




CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES (CAPS)

Forum for National Security Studies (FNSS)

INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from
Centre for Air Power Studies

From the Editor's Desk

From September 21–23, Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to the United States. Prime Minister Modi met with President Joe Biden during the bilateral portion of his visit to the US, during which he evaluated the Comprehensive and Global Strategic Partnership. Additionally, he attended the sixth Quad Summit, which President Biden convened, along with leaders from Australia, Japan, and the US. He spoke at the UNGA's Summit of the Future as part of the multilateral component.

During their 11th Australia-Japan 2+2 in Melbourne, the foreign and defense ministers of Australia and Japan agreed to further enhance their security cooperation in light of China's assertive actions in the East and South China Seas. Shigeru Ishiba won Japan's LDP election on September 27 and took over as Japan's new Prime Minister.

The Taiwan Strait was in focus during the month, with the first passage by German warships through it since 2002 on September 13, a transit by a USN aircraft on September 17, and the first ever transit by a Japanese destroyer across the Strait on September 25.

On September 15, the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) withdrew PCGS Teresa Magbanua, which caused a surprise turn in the stalemate between the PCG and the China Coast Guard (CCG) at Sabina Shoal. Although the PCG maintains that it has not given up on the Shoal, China actually has the means and the motivation to stop the Philippines' ships from being redeployed.

This month we present specially selected opinions and cherry picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts.

Jai Hind

Vol IV, No 05, 07 October 2024

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PEEP-IN

The Recent Quad Summit and Its Takeaways

Read more about it at :-

<https://japan-forward.com/the-recent-quad-summit-and-its-takeaways/>

QUOTE

Free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific is our shared priority and shared commitment. QUAD is here to stay, to assist, to partner, and to complement.

- Prime Minister Narendra Modi

Opinions/Review/Expert View

Biggest Takeaway from Quad Summit is that it's here to Stay

Source: Harsh V. Pant and Sayantan Haldar | ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/biggest-takeaway-from-quad-summit-is-that-it-s-here-to-stay> 24 September 2024



US President Joe Biden hosted the Prime Ministers of India, Australia, and Japan for the fourth in-person Quad Leaders' Summit at his hometown, Wilmington, last week. This summit was seen as crucial for multiple reasons. First, it was the last one to be attended by Biden, a key architect of the grouping's institutionalisation, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who played a pivotal role in adding political heft to the forum. Second, 2024 marks 20 years since the formation of the grouping. Third, and most importantly, the Wilmington summit further consolidated the grouping by expanding key areas of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, this summit has been successful in signalling - 'The Quad is here to stay'.

With enduring wars in Europe and the Middle East, China's belligerent activities in the Indo-Pacific region and emerging non-traditional security challenges in the region, the Quad had its task cut out.

At a time of highly complex global crises playing out in different parts of the world, the Quad leaders' summit took place in the context of critical challenges and vital opportunities. With enduring wars in Europe and the Middle East, China's belligerent activities in the Indo-Pacific region and emerging non-traditional security challenges in the region, the Quad had its task cut out. The Wilmington Declaration - the joint statement of the Quad leaders - amply addressed these critical questions.

The Wilmington Statement

The joint statement issued by the leaders of the Quad grouping in Wilmington exhibits continuity in responding to the war in Ukraine, reiterating the urgent need to put an end to the conflict and uphold the spirit of international law. Similarly, this year's statement expressed concerns over ballistic missile launches conducted by North Korea and the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear missiles and technologies. Additionally, the Wilmington Declaration focused on the ongoing conflict in Gaza as well.

The group shared its concerns over the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza advocating for a sovereign, viable, and independent state of Palestine while remaining sensitive to the concerns of Israel. Apart from these, the statement further reiterated concerns over the worsening political and humanitarian situation in

Myanmar, as well as attacks by the Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. However, China remained the big-ticket question for the Quad in the Indo-Pacific context. On the China question, Quad's response this year seems sharper than the previous years. Earlier, at the Quad Foreign Ministers' meet, the grouping called Beijing out - albeit without naming it - for disregarding international law and unilaterally acting in the East and South China Sea region. Similarly, the Quad leaders expressed their concern over increasing militarisation in disputed pockets of the Indo-Pacific. Responding to the tensions in the region, the grouping condemned the use of coastguards and maritime militia vessels, which serve as China's tactics for coercive and intimidating manoeuvres.

A Slew Of Announcements

Quad's synergy on issues of maritime safety and security in the Indo-Pacific has also gained vital momentum at this summit. A joint coastguard-level cooperation among the four Quad countries - Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission - proposed at the summit seeks to improve interoperability among the coastguard services of the four countries, advancing cooperation in the domain of maritime safety and security. Similarly, responding to the imminent challenges posed by natural calamities and disasters in the Indo-Pacific, the grouping announced the launch of the 'Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network', which is meant to pursue shared airlift

capacities in a bid to improve cooperation in the domain of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities.

Additionally, Quad's efforts to bolster Maritime Domain Awareness through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) received a significant push with Australia committing to involve the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency to enhance cooperation, as well as by the grouping proposing a new Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI). This summit further consolidated its regional

The Quad Fellowship programme has been expanded to include students from ASEAN countries demonstrating the grouping's inclusion of regional partners in fostering people-to-people ties.

partnerships through continued cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Notably, the Quad Fellowship programme has been expanded to include students from ASEAN countries demonstrating the grouping's inclusion of regional partners in fostering people-to-people ties.

The slew of announcements made at this year's Quad summit, and the resultant Wilmington Declaration, underscore the enduring promise and relevance of the grouping. While Quad continues to respond to critical geopolitical challenges in the world - specifically in the Indo-Pacific - it has also demonstrated a robust positive agenda to harness shared opportunities.

Indeed, the Quad is here to stay, in pursuit

of a free and open Indo-Pacific - one that is inclusive and resilient.

Philippines may Face China-Sized Hurdle as it makes its Case for UN Security Seat

Source: Sam Beltran | SCMP

<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3280786/philippines-may-face-china-sized-hurdle-it-makes-its-case-un-security-seat>

03 October 2024



The Philippines is campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), a bid analysts say could bolster its diplomatic leverage to address maritime tensions in the South China Sea. However, they warn Beijing’s veto power might hinder these efforts.

Making his country’s case before the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo said on Sunday that the Philippines “has emphasised that the rule of law and the integrity of the multilateral system must prevail amid the current global challenges”.

Philippine officials called the missile boats’ presence at Half Moon Shoal illegal, as analysts warned it could be turned into an airbase.

He also noted that President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr, affirmed that “multilateralism

remains the single viable platform for collective action against transcendent global challenges.”

In September, Manalo announced the Philippines’ intention to seek support for a non-permanent seat on the council for the 2027-2028 term.

“The Philippines is making positive headway in its campaign for the UNSC, secure in our proven track record of being a dependable partner, pathfinder and peacemaker in world affairs, with eight decades of multilateral diplomacy experience as a founding member of the UN and having previously sat in the UNSC four times,” Manalo said.

Without explicitly naming China, Manalo alluded to rising tensions in the South China Sea.

“Despite irresponsible and dangerous actions against our legitimate activities within our own waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Philippines remains committed to diplomacy and other peaceful means,” the Philippines’ top diplomat said, adding that the country will abide by the UN Charter and Manila declaration on the peaceful resolution of disputes.

He also rejected narratives portraying the South China Sea as a stage for a “proxy war” between China and the United States.

“We do not accept narratives depicting the South China Sea as a theatre of major power rivalry because they all ignore what is an essential truth: all

states in this region have a right to determine their own destiny and secure their own future,” he said.

Non-permanent members of the UN Security Council are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with five seats up for election each year. To win a seat, a candidate country must secure a two-thirds majority of votes from member states. The vote for the 2027-2028 term will be held in mid-2026.

A Seat at the Table

Observers said securing a seat on the Security Council could give Manila a platform “to advocate for its interests.”

Matteo Piasentini, an analyst with the Italian think tank Geopolitica, said Manila’s bid was consistent with its foreign policy goal of internationalising its maritime disputes with Beijing, “highlighting Manila’s role as a responsible member of the international order, observant of international law, norms, and principles.”

“Additionally, being a member of the Security Council provides a platform for informal consultations and dialogue, which may serve as a useful avenue for the Philippines in pursuing its strategy,” Piasentini said.

Still, observers cautioned that raising issues about tensions in the West Philippine Sea – Manila’s term for the portions of the South China Sea within its exclusive economic zone – may have limited impact due to China’s status as a permanent member of the UNSC.

Piasentini said if the Philippines secures a

seat on the council, China is unlikely to respond strongly as both countries already engage in various multilateral forums. However, he acknowledged that Beijing could use its veto power to block any resolutions Manila might propose concerning disputes in the South China Sea.

“[The Philippines] has to be realistic too, given the structure of the UN Security Council, with five members, including China, enjoying veto powers,” Nathaniel Candelaria, assistant professor at the University of the Philippines’ political science department, told This Week in Asia.

He added that Manila may face other hurdles, given geopolitical disputes in the South China Sea.

All three Indian and Japanese military services – army, naval and air – held bilateral exercises in 2023, including the inaugural Veer Guardian 2023, which took place at Japan’s Hyakuri Air Base.

China claims most of the South China Sea, based on its “10-dash line,” which overlaps significantly with the Philippines’ EEZ. An international tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines in 2016, rejecting China’s claims as inconsistent with international law. Beijing rejected the ruling and continues to assert control, leading to frequent maritime confrontations.

Candelaria said Manila’s hopes for winning a seat may “depend on how it packages its candidacy as a non-permanent member”.

In his speech before the General Assembly, Manalo highlighted the Philippines’ contributions across various UN initiatives, saying the country “offers constructive solutions across the spectrum

of the work of the United Nations.”

“The Philippines is a trusted partner, innovative pathfinder, and committed peacemaker. We bring experience, depth, and steadfastness in working with the international community to address common global challenges,” he added.

While a seat on the UNSC could elevate the Philippines’ global influence, observers remain sceptical of the body’s capacity to deter Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea.

“Unfortunately, as we’ve seen many times in the history of the body, great powers that possess veto prerogatives aren’t easily deterred by the Council’s operations. For example, it didn’t stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and recently, in 2024, the US vetoed a resolution that aimed at granting Palestine statehood,” Piasentini said.

Candelaria said that China’s permanent membership also prevents the council from deterring its activities in the disputed waterway.

“Even so, the Philippines can still use the UNSC as a platform to raise these issues. Even if the UNSC will not be able to act on it,” he added.

Meanwhile, Piasentini said that Beijing may likely use its veto powers to strike down any resolution that Manila may try to pass regarding the South China Sea, but added that “this may very well be what the Philippines aims for – to show which of the two is acting responsibly for the sake of international peace and stability.”

Prime minister Abe Shinzo, the long-time president of the LDP and another staunch conservative, who served as PM from 2012 to 2020 before his assassination in 2022.

Japan’s New Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru Faces Internal, External Challenges in Lead-up to National Election

Source: Stephen R. Nagy | Asia Pacific

<https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/japans-new-prime-minister-ishiba-shigeru-faces-challenges> 03 October D2024



Japan's new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba speaks during a press conference at the prime minister's office on October 1, 2024, in Tokyo, Japan. Ishiba was elected as the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan after winning the leadership election of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. | Photo: Yuichi Yamazaki, Pool/Getty Images

The selection of Ishiba Shigeru, who won his party’s leadership race to become Japan’s new prime minister on October 1, reflects the divisions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party between the centre-right and harder right.

Ishiba’s slim margin of victory over the staunchly conservative Takaichi Sanae in the second round of intra-party voting demonstrates that the LDP is still negotiating internally what kind of party it wishes to be after the death of former prime minister Abe Shinzo, the long-time president of the LDP and another staunch conservative, who served as PM from 2012 to 2020 before his assassination in 2022.

This introspection includes what ideologies inform the basis of its governing and national philosophy, economic policies, and what degree of securitization of foreign policy the members are willing to accept.

Ishiba will not advocate for liberal migration policies, dynamically promoting gender and other forms of equality, or deviating from Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy.

In fact, Ishiba, a former defence minister, has advocated for the establishment of an Asian NATO and for members of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, the country's military, to be stationed in the U.S. He even visited Taiwan prior to the election to highlight the island's importance to Japan's security.

Support for Ishiba's leadership is precarious. During the LDP's internal election process, it wasn't until outgoing prime minister Kishida Fumio threw his support behind Ishiba's candidacy that the latter was able to win a modest victory over conservative favourite Takaichi, a close ally of former prime minister Abe.

Ishiba's lack of conservative appointments in his cabinet further suggests that he is serious about transforming the LDP's ideological inclination. And by appointing former prime minister Suga Yoshihide as vice-president of the LDP while sidelining Aso Taro from the same role, Ishiba is indicating that he aims to break the influence of the old conservative guard within the LDP and tack to the centre-right.

But this will be difficult. The conservative old guard has never been shy about pressuring sitting prime ministers to step down. To illustrate, between 1997 and 2012, Japan had no less than eight prime ministers

Not so Great Domestic Expectations

On the domestic front, policy continuity is likely in the Ishiba administration. This means policies instituted under Abe, including the so-called three arrows (Abenomics), will be carried over with modest reform. Expect further investment in measures to promote families as Japan's dire demographic problems remain, and modest migration reform to allow more non-skilled labourers to work in those parts of the Japanese economy that ordinary Japanese citizens won't. There is also the possibility that Ishiba will normalize same-sex marriage if his prime ministership lasts beyond a year.

Ishiba's lack of conservative appointments in his cabinet further suggests that he is serious about transforming the LDP's ideological inclination.

There is consensus within the LDP about further investing in economic security and resilience initiatives in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, past experiences with economic coercion and hostage diplomacy, and the possible breakdown or weaponization of supply chains. An Ishiba administration is likely to continue to strengthen these signature policies.

Japanese prime ministers have few options to fundamentally transform the country's socio-economic structure in a short period of time. For example, Abe Shinzo, despite being in power for almost eight years and being a dominant political force in the LDP, couldn't make significant

progress on pension and social welfare reform, digitization, gender equality, or allowing more horizontal and vertical mobility in the labour market.

Ishiba's past record as a party outsider suggests that he may not be able to accrue support within the party for consequential economic reform to deal with Japan's many economic and social problems.

Foreign Policy Opportunities and the Limits of a Securitized China Policy

By including two former defence ministers in his new cabinet, Ishiba is signalling to both party members and Japanese society that he is taking security threats from China, Russia, and North Korea with the utmost seriousness.

However, his proposal for an Asian NATO has been met with skepticism from Washington. The region's heterogeneity in terms of politics, economics, and security challenges makes this idea untenable, as does the fact that most countries in the region don't want to choose between China and the U.S.

Over-securitizing Japan-China relations also has limitations. China, which still sees Japan as a source of investment, technology, and human capital development, hosts over 20,000 Japanese small and medium enterprises, and the bilateral trade relationship as of 2023 was approximately US\$380 billion. This mutually beneficial trade relationship continues to deepen despite security tensions and public perceptions reaching record-

high rates of unfavourability in both countries.

Bolstering Japanese relations with Taiwan, meanwhile, would only provoke Beijing to engage in economic coercion, hostage diplomacy or other tactics to convey to an Ishiba administration that deviating from the One-China Policy is the reddest of red lines.

However, Ishiba may find other room to manoeuvre in the foreign policy domain. Examples include investing in existing partnerships such as the Japan-U.S. alliance; the reciprocal access agreements (RAA) with Australia, the U.K., and the Philippines; the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; expanding CPTPP membership; and investing in existing and new minilateral arrangements.

Many countries view Japan as an international 'adapter' and middle power that helps countries connect with each other and with associations in

the Indo-Pacific. To illustrate, with the CPTPP, Japan was indispensable in bringing together developed and developing economies to forge this 21st-century trade agreement.

Japan has also used the Quad and minilateral partnerships between the Philippines, the U.S., and Japan to engage in infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, technology transfers, and other projects.

Ishiba, while working with allies and partners, can expand the scope of Japan's international co-operation. For example, he could offer to work with Canada, the Philippines,

Ishiba's past record as a party outsider suggests that he may not be able to accrue support within the party for consequential economic reform to deal with Japan's many economic and social problems.

Vietnam, and Indonesia on Illegal, Unregulated and Undocumented (IUU) fishing. In trade, he could advocate for CPTPP expansion with new members, including South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and even China and Taiwan.

In the area of combating disinformation, Ishiba could find a way to work with partners that are on the forefront of dealing with this global challenge by offering to form a non-state-level consortium of research institutes or organizations specifically focused on identifying, mitigating, combating, and vaccinating our societies against disinformation.

Intra-Party Challenges will Determine PM Ishiba's Longevity

The challenge for Ishiba is that while he may be a new face, he has, at best, only a marginal base of support within the LDP. Without a broader base, he will find it difficult to formulate and implement policies, especially against the backdrop of intra-party opposition from more conservative politicians.

Prime Minister Ishiba has called for a general election on October 27, 2024. This election will be critical to the longevity of his prime ministership. A weak LDP showing could reflect poorly on Ishiba's attractiveness as a leader and on the cabinet he has assembled. If the LDP under-performs, Ishiba's political adversaries will try to replace him. If the party is successful, Ishiba may win some time and earn some political capital to spend on some of his campaign pledges.

Why this matters for Canada

What happens in Japan matters for Canada. It is a major trading partner and a priority partner in Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy. With its bilateral relations with India and China less than ideal, Canada can ill afford Japan falling into another cycle of rotating or weak prime ministers. In preparation for that possibility,

Ottawa should seek to insulate its lines of co-operation at the institutional level. This will require more military-to-military, parliamentarian-to-parliamentarian, and business-to-business exchanges. Ottawa

could also work with the new Japanese leadership on initiatives that accrue political capital in both Tokyo and Ottawa, such as expanding the CPTPP, working together in lobbying the U.S. post-2024 presidential elections, and more.

Prime Minister Ishiba has called for a general election on October 27, 2024. This election will be critical to the longevity of his prime ministership.

Modi's U.S. Visit Underscores India's Deepening Ties with Washington, Quad

Source: Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury, Suyesha Dutta and Tanya Dawar | Asia Pacific

<https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/modis-us-visit-underscores-indias-deepening-ties-washington>

02 October 2024



Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participates in a Quadrilateral Summit 'family photo' with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Joe Biden, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the Archmere Academy in Wilmington, Delaware, on September 21, 2024. | Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP

via Getty Images

The Takeaway

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's three-day visit to the U.S. in late September to attend the Quad Leaders' Summit — comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. — reaffirmed India's commitment to joint security efforts in the Indo-Pacific and highlighted the growing importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the 'Quad') amid rising geopolitical tensions in the region.

The visit also underscored that India-U.S. ties are deepening despite allegations by the U.S. Department of Justice in November 2023 of New Delhi's involvement in a murder-for-

hire plot targeting a Sikh activist in New York. While similar issues have derailed Canada-India relations, ties between New Delhi and Washington have advanced, with their strategic co-operation reaching new heights in technology, defence, and regional security matters.

In Brief

- At their meeting in Wilmington, Delaware, the four Quad leaders agreed to extend co-operation on issues ranging from public health to semiconductor supply chains. The most notable efforts, however, focused on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Key initiatives that came out of the leaders' summit include expanding joint training and naval operations to enhance interoperability, real-time monitoring of regional waters, and developing port infrastructure.
- Separately, Modi met with U.S. President Joe Biden for a bilateral discussion on strengthening India-U.S. ties. The two nations will jointly establish a new advanced semiconductor fabrication facility in the eastern Indian city of Kolkata.
- In advance of Modi's arrival, White House officials met with Sikh activists in the U.S., assuring them of protection against "any transnational aggression on U.S. soil." Despite these sensitivities in the relationship, Biden described U.S.-India relations during Modi's visit as "stronger, closer, and more dynamic than ever."
- Modi also met with top executives from major

Modi met with U.S. President Joe Biden for a bilateral discussion on strengthening India-U.S. ties.

U.S. tech companies such as Nvidia, Alphabet, and IBM. He encouraged greater collaboration in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and semiconductors to enhance India's position as a hub for manufacturing and innovation.

Implications

China remains an unnamed focus of Quad co-operation. While the minilateral grouping seeks to counterbalance China's rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, it has thus far avoided directly naming Beijing as an adversary. Although the recent Quad leaders' joint statement also refrained from explicitly mentioning China, Biden's concerns about China were inadvertently captured on a 'hot mic.' The summit's joint declaration featured stronger language regarding the South China Sea than in previous years, "express[ing] serious concern about the militarization of disputed features, and coercive and intimidating maneuvers in the South China Sea."

The statement also underscored maritime security in the Indo-Pacific as a critical area of co-operation. This includes expansion of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, an existing agreement on real-time monitoring and tracking of regional waters, new initiatives on joint coast guard operations, increased military logistics co-operation, and port development.

Despite challenges, the India-U.S. strategic partnership has deepened. Shared security concerns in the Indo-Pacific and the need to

build resilient supply chains amid growing economic and security competition with Beijing have helped to cement India-U.S. ties. So, too, has closer collaboration in critical technologies, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors, which has been bolstered by the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, launched in January 2023.

These shared concerns and incentives have helped to foster resilience in the bilateral relationship, allowing it to withstand tensions over New Delhi's enduring friendship with Moscow and the Indian government's alleged involvement in a 'murder-for-hire' plot targeting a Sikh activist on U.S. soil.

What's Next

1. Teaming up on 'Cancer Moonshot,' Pandemic Preparedness, and more

The Quad Cancer Moonshot announced at the summit will combat cervical cancer in the

Shared security concerns in the Indo-Pacific and the need to build resilient supply chains amid growing economic and security competition with Beijing have helped to cement India-U.S.

Indo-Pacific region. This initiative includes a pledge of US\$7.5 million from New Delhi for vaccines that guard against cervical cancer and the provision of detection kits to other Indo-Pacific countries. Additionally, the Quad has launched an initiative for pandemic preparedness, under which India will host a workshop and release a white paper on emergency public health responses. Other areas of emerging collaboration include critical and security technologies, such as a new open radio access network for a secure and resilient telecommunications ecosystem to be provided to Pacific Island nations and Southeast

Asia.

At the summit, Quad leaders also finalized a memorandum to collectively address semiconductor supply chain risks. India and the U.S. announced that they will establish an advanced semiconductor plant in Kolkata, which will focus on powering electronics for national security, next-generation telecommunications, and green energy applications.

2. Canada Remains an Outlier

While Ottawa's 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy identified New Delhi as a "critical partner," Canada-India relations spiralled after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's statement in September 2023 on the alleged involvement of agents of the Indian state in the murder of a Canadian Sikh activist in Surrey, B.C. In contrast to deepening India-U.S. ties, Canada-India official diplomatic relations remain frozen. Canada remains an outlier as India's relations with other Western nations continue to strengthen.

Cherry-Picks of the Month

1. Prime Minister Modi's Visit to The US: Strengthening Ties Through QUAD Summit and Key Bilateral Meetings - <https://www.indiatoday.in/global/story/prime-minister-modis-visit-to-the-us-2600935-2024-09-16>
2. Philippines Withdraws Ship from Disputed Area of South China Sea - https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/09/0ee70c085c77-philippines-withdraws-ship-from-disputed-area-of-south-china-sea.html#google_vignette
3. German Navy Ships Transit Taiwan Strait, Draw Chinese Criticism - <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/german-navy-transits-taiwan-strait/>
4. Australia-Japan 2+2 and the Latticework of Partners - <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-japan-22-and-the-latticework-of-partners/>
5. Tough Challenges Ahead for Japan's New Prime Minister - <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/10/tough-challenges-ahead-for-japans-new-prime-minister/>

Caps Experts View

1. Analysing India-South Korea Defence Ties and Korea's Defence Industry - <https://capsindia.org/analysing-india-south-korea-defence-ties-and-koreas-defence-industry/>

Podcasts/Debates/Discussions

- 1.- U.S. and The Philippines Conduct Joint Patrol with Allies as China Test-Fired IBM into the Pacific - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYzmCfSHx4I>
- 2.- Shigeru Ishiba elected new Prime Minister of Japan | ABC News - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DOqrp3jKMY>
- 3.- Special Show | PM Modi in Quad Summit 2024 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WiZtsviWd3w>



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Centre for Air Power Studies

P-284 Arjan Path, Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110010

Tel.: +91 - 11 - 25699131/32 Fax: +91 - 11 - 25682533

Email: capsnetdroff@gmail.com

Website: www.capsindia.org

Editorial Team: Ms Simran Walia

Composed and Formatted by: Mr Rohit Singh, CAPS

Contact: +91 9716511091

Email: rohit_singh.1990@hotmail.com

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