Keywords: Strategic Coherence, OODA Loop, Op Sindoor, Higher Defence Organisation, Modern Warfighting

Introduction

Reforms in the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) of India have been an ongoing process for many years, yet nothing substantial has come its way. In 2019, after many years of procrastination, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was established, and a post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was sanctioned. The CDS was to serve as the single-point adviser to the Government of India (GoI) on all military matters. While revolutionary, these reforms have not quite reaped the benefits that should have accrued with such path-breaking changes. Both these steps are welcome measures and are in the right direction; however, India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) continues to run in independent silos without any significant cross-domain interaction. These reforms have not brought about any meaningful measures to enhance integration of the armed forces; civil-military relations have not quite improved, and jointness in war fighting has still not materialised. These inadequacies have arisen primarily due to ambiguity in the laid-down charter, leading to structural paralysis.

The Allocation of Business (AoB) Rules of MoD spell out the charter for both the Department of Defence (DoD), headed by the Defence Secretary and the DMA, headed by the CDS.  A closer look at the charter reveals several interesting observations. The first rule in the DoD charter is, “Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy and preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation.”[1] The DoD is responsible for the entire gamut of military operations, starting from mobilisation, to the conduct of operations, followed by demobilisation. The DoD is also responsible for all matters concerning defence policy, preparation for defence, Research and Development (R&D), and all capital procurement. The moot question that arises is, “Why was the DMA created when everything pertaining to India’s defence was to be handled by DoD?” The Allocation of Business Rules pertaining to DMA appears to be more like ‘Terms of Reference’ for a ‘Board of Officers’ rather than articulating responsibilities for the defence of the nation.[2]  One cannot help but think that the DMA was created in haste, without giving much thought to the actual charter and how the DMA (as part of MoD) should have been the department entrusted with the defence of India and all substantial matters pertaining to operations. Further scrutiny of the AoB rules also brings out the fact that the setting up of Theatre Commands, in quick time, appeared to be one of the main aims and mandates of DMA.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the problem statement, examine India’s defence priorities and recommend a possible HDO structure to plan and fight future wars.

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence: What is Wrong with the Way the Indian Armed Forces Fight?

There are many papers and scholarly articles on jointmanship, the need for integrated application of combat power, Multi-domain Operations (MDO), a ‘whole of nation’ approach towards national security and transformation of the Indian Armed Forces. Having gone through a substantial number of such writings, when dealing with the modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces (IAF), it was felt that Artificial Intelligence (AI) should also have a say to identify problem areas, bring out key criticisms of the Indian Armed Forces’ approach to combat and find out what was wrong with the way the Indian Armed Forces fought? Two independent questions were posed to AI chatbots, Grok and ChatGPT. The question presented to Grok was ‘Identify key criticisms of the Indian Armed Forces’ approach to combat’ and ChatGPT was asked ‘What is wrong with the way the Indian Armed Forces fight?’ The AI-generated responses (bulleted) have been collated below to provide additional inputs when arriving at the all-important ‘problem statement’.

Grok processed the inputs and brought out the following problem areas, drawing on expert assessment and historical analyses: –

(a)    Outdated and Rigid Doctrine Skewed Towards Large-Scale Conventional Offensives.

(i)       Emphasis on massive, autonomous ground formations for deep incursions and territorial gains to impose post-war leverage.

(ii)       Orthodox approach, ill-suited for modern wars.

(iii)      Calls for support by other arms if and when considered necessary.

(iv)     Unwieldy and large formations attempting high-speed manoeuvre warfare in obstacle-ridden terrain.

(v)      Tactics prioritising mass mobilisation and firepower over precision and agility, leaving the forces vulnerable.

(b)       Chronic Lack of Jointness and Inter-Service Coordination.

(i)      Services operating in silos due to historical rivalries and a lack of a unified command structure at the apex level.

(ii)     Disjointed responses highlighted during recent conflicts like Balakot operations, Galwan clash, Doklam imbroglio and Eastern Ladakh contingency.

(iii)   Lack of a common Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) grid encompassing both the HDO set-up as well as the fighting forces.

(iv)    Resort to static infantry heavy defences against drones, Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and hybrid threats.

(v)  Political micro-management and bureaucratic inertia risking irrelevance against agile forces.

(c)       Intelligence and Surveillance Failures.

(i)     Repeated lapses in human and electronic intelligence, allowing surprise incursions like Kargil and Galwan.

(ii)     Without adequate early warning and battlefield transparency, troops end up fighting reactively rather than adopting a pro-active strategy.

(d)   Equipment Shortages, Outdated Arsenal and Procurement Inefficiencies.

(i)    A bloated manpower focus starves modernisation, resulting in reduced ammunition stockpiles, obsolete equipment and platforms and chronic delays in induction of modern equipment.

(ii)     Forces compensate for quality by quantity, leading to high attrition tactics being adopted, which is unsuitable for modern conflicts. The Navy and Air Force severely lag in capability and technological upgrades.

(e)       Limited High-Intensity Combat Experience and Training Gaps.

(i)    No major wars since 1971, experience skewed towards Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

(ii)   Doctrinal Mismatch and emphasis on defensive holding over fluid manoeuvres.

(iii)  Fostering a ‘promotion over performance’ culture, making the organisation resistant to innovation.

ChatGPT looked at it from another angle by analysing how the Indian Armed Forces fought wars (operational art, doctrines and command structures) vis-à-vis how they were prepared to fight (institutional structures, procurement mechanisms and integration of the three services) to arrive at a candid assessment often echoed by military thinkers, veterans and strategic scholars: –

(a)       Fragmented Warfighting and Lack of Jointness.

(i)      Siloed planning and conduct of operations by the three services leading to fragmented warfighting.

(ii)      Joint targeting and ISR integration are severely lacking.

(b)       Doctrine-Technology Gap.

(i)    Reactive doctrines, especially for land warfare, leading to large-scale attrition.

(ii)    Limited infusion and exploitation of technology in the actual conduct of operations.

(iii)    Very little focus on enabling technology.

(c)       Centralised Decision Making and Lack of Flexibility.

(i)     Culture of close control by senior leadership resulting in a lack of latitude for junior commanders.

(ii)     Minimal decision-making at the junior leadership level affecting flexibility in the tactical environment.

(iii)     Both  close control and lack of latitude to junior leadership resulting in slower tempo, reduced initiative, and difficulty in adapting to fluid battlefield dynamics, especially in hybrid or grey-zone scenarios.

(d)       Overemphasis on Manpower, Underemphasis on Capability.

(i)     Land Power-centric mindset rendering naval and air assets as support providers rather than independent sources of firepower.

(ii)    Neglect of air and naval modernisation is crucial for strategic deterrence and power projection.

(e)       Bureaucratic and Procurement Bottlenecks.

(i)        Civil-Military divide in MoD, with service headquarters having limited autonomy in procurement and planning.

(ii)        Delayed modernisation and capability enhancement.

(iii)       Lack of accountability of the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) leading to lethargic indigenisation, delayed R&D, deferred manufacturing and wastage of precious funds.

(f)        Weak Integration of Strategy, Policy and Operations.

(i)     No clarity on ‘Theory of Victory’. No articulation of how military means achieve political ends. This leads to wars being fought for limited tactical gains without strategic clarity.

(ii)    Civil-Military disconnect wherein political leadership does not involve military leadership for advice on integrated national security frameworks combining diplomacy, economy and defence.

(g)       Training and Simulation Deficits.

(i)        Limited realism in training with more emphasis on drills rather than realistic combat simulation and joint exercises in multi-domain warfare environments.

(ii)      Very few large-scale tri-services war games simulating high-intensity combat against a peer adversary in a multi-domain setting.

(h)       Adaptation to the Changing Character of War.

(i)     Slow in the information domain: China’s concept of intelligentised warfare, combining AI, cyber, EW, and space, has no equivalent Indian concept.

(ii)     India’s response to low-intensity conflicts is reactive rather than pro-active or pre-emptive.

(iii)  Severe shortage of ‘informatisation’ within the armed forces, especially the Army, affecting flexibility at the tactical level.

(iv)     Lack of technological expertise for hybrid and grey zone situations.

(j)         Limited Learning Culture.

(i)      Indian armed forces have a weak after-action analysis ethos. There is a lack of an open culture of institutional introspection and bringing out doctrinal lessons.

(ii)     Western militaries conduct extensive after-action reviews and bring out strategic, operational and tactical lessons. The Indian system tends to keep failures under wraps by giving high security classifications, thereby preventing effective scrutiny and analysis.

ChatGPT further added that the ‘Indian armed forces do not fight badly, they fight bravely, but neither jointly, efficiently or strategically. Their character of fighting is professional but their system of fighting is structurally inefficient. The challenge therefore is not courage or competence; it is integration and innovation with strategic clarity.’

Key Takeaways

Artificial Intelligence has provided certain inputs that resonate with inputs from scholarly articles, newspaper reports and academic discourse in various seminars and for national defence. Certain significant issues and associated inferences from them are being collated below for ease of comprehension: –

(a)     Outdated and rigid doctrines skewed towards large-scale conventional action.

(i)       Strategy prioritising mass mobilisation and conventional war fighting.

(ii)        More stress on individual service capability and less on integration.

(iii)       Infantry heavy defences are ineffective against drones, PGMs and swarms.

(iv)       Fragmented war fighting.

(b)        Chronic lack of integration and operations in silos.

(i)         Inter-service rivalries.

(ii)        Lack of unified command and control structures.

(c)      Repeated failures of intelligence and surveillance, creating large gaps in battlefield awareness.

(d)     High attrition tactics focusing on mass rather than a healthy mix of technology and mass.

(e)   Limited combat experience in modern conventional operations. Significant focus on Counter Insurgency (CI) and Counter Terrorism (CT) operations.

(f)       Equipment shortages, outdated arsenal and procurement inefficiencies.

(g)    Weak integration of strategy, policy and operations with a focus on limited tactical gains without strategic coherence.

(i)        Very high bureaucratic inertia.

(ii)       A missing whole-of-nation approach to war fighting.

(h)   Reactive strategy primarily responding to situations rather than preempting/anticipating developments due to limited battlefield transparency and situational awareness.

(j)        Over-emphasis on manpower and under-emphasis on capability.

(k)       More stress on ownership of assets and less stress on collective war-fighting capability.

(l)        Doctrine-technology gap. The vision exists, but capability development lags far behind.

(m)     Lack of common communication protocols further promoting operations in silos.

(n)       Limited learning culture with very little after-action review.

The points listed above are just a few pointers and by no means exhaustive; however, they do bring out certain inadequacies and deficiencies that need to be addressed. These issues, though deliberated in various defence forums, do not gain the necessary traction at the apex level and thus remain unaddressed. Capability development plans lack the required budgetary support, and in India’s quest for self-reliance, many times, existing capability gaps go unnoticed and ignored.

Continental and Maritime Powers

Before discussing the problem statement, it would be interesting to understand where the dominant threat to India would emerge from. Between the end of the Civil War in the USA and the Spanish-American War of 1898, the American economy quietly chugged along with high annual growth rates.[4] Consequently, as America traded more with the outside world, it developed, for the first time, complex economic and strategic interests in far-flung places that led to, among military actions, Navy and Marine landings in South America and the Pacific.[iv] Another factor that allowed America to focus outwards was its consolidation and stabilisation of internal issues. As a result, the USA embarked on the development of a large Navy along with a Marine Force to project power far away from its shores. Over the next century, the USA became a dominant maritime power, able to traverse the world’s oceans and dominate from the seas. An interesting supposition is that the continental USA faced no external threats for over two centuries, allowing the USA to develop its Navy and exercise military might all across the world. Post World War II and during the Cold War, Russia emerged as a threat to American hegemony and also posed an existential threat to the continental USA through long-range bombers and ballistic missiles. After the disintegration of the USSR, the USA again became the sole super-power and continued its forays across the world, especially in West Asia and Western Pacific regions, including the South China Sea. The US Navy became stronger with the advent of supercarriers and nuclear submarines. American strategic interests continue to lie far from its own shores, physically isolating the country from any threat, Black Swan events like 9/11 being more of an exception rather than a norm. Therefore, it would be appropriate to tag the USA as a dominant maritime power with global aspirations.

China, on the other hand, has primarily been a Continental Power with regional aspirations. Having consolidated its land borders (barring a few), it has now begun to focus outwards. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest standing Army in the world, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) are still slowly expanding their strength and capability. Having dominated the region on land, what drives China beyond its official borders is its core national interest, economic survival and growth.[5] China has also begun expanding its presence across the world in search of oil, minerals and proximity to Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) to safeguard its energy needs. China is also blessed with an extensive coastline and is the largest littoral nation on the Western Pacific Coast. The East and South China Seas are China’s backyard and the USA’s playground. Herein lies the contest where we can see Chinese land power pitted against American sea power, with Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula as the main focal points.[6] Therefore, we see Chinese strategies such as Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) being played out to safeguard continental China and also prevent incursions by the USA into the First Island Chain. For decades, China was preoccupied with land, where America, particularly since its misadventure in Vietnam, has no appetite to go. America, even today, has no such appetite in Asia, especially after its ordeals in Iraq and Afghanistan.[7] China is in the early stages of transforming from a predominantly continental power to an aspiring maritime power, and that is the biggest change occurring in the Asia-Pacific region.

From the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the USA is a dominant Maritime Power with global aspirations, and China remains a dominant Continental Power with maritime ambitions. Where does that leave India? Is India a continental power or a maritime power? Such questions are better answered after seeing how geography plays a significant role in determining India’s priorities.

The Stopping Power of Water and India’s Options

John J. Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, speaks of the stopping power of water and how it serves as an effective barrier. He further adds that, “When great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that pose significant power projection problems for attacking armies. For example, the stopping power of water helps to explain why the United States has never been invaded by another great power. It also explains why the USA has never tried to conquer territory in Europe or North East Asia. Great powers located on the same land mass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.”[8] One may say that the Britishers and other colonial forces came from the seas and occupied India; true as it is, the fact that India in those times was not united but rather fragmented under various rulers and kingdoms, making it vulnerable to external influence and subjugation. Today’s India is a far cry from that, unified and centrally controlled.

What emerges is an interesting fact that Indian policymakers may wish to dwell on further. The geography of India is such that the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal give India the inherent safety provided by the stopping power of water and also give valuable access to some of the most important SLOCs in the world. The seas and oceans not only provide dividends and bounty but also protect the Indian subcontinent from external aggression. However, juxtaposing what Mearsheimer said, the larger threat emerges from the continental borders to India’s west and north. Traditionally, India has been a continental power and has developed capabilities and capacities to safeguard itself against land-based external aggression. Therefore, the predominant threat to India continues to be from Pakistan and China in the continental battlespace. China’s growing naval power is primarily aimed at countering the USA in the South China Sea and at safeguarding its maritime trade and energy supplies. Similarly, while it needs to maintain strong and capable forces to thwart threats emanating from the land borders, it must also develop a credible naval capability to be able to project military power from the maritime domain to affect the battle on land significantly. As an adjunct to this theory, India must develop both the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands to serve as credible military outposts and first lines of defence against any threat emanating from the maritime domain. However, it is important to note that the main threat to Indian sovereignty will continue to be from the continental domain, and the armed forces of India need to be prepared, equipped and trained for fighting in this domain as a primary front. Growth and capability enhancement of the Navy must continue, but definitely not at the cost of the land and air forces.

The Problem Statement

There are multiple issues that need to be addressed when it comes to the Indian Armed Forces and their fighting methods. Op Sindoor has provided India with an opportunity to introspect and arrive at tangible solutions. There is a lot of banter going on about how many aircraft India shot down and how many Pakistan shot down. Modern warfare is not just about targeting individual aircraft, tanks and ships; it is about crippling the war machinery of the adversary, which in today’s parlance amounts to targeting and destroying C2 nodes and communication centres to achieve information and decision dominance. One must be able to affect the adversary’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop to gain the upper hand. Unlike yesteryears, in a highly connected and networked battlespace, decision-making takes place further and further away from the actual battle. The inherent safety that distance from the battlefield provided earlier is no longer available today. Modern weapons permit precision targeting from large distances, and leadership can be threatened from the word go. The aim is to destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight. It is the ability to cripple the enemy’s war-waging potential that will prove to be decisive, and aircraft, tanks and ships are the means to get to the ends, not an end by themselves. Without going into the bean count, suffices to say, Pakistan was forced to stop kinetic action in just four days because India managed to target important communication nodes and affect their C2 capability. Additionally, targeting runways like Sargodha and Chaklala and destroying early warning radars sent a clear message to the Pakistan leadership of possible repercussions, directly affecting their will to fight. Some key takeaways from Op Sindoor are as follows: –

(a)        A whole-of-nation approach to war fighting is essential. The entire weight of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) must be brought to bear on an adversary for decisive victory.

(b)         Centralised planning, distributed control and decentralised execution.

(c)          Need for a joint planning establishment at the apex level.

(d)            Need for integrated application of combat power, without worrying about ownership of assets.

(e)      Importance of networking air defence assets for ensuring a comprehensive and coherent response.

(f)         Future wars may not necessarily be long drawn out like what is being seen between Russia and Ukraine. They could also be very short, swift and intense, giving very little time for conventional response mechanisms to activate. Wars could be over well before the completion of mobilisation by conventional land forces.

(g)        Primary threat to Indian sovereignty will continue to be continental, and therefore India needs to be prepared for the same.

(h)       Air Power as an instrument of choice proved to be decisive. India cannot afford to let its air power capability diminish. While indigenous programmes need impetus and support, the war-waging capability of the country cannot be held to ransom for want of indigenous products. It is not about acquiring 42 squadrons or three aircraft carriers. It is about retaining an edge over India’s adversaries because, as of now, with respect to Pakistan, that gap is rapidly reducing.

(j)      Modern technologies like AI, drones, Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS), and smart Air Defence philosophy need to be invested in to retain effectiveness.

(k)      Modern combat is all about systems and ‘system of systems’. Networking and ‘informatisation’ are key enablers and must become a priority for all planners. Akashteer of the Army, Trigun of the Navy and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) of the Air Force need to have a handshake at appropriate levels to ensure decision dominance.

(l)         Importance of operational logistics, robust and secure supply chains cannot be over-emphasised.

(m)       Hybrid wars and multi-domain operations (MDO) are the way forward, and capability development plans must factor these requirements.

(n)    Large unwieldy force structures need to be replaced with agile, networked and adaptive force structures. There is a need to remove silos and create structures more suitable for fighting in multiple domains.

(o)      Information warfare and the battle of narratives are as important as kinetic action and must be embedded as part of the overall strategy.

(p)      One must develop technology and weapons to target an adversary’s critical infrastructure while simultaneously ensuring the protection of one’s own critical infrastructure.

(q)     The adversary will not always respond in the way it has previously done. There will never be any precedence to template own plans. This calls for agile forces, effective ISR, swift decision making and most importantly, a changed mindset.

(r)       The importance of long-range, precision stand-off weapons cannot be ignored. The ability to hit the enemy well inside his territory with precision can win wars.

(s)        While the West may have done away with concepts like Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Centre of Gravity (CoG) targeting, in the Indian context, their relevance will always remain.

(t)        To be able to deliver decisive firepower in a short time is the rasion-de-etre of contemporary forces. See first and see the farthest; reach first and reach the fastest; hit first and hit the hardest will continue to be the ‘mantra’ of success.

Op Sindoor showed that the Indian Armed Forces have the capability to demonstrate tactical brilliance and arrive at strategic coherence. This was not the case in previous wars and conflicts, where tactical brilliance often outshone strategic coherence. For once, India demonstrated a whole-of-nation approach to war fighting, and it worked! Silos were forgotten, planning was undertaken jointly, and the three Service Chiefs were given a clear mandate with adequate freedom to prosecute the war. Clarity in the political aim and a well-articulated Conflict Termination Criteria (CTC) made things easier for the armed forces. In a nutshell, the problem is not joint fighting; it is joint planning. If joint planning is done meticulously, the Indian armed forces have the capability and wherewithal to prosecute modern wars.

Another problem that emerges is the ‘informatisation’ of the armed forces. In modern wars, adequate ‘informatisation’ at the tactical and operational level is a pre-requisite. The air and ground situation in modern wars is very fluid, and there will be situations when tactical and operational commanders will have to undertake time-sensitive targeting to gain immediate advantage and waiting for a decision from higher headquarters may be too late. Therefore, there is a need to create specialised, agile, adaptive and all-arms forces to deliver when and where it counts. The Indian borders continue to be hostile and hot. Post Op Sindoor, India has drawn its red lines, which, if crossed or transgressed, would lead to punitive action by India. Therefore, India does not have the luxury of going through the long-drawn process of force restructuring while still retaining the capability to respond to threats and win wars. In such a situation, force reconfiguration becomes a viable option.[9]

The problem statement, therefore, needs to take into account the need for joint planning at the apex level, a whole-of-nation approach to war fighting, force reconfiguration rather than restructuring and most importantly, integrated application of combat power.[10] Interestingly, none of these issues classically requires the setting up of Theatre Commands.

Having examined inputs from AI, considering the nuances of geography and blending them with political constraints and looking at the likely threats to Indian sovereignty, a suggested problem statement is as follows. “In the future, the Indian Armed Forces will be faced with high-intensity, hybrid and multi-domain threats in the region. There is a need to operationalise an Indian Concept of War Fighting, which fuses sound doctrine with dynamic leadership, joint planning with decentralised execution, modern technology with capability-driven acquisition programmes, mission-specific operational logistics with robust and redundant supply chains and adaptive C2 with a changed mindset to prosecute and win future wars.”

Recommended Structures at the Apex Level

Success in combat largely depends on sound leadership, adaptive decision-making and effective C2. In the Indian context, most problems have emanated not at the tactical or operational level but at the apex level. As Clausewitz famously said, war is a continuation of politics by other means; therefore, in order to align military strategy with national objectives, the armed forces must be part of the national decision-making process. Strategic guidance cannot be over-emphasised, and therefore, there is a need for the creation of joint apex structures in India’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) to bring about tactical and operational coherence. For force reconfiguration, it would be prudent to have a ‘top-down’ approach rather than a ‘bottom-up’ approach. India’s service-specific planning structures are a relic of the industrial age. In the information age, unity of effort, speed and interoperability will determine success or failure.

At the apex level, under the MoD, a new vertical, the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ), is needed for joint planning. For a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to warfighting, all essential functionaries of relevant ministries and organisations must have representatives in the JFHQ. To ensure the JFHQ is sufficiently armed, it is proposed that representatives from various ministries and organisations be at the level of Additional Secretaries (AS), with essential staff placed under them. It is important to create a fresh mandate for DoD, DMA and the proposed JFHQ, clearly allocating responsibilities, roles and tasks without ambiguity. While the DoD would continue to operate under the Defence Minister, the DMA and the JFHQ are recommended to be placed under the COSC to have coherence between RTS functions and war fighting.

Figure 1.

For a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach, there is a need for the CDS and three Service Chiefs to be a permanent part of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and not on an invitational basis. The CDS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) must continue to remain the single point of advice on defence matters to the Defence Minister. For Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to be exercised, representatives from all elements must form a part of CCS.

Figure 2.

 It is recommended that the COSC have two verticals placed under it. The first would be the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), recommended to be headed by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff and Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC). It is recommended that the present system of dual-hatting by the CDS as Chairman COSC and Secretary DMA be discontinued to ensure equivalence in protocol with other Secretaries in various ministries. Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) would continue to be placed under the CISC. The current role of IDS includes managing policy, doctrine and procurement, facilitating joint training with special focus on modernising defence by integrating emerging technologies which would further be divided into three verticals, namely Raise. Train and Sustain (RTS). As Secretary to COSC, the CISC would have the essential know-how on all operational plans and contingencies, based on which tri-service functions of RTS would be undertaken.

The other vertical under COSC is proposed to be the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) for apex-level planning of operations. The existing dichotomy of responsibility for war fighting must be addressed on priority. The DoD’s mandate for warfighting must be withdrawn and handed over to the COSC and the JFHQ. [11] The JFHQ must have representatives from all elements concerned with military operations, including those from relevant ministries and organisations involved in national security. It would be prudent to have representation from the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) as part of the JFHQ for the conduct of hybrid and multi-domain operations.

Figure 3.

The Indian Army has seven regional Commands; the Navy has three, and the Air Force has seven. A total of 17 Commands, spread across the entire country, handle various contingencies and safeguard the territorial integrity of India. Joint planning organisations will need to be created not only at the apex level but also at the level of Command HQs. For effective C2, it is proposed that India be divided into two threat zones/fronts, i.e., Western Front (threat from Pakistan) and Northern Front (threat from China) and be named Joint Forces Command (West) and Joint Forces Command (North), respectively. It is also proposed that for retaining unity of command, a Regional JFHQ be created in each of the two threat zones [JFHQ(W) and JFHQ(N)], headed by a three-star officer. Below the Regional JFHQs, two options are possible: either merge all relevant regional commands or let the regional commands remain. The main aim is to synergise operations at the combatant command level to ensure strategic and operational coherence.

Figure 4.

In both the regional JFHQs, there is a need for representation from all elements involved in MDO, including the cyber and space domains. The focus of the regional JFHQ would primarily be warfighting. The process of modernisation of the armed forces is a slow and long-drawn process, and it may not be practically possible to make all elements of the armed forces fully ‘intelligentised and informatised’. Therefore, it is essential to create specialised battle groups which are fully modernised and trained for MDO. The Indian Army has been in the process of creating Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) for some time now. Rather than a service-specific battle group, it is recommended to create Joint Task Forces (JTFs) on the lines of the IBGs, consisting of all arms and services, to ensure effective application of combat power. The JTFs created could be specialised battle groups equipped and trained for specific tasks and roles. They could be either terrain-specific or role-specific. But it is essential that they are highly ‘informatised’ and consist of all three services (wherever applicable). The main task of JTFs would be to synergistically undertake multi-domain operations in an ‘intelligentised and informatised’ environment and act as force multipliers, augmenting the rest of the conventional forces.

The Training Commands of the three services [Army Training Command (ARTRAC) of the Army, Southern Naval Command (SNC) of the Navy and Training Command (TC) of the IAF] are recommended to be placed under HQ IDS as part of the RTS effort and ensure joint training for the armed forces, optimising resources and training effort. The role of the Maintenance Command of the IAF could be merged with the role of the Air Officer-in-charge Maintenance (AOM) branch at the level of the Air HQ, with parallel representation at the regional JFHQs.

Parting Shots

The Indian Armed Forces have demonstrated brilliant tactical acumen in every war India has fought since independence. As first responders, the armed forces of India have also distinguished themselves during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations within India and around the world. Their professional acumen, patriotism, perseverance and courage are, without doubt, of a very high order, and the armed forces are looked up to by all Indians.  However, tactical and operational brilliance must be backed up by strategic coherence, and this is where gaping voids have emerged. From Kargil to Galwan and from Uri to Balakot, there have been instances of intelligence failures, a lack of understanding of operational philosophies of other services, and inter-service turf wars that have affected the conduct of operations. This paper has adopted a blended approach by amalgamating various scholarly articles with AI inputs to arrive at a problem statement to address key issues that impact the effective employment of the armed forces.

The geo-political situation in India is quite different from what we can see across the world, and therefore, lessons from current conflicts cannot be directly implemented in the Indian context. Force reconfiguration or restructuring cannot be templated from other countries, nor can reforms be directly replicated. Concepts and ideas from across the world must be studied in detail, but what is essential is that India develops a nuanced, well-thought-out Indian Concept of War Fighting. The absence of a suitable joint planning mechanism at the apex level has emerged as a major lacuna in the Indian context and must be addressed as a priority. Op Sindoor has given a glimpse of what India is capable of when an optimal process for the employment of CNP is undertaken. Clarity of political objective, well laid down rules of engagement, operational freedom and clear conflict termination criteria make employment of the armed forces more coherent and in-sync with the political aim. The starting point for this to happen is the setting up of an apex joint planning organisation comprising all elements of CNP. Other issues like service-specific silos, procurement inadequacies, civil-military divide, lack of clear political directions and most importantly, integrated application of combat power will all fall into place.

Another major issue identified in this paper is the limited learning culture prevailing in India. India must develop an open culture of institutional introspection by conducting extensive after-action reviews. These reviews must be conveyed to all concerned to ensure mistakes made earlier are not repeated, and gaps/voids are suitably plugged. There is a great deal of talk about reducing the strength of the armed forces, primarily focused on being able to cut down on the revenue budget. In the Indian context, it must be understood that mass has its own inherent advantages. Against both Pakistan and China, mass has a very important role to play, and the same needs to be respected. Even in the Russia-Ukraine war, along with modern technology, mass has played a crucial role. While technology offers tremendous advantages, it cannot completely replace mass, and attempts to do so may jeopardise both offensive as well as defensive capabilities. India must endeavour to balance quality with quantity to arrive at optimal force structures without compromising either.

The way India’s Armed Forces fight is a product of history, institutional customs and traditions, and a strategic culture deeply rooted in India’s colonial past. There is a need to take a leaf out of our pre-colonial past to revive India’s original strategic culture and thinking. India has always prioritised territorial defence over developing an ability to project power, which has resulted in outdated structures, organisations and doctrines. India needs to shed these inadequacies and transition from attrition warfare to warfare that is agile, multi-domain, adaptive and most importantly, joint, so that military potential can be converted into decisive strategic outcomes.

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Notes:

[1] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Allocation of Business Rules,” https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DODall141220.pdf.  Accessed on November 12, 2025.

(2) Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Allocation of Business Rules,” https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DMAall141220.pdf. Accessed on November 12, 2025.

[3] Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (Gurugram: 2013 Random House Publication), pp. 198-199.

[4] Ibid., p. 198.

[5] Ibid., p. 199.

[6] Ibid., pp. 213-214.

[7] Ibid., p. 214.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 2003, Norton Paperback), p 44.

[9] V P Naik, “Air Power Musings: Theatre Commands- To be or not to be?,” Defence and Diplomacy Journal, Vol 14, No. 2, 2025 (January to March), pp. 77-86, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/7-VP-Naik.pdf. Accessed on November 13, 2025.

[10] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[11] Ministry of Defence, n. 1.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

The post India’s Higher Defence Reforms: Tactical Brilliance or Strategic Coherence appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act

Introduction

The first part of this discussion looked at why jointness matters — the habits and mindsets that must precede structure. This part turns to how those ideas might evolve in practice. Having observed the Air Force’s journey from both maritime and joint vantage points, I find its caution doctrinally sound — not defensive, but disciplined. What appears to some as resistance is, in fact, professional logic: the instinct to preserve flexibility, unity, and clarity of command as one enters significant efforts at integration. Understanding why the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does is essential before judging what must change — and how the Service can, in fact, lead the process.

The Air Force Perspective

The IAF’s position is rooted in doctrine, not defensiveness. Indeed, air power is, by design, a single, flexible national instrument. Aircraft and sensors can shift across fronts within hours, concentrating effect where it matters most. Dividing those assets among multiple theatre commanders could fragment effort and dilute unity. Command of the air, therefore, must remain a national responsibility.

Such caution reflects professional discipline. Air power thrives on agility, but agility depends on coherence. As Brigadier General J. D. Hittle observed in The Military Staff: Its History and Development, the true strength of command lies in firm direction from the top combined with initiative at every level.[1] Centralised planning and decentralised execution remain the bedrock of effective operations.

Recent Air Chiefs have consistently urged that doctrine, networks, and training must come before structure.[2] That sequence is sound. It reminds policymakers that integration should enhance agility, not erase it. From my own experience in joint planning environments, this emphasis on sequencing is professional caution rooted in operational realism.

Historical Models of Balance

History offers lessons in how strong commanders and strong staffs can rationalise the contradictions that are the military.

South East Asia Command (SEAC): Admiral Lord Mountbatten relied on his Chiefs of Staff — Brigadier Francis Festing and later Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning — to knit together Army, Navy, and Air operations across a vast, under-resourced theatre. As Arthur J. Marder notes in Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–1945, even Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s clashes with Admiral Sir James Somerville showed that shared Service identity cannot replace structured oversight.[3]

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF): In Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder turned coordination into unity. Drawing on lessons from the Middle East, Tedder urged a unified air command and direct access for ground commanders to call air support.[4] It was this blend of central planning and frontline flexibility that made SHAEF an exemplar of joint command.

Patton and Weyland: The partnership between General George Patton’s Third Army and Brigadier General Otto Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command demonstrated real jointness. Their staff shared maps, radios, and urgency. As David N. Spires notes in Air Power for Patton’s Army, their effectiveness came from shared education, mutual trust, and a clear divide between central planning and decentralised execution.[5]

Montgomery and de Guingand: General Bernard Montgomery’s close partnership with his Chief of Staff, Major General Francis de Guingand, showed how command and dissent can coexist productively. De Guingand tested assumptions, filtered information, and ensured that plans aligned with the commander’s intent — precisely the role envisaged by Scharnhorst and Moltke, two military geniuses who offer many lessons two centuries later.[6]

From these cases flows a consistent truth: empowered staff strengthen, rather than weaken, command.

The Modern Staff Logic

As Charles Edward White notes in The Enlightened Soldier, Scharnhorst conceived of the General Staff as “a system of brains” — a collective intellect designed to ensure that strategy was tested by logic rather than driven by personality. Scharnhorst created the General Staff as a professional counterweight to command officers trained to test plans, challenge assumptions, and ensure that decisions followed logic, not impulse.[7] Moltke refined this idea: staff officers were to think, not just assist, and to exercise independent responsibility within the commander’s intent.[8] This institutionalised professional dissent makes it a form of discipline rather than disobedience.

Institutional Balance through Staff Design

For the Indian Air Force — operating alongside an Army of far greater size and presence — balance must come from institutional design, not numerical equivalence. Mass cannot be matched, but structure can offset scale. The Prussian reformers Scharnhorst and Moltke demonstrated that intellect could compensate for numbers: a “system of brains” where analysis, critique, and command coexisted in productive tension.

India can adapt that principle through a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) supported by an empowered Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS–VCDS axis could serve as an institutional counterweight — one focused on direction, the other on disciplined dissent — ensuring that strategy benefits from dialogue, not deference. For the IAF, this balance may be necessary to preserve its culture of procedural precision and doctrinal clarity within a joint framework that values questioning as much as compliance.

The Commonwealth Legacy and Its Limits

The Indian military did not inherit the Prussian model; it inherited the British one — efficient, orderly, but wary of internal debate. In Britain (and in colonial India), aristocrats and senior officers long commanded not just with strategy but with rank and class, treating staff as advisers rather than partners.

At Waterloo, Prussian liaison to the headquarters of Wellington General von Müffling urged two British commanders to seize a fleeting opportunity against Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. Both agreed, but refused to act without written orders, fearing court-martial if they did. Wellington later confirmed that such an initiative would indeed have been punished. It was a system built on control, not trust.[9]

That instinct would carry into the Royal Air Force (RAF) through its Army lineages, and from there to the Indian Air Force. The RAF headquarters were organised by functional branches — operations, plans, maintenance, and administration — without a system of an empowered Chief of Staff. The design delivered efficiency but discouraged institutional challenge. The IAF inherited this form almost intact: precise, methodical, and professional, yet inclined toward compliance rather than contest.

Managing Large Air Formations vs All-Domain Forces

The IAF’s centralised command model is highly effective within the air domain. Large formations drawn from different bases can be tasked as a single instrument, with tight vertical control ensuring precision and responsiveness. From personal experience, such centralisation works superbly in air operations, where speed and concentration are decisive.

But managing an all-domain force is a different challenge. Air operations shift in hours; land and maritime campaigns unfold over days; cyber and space effects operate on entirely different temporal scales. A Commander responsible for land, sea, air, cyber, and space must orchestrate effects, not simply allocate sorties. That requires a lateral staff structure where domain specialists plan together, share data, and challenge each other’s assumptions in real time.

Air component planning thrives on centralisation; joint command thrives on collaboration. The task before the IAF is not to abandon its precision but to extend it — to translate air-power discipline into a joint habit of dialogue and co-design. Only when staff from every Service can think, argue, and decide together will India’s theatre commands move from intent to effect.

From Coordination to Command

The relationship between command and staff is, as noted earlier, not just structural but also symbolic. Rank conveys authority, but how command interacts with staff reveals the maturity of that authority. Before the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee reforms, hierarchy made this distinction clear: the staff advised, command decided. After rank parity blurred those lines, the Army has notionally reintroduced clarity through distinct command and staff streams — reaffirming that direction, not designation, defines authority.

As India now attempts to design integrated commands, this semiotic balance becomes critical. Theatre commands will require staff who can question without overstepping, and commanders who can decide without silencing debate. That equilibrium — advice without rivalry, command without insularity — is what will turn integration from structure into strategy.

India’s reform journey — from the Kargil Review Committee (1999) to the Group of Ministers (2001), the Naresh Chandra Task Force (2012), and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) — culminated in the creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (2019). The Inter-Services Organisations (ISO) Act (2023) added a legal framework, but one primarily administrative; it governs people and discipline, not missions or operational direction.

Five years on, we have coordination without command. Authority is dispersed among four coequal Chiefs, leading to caution when decisiveness is required. Theatre Commanders remain three-star officers, junior to the four-star Service Chiefs whose forces they must lead. In a hierarchy-sensitive military, this imbalance weakens confidence and clouds authority.[10]

The Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986) in the United States resolved the same issue by raising theatre commanders to four-star parity, aligning rank, responsibility, and remit. India can learn from the logic of that Act— consistent with the Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act (1955)[11] — without creating a politically sensitive “supreme commander.” Aligning rank, responsibility, and remit is not cosmetic; it is the foundation of credible command.

Toward a Balanced Joint System

There are glimpses of what this could look like. Air Marshal K. K. “Timmy” Nohwar’s tenure as Chief of Staff at the Andaman and Nicobar Command — the only time an Air Officer has held that post — proved that when officers step outside Service silos, the quality of joint planning improves. This is as told to me by his Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN).

Building on such precedent, India could:

(a)         Get the post of CDS, like so much else in defence reform, to be rotational. Jointness isn’t rocket science — it’s just common sense, applied consistently.

(b)          Appoint a four-star VCDS from another Service as the CDS’s counter-ego, safeguarding diversity of perspective;

(c)         Transform HQ IDS from a coordinating secretariat into a Joint Staff HQ, the analytical and doctrinal core;

(d)         Legally distinguish Administrative Control (ADCON) from Operational Control (OPCON);

(e)       Create a Permanent Joint Operations HQ under the CDS with regional hubs (pilot projects could be a maritime command and possibly the Central Command);

(f)     Establish a Joint Operations Fund, ring-fenced under parliamentary oversight, to finance ISR, cyber, logistics, and training, gradually pooling Service budgets.

Such steps would shift reform from paperwork to purpose — where law provides the foundation, structure provides direction, and funding provides the muscle.

Conclusion — From Clarity to Coherence

As a person who has pushed Critical Thinking from about 2015 till recently at the faculty and students of DSSC, Wing Commander Raja’s work is valuable in helping restore factual clarity to a debate too often clouded by sentiment. But clarity is only the beginning. Five years after creating the CDS, we still have coordination without command — structure without synthesis.

For jointness to mature, India must separate ADCON from OPCON, build a permanent operational core, align rank with responsibility, and embed joint education early in Service careers.  The IAF, with its tradition of disciplined planning and mission precision, is best placed to lead this evolution.  If it can carry its internal coherence into the joint arena, India’s Armed Forces will move decisively — from coordination to command, and from clarity to coherence.

*****

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Notes:-

[1] J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1961; Kindle ed.), p. 2.

[2] Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, remarks at Ran Samvaad, Mhow, August 2025.

[3] Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Pacific War 1942–45 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

[4] Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

[5] David N. Spires, Air Power for Patton‘s Army (Washington, DC: USAF History and Museums Program, 2002).

[6] Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947); Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981).

[7] Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805 (New York: Praeger, 1989; Kindle edition).

[8] Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed. Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993; Kindle edition).

[9]White, n. 7.

[10] Sudhir Pillai, “Theaterisation Reform Is Stuck on Ranks and Roles — India’s Military Needs Clarity,” The Print,  September 25, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/theaterisation-reform-is-stuck-on-ranks-and-roles-india-military/2750307/. Accessed on October 27, 2025.

[11] Ministry of Law, Government of India, “The Commanders-in-Chief (Change in Designation) Act, 1955. Act No. 19 of 1955,”   May 03, 1955,  https://www.indiacode.nic.in/repealedfileopen?rfilename=A1955-19.pdf. Accessed on October 28, 2025.

The post From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part II: From Coordination to Command — Designing India’s Joint Future appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Theaterisation, Theatre Command, Jointness, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Op Sindoor, National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Goldwater–Nichols Act

Setting the Stage

Among the many contributions to India’s debate on jointness are two essays on the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS) portal by Wing Commander A. Pichipoo Raja. His earlier piece, “Revisiting the Eight-Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,” [1] traced the evolution of India’s inter-service integration. His later article, “08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command,”[2] builds on that foundation—trying to bring discipline to a discussion that has often been shaped more by sentiment than by evidence.

Both essays mark a welcome maturity in professional debate and, in an oblique way, remind us that the Air Force’s caution is often misread. What some see as reluctance is, in truth, doctrinal logic: a concern for coherence, unity, and agility. Before judging what needs to change, it is essential to understand why the Indian Air Force (IAF) thinks as it does—and how it could, in fact, lead India’s transition to genuine jointness.

Early Roots of Jointness

In his first of the two articles referred to here, Wing Commander Raja suggests that the idea of theaterisation arose to address India’s “lack of jointness,” tracing its roots to 1944, when he links the origins of jointness to the founding story of the National Defence Academy (NDA), using the Sudan Block donation as a symbolic anchor. That is partly right, though the deeper roots lie in Britain’s wartime experience.

The campaigns of 1939–45 showed how badly the Services faltered when they operated in silos. The setbacks in France, North Africa, Greece, and the Far East were not just tactical defeats—they were failures of coordination between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Only after repeated reverses did joint planning and staff education become central to success. By the time of Normandy and Burma, integration had matured: General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Europe and Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command demonstrated how air-land-sea cooperation, properly institutionalised, could turn friction into synergy.

As an alumnus of the NDA, I still remember quiet Sunday mornings spent in the library after breakfast—hours lost in military history that gave us our first authentic taste of joint thinking. Has that early exposure in jointness at the NDA fully percolated to the echelons of the Indian Military?

The DSSC and Its Limits

India established the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington even before the National Defence Academy (NDA) came up at Khadakwasla. Its core focus, however, has mainly remained single-service — given the Army’s central role under an Army Commandant and its mission, much like Quetta before it, to prepare junior staff officers for mid-level formations.

This was not for lack of vision. The second Commandant, Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne, had to take it up with the then Governor-General, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, to convince the Defence Minister that the new college had to be tri-Service — a move the Army initially resisted but one that made DSSC India’s first real step toward integrated professional education.[3]

Over time, DSSC has evolved into a respected postgraduate, mid-career institution, yet its joint curriculum remains more a conversation than a culture. General Lentaigne himself once remarked, “I only wish the Army could cut down its syllabus and also get more time for research and discussion.”[4] The college’s history notes that as Army subjects multiplied, the Naval and Air Wings pressed for greater combined and joint instruction to balance their programmes.

It is not the aim of this submission to get into the subtleties of words used, like training and education, but readers would benefit if they read through the author’s writings on the subject.[5]

Personal Ties and Professional Distance

Wing Commander Raja notes the personal bonds among recent Chiefs — NDA coursemates and Sainik School Rewa classmates — as examples of natural synergy. These connections are real, but they do not automatically create operational integration. If friendship alone could guarantee jointness, India would have achieved it long ago.

When the government accepted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and Group of Ministers’ (GoM) recommendations to establish the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the three Chiefs then in office were all my own NDA contemporaries. Yet that did not by itself deliver integration. At the highest levels, professionalism outweighs personality. Structures, doctrine, and accountability—not nostalgia—bind the Services together.

I saw this clearly as Chief of Staff at the Andaman and Nicobar Command. One Commander-in-Chief and the Lieutenant Governor were, coincidentally, classmates at Sainik School Rewa—the very school Wing Commander Raja mentions. Yet their conduct was always defined by role, not relationship. Professional distance kept both focused on duty. Familiarity can ease communication, but it never substitutes for institutional design.

Revisiting the “Eight Myths”

Raja’s 08 Myths article aims to clear the fog that surrounds the theaterisation debates. It succeeds in re-centering the argument on evidence rather than emotion. But the real task is to link these “myths” to the broader history of reform—from the KRC and GoM to the Naresh Chandra Task Force and the Shekatkar Committee. Together, they form India’s official reform continuum. Once accepted in principle by the government, their recommendations gain directive weight even if implementation remains uneven.

Seen that way, the debate should not be about whose view prevails but about how to build common purpose. The aim here is not to impose a non-IAF perspective, but to offer, for an Air Force audience, a structured way forward—a method amid the noise.

Lessons from Kargil and Sindoor

Readers seeking a deeper anchor might look to my chapter “Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command” in Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective. It recalls the winter of 1998–99, when Pakistan’s Operation Badr led to the Kargil War and to two separate Indian responses—Operation Vijay by the Army and Operation Safed Sagar by the Indian Air Force.[6]

As AVM Arjun Subramaniam notes, had the Army involved the IAF from day one, a single integrated plan could have exploited both Services’ strengths and covered their weaknesses. That insight remains strikingly relevant. Operation Sindoor again showed individual brilliance within each Service but exposed the absence of a unified design. The lesson from Kargil and Sindoor alike is not about our people or platforms, but about how we plan together. True jointness requires shared understanding, confidence, and a structure that aligns authority with purpose.[7]

Myths and Realities of Reform

Wing Commander Raja’s effort to separate fact from belief is valuable, but facts must be translated into design. Major General Alok Deb makes this point in “Kargil and its Impact on India’s National Security.” [8] His reading of the KRC and GoM reports shows that, even if the term “theatre command” wasn’t used, the intent toward integration was clear. The committees’ reforms—the Integrated Defence Staff, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Strategic Forces Command, and the Andaman & Nicobar Command—were all steps toward jointness. The CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) represent a significant political step that places the onus on the militaries to get their act together.

For a fuller view, readers should explore the Journal of Defence Studies special issue “National Security since Kargil,” which offers a 360-degree review of India’s progress two decades after the conflict.[9]

Raja is also correct that reform in India has evolved through context and experience, not declarations. Our path to jointness has been deliberate, incremental, and built through learning rather than slogans.

The claim that India’s jointness “problem” lacks empirical proof confuses the absence of audit with adequacy. Without a structured review, neither strengths nor gaps are known. India still lacks cross-service mechanisms to analyse operations collectively. Lessons remain trapped within individual Services and seldom shape doctrine or training. A Joint Operations Review Board (JORB) under the National Security Council Secretariat—or the CDS—could fill that gap, turning anecdote into evidence.  The Army’s Headquarters Army Training Command (HQ ARTRAC) has a Lessons Learnt system, but do we have a joint Lessons Learnt system?

Learning from Others

Raja’s reading of the United States (US) experience is broadly correct but incomplete. Unified Commands existed well before 1986; what the Goldwater–Nichols Act changed, as Gordon Nathaniel Lederman explains in Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, was alignment, not architecture.[10] The Act enforced clarity—who commands, who is accountable, and who advances for joint performance. It linked professional reward to joint competence and turned what had been an organisational chart into a living system.

The caution that theaterisation alone cannot deliver jointness is well-taken. Structures succeed only when supported by doctrine, education, and incentives. The lesson from abroad is not imitation but adaptation—building systems that fit our realities while preserving each Service’s ethos and aligning all to a common strategic purpose.

Beyond Structure

Theatre commands are meant to unify command—to bring planning, resources, and execution under one operational authority. That purpose is sound and long overdue. But unity of command is not the same as unity of purpose. Real jointness grows from shared education and professional incentives that make officers think and act as one, even when they wear different uniforms. Without that intellectual and doctrinal foundation, theatre commands risk becoming hollow frameworks—united in form but divided in spirit.

The final myth—that theaterisation is politically driven—needs nuance. In China, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2015 reforms certainly strengthened Party control, yet they also produced real operational integration.[11] Under Xi Jinping’s centralised leadership, structural change combined with a genuine “military intellectual revolution” born of debate, international study, and relentless field experimentation. Political will can push reform, but professional depth must sustain it.[12]

The Way Ahead

Taken together, these insights repair the record but leave open the core question: how do we turn factual clarity into functional reform?

If the first part of this debate has explained why jointness matters—the habits of thought, education, and incentives that must underpin reform—the next must ask how those principles can work in practice. Understanding the IAF’s reasoning is essential here. Before prescribing change, one must first appreciate the logic behind its caution: a perspective shaped not by reluctance, but by doctrine, experience, and operational prudence.

*****

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Notes:-

[1] A Pichipoo Raja, “Revisiting the Eight Decade History of Indian Jointness: Drawing the Right Lessons from Op Sindoor,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 03, 2025, https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[2]A Pichipoo Raja, “08 Myths in Indian Debates on the Theatre Command- A Ready Reckoner for the Pursuit of Informed Discussions,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), October 10, 2025, https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/. Accessed on October 26, 2025.

[3] R. D. Palsokar, A History of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1997), pp. 56-58.

[4] Ibid., p. 90.

[5] For earlier discussions on this subject, see Sudhir Pillai, “Faculty at DSSC – A Necessity of Professional Military Education,” Trishul Journal 17, no. 2, Spring 2015; Sudhir Pillai, “Schooled to Think,” Force Magazine, January 2018; and Sudhir Pillai, “Change with Times: Indian Professional Military Education System Needs Urgent Reform,” Force Magazine, November 2020.

[6] Sudhir Pillai, “Lessons from the Andaman and Nicobar Command,” in Force in Statecraft: An Indian Perspective, ed. Arjun Subramaniam and Anil Chopra (New Delhi: National Defence College and KW Publishers, 2021), pp. 283–305.

[7] Ibid., p. 285.

[8] Alok Deb, “Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security,” Journal of Defence Studies, vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, Kargil and Its Impact on India’s National Security. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[9] National Security Since Kargil, Journal of Defence Studies vol.13, no. 3, July–September 2019, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 2019 – MP-IDSA. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[10] Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999).

[11] Brian Lafferty, “Civil Military Integrations and PLA Reforms,” National Defence University Press, February 05, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748777/civil-military-integrations-and-pla-reforms/. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

[12] Sugiura Yasuyuki, “The PLA’s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities,” NIDS China Security Report, 2022,  https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_A02.pdf. Accessed on October 25, 2025.

The post From History to Myths — A Naval Officer’s Dialogue Part I: The Idea of Jointness: Beyond Structure and Slogan appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Warfare, Airspace Management (ASM), Tactical Battle Area (TBA), Air Littoral, Op Sindoor

“Future warfare is all about air, space and sub-surface domains.

The conventional land and sea domains will restrict to holding territories.”

–Author

Group Captain Swaim Prakash Singh, PhD

Introduction

Warfare is an inherently complex and serious business that cannot be conceptualised or executed on the flawed premise of the primacy of a single warfighting arm. The long standing assertion that ‘the nature of warfare remains same, while its character evolves with time’ warrants nuanced deliberation, structured reasoning and a contextually grounded understanding especially in the light of a few western narratives being built on the topic of Air Littoral. As expected, like others, this term has also been picked up by few land warfare enthusiasts trying to embed into the Indian context.

In this regard, the proposition of delineating fixed geographical limits under the construct of Air Littoral and advocating for its control under a land forces-led command structure[1] reflects a myopic view with borrowed and ill-conceived unprofessional arguments. Such construct[2] not only risks diluting the core integrated Airspace Management (ASM) but also contravenes the doctrinal imperatives of jointness and integration across Services by diluting the basic tenets of air power.

This approach appears counterproductive and potentially regressive in the context of contemporary and future warfare especially when the Indian Armed Forces are making concerted efforts to overcome legacy challenges and institutional frictions in pursuit of a genuinely integrated battle management architecture.

Essentially, the stated narratives focus on two distinct issues of defining the term ‘Air Littoral’ and the concept of its ‘Control by the land forces.’ This paper aims to highlight the drawbacks in the philosophy behind the control of the air littoral, using source based, conceptual and contextual arguments. It will also underscore the critical importance of ASM in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and why it must continue to remain under the control of the Indian Air Force (IAF) within the integrated battle management framework.

Air Littoral: A Conceptual Misfit

Militarily, the term ‘Maritime Littoral’ is broadly defined worldwide as “the portion of land and sea adjacent to the coast that is susceptible to influence or control from the sea and to influence or control the sea from the land.” Operationally, this zone demands specialised capabilities such as amphibious operations, coastal defence, mine countermeasures and the integration of naval gunfire and air support with land operations through an integrated tri-services mechanism.

Drawing a simile with this, a few academicians have coined the term Air Littoral, though it does not appear in any doctrinal publications globally. In reality, Air Littoral is an inconsiderate borrowing[3] from Western narratives and lacks conceptual validity.

In the air domain, there is no equivalent physical or geographical feature. Airspace is a continuous, three dimensional medium defined by altitude, range and threat environment. It is in no case by fixed boundaries like a shoreline. Both Indian and global air doctrines already classify airspace by altitude bands (very low, low, medium, high etc), threat environment (permissive, contested, denied) and mission type (Counter Air, Coordinated Operations, Air Defence (AD) etc).

The proposed concept of Air Littoral adds no doctrinal clarity. Rather, it risks creating artificial silos and confusion over command and control (C2) responsibilities. The low altitude fight is not a distinct ‘special zone’ requiring separate service ownership as envisaged by land warfare enthusiasts. It is simply a segment of airspace within the Joint Air Defence System managed through layered AD Systems, counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) measures, Close Air Support and Rotary Wing Operations through Joint Air Defence Centre (JADC) under centralised command of the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

Furthermore, the Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine, the IAF Doctrine and the Joint Services Study Group (JSSG) documents make no reference to Air Littoral as an independent operational construct. Likewise, leading air forces such as the United States Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force (RAF) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) do not recognise the term in their doctrinal lexicon. It just remains an academic expression without operational relevance.

Source Based Arguments

Borrowed Western Narrative: Not Suited for Indian Context

The core argument of Air Littoral is largely based on foreign doctrinal experimentation and recent conflict-specific adaptations (eg Ukraine, Israel, USA) from couple of foreign literatures. These examples emerge from unique geopolitical, technological and command structure environments. Attempting to replicate these foreign constructs especially regarding the C2 of the air littoral without contextual adaptation, amounts to simply force fitting foreign models into India’s vastly different strategic, organisational, and doctrinal ecosystem.

India’s battle management philosophy is shaped by the following realities:

• • India is not expeditionary in nature, like the US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

  • Joint operations are driven by sovereign geographical imperatives, not global force projection requirements.

Within this framework:

• • India already operates under established joint doctrines and procedures governing air-land cooperation, including the so-called Air Littoral zone in form of TBA.

  • JSSG is the master document which unambiguously brings out the detailed coordination and operating procedures for all aerial platforms in the highly contested and congested TBA.

Reviewing Foreign Literature

Foreign literature on the subject is largely academic or opinion-based and cannot be applied to the Indian context either selectively or in entirety without due consideration of India’s doctrinal outlook, geography and capabilities. In most cases, the Indian Joint Doctrine and the IAF’s existing capabilities already address the stated vulnerabilities thereby negating the case for creating a new concept of an ‘Air Littoral’.

Various doctrines and documents such as the Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (2017), IAF Doctrine (2012, 2022), JSSG and the précis of Staff and War Colleges categorically negate the validity of this borrowed construct in its entirety. The following table, however, brings out opposing statements from Western literature itself, thereby validating the inadequacies of these arguments.

Table 1: Air Power Doctrinal Stand against Imported Quotes

Interestingly, the Air Littoral concept mentioned in the above-referred documents has been notably downplayed by USAF airpower practitioner Lt Col Grant Georgulis in his article “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia”, published in Air & Space Forces Magazine on 25 July 2025.[15]

The aforesaid paper presents several arguments which seem to accord considerable emphasis to the perceived impact of drones on land warfare. The bottom line is that the loosely used term ‘Drones’ for UAS, now being projected as a revolution in land warfare had already evolved within air forces at least two decades ago. Consequently, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) including ASM in the TBA have long been in practice. The devastating effect of such technology has been widely witnessed during Operation Sindoor in May 2025.[16]

In the Indian context, particularly for drones of nuisance value (eg Swarm drones), a chain of counter-UAS (CUAS) systems with both soft and hard kill capabilities already operate under the centralised command of IACCS with decentralised execution with full operational freedom meeting the requirements of the IA, thereby eliminating the need for a separate structure. Further, the wide variety of UAS spread over the flight envelope in terms of height and speed of operation makes any separate structure needless. Nevertheless, it requires further strengthening and it has to be both joint and integrated effort.

Notably, NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy of 26 June 2018 negates all aforesaid imported quotes. Also, USAF Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations published in 22 Jan 2025 provides a self-explanatory paragraph on ‘Fires’ and ‘Air Space Control.’  An excerpt is mentioned below:

“The fire’s function is supported by the airpower tenets of synergistic effects and concentration as airpower masses and maneuvers to surprise adversaries by creating effects at the times and locations of the JFC’s choosing. USAF contributions to fires are primarily captured in AFDP 3-01, Counter Air Operations, AFDP 3-03, Counter Land Operations, AFDP 3-04, Counter Sea Operations, AFDP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, AFDP 3-14, Air Force Space Support, AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack, and AFDP 3-72, Nuclear Operations. In addition, for long-range fires considerations, see AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control, and AFDP 3-60, Targeting”.

The Fallacy of Drawing Lessons from Ukraine

• • The literature has also tried to draw inferences from Ukraine as a template for battlefield air control which is rather problematic.

  • OSINT indicates Ukraine operates under a ‘weapons free’ environment characterised by minimal restrictions on engagement within contested zones, primarily because the protracted conflict has not manifested as a classical air war in the conventional sense.

  • Indian Rules of Engagement (RsOE) are more controlled, disciplined and politically calibrated. Airspace is a regulated battlespace, especially given proximity to nuclear thresholds with both adversaries and escalation management.

  • Drawing conclusions from a unique warzone with permissive engagement and applying them to a structured Indian context or TBA is operationally dangerous with flawed foundation.

  • Operation Sindoor has clearly reminded that joint and integrated warfare is the only key to success in the Indian context.[17]

Conceptual & Contextual Arguments in the Indian Context

Understanding the Tactical Battle Area (TBA)

The TBA refers to a geographically defined zone of military operations that is dynamically flexible and horizontally fluid. While land operations form its core air operations conducted by both manned and unmanned platforms are an integral component of the TBA. These flying platforms vary significantly in speed, ranging from slow movers to high-speed and very high-speed systems and operate across a wide vertical envelope from terrain hugging altitudes to high altitude flight levels thus making it Multi-Level Multi-Domain (MLMD) warfare.

Given this multi-layered tactical environment, all aerial platforms within the TBA operate under a complex, multi-level threat scenario, often from friendly weapon systems. To prevent fratricide and ensure the optimal employment of the most suitable weapon systems, a designated authority must regulate the use of airspace. This function is known as Airspace Management. This aims to provide freedom of action to all operators through defined and dynamic procedures while avoiding fratricide and simultaneously denying the use of the air medium to the enemy.

In the Indian context, the responsibility of Air Defence of the country lies with the Air Force as mandated by the Union War Book. The Control and Reporting (C&R) element of the IAF as the designated authority through IACCS exercises the entire air space management 24x7x365, be it during peacetime, wartime and No War No Peace (NWNP).

With the advancement of technology and the availability of longer-range weapon systems, it has been necessary to reassess vertical boundaries within the TBA. As a result, it was revised once in late 2000. However, such reassessment must not infringe upon the operational freedom of other combat elements within the same space in increasing the vertical limits manifold, as envisaged in the said concept. It is to be ensured that C2 continues to be centralised irrespective of the number of users in the TBA.

In light of the narrative of the proposal to allocate a vertical limit of coordinating altitude of 3 km (10,000 feet) exclusively to land forces[18] is a tall claim lacking not only operational rationale but also conceptual and contextual application.

Conceptual Divergence Vs Conceptual Overreach

The proponent of Air Littoral who claim the concept to be the so-called ‘Conceptual Divergence’ with air forces is less an innovative doctrinal breakthrough and more a case of ‘Conceptual Overreach’ under a borrowed maritime metaphor that has no intrinsic significance in the air domain.

The contribution of UAS to warfare is substantial and complementary but not transformational. Drones can observe, harass or even sting, but they cannot control. Air power is characterised by control of the airspace, strategic reach and decisive impact.

In the Indian context the divergence between the need of land and air forces is already doctrinally resolved in existing joint documents and related SoPs through integrated C2, layered engagement and shared situational awareness via IACCS. By ignoring these established mechanisms and importing a non-doctrinal term like Air Littoral, the argument is creating an artificial fault line between Services where joint doctrine already provides the solution.

Therefore, the assertion of Air Littoral as a key imperative needs correction in light of established doctrinal considerations. A few of the critical questions that merit introspection by the land forces are mentioned below:

• • What is the rationale for setting a vertical limit of 3 km (10,000 feet)? Are only guns, artillery, AD guns, and UAVs intended to operate below this altitude?

  • Will the land forces not also be controlling the Short, Medium and Long Range Surface to air Guided Weapons (SAGWs) of Army units deployed in the TBA or in adjacent areas falling within their engagement ranges?

  • Will Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO) be restricted to altitudes above 3 km, and would that be tactically and doctrinally viable?

  • Will fighter aircraft be permitted to ingress and egress within the TBA only above the 3 km ceiling?

  • How will the land forces ensure that fighter aircraft can switch from subsonic to supersonic speeds and change altitudes rapidly during BVR hot/cold patterns, in order to optimise missile performance while remaining outside enemy radar coverage within the 3 km altitude band?

  • The IAF inventory of 4.5-generation aircraft achieve optimal engine performance at around 3 km altitude, while deep-penetration aircraft require even lower altitudes for maximum effect. How would the land forces effectively control and coordinate the operations of such aircraft?

  • What mechanisms will ensure effective deconfliction of multi-domain operations, particularly in high-threat and high-tempo scenarios?

  • Would interdiction missions under coordinated air operations be excluded from TBA or fall under land forces control within it?

  • How will air-landed and air assault operations transition between outside and inside the TBA?

  • What measures will protect aircraft operating within the TBA from aerial threats and standoff weapons originating outside this envelope?

  • What would be the implications for air operations near forward airfields or Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), often located within or adjacent to the TBA?

  • How will land forces manage airspace across the International Border (IB), Line of Control (LoC), Line of Actual Control (LAC), and rest of the sectors during peacetime, wartime and in the NWNP scenarios near/ adjacent/ within TBA?

These few questions out of many underscore the need for a balanced and integrated approach to airspace control, rather than adopting vertical limitations and seeking command and control that risk operational friction and tactical incoherence affecting strategic outcomes.

Lack of Doctrinal Merit

In another work, the notion of an ‘‘Air-Surface Littoral’’[19] has been introduced. This reflects a divergence in the understanding of doctrinal nuances related to integrated operations in the TBA. The following arguments indicate that the proposed construct of an Air Littoral or Air-Surface Littoral does not align with established doctrinal principles.

• • Joint document on the subject exists both at the joint level and Service specific level.

  • It clearly defines roles & responsibility, C2 structures and deconfliction procedures in the TBA.

  • There is no doctrinal void per se, only a need for adherence is missing.

  • There is a need to trust the process and adhere to the joint document for better interoperability, strengthening air-ground coordination mechanisms and not command takeover or Army ownership.

  • Elevating a threat perception into an argument for Army-led control of the airspace dilutes the very purpose of jointness which is meant to synergise not override the inter Service roles.

  • Unity of Command is essential to ensure optimal employment and freedom of action for all weapon systems (land or air, manned or unmanned, across multiple operational levels) in TBA.

  • The fundamental doctrinal tenet of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution remains non-negotiable and sacrosanct for implementing dynamic ASM within TBA.

  • The stated joint document stands as one of the most comprehensive operational documents for integrated battle management. However, its utility remains under leveraged due to limited understanding and non-ratification by the land forces.

Air Littoral is not about Control but Efficiency and Safety Issues

Though the term Air Littoral is undefined, is inherently a shared battle space, it is not about one that must be ‘controlled’ solely by one Service. While the Army is the primary user in the TBA especially with the advent of drone swarms and loitering munitions, this does not logically lead to the Army ‘owning or leading’ the air littoral. This remains applicable globally.

Instead, existing and time-tested JADC structure need to be further strengthened by trained manpower and digital communication from land forces for both voice and data in the Indian context. The very fact that most of the air domain threats to land forces now emerge from the low altitude envelope makes it more imperative for the IA to be familiar to the nuances of air power and its utilisation in MLMD warfare. It needs to be internalised that the Air Force retains:

• • Generation of Integrated Air Picture through feeding by Army and Navy networks (Digital/Manual) as well.

  • Building up of Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) in indispensable congested airspace through sensor fusion, real-time data links, and air deconfliction.

  • Battlefield air strike coordination and execution.

  • Control of air traffic, deconfliction and dynamic management of weapon fire areas/zones (WFA).

Instead of displacing the IAF, Army integration can be enhanced through:

• • Empowered Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) and embedded TACs with enhanced operational training.

  • Need based shared access to IAF’s ISR and C2 pictures.

  • Creating/Strengthening Joint battle planning cells at Corps HQs through effective implementation of procedures in Corps Area Control Centre (CACC).

  • Integration with the proposed Drone Airspace Management Cells (DASM) at airbases.

  • Immediate operationalisation of Akashteer at the unit level and seamless integration into the IACCS architecture.

  • To ensure fratricide-free airspace management, enhance war-footing training of IA operators in C&R digital reporting and in executing orders received from IACCS.

  • Participation of IA troops in the realistic tactical and operation exercise/war gaming in TBA.

Trust in the Joint Process is the Real Need

A recurring theme in such arguments is the perceived trust deficit concerning timely decision making, execution of orders, responsiveness and communication latency. These concerns however, can be effectively mitigated, if IA acknowledge that ‘Unity of Command’ is a non-negotiable principle in the regulation of airspace especially in an environment where a diverse range of aerial platforms (manned-unmanned, slow-fast and hypersonic) operate simultaneously.

The land forces’ apprehensions regarding responsiveness are best addressed by Tactical Air Centers (TACs), Forward Area Controllers (FACs), and enhanced IA-IAF integration at lower echelons which need to be further institutionalised, not bypassed. Also the land forces coercing the concept of ‘persistent presence’ and ‘under command’ must be examined within the bounds of available technology, capability and survivability, which the Air Force is best equipped to manage for an effective integrated battle management.

Operation Sindoor: A Contextual Reality Check

Future warfare is increasingly shifting its centre of gravity towards the air, space and sub-surface domains where speed, precision, stealth and information dominance are decisive. As technology redefines the character of conflict, these domains offer strategic advantages far beyond the physical occupation of land or sea. Air and space provide unparalleled reach, surveillance and rapid strike capabilities while sub-surface operations ensure stealth, survivability and disruption of critical infrastructure.

In contrast, the traditional land and maritime domains are progressively being relegated to roles focused on holding ground and securing strategic chokepoints rather than initiating or shaping the battle. This statement is not an off-the-cuff remark but requires a serious, impartial, and futuristic professional brainstorm that rises above the arguments of structures, notions of victory, etc. The essence of future war lies in mastering the intangibles such as electromagnetic spectrum, cyber space, orbital dominance and deep sea superiority where control equates to deterrence, denial and domination.

Operation Sindoor, with clearly defined conflict termination criteria, has redefined this argument within the Indian context. The punitive impact delivered through the medium of air achieved in less than 30 minutes during each wave of targeting has reaffirmed that contemporary conflicts are increasingly being shaped in the vertical dimensions rather than solely on the ground.

While the primacy of land and maritime domains remains undisputed, it is time to acknowledge a significant shift. The traditional roles are reversing with air power now taking a decisive lead and surface forces assuming more supportive functions in shaping and concluding conflicts.

Before advocating for the Control of Air Littorals, it is important to recall the operational realities witnessed during Op Sindoor. The air operations were orchestrated in a manner that enabled tactical freedom of action for all types of weapon systems (manned, unmanned aircraft and surface weapons) based on real-time threat assessments and the required response. However, classical airspace management, wherein both aircraft and surface-based weapons operate with full freedom, remained limited.

The prevalence of mass unarmed drone saturation, often deployed as a nuisance and harassment wave, necessitated prioritising surface based weapon engagement in most scenarios. Fighter aircraft were thus employed primarily for offensive missions and maintaining air defence (AD) watch beyond the effective envelope of surface based weapons. This operational arrangement dictated by situational constraints cannot be misconstrued as a precedent for reshaping or rewriting an Air Littoral doctrine under the primacy of Indian Army.

Op Sindoor demonstrated the IAF’s operational acumen and responsiveness to an unprecedented situation. A robust joint AD and CUAS grid was rapidly put in place, utilising existing procedures and coordination arrangements to excellent effect.

The operation was conducted with de-novo operating procedures for the first time while dealing with such scenarios that already exist in the joint operating mechanism. It is just a matter of how best and timely it is orchestrated. The forward looking planning and careful planning facilitated unproblematic utilisation of available platforms, networks and procedures.

The success highlighted the power of jointness, agility and innovation within real-time battlefield scenarios. Notably, the operation also produced valuable lessons and the process of consolidating tactics, techniques and procedures continues to be an ongoing effort to improve future readiness.

In fact, it is to be internalised by the land forces that such smooth conduct of operations could take place only because of Unity of Command with the principle of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised Execution through IACCS of IAF.

Conclusion

In contemporary and future warfare technology plays a pivotal role in shaping capabilities enabling new forms of engagement and offering enhanced situational awareness. However, the formulation of military doctrine must remain a product of strategic foresight, operational logic and historical military wisdom and not of reactionary impulses triggered by emerging technologies under the trap of ‘technological panic.’

The discourse advocating for the creation of new C2 structures redefining air domain boundaries ostensibly to accommodate unmanned systems and slow movers risks distorting the fundamental principles of joint warfare.

The proposal to give land forces command over the air littoral is an agenda based conceptual overreach based on foreign models, false doctrinal gaps and misapplied conflict lessons. Building narrative of Control of Air Littoral is operationally risky and counterproductive leading to mass fratricide scenario. Rather than questioning the IAF’s primacy in airspace management and gaining control of airspace by the IA, efforts must focus on the following:

• • Airspace remains centrally controlled for safety, deconfliction and tactical flexibility for achieving operational and strategic effects.

  • Land-Air synergy is achieved through joint training, empowered liaison and procedural reforms not structural domination.

  • Strengthening joint structures for air-ground integration.

  • Joint planning and execution of operational fires.

  • Avoiding doctrinal fragmentation in pursuit of temporary tactical convenience.

  • Operationalisation of Akashteer and enmeshing into IACCS without any more delays.

Army to devise and revise the ground tactics in view of emerging technological challenges in multi domain scenario.

 (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Notes:

[1] Maximilian K Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco. “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (2021): 67-80, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3092, United States Army war College Press.       https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/ Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel “Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the US Air Force” War on the Rocks, 7 March 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-the-air-littoral-and-the-looming-irrelevance-of-the-u-s-air-force/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[3] “Control of Air Littoral by Land Forces: A Key Battle Imperative” An Indian narrative in circulation. Accessed on 31 July 2025.

[4] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[5] Airpower in Joint Operations: Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations (AFDP3.0) https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/AFDP3-0Operations.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[6] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[7] Ibid N2. Barno and Bensahel.

[8] Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 30, Number 2, Summer 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1018276.pdf. Accessed on 20 Aug 2025.

[9] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[10] Ibid N1. Bremer and Grieco.

[11] Ibid N5. (AFDP3.0).

[12] Posen Barry. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” Summer 2003, Harvard                             Kennedy School – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/command-commons-military-foundation-us-hegemony. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[13] Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-03, Counterland Operations, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AFDP-COUNTERLAND.pdf. Accessed on 05 Aug 2025.

[14] “India’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS): A NCW Milestone”, ANALYSIS, IndraStra Global, 5 October 2015. https://indrastra.medium.com/analysis-india-s-integrated-air-command-control-system-iaccs-a-ncw-milestone-e1f4fea09f2b. Accessed on 12 Aug 2025.

[15] Grant Georgulis. “Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 25 July 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-airpower-amnesia/. Accessed on 06 Aug 2025.

[16] “Operation SINDOOR: The Rise of Aatmanirbhar Innovation in National Security: India’s growing technological self-reliance” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 14 May 2025.               https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128746#:~:text=Loitering%20munitions%20also%20known%20as,minutes%2C%20demonstrating%20India’s%20technological%20edge. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[17] “Operation SINDOOR: Forging One Force- The Synergy of India’s Armed Forces” Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 18 May 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453. Accessed on 18 Aug 2025.

[18] Ibid N3. Control of Air Littoral……

[19] Abhishek Singh, “The Air-Surface Littoral: Tomorrows Kurukshetra (Battleground)” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 4 March 2025. https://cenjows.in/the-air-surface-littoral-tomorrows-kurukshetra-battleground/. Accessed on 09 Aug 2025.

The post Control of Air Littoral by Land Forces A Doctrinal Misstep in the Making: An Indian Perspective appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: OP Sindoor, IPKF, Mission Creep

“He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.”

                                                                                          Sun Tzu

Scholars and veterans meticulously analyse wars or campaigns, revealing their profound and lasting effects on the nations involved. Such analysis, viewed in hindsight, uncover events and outcomes that deserve closer examination. Op Sindoor, the adrenaline-pumping skirmish, has also been analysed, revealing some presumed oversights and shortcomings. Criticism has focused mainly on two aspects. The first is the premature acceptance of the ceasefire, especially when, as the Air Chief noted, “the India Air Force was on song.” This criticism has gained traction even in internal political discussions. The second aspect addresses the perceived political constraints imposed on the operations. Such doubts call into question the success of the operation and obscure the euphoria that followed. Persistent uncertainties of this nature must be resolved, as they relate to fundamental aspects of warfare.

These doubts raise numerous questions. How do we define success in war? What are the criteria for determining success? When should military operations end? Is it standard to impose political constraints on military operations, or should the military have total freedom to execute its plans?

The two perspectives that question the conduct of Operation Sindoor reflect a simplistic view of war. The assumption is that once the political objectives are identified, it is the military’s prerogative to decide how to achieve them and when to conclude operations. In essence, the political and military aspects of war are seen as sequential but unrelated. This assumption, particularly prevalent among military personnel, may stem from earlier times when monarchs held absolute authority over issues of war and peace. Later on, the political and military leadership resided with the sovereign, and there was no distinction between the political and military perspectives. However, in a democratic setup, there is a clear separation between the two functions.

A nation goes to war when other options fail to achieve its goals. Before embarking on armed action, it is essential to have a clear understanding of what is to be accomplished and the means to achieve it. The first part involves political considerations, while the second pertains to military strategies. The military enters the picture only when a political decision has been made to employ force.

War is inherently political. As Carl von Clausewitz stated, “War is the continuation of policy by other means.” This perspective on the political nature of war is not a modern concept; it can be traced back to figures like Cicero and ancient Chinese philosophers. Politics provides the raison d’être for the war as well as its logic. The type of military force used, the level of engagement, and the conditions under which it occurs all emerge from the political context. Is there an existential threat that requires the mobilisation of a nation’s entire resources for total war? Or will the war be limited to its geographical scope, the level of force employed, and its objectives? The political context shapes the broad contours of military operations. The military serves as a tool to achieve specific goals under stipulated conditions. Therefore, if war is fundamentally political, then, as the eminent scholar Colin Gray noted, “politics is the master.”

Politics and the military operate simultaneously in war, influencing each other in significant ways. Their impact cannot be segregated. In the Ukraine-Russia war, the initial goal of Russia was to force Ukrainian capitulation by threatening the capital, Kyiv, with airborne troops landing on the nearby airfield alongside an armoured ground offensive. When this plan failed, the Russians realised that achieving this political goal was impossible. The strategic objectives then shifted to occupying Donetsk and Luhansk, regions with a large Russian-speaking population. Consequently, the entire military, including the Air Force, focused on achieving the revised objective. In this case, politics dictated the course of the war, taking into account the military capabilities.

In the ongoing conflict in Gaza, Israel’s objectives have expanded as the war progressed, especially in response to perceived threats from Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the key actor, Iran. The initial plan of eliminating Hamas expanded to include neutralising Hezbollah as a threat, and eventually, confronting Iran directly. Politics played its role, with both Israel and the United States of America (USA) colluding to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. The military adapted these expanding objectives. Numerous differences between military and political leadership have been reported in the media. However, ultimately, political decisions prevailed, and the Israeli Army is now pursuing the objective of complete control of Gaza.

The Korean War provided a clear example of the supremacy of political authority in wartime. Operations beyond the Yalu River were not authorised to preclude a confrontation with China. Logistics and some operating bases were located on the far side of the river, preventing the military from interdicting supplies or attacking those bases. This situation created conflict between the military commander, General MacArthur, and the political leadership. The disagreements ultimately led to the US President Harry Truman firing General MacArthur. This well-publicised incident reinforces the principle that politics is the master during war, and the military is the means.

Wars are often pursued for political interests, which means that political leaders may impose restrictions on military operations to hedge against undesirable consequences, similar to those experienced during the Korean War. For instance, during the Kargil War, a restriction was imposed on crossing the Line of Control (LoC). This limitation likely contributed to the high casualties sustained by the Indian Army and created challenges during air attacks. The political leadership imposed this restriction to prevent a nuclear escalation. Similarly, the use of heavy artillery was prohibited during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations. Although this constraint complicated combat efforts, it was implemented without resistance. Political constraints are not unusual and are generally imposed to preclude escalation to a broader conflict. Since political decisions take precedence, the military must plan its operations while considering these imposed limitations.

Coming to the issue of defining success in war. Two terms are used interchangeably in this context: victory and success. Victory usually refers to military objectives, such as defeating enemy forces and capturing territory. In contrast, success is about achieving political goals. War is fundamentally a political endeavour; politics defines the purpose of the war, while the military serves as the means to accomplish that purpose. Success follows when the military achieves the political objective of the war. Clausewitz emphasises this distinction, stating, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” Ultimately, wars are fought primarily for political objectives.

Success in war involves achieving defined strategic and political goals that enhance a nation’s position vis-à-vis the adversary. In this context, was Op Sindoor a success? Although the political goals were not disclosed before the operation commenced for obvious reasons, they were articulated by the Prime Minister in his address to the nation after the ceasefire was declared. He clearly outlined the political goals: India would retaliate against terrorist attacks on its own terms, there would be no distinction between terrorists and their state sponsors, and India would not tolerate nuclear blackmail. All three political goals were accomplished. Terrorist dens within Pakistan’s Punjab heartland were severely impacted, military targets associated with the state sponsor of terrorism were attacked, and the threat of nuclear escalation was effectively disregarded.

Once the political objective of Op Sindoor was achieved, there was no reason for further attacks, despite India being in a dominant position. Continuing such operations would have been aimless and would not have served any political purpose. In response, Pakistan might have escalated the situation, leading to unintended consequences. This tendency to continue with military operations after achieving political goals is referred to as “Victory Disease.” Such action hinders long-term success, and as Colin Gray noted, they represent “the extreme, almost euphoric, condition of overconfidence.”

The term “Mission Creep” refers to the tendency to continue operations after achieving initial goals. This term was first used by The Washington Post in relation to the USA’s intervention in Somalia. Initially, the US intervention aimed to provide humanitarian aid, but it eventually expanded to include nation-building efforts, culminating in the catastrophic incident known as “Black Hawk Down.” A similar scenario unfolded during the Libyan Civil War of 2011, where a multi-state coalition intervened with humanitarian objectives that progressively transformed into a regime change effort. This shift led to chaos, and Libya continues to face civil unrest even today. Another case was about the Korean War. It began as a defence of South Korea against a North Korean invasion. After the initial success, the scope of the conflict expanded to include attempts to reunify the Korean Peninsula. However, this goal proved unattainable as the Chinese intervened, resulting in a costly war, followed by the allies retreat through North Korea back to the 38^th Parallel.

“Mission Creep” or “Victory Disease” refers to the continuation of hostilities after initial objectives have been met, often driven by overconfidence and resulting in unexpected and unpleasant consequences. In the case of Op Sindoor, continuing operations after the ceasefire could have led to unforeseen and unpleasant consequences. In hindsight, better judgment prevailed, and the operation was appropriately paused at the right time.

War is fundamentally a political event, with the military serving as a means to achieve political ends. It is the political context that dictates certain restrictions on military operations. Consequently, military planners need to consider these restrictions or constraints when planning operations. The primary purpose of war is to achieve political objectives; therefore, it is reasonable to expect that fighting will cease once these goals are met. In light of these conclusions, it can be confidently stated that Op Sindoor was a success, as it accomplished its political goals. Furthermore, the decision to accept the ceasefire was both timely and appropriate; continuing operations beyond that point would likely have been futile and could have led to unpleasant consequences.

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