Author: Mr Aayush Parekh, Research Intern, CAPSS

Keywords: BrahMos Missile, India, Russia, United Arab Emirates, West Asia

Introduction

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is poised to become the first Gulf country to acquire the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, marking a potential milestone in the jointly developed project by India and Russia.¹ After three successful deals with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, BrahMos Aerospace has formally presented its missile system and submitted a detailed proposal to Abu Dhabi, which is under consideration.² This is a potential moment for BrahMos Aerospace to leave its footprint in West Asia. This article analyses the strategic motivations of both New Delhi and Abu Dhabi and the broader implications for India’s defence exports in West Asia, along with Russia’s role in this joint-venture deal.

Background

This is not the first time that India has made a defence deal with a West Asian nation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest buyers of Indian ammunition in the region, and it previously signed an agreement worth USD 225 million for defence ammunition.³ Meanwhile, India has the most defence Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) with Oman compared with other West Asian nations.⁴ Even the UAE has signed an agreement with India for joint production of drones, missiles, and naval platforms in May 2026.⁵

BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile jointly developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russian NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPOM). It is one of the world’s fastest cruise missiles; capable of flying at the speed of ~Mach 2.8 and with a range of 290 km. Named after two prominent rivers in India and Russia, Brahmaputra and Moskva, respectively, BrahMos is designed for launching precision strikes from all three domains: air, land, and sea.⁶ The BrahMos is a versatile weapon system, renowned for its speed, accuracy, and survivability against modern air defence systems, which was evident during India’s Operation Sindoor in 2025.

BrahMos Aerospace’s formal proposal to supply supersonic cruise missiles to the UAE signals a shift toward substantive defence-industrial engagement. If BrahMos Aerospace successfully closes the deal with the UAE, it will open the Gulf market for high-value Indian defence systems, cementing India’s strategic presence in West Asia, especially after the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.⁷

Why is Abu Dhabi Interested in BrahMos?

The deal is a part of official talks between both countries for selling some of India’s flagship defence systems, which occurred in July 2026, amid the war in West Asia.⁸ BrahMos is not the only Indian equipment the UAE is focusing on; the Gulf nation is also interested in India’s Akashteer air defence system as well.⁹ The probable reason why Abu Dhabi is looking to add some serious firepower to its arsenal with the BrahMos missile is due to emerging threats from Iran, especially after the UAE was attacked by Iran during the ongoing war in West Asia.¹⁰ The BrahMos is one of the few missiles capable of striking both maritime and land targets, with speed and precision. This combination gives the UAE an unmatched strike option against Iran or any other regional threat.

The significance of BrahMos for Abu Dhabi is clear because the country already operates advanced American defence systems, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot.¹¹ This is because BrahMos offers long-range launch capabilities. The UAE is located at the doorstep of the Strait of Hormuz, which is under constant threat due to ongoing dynamics. Therefore, the question for Abu Dhabi is not about an addition to its arsenal but about developing an architecture that can mitigate such threats.

Implications for India

The Indian defence exports have already been increasing over the past decade. According to official figures, exports reached a new all-time high of INR 38,424 crore (more than USD 4 billion) in the financial year 2025-26.¹² Compared with financial year 2024-25, exports were just INR 23,622 crore (~USD 2.5 billion).¹³ During Operation Sindoor, when India used its weapon systems, including BrahMos, it sparked interest among other countries in buying BrahMos. Since then, India has signed deals to sell the BrahMos to Vietnam and Indonesia and has also received interest from Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile.¹⁴ The BrahMos has now become one of the flagship symbols of India’s ambition to become a major and credible defence exporter, transitioning from ‘Make in India’ to ‘Make for the World’.¹⁵

India and the UAE are expanding their relationship across trade, investment, energy, technology, defence, and the digital economy.¹⁶ The BrahMos deal would deepen this strategic partnership amid rapidly changing security architecture in West Asia. This deal will also signal to the world that India is not only a major economic power but also a supplier of sophisticated defence technologies and a reliable Gulf partner. One of the major challenges will be to balance technology transfer sensitivities and navigate regional fault lines, particularly in the case of Iran.¹⁷

Role of Moscow

The BrahMos missile is manufactured by BrahMos Aerospace, which is a joint venture with an authorised capital of USD 300 million in the ratio of 50.5 per cent from the Indian side and 49.5 per cent from the Russian side.¹⁸ Hence, approval from Moscow also becomes an important aspect before closing any deal for this 290 km-range missile. Given the close and growing ties between Moscow and Abu Dhabi across diplomacy, trade, and investment, it is unlikely to pose any hurdles for India to close the deal. ¹⁹

Additionally, BrahMos is one of the most successful military collaborations between India and Russia, and with every international sale, Moscow gains royalties. Therefore, every approval benefits both parties in this joint venture, as shown by previous sales to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Furthermore, looking at the sanctions imposed on Russia from Western nations due to the Ukraine war, the West Asian countries are one of the financial safe havens for Russian trade and investments.

Conclusion

As Abu Dhabi looks to expand its defence partnerships apart from countries like the United States, Italy and France, the jointly developed BrahMos cruise missile by India and Russia has caught the attention in the global defence market. The Philippines became the first foreign country to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile in 2022. Since then, India has signed BrahMos deals with Indonesia and Vietnam as of August 2026. Now India looks to make BrahMos enter the Gulf market with the UAE as the first potential buyer. India and the UAE are significantly expanding their relations, and a BrahMos deal will deepen this tie amid rapidly changing security architecture in West Asia.

For India, the deal will support its broader defence export initiatives, proving that its indigenous platforms can compete in demanding international markets. The deal, likely to be supported by Russia, underscores the deepening India-UAE partnership and heralds India’s arrival as a consequential defence exporter on the global stage.

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Keywords: Indian Air Force, Unmanned Aerial System, Anti-UAS, Helicopter, Exercise Rotor Clap-III

Introduction

The rapid proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has reshaped conflict zones worldwide. Today’s battlefields feature an array of threats, ranging from off-the-shelf quadcopters modified to carry explosives to military-grade loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones. The forces now have an affordable yet potent way to carry out low-cost, high-leverage precision strikes, intelligence gathering, and battlefield disruption. The UAS are no longer a part of future warfare; they are the present. From the Russia-Ukraine war to conflicts in West Asia, UAS are proven to be destructive when employed in large numbers or in coordination with conventional forces. For militaries around the world, addressing these systems has become a need of the hour.

In response to this evolving threat, the Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to refine its anti-UAS technologies. The most recent development includes integration of anti-UAS capabilities into its helicopter fleet. On August 02, 2026, the IAF concluded its weeklong Exercise Rotor Clap III. This specialised counter-UAS exercise was designed to validate tactics, techniques, and systems for how IAF helicopters can hunt such systems. The exercise featured live missile and rocket firing, validating new tactics for engaging with such unmanned systems, which can fly low and avoid being detected by the radars.[1] The article aims to highlight how Ex. ROTOR CLAP III aligns with India’s broader plan of developing anti-UAS technologies, and what the significance of such technologies is.

Ex. ROTOR CLAP III 2026

The exercise was explicitly designed to test and refine the operational concepts for employing helicopters as airborne drone hunters. It moved beyond theoretical discussions to practical validation under realistic, simulated combat conditions at the Pokhran Field Firing Range in Jaisalmer district, Rajasthan. It brought together the large spectrum of IAF’s rotary-wings, from attack helicopters like the AH-64 Apache and the indigenous Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) Prachand, to transport and utility helicopters such as the Mi-17, Mi-25/35, Chinook and Dhruv.[2] The IAF plans to push its counter-drone capabilities. Designated helicopters are expected to be outfitted with artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled radars, electronic warfare suites (EWS), jammers and lightweight micro-missiles, establishing a dedicated, mobile, airborne anti-UAS weapon, capable of engaging multiple low-flying threats.[3]

Based on the available information, the Indian Army was not part of this exercise, despite operating a comparable fleet of helicopters. The exercise was structured particularly for the IAF.[4] This absence does not necessarily indicate services operating in silos; rather, the standalone structure reflects phased development, prioritising initial testing within one branch before introducing joint-service operations.

Additionally, the same concept has been tested successfully by the armed forces of several countries across the globe, such as the United States (US) through its Operation Skyfall in 2026 and Operation Flyswatter in 2025; Israeli AH-64A Peten helicopters are already being used in combat to shoot down drones.[5] French Tigre attack helicopters have reportedly achieved a near 100 per cent interception rate against Shahed drones in support operations, using their cannon and missiles.[6]

How Is India Planning to Further Develop Such Technologies?

Anti-UAS systems have become a key priority of the IAF. India is looking closely at its defence industry to develop such technologies. The proposal was discussed during a seminar between the IAF and various defence industries, held in New Delhi on July 30, 2026.[7] At the seminar, the IAF released its latest problem statement proposing the technologies it wants the defence industry to build. The following plans were discussed during the seminar:[8]

1   Specialised micro missiles for helicopters, built to destroy slow-moving, low-flying aerial targets.

2.   Inclusion of forward-mounted 20 mm guns for close engagements.

3.   AI-powered target identification systems.

4.   Lightweight radio frequency and GPS jammers.

5.   Air-burst fragmentation warheads.

6.   Ultimately building a 25-meter lethal radius.

 Significance of Anti-UAS Systems

As UAS risks grow, air forces globally are moving beyond conventional, geographically fixed ground defence. The following points outline how leveraging rotary-wing assets can help the IAF create rapid-response and airborne anti-UAS platforms capable of operating in remote and challenging terrain.

1.  Helicopters transition counter-UAS operations from ground-based systems to flexible airborne interceptors that respond rapidly around the battlespace.

2.   Vertical takeoff and landing lets crews operate the helicopters out of austere, undeveloped and remote areas where heavy ground systems physically cannot arrive in time.

3.  Ground-based air defence systems include a layered network of systems, including radars, sensors, radio frequency detectors, electro-optical cameras, infrared systems, etc., to track the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). After target detection, the response includes soft kill (jamming or spoofing) and/or hard kill (missiles, lasers, interceptors). This setup is spread over a large space, which is less mobile. With the integration of such techniques into helicopters, the IAF will have dedicated airborne UAV hunters, which consist of a comprehensive system on one highly mobile platform.

3.  The operational training through exercises like ROTOR CLAP III ensures inter-unit coordination, precision target engagement, rapid response and operational readiness against hostile UAS.

4.  Exercise ROTOR CLAP III 2026 not only included attack helicopters, but the IAF also focused on including other types of helicopters as well. The most notable helicopters were the MI-17 series. These helicopters are generally classified as transport helicopters, but during this exercise, the IAF used them to fire a barrage of unguided missiles. This shows how such technology could turn a transport helicopter into a secondary anti-drone system. Additionally, IAF’s Chinook and Dhruv helicopters were also a part of this exercise.[9]

Conclusion

India faces a two-front threat from its neighbours who are actively investing in and deploying advanced UAS capabilities. It is crucial for India to safeguard itself against these growing challenges. To remain combat-ready, the IAF conducted a week-long Ex. ROTOR CLAP III in Rajasthan. This tested the capabilities of the helicopter fleets of the IAF. Additionally, during a joint seminar between the IAF and defence industry on July 30, 2026, a list of innovations was requested for the development and integration of anti-UAS systems in helicopters. These developments have placed a strong emphasis on anti-UAS systems, as they are no longer a future prospect; rather, they have become a present phenomenon. As India continues to develop its counter-UAS strategy, such seminars and exercises will continue to serve in building a resilient, adaptive, and technologically advanced air force capable of dominating the new battlespace.

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Notes:

[1] Bharat Shakti (@bharatshakti6583), “Rotor Clap-III Builds India’s Airborne Drone Hunters,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8cebTzj2TQ.

[2] Vijay Mohan, “IAF’s helicopter units conduct anti-drone drill in Rajasthan,” The Tribune, August 01, 2026, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/defence/iafs-helicopter-units-conduct-anti-drone-drill-in-rajasthan/. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[3] Bharat Shakti, n. 1.

[4] Indian Air Force, “#IAF Helicopters undertook, Exercise Rotor Clap III themed “Counter-UAS” in Rajasthan,” Facebook, August 01, 2026 at 16:30, https://www.facebook.com/IndianAirForce/posts/iaf-helicopters-undertook-exercise-rotor-clap-iii-themed-counter-uas-in-rajastha/1388986963411122/.

[5] Taras Safronov, “Apache vs Drones: US Tests, Israel Already Shooting Down Shaheds,” Militarnyi, September 07, 2025, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/apache-vs-drones-us-tests-israel-already-shooting-down-shaheds/. Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[6] Peter Bass, “Helicopters Rise as Drone Hunters: France’s Tiger Leads the Charge in Modern Air Defense,” Defence Magazine, June 05, 2026, https://www.defensemagazine.com/article/helicopters-rise-as-drone-hunters-frances-tigre-leads-the-charge-in-modern-air-defense. Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[7] Firstpost (@Firstpost), Indian Air Force Eyes Micro-Missiles to Turn Helicopters into Drone Hunters,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://youtu.be/13hEw9RAwhA?si=SrVHMYs5QidaelGM.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Firstpost (@Firstpost), “Indian Air Force Helicopters to Become Aerial Drone Defence Platforms,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nZtK1LQiMA.

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Keywords: Bharat Forge, Flying Whales, MoU, LCA60T, Heavy-Lift Airship

Introduction

What if the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army could airlift tons of supplies and weaponry to remote, high-altitude outposts without a runway? Now it seems possible after India’s Bharat Forge signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the French-Canadian aerospace joint venture Flying Whales. The MoU was signed during the Farnborough International Air Show 2026 in the United Kingdom (UK) on July 22, 2026, and both parties have agreed to jointly develop and manufacture advanced heavy-lift airships in India. Such giant aircraft could transform Indian defence logistics and mobility.[1]

This paper addresses the capability gap in India’s defence logistics architecture: the absence of a heavy-lift platform capable of delivering oversized and heavy payloads to mountainous, border, and disaster-affected areas without dependence on runways or extensive ground infrastructure. The collaboration between Bharat Forge and Flying Whales represents a decisive step toward building an indigenous airship ecosystem in India, aligned with the Government of India’s Make in India initiative.

About the Deal

The MoU was signed between Mr Guru Biswal, CEO, Aerospace, Bharat Forge and Mr Sébastien Bougon, President, Flying Whales. At the core of this deal is the LCA60T platform.[2] It is the Flying Whales’ next-generation, heavy-lift airship capable of transporting up to 60 tons of cargo with vertical take-off and landing capability, minimal ground infrastructure requirements and hybrid-electric propulsion. It is designed for point-to-point operations in challenging and remote environments.[3] Mr Amit Kalyani, Vice Chairman & Joint Managing Director, Bharat Forge, said, “Airships will redefine how nations move, supply and sustain their forces, and India will lead that change. This strategic partnership places India among a select group of nations with the capability to design, build and field heavy-lift airships, bringing together Flying Whales’ pioneering technology and Bharat Forge’s six decades of advanced engineering strength and deep understanding of India’s defence needs. Aligned to the spirit of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, we are creating a sovereign capability, a new industrial ecosystem and an entirely new dimension of strategic mobility for the nation.”[4]

The collaboration aims to establish manufacturing integration and a long-term aerospace ecosystem inside India, on which Mr Tanguy Lestienne, CEO, Flying Whales, said, “The LCA60T was conceived to reach the world’s most remote and demanding locations, and that promise finds its fullest expression in India, with its vast geography, challenging terrain and extraordinary ambition. We are delighted to partner with Bharat Forge, whose engineering depth; defence expertise and shared vision make this a true strategic alliance to take the programme to scale. Together, we will build in India, for India and for the world, laying the foundations of an airship industry that will serve this region for generations.”[5]

Neither Bharat Forge nor Flying Whales has mentioned IAF’s Expression of Interest (EoI), and nothing has been published so far that directly connects this partnership, but the assumption on open-source platforms is that the IAF has signaled real demand for domestically built military airships.[6] The EoI has been stipulated for an unmanned airship staying aloft for 10 days at full payload (with 30 days preferred). Currently, this could be a tall order for the Flying Whales airship since its default configuration is not unmanned, but calls for a minimum of two crew: a pilot and a load-exchange officer. Conversely, other requirements such as a minimum of 5,000 kg cargo capacity are within reach.[7]

Architecture of LCA60T

The LCA60T is a semi-rigid, heavy-lift airship, roughly 200 meters long and 50 meters in diameter. Its internal cargo bay, about 96 meters long, 8 meters high, and 7 meters wide, can accommodate payloads up to 60 tons. Primarily, lift is provided by 180,000 cubic meters of non-pressurised helium, allowing operations at altitudes up to 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) even when fully loaded. Propulsion comes from 32 electric motor-driven units producing up to 4,000 kW (5,360 hp), enabling a maximum speed of 100 km/h and a typical mission range of 200-500 km from base.[8]

A defining feature of the LCA60T is its ability to hover steadily at approximately 100 meters above ground level to facilitate load transfer, removing the need for landing gear or prepared runways. It achieves vertical take-off and landing by modulating dynamic lift through its distributed propulsion systems, then transitions to forward flight with the payload suspended beneath the gondola. This Helicopter-like hover and vertical take-off and landing capability allows the airship to operate from austere sites such as mountain plateaus, forest clearings, and disaster zones.[9]

The platform is expected to support renewable energy initiatives, including transportation of wind turbine blades and transmission towers, alongside applications in construction, defence, humanitarian relief, mobile medical units, and remote freight operations.[10]

How is LCA60T different from Heavy Lift Helicopters?

The question is: if the IAF has heavy-lift helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook and Mil Mi-26, then why should India acquire a heavy-lift airship like LCA60T?

Both the LCA60T airship and helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook are heavy-lift aerial vehicles but possess distinct logistics abilities and problems. The airship has lower operating costs, much larger single-lift payloads, and the ability to operate from unprepared sites without runways, whereas the Chinook has high speed, manoeuvrability, and all-weather responsiveness.

Table 1: Key distinctions between LCA60T and Heavy-lift Helicopters

Note: The data has been complied by the Author through various sources.

The acquisition of the LCA60T will add a different kind of capability to optimise the IAF’s heavy-lift abilities. This airship fills a gap that other heavy-lift helicopters and cargo planes do not, such as low cost, large capacity, runway independence, and sustained logistics in difficult terrain.

Limitations of LCA60T

The LCA60T airship delivers various advantages through runway-independent operations and sustained hover capability, but its practical deployment faces a range of constraints. The following points outline key limitations of the LCA60T, underscoring factors that must be tackled to ensure the platform’s effectiveness and survivability in real-world operational environments.

1.    While the airship is designed in such a way that it does not require a runway or a landing spot due to its ability to hover, for loading and offloading its payload, it will require some ground infrastructure in order to have a safe delivery.

2.    If the jet stream speed is 100 km/h or more, the airship, with a speed limit of 100 km/h, will not be capable enough to outrun such strong winds.

3.    Airships, unlike helicopters, cannot easily pass through tight spaces; hence, providing logistical support in the narrow mountain passes such as in Kashmir will be quite difficult.

4.    The LCA60T is fueled by Helium. As per reports of Helium production by countries worldwide in 2025, the US and Qatar are the largest producers, contributing around 75.8 per cent to total production.[13] If in future any conflict arises across West Asia, it might get difficult for India to access Helium.

5.    In future, if the airship has been deployed to deliver required items at the border region, such a large airship cannot go undetected. With Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) systems and their ranges reaching up to 400 kms and more, the airship will be in a vulnerable spot and become an easy target.

Imperatives of LCA60T to India

The following imperatives of LCA60T outline the rationale for adopting the airship within India’s defence logistics framework and its ability to deliver heavy and oversized loads to infrastructure-denied areas, enhancing India’s crisis response capabilities.

1.    Owing to high altitude, severe weather, and sparse road networks that are often shut by snow or landslides, vast sections of the Himalayan frontier remain hard to reach by either air or road. The LCA60T’s ability to perform vertical take-off and landing without a runway, combined with its capacity to lift payloads far exceeding those of helicopters, provides the Indian armed forces with a logistics solution that neither fixed-wing transports nor rotary aircraft can fully match.

2.    Based on the information available in open sources, there are no publicly available announcements regarding transfer of technology; however, the deal has explicitly mentioned development and manufacturing of LCA60T in India.[14] This programme aligns with the government of India’s ‘Make in India’ initiative and falls under the ‘Buy (Global) and Manufacture in India’ acquisition category of draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026 of the Ministry of Defence released in February 2026.[15] Hence, leveraging Bharat Forge’s six decades of advanced engineering strength, alongside Flying Whales’ pioneering airship technology will foster indigenous aerospace expertise and industrial base. Additionally, the project is expected to create more than 300 high-skilled aeronautics jobs in India.[16] Thereby expanding India’s role in the global aerospace and defence supply chain.

3.    By establishing production units within the country, India will position itself not only as a consumer but also as a potential exporter of such heavy-lift airship technology. The LCA60T’s distinctive capabilities, notably its minimal land infrastructure requirements for take-off, have worldwide applications for remote logistics, resource extraction and disaster response. Export opportunities to diversify income sources would make India less vulnerable to supply disruptions caused by geopolitical events.

4.    Beyond its military applications, the LCA60T holds transformative potential for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. When floods, earthquakes, or landslides wipe out roads and bridges, this airship can deliver heavy equipment, medical supplies, and relief materials directly to hard-hit areas. Since the IAF’s helicopter fleets have a ceiling with heavier loads, the LCA60T fills a critical gap, making the partnership a far stronger investment on both military and civil fronts.

Recommendations

To fully leverage the benefits of this partnership, the following recommendations may be considered:

1.    The Ministry of Defence ought to establish defined acquisition schedules for the LCA60T, tying them directly into broader military modernisation goals.

2.    Bharat Forge and Flying Whales should focus on thorough technology sharing, specifically covering design authority, certification expertise, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) infrastructure setups, to foster genuine indigenous production.

3.    The government should support the development of secure helium supply chains, potentially through strategic reserves or investment in helium recovery technologies, to mitigate lifecycle cost and supply risks.

4.     In parallel, partners should map out an export plan tailored to nations dealing with harsh terrain and remote logistics hurdles.

Conclusion

As India pushes forward with advanced aerospace technology, joint ventures like this can speed up innovations, boost export opportunities, and position a country as a major hub for next-generation manufacturing. Producing the LCA60T heavy-lift airship locally gives India a game-changing logistical tool, which can deliver 60-tonne payloads to austere, runway-less locations. This partnership not only strengthens indigenous aerospace expertise, creates skilled employment, and opens up export avenues, but also solves persistent supply challenges in broader regions and in disaster zones. Bringing this program to fruition will take dedicated effort from both public and private sectors, but the long-term payoff is substantial.

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Notes:

[1] “Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign Strategic MoU to Develop and Manufacture Heavy-Lift Airships for Sovereign Applications in India,” Bharat Forge, July 22, 2026, https://www.bharatforge.com/media/press-release/bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-strategic-mou-to-develop-and-manufacture-hea. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kirk McGinnis, “Flying Whales Signs MoU with India’s Bharat Forge,” Airship Advocate, July 22, 2026, https://airshipadvocate.com/flying-whales-signs-mou-with-indias-bharat-forge/?srsltid=AfmBOoo-COfKOxhgK2gRvJ1o5UvUC945sY3U9UtEwW_8A8B_7i8PnOxi. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Our solution for air cargo transport,” Flying Whales, https://www.flying-whales.com/en/the-lca60t/. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[9] Ibid.

[10] “Flying Whales to establish third airship facility in India: French-backed company expands heavy-lift airship project globally,”                Bhaskar English,  April 2026, https://www.bhaskarenglish.in/utility/news/flying-whales-airship-project-india-global-expansion-137593850.html Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[11] “Mi-26 HALO,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mi-26.htm. Accessed on August 11, 2026.

[12] “H-47 Chinook,” Boeing, https://www.boeing.com/defense/military-rotorcraft/h-47-chinook Accessed on August 11, 2026.

[13] Niccolo Conte, “Charted: Helium Production by country,” Elements, April 27, 2026, https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/charted-helium-production-by-country/. Accessed on August 09, 2026.

[14] Bharat Forge, n. 1.

[15] Nitin A. Gokhale (@nitingokhale), “The draft of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 is out. Many aspects to study but this is my first observation. Categories for capital acquisition…,” X, February 10, 2026,          https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2021248578942079072?lang=en

[16] Bhaskar English, n. 10.

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Keywords: Credible Minimum Deterrence, India, Nuclear Warhead, Recessed Deterrence, SIPRI

Introduction

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2026 indicated a small increase in the number of nuclear weapons in India.[1] As of January 2026, India has approximately 190 nuclear weapons. The most eye-catching thing in the report is that India may start deploying a small number of warheads on a single Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) for conducting occasional deterrence patrols. However, it is important to understand that the report’s estimates about nuclear weapons are based on open-source data and tracking of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) production, and it is not based on any official government declarations. SIPRI itself confirms that the figures are inherently uncertain and do not accurately reflect a change in the state’s official policy. Some media channels described the findings as “Big Policy Shift.”[2] This questions India’s long-held recessed deterrence. Recessed deterrence is understood as a nuclear warhead that would remain separate from delivery vehicles (missiles or aircraft) during peacetime, either semi-assembled or completely unassembled.[3] After examining the report, it is observed that India has slightly shifted from a low-readiness to a medium-readiness operational posture. It is noteworthy that India has not adopted a high-readiness operational posture, in which warheads are always ready for launch.

This position is nevertheless in line with India’s broader goals of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD).[4] Rather than a shift in policy, it reflects a shift in operational practices driven by a constantly shifting security environment and changing security concerns. The discrepancy between media interpretations, SIPRI conclusions and India’s nuclear triad will be examined in the following sections of this article.

Opinion vs. Reality

Generally, the deployment of a nuclear weapon is understood as having warheads mated with the delivery systems and ready for immediate use. Media reports often conflate this high alert state with the normal operation of strategic platforms.[5] SIPRI notes that India’s “recent moves towards placing missiles in canisters and conducting sea-based deterrence patrols suggest that India could be shifting in the direction of mating some of its warheads with their launchers in peacetime.”[6]

This assessment is based on India’s naval deployment patterns under its nuclear triad. SIPRI highlights that “as of January 2026, India may have started to deploy a small number of nuclear warheads on a single SSBN conducting occasional deterrence patrols.” The assessment is viewed from an operational perspective rather than a political one, as a naval nuclear vessel requires loaded missile tubes to carry out deterrence. An SSBN patrolling with empty tubes provides no CMD because warheads are stored in a land-based storage facility, and the vessel lacks second-strike capability. Thus, limited patrols of naval platforms are a technical requirement for sea-based deterrence and not an aggressive shift in policy.

Comparative Analysis of Global Nuclear Postures

The following is a comparison of other nuclear-armed states to evaluate India’s current nuclear posture:

(a)    United States of America and Russia: Together, the United States (US) and Russia control about 85 per cent of the world’s nuclear inventory, with an estimated active deployment of 1,770 warheads by the US and 1,790 by Russia.[7] Both countries maintain a significant portion of their land- and sea-based ballistic missiles at high operational readiness. In contrast, India has a much smaller inventory of about 190 warheads, with most remaining un-mated and stored in central facilities during peacetime.

(b)    The United Kingdom (UK) and France: Both the United Kingdom and France maintain aerial and maritime deterrence on high operational readiness. The UK follows a “triple-lock” policy, focusing on continuous sea-based deterrence. France maintains a stockpile of approximately 290 warheads, focusing on capability modernisation and increasing numbers.[8] India, on the other hand, has minimal involvement and conducts only occasional sea patrols, unlike the continuous patrol of the UK and France.

(c)     China: For a long time, China has adhered to ‘No First Use.’ However, SIPRI estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal has grown to around 620 warheads. The US Department of War suggests that China is adopting an “early warning counter strike” strategy with a “launch on warning” posture. While most of China’s warheads remain in central storage, routine drills during mobile battalion exercises and near-continuous SSBN patrols suggest that China has started mating warheads in peacetime, raising questions about its traditional No First Use commitment.

(d)    Pakistan: Pakistan, in contrast to India, has developed low-yield weapons targeted at India under a “Full Spectrum Deterrence” stance and publicly opposes the “No First Use” doctrine. In the past, Pakistan has frequently managed conflicts by using nuclear signals through brinkmanship. However, India’s strategic position has shown itself to be a restraint on such acts. Despite Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), India has continued its approach of No First Use and CMD and continued with conventional military actions in retaliation. The same was showcased during India’s counter-offensive Operation Sindoor in 2025.

Conclusion

India’s nuclear force structure is shaped by variables that affect India’s nuclear triad. As per its policy of CMD, the nuclear forces must be able to withstand an enemy’s initial attack and possess the capability to react effectively. There is no evidence of a change in India’s policy in the reports on the mating of warheads. Instead, loaded tubes are a prerequisite of an SSBN under India’s nuclear triad because empty tubes would render the vessel incapable of deterrence. This allows India to be capable of continuous nuclear retaliation, guaranteeing India’s CMD. Hence, before a vessel is deployed for patrol, warheads are mated.

The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 makes it clear that the sporadic presence of weapons on a single SSBN is not a major change but rather a requirement for sea patrols. To maintain its second-strike capabilities under CMD, India has modernised its operational stance to a steady medium-readiness posture rather than changing its basic framework of recessed deterrence.

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Notes:-

[1] Hans M Kristensen and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2026: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026), pp. 251- 301.

[2] “In A First, India Deploys 12 Nuclear Warheads in Big Policy Shift: Report,” NDTV, June 09, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/in-a-first-india-deploys-12-nuclear-warhead-in-big-policy-shift-report-11611678. Accessed on June 19, 2026.

[3] Debalina Ghoshal, “India’s Recessed Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2016, April 29, 2016, pp.1-13, https://www.cndpindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/The-Washington-Quarterly-Indias-Recessed-Deterrence.pdf. Accessed on June 20, 2026.

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews perationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” January 04, 2003, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine. Accessed on June 20, 2026

[5] NDTV, n. 2.

[6]  Kristensen, Korda, n. 1, pp. 251-301.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Government of France, “President delivers speech on France’s nuclear deterrence,” March 04, 2026, https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrence#haut-de-page. Accessed on June 23, 2026.

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