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		<title>October Lessons for Indian Military Reforms</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/october-lessons-for-indian-military-reforms/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[A Pichipoo Raja]]></dc:creator>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, CAPSS Keywords: Indian Military, Jointness, Reforms, Civil-Military Relations One October, I took my daughter to the cleaning activity organised as part of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan. She was excited to wear gloves and a mask and be part of the team. While we were waiting for everyone to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/october-lessons-for-indian-military-reforms/">October Lessons for Indian Military Reforms</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, </strong><strong>Senior Fellow, CAPSS</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords:</strong> Indian Military, Jointness, Reforms, Civil-Military Relations</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">One October, I took my daughter to the cleaning activity organised as part of <em>Swachh Bharat Abhiyan.</em> She was excited to wear gloves and a mask and be part of the team. While we were waiting for everyone to arrive, she asked, “Dad, why do we need to clean this place?” I explained the virtues of cleaning, why it is good to maintain something clean, the benefits of community exercises, etc. She patiently listened and then replied, “No, I am not asking that. I am asking why there is garbage lying here. Don’t the people know they have to put the waste in the dustbin? In my school, there is a big bunny dustbin where we kids drop our trash.” So, why did this Eureka never occur to me earlier until the child asked? It is because we usually don’t question popular beliefs and assumptions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Every October, the media is filled with images of officials and leaders cleaning, sweeping, and picking up garbage. On other days, it is common for people to share images of littered spaces on social media, tag all the relevant municipal bodies and political leadership for action. Yet, the fact is that garbage doesn’t grow out of thin air &#8211; someone has to drop it there. The fundamental problem is not a lack of picking up waste; the real problem is the garbage being thrown. Since the focus is on picking up garbage, the real issue of littering remains unaddressed. Result: year after year of <em>Swachh Bharat</em> drives and an eternal quest for cleanliness. Indian defence reforms are built on similar misdiagnosis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Indian Defence Reforms—a Case Built on Misdiagnosis</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India has a structural politico-military problem. Yet it has often been misdiagnosed as a structural inter-services problem. A strong reason is the abundance of <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">misinformation</a> on the topic. For example, the regional command headquarters of all three services being <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!bharat/should-the-indian-armed-forces-have-theaterisation-a-unified-military-command-for-future-warfare-enn25090300776" target="_blank" rel="noopener">located separately</a> is often cited as a reason for lack of jointness. However, even in the United States of America (USA), they are geographically separate. For example, in the ongoing Operation Epic Fury, the theatre commander (CENTCOM Commander) is orchestrating the ongoing war from their headquarters in Florida, USA, which is not even located in the area of operations. Their naval component is headquartered in <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMPONENT-COMMANDS/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bahrain</a>, while the Army has a forward headquarters in Kuwait. So how can the US military fight wars effectively despite not being co-located? It is because it is co-located at the politico-military level. There is only one Pentagon and no separate individual service headquarters. All headquarters of the US Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, etc., are located inside the Pentagon. Likewise, each service’s <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/aps/aps_2026.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">posture</a> <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2022SAF/FY23_DAF_Posture_Statement.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement,</a> which provides the broad strategic guidance, is a document signed jointly by both the Secretaries of the Army/ Navy/ Air Force and the service Chiefs. India currently lacks this level of integration at the apex level.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Civil-Military Relations or Jointness—What affected India’s wars more?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The outcome of India’s wars has depended more on apex-level relations than on inter-service jointness. The 1962 War was preceded by a decade of unsettled relations between the services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In 1953, Admiral Mark Pizey wrote that the Defence Secretary, H.M. Patel, was “very anxious to clip the wings of the Army C-in-C.”<a id="fnref1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> In 1955, the title of ‘Commander-in-Chief’ for the service chiefs was abolished with unusual hurry. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had to <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://nehruarchive.in/documents/to-k-n-katju-1-march-1955-j9plp4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speak</a> to Mr M.K. Vellodi, the Defence Secretary, to hold the order until he discussed the matter with the chiefs, while assuring that the decision wouldn’t be reversed. Relations worsened after Krishna Menon was appointed the Defence Minister in 1957. After an uncomfortable working relationship, General Kodandera Subayya Thimayya, the Army Chief, submitted his <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://nehruarchive.in/documents/to-vijaya-lakshmi-pandit-thimayyas-resignation-2-september-1959-31w5g" target="_blank" rel="noopener">resignation</a> on August 31, 1959. Though the resignation was subsequently withdrawn, the environment continued to be turbulent throughout and was one of the key reasons for the defeat in 1962.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">In the second instance during Kargil, significant turmoil existed between the MoD and service headquarters in the year preceding the Kargil War. This ultimately led to the dismissal of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat from service on December 31, 1998. It was the only occasion in India that a service chief was dismissed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">On the other hand, during successful operations like 1971 and 2025, the relations were excellent. The political leaders and the military shared a healthy relationship. Thus, politico-military relations are directly correlated with war outcomes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Indian Civil-Military Relations: A Faulty Colonial Inheritance that is now Fortified</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">As one travels in the metro from the airport to the city in New Delhi, two colossal buildings stand as testimony to this disjointedness. The Army and the Naval Headquarters, both massive and commanding—yet, located away from the government. This civil-military structure is one of the most significant yet under-debated colonial inheritances. The British kept the Indian military in cantonments physically away from the public. The British deliberately kept Indians out of higher defence roles. While the bureaucracy (the Indian Civil Services) <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://thecsrjournal.in/satyendranath-tagore-first-indian-civil-servant" target="_blank" rel="noopener">opened</a> to Indians in higher ranks much earlier in 1864, the higher defence was exclusively staffed by the British till independence. This inadvertently encouraged a policy of distancing the Indian military leadership from the government at the time of independence. This was subsequently codified as policy in 1961 when the armed forces headquarters were designated as ‘Attached Offices’ to the Ministry of Defence. This continues to date.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Bogey of Coup</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The possibility of a coup has often been cited as a reason to keep the military at an arm’s length. It may explain why no military officer has ever been appointed National Security Advisor in India. In other countries, military experience is usually desirable for similar appointments. Yet, there is no evidence that the Indian military has ever shown such intentions. Even during the most vulnerable times of Indian democracy, like the Emergency in 1975, the military stuck to its mandate. Hypothetically speaking, if the Indian military had such intentions, then Andaman could have become a country long ago. The C-in-C Andaman and Nicobar Command, along with a Lieutenant Governor who could be a veteran, could have orchestrated a coup and become independent. Yet this hasn’t happened, or even been discussed, proving that fear of a coup in India is wildly exaggerated. Authors like Steven I. Wilkinson attribute this to deliberate efforts by politicians to structurally prevent a coup, while others like RR Chaudhary argue that it stems from India’s strategic culture.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Integrated Defence Staff or Integrated Military Staff? —The Intent vs Outcome</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The military&#8217;s confinement to the periphery and its impact are well documented. The Kargil Review Committee opined that India was the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters were outside the government.<a id="fnref2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn2"><sup>2</sup></a> The first recommendation of the Group of Ministers Report of 2000 subsequently recommended changing the status of armed forces headquarters from ‘Attached Offices’ and reforming them as ‘Integrated Headquarters of the MoD.’<a id="fnref3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn3"><sup>3</sup></a> The spirit behind this reform was to enhance synergy between the Ministry of Defence and the service headquarters. However, instead of integrating the service headquarters and the MoD, a new Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was created. It would be apt to call it the Integrated Military Staff now, as the civilian vacancies haven’t been appropriately filled. The result is best captured by the <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2317807&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2." target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> of MoD on the occasion of the silver jubilee of HQ IDS. It said, “Over the past two-and-a-half decades, HQ IDS has evolved as the apex institution driving jointness, integration and synergy among the three Services, with a focus on capability enhancement and joint employment of combat power in line with national security objectives.” Thus, an organisation created to improve relations at the apex level has resigned itself to the task of improving inter-services relations due to a lack of civilian participation.<a id="fnref4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn4"><sup>4</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">One of the most ambitious reforms of post-independence India is the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). But its charter has once again been largely confined to bringing about jointness between the <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1597425&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">armed forces</a>. Even in the DMA, only one civilian post at the AS/JS level is <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.dmamod.gov.in/ministry/our-team" target="_blank" rel="noopener">filled</a>, while the entire military posts are filled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Jointness in the Indian Military—A Case of Perfect is the Enemy of the Good</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">As of October 2026, the following mechanisms/structures exist in India for bringing in jointness in the armed forces:</p>
<ol style="margin: 0 0 18px 0; padding-left: 30px;" type="1">
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">DMA.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">HQ IDS.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Joint training establishments like NDA, DSSC, CDM, etc.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Tri-service commands like Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), Strategic Forces Command (SFC).</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Tri-service agencies like Defence Space Agency, Defence Cyber Agency.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://iafhistory.in/2026/09/13/iaf-advance-hq-western-air-command-1971-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Advance Headquarters</strong></a> (IA-IAF Command HQ) and Maritime Air Ops Centre (IAF-IN Command HQ).</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Tactical Air Centres.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">A lot has been achieved due to sustained efforts of all these entities. The govt subsequently <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> on May 18, 2025 that “India’s ability to project strength across land, sea, and air is no longer theoretical- it is structured, synchronised, and deeply integrated. The nation’s tri-services architecture now operates as a cohesive force.” Some shortcomings in cohesion will always remain since picture-perfect jointness is achievable only in choreographed peacetime exercises and war games. Actual wars are chaotic, abundant with fog and friction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Disjointed and Duplicated—Service HQ and MoD</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Except in the aerial domain, there is hardly any duplication among the armed forces. World over, usually armies don’t want to own ships; navies don’t want to operate tanks, while both want to own aircraft, drones, and air defence systems. In India, even if one adds the total number of all the aircraft, drones and air defence assets of all three services, the numbers are grossly inadequate for a country of India’s size and threat landscape. However, in India there is significant duplication between the services headquarters and the MoD because for several functions that service headquarters carry out, there is almost a mirror desk in the MoD.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">One of the first reforms instituted by PM Narendra Modi after taking office in 2014 was a directive that no file should move more than <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-file-should-go-through-more-than-4-layers-cabinet-secretary-to-departments/articleshow/36167501.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">four layers</a>. Yet, this is not the case of the military. For example, in the case of capability building, each file sequentially moves from top to bottom, with each headquarters having several layers within itself.</p>
<div style="text-align: center;"><img decoding="async" style="display: inline-block; max-width: 100%; height: auto;" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/october-lessons-indian-military-reforms_.png" alt="Image description" /></div>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Image</strong>: Depiction of File movement in Indian Defence created by the author</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Since there is no common network connecting all the entities above, the files move physically between each of them, causing huge delays. The <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=146663&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Defence Communication Network (DCN)</a> is also designed to integrate only the services, HQ IDS and SFC, making it a Military Communication Network. It <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://archive.pib.gov.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=271050" target="_blank" rel="noopener">doesn’t extend</a> to the MoD. Thus, delayed decisions, delayed acquisitions and depleting capability are structurally inbuilt into the system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Way Ahead</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The US military is integrated at the top. China has leapfrogged by employing a national policy of <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Asia-Policy-16.1-Jan-2021-Richard-Bitzinger.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Military-Civil Fusion</a>. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on August 03, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2293732&amp;reg=5&amp;lang=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that ‘<em>Military-civil integration is key to a robust defence ecosystem to tackle emerging challenges.</em>’ Some steps mentioned below will help achieve this.</p>
<ol style="margin: 0 0 18px 0; padding-left: 30px;" type="1">
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Change Service Headquarters to Departments of MoD and collocate:</strong> While the politically tougher decision to appoint a CDS has been implemented, this small but significant step has been delayed. Until civilians and the military are co-located, share a healthy relationship, and tap each other’s strengths, real cohesion and speedy capability building will remain a distant dream.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Appoint a Committee for Civil-Military Reforms:</strong> Solutions to problems need to start from a correct diagnosis. A committee involving both the military and civilians from diverse disciplines is essential to study this issue afresh and offer recommendations. National Defence Academy, which has done yeoman service to the country, was born out of one such <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/revisiting-the-eight-decade-history-of-indian-jointness-drawing-the-right-lessons-from-op-sindoor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">committee</a>.</p>
</li>
<li style="margin: 0 0 12px 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="margin: 0; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Delineate the role and missions of each service at CCS Level:</strong> In the existing set-up, no one service has clear <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/12-26-Wg-Cdr-Dhruv-Shukla-22-05-2026.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">roles and tasks</a>. <strong>This is the origin of duplication</strong>. The publicly discussed solutions involve creating more headquarters and appointing arbiters to solve this. This approach, like the garbage case study discussed in the beginning, will once again result in more and more headquarters without solving the underlying cause. The US recognised this as early as 1948 and instituted initial measures such as the Key West Agreement. This has since evolved through several iterations.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Problems in the Indian military result from a faulty structure of civil-military relations. Yet the proposed solutions aim only to improve inter-service relations. The national interest requires a fundamental rethinking of the issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</strong></em></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em><strong>Notes:-</strong></em></p>
<aside id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document" role="doc-endnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Letter from Admiral Mark Pizey to Admiral Mountbatten. Quoted in Anit Mukherjee, <em>The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Military in India</em> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 40.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref1">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">From <em>Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report</em> (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 258-259.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref2">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Group of Ministers, Government of India, <em>Reforming the National Security System: Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security</em> (New Delhi: Government of India, 2001), p. 99.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref3">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn4" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Report of the Standing Committee on Defence: Status of the Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces,” February 29, 2009, pp. 1-46, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://sansad.in/ls/committee/departmentally-related-standing-committees/7-Defence-nameH=%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B7%E0%A4%BE" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://sansad.in/ls/committee/departmentally-related-standing-committees/7-Defence-nameH=%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B7%E0%A4%BE</a>. Accessed on October 20, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref4">↩︎</a></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/october-lessons-for-indian-military-reforms/">October Lessons for Indian Military Reforms</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>When the Army and Navy Wanted to Abolish an Air Force:  Revisiting Inter-Service Rivalry 100 Years Ago</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/when-the-army-and-navy-wanted-to-abolish-an-air-force-revisiting-inter-service-rivalry-100-years-ago/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[A Pichipoo Raja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 16:10:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[APRIL 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=17995</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Military History, Inter-service rivalry, Theatre Command, Air Force Introduction The war in West Asia has triggered an interesting set of debates in the Indian military.  Veterans from each service have been highlighting the irrelevance of the other services on [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/when-the-army-and-navy-wanted-to-abolish-an-air-force-revisiting-inter-service-rivalry-100-years-ago/">When the Army and Navy Wanted to Abolish an Air Force:  Revisiting Inter-Service Rivalry 100 Years Ago</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: </strong></span><strong>Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja</strong>, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Military History, Inter-service rivalry, Theatre Command, Air Force</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The war in West Asia has triggered an interesting set of debates in the Indian military.  Veterans from each service have been highlighting the irrelevance of the other services on social media, in TV debates, and in print media. Some have argued that the surface navy is irrelevant, especially the aircraft carriers. Others have opined that manned aircraft are irrelevant and suggested moving to an independent drone and rocket force. Some have questioned the utility of massive ground forces in modern battles, especially tanks and armoured formations. The civilian audience is amused by why the services are fighting amongst themselves in the media when they should ideally be fighting the enemy. While it may appear to be something new and unique to India, it is absolutely common behaviour worldwide. In fact, some past debates have been much fiercer. This article revisits one such debate from the 1920s to show how little things have changed over a century and what lessons can be drawn from these inter-service rivalries.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Origin of Twentieth Century Inter-Service Rivalries: Birth of the RAF</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The German air raids on London in 1917 were a turning point in inter-service relations. While millions had died on the Front since 1914, it didn’t matter as much to the politicians as the air strikes on the capital of the mighty British Empire. This was beyond the policymakers’ imagination. Immediately, the British Prime Minister George Lloyd constituted the Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air Raids with General Jan Smuts as its head. Its mandate was to examine how to defend Britain from air raids and how air operations and their supporting structures should be organised.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This Committee recommended the creation of an Air Ministry and an Independent Air Service at par with the Army and the Navy. The committee concluded by stating that, “<em>Air supremacy in the long run will become as important a factor in the defence of the empire as sea supremacy</em>.” This laid the foundation for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918. A key argument that justified the creation of an independent air force is reproduced here:</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Smuts Committee Arguments as to</strong> <strong>Why the Air Force Should be an Independent Force </strong></h4>
<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17986" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1.jpg" alt="" width="940" height="246" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1.jpg 940w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1-300x79.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1-600x157.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1-768x201.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1-150x39.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-1-696x182.jpg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 940px) 100vw, 940px" /></p>
<figure id="attachment_17987" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17987" style="width: 1554px" class="wp-caption alignright"><img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17987" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2.jpg" alt="" width="1554" height="550" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2.jpg 1554w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-300x106.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-600x212.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-1024x362.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-768x272.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-1536x544.jpg 1536w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-150x53.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-696x246.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-2-1068x378.jpg 1068w" sizes="(max-width: 1554px) 100vw, 1554px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17987" class="wp-caption-text">Source: Cabinet Papers, CAB 24/22/58, The National Archives, UK.</figcaption></figure>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Royal Air Force was created as the world’s first independent air force, on April 01, 1918, introducing the youngest and most energetic player in inter-service rivalries. The RAF was created by merging the assets and personnel from the air arms and was granted equal status with the Army and the Navy. This naturally caused resentment, as the services essentially viewed it as an elevation of their own support arms to equal combatant status. However, they had no choice but to comply since it was a political decision by the Cabinet.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Every Man for Himself: Survival in the Decade of Fiscal Austerity &#8211; 1920s</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The timing of the creation of the RAF couldn’t have been worse. The First World War ended within a few months of the creation of the RAF, and the defence budget immediately dried up. As part of post-war demobilisation, there were massive cuts in manpower and material. All institutions created during the war were put under review, and several were threatened with closure. To avoid the axe, each ministry/service often questioned the rationale for the existence of the other while justifying its own relevance.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Cabinet, on its part, suspended all new warship building until the effectiveness of submarines and aircraft could be assessed through a detailed study. The Army vehemently argued for retaining its manpower in the infantry despite new forms of warfare such as aircraft and tanks, but was overruled by the political authority.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The RAF got a lease of hope when Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard conceived the idea of ‘Air Substitution’- a policy of using aircraft to police colonies without deploying the British Army regulars on the ground. This was both economical and politically preferred, but it challenged the Army’s role in colonial control, leading to a reduction in manpower.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Cabinet Note on The Separate Existence of the Royal Air Force and the Air Ministry Scheme of Expansion for Home Defence, July 1923</strong></h4>
<figure id="attachment_17988" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17988" style="width: 1324px" class="wp-caption alignright"><img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17988" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3.jpg" alt="" width="1324" height="472" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3.jpg 1324w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-300x107.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-600x214.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-1024x365.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-768x274.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-150x53.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-696x248.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-3-1068x381.jpg 1068w" sizes="(max-width: 1324px) 100vw, 1324px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17988" class="wp-caption-text">Source: CAB 24/161, The National Archives, UK.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, both the Army and the Navy took the extreme step when they moved the case to abolish the independent RAF.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Cabinet Note on The Separate Existence of the Royal Air Force and the Air Ministry </strong></h4>
<figure id="attachment_17989" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17989" style="width: 1424px" class="wp-caption alignright"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17989" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4.jpg" alt="" width="1424" height="370" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4.jpg 1424w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-300x78.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-600x156.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-1024x266.jpg 1024w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-768x200.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-150x39.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-696x181.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-4-1068x278.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1424px) 100vw, 1424px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17989" class="wp-caption-text">Source: Cabinet Papers, CAB 24/161, The National Archives, UK.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Role of Political Leadership in Inter-Service Rivalries </strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Had the military been allowed to decide for themselves, there is a very strong possibility that the independent RAF would have been abolished there and then based on consensus. Here, politicians like Winston Churchill played a major role. One must remember that it was on their initiative that the independent air force was created, not through the military’s efforts. Therefore, while all this intense rivalry amongst the services was on, the Cabinet set up a committee on the Amalgamation of Services Common to the Navy, Army and Air Force on February 17, 1922. This was to identify areas of duplication and bring in economy by amalgamating wherever feasible. All branches except Defence Estates were supposed to be examined. It had already been decided to manage the defence land centrally. This committee had a diverse set of members drawn from the civilian and the military, with the following mandate:</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Terms of Reference for the Committee on Amalgamation of Services</strong></h4>
<figure id="attachment_17990" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17990" style="width: 942px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17990" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5.jpg" alt="" width="942" height="282" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5.jpg 942w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5-300x90.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5-600x180.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5-768x230.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5-150x45.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-5-696x208.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 942px) 100vw, 942px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17990" class="wp-caption-text">Source: Report of the Committee on the Amalgamation of Services Common to the Navy, Army and Air Force, 1926, Published by His Majesty’s Office.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">It is very interesting to compare what the committee instinctively thought and what the actual data finally revealed. The initial thoughts, based on the arguments put forth by each service, gave the impression of enormous duplication/triplication, and a huge scope for rationalisation. However, the results at the end of the study by experts revealed quite the opposite. Contrary to popular belief, not much duplication/triplication actually existed.</h4>
<h4><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-full wp-image-17991" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6.jpg" alt="" width="954" height="278" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6.jpg 954w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6-300x87.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6-600x175.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6-768x224.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6-150x44.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-6-696x203.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 954px) 100vw, 954px" /></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The committee finally recommended only amalgamating Work Services and setting a committee to further examine the medical services. Today, there is a common MES (Military Engineering Services) and a commonly administered medical arm for all three services- an outcome that could be traced to this committee a hundred years ago.</h4>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>So, Why Discuss This 100-Year-Old Case Now?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">History has plenty of lessons to offer those who seek to benefit from it. The terms of reference of the Amalgamation Committee in 1926 and the Department of Military Affairs’ <a href="https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/allocationbusinessrule/completeaobrules/english/1_Upload_4067.pdf">mandate</a> towards optimisation are very similar. Both these initiatives tried to achieve economic benefit by aggregating the service demands or organisations. This 1926 committee laid the initial foundations of the joint services that the Indian Armed Forces subsequently inherited post-independence. A hundred years later, in 2026, it remains the same time-tested structure, with common Defence Estates, MES, and medical services across the Indian Armed Forces. Yet, this committee has not been referred to in any debate/talk so far. This is possibly due to a lack of academic rigour and enquiry into the history.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A reading of this 1926 report would also have revealed how operationally ineffective several peacetime jointness ideas are. Take the case of joint logistics. Ships need to be loaded at ports before they sail, air forces need frequent replenishment from fixed bases due to the tempo of air operations, and the Army needed prior positioning in places as the war progressed. During wartime, these places weren’t usually co-located. The report cited the practical difficulties in achieving common technical equipment, as each service had a unique role and therefore unique equipment. This difficulty was in an era when equipment wasn’t so technically complex. Today, the problem is much more severe. An anonymous user on social media platform <em>X</em> compiled images from the official social media handles of the Indian Army and concluded that the Infantry alone operates 29 small arms across 10 calibers from 16 countries. Thus, even single-arm logistics is a nightmare during operations. Why have lessons from history not been considered?</h4>
<figure id="attachment_17992" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17992" style="width: 1284px" class="wp-caption alignright"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17992" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7.jpg" alt="" width="1284" height="2090" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7.jpg 1284w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-300x488.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-600x977.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-184x300.jpg 184w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-629x1024.jpg 629w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-768x1250.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-944x1536.jpg 944w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-1258x2048.jpg 1258w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-150x244.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-696x1133.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-7-1068x1738.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1284px) 100vw, 1284px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17992" class="wp-caption-text">Screenshot of Post by an Anonymous User on X</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Similarly, instead of looking to theatre commands in the United States, China, or Russia for inspiration, it would be better to refer to India’s own history. The Second World War was fought with China-Burma-India as a single theatre under a single commander, Admiral Louis Mountbatten. If the communication capabilities of that era could facilitate command and control over this expanse of geography and millions of personnel, there is no reason why, in 2026, command and control cannot be exercised by a single India Theatre Command for the whole of India.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>1943-44 Map of China-Burma-India Theatre Source: </strong><a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/502321745"><strong>The National Archives</strong></a><strong>, US</strong></h4>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-full wp-image-17993" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8.jpg" alt="" width="1099" height="1379" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8.jpg 1099w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-300x376.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-600x753.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-239x300.jpg 239w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-816x1024.jpg 816w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-768x964.jpg 768w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-150x188.jpg 150w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-696x873.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pic-8-1068x1340.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1099px) 100vw, 1099px" /></p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">These are just two instances in which the past can guide present reforms. There are many more. Churchill once <a href="https://johnaddisonleadership.com/churchill-quotes/">said</a>, “<em>The further backward you can look the further forward you are likely to see.</em>” In the ongoing reforms in India, whether it is a deliberate action to ignore the lessons of the past, since the outcomes do not support the current course of action, or plain ignorance, remains unknown. In the author’s opinion, thorough research of own history and analysis are essential before any policy change. This is as a matter of national interest and needs attention.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<p><a href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/CAPSS_InFocus_APR_24_04_26-1.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF </strong></span></a></p>
<h4></h4>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/when-the-army-and-navy-wanted-to-abolish-an-air-force-revisiting-inter-service-rivalry-100-years-ago/">When the Army and Navy Wanted to Abolish an Air Force:  Revisiting Inter-Service Rivalry 100 Years Ago</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>For the Sake of Military Effectiveness, Details of Indian Military Operations Need to be Told Accurately</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/for-the-sake-of-military-effectiveness-details-of-indian-military-operations-need-to-be-told-accurately/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[A Pichipoo Raja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 21:37:30 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Military History, Official History, Indian Armed Forces, Naravane Introduction The recent controversy around the unpublished memoir of General MM Naravane (Retd) offers valuable lessons for the military. Looking beyond the controversy, it reveals a larger systemic failure of not [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/for-the-sake-of-military-effectiveness-details-of-indian-military-operations-need-to-be-told-accurately/">For the Sake of Military Effectiveness, Details of Indian Military Operations Need to be Told Accurately</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: </strong></span><strong>Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja</strong>, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Military History, Official History, Indian Armed Forces, Naravane</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The recent controversy around the unpublished memoir of General MM Naravane (Retd) offers valuable lessons for the military. Looking beyond the controversy, it reveals a larger systemic failure of not letting one’s own public/armed forces know the details of the Indian military operations. The result: despite the publisher’s appeal stating that any circulation in any form is an infringement of copyright, the book&#8217;s contents were openly discussed on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJ0lHYERfE0">TV debates</a>. When official versions of important national security events don’t exist, such TV debates are the only source to satisfy people’s curiosity. This article attempts to offer a view on the different aspects of the issue and their relation to military effectiveness.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>How Important is Operational History to the Military?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Jim Mattis, the former United States (US) Secretary of Defense, <a href="https://thearmyleader.co.uk/mattis-professional-military-reading/">wrote</a>, “<em>We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years, and we should take advantage of their experience.</em>” This email went viral. He highlighted a practice of the US Marine Corps wherein, before every combat, they read specific books about the expected combat. He wrote, “<em>Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I read (and reread) Rommel</em><em>’</em><em>s Papers (remember </em><em>“</em><em>Kampstaffel</em><em>”?), Montgomery</em><em>’</em><em>s book (</em><em>“</em><em>Eyes Officers”…), </em><em>“</em><em>Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, </em><em>“</em><em>commanders</em><em>’ </em><em>relationships” being more important than </em><em>“</em><em>command relationships”), and some others. As a result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives.</em>” This relationship of reading as a path to saving lives on the battlefield seldom receives the attention it deserves in India.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What Happens When Combatants Don</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>t Read Military History?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://idsa.in/system/files/OP_WarStudiesIndia.pdf">Colonel PK Gautam</a> cites an example during the Kargil War. The Indian Army operations during Kargil in 1999 were named ‘Op <em>Vijay</em>’, even though the Liberation of Goa in 1961 was already named  ‘Op <em>Vijay</em>’. This he cites as evidence of a complete lack of knowledge of their own military history amongst the entire planning staff in 1999. Likewise, there are several accounts that <a href="https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2025/05/26/remembering-operation-safed-sagar-when-indian-air-force-helped-indian-army-to-end-pakistans-kargil-ambitions.html">claimed</a> that Op <em>Safed Sagar</em> was the first time offensive air power was employed at high altitudes, forgetting entirely the <a href="http://www.apple.com/uk">First Indo-Pak War of 1947-48</a>, especially the employment of aircraft at <a href="https://gallantryawards.gov.in/assets/uploads/wars/pdf/pak.pdf">Zoji la</a> and <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/war-in-our-times-independent-indias-first-war-the-gilgit-skardu-saga-of-1947-48-13360842.html">Skardu</a>.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Today, even if one wants to read the Indian Military’s operational history, can they get an accurate account?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Where are the Indian Operational Histories?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The last official history of any Indian military operation that has been published is that of the <a href="https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/HistDivision_14723.pdf">1971 war</a>. Government policy on the issue mentions that the operational history is to be declassified as early as possible and not later than <a href="https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/178/AU665.pdf?source=pqals">25 years </a>from the date of compilation. Yet, the official history of Indian military operations such as Op Falcon (1986), Op Cactus (1988), Op <em>Meghdoot</em> (1984), Op <em>Pawan</em> (1987), Op <em>Vijay</em> (Kargil 1999), Op <em>Khukri </em>(2000) etc., hasn’t been published. Since 1971, several governments have been in power. Thus, it is neither a recent phenomenon nor linked to any particular government. It is a wider structural issue.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Timeline For Publication of Operations Histories</strong></h4>
<figure id="attachment_17695" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-17695" style="width: 696px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-17695" src="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pic1.jpg" alt="" width="696" height="526" srcset="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pic1.jpg 696w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pic1-300x227.jpg 300w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pic1-600x453.jpg 600w, https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pic1-150x113.jpg 150w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-17695" class="wp-caption-text">Source: Reproduced from the Policy on Archiving, Declassification &amp; Compilation of War/Operations Histories, Issued by the Government of India (GoI) on June 17, 2021.</figcaption></figure>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Why are Operational Histories not getting published?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The steps to publishing the official history can be broadly classified as:</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">(a)    Recording and Collection</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">(b)    Storage and Preservation (Archiving)</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">(c)    Compilation and Publication</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">(d)    Dissemination</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The first step is the accurate recording of events as they unfold. Countries like the US have <a href="https://history.army.mil/Unit-History/Field-Historians/">Military History Detachments</a>. These are small teams whose job in combat is to capture and record every detail. They are specifically trained and equipped to do this. This is extremely valuable, as people who are busy fighting seldom have the spare mental capacity to do this additional task. A log created at a later time is likely to be as flawed, as the limits of human memory allow.  In the absence of an institutional mechanism for professional recording of history, complete details of operations seldom get captured. The Unit War Diaries, which contain details of operations, could be extremely detailed or absolutely vague, depending on the Commanding Officer at that time.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, the custodian of the data is the armed forces. In the absence of specific training and institutions (history cell) at all levels, there is every possibility that some of the details of the operations are filed incorrectly among the huge pile of routine paperwork. They could also be routinely destroyed along with regular correspondence. Thus, there is a high chance that not every little detail of all operations remains preserved. Whatever data that now survives is sent to the MoD History Division, who are supposed to compile, publish and preserve. Once declassified, the data is then made available to the public. Thus, there is a capability gap at every step, right from recording to publishing, resulting in the situation that no history is published beyond 1971. This continues to be unresolved, possibly due to a lack of oversight and accountability.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">It can be argued that official histories are not the only source of military history. Several well-researched books can be good alternatives. But for people to conduct research and publish books, the availability and accessibility of declassified official data are fundamental requirements. That leads to the next set of questions.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Where is the Indian Military Archival Data</strong>?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">For unknown reasons, the Indian military records are available on the <a href="https://samar.iitk.ac.in/">IIT-Kanpur</a> website. There is not even a hyperlink on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) website. As an additional layer of difficulty, the records are restricted by the system from being downloaded. Therefore, despite being digitised, one needs to read manually and take live notes. This cumbersome process restricts the user from using modern research tools.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A related aspect mentioned by some writers on the subject is that the Indian MoD demonstrates a reluctance to declassify military records when compared to Western democracies.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Why De-Classification is Difficult?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Firstly, there is no incentive to declassify. Due to the nature of limited tenures, the decision to declassify needs to be taken by someone who is new to the chair and not privy to the details/contents of the document. It involves significant effort to read and make a decision. This has to be done in addition to all the regular work. Thus, this task seldom receives any priority. Secondly, history continues to hold significant electoral weightage in India. Poll speeches still find regular mention of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and Indira Gandhi, who are long dead. A declassification of any military operational records is fraught with the risk of exposing some wrong decisions in history. In hindsight, everyone is wise – but that doesn’t matter in elections, and past actions could trigger new controversies.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Thus, the odds are tilted against a military record holder’s decision to declassify operational records. Any individual will naturally find it safer to maintain the status quo during their tenure without attempting to initiate declassification. In the absence of a system of accountability for delays in declassification, these norms get codified as standard practices. Thus, while official histories are not published, not declassifying and disseminating official data also deprives independent research of authentic data. The outcome is an absence of an authentic Indian military history that is useful.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What Happens When Operational History Isn’t Told Accurately</strong>?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Daniel Kanhemann describes a bias using the acronym WYSIATI– What You See Is All There Is. He argues that people tend to make judgments and decisions based solely on the information readily available to them, while ignoring or underestimating the information that is not immediately present. In the absence of official histories and well-researched books, other forms of information end up filling the gap. Individual memoirs, interviews from unnamed sources, and conversations with veterans substitute as the sources of information on any operation. These are usually anecdotal, speculative and not verified. To quote an example, several books on Op <em>Sindoor</em> are already available in the market despite no significant official disclosure of operational details. On most occasions, these convey individual opinions and speculations rather than established facts. But they end up being treated as real due to WYSIATI.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A widely known example is the case of the Kargil Review Committee Report (KRC). Several times, it has been repeatedly falsely claimed in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jh8w9QbYhxM">talks</a> that KRC recommended setting up theatre commands. The past credentials of the speaker, perfect articulation and confident delivery often convince any listener beyond doubt that whatever is being said is true. Yet, the misinformation on this one topic alone is so widespread that a separate article had to be published by the author <a href="https://capssindia.org/08-myths-in-indian-debates-on-the-theatre-command-a-ready-reckoner-for-the-pursuit-of-informed-discussions/">earlier</a>. This is not an isolated case, and several other folklores thrive when official information remains locked up. Sensational TV debates, short-form content generated from AI, etc., further distort facts, preventing the right lessons from being drawn. This distorts policy and doctrinal changes. An accurate articulation of history is needed, not an imaginary one.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Indian society attaches great significance to valour. This is evident from the rich history of always having an all-volunteer military. Even during the rapid expansion during the World Wars, the two-million-strong military continued to be entirely voluntary. Yet, relying on valour and individual judgement alone is not a good strategy. As India grows as a strong nation, paying attention to these issues would ensure consistent victories on the battlefield. In the absence of a US Marine Corps-like tradition of re-reading before combat in the Indian Armed Forces, the combatants are routinely deprived of the wisdom of the past. Folklore fills the gap in an undesirable manner. Battlefield is not the place to learn from one’s own mistakes–certainly not at the cost of lives. Wars need to be read before wars can be fought.</h4>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/for-the-sake-of-military-effectiveness-details-of-indian-military-operations-need-to-be-told-accurately/">For the Sake of Military Effectiveness, Details of Indian Military Operations Need to be Told Accurately</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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