DETERRENCE AND DISSUASION

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INTRODUCTION

Deterrence and dissuasion are terms used by academics as well as military strategists. This article is an attempt to throw light on what the international strategic community understands by these terms. It traces their origins, explains the basic theory, comments on their characteristics as well as limitations, shows how they have been used, and tries to emphasise on the relationship between the two. Deterrence emerges as a more restrictive strategy, while dissuasion is more nuanced, with many more lines of action. Deterrence studies have a lot of history to draw on, while dissuasion is new. I will first write about deterrence, followed by dissuasion, elucidating with examples, emphasising on their differences.

DETERRENCE

Deterrence has different connotations when used as a generic concept, than when used as a military theory. Deterrence as a concept has been often historically used whether in diplomacy, interpersonal relations, or even by animals. It finds academic mention in the writings of international relations theorists like Bentham and the father of Realism, Hobbes. It regained prominence as a theory after 1959, when Bernard Brodie expounded upon it in relation to the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, offering it as

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Whereas earlier, coercive diplomacy promised the threat of hurt to a population after a military victory, with nuclear weapons, *victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy***. This ability to** *hurt without victory* **was at the heart of the deterrence strategy of the nuclear era.**

an alternative to massive retaliation.[1] Other theorists also expanded the theoretical debate, foremost being Thomas C. Schelling.[2] Schelling explained how the nature of war had been radically altered by nuclear weapons. Whereas earlier, coercive diplomacy promised the threat of hurt to a population after a military victory, with nuclear weapons, *victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy*. This ability to *hurt without victory* was at the heart of the deterrence strategy of the nuclear era. The same logic applies to the use of air power over other forms of force application towards coercive diplomacy. Since landed armies need victory before promising hurt, and air power does not, air power also emerges as a preferred tool of deterrence. Deterrence is now, thus, an accepted strategy for nuclear as well as conventional conflict.

In simple terms, deterrence is the use of threats by one party to another party to **refrain** from initiating some course of action.[3] Patrick Morgan narrowed its scope to say it is "the threat of military retaliation to forestall military action." [4] It is a "form of preventive influence that rests primarily on negative incentives."[5]

Deterrence has four defining characteristics. Being a theory based on microeconomic decision-making, it assumes that both states behave as rational actors. Rationality implies economic evaluation of cost and benefit, where economics predicts a rational actor, making value maximising choices.

1. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959; reprint, Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), pp.264-304.
2. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence,* (1966; reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), and *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
3. P. K. Huth, , "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, 1999, pp. 25-48, as cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterrence_theory, accessed on July 7, 2013.
4. T. V. Paul et al, *Complex Deterrence – Strategy in The Global Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 35.
5. Ibid., p. 37.

First, deterrence emphasises on potential **costs** or negative inducements alone, and not benefits. Second, to succeed, the deterrer must possess adequate **capability** to carry through his threat. Third, it should be able to **communicate** this threat to the opponent, and last, the threat must be **credible**.[6]

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The credibility depends on both **military capability**, as well as **believed resolve** by the enemy that the deterrer will act. The believed resolve itself depends to a great extent on past history, especially display of 'costly behaviour'. Costly behaviour, like, say, military action, shows the demonstrated resolve. For example, China has repeatedly demonstrated resolve to act militarily over territorial claims, whether in Tibet, the Indo-China War, or, lately, in the show of force over Diaoyu Islands. These actions define sensitivity to thresholds in the adversary's minds and affect the deterrence calculus of the adversary.

The need to have military capability to effectively deter drives nations that have adopted deterrence as an articulated strategy, to arm themselves. The superpower nuclear arms race was a classic example. This propensity is explained by the classic balance of power theory argument. Kenneth Waltz, a leading international relations scholar, explains how nations try to maximise power for security in two ways: internal or external efforts. In the military domain, internal efforts are through increase in military strength. The other option, external efforts, is alliance-based, either strengthening own alliances, or weakening opposing ones.[7] Thus, if deterrence becomes an articulated strategy, it leaves a country which does not want to get bound

6. Ibid., p. 2. I have used the rational actor model in the entire article when referring to countries' actions. This is a simplification used for ease of analysis as well as representation. In reality, an action/ decision taken by 'India' is a result of many forces / individuals/ stakeholders, played out in a fluid environment which influences outcomes.
7. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Waveland Pr Inc, 2010), p. 118. However, even alliance-based deterrence can be equated with 'extended deterrence', where the force of a great power is used as the potential threat. The problem here is that 'credibility' weakens, in the case of extended deterrence, the onus of proving credibility falling on the great power.

by military alliances, and has enemies, no choice but to continue arming itself to achieve credible deterrence, nuclear or conventional.

Deterrence is actually a sub-set of coercion strategies. Coercion is of two types: compellence, forcing someone to do something particular or desist from doing something already started; and deterrence, preventing someone from doing something.[8] Compellence involves both the threat of use of force or the actual use of force, while deterrence only uses the threat of force. Compellence leaves the compelled with no choice, and so is more difficult, while deterrence tries to make the enemy avoid one particular path, amongst the many he has. However, both can work through similar ways.

How do you deter? Air power theorist Robert Pape, while talking about coercion through air power says that coercion (since deterrence is a sub-set of coercion, this applies to deterrence as well) works mainly through two distinct ways: **punishment strategies** and **denial strategies**.[9] Punishment implies the threat of hurting the other state, often translating to hurting the population. Denial implies the threat of denying the enemy his objective. It often translates to denying the military objective. It helps to cognitively separate nuclear deterrence from conventional deterrence.

Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence

In the nuclear context, counter-value targeting is a punishment strategy, while counter-force targeting is a denial strategy. In the current context, the recently articulated massive retaliation response nuclear strategy of India seems to indicate a counter-value targeting of the entire state of Pakistan – a punishment strategy for deterring any use of nuclear weapons.[10] Half

8. Schelling, n.2, pp. 70-72.
9. Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win – Air Power and Coercion in War* (USA: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 13. Other writers have reiterated the same two strategies for deterrence. Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), was the first one to suggest these. Also, T.V. Paul, et. al., eds., *Complex Deterrence : Strategy in a Global Age (*Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2009*)*. Pape also argues that the best instrument for coercion is air power, rather than land or sea power.
10. Indrani Bagchi, "Strike by Even a Midget Nuke will Invite Massive Response, India Warns Pak," *The Times of India,* April 30, 2013), at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-30/india/38928972_1_pakistan-shyam-saran-india, accessed on May 2, 2013. Statement by Shyam Saran, convener, National Security Advisory Board.

a century ago, the US' European strategy of counter-force targeting of the USSR's forces was partly because despite having accepted the responsibility to protect Berlin, "the Western position could not be maintained with conventional weapons in a straightforward fight."[11] Nuclear weapons seemed the easiest denial strategy weapons against the conventionally stronger USSR's land offensive.

Conventional deterrence differs from nuclear deterrence in its effectiveness. Deterrence as a concept underwent much study because of the Cold War. Thus, when the current generation thinks of deterrence, it is unconsciously influenced by the cognitive baggage of the nuclear era. The logic of mutually assured destruction was a logic of mutually assured deterrence, to deter nuclear war. Pape has consciously separated nuclear coercion from conventional coercion. What works for nuclear deterrence may not work for conventional deterrence. While the threat of punishment works in a nuclear scenario due to the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, it fails in the conventional scenario due to the small damage caused by conventional weapons vis-a-vis resilience of the populations and states. Punitive bombing does not work, unless it is nuclear. During World War II, all the fire-bombing of Japan did not reduce resistance, but two atomic weapons broke its collective will. However, nuclear and conventional deterrence have one thing in common – the air medium is most often used for the threatened application of force.

Continuing with regard to coercion through conventional air power, Pape also adds **risk** and **decapitation** strategies to the former two, and also asserts that they are not very effective, maintaining that the denial strategy is the best form of coercion in **conventional** warfare. Risk strategies involve manipulation or escalation of risk, "raising the probability of suffering costs… slowly raises the probability of civilian damage."[12] Decapitation works on targeting the key command control, and communication capabilities – the classic C3. Pape shows

11. Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.229. However, the trouble with the counter-force strategy is that it is easily associated with first use, as the USSR interpreted in the case of Berlin.
12. Pape, n.9, p. 18. He argues that in nuclear coercion, risk works better than denial. Thomas C Schelling is the one who articulated manipulation of risk of punishment as a workable nuclear era strategy.

how the denial strategy through air power works best when it aims to nullify the military objectives of the enemy through the roles of interdiction of target systems and counter-surface force operations, especially in short wars. Even here, he leans towards the latter, the destruction of enemy forces, the same objective Clausewitz holds paramount. Its best recent example is Gulf War 1, where Instant Thunder in the first six days was not decisive but contributory. "...depleting frontline infantry divisions, and destroying a large amount of equipment in place, theater air power unhinged Iraqi military strategy."[13] Pape tries to prove by historical examples that pure punishment strategies (like Douhet's used in World War II to bomb population centres), risk strategies (manipulation of risk through gradually escalating punishment of the enemy, as propounded by Schelling), and decapitation strategies (as was tried against Saddam Hussein during Gulf War I), are not very effective options for air power deterrence strategies in **conventional** warfare. If we believe his logic, the best conventional air power strategy, denial of enemy objectives, means that with a reactive stance of deterrence, own *strategy employed to deter depends on the enemy strategy*. While what applies to coercion also applies to deterrence, the reverse may not be true.

Nuclear deterrence is often a strategy of the weak.[14] This is because the weaker force knows it cannot win the war, but both sides know that with nuclear weapons, the weak state can inflict unacceptable damage. The damage is unacceptable because of the immense power of nuclear weapons and the speed at which they can be used. As Schelling said, victory over enemy forces is no longer needed to inflict punishment on the other side, a prerequisite before the advent of both nuclear and air power. Recent examples support this generalisation of nuclear deterrence being an apt strategy for the weaker side. As per one analyst, in order to avoid nuclear confrontation, a stronger India has shown restraint vis-a-vis a weaker Pakistan on four occasions : 1986, 1990, 1999, and 2001-2002.[15] In 1999,

13. Ibid., p. 58.
14. Brodie, n.1, p.275.
15. Sunil Dasgupta, "How Will India Respond to Civil War in Pakistan?", S*trategic Analysis*, vol. 37, no. 4, July August 2013, pp.388, 401. He attributes this to deterrence as well as the Indian culture of strategic restraint.

it was a miscalculation of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence which emboldened the conventionally weaker Pakistan to attempt a misadventure in Kargil.[16] North Korea has deterred the US from initiating offensive action, something Iraq and Libya failed to achieve, because they lacked nuclear weapons. Iran understands this, hence, its quest for nuclear security against the US. For the weaker countries, the nuclear deterrence strategy has an inescapable lure as "value for money" security against larger forces, conventional or nuclear. Even in a conventional scenario, if the aggressor is convinced that the defender has the capability to destroy his forces, a denial of objective, he will be deterred. Thus, **punishment and risk** may **work for nuclear deterrence** while **denial** is the strategy of choice **for conventional deterrence**.[17]

Deterrence does not always work. Various reasons have been offered for its failures. However, a failure of deterrence is essentially a failure to deter the mind of the target. States do not always act with the level of rationality we expect of them. others cultural values and frames of reference often differ from our own. The failures bring out the limitations of the classic deterrence theory, which like all theories, is a simplification of reality, and so incomplete. Its biggest problem is "strategic monism; the belief that one strategic concept fits all situations."[18] The situation is often not the one we have prepared for. The liberal thought on deterrence says its chances of working are better when coupled with positive incentives. Used as a stand-alone strategy, its chances of failure are higher; used as one tool with other complementary strategies of influence, its chances of success increase. Dissuasion is one such framework.

DISSUASION

Dissuasion as a strategy first made its appearance in 2001 when the US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld introduced the concept in that year's

16. Dinshaw Mistry, "Complexity of Deterrence Among New Nuclear States: The India-Pakistan Case" Paul et al., n. 4, p. 183.
17. However, as Pape contends, denial does not work against guerrillas. As the US is practising in Afghanistan and Pakistan, decapitation may also work as a complementary action to political solutions, rather than an attempt at denial using air power.
18. Mackubin Thomas Owens, *National Review Online*, January 5, 2005, cited in Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p.143.

Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR). The *National Defence Strategy of the United States*, published in 2005, followed by the QDR of 2006, reiterated the strategy. The term has also been heard in Indian strategic circles. Yet, being a newer strategy, at least in articulation, its meaning is unclear to most. Much less has been written about dissuasion as compared to deterrence. The most comprehensive write-up is by Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert C. Martinage in their 2008 study.[19]

The study defines **dissuasion** as "actions taken to increase the target's perception of the anticipated costs and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening or otherwise undesirable." It continues "dissuasion can be viewed as a kind of 'pre-deterrence' in which the target—which may be an opponent or even an ally—is discouraged, not from employing the military capabilities it possesses, but from creating such capabilities in the first place."[20] However, if a state were to fail in dissuading another from building a capability, it then perforce has to deter it from using it. Many people confuse the term 'pre-deterrence' with 'mini-deterrence', assuming that dissuasion works on the same principles as deterrence, just on a smaller scale. This understanding would lead to an emphasis on force structure build-up, rather than specific strategies to operationalise dissuasion.

While Krepinevich's study only talks about capability as the object of dissuasion, the same precepts may also apply to a course of action. In an earlier 2006 study, James A. Rushton says, "Dissuasion is a strategy for persuading adversaries to seek acceptable alternatives to building threatening capabilities **or adopting hostile intentions** …. Dissuasion is a framework for organising strategy directed at dealing with *future* threats. As such, it complements other traditional national strategies (such as deterrence or coercion), and *uses* deterrence, coercion, and even

19. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert C. Martinage, *Dissuasion Strategy* (Washington DC: Centre For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2008), at http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2008/05/dissuasion-strategy/, accessed on April 28, 2013. Most of the following write-up is extracted from the report, using its definition and argument, explaining with my examples.
20. Ibid., p. vii.

appeasement, to meet overall policy goals."[21]

Unlike deterrence which uses only the threat of cost via military retaliation, dissuasion works on both **increased cost and reduced benefit**, using not only the military tool, but also economic and diplomatic instruments of persuasion. On the **cost** side, dissuasion works by increasing the target's perception of the anticipated cost of developing or expanding a particular military capability. This could be economic, military or diplomatic costs.[22] For example, Nepal is naturally dissuaded from developing offensive military capability against India purely on the **economic cost** involved. Increasing international condemnation for terror camps increases Pakistan's **diplomatic cost** in keeping its India oriented terror camps intact.

On the **benefit** side of the equation, dissuasion works by diminishing the target's perception of anticipated benefits. This works by convincing the target that the capability it seeks is not survivable, diminishing the target's perception of an offensive capability's operational effectiveness, or changing the character of the competition.[23] China's Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test was a dissuasive message to the US that increasing space dominance may not give the anticipated benefits, because the **capability is not survivable**. Similarly, a potential weaponisation of space by the US may dissuade nuclear missile capable countries from developing Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) because the many of them may be knocked out before reentry, **reducing operational effectiveness**, and so reducing the incentive to invest in this technology. This would also be an example of the US **changing the character of the competition**, from terrestrial to space strength. This shift to space weapons can also dissuade countries from challenging US space capabilities due to the economic cost involved.

In some ways, dissuasion is also a limited strategy because it works only on the targeted capability and only through negative influence on the incentives. Both increasing cost and reducing benefits are negative

21. James A Rushton, *Operationalizing Dissuasion*, Thesis, (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), p.v. at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/rushton06_dissuasion.pdf, accessed on April 28, 2013.
22. Krepinevich and Martinage, n.19, pp. viii-ix.
23. Ibid., pp. ix-x.

Dissuasion is more visible in its failure than its success, especially in hindsight. China's investment in asymmetric capabilities like ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons, cyber-attack, and AAAD (Anti-Access Area Denial), is a failure of US dissuasive efforts.

incentives. Perceived increase in benefits in pursuing capabilities other than the targeted capability can also be used as a positive tool, complementing dissuasion. Such influence would work on the opportunity cost calculus of the target. For example, seen from China's point of view, it would prefer that the US military spending be channelled into the US Army, a less threatening capability, as compared to the US Air Force (USAF) or US Navy (USN), both entities with more offensive potential. Influencing US domestic policies to ensure that the chunk of the homeland defence role, along with its budget, goes to the army, rather than the USAF, would channel the expansion budget away from the USAF.[24]

Dissuasion works on cost and benefit through many tools. Explaining some of the tools which may be used to dissuade, Rushton says, "Methods of implementing a dissuasion policy include: presence and engagement; controlling the spread of technology and arms; conditional promises of support and threats to withdraw support; building economic ties that promote influence; and erecting cost, technological, and 'human capital' barriers to effective competition."[25] To continue with the earlier example, one way China can help the US Army get a bigger piece of homeland defence is by ensuring a presence in US think-tanks, influencing the outputs.[26]

24. The USAF has already increased its role in homeland defence. See, Eric V. Larson, "US Air Force Roles Reach Beyond Securing the Skys,"*Rand Review*, Summer 2002, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/rr-08-02/airforce.html and Staff Sgt. Mathew Bates, " NORAD Commander: Air Force Role Vital to Homeland Security," November 8, 2006, at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123031246, accessed on July 7, 2013.
25. Rushton, n.21, p.18.
26. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which de-facto controls foreign policy, has apparently already infiltrated US think-tanks to influence policy. Chidanand Rajghatta, "ISI has Infiltrated US Think-Tanks, Pak Scholar Says," *The Times of India*, June 30, 2013, at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-06-30/us/40285947_1_moeed-yusuf-pakistan-scholar, accessed on July 7, 2013.

Dissuasion is more visible in its failure than its success, especially in hindsight. China's investment in asymmetric capabilities like ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons, cyber-attack, and AAAD (Anti-Access Area Denial), is a failure of US dissuasive efforts. By militarily leading other countries by an insurmountable margin, its predominantly realist vision of international relations, coupled with a propensity to use force as a preferred tool of coercion, using the air and sea media to project this force, the US forced China to change the character of the competition – China transferred capability into alternative technologies and asymmetric strategies. The same can be said to have happened in the case of Pakistan investing in tactical nuclear weapons. The perceived asymmetry in conventional combat potential may have inadvertently induced the Pakistani defence establishment to shift capability into cheaper nuclear deterrence.[27]

The perceived asymmetry in conventional combat potential may have inadvertently induced the Pakistani defence establishment to shift capability into cheaper nuclear deterrence.

There are many reasons why dissuasion might fail. First, the target's rationality might not be what one assumes. It is very important to understand how the target perceives the world, and what alternatives it would evaluate. Much of North Korea's brinkmanship relies on the questionable rationality it projects.[28] Second, dissuasive strategy must have overt and covert elements. As Krepinevich says, "Whereas some dissuasion strategy initiatives are best pursued in the light of day so that the target (or targets) and others can readily discern them, others are best pursued covertly, such that a target cannot easily discern a direct link between US actions and their intent."[29] China's recent increased capability development in the

27. The arms embargo on Pakistan, the Indian transparent defence purchases, and the propensity of all nations to inflate the military potential of adversaries, and paranoia over possible territorial loss, all may have contributed to this unintended result. In hindsight, this capability shift could only have been prevented if avoiding a nuclear race with Pakistan had been identified and articulated as a dissuasive politico-military aim.
28. Schelling, n.2, pp. 17, 187-203. He shows how deliberately risky behaviour is good strategy of keeping the other side guessing, unsure of control of the situation, convinced that the risk of war is real and uncontrollable – the crazy man may actually start the conflict.
29. Krepinevich and Martinage, n.19, p. xii.

Finally, dissuasion fails because, though more effective than deterrence, it is difficult to operationalise. Operationalising dissuasion requires much strategic thought, and implementation via multiple agencies, while operationalising deterrence requires mainly capability build-up, which falls in tune with any organisation's tendency to keep expanding.

Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) could be partly attributable to the reactionary Indian capability build-up being overt, a very normal feature for a liberal democracy. The Indian media playing up the Chinese threat, the Indian Army's publicised bid to raise new mountain strike corps, the Indian Air Force's publicly known capability increase in the northeast, may all have contributed to China perceiving India as an increasing potential threat. Third, a successful dissuasion may result in unintended consequences, forcing a rival to choose an unintended path. For example, in an article that offers a dissuasive framework on how the US should influence the People's Liberation Army (PLA) procurement decisions, Eric Sayers argues that the PLA might turn the dissuasive efforts of the US against itself. This could be by the PLA itself stopping ASAT development, but simultaneously blocking weaponisation of space – and, thus, raising "the political costs for the United States of developing, testing, and deploying space-based missile defence systems."[30]

Finally, dissuasion fails because, though more effective than deterrence, it is difficult to operationalise. Operationalising dissuasion requires much strategic thought, and implementation via multiple agencies, while operationalising deterrence requires mainly capability build-up, which falls in tune with any organisation's tendency to keep expanding. It is also simpler to pursue a strategy like deterrence, whose implementation can be independent of coordination with other agencies. Dissuasion also needs to be operationalised at the national level, while deterrence can even

30. Eric Sayers, "Military Dissuasion: A Framework for Influencing PLA Procurement Trends," at http://www.ndu.edu/press/military-dissuasion.html, accessed on April 28, 2013.

be implemented down to a tactical military level.[31] For all these reasons, deterrence tends to emerge as the strategy of choice, while dissuasion is never discussed. Countries which rely on deterrence tend to continue arming, while those which use dissuasion tend to also use strategy. Conversely, it is easier to pursue dissuasion in organisational structures where all agencies can be made to cooperate in pursuance of a strategy which requires inter-agency coherence. These agencies include the branches of the military, the diplomatic corps, and intelligence agencies.

As realists assert, it is capability which threatens, because once capability exists, intentions can change overnight. This logic is at the heart of spiral instabilities of arms races – only military capability matters. Dissuasion works on capability, deterrence works on the intent to use the capability.

Krepinevich asserts that the most important ingredient of dissuasion is good intelligence. He means strategic intelligence, understanding reality, the imperatives of all players who have a stake in decision-making. This is essential to decide who should be dissuaded, from what, and by what means. Not only must this dissuasive strategy be decided, it must be articulated to the actors who will implement the common dissuasive strategy through their individual strengths – economic, diplomatic, military, and information. Rushton articulates a broader understanding of intelligence to give maximum importance to the "strategic culture" of the target as the framework within which dissuasion works. Strategic culture both sets limits to what is possible, as well as indicates what trajectories are more probable.[32]

DISSUASION TO DETERRENCE

When dissuasion fails, deterrence is the next step. This is because, once you fail to prevent the target from building a capability, you next need to work

31. For example, a border incursion can be deterred by a local level tactical military build-up, but dissuading the enemy from a similar capability build-up on his side of the border cannot be done at the local tactical level.
32. Rushton, n.21, pp. 21-29.

at preventing him from using it. Dissuasion alone, in the dictionary form of the word, cannot be trusted to ensure non-use of military capability. This is also a realist argument. As realists assert, it is capability which threatens, because once capability exists, intentions can change overnight. This logic is at the heart of spiral instabilities of arms races – only military capability matters. **Dissuasion works on capability, deterrence works on the intent to use the capability**. However, a country need not work on negative inducements alone; along with deterrence, it helps to use positive tools – emphasise the rewards of not pursuing the threatening path.

After pure dissuasion fails against capability build-up, and deterrence emerges as the dominant strategy, it can still be complemented by dissuasive strategies too. In such a case, we need to accept Rushton's more inclusive definition of the object of dissuasion being not only capability, but also "a course of action", in other words – intent. However, we must keep in mind that before the capability is built, dissuasion is the more efficient strategy, and after build-up, deterrence, even as you may still try to dissuade intent too.

While the entire paper has used the term strategy to classify dissuasion and deterrence, they are not really strategies. They are instead (strategic) *concepts*. These concepts help every level of the politico-military structure to easily understand higher guidance – policy. True strategy involves much effort in choosing the *ends* to be achieved, as well as assessing the *means* available, before choosing and articulating the *ways*. Dissuasion and deterrence are two amongst many such *ways*. These "strategic concepts provide direction and boundaries for subordinate strategies and planning."[33] They become strategy only when the ends, ways, as well as the context of the strategic environment, are articulated alongside.

CONCLUSION

Nations use both dissuasion and deterrence as strategic concepts, mostly in the military context. Both have distinct meanings, characteristics, and ways

33. For a fuller explanation see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 140-144.

to achieve them. Both can work or fail. Dissuasion is more nuanced and uses many tools to achieve the ends, applying the tools through affecting the cost and benefit calculus of the target. Deterrence only works through the cost calculus, using only the threat of use of force. Dissuasion works to primarily discourage a capability build-up, while deterrence works to prevent use of the capability already built. This makes deterrence the poorer strategy. Yet, deterrence is more often the chosen strategy. This is more because of the effect of the national politico-military structure on strategic trajectory, than because of the objective strategic choice.

This article presents a condensation of the work of some theorists and academics. How does one use this knowledge? By asking the right questions. What capability do we want to dissuade? Why? How shall we achieve the ends? Which agency will play what part? How will we know we are succeeding or when we have failed? When should we switch to either new capabilities to dissuade, or acknowledge a failure of dissuasion, and switch to deterrence? What force structures will be required to deter? How will we communicate our deterrence stance unambiguously to the adversary? How much of our behaviour must seem risky? How do we display this risky behaviour? Will our chosen deterrence strategy be nuclear punishment, or conventional denial? Shall the preferred deterrence tool be the land forces, air forces, or naval forces? Why?

Dissuasion and deterrence are but two concepts in a repertoire of strategies. They are often used together. They are also misunderstood, especially when used together. But any agency which uses these specific terms, needs to first either accept the given definitions of dissuasion and deterrence, or articulate its own doctrinal understanding, so that it can effectively operationalise these concepts in its own context.