Author: Gp Capt VP Naik VM, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
Keywords: Modern battlefield, Warfighting, Air Power, Bunker Buster, B2 Bombers, Operation Midnight Hammer
Introduction
Operation Midnight Hammer, was launched jointly by the United States Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN) attacking the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center in Iran on June 22, 2025. The American bombers flew for 18 hours from mainland USA, joined up with 4th and 5th generation fighters acting as sweeps and escorts and delivered their load on the intended targets before returning to the US.
Suppression/destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) operations, deception and decoy attacks, and Electronic Warfare (EW) were carried out prior to the main attack. Remarkably, throughout the entire mission, the potent Iranian Air Defence (AD) remained inactive, with not a single Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) being launched either during ingress or egress. Either the Israelis paralysed the entire AD system of Iran during Operation Rising Lion (most probable), or the USA caught them by surprise (a remote possibility, especially with the Israel-Iran War going on), or the Iranians chose not to fire. Whatever the reason, it is certainly something that warrants further discussion and analysis.
Historical Timeline
Iran’s armed forces consist of two separate, parallel militaries – the Artesh (established in 1921), which is the regular force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), formed from armed militias during the 1979 revolution. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, under the Artesh, evolved into the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF), the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN). [1] The Artesh, which pre-dated the revolution, focused on defence against external threats. At the same time, the IRGC was created to defend the Islamic regime and Islamic system of government from foreign and domestic threats. In 1985, the IRGC was divided into the IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF), the IRGC Air Force (IRGCAF) and the IRGC Navy (IRGCN). In 2008, the Khatemolanbia Air Defence Headquarters (KADHQ) was established within IRIAF to oversee the Air Defence requirements of Iran. In 2009, IRGCAF was renamed the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF). In 2019, the KADHQ was elevated to the Artesh HQ, with the Artesh Air Defence Force subsequently renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force (IRIADF). [2]
The IRIADF
The IRIADF consists of approximately 15,000 active personnel and features a mix of legacy and modern equipment. The IRIADF is responsible for protecting the Iranian airspace from aircraft, drones and incoming missiles. While less advanced than Western or Russian systems such as the US Patriot and Russia’s S-400, Iran’s domestically developed systems have shown significant progress over the last two decades. Some key elements of IRIADF include the Arman Long-Range Air Defence System, the Azarakhsh Low-Altitude Air Defence System, the Khordad-15 Air Defence System, the Bavar 373 Missile Defence System, and the S-300 Missile Defence System. [3] These systems are integrated into the C2 architecture for quick response to any emerging threat. Details of a few newly inducted systems available in the open source are as follows: –
(a) Arman, Long Range Air Defence System: Unveiled to the world on
February 17, 2024, it is a long-range air defence system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. In English, Arman means “Aspiration”. The system can simultaneously engage six targets at a range of 120 to 180 km. [4] The system utilises Iran’s indigenously manufactured Sayyad-3 class of missiles and has two versions: one with a passive radar and the other with an active radar.
(b) Azarakhsh, Low Altitude Air Defence System: Unveiled to the world on
February 17, 2024, Azarakhsh (lightning) is a low-altitude AD system that can simultaneously use radar and electro-optic systems to detect and intercept targets. The system utilises heat-seeking missiles (IR) to lock onto targets, including missiles and aircraft. [5]
(c) Khordad-15 Air Defence System: The Khordad-15 was developed by the Iran Aviation Industries Organisation (IAIO) and unveiled to the world in June 2019. The system was designed to detect and intercept a range of aerial threats, including fighters, stealth targets, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and Cruise Missiles using Sayyad-3 missiles. [6]
(d) Bavar-373 Missile Defence System: The Bavar-373 represents a significant advancement in Iran’s air defence capabilities. It is a long-range, road-mobile SAM system developed in August 2016. The name Bavar-373 carries a symbolic meaning, translating to “Belief”, with 373 representing a numerical equivalent to “O, Messenger of Allah” in Abjad numerals. [7] It is believed to be an Iranian equivalent of the S-300 system of Russia and also has an upgraded version believed to be equivalent to the S-400 system.
(e) S-300 Missile Defence System: The S-300 missile defence system is a formidable asset in Iran’s arsenal. Capable of tracking and intercepting airborne threats 300 km away, the system can also engage ballistic missiles. The Iranian configuration features a surveillance radar for search, a command vehicle for target identification and launch orders, an engagement radar for missile guidance and six launch vehicles capable of firing two missiles each. [8] Russia delivered the system to Iran in November 2016, marking a significant milestone in the development of Iran’s AD network and infrastructure.
(f) Radar and Command Systems: Iran’s missile defence network relies on an extensive array of radars and sensors. Indigenous radars like Ghadir and Sepehr can detect targets up to 1,000 km and are integrated into a centralised Command and Control (C2) system, enabling real-time coordination of air and missile defences. Coordination of national-level AD is the responsibility of KADHQ, which controls Iran’s AD C2, surveillance radars, SAM systems and a network of visual observation posts. While C2 is centralised during peacetime at the National Air Defence Operations Centre, it can become decentralised for operations, transferring decision-making authority down to a network or the regional Sector Operations Centres (SOCs), which may be either static or mobile. SOCs manage AD operations within their areas of responsibility and coordinate with adjacent sectors to ensure seamless integration and continuity of operations.
(g) Analysis: The Iranian AD system is a small and potent organisation capable of taking on a wide variety of threats. A mix of legacy and modern systems, on paper, the AD system appears to be very capable but has not been battle-proven. The system also has limited capabilities when compared to the modern Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) due to severe technological constraints resulting from various sanctions imposed on Iran over the last few decades. Iran primarily relies on Russia and China for the import of technology. The airborne AD assets of Iran are “few and far between”. Being one of the few countries still operating the F-14A/AM Tomcat, the IRIAF also has the vintage MiG-29 in its arsenal, making its airborne AD a relatively underdeveloped and ineffective system. The system may not be fully capable of withstanding a strike of the magnitude and scale of the US’s Operation Midnight Hammer. However, it will have the capability to inflict limited damage on the attacking forces. Iran should have extensively used its indigenously developed AD systems during the strikes but failed to fire even a single shot. The S-300 is a reasonably potent system with long-range capability. Why did this system also fail to fire?
The main reason for the failure of AD appears to be the systematic dismantling of the entire AD network by Israel from the time the war started. Since June 12, 2025, Israel has established air supremacy over Iran with very little prohibitive interference, and the Israeli forces have been enjoying complete freedom of operations in Iranian air space. Israel destroyed all major Iranian AD systems (80 batteries) in the first two days of the Israel-Iran War (Operation Rising Lion), and Iran was left with only passive measures like camouflage and concealment, dispersion and hardened underground structures to defend itself. [9] With the Iranian AD system paralysed, why would the US forces fly in with a force structure as large as 125 aircraft??
Challenges and Limitations
The Iranian AD system faces many significant challenges and limitations. The system is quite old, with newer technology being slowly introduced. The system lacks a comprehensive, multi-layered architecture, a hallmark of modern AD and C2 systems. Iran faces a severe constraint in accessing modern technology, primarily due to the numerous sanctions imposed on it. These technological constraints have limited their system’s ability to meet global standards, significantly affecting its range, response, and effectiveness. Iran has significant dependencies on foreign suppliers, mainly Russia, which has limited its autonomy and delayed upgradations. Spare support and supply chain management have also deteriorated over the years, thereby affecting the overall capability of the AD network. The system could easily have been saturated due to the inherent architecture of the network. Overall, the system is highly reactive but may not be able to engage a large-scale strike using modern weapons and aircraft. In addition, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the system had already been targeted by Israel in the preceding days, making it more vulnerable, almost non-existent, on the day of the main attack by the US forces.
Lessons Learnt
There are many important takeaways from this operation, both in terms of AD and C2. Some key takeaways are being listed and discussed.
(a) Requirement of a Modern IADS: There is no denying the fact that a robust and effective modern IADS is required, one that can detect and engage the entire gamut of targets, ranging from small drones and quadcopters to ballistic and hypersonic missiles. However, no system has yet been developed which can take on the entire spectrum of threats. Ingenuity, innovativeness and smart integration have the potential to create a system close to a utopian one. A mix of legacy and modern systems with varied capabilities would need to be networked to create a system of systems capable of addressing the majority of perceived threats.
(b) Indigenous Development: AD systems often have very niche technology embedded into them. From detection and identification to decision and action, there is a need to develop this technology in-house. The four key processes of AD- namely, Detection, Identification, Interception, and Destruction- need to be infused with indigenous technology to avoid compromising effectiveness in times of need. Modern systems utilise Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data for each of the four functions, and the roles of the indigenous industry and academia have become increasingly crucial.
(c) Mass, Mix and Mobility: Smart and modern AD systems are an amalgamation of different calibres of weapons in terms of range and altitude of engagements (mass). The system must also incorporate a mix of varied guidance and homing capabilities to mitigate the effects of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Attack (EA). The system must also be a mix of different vintages because no country can afford to have only modern weapons in its arsenal. This mix would ensure that the adversary is always thinking of a suitable counter to a varied inventory, which may be difficult to carry on limited platforms. The network also needs to have a healthy combination of mobile, transportable and fixed elements to provide the necessary flexibility for operations.
(d) Vulnerability of Long Range LRSAMs: Modern Long-range SAMs are essential components of an IADS. However, they have their associated issues. Most LR SAMs are transportable but not inherently mobile. Their associated systems and support infrastructure is fairly large making them almost static. This makes them vulnerable. Choosing alternate sites, providing the LRSAM intrinsic cover using other weapons systems and transporting them to alternate sites for operations are a few key elements that must be thought of and exercised regularly.
(e) Airborne Elements: Airborne elements like AD fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&C), Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and Special Mission Aircraft (SMA) for EW operations are essential ingredients of the IADS and cannot be ignored. The Iranian AD system severely lacks airborne assets, making it more vulnerable and less effective.
(f) The Longer Stick: There is no denying the fact that possessing the longest stick has tremendous inherent advantages in terms of first-shot capability; therefore, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) must be developed to counter them. Additionally, there is a need to integrate long-range aerial weapons on a wider variety of aircraft to ensure multiple threats to airborne targets. Developing the first shot capability is essential in the modern AD environment, and countering it even more so.
(g) Survivability of C2: The modern battlespace increasingly relies on information and decision superiority. The survivability of C2 infrastructure will undoubtedly give the defending force a significant advantage. All strikes will be preceded by Counter-Air Operations (CAO); therefore, one must create robust, redundant, and survivable infrastructure to maintain effective C2.
(h) Stealth: Low-observable technology is here to stay. Conventional radars may struggle to cope with this new trend in aerial warfare; therefore, there is a need to develop technology, such as VHF radars, to counter the use of stealth by an adversary. Due to their longer operating wavelength, VHF radars have been known to detect stealth platforms. Interestingly, some of the oldest radars have been VHF radars and the time may be right to resurrect this technology for use in the modern battlespace to counter 5th and 6th generation aircraft.
(j) Developing anti-Hypersonic Capability: Hypersonic weapons are the latest class of weapons that have already invaded the modern battlespace and counters are yet to be developed. Counter-hypersonic technology would be very niche and once developed, no country would want to share it. Therefore, indigenous counters to hypersonic weapons must be developed.
(k) Integrated Application of Combat Fire Power: The Iranian forces have been arrayed into very rigid verticals with very little or no overlap. Each silo operates independently, thereby reducing their overall effectiveness. Ownership of assets is not important; what is important is the integration of assets. The C2 organisation must have the most appropriate weapon system at its disposal at the right time to be effective and timing is crucial. One cannot afford to act in silos; therefore, the creation of integrated systems, irrespective of ownership, is crucial for winning tomorrow’s wars.
(l) Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Iran faces numerous challenges in terms of access to spares and modern technology due to sanctions and a lack of indigenous industry. Despite this, Iran has made significant strides in developing a vibrant in-house drone manufacturing industry. Iran has been utilising them for a wide range of missions, including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and air-to-ground strikes. While they may not have access to high-end technology, they are making a constant effort to develop the same within Iran. Regular upgrades, spare support, and effective logistics supply chain management would go a long way in enhancing a nation’s war-waging potential.
Parting Shots
The Iranian Air Defence was known to be a potent system in its arsenal, and yet it failed miserably. Why did Iran not fire a single SAM? How was the S-300 silenced? Who silenced the S-300? How did all the 125 aircraft involved go unnoticed? Why did China or Russia not warn Iran of the incoming strike? The bombers were in Iranian airspace for twenty minutes, and the support aircraft were within/in proximity of Iran airspace for nearly ninety minutes, yet no SAMs could be fired. The reasons for failure could be many, and some of them have been discussed in this paper. However, the “Silence of the SAMs” is surely very deafening …
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Notes
[1] Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S Government, “Iran Military Power, Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,” https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[2] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[3] Shamsuddoza Sajen, “Inside Iran’s Missile Defense Systems (2025),” Foreign Affairs Insights and Review, June 23, 2025, https://fairbd.net/inside-iran-missile-defense-system/. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[4] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[5] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[6] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[7] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[8] Ibid. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
[9] Lt Gen H S Panag (retd.), “Israel-US air power chose regime survival over war,” The Print, June 26, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/idrael-us-air-power-iran-regime-survival-war/2670944/?amp. Accessed on June 26, 2025.
