN-OF-DEFENCE/PDF/DEF-1947-01-27_030.pdf . Accessed on September 24, 2025.

[2] “Two Coursemates, Two Classmates, Will Now Head Three Armed Force Services,” The Economic Times, September 21, 2024,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/two-coursemates-two-classmates-will-now-head-three-armed-force-services/articleshow/113552033.cms. Accessed on September 24, 2025.

[3] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 77.

The post Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor appeared first on CAPSS India.

Author: Ms Sanaa Alvira, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: Nuclear energy, Nuclear Energy Mission, Private sector

The post Roadmap to a Nuclear-Powered 2047 appeared first on CAPSS India.