Author: Dr Priyanka Yadav, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: BRICS, Quad, China, Strait of Hormuz, Indo-Pacific

India, at the helm of the BRICS chairmanship, hosted the 18^th BRICS Summit from September 12 to 13, 2026, in New Delhi. This year’s summit came against the backdrop of the West fighting wars in West Asia and Europe, United States (US) President Trump’s imposition of harsh unilateral trade tariffs against nations, and more broadly, the visible rupture of the international order that the US had led for decades. Western narratives have often portrayed the BRICS grouping as an anti-Western bloc¹ due to the deep ideological and security divide between Western nations, notably the US, and non-Western nations such as China and Russia. However, India’s interests in BRICS go beyond bloc politics, particularly as new security and economic challenges emerge. These include China’s control over critical minerals, emerging vulnerabilities in strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing role of artificial intelligence (AI) in political, economic, and security domains. Most of these pressures originate from the grouping itself, which makes India’s position peculiar: it continues to occupy a significant middle ground, embedded in US-led regional groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), while shaping and influencing non-Western-led institutions like BRICS from its chair.

This article examines whether India’s engagement with BRICS may shape or alter its long-term strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific. It also examines how India balances its participation in BRICS with its commitments to the Quad and its broader Indo-Pacific interests, without compromising its foreign policy principle of strategic autonomy.

India and the Quad

India’s Indo-Pacific objectives are centred on protecting its maritime security, securing vital sea lanes and energy routes, and maintaining a stable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific. India holds a significant position in the Quad grouping with the other three major powers, the US, Japan, and Australia, to strengthen its defence and strategic partnerships. For instance, in May 2026, India hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, where the member nations jointly launched the USD 20 billion ‘Quad Minerals Initiative Framework.² Alongside this, it anchored India as a strategic processing and recycling hub, securing the high-tech supply chains essential to the clean energy and defence systems of all the Quad nations. India’s defence agreements with Japan³ and Australia⁴ in mid-2026 also centred on boosting defence cooperation with naval co-development, enhancing maritime domain awareness and interoperability to build a better, more resilient Indo-Pacific architecture. It indicates that India’s Indo-Pacific security commitments are growing as defence ties among these nations deepen. Thus, India’s position in the Quad is not at the expense of the Western powers but primarily to ensure its own interests in the Indo-Pacific theatre, including the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean lies in India’s backyard and holds substantial significance of its own because it comprises a multitude of shipping lanes, along with notable India-led initiatives such as Look East (strengthening cooperation with Southeast and East Asian nations), SAGAR (Security and Growth for all), and MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), strengthening defence ties with Southeast Asian nations⁵ (notably the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam), and conducting regular joint military exercises and patrols to preserve the existing regional order. Through these initiatives, India indirectly seeks to monitor China’s coercive tactics against smaller nations in the region and to counter China’s aggressive naval buildup, investments in maritime infrastructure, and alternative connectivity corridors under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India’s geography aligns more closely with the Indo-Pacific; therefore, outcomes in the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific directly affect India’s territorial and maritime security, energy supply routes, and its regional standing.

India’s Position in BRICS

While India’s objectives in BRICS differ from its security objectives in the Indo-Pacific. This year, hosting the BRICS Summit, New Delhi provided a platform for defence and diplomacy among nations, strengthened economic cooperation, bolstered the Global South’s voice in global governance, and collectively shaped decision-making. This also aligns with India’s principle of strategic autonomy and non-alignment, which allows it to work with Western nations while securing a platform for consensus with major powers such as Russia and China within BRICS.

India has been wary of rigid geopolitical alignments, and it demonstrated this by abstaining from the BRICS-linked naval exercise “Will for Peace” in South Africa, clearly dismissing China’s intent to develop BRICS maritime cooperation into a securitised framework among member nations.⁶ Prior to the BRICS Summit, in July 2026, India also hosted the BRICS Seafarers’ Forum in Mumbai, issuing the Mumbai Declaration 2026, which focused on seafarer safety in conflict zones, addressed crew abandonment, and emphasised maritime sovereignty.⁷

Additionally, India has also maintained distance from any understanding of a common BRICS currency and de-dollarisation⁸ efforts in the near term, which has often been a source of worry and angst for US President Trump regarding the BRICS grouping. Instead, India kept the focus on a technocratic approach involving interoperable payment systems, settlements in local currencies, and maintaining cooperation based on national priorities.

It is essential to note that the BRICS agenda spans a range of issues, including terrorism, global governance, agriculture, technology, climate, health, education, culture, and finance, making it a strategic convergence mechanism for all participating nations rather than merely another security bloc. The nations of this grouping do not share a similar regional threat perception; thus, it does not directly serve as a basis for a security-led alternative mechanism.

Here, India also has an advantage in BRICS due to Pakistan’s absence, as it provides more room for close cooperation among member nations on issues such as terrorism, which directly hinders India’s sovereign interests. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration,⁹ signed on September 12, 2026, by all nations, including China, which often portrays its relations with Pakistan as an ‘all-weather friend,’ condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam attack. Such attempts have repeatedly been obstructed by Pakistan on other international platforms, which remains a perennial security concern for India, emanating from cross-border terrorism. Despite the ongoing conflict and divergences in West Asia, New Delhi also managed to bring Iran and the UAE to a single consensus text at this year’s BRICS Summit. At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India for the BRICS summit added strategic weight, given the strained relations between the two nations since the 2020 border crisis. ¹⁰

For India, BRICS serves as a platform to engage with China in a multilateral setting, while other non-Western economies pursue objectives that broaden the scope of the international order and deepen cooperation on a range of issues such as supply chain resilience, digital systems, climate adaptation, health, and food security.

India’s Choices

India’s strategic choices are shaped by a multidimensional China challenge: a competitor to its interests in the Indo-Pacific, a dominant force in BRICS owing to its technological and manufacturing edge, and an adversary along the contested Himalayan frontier, where border skirmishes continue to strain ties.

Although India’s BRICS and Indo-Pacific objectives are not inherently contradictory, tensions can arise between them. The main concern is China. India seeks to engage China through BRICS while strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships to respond to China’s growing regional presence. A stronger security role for BRICS could work against India’s interests, as pressure for bloc solidarity may force it into positions that strain its strategic partnerships and limit its room to counter China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Navigating its choices across different platforms also gives India institutional leverage, room for strategic manoeuvring on a range of issues, and more negotiating ground to build bridges with China in a multilateral setting. It also leaves enough room for India to participate in Western-led forums such as the G7 and G-20 without friction. Weakening international forums such as BRICS could undermine a platform that can echo the concerns of developing nations from a vantage point.

The New Delhi Declaration notes that the outcome stems from practical cooperation among member nations, despite their different positions on the international stage. The 2026 BRICS Summit was not about who gets to write the rules, but who is represented when the rules are being written. The Quad’s concerns centre on ensuring maritime security and effectively balancing China by building robust multilateral partnerships within the Indo-Pacific. India’s challenge will be to ensure that cooperation within BRICS does not develop into bloc-based security commitments that restrict its long-term strategic choices. As long as India retains this flexibility, its growing role in BRICS is more likely to strengthen its strategic autonomy than dilute its long-term Indo-Pacific objectives.

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Keywords: Indo-Pacific, USPACOM, INDOPACOM, US-India Relations, Quad

Introduction

On June 16, 2026, the United States (US) Department of War (formerly known as the Department of Defense) made a quiet but significant gesture by renaming US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).^[1] The US has maintained a dedicated Indo-Pacific posture since President Trump’s first administration, built around treating the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space.^[2] Thus, the renaming raises a simple but important question: whether it is only an administrative change or does it signal that the US is stepping back from its Indo-Pacific framing? The move also comes at a critical juncture, when the India-US relationship is already at a crossroads due to high-tariff onslaughts since President Trump’s second presidency. While the renaming does not change US military operations, missions, or troop deployments in the region, it is a symbolic signal worth noticing.

Some officials in the US believe that referring to the command’s historical identity signifies its military heritage.^[3] However, as per the US official position, its priority areas in the Indo-Pacific, including areas of operations, missions, and troop deployments, remain unchanged.^[4]

India in the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

With the US Indo-Pacific strategy introduced during the first Trump administration and continued under subsequent President Biden’s administration, India’s position in US regional planning grew significantly, with increasing relevance to the region. It focused on the approach to countering China’s assertive presence in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening cooperation with nations, including India, Japan, and Australia, which grew more^[5] in the backdrop of increasing Chinese naval activity beyond the Western Pacific, that is, in the Indian Ocean.

Under US Secretary James M. Mattis in 2018, the renaming of the command from USPACOM to INDOPACOM also signalled the intent of ‘connecting the two oceans’.^[6] It explicitly highlighted the importance of the Indian Ocean and its centrality, as well as deepening Indo-US relations in the Indo-Pacific. Reflecting India’s central role in the US Indo-Pacific strategy, the US called the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) ‘Asia-Pacific Plus India’.^[7] The first Trump administration also increasingly treated the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a single military and economic theatre.

The current unease in the Washington-New Delhi relationship, however, suggests that the US may no longer be considering India central to its Indo-Pacific strategy,^[8] even as the US continues to prioritise its rivalry with China in the wider Pacific. There is also a broader consensus in US strategic circles that, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, India will pursue independent foreign policy decisions. India will not change its commitment to the ‘One China Policy’, and thus will not come to the US’s aid against China.^[9] India considers the South China Sea as a ‘secondary area of interest’ and prefers to avoid confrontation with China in this region.^[10] Thus cumulatively, while the operational domain of USPACOM remains intact, it could hint at a silent, gradual distancing from deepening its equation with India to deal with China.

Inferences for India

Taken together, this suggests the practical footprint of US Indo-Pacific policy has not shifted, but symbolism matters in diplomacy, especially when the US relations with India are already under strain. This is why the renaming also needs to be viewed from the Indian perspective. Against this backdrop and amid rapidly evolving dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, India should build on its capabilities and engage with more trusted partners. The recent visits from the Indo-Pacific nations, such as Japanese PM Taikichi’s visit to India, and then Indian PM Modi’s recent travels to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, suggest that India sees the Indo-Pacific region, from its western to eastern maritime edges, as central to its strategic and economic future, and wants to deepen ties with all the key countries in this region.^[11] This likely means deeper ties with these nations, as well as with other important regional Indo-Pacific players such as South Korea and ASEAN member states. All of these states share India’s concern about Chinese expansionism amid increasing instability in this maritime geography.

Thus, it calls for New Delhi to form more like-minded, collaborative partnerships and issue-based coalitions in the Indo-Pacific. It requires steady investment in India’s defence capabilities, its island territories, its surveillance networks, more coordinated military exercises, and its partnerships across the Indian Ocean Region, from Mauritius to the Seychelles to Southeast Asia. Since the renaming of INDOPACOM to USPACOM changes little in practice: American forces, missions, and deployments remain where they were, it points to a Washington that is distracted by the war in West Asia and less inclined to court India than it once was. India should neither treat this as a crisis nor dismiss it as meaningless. The Indo-Pacific remains a region in which India, the US, and other regional powers all have real stakes, and securing it will matter regardless of how the region is reframed to suit their respective interests. India’s clearest path forward is the one it has already been taking: building its own capability and deepening practical partnerships across the region, so that its strategic position does not depend on how Washington names its commands.

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Notes:-

^[1]U.S. Pacific Command, United States of America, “Department of War Restores U.S. Pacific Command Designation,” June 16, 2026, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Press-Releases-and-Readouts/Article/4519249/department-of-war-restores-us-pacific-command-designation/. Accessed on June 18, 2026.

^[2] Alyssa Ayres, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 22, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-indo-pacific-strategy-needs-more-indian-ocean. Accessed on June 18, 2026.

[3] “Why the U.S. Restored Pacific Command Name, Ending the Indo-Pacific Designation After Eight Years,” The Defence News, June 17, 2026, https://www.thedefensenews.com/Why-the-US-Restored-Pacific-Command-Name-Ending-the-Indo-Pacific-Designation-After-Eight-Years/. Accessed on June 18, 2026.

[4]  U.S. Pacific Command, n. 1.

[5] Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande, “Another Turbulent Year in the Indian Ocean” Proceedings 151, no. 5 (2025), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/may/another-turbulent-year-indian-ocean. Accessed on June 22, 2026.

[6]Tara Copp, “INDOPACOM, It Is: US Pacific Command Gets Renamed,” Military Times, May 30, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/05/30/indo-pacom-it-is-pacific-command-gets-renamed/. Accessed on June 24, 2026.

^[7] Rajiv Bhatia, “The Relevance of the Indo-Pacific,” Gateway House, June 18, 2026, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-relevance-of-the-indo-pacific/. Accessed on June 20, 2026.

[8] Aparna Pande, “How India’s Role in US Indo-Pacific Strategy Diminished,” Hudson Institute, December 18, 2025, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/how-indias-role-us-indo-pacific-strategy-diminished-aparna-pande. Accessed on 23 June, 2026.

^[9]Lyle Goldstein, “Target Taiwan: Limits of Allied Support,” Defense Priorities, October 16, 2025, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/target-taiwan-limits-of-allied-support/. Accessed on June 22, 2026.

[10]  Pooja Bhatt, “Indian Presence in the South China Sea: Strategic Compulsions,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, June 26, 2023, https://www.isdp.eu/indian-presence-in-the-south-china-sea-strategic-compulsions/. Accessed on June 24, 2026.

[11] Ajai Malhotra, “What PM Modi’s Three-Nation Tour Tells About India’s Changing Indo-Pacific Policy,” The Print, July 6, 2026, https://theprint.in/opinion/pm-modis-three-nation-tour-indias-indo-pacific-policy/2978275/. Accessed on July 6, 2026.

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Keywords: West Asia, East Asia, Strait of Hormuz, United States

Introduction

On February 28, 2026, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in a decapitating strike by a joint United States (US)-Israel military operation code-named Epic Fury.^[1] Following this attack, Tehran initiated a series of retaliatory missile strikes on the US bases in West Asia, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan. These rapidly unfolding events suddenly plunged the world into chaos when Iran blocked the critical Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway that carries one-fifth of global oil exports and connects the Gulf of Persia with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.^[2] This has left the US allies in East Asia, from South Korea to Japan, scrambling over the situation as they rely heavily on this passage for their energy security.

In response, the US President Donald Trump called on his social media platform, Truth Social, on March 15, 2026, for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies like the United Kingdom (UK) and France, and for non-NATO allies such as Japan and South Korea, to secure the Strait of Hormuz by deploying their naval assets to the Strait. Having received lukewarm response from his allies, he hastily announced that he didn’t need his allies, citing America’s military superiority. Amid this crisis in West Asia, which remains uncertain at the time of writing, it becomes imperative for the US allies in East Asia, such as South Korea and Japan, to recalibrate their foreign policies. This piece tries to put forth two questions:

(a)   How the crisis in West Asia is impacting the US allies and their strategic responses?

(b)   What lessons the US’s strategic rivals, like North Korea, are deriving?

America’s Allies’ Strategic Interpretation and Military Support to the US

South Korea, a highly industrialised economy, remains dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for its energy needs, accounting for around 70 per cent of its crude oil imports and about 20 per cent of its liquefied gas imports.^[3] In addition, there have been reports of the US relocating its anti-missiles from South Korea to West Asia in order to protect its bases from Iranian attacks, raising concerns amongst its allies. With continuous and immediate threats from North Korea, such steps by the US put South Korea’s security in a vulnerable position. In the aftermath of the Korean War of 1950-1953, South Korea became reliant on the US security umbrella to protect against threats emanating from North Korea and to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula. In recent times, South Koreans have not been convinced enough by the US’s extended deterrence and have been debating acquiring nuclear weapons for their security.^[4] Such concerns are compounded due to the impulsive and transactional nature of the President Trump administration’s transactional approach and inconsistent behaviour towards its allies, demanding a payment of five per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for its troop deployment on South Korean soil.^[5]

In Japan’s case, it initially outrightly denied the US’s request to send military assistance to the Strait of Hormuz. However, during Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Washington on March 19, 2026, she reaffirmed the strength of the US-Japan alliance and signalled her intent to assist the US, despite Japan itself being constrained by its pacifist constitution from engaging overseas militarily.^[6] Later issuing a Joint Statement, the leaders from the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan expressed a “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait” and welcomed “the commitment of nations who are engaging in preparatory planning.”^[7] These efforts by allies came on the heels of surging oil prices that are destabilising the global energy market.

However, US allies in East Asia remain worried about the nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea, and thus cannot afford to divert their resources completely to the US war in West Asia at this critical juncture. Many of the US allies have been reluctant to provide active support because they believe that the US initiated the escalation. Therefore, in the short to long term, this conflict is going to shape the strategic outlook of states that do not possess nuclear weapons, making them vulnerable to powerful, nuclear-armed states. This would also reignite debates regarding nuclear acquisition and proliferation amid an increasing security dilemma in this region.

North Korea- A Nuclear Threat in East Asia

On March 14, 2025, North Korea fired ten ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan in response to the US-South Korea annual exercise, Freedom Shield, held at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, raising concerns for neighbouring Japan and South Korea.^[8] Such near incursions of adventurism are not new for North Korea, as it has been engaging in such practices of firing missiles at regular intervals. Such frequent actions from North Korea solidify its image as a rogue nuclear power. Its regular testing of missile systems and stockpiling of weapons reflect its evolving military strategy, thereby putting other regional nations at a significant disadvantage. North Korea’s external engagement with other countries is also perceived as an area of concern. In the past, its relations with Iran in terms of providing missile defence, with shared animosity towards the US.^[9] There have been reports as well of North Korean weapons being used by Hamas in its war with Israel.^[10] These nations have been under economic sanctions for a long time, often resorting to engaging in clandestine business activities. One significant conclusion that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has withdrawn from the Iran-Israel-US ongoing conflict is that nuclear weapons provide real protection and are the ultimate source of his regime’s survival.^[11] With an analysis of the challenges for US air superiority in its attack on Iran, North Korea would bolster its drone and counter-drone capabilities, along with the stockpiling of conventional missiles.^[12]

In early January of 2025, North Korea declared that any talks of stalling North Korea’s nuclear programme should be off the table if future negotiations are to take place. Such actions by North Korea put the US and South Korea in a dilemma vis-à-vis North Korea and on North Korea’s preemptive demands for engagement. North Korea’s continuous expansion of its nuclear arsenal is becoming an immediate problem for states like South Korea and Japan, which they perceive as impacting their regional stability. Moreover, the US becoming entangled in West Asia following its attack on Iran raises apprehensions among these nations about their strategic survival.

Evaluating Outcomes

The Strait of Hormuz crisis ought to make the US realise that its alliances are not globally transferable security instruments; instead, they are regionally bounded partnerships shaped by domestic priorities, energy dependence and strategic prioritisation. The ongoing war in West Asia only exposes US allies to strategic risks. Thus, they need to reflect on recalibrating partnerships and engaging with global mechanisms grounded in multilateral frameworks.

The multiple interstate rivalries in the Indo-Pacific, including India-China, India-Pakistan, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-Japan, China-Taiwan, and Thailand-Cambodia, make the region highly volatile amid the receding US hegemony. Alongside this, if the war continues for a long period in West Asia, US losses will be manifold:

(a)   It will be distracted from China’s strategic ascendance in the Indo-Pacific.

(b)   Moving defence assets from South Korea and Japan might give rise to China’s and North Korea’s overtures, making US’s allies like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan vulnerable.

(c)   The crisis is turning in Moscow’s favour in improving its revenue deficit as countries are resorting to buying Russian oil despite sanctions. President Trump must reckon with these outcomes and recalibrate by choosing the path of diplomacy rather than putting its allies at risk of entrapment on the global security stage.

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Notes:-

^[1] Sanam Vakil and Bronwen Maddox, “US and Israel attack Iran, killing Khamenei. Tehran launches counterstrikes: Early analysis from Chatham House experts,” Chatham House, March 02, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/us-and-israel-attack-iran-early-analysis-chatham-house-experts. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[2] Shekhar Gupta, “Why Strait of Hormuz is critical oil chokepoint & how Iran is weaponising it | Cut The Clutter” The Print, March 12, 2026, https://theprint.in/world/why-strait-of-hormuz-is-critical-oil-chokepoint-how-ir,an-is-weaponising-it-cut-the-clutter/2876983/. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[3] Aurelia Schlosser, “Iran War Highlights South Korea’s Vulnerability,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, March 13, 2026, https://www.freiheit.org/north-and-south-korea/iran-war-highlights-south-koreas-vulnerability. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[4] Jennifer Ahn, “The Evolution of South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/evolution-south-koreas-nuclear-weapons-policy-debate. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[5] Kim Eun-joong and Kim Seo-young, “U.S. urges S. Korea, Asian allies to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP,”  The Chosun Daily, June 20, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/06/20/LDZQFQZREZCBVN5WYCLE3FYJZE/. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[6] Tim Kelly, “Explainer-How Trump’s Hormuz push tests Japan’s pacifist limits,” The Print, March 18, 2026, https://theprint.in/world/explainer-how-trumps-hormuz-push-tests-japans-pacifist-limits/2882175/. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me2/pageite_000001_01536.html. Accessed on March 20, 2025.

^[8] Belinda Culley, United Nations Command, “Multinational Forces Arrive for Exercise Freedom Shield 2026 – Reaffirming Commitment to Stability”, U.S Indo-Pacific Command, 9 March 2026,” https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4429492/multinational-forces-arrive-for-exercise-freedom-shield-2026-reaffirming-commit/. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[9] Mehmet Kılıç, “A Dangerous Partnership: The Iran-North Korea Nexus,” TRT World Research Centre, November 2024, https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Iran-North-Korea.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2026.

^[10] Gabriela Bernal, “Trouble together: How North Korea sees its growing interests with Iran,” The Interpreter, April 30, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trouble-together-how-north-korea-sees-its-growing-interests-iran. Accessed on March 10, 2026.

^[11] Vann H. Van Diepen, “Eight Lessons for North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Forces From the Ongoing Iran Conflict,” 38 North, March 16, 2026, https://www.38north.org/2026/03/eight-lessons-for-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-forces-from-the-ongoing-iran-conflict/. Accessed on March 20, 2026.

^[12] Ibid.

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