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INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from Centre for Air Power Studies

From the Editor's Desk

On October 1, Shigeru Ishiba took the oath of office as Japan's 102nd prime minister. He called for hasty elections, but the ruling LDP-Komeito combination only managed to secure 215 seats—far less than the 233 needed for a majority—likely bringing about a period of political instability. By kicking out a Japanese fishing boat from the area around the Senkaku Islands, China posed a challenge to the newly established Ishiba government.

On October 10, Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to Vientiane, Laos, to attend the 21st ASEAN-India Summit and the 19th East Asia Summit. Additionally, on October 22–24, he traveled to Kazan, Russia, for the 16th BRICS Summit. To reestablish bilateral relations, Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu traveled to India from October 6–10. The two nations signed a new Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership Agreement.

India hosted the drill in the Bay of Bengal from October 8–18, marking the return of drill Malabar to the Indian Ocean. Indian naval vessels also took part in the October 13–18 Exercise Naseem Al-Bahr with the Omani Navy, the October 23–29 Exercise SIMBEX-2024 with the Singapore Navy, and the October 06–18 Exercise IBSAMAR-2024 with the South African Navy. On October 31, North Korea tested an ICBM, which is thought to have a range of more than 18,000 kilometers, which is enough to cover the entire continental United States.

This month we present specially selected opinions and cherry picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts.

Jai Hind

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The BRICS imperative for India

Read more about it at :-

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-brics-imperative-for-india>

QUOTE

India attaches great importance to friendly relations with ASEAN. We are committed to adding even more momentum to this relation in the times to come

- Prime Minister Narendra Modi

Opinions/Review/Expert View

Asian NATO: Why India Does Not Back Japan's Idea Despite Tensions With China & Alliance With Tokyo?

Source: Simran Walia | The Eurasian Times

<https://www.eurasiantimes.com/asian-nato-why-india-does-not-back-japans/> 08 October 2024



File Image: QUAD Nations Meet

As a result, on October 01, Ishiba took over as prime minister of Japan from Fumio Kishida following his official election by the Japanese parliament. Ishiba stands for an attempt to change the LDP. If you vote for him, it indicates that the LDP is committed to fostering a reform-oriented image. If a non-conformist, non-faction leader is elected, the LDP should be stronger for the elections that take place next month.

Known for his defense expertise, Ishiba is likely to continue many of the policies of his predecessor, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. However, it is also widely anticipated that he will seek methods to strengthen Japan's independence while appreciating the importance of the American

alliance.

Some of these strategies include renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement and exploring collective security agreements with like-minded allies in Asia.

The inauguration of Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister ushers in a new era for the nation's military tactics and foreign policy. In an article he wrote for the Hudson Institute in Washington, Ishiba advocated for a conversation on the potential for American nuclear weapons to be stationed in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and the establishment of an Asian counterpart to NATO.

This project not only changes the course of Japanese policy but also questions the country's remilitarization and what it means for the rest of the region.

Japan followed a pacifist posture outlined in its Constitution for many years. But shifting political dynamics worldwide and escalating hostilities in the area—particularly in light of China's expanding military might and North Korea's nuclear aspirations—are pressuring

Japan to reevaluate its defense policies.

Shigeru Ishiba, a well-known supporter of bolstering Japan's defense capabilities, has drawn attention to the absence of an Asia-Pacific

collective defense framework that is NATO-equivalent and capable of successfully thwarting threats from nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea.

On September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged victorious in a runoff against top female candidate Sanae Takaichi to become the head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan.

Ishiba explicitly suggested in his statement that an alliance be formed in Asia to coordinate operations with the United States and maybe employ nuclear weapons as a deterrent. This action represents a significant shift from Japan's "nuclear-free" posture adopted after the war. Tokyo has long refrained from making official commitments to nuclear weapons, even in spite of its close defense ties to the United States.

However, Japan's objectives have changed as a result of North Korea's nuclear ambitions and China's growing military activities, notably near the disputed Senkaku Islands.

China has been acting more aggressively in the South China Sea and surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims as its own. The increased level of tension makes Japan more dependent on security assurances and ways to stave off possible attacks.

In the meantime, China and Russia maintain their military cooperation by deepening their strategic partnership and holding cooperative drills. In this situation, Ishiba suggested an Asian alliance modeled after NATO.

The countries in the region will have no choice but to look for measures to safeguard their interests if China and Russia maintain their tight coordination. It is believed that Ishiba's idea is a reaction to these altering global dynamics. Recently, for the first time, Chinese warships sailed into Japanese waters while Chinese aircraft flew over Japanese

airspace. In response, Japan sent its own warships—for the first time—into the Taiwan Straits.

Apart from maintaining nuclear deterrence, Japan is proactively improving its military capabilities and fortifying its alliance with the United States armed forces. One of the biggest military exercises, with 45,000 soldiers, is called "Keen Sword-25," and it is slated for the fall of 2024. These drills show Japan's preparedness to incorporate military activities into its civilian domain by utilizing civilian infrastructure like ports and airports.

China has been acting more aggressively in the South China Sea and surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims as its own.

Tokyo is trying to move away from its long-standing pacifist position, which restricted the use of its military forces to self-

defense, as these moves indicate. Although Japan adheres to a Constitution that outlaws war as a way of resolving international conflicts, its current activities demonstrate increased confidence in the need for active deterrence.

Positioning India

PM Ishiba's proposal to form an Asian NATO includes India as well. Additionally, he recommended that the region either build its own nuclear weapons or that the US station nuclear weapons there.

This proposal results from the growing Chinese threat, especially regarding Taiwan, and doubts about the US extended deterrent's dependability.

As tensions rise, India will need to strike a balance between its strategic autonomy and the security interests of its close partners without getting embroiled in a formal mutual defense pact.

Ishiba hasn't traveled to India on business. For most of this century, when India-Japan relations grew under Shinzo Abe, he was not part of the mainstream LDP. At the G20 and East Asia summits, Ishiba would meet the leaders of ASEAN and the Quad, which included Australia and India.

Naturally, Japan's top focus continues to be its deepening and intensifying alliance with the US. Unlike its more junior partner status in the past, Japan is today a global partner with a growing defense role.

Under the US nuclear umbrella, Japan had placed sanctions on India for its 1998 nuclear tests; today, it is considering a future in which it may require nuclear weapons. With a developing fleet of ship-based submersible ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), India is a nuclear weapons state.

India's security is not dependent on the US nuclear umbrella. This is the exact reason India should not join an Asian NATO, especially if it is motivated by concerns over Taiwan. A mutual defense commitment will be going too far, even if India has strategic alliances, reciprocal logistics agreements, joint military exercises, and enhanced interoperability with

the Quad countries.

India's external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, recently said that India didn't share the vision for an 'Asian NATO' proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Jaishankar was speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington when he said that, unlike Japan, India had never been a treaty ally of another country.

When asked about Japan's call for a NATO-like grouping of Asian countries, Jaishankar said, "We don't have that kind of strategic architecture in mind." India, Japan,

Australia, and the US are part of the Quad, deemed a counterbalance to China.

The idea put up by Ishiba to station nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific area will undoubtedly spark fresh

hostilities. China and Russia will probably interpret this action as a threat to their security and take appropriate action diplomatically or militarily. It's unlikely that North Korea will overlook any discussion of increased American nuclear deterrent in the area.

India and Japan have been strong allies for many years. They share the goal of an open and free Indo-Pacific, have growing economic and defense ties, and are dedicated to regional stability.

Although China's assertiveness and Japan's growing security worries are legitimate, India must proceed cautiously with the suggested

Japan's top focus continues to be its deepening and intensifying alliance with the US. Unlike its more junior partner status in the past, Japan is today a global partner with a growing defense role.

solution—an Asian NATO. Remilitarization, the creation of an Asian NATO, and nuclear weapons may be considered necessary responses to escalating threats.

However, there are still unanswered concerns about how these choices will affect Japanese society and the stability of the Asia-Pacific area in the long run. If an Asian NATO is established, India will need to collaborate closely but will not join it.

India's involvement in the Indo-Pacific is already important, and its participation in organizations like the Quad provides a framework for coordination on regional security without the rigidity of a formal military alliance.

Can ASEAN and India bring peace to Myanmar

Source: Harsh V. Pant and Sreeparna Banerjee | ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/can-asean-and-india-bring-peace-to-myanmar> 30 October 2024



Image Source: Getty

The 44th ASEAN Summit held from October 6 to 11 in Vientiane, Laos, highlighted mounting

regional concerns, especially Myanmar's worsening crisis. Since the military coup in 2021, Myanmar has been in turmoil, and despite multiple efforts, including ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus, there has been little progress towards stability. The civil war is not only ravaging Myanmar, but also challenging ASEAN's credibility as a regional bloc committed to peace and stability.

ASEAN and India will need to adopt a more inclusive and pragmatic approach towards Myanmar — one that involves all key stakeholders

The Situation in Myanmar

Myanmar remains engulfed in a brutal civil war between the military junta and various resistance groups, including Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the People's Defence Forces (PDFs). The junta, which forcibly took control after toppling the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, faces widespread armed resistance. The resistance groups now control significant swathes of territory, including six major border trade routes. The military's efforts to quash the rebellion have led to violence, displacing hundreds of thousands and creating a humanitarian crisis. More than 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are in need of assistance, according to the United Nations.

The failure of the junta to cooperate with international peace efforts has exacerbated the conflict. The military continues to label opposition groups as terrorists and has shown little interest in holding genuine negotiations. In 2021, ASEAN broke its long-standing non-interference policy in response to the coup in Myanmar, recognising the breach of the ASEAN Charter regarding the rule of law and governance. However, its attempts to implement the 2021 Five-Point Consensus, which calls for an end to violence, inclusive dialogue,

and humanitarian assistance, remain largely unheeded, revealing the limitations of regional responses.

Earlier, ASEAN tried to exclude Myanmar's military leaders from high-level summits due to the country's non-compliance with the Five-Point Consensus. However, this time, after three years of boycotting the summit, Myanmar sent Aung Mye Swe Win, a senior official from Myanmar's Foreign Ministry, to Laos. This highlights ASEAN's need to keep dialogue alive and shows a pragmatic shift in its approach. It also indicates the junta's willingness to participate in ASEAN dialogues and signals that it is not entirely avoiding the bloc's engagement efforts.

Some ASEAN members, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, continue to push for stronger action, while others, such as Thailand,

Cambodia, and Laos, maintain closer relations with the military government. The principle of consensus-based decision-making complicates matters, as it necessitates unanimous agreement, resulting in diluted and slow responses to the crisis. Thailand's recent proposal to host informal talks later this year with the Troika involving Indonesia (previous chair), Laos (present chair), and Malaysia (future chair) illustrates an attempt to break the diplomatic impasse. However, without the full involvement of all the stakeholders in Myanmar, including the National Unity Government and the EAOs, such efforts may not succeed. For instance, Thailand's humanitarian corridor operates only with the junta's consent in areas under its control. To move forward, engaging non-state actors will be crucial

The resistance groups now control significant swathes of territory, including six major border trade routes.

for ASEAN to craft a more inclusive and effective dialogue.

India's Myanmar Policy

During the 21st ASEAN-India Summit and the 19th East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised ASEAN's centrality and the Five-Point Consensus while encouraging continued engagement with Myanmar. India's approach to Myanmar is closely tied to its Act East Policy. Myanmar is a pivotal land bridge between India and other ASEAN countries, and its stability is crucial for India's bilateral and regional interests. India shares a 1,643 km-long border with Myanmar, so it needs to balance security concerns regarding cross-border

militancy and illegal activities by maintaining relations with Myanmar's military regime while supporting democratic processes through diplomacy.

India is involved in regional connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to enhance trade and connectivity. Recently, both nations signed five Memorandums of Understanding under the Quick Impact Projects framework, focusing on agricultural development, vocational training, disaster management, and education. With India's \$250,000 grant, these projects aim to enhance Myanmar's socio-economic development, but Myanmar's political instability will likely challenge its success.

Concerns over regional stability and refugee influxes have led India to discontinue the Free Movement Regime and fence the border. As the

Central government faces resistance from various State governments regarding this move, India is walking a tightrope.

New Delhi is also considering broader engagement with various stakeholders in Myanmar, which would help it safeguard its strategic interests, while also contributing to peace and stability in Myanmar.

The effectiveness of this strategy will depend on the evolving undercurrents within Myanmar and India's ability to engage meaningfully with all the parties involved. ASEAN and India will need to adopt a more inclusive and pragmatic approach towards Myanmar — one that involves all key stakeholders.

Muizzu's Visit to India: An Attempt to Reset Ties

Source: Amit Ranjan | ISAS Brief

<https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/muizzus-visit-to-india-an-attempt-to-reset-ties/> 15 October D2024



Confronted with economic challenges, a year after his election, Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu made his first standalone official visit to India from 6 to 10 October 2024. The Maldives faces a Sukuk debt of around US\$500 million

(S\$642 million). The World Bank estimates that Maldives' total public and publicly guaranteed debt stood at US\$8.2 billion (S\$10.7 billion), an equivalent of 116 per cent of the country's

Economic challenges in the country have forced Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu to reset ties with New Delhi. For strategic reasons, India did not disappoint him.

gross domestic product, in the first quarter of 2024. A large portion of the Maldives' external debt is in the form of loans owed to China, amounting US\$1.37 billion (S\$1.78 billion), and US\$124 million (S\$159 million) to India.

Both China and India have extended support to the Maldives. In September 2024, the People's Bank of China and the Maldivian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced a 'memorandum of understanding' under a 'framework for cooperation' aimed at "promoting the settlement of current account transactions and direct investments in local currencies" and to facilitate smooth trade. In May and September this year, India extended the repayment of two treasury bills worth US\$100 million (S\$130 million) subscribed by the State Bank of India for another year. Further, an agreement between the Reserve Bank of India and the Maldives Monetary Authority in October 2024 allowed the Maldives to obtain financial support of US\$400 million (S\$522 million) under the United States dollar/Euro swap window and ₹30 billion (S\$465 million) under the INR (Indian rupee) swap window. In early 2024, India also offered a loan of over US\$29 million (S\$37 million) to the Maldives.

The Island country's economic condition has forced Muizzu to make a diplomatic reversal. For Muizzu, India is now a "valued partner". He

even denied pursuing the “anti-India” agenda. In response to a question during the Deans Leadership Series at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs in September 2024, Muizzu said, “We have never been against any one country at any point. It’s not India Out. [The] Maldives faced a serious problem with a foreign military presence on this soil...The people of [the] Maldives do not want a single foreign soldier in the country”. Notably, soon after winning the election, Muizzu asked India to withdraw its soldiers stationed in the Maldives to operate two helicopters and decided not to renew the joint hydrographic survey agreement with India.

The Maldives’ ties with India took a deep plunge following derogatory remarks made by three deputy ministers – Malsha Shareef, Mariyam Shiuna and Abdulla Mahzoon Maajid – against India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January 2024. They were suspended with pay. In September 2024, several days before Muizzu visited India, Shareef and Shinua resigned from their positions.

Under the “Vision for Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership”, some of the important issues which India and the Maldives agreed upon during Muizzu’s visit to New Delhi were to complete the Greater Malé Connectivity Project, and undertake a feasibility study to connect the islands of Thilafushi and Giraavaru as an extension; collaborate to develop a state-of-the-art commercial port at Thilafushi island to de-congest the Malé port and provide

enhanced cargo handling capacity at Thilafushi; initiate discussions on a bilateral free trade agreement; to operationalise the settlement of trade transactions in local currencies; cooperate in digital public infrastructure; and cooperate in energy and health sectors. In matters of defence and security, they agreed that India will support the Maldives in enhancing the surveillance and monitoring capability of the Maldives National Defence Force with the provisioning of radar systems and other equipment. It will also support the Maldives on hydrographic matters, including through capacity building and training and strengthen cooperation in the area of disaster response and risk mitigation. At the same time, New Delhi will soon inaugurate the state-of-

The Maldives’ ties with India took a deep plunge following derogatory remarks made by three deputy ministers – Malsha Shareef, Mariyam Shiuna and Abdulla Mahzoon Maajid – against India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January 2024.

the-art Maldivian Ministry of Defence building in Malé, constructed with India’s assistance; and increase capacity building and training slots for Maldivian security forces and police personnel in India. To further enhance people-to-people contact, the two countries have decided to work positively to establish a consulate of Maldives in Bengaluru and a consulate of India in Addu City.

One of the Maldives’ key economic concerns is the decline in the number of Indian tourists to the island country after the disparaging remarks against Modi. As of 8 October 2024, the Maldives has welcomed slightly more than 1.5 million tourists this year. China’s market share was 15 per cent, while India’s contribution has plummeted to 6.1 per cent of the total visitors. In New Delhi, sharing the dais with Modi, Muizzu said, “India is one of our largest tourism source

markets, and we hope to welcome more Indian tourists to the Maldives.” Then, speaking at the India-Maldives Business Forum in Mumbai, Muizzu reiterated the country’s opportunities and key investment prospects in areas, including special economic zones, luxury private islands, eco-friendly resorts, and integrated tourism projects. In Bengaluru, Muizzu emphasised the importance of collaboration between the two countries to achieve a digital and sustainable future for the Maldives.

Muizzu’s visit to New Delhi and India’s extension of help prove that despite bilateral issues, the smaller South Asian countries cannot afford to stay away from New Delhi for long. On its part, as the agreements between India and the Maldives show, New Delhi has regained some of the lost ground in Malé.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the test was a warning to enemies that have been threatening the country's security, KCNA state news agency said.

North Korea Leader Says Longest ICBM Test 'Appropriate Military Action' Against Enemies

Source: Jack Kim and Kaori Kaneko | Asia Pacific

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-conducts-longest-icbm-test-amid-storm-over-troop-deployment-russia-2024-10-31/>
31 October 2024



Japan's Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba speaks to media about North Korea's long-range ballistic missile in Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 2024, in this photo taken by Kyodo. Mandatory credit Kyodo/via REUTERS

SEOUL/TOKYO, Oct 31 (Reuters) - North Korea said it tested an intercontinental ballistic missile on Thursday, upgrading what it called the "world's most powerful strategic weapon", as Seoul warned Pyongyang could get missile technology from Russia for helping with the war in Ukraine.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the test was a warning to enemies that have been threatening the country's security, KCNA state news agency said.

"The test-fire is an appropriate military action that fully meets the purpose of informing the rivals, who have intentionally escalated the regional situation and posed a threat to the security of our

Republic recently, of our counteraction will," the U.S. presidential election." Kim was quoted as saying by KCNA.

The muscle-flexing comes amid international outcry and rising alarm over what the U.S. and others say is North Korea's deployment of 11,000 troops to Russia - 3,000 of them close to the western frontlines with Ukraine.

The launch drew swift condemnation from South Korea, Japan and the United States.

A day earlier, Seoul cited military intelligence suggesting the North may test-launch an ICBM or conduct a seventh nuclear test around the U.S. presidential election on Tuesday, seeking to draw attention to its growing military prowess.

Shin Seung-ki, head of research on North Korea's military at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, said the launch was likely to test improved booster performance of an existing ICBM - possibly with Russia's help.

"North Korea will want to keep getting help like this, because it saves times and costs while improving performance and upgrading the stability of weapons system," he said.

It could also be Pyongyang's response to pressure over its engagement with Russia, Shin said.

"The intention may be to show that it will not bow to pressure, that it will respond to strength with strength, and also to seek some influence on

The launch early on Thursday was the longest ballistic missile test by the North with a flight-time of 87 minutes, according to South Korea.

KCNA said the test set new records of its missile capabilities.

The missile took off on a sharply lofted trajectory from an area near the North's capital and splashed down about 200 km (125 miles) west of Japan's Okushiri island, off Hokkaido.

It reached an altitude of 7,000 km (4,350 miles) and flew a distance of 1,000 km, the Japanese government said.

The so-called lofted trajectory of a projectile flying at a sharply raised angle is intended to test its thrust and stability over much shorter distances relative to the designed range, partly for safety and to avoid the political fallout of sending a missile far into the Pacific.

North Korea's last ICBM, dubbed the Hwasong-18, was tested in December 2023. Fuelled by solid-propellant and fired from a road launcher, it was also launched at a sharply raised angle and flew for 73 minutes, translating to a potential range of 15,000 km on a normal trajectory.

That is a distance that puts anywhere in the mainland United States within range.

"The test-fire is an appropriate military action that fully meets the purpose of informing the rivals, who have intentionally escalated the regional situation and posed a threat to the security of our Republic recently, of our counteraction will,"

South Korea announced on Thursday new export controls on materials needed by North Korea to produce solid-fuel missiles.

Asked about the missile launch, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China "has always believed that peace and stability, and promoting a political solution to the peninsula issue are in accordance with the common interests of all sides."

Pyongyang's latest test came just hours after U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and his South Korean counterpart Kim Yong-hyun met in Washington to condemn the North Korean troop deployment in Russia.

Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang have directly acknowledged the deployment, but Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia on Wednesday questioned why its allies like North Korea could not help Moscow in its war against Ukraine when Western countries claim the right to help Kyiv.

South Korea said the deployment directly threatened its security because the North would gain valuable combat experience in a modern warfare and was likely to be rewarded by Moscow with "technology transfers" in areas such as tactical nuclear weapons, ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and military reconnaissance satellites.

Cherry-Picks of the Month

1. North Korea Launches Barrage of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles Towards Sea - <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/4/north-korea-launches-ballistic-missile-towards-sea-south-korean-military>
2. PM Modi at East Asia Summit: First Speaker at Event, Focus on ASEAN and Indo-Pacific Strategy & More - <https://www.livemint.com/news/world/pm-narendra-modi-at-east-asia-summit-first-speaker-focus-on-asean-and-indo-pacific-strategy-security-news-top-10-points-11728627713029.html>
3. Quad Partners Take Part in back-to-back Naval War Games - <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/quad-partners-take-part-in-back-to-back-naval-war-games/article68775941.ece>
4. The Compulsions and Challenges of Indian Strategic Autonomy Amid the Russia-Ukraine War - <https://southasianvoices.org/geo-c-in-n-india-ukraine-russia-strategic-autonomy-10-14-2024/>
5. Maldives: Expectations from Muizzu's Second 'Successful' India Visit - <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/maldives-expectations-from-muizzu-s-second-successful-india-visit>

Caps Experts View

1. China's ICBM Test: An Analysis - <https://capsindia.org/chinas-icbm-test-an-analysis/>
2. Reflections on Muizzu's First State Visit to India - <https://capsindia.org/reflections-on-muizzus-first-state-visit-to-india/>
3. Key Takeaways from 21st India-ASEAN Summit: A Comprehensive Partnership - <https://capsindia.org/key-takeaways-from-21st-india-asean-summit-a-comprehensive-partnership/>

Podcasts/Debates/Discussions

1. 21st ASEAN-India Summit 10/10/2024 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Uex8Hzs1MQ>
2. Indo-Pacific Under Focus | France's Role in Future Strategy & Security - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgqYRvVQiXI>



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