Keywords: National Security Strategy, strategic autonomy, China White Paper, Non-proliferation

In November 2025, two major nuclear powers, China and USA, released strategy documents within weeks of each other. Though not on the same subject, they provided insights into strategic issues as they envision them. They also make for a study in contrasts. While the Chinese document is old school, classic diplomatic writing, the document by the United States of America reflects the personality and style of the current leadership.

China was first off the mark with its White Paper entitled, China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation in the New Era. This was the second iteration of a Paper on the same subject released in 2005. The new document provides fresh insights into Chinese thinking on nuclear issues. Later the same month, the USA released its broad-based National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, the first official document on the subject by the current administration. As is the tradition in the USA, each president brings out his own set of official documents on national security, defence strategy, and nuclear posture.

Different Styles, Divergent Priorities

The recent Chinese and American documents vary widely in language, tenor, and messaging. China’s White Paper adopts a diplomatic tone though liberally extolling the ‘constructive role’ that Beijing plays in shaping global security. The US NSS, on the other hand, is unapologetic about its ‘America First’ approach. It does not couch its objectives in diplomatese, nor does it pretend to pursue global peace and stability. In fact, there is an expressed unwillingness to share global burdens that do not directly align with American national interests.

Also divergent from the US NSS of 2022, which had identified Russia and China as near-peer threats of equal weightage, the 2025 version plays down Russia’s threat potential. China is listed as the primary challenger to be addressed by reshaping the economic relationship on the basis of “reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence” and by building deterrence to prevent any large-scale military conflict by “maintaining American economic and technological pre-eminence.” In meeting these objectives, the US exhorts its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific too, to step up through increased defence spending and preparedness.

China’s White Paper, meanwhile, does not mention the USA by name. Instead, it uses the code word “a certain country” that seeks “absolute strategic superiority by constantly expanding its armaments, strengthening combat readiness, and provoking bloc confrontation.”  China decries such policies for their impact on regional peace and security, erosion of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and exacerbation of security risks of emerging technologies.

Both also frame their relationship with friends, partners and allies quite differently. Washington adopts a transactional approach of ‘burden sharing and burden shifting’, asking the allies and partners to take more responsibility for their own security. As the Strategy states, “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”  China, meanwhile, emphasises joint handling of issues by “building a community with a shared future for humanity.” It envisions international relations characterised by “mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.” The irony is that while China uses lofty terms that are seldom evident in its relationships, the USA has discarded even lip service to such ideals. On the economic front, for example, the USA has weaponised trade by emphasising tariffs and reshoring, while China seeks to secure resources through elite capture and debt diplomacy.

The Nuclear Dimensions

As regards nuclear weapons, the US explicitly states that it seeks “the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent, plus next-generation missile defences—including a Golden Dome for the American homeland—to protect the American people, American assets overseas, and American allies.” China criticises such pursuit as stubborn maintenance of a “massive nuclear weapons stockpile while further reinforcing its nuclear deterrence and war-fighting capabilities.” BMD is particularly opposed for “reshaping the traditional strategic offense-defence dynamic, posing new challenge to global strategic stability.” As things stand, both are engaged in a nuclear arms race – expanding arsenals, building new delivery systems, developing missile defences and refusing to engage in strategic stability dialogues.

Both also seek dominance in emerging technologies. The USA blatantly declares, “We want to ensure that US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” China, meanwhile, couches its desire to lead the regulation of these fields within the framework of global governance and equity through UN-mandated mechanisms. Given its position and influence in the Global South, it leverages numerical support within multilateral institutions by prioritising these debates in such forums.

China’s White Paper is explicitly on arms control and non-proliferation, but it does not offer any new ideas for advancing these fronts. It describes nuclear weapons as a ‘sword of Damocles’, recounts the grim state of affairs and laments the risks. The bulk of the paper, however, extols China’s ‘constructive role in international arms control’ by listing its membership of multilateral treaties. It applauds China’s commitment to the principle of nuclear restraint by stating that it has “never used nuclear weapons to threaten other countries nor deployed nuclear weapons outside its territories, and has never provided a nuclear umbrella for other countries.” However, it neither mentions nor explains the rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear arsenal. The US NSS, meanwhile, makes no mention of arms control or non-proliferation, which have slid low down in the US priority for now.

Both documents indulge in strategic storytelling, as is the wont of such articulations. They create narratives for global consumption. While the USA shows little regard for the existing order and is in retreat from its traditionally global role, China positions itself as a guardian of stability by invoking the vision of a multipolar world an “equal and orderly” international order where it can institutionalise its influence over old and new domains.

Takeaways for India

As the two major powers reimagine their competitive relationship and work out a modus vivendi, it is clear that India should build its relationships with both of them independently of the other. The USA and China are both important for India for different reasons. Its relations with one must not be contingent on the other. In fact, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is of utmost importance in a world where the major powers will only be looking out for themselves. India must continue to team up with nations wherever its interests align and not hesitate to stand apart on divergent issues. A flexible response, rather than the fixity of relationships, seems to be the order of the day.

Given the centrality of the Indo-Pacific to India’s security, New Delhi must keep its focus on building the necessary relationships in the region, irrespective of the level of US participation. China will try to use all kinds of proxy tools to create digressions for India and disrupt its rise as a contender. India will have to be prudent to choose its fights wisely and concentrate on building its comprehensive national power. That would be the biggest deterrent.

India must also not hold back on leveraging its economic strength of demographics, skilled workforce, manufacturing potential, and markets. Simultaneously, it must enhance its soft power by showcasing the stabilising effects of its philosophy of strategic restraint in military operations and nuclear build-up. No-First-Use (NFU) should be India’s too to leverage in multilateral fora. In fact, none of the other nuclear-armed states has shown as much restraint and responsibility as India in building its nuclear arsenal and in the use of conventional force in nuclear shadow in the face of complex security challenges.

One way to let the world know the Indian side of the story could be to bring out one’s own strategy document of sorts. Irrespective of whether it is called a White Paper or a National Security Strategy, the document could provide the Indian version of how the country perceives the global landscape, where it plans to go, and how it intends to navigate its way towards the goals. The document would be a high-order articulation of the principles/guidelines that reflect the nation’s vision on all elements of national security. Such an articulation could serve as a compass for different ministries to find their fix while keeping a common goal in sight.

Over the decades, various governments have drafted such vision documents and toyed with the idea of putting them in the public domain. But there has been a hesitation to do so. Of course, not having such a publicly articulated document does not mean the country lacks a coherent strategy. On the other hand, having a publicly shared strategy document could make it more inclusive for fellow citizens, and also provide clarity to the rest of the world on India’s vision and priorities.  A clear national security strategy that has been well deliberated across all strands of comprehensive national power could better enable India to harness resources in service of its expressed aspiration of being a consequential power in a world as fractious as the present one.

The new year may be a good time to start a debate on the pros and cons of a publicly articulated Indian NSS given that India has changed, and so has the world.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

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Author: Ms Priyanka Yadav, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: QUAD, Strategic Flexibility, Indo-Pacific, Strategic Autonomy

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Keywords: India–Africa, Critical Minerals, Rare Earths, South–South, Strategic Autonomy

The recent visit of India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, to Ghana and Namibia represents a diplomatic outreach and an extension of India’s National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), shaping its global economic strategy. These visits are not just a symbolic gesture, but a sign of India’s intention to expand its presence in the African region, which has long been dominated by China and is increasingly contested by the United States (US) lately. China’s near-monopoly on rare earth processing and its position in the global supply chain make it an existential necessity for India to expand its critical mineral partnership. With nearly 100 per cent import dependence on cobalt, nickel, and lithium, India’s search for resource security can be met by building partnerships with African countries, which have vast and untapped reserves of critical minerals and strategic resources. This article examines the potential of India’s critical mineral partnership with Ghana and Namibia, set against the backdrop of changing global supply chain dynamics. It analyses India’s strategic interest in leading the Global South, focusing on its long-term development partnerships with Africa through bilateral agreements for critical minerals, including rare earth elements and uranium.

From Shared Histories to Strategic Partnerships

India has long claimed a special affinity with Africa, rooted in a shared anti-colonial history, ties forged through the Non-Aligned Movement, and a shared vision of a more equitable global order. In recent years, New Delhi has sought to transform that historical goodwill into concrete partnerships, driven by its booming economy (now among the world’s largest) and pressing needs in energy, technology, and markets.[1] As Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently embarked on a five‐nation tour, including Ghana and Namibia, with additional stops in Latin America, India’s increasing engagements with these countries take place amid intense competition among major powers in Africa. India’s pitch emphasises South-South solidarity, capacity-building and digital partnership – a contrast with the heavy infrastructure loans of China’s Belt and Road and the transactional aid-for-trade of Western powers.[2]

Prime Minister Modi’s Africa tour began in Ghana, where he became the first Indian premier in three decades to visit Accra. India and Ghana pledged to double bilateral trade within five years and inked a series of agreements covering defence, agriculture, health, culture, and digital payments. Modi announced that “Indian companies have invested nearly USD 2 billion in about 900 projects” in Ghana and set a target to double trade by 2030. He also offered to share India’s experience with its Universal Payments Interface (UPI) system, saying, “in the field of FinTech, India is ready to share its experience of UPI digital payments with Ghana.” Among the four new Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) signed was a fintech pact to deepen cooperation in digital infrastructure. The leaders agreed to bolster defence cooperation (including training and equipment) and to combat terrorism together. Notably, India backed Ghana’s ambition to become a regional vaccine hub and reaffirmed support for African positions in global forums (Modi welcomed the African Union’s new permanent seat at the G20).[3] In a symbolic gesture, Ghana conferred on Modi the Officer of the Order of the Star of Ghana, underscoring the warmth of ties.[4]

In Namibia, Modi’s agenda shifted to resource diplomacy. Namibia is Africa’s largest uranium producer and home to vast reserves of lithium, copper, and rare earth elements. New Delhi sees Namibia as a key partner for securing critical minerals to support its EVs and clean energy initiatives. Indian exports to Namibia already surpass USD 400 million, and Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Namibia (in mining, manufacturing and diamonds) is roughly USD 800 million. PM Modi’s talks with President Netumbo Nandi‐Ndaitwah and an address to Namibia’s Parliament (the first by an Indian PM in 27 years) focused on long‐term supply agreements for uranium and other minerals. According to media reports, India is in discussions for uranium supply deals and joint mining ventures. It even aims to bypass the London/Antwerp trade hubs to import Namibian rough diamonds directly, thereby feeding India’s gem industry. A tech MoU was also signed to enable cross‐border UPI interoperability – part of India’s digital diplomacy sweep. Namibia’s government views Modi’s visit as an opportunity to attract investment and bolster its global standing in the mineral value chain.[5] Semafor reports that Indian officials consciously framed the trip as a South-South partnership, pushing back against any suggestion of “neo‐colonialist” resource grabs.  PM Modi emphasised that India “has historically stood with Africa” and is committed to investing in skills and technology with local communities. During the tour of Ghana and Namibia, specific outcomes were achieved, including MoUs focused on digital infrastructure, finance, and mining, as well as commitments to defence training and the establishment of high‐level ministerial mechanisms.  This tour highlighted India’s message of mutual respect and a commitment to development partnership.[6]

India’s Africa Model: A Different Kind of Partnership

Unlike the Chinese approach, which often hinges on large-scale infrastructure projects tied to sovereign debt, India’s pitch to Africa is couched in the language of capacity-building, sustainable investment, and digital public infrastructure. Africa holds nearly 30 per cent of the world’s critical mineral reserves. Yet for decades, its nations have mostly exported raw ore without developing domestic refining or value chains. [7] India’s model, if pursued with sincerity and scale, offers a corrective: joint ventures in processing, skill-sharing, digital governance, and local employment.

India’s National Critical Minerals Mission (launched in early 2025)[8] and the setting up of strategic hubs like its Dubai office for mineral acquisitions[9] show that this isn’t just about diplomacy; it’s about building an industrial foundation. Ghana offers rare earth mining potential, Namibia has uranium and lithium, and Zambia has become a new frontier for copper and cobalt exploration. Strategically, these alliances reduce India’s over-dependence on China and give it new bargaining power in the clean-tech and defence sectors. They also strengthen its pitch as the voice of the Global South, a narrative PM Modi leaned into strongly during both his visits.[10]

To grasp the significance of India’s moves, it is essential to understand the broader global landscape. China is Africa’s largest economic partner, with trade reaching USD 282 billion in 2023 alone. It has financed massive rail, road, and port infrastructure under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often in exchange for long-term access to critical resources.[11] However, concerns about debt distress, labour standards, and extractive business models have grown. A recent Wall Street Journal investigation noted how many African governments are pushing back against one-sided agreements, particularly as they seek to maximise the value of their mineral exports.[12]

The US, for its part, is trying to re-engage. President Joe Biden’s October 2024 visit to Angola focused on launching the Lobito Corridor, a rail network to ship cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to global markets via Angola’s ports. Through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and new clean-tech partnerships, the US is gradually recalibrating its approach from aid to strategic investment; however, it still lacks a cohesive Africa strategy.[13] India’s offer stands out as more flexible, digitally forward, and framed as demand-driven. Its lines of credit are smaller, but grants and technical cooperation have fewer political strings. Many African countries view this as a more respectful and less transactional approach.

From Intent to Impact

PM Modi’s outreach to Africa extended beyond critical minerals. It sought to establish India as a key player in shaping a multipolar world in the 21^st century. His embrace of the African Union’s G20 seat, support for United Nations (UN) reforms, and defence and digital diplomacy demonstrate a country ready to lead and not just talk and sign agreements. India’s Africa strategy is still in motion. However, if it remains consistent, by investing in people, respecting sovereignty, and co-creating capacity, it can turn good intentions into lasting influence.

In the mineral-rich soil of Africa, India may yet find the foundations of its own strategic autonomy. India’s foray into Africa is fast evolving from nostalgia to realpolitik. PM Modi’s recent trips to Ghana and Namibia yielded both symbolic goodwill and practical agreements, ranging from trade and UPI to minerals and defence ties. India has made significant progress: bilateral trade has increased to USD 100 billion (as of FY 2023), and Indian corporations, along with small entrepreneurs, are actively engaged across the continent.[14] Yet India still lags well behind China in sheer volume and deeply ingrained influence. In the future, New Delhi must leverage its trump cards – its robust MSME (Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises) sector, Information Technology (IT) expertise, English‐language affinity and diaspora linkages – to translate goodwill into growth. In addition, India should invest in local value addition (refineries, electronics assembly) and skills, so that Africa sees lasting development rather than mere extraction. It should also continue to champion African priorities on the world stage, such as pushing for debt relief, climate finance, and UN reforms, to strengthen its moral leadership among the Global South.[15]

But for India to succeed, intent must translate into impact. Three things are critical:

1. 1. Invest in Value Chains, Not Just Resources: Building refineries, battery plants, and training programs in Africa will benefit both sides. India should move beyond shipping raw minerals and focus on developing local capabilities.

   2. Be Visible, Be Fast: India’s infrastructure projects often experience slow delivery and poor public relations. Africa’s younger generation needs to see India as more than a sentimental friend—it must be seen as a results-driven partner.

   3. Back it with Capital: India may not outspend China, but it can out-innovate and build a greater trust. Combining the strengths of public sector entities, such as Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL), National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC), and Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL), with agile private investments and digital tools, like UPI and Aadhaar, is essential.

In essence, India is positioning itself as Africa’s development partner of choice: one that shares historical solidarity, offers technology and expertise, and leaves behind colonial-era baggage. If it succeeds, India can become an indispensable part of a multipolar Africa, shaping the continent’s supply chains and geopolitics in its next chapter. As Modi’s visits made clear, the India-Africa partnership is poised to move from rhetoric to a results-oriented agenda; the question is whether both sides will sustain the momentum to turn opportunities into enduring progress.

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Notes

[1]  Veda Vaidyanathan, “India, Africa and Critical Minerals Towards a Green Energy Partnership,” Centre for Social and Economic Progress, Working Paper-91, March 2025. https://csep.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/India-Africa-and-Critical-Minerals-Towards-a-Green-Energy-Partnership.pdf. Accessed on July 18, 2025.

[2]  Pia Krishnankutty, “India‘s economic sway in Africa is far behind China‘s but ‘trump cards‘ yet to be played,“ The Print, May 17, 2025. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/indias-economic-sway-in-africa-is-far-behind-chinas-but-trump-cards-yet-to-be-played/2088059/. Accessed on July 20, 2025.

[3]  Anil Trigunayat, “Third Voice of Global South Summit: How India is institutionalising a developing world perspective amid polarising global order,” Firstpost, August 16, 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/third-voice-of-the-global-south-summit-how-india-and-developing-world-perspective-amid-polarising-global-order-13805378-13805378.html. Accessed on July 21, 2025.

[4]  Alyson le Grange, “PM Modi in Namibia: Diplomacy for Minerals, Diamonds & More on Agenda, ” Firstpost, July 10, 2025. https://www.firstpost.com/web-show/firstpost-africa/pm-modi-in-namibia-diplomacy-for-minerals-diamonds-more-on-agenda-firstpost-africa-n18g-vd1268391/. Accessed on July 20, 2025.

[5]  Ubeer Naqushband, “On first leg of five-nation tour, PM receives 21-gun salute in Ghana,” The Tribune, July 3, 2025. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/pm-modis-longest-diplomatic-visit-in-10-years-a-focus-on-global-south-cooperation/. Accessed on July 21, 2025.

[6]  “PM Modi Ghana visit highlights: Key outcomes and agreements between New Delhi and Accra,” Economic Times, July 3, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/pm-modi-ghana-visit-key-highlights/articleshow/122216455.cms. Accessed on July 20, 2025.

[7]  Magnus Ericsson, M., O. & A. Löf, “Chinese control over African and global mining—past, present and future,” Miner Econ 33 (2020): 153-181, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13563-020-00233-4. Accessed on July 21, 2025.

[8]Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “National Critical Mineral Mission,” April 9, 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2120525. Accessed on July 22, 2025.

[9]  Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Union Minister HD Kumaraswamy Meets Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, Inaugurates MECON & NMDC Offices in Dubai,” June 30, 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2141001. Accessed on July 23, 2025.

[10]  Ibid. Accessed on July 23, 2025.

[11]  Vaidyanathan, “India, Africa and Critical Minerals.” Accessed on July 18, 2025.

[12]  Giulia Petroni, “Critical Minerals Supply Risks Mount Amid China‘s Grip, Export Curbs,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/finance/commodities-futures/critical-minerals-supply-risks-mount-amid-chinas-grip-export-curbs-f4b2f666. Accessed on July 18, 2025.

[13]  Trevor Hunnicutt and Miguel Gomes, “On 11th-hour visit to Angola, Biden pledges lasting support to Africa,” Reuters,     December 3, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/biden-mark-us-angolas-shared-slave-trade-history-2024-12-03/#:~:text=During%20brief%20remarks%20at%20the,in%20Washington%20in%20December%202022. Accessed on July 23, 2025.

[14]  Ibid. Accessed on July 23, 2025.

[15] Confederation of Indian Industry, Government of India, “Report- Pathways for Shared Progress: India-Africa Economic Cooperation,” August 2024,                                                       https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/Pathways%20for%20Shared%20Progress%20India_Africa%20Economic%20Cooperation.pdf. Accessed on July 23, 2025.

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