For the Sake of Military Effectiveness, Details of Indian Military Operations Need to be Told Accurately

Author: Wg Cdr A Pichipoo Raja, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies

Keywords: Military History, Official History, Indian Armed Forces, Naravane

Introduction

The recent controversy around the unpublished memoir of General MM Naravane (Retd) offers valuable lessons for the military. Looking beyond the controversy, it reveals a larger systemic failure of not letting one’s own public/armed forces know the details of the Indian military operations. The result: despite the publisher’s appeal stating that any circulation in any form is an infringement of copyright, the book’s contents were openly discussed on TV debates. When official versions of important national security events don’t exist, such TV debates are the only source to satisfy people’s curiosity. This article attempts to offer a view on the different aspects of the issue and their relation to military effectiveness.

How Important is Operational History to the Military?

Jim Mattis, the former United States (US) Secretary of Defense, wrote, “We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years, and we should take advantage of their experience.” This email went viral. He highlighted a practice of the US Marine Corps wherein, before every combat, they read specific books about the expected combat. He wrote, “Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I read (and reread) Rommel’s Papers (remember “Kampstaffel”?), Montgomery’s book (“Eyes Officers”…), “Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, “commanders’ relationships” being more important than “command relationships”), and some others. As a result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives.” This relationship of reading as a path to saving lives on the battlefield seldom receives the attention it deserves in India.

What Happens When Combatants Don’t Read Military History?

Colonel PK Gautam cites an example during the Kargil War. The Indian Army operations during Kargil in 1999 were named ‘Op Vijay’, even though the Liberation of Goa in 1961 was already named  ‘Op Vijay’. This he cites as evidence of a complete lack of knowledge of their own military history amongst the entire planning staff in 1999. Likewise, there are several accounts that claimed that Op Safed Sagar was the first time offensive air power was employed at high altitudes, forgetting entirely the First Indo-Pak War of 1947-48, especially the employment of aircraft at Zoji la and Skardu.

Today, even if one wants to read the Indian Military’s operational history, can they get an accurate account?

Where are the Indian Operational Histories?

The last official history of any Indian military operation that has been published is that of the 1971 war. Government policy on the issue mentions that the operational history is to be declassified as early as possible and not later than 25 years from the date of compilation. Yet, the official history of Indian military operations such as Op Falcon (1986), Op Cactus (1988), Op Meghdoot (1984), Op Pawan (1987), Op Vijay (Kargil 1999), Op Khukri (2000) etc., hasn’t been published. Since 1971, several governments have been in power. Thus, it is neither a recent phenomenon nor linked to any particular government. It is a wider structural issue.

Timeline For Publication of Operations Histories

Why are Operational Histories not getting published?

The steps to publishing the official history can be broadly classified as:

(a)    Recording and Collection

(b)    Storage and Preservation (Archiving)

(c)    Compilation and Publication

(d)    Dissemination

The first step is the accurate recording of events as they unfold. Countries like the US have Military History Detachments. These are small teams whose job in combat is to capture and record every detail. They are specifically trained and equipped to do this. This is extremely valuable, as people who are busy fighting seldom have the spare mental capacity to do this additional task. A log created at a later time is likely to be as flawed, as the limits of human memory allow.  In the absence of an institutional mechanism for professional recording of history, complete details of operations seldom get captured. The Unit War Diaries, which contain details of operations, could be extremely detailed or absolutely vague, depending on the Commanding Officer at that time.

Secondly, the custodian of the data is the armed forces. In the absence of specific training and institutions (history cell) at all levels, there is every possibility that some of the details of the operations are filed incorrectly among the huge pile of routine paperwork. They could also be routinely destroyed along with regular correspondence. Thus, there is a high chance that not every little detail of all operations remains preserved. Whatever data that now survives is sent to the MoD History Division, who are supposed to compile, publish and preserve. Once declassified, the data is then made available to the public. Thus, there is a capability gap at every step, right from recording to publishing, resulting in the situation that no history is published beyond 1971. This continues to be unresolved, possibly due to a lack of oversight and accountability.

It can be argued that official histories are not the only source of military history. Several well-researched books can be good alternatives. But for people to conduct research and publish books, the availability and accessibility of declassified official data are fundamental requirements. That leads to the next set of questions.

Where is the Indian Military Archival Data?

For unknown reasons, the Indian military records are available on the IIT-Kanpur website. There is not even a hyperlink on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) website. As an additional layer of difficulty, the records are restricted by the system from being downloaded. Therefore, despite being digitised, one needs to read manually and take live notes. This cumbersome process restricts the user from using modern research tools.

A related aspect mentioned by some writers on the subject is that the Indian MoD demonstrates a reluctance to declassify military records when compared to Western democracies.

Why De-Classification is Difficult?

Firstly, there is no incentive to declassify. Due to the nature of limited tenures, the decision to declassify needs to be taken by someone who is new to the chair and not privy to the details/contents of the document. It involves significant effort to read and make a decision. This has to be done in addition to all the regular work. Thus, this task seldom receives any priority. Secondly, history continues to hold significant electoral weightage in India. Poll speeches still find regular mention of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and Indira Gandhi, who are long dead. A declassification of any military operational records is fraught with the risk of exposing some wrong decisions in history. In hindsight, everyone is wise – but that doesn’t matter in elections, and past actions could trigger new controversies.

Thus, the odds are tilted against a military record holder’s decision to declassify operational records. Any individual will naturally find it safer to maintain the status quo during their tenure without attempting to initiate declassification. In the absence of a system of accountability for delays in declassification, these norms get codified as standard practices. Thus, while official histories are not published, not declassifying and disseminating official data also deprives independent research of authentic data. The outcome is an absence of an authentic Indian military history that is useful.

What Happens When Operational History Isn’t Told Accurately?

Daniel Kanhemann describes a bias using the acronym WYSIATI– What You See Is All There Is. He argues that people tend to make judgments and decisions based solely on the information readily available to them, while ignoring or underestimating the information that is not immediately present. In the absence of official histories and well-researched books, other forms of information end up filling the gap. Individual memoirs, interviews from unnamed sources, and conversations with veterans substitute as the sources of information on any operation. These are usually anecdotal, speculative and not verified. To quote an example, several books on Op Sindoor are already available in the market despite no significant official disclosure of operational details. On most occasions, these convey individual opinions and speculations rather than established facts. But they end up being treated as real due to WYSIATI.

A widely known example is the case of the Kargil Review Committee Report (KRC). Several times, it has been repeatedly falsely claimed in talks that KRC recommended setting up theatre commands. The past credentials of the speaker, perfect articulation and confident delivery often convince any listener beyond doubt that whatever is being said is true. Yet, the misinformation on this one topic alone is so widespread that a separate article had to be published by the author earlier. This is not an isolated case, and several other folklores thrive when official information remains locked up. Sensational TV debates, short-form content generated from AI, etc., further distort facts, preventing the right lessons from being drawn. This distorts policy and doctrinal changes. An accurate articulation of history is needed, not an imaginary one.

Conclusion

Indian society attaches great significance to valour. This is evident from the rich history of always having an all-volunteer military. Even during the rapid expansion during the World Wars, the two-million-strong military continued to be entirely voluntary. Yet, relying on valour and individual judgement alone is not a good strategy. As India grows as a strong nation, paying attention to these issues would ensure consistent victories on the battlefield. In the absence of a US Marine Corps-like tradition of re-reading before combat in the Indian Armed Forces, the combatants are routinely deprived of the wisdom of the past. Folklore fills the gap in an undesirable manner. Battlefield is not the place to learn from one’s own mistakes–certainly not at the cost of lives. Wars need to be read before wars can be fought.