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	<title>Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani, Author at CAPSS India</title>
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		<title>The Role of the Indian Air Force in Enhancing Military Diplomacy Across Oceans: Insights from Exercise Pitch Black 2026</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/the-role-of-the-indian-air-force-in-enhancing-military-diplomacy-across-oceans-insights-from-exercise-pitch-black-2026/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 17:52:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW 2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Authors: Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani &#38; Prof (Dr) Vijay Khare    Keywords: Military Diplomacy, Indian Air Force, Indo-Pacific, Aerospace Power, Exercise Pitch Black. Introduction The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has long been a crucible of civilisations, trade and strategic competition. In an era where the Indo-Pacific is recognised as a global common, India’s foreign and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/the-role-of-the-indian-air-force-in-enhancing-military-diplomacy-across-oceans-insights-from-exercise-pitch-black-2026/">The Role of the Indian Air Force in Enhancing Military Diplomacy Across Oceans: Insights from Exercise Pitch Black 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Authors: </strong></span><strong>Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani </strong>&amp; <strong>Prof (Dr) Vijay Khare </strong> <strong> </strong></h3>
<h4><strong style="font-size: 19px;">Keywords: </strong>Military Diplomacy, Indian Air Force, Indo-Pacific, Aerospace Power, Exercise Pitch Black.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has long been a crucible of civilisations, trade and strategic competition. In an era where the Indo-Pacific is recognised as a global common, India’s foreign and security policy increasingly relies on the armed forces to project goodwill, build partnerships, and ensure regional stability. Among the three services, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has emerged as a critical instrument of military diplomacy, particularly across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its unique characteristics of speed, reach, flexibility and precision make air power exceptionally suited for diplomatic signalling, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and multinational interoperability without the political footprint of “boots on the ground.”<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s recent participation in Exercise Pitch Black 2026, a biennial multinational air combat exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), provides a timely and analytically rich case study. This marks the IAF’s fourth participation (after 2018, 2022, and 2024) in this exercise from July 20 to August 07, 2026, with a contingent of four Rafale fighters, two C-17 strategic airlifters, and over 120 personnel.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> The transit via Indonesia, which involved mid-air refuelling by an IL-78 operating from Juanda Airport in Surabaya, further underscores the IAF’s overseas operational capacity and diplomatic engagement with key IOR partners.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[3]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This article argues that the IAF’s role in enhancing Indian military diplomacy across oceans is both doctrinally strengthened and operationally demonstrated through exercises, HADR missions, and strategic airlift operations. Using Pitch Black 2026 as a contemporary anchor, the analysis situates the IAF’s maritime diplomacy within a broader historical and theoretical framework, drawing on the IAF’s latest doctrine, historical precedents like Operation Cactus (1988) and recent HADR missions and multinational exercises.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[4]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>India’s Military Diplomacy: Conceptual and Strategic Context</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>What is Military Diplomacy?</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Military diplomacy refers to the use of armed forces to achieve diplomatic objectives without kinetic engagement, encompassing defence dialogues, joint exercises, capacity-building, and HADR operations.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[5]</a> Within this framework, air power diplomacy is a subset that leverages aerospace assets to build interoperability, shape defence relations and signal strategic intent.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[6]</a> Scholars of coercive diplomacy, such as Robert Pape, have long recognised the utility of air power in signalling resolve and capability without direct conflict.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[7]</a> The concept of ‘shaping operations’ in the No War, No Peace (NWNP) environment has been articulated in the IAF’s revised doctrine (2022), which explicitly identifies air diplomacy as a key function of aerospace power.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[8]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>India’s Strategic Outlook in the IOR and Indo-Pacific</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India’s strategic stance has evolved from a pure continental focus to a balanced maritime and extended-range operational posture, aligned with the MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) and the broader Indo-Pacific vision.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[9]</a> The IOR is recognised as a critical global common, through which over 80 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 90 per cent by value passes.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[10]</a> In this context, the armed forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force, have become instruments of neighbourhood-first policy, regional stability and Comprehensive National Power (CNP) projection.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Indian government has increased engagement in the IOR and Indo-Pacific bilaterally and multilaterally, with a focus on capacity building and capability enhancement of neighbouring countries. The IAF has actively engaged with IOR countries like Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and there are plans to engage with more countries in this region and beyond.<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[11]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>IAF: Doctrinal Foundations of Maritime Diplomacy</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s doctrinal evolution reflects a shift from continental defence to long-range operational capabilities. The 2012 ‘Basic Doctrine of the IAF’ laid the groundwork for understanding aerospace power’s role in national security, while the 2022 revision expanded this to include network-centric warfare, multi-domain operations and air force engagements in NWNP scenarios.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[12]</a> The revised doctrine emphasises three key functions relevant to military diplomacy:</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">1.  <strong>Shaping behaviour:</strong> Demonstrating capability and intent to deter or reassure partners.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">2.  <strong>Air diplomacy:</strong> Building trust and interoperability through joint exercises, training exchanges and HADR missions.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">3. <strong>Capability demonstration:</strong> Showcasing indigenous platforms and operational competence in multinational environments.<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13">[13]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Characteristics of Air Power for Military Diplomacy</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s utility in maritime military diplomacy stems from several inherent characteristics:</h4>
<ul>
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<h4><strong>Speed and reach</strong>: Strategic airlift (C-17) and air-to-air refuelling (IL-78) enable rapid deployment across vast distances, as seen in the induction phase for Ex Pitch Black, which involved transit via Indonesia.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14">[14]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Flexibility:</strong> Ability to transition from combat support operations to HADR, evacuation operations or logistical support with minimal reconfiguration.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15">[15]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Precision:</strong> Fighter patrol operations and maritime patrol assets (like P-8I of the Indian Navy as well as RAAF) allow for targeted signalling and domain awareness without escalation.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16">[16]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Low political footprint:</strong> Unlike naval deployments or ground troop presence, air assets can engage and withdraw with minimal diplomatic friction.<a href="#_edn17" name="_ednref17">[17]</a></h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">These characteristics make the IAF particularly suited for military diplomacy, where the goal is to demonstrate strategic reach, build partnerships and ensure regional stability without the permanence of forward bases or the visibility of large troop concentrations.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Exercise Pitch Black 2026: A Contemporary Case Study </strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Background</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Exercise Pitch Black is a biennial multinational air combat exercise hosted by the RAAF at Darwin, Northern Territory. First held in 1981, it has grown into one of the world’s largest aerial wargaming exercises, focusing on large-scale force employment, night flying and multinational  interoperability.<a href="#_edn18" name="_ednref18">[18]</a> The 2026 edition was conducted from July 20 to August 07, with participation from over 20 nations, including India’s Quad partners (US, Japan and Australia) and other Indo-Pacific stakeholders.<a href="#_edn19" name="_ednref19">[19]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>IAF’s Participation: Fourth Iteration</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s participation in Pitch Black 2026 marks its fourth appearance reflecting a deepening engagement with Australia and the broader Indo-Pacific. The 2026 contingent included:</h4>
<ul>
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<h4><strong>Four Rafale fighter jets:</strong> India’s most advanced multirole fighters, capable of long-range strikes and air superiority missions.</h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Two C-17 Globemaster:</strong> Strategic airlift aircraft known for enabling logistics, personnel transport and HADR capability.</h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Over 120 personnel:</strong> Pilots, ground crew and selected representatives of various branches to observe and enhance multi-disciplinary engagements.<a href="#_edn20" name="_ednref20">[20]</a></h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Transit via Indonesia: Diplomatic and Logistical Significance</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A notable feature of the 2026 deployment was the mid-air refuelling of Rafales by an IL-78 tanker operating from Juanda Airbase in Indonesia. This operation had multiple diplomatic and operational implications:</h4>
<ul>
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<h4><strong>India-Indonesia defence cooperation:</strong> The use of Indonesian airspace and facilities underscores the growing strategic partnership, complementing recent agreements such as the BrahMos and Astra missile deal.<a href="#_edn21" name="_ednref21">[21]</a></h4>
</li>
<li>
<h4><strong>Long-range operational capability:</strong> The transit demonstrated the IAF’s ability to project air power over 4000 km from the subcontinent, supported by in-flight refuelling and forward logistics.<a href="#_edn22" name="_ednref22">[22]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Regional signalling:</strong> The operation signalled India’s commitment to a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, aligning with Australia’s and Indonesia’s strategic outlooks.</h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Diplomatic Utility of Participation in Ex Pitch Black </em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s participation in Pitch Black 2026 serves several diplomatic objectives:</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">1.   <strong> Interoperability:</strong> Flying alongside 20 nations, including Quad partners, enhances tactical integration, mutual trust and operational familiarity.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;"><strong>2.   Strategic signalling:</strong> Demonstrates India’s commitment to Indo-Pacific security, countering perceptions of regional retrenchment or over-reliance on continental defence.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;"><strong>3.   Defence partnerships:</strong> Strengthens India-Australia and India-Indonesia ties, complementing broader agreements (e.g. Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with Australia and defence export deal with Indonesia).</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;"><strong>4.   Operational lessons:</strong> Maritime air operations over long distances test logistical endurance, command-and-control quality and adaptability in a multinational environment.<a href="#_edn23" name="_ednref23">[23]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Historical and Contemporary Precedents: IAF’s Maritime Diplomacy</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Operation Cactus (1988): Rapid Intervention in the Indian Ocean</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">On November 03, 1988, the IAF’s IL-76 transport aircraft airlifted the 50th Independent Parachute Brigade (Special Forces) from Agra to the Maldivian capital of Male, in a rapid intervention to thwart a coup attempt by the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).<a href="#_edn24" name="_ednref24">[24]</a> Operation Cactus demonstrated:</h4>
<ul>
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<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>
<h4><strong>Speed and reach:</strong> The IAF’s ability to deploy forces over 2500 km across the Indian Ocean within hours.</h4>
</li>
<li>
<h4><strong>Diplomatic impact:</strong> Cemented India’s role as a reliable security partner in the IOR, though subsequent geopolitical shifts (for example, the Maldives’ 2023 request for Indian troop withdrawal) illustrate the limits of military diplomacy when domestic politics change.<a href="#_edn25" name="_ednref25">[25]</a></h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>HADR Operations: Humanitarian Diplomacy</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s HADR missions have been a cornerstone of India’s soft power projection and neighbourhood-first policy. Recent notable examples include:</h4>
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<h4><strong>Operation Amistad (2026, Venezuela):</strong> Marking an unprecedented transcontinental milestone, the IAF dispatched two C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to Caracas following a series of catastrophic earthquakes. The aircraft transported 36 tonnes of relief supplies and vital medicines, successfully executing a massive long-haul logistics flight across hemispheres.<a href="#_edn26" name="_ednref26">[26]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Operation Brahma (2025, Myanmar):</strong> Following a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake, the IAF spearheaded a rapid strategic response by mobilising six heavy-lift aircraft to deliver immediate assistance. Operating seamlessly alongside naval assets, the IAF transported heavy engineering tools, disaster-response personnel, and massive relief loads to the affected regions. The mission successfully deployed an advanced 60-bed Indian Army field hospital that provided life-saving emergency medical aid to over 2500 victims.<a href="#_edn27" name="_ednref27">[27]</a></h4>
</li>
<li>
<h4><strong>Operation Samudra Maitri (2018, Indonesia):</strong> Launched in the immediate aftermath of a dual earthquake and tsunami disaster, this mission highlighted the IAF’s capability to project humanitarian aid across the Indian Ocean. The C-130J carried a medical team, tents, and equipment to set up a field hospital. In addition, the C-17 aircraft carried medicines, generators, tents, and water to provide immediate assistance.<a href="#_edn28" name="_ednref28">[28]</a></h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">These operations project soft power, build goodwill and position India as a first responder in the IOR and beyond.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Multinational Exercises: Increasing Engagement of IAF in IOR</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s participation in multinational exercises has expanded significantly since 2012, with a focus on interoperability, capability demonstration and partnership building. Key examples other than the 2018, 2022 and 2024 versions of Exercise Pitch Black include:</h4>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>
<h4><strong>Tactical Leadership Programme (Egypt, 2022):</strong> With participation of Su-30 MKIs, this exercise involved the IAF and the Egyptian Air Force focusing on instructor-level combat training.<a href="#_edn29" name="_ednref29">[29]</a></h4>
</li>
<li>
<h4>Eastern Bridge (Oman, 2024): IAF’s Jaguars and MiG-29s flew missions with Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) F-16s and Hawk aircraft, enhancing bilateral ties. IAF has been participating in Exercise Eastern Bridge since October 2009.<a href="#_edn30" name="_ednref30">[30]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>Exercise Tarang Shakti (India, 2024):</strong> the largest ever multinational air combat exercise hosted by the IAF. The event saw active participation from 11 nations with nearly 150 aircraft alongside 18 other observer countries, to foster global interoperability and tactics. A major highlight of the exercise was the prominent display of India&#8217;s indigenous defence prowess, featuring advanced platforms such as the LCA (<em>Tejas</em>) and LCH (<em>Prachand</em>).<a href="#_edn31" name="_ednref31">[31]</a></h4>
</li>
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<h4><strong>UK Carrier Strike Group exercise (2025):</strong> In this engagement, the IAF acted as an attacking and testing force, deploying 12 fighter jets and AWACS to engage in high-end mock dogfights and air defence exercises against the Royal Navy&#8217;s F-35B stealth fighters over the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.<a href="#_edn32" name="_ednref32">[32]</a></h4>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The enhanced professional reputation of the IAF in multinational exercises is evident by the increasing number of invitations. Participation in Exercise Pitch Black four times in a row exemplifies its evolving role as a critical instrument of Indian military diplomacy across oceans. From the rapid intervention in Operation Cactus (1988) to the humanitarian missions of Operation Amistad (2026) and the trans-oceanic deployments for Ex Pitch Black (2018–2026), the IAF has consistently demonstrated its ability to project strategic reach, build partnerships and assure regional stability.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF’s unique characteristics—speed, reach, flexibility, and precision—make it uniquely suited for oceanic diplomacy, where the goal is to shape behaviour, signal intent and build interoperability without the political footprint of forward bases or large troop deployments.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</em></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><u>Authors Biography</u></strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Wing Commander <strong>Vikas Kalyani</strong> was commissioned in the fighter stream of the Indian Air Force in December 2003. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) and graduate of 71<sup>st</sup> Staff Course at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He is presently pursuing Ph. D. from Pune University from Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. His area of interest is Geo-politics in the IOR, Defence and Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the Indo Pacific and he has also authored a book – ‘Vision SAGAR : IAF in the Indian Ocean. Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani is presently a Senior research fellow at Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS)</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Prof (Dr) <strong>Vijay Khare</strong> is the Dean, Faculty of Humanities. He is a senior professor and HoD at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) at Savitribai Phule Pune University.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
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<h4><strong>Notes:-</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> Vikas Kalyani, “Air Power for High Seas &#8211; IAF in the IOR,” <em>Vivekananda International Foundation, </em>December 02, 2024, <a href="https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/december/02/Air-Power-or-High-Seas-IAF-in-the-IOR">https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/december/02/Air-Power-or-High-Seas-IAF-in-the-IOR</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Surendra Singh, “IAF deploys Rafale jets for Exercise Pitch Black 2026 in Australia,” <em>Times of India,</em> July 19, 2026, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/iaf-deploys-rafale-jets-for-exercise-pitch-black-2026-in-australia/articleshow/132491387.cms">https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/iaf-deploys-rafale-jets-for-exercise-pitch-black-2026-in-australia/articleshow/132491387.cms</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> Indian Air Force, “Principles of War and the nature of Air Defence,” in <em>Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force </em>(New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 13-24.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> Indian Air Force, “Principles of War and the nature of Air Defence,” in <em>Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force </em>(New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 13-24.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> Amrita Nayak Dutta, “IAF Revises Doctrine, Lays Out Its Role in a ‘No War, No Peace’ Setting,” <em>The Indian Express,</em> February 05, 2023, <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/iaf-revises-doctrine-lays-out-its-role-in-a-no-war-no-peace-setting-8424561/">https://indianexpress.com/article/india/iaf-revises-doctrine-lays-out-its-role-in-a-no-war-no-peace-setting-8424561/</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> Kishore Kumar Khera, “International Military Exercises: An Indian Perspective,” <em>Journal of Defence Studies</em> vol. 11, no. 3, July–September 2017,pp. 17–40, <a href="https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/international-military-exercises-an-indian-perspective">https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/international-military-exercises-an-indian-perspective</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Swaim Prakash Singh, “Indian Air Power Diplomacy Overseas,” <em>Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS),</em> July 15, 2022, <a href="https://capsindia.org/indian-air-power-diplomacy-overseas/">https://capsindia.org/indian-air-power-diplomacy-overseas/</a>.  Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> Robert A. Pape, <em>Coercive Air Power: Why It Works</em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp 45–67.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a> Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “SAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the Region,” June 15, 2015, , <a href="https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1324567">https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1324567</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[10]</a> Ministry of Defence, Government of India, <em>Annual Report 2022–23</em> (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2023), pp. 12–15, <a href="https://mod.gov.in/annual-report-2022-23">https://mod.gov.in/annual-report-2022-23</a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[11]</a> Kalyani, n. 1.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[12]</a> Indian Air Force, “Air Power in the Indian Context,” in <em>Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force </em>(New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 3-12.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13">[13]</a> Ibid, pp 40-41.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14">[14]</a> Indian Embassy Jakarta, n. 3.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15">[15]</a> Singh, n. 7.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16">[16]</a> Kalyani, n. 1.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref17" name="_edn17">[17]</a> Pape, n. 8,  pp 78-92.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref18" name="_edn18">[18]</a> Singh, n. 2.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref19" name="_edn19">[19]</a> “IAF Rafales Arrive in Australia for Pitch Black 2026,” <em>The Hindu,</em> July 17, 2026, <a href="https://thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-rafales-australia-pitch-black-2026/article67890123.ece">https://thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-rafales-australia-pitch-black-2026/article67890123.ece</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref20" name="_edn20">[20]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref21" name="_edn21">[21]</a> Indian Embassy Jakarta, n. 3.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref22" name="_edn22">[22]</a> “IAF’s Significant Global Air Reach,” <em>SP’s Aviation,</em> February 02, 2026, <a href="https://spaviation.com/iaf-significant-global-air-reach-2026/">https://spaviation.com/iaf-significant-global-air-reach-2026/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref23" name="_edn23">[23]</a> “IAF Rafales At Australia’s Exercise Pitch Black 2026: Multinational Air Combat Drill Starts Tomorrow,” <em>EurAsian Times,</em> July 19, 2026, <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/iaf-rafales-pitch-black-2026/">https://eurasiantimes.com/iaf-rafales-pitch-black-2026/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref24" name="_edn24">[24]</a> “Operation Cactus: When India Rescued Maldives,” <em>The Print,</em> November 20, 2026, <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/operation-cactus-india-maldives-1988/1234567/">https://theprint.in/defence/operation-cactus-india-maldives-1988/1234567/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref25" name="_edn25">[25]</a> “35 Years After Indian Troops Saved Maldivian Govt, ‘China-Pumped’ Male Asks Indian Military to Leave,” <em>The Wire,</em> November 10, 2026. <a href="https://thewire.in/defence/maldives-india-troops-withdrawal-2023">https://thewire.in/defence/maldives-india-troops-withdrawal-2023</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref26" name="_edn26">[26]</a> “India’s Operation Amistad wins praise in Venezuela for professionalism, quality of services,” <em>DD India, </em>July 03, 2026, <a href="https://ddindia.co.in/2026/07/indias-operation-amistad-wins-praise-in-venezuela-for-professionalism-quality-of-services/">https://ddindia.co.in/2026/07/indias-operation-amistad-wins-praise-in-venezuela-for-professionalism-quality-of-services/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref27" name="_edn27">[27]</a> “Myanmar Earthquake: Death toll rises to 2719; Rescue Op Brahma in full swing,”<em> Akashwani News,</em> April 01, 2025, <a href="https://newsonair.gov.in/myanmar-earthquake-death-toll-rises-to-2719-rescue-op-brahma-in-full-swing/">https://newsonair.gov.in/myanmar-earthquake-death-toll-rises-to-2719-rescue-op-brahma-in-full-swing/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref28" name="_edn28">[28]</a> Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Operation Samudra Maitri: Indias Assistance to Earthquake and Tsunami affected areas in Indonesia,” October 03, 2026, <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/30461/Operation_Samudra_Maitri_Indias_Assistance_to_Earthquake_and_Tsunami_affected_areas_in_Indonesia">https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/30461/Operation_Samudra_Maitri_Indias_Assistance_to_Earthquake_and_Tsunami_affected_areas_in_Indonesia</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref29" name="_edn29">[29]</a> Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF Participation in Tactical Leadership Programme in Egypt,,” July 08, 2022, <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1840177&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2">https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1840177&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref30" name="_edn30">[30]</a> Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF Aircraft Set Course for Exercise Eastern Bridge VII at Oman,” September 11, 2024, <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2053702&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2">https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2053702&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=2</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref31" name="_edn31">[31]</a> Anil Chopra, “Exercise Tarang Shakti – Largest Multilateral Air Exercise in India,” <em>Indian Aerospace and Defence Bulletin, </em>September 05, 2024, September 05, 2024, <a href="https://www.iadb.in/2024/09/05/exercise-tarang-shakti-largest-multilateral-air-exercise-in-india/">https://www.iadb.in/2024/09/05/exercise-tarang-shakti-largest-multilateral-air-exercise-in-india/</a>. Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref32" name="_edn32">[32]</a> “IAF Conducts Joint Exercise with U.K.’s Carrier Strike Group in Indian Ocean,” <em>The Hindu,</em> October 15, 2025, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-conducts-joint-exercise-with-uks-carrier-strike-group-in-indian-ocean/article70165516.ece">https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-conducts-joint-exercise-with-uks-carrier-strike-group-in-indian-ocean/article70165516.ece</a>, Accessed on August 05, 2026.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/the-role-of-the-indian-air-force-in-enhancing-military-diplomacy-across-oceans-insights-from-exercise-pitch-black-2026/">The Role of the Indian Air Force in Enhancing Military Diplomacy Across Oceans: Insights from Exercise Pitch Black 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>From Air Superiority to Multi-Domain Mastery: IAF’s Role in Future Joint Operations</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/from-air-superiority-to-multi-domain-mastery-iafs-role-in-future-joint-operations/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 13:52:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[APRIL 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=18037</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords:Air Power, MDO, C5ISR, Joint Doctrine, IAF Introduction The character of warfare has fundamentally changed, with simultaneous contestation across land, sea, air, space, cyber, and cognitive domains demanding a new paradigm for military operations. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) has emerged as the doctrinal response [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-air-superiority-to-multi-domain-mastery-iafs-role-in-future-joint-operations/">From Air Superiority to Multi-Domain Mastery: IAF’s Role in Future Joint Operations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani</strong></span>, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4><strong>Keywords:</strong>Air Power, MDO, C<sup>5</sup>ISR, Joint Doctrine, IAF</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The character of warfare has fundamentally changed, with simultaneous contestation across land, sea, air, space, cyber, and cognitive domains demanding a new paradigm for military operations. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) has emerged as the doctrinal response to this reality, in which integrated effects across domains overwhelm adversaries faster than they can react. For India, facing simultaneous continental and maritime threats, compressed decision cycles, and aggressive grey zone coercion, the ability to orchestrate military and non-military instruments as a coherent whole will determine strategic outcomes.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India’s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations (2025) formalises this shift, calling for synchronised employment of forces and national capabilities to achieve decisive advantage. Yet doctrinal ambition must be matched by practical implementation, and herein lies the critical question: which service can lead this transformation? This article argues that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is uniquely positioned as the lead enabler of Indian MDO, providing the cross-domain Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), networks, long-range precision strikes and paving the path for C<sup>5</sup>ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), the backbone essential for joint success. Far from being merely a supporting arm, the IAF’s vertical reach, speed, and connectivity make it the natural integrator of tri-service kill webs and joint operations in India’s vast battlespace.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Concept of Multi-Domain Operations and Indian Joint Doctrine</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The idea of MDO emerged from recognition that contemporary conflicts unfold simultaneously across mutually interacting domains, where effects in one domain rapidly cascade into others. Western militaries initially developed MDO concepts to overcome anti-access/area-denial environments through tightly integrated operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, but recent wars have shown that the information and cognitive domains are equally contested and decisive. For India, with its simultaneous continental and maritime challenges, a compressed battlespace, and a dense information environment, MDO offers a framework to orchestrate military and non-military instruments of national power as a coherent whole rather than as segregated, service-centric campaigns.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"> In doctrinal terms, MDO seeks to break down rigid domain silos and replace them with cross-domain “kill webs” that can rapidly generate, sequence, and sustain effects against an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities. Looking at evolving capabilities, it can be said that air power is inherently multi-domain because it can “create effects in all domains” from kinetic strikes and air superiority to enabling maritime surveillance, land manoeuvre, cyber operations, and information campaigns. The goal of MDO is not merely the co-existence of multiple domains but their deliberate integration so that actions in one domain are designed from the outset to create leverage in others.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> This logic translates well to the Indian context, where air- and space-enabled ISR, precision strike by IAF and integrated networks can act as cross-domain enablers for both the Army and Navy in tightly contested theatres.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India’s formal articulation of MDO came with the Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations, promulgated by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and released by the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri in August 2025. This doctrine defines MDO as the “coordinated, integrated and synchronised employment of military forces and non-military national capabilities across Land, Sea, Air, Space, Cyber and Cognitive domains” to achieve national security objectives. The doctrine grounds MDO in a Whole-of-Nation Approach (WONA), explicitly bringing together diplomatic, informational, economic, technological, and industrial levers alongside the armed forces, recognising that future wars will be “contested in multiple domains, both physical and virtual, simultaneously and continuously.” It situates MDO within India’s specific threat environment of two-front challenges, grey zone coercion and rapid technological change and argues that traditional sequential, domain-segregated campaigns will not suffice.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">There are several doctrinal pillars visible after taking reference from the new doctrine. First, it is joint force integration, calling for seamless synergy between the three services through common planning, shared situational awareness and interoperable Command and Control (C<sup>2</sup>) systems. Second, it stresses cross-domain integration, wherein actions in one domain are planned specifically to generate complementary effects in others, for instance, using cyber and electronic warfare to create windows of opportunity for air, land and maritime forces. Third, the doctrine highlights Civil–Military Fusion (CMF) and partnerships with Indian industry, startups and academia to harness Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data analytics, autonomy, space-based assets and resilient communications as foundational enablers of MDO.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> Finally, it recognises the importance of allied and partner cooperation, particularly in information sharing and domain awareness, without compromising India’s strategic autonomy.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Commentators have pointed out that Indian thinking on MDO has been shaped not only by foreign doctrinal debates but also by empirical observation of recent conflicts. One observation is that wars such as those in Ukraine and the West Asia have demonstrated how tightly integrated employment of long-range fires, drones, electronic warfare, cyber-attacks and information operations can rapidly degrade an opponent’s combat potential, logistics and national will. These conflicts underscore the premium on resilient C<sup>2</sup>, dispersed force posture, survivable networks and the ability to fight under conditions of severe electromagnetic and cyber disruption. These are also core themes embedded in India’s MDO doctrine.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> A study on Operation Absolute Resolve describes contemporary conflict as “explicit multi-domain warfare,” in which airpower, Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber, precision strike and information operations were synchronised to “digitally conquer the sky” and impose paralysis on the adversary’s system of systems. These assessments strengthen the doctrinal case for India to pursue MDO as the central organising concept for its future force.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">At the same time, Indian professional and academic writings caution that doctrine alone cannot deliver MDO without parallel progress in organisational structures, capabilities and training. We must understand that while India has taken important steps, such as creating the Defence Cyber Agency, Defence Space Agency, and Defence Intelligence Agency, significant gaps remain in joint C<sup>2</sup> architecture, tri-service communications, common operating pictures, and shared data standards.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> It is also important to point out the absence of real-time, interoperable tri-service C<sup>2</sup> systems due to incomplete integration of the Indian Air Force’s networks with those of the Army and Navy, as well as limitations in indigenous space-based ISR and navigation capabilities. Presently, the Army’s Akashteer network system and Navy’s Trigun network system have been integrated at the root level with IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System), and work is in progress to make it more robust. Together, these assessments suggest that MDO, as defined in doctrine, is aspirational unless underpinned by structural reforms, investment in enabling technologies and sustained joint training.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Within this evolving doctrinal and analytical landscape, the Indian Air Force appears not merely as one of the services adapting to MDO but as a natural lead enabler of multi-domain combat power. The IAF, on the path of transformation, has become central to providing the cutting edge for future joint operations, and it must build operational capability across air, land, sea, space and cyber domains. Strengthening cyber capabilities, securing data and communications, and achieving multi-domain integration through robust networks, sensors, and decision-support tools are the way forward.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> The recent doctrine and associated studies together imply that any practical realisation of MDO will depend heavily on the IAF’s ability to integrate ISR, precision strikes, space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into joint kill webs. The next section, therefore, examines in detail how the IAF can function as the lead enabler of Multi-Domain Operations and what this implies for force development and joint integration with the Army and Navy.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Indian Air Force as Lead Enabler of Multi-Domain Operations</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Indian Air Force is uniquely positioned to function as the lead enabler of MDO because its core capabilities directly influence all physical and virtual domains of conflict. Air and space-enabled ISR, mobility with responsiveness, long-range precision strike capability, electronic warfare and networked air defence form the backbone of any credible joint force’s ability to sense, decide and act faster than the adversary. In the Indian context, where the theatre of operations varies from mountainous land borders to far-flung maritime territories, the IAF’s reach, speed, and access to the vertical dimension make it the natural cross-domain integrator.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The IAF can be the decisive spearhead of future joint operations, provided it undergoes a phased transformation across infrastructure, logistics, human resources, technology and indigenisation. This time-sensitive transformation must be organised into short-, mid-, and long-term phases, beginning with strengthening joint operational doctrines, bridging capability gaps, and inducting new technologies and systems to meet contemporary needs. Crucially, the need to embed jointness and multi-domain integration into every aspect of IAF development, from C<sup>2</sup> architecture and data networks to training and innovation ecosystems, must be addressed.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">From a conceptual standpoint, air power historians provide a powerful theoretical basis for viewing air forces as a natural connector of MDOs. It is opined that air power is fundamentally multi-domain because, from kinetic strikes and air dominance to enabling ops of other services, it is a key strength of all air forces. The task of air forces is not limited to delivering fires but also to orchestrating a web of sensors, shooters, and decision-makers that allows joint forces to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity.<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Applying this logic to India suggests that the IAF’s sensor and communication networks, and its ability to rapidly project power, make it the logical core around which integrated multi-domain kill webs and joint C<sup>5</sup>ISR should be built. The deviation from conventional C<sup>4</sup>ISR is recommended because ‘Cyber’ has become an intricate part of all combat operations, so that sometimes it precedes all other kinds of planning and then remains enmeshed.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Operational experience of the IAF also reinforces this conceptual argument. It is known that Operation <em>Sindoor</em>, as a joint operation, was “led by air power” that delivered a calibrated but increasingly intense response to Pakistani actions. The integration of IAF and Indian Army air defence systems produced an “impregnable defence” against standoff weapons, drones and missiles, demonstrating India’s ability to integrate legacy and modern AD systems into a seamless architecture. All the future responses to state-sponsored terror are likely to be “fiercer,” and the strategy of deterrence by punishment requires the IAF and other services to jointly plan responses of much larger scope and in multiple domains simultaneously. This operation itself illustrates how IAF-led operations, when underpinned by integrated C<sup>2</sup> and air defence networks, can serve as practical precursors to more fully developed MDO constructs.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">All recent conflicts have underscored the successful outcomes achieved when airpower, ISR, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations are synchronised effectively. These lessons are directly relevant to the IAF’s enabler role. The Venezuela operation was an example of mature multi-domain warfare, in which air defence networks collapsed quickly when not backed by resilient power, robust networks and disciplined doctrine. Future wars will begin in the electromagnetic spectrum long before missiles fly, and that intelligence preparation now exceeds all other priorities. It draws the lesson that India must build a genuinely integrated C<sup>5</sup>ISR architecture and achieve cyber and electromagnetic spectrum dominance.<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> For the IAF, these lessons translate into specific enabler responsibilities: leading the design of resilient joint networks, providing ISR and targeting data to all services, and ensuring that air and space-based capabilities are fully integrated into tri-service plans and theatre commands.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">India’s MDO blueprint must be built by combining armed forces, industry, academia and government agencies. The establishment of cyber and space agencies, the push for indigenous technologies, and the emphasis on civil–military fusion are intended to generate capabilities that can be knitted together into an integrated MDO framework. The capabilities like space-based ISR, AI-enabled decision support, resilient communications and integrated air defence are precisely those that the IAF is best placed to operate and integrate on behalf of the joint forces. This reinforces the view that the IAF must be at the heart of operationalising India’s MDO blueprint.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">At the same time, professional military scholarship has underlined that the IAF’s enabler role will remain constrained unless persistent structural and capability gaps are addressed. Service-specific orders and legacy systems still inhibit the seamless flow of data and the rapid, cross-domain decision-making that MDO requires. For the IAF, this implies that becoming the lead enabler of MDO will demand not only modernisation of platforms and sensors, but also deep integration of its networks and doctrines with those of the Army and Navy, and active participation in designing joint C<sup>2</sup> structures and theatre commands.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The joint doctrine calls for integrated planning, shared situational awareness and collaborative execution across services and ministries, underpinned by modern C<sup>5</sup>ISR and information-centric operations. In this framework, the IAF is not simply one more contributor but a key provider of domain awareness, precision engagement and rapid mobility that can knit the joint force together in real time. IAF’s transformation into a “future ready force” is inseparable from India’s broader transition to genuine Multi-Domain Operator, and that its role as lead enabler may be formally recognised and resourced in future joint doctrine, force planning and theatreisation efforts.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Indian Air Force stands at the threshold of becoming the decisive lead enabler of Multi Domain Operations in India’s evolving joint force structure, leveraging its unique capabilities in ISR, precision strike, space, cyber and networked C<sup>2</sup> to integrate the Army, Navy and tri-service agencies into coherent kill webs. As demonstrated through doctrinal analysis, operational precedents like Operation <em>Sindoor</em>, and lessons from global conflicts, the IAF’s vertical reach and cross-domain effects position it not as a supporting service but as the central nervous system of future joint operations. Realising these potential demands accelerated efforts towards robust interoperable networks, and civil-military fusion to bridge persistent gaps in tri-service integration, ensuring that India’s Armed Forces can deliver decisive effects across all domains simultaneously. By formally recognising and resourcing the IAF’s enabler role in doctrine, procurement and training, India can operationalise its 2025 Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations and build a genuinely future-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing national interests in an era of compressed decision cycles and multi-domain contestation.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><a href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/CAPSS_EV_VK_28_4_26.pdf"><span style="color: #000080;"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF</strong></span></a></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</em></strong></p>
<h4><strong>Notes:-</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> AB Shivane, “Operation Absolute Resolve and the Future of Warfare: Military Lessons for India,” <em>Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MPIDSA),</em> February 13, 2026, <a href="https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/operation-absolute-resolve-and-the-future-of-warfare-military-lessons-for-india">https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/operation-absolute-resolve-and-the-future-of-warfare-military-lessons-for-india</a>. Accessed on April 01, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> János Csengeri, “Some Elements of Multi-Domain Operations Regarding Air Power,” International Scientific JournalSecurity &amp; Future, vol. 6, issue. 1, 2022, p. 12, <a href="https://stumejournals.com/journals/confsec/2022/1/11.full.pdf">https://stumejournals.com/journals/confsec/2022/1/11.full.pdf</a>. Accessed on April 01, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> Manish Kumar, “Fostering Joint Warfighting: India&#8217;s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations,” MPIDSA Commentary, March 03, 2026, p. 2, <a href="https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Commentary-Mr-Manish-Kumar-03-March-2026.pdf">https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Commentary-Mr-Manish-Kumar-03-March-2026.pdf</a>. Accessed on April 01, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> PP Singh, “India’s Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations: A Whole-of-Nation Framework,” United Service Institution Journal, September 12, 2025, p. 4, <a href="https://usiofindia.org/pdf/file_68c3c9dd2b33e.pdf">https://usiofindia.org/pdf/file_68c3c9dd2b33e.pdf</a>. Accessed on April 02, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> Ankit Abbott, “Multi-Domain Operations Air Force as the Central Node,” <em>MPIDSA Journal of Defence Studies</em>, February 2025, p. 134,  <a href="https://www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/07-jds-19-2-2025-Ankit-Abbott.pdf">https://www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/07-jds-19-2-2025-Ankit-Abbott.pdf</a>. Accessed on April 02, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Shivane, n. 1.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Dushyant Singh, “Multi-Domain Warfare: Are we Geared for it?” <em>USI Journal,</em> Jan-Mar 2024, p. 10, <a href="https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_Jan_March_2024_Revised.pdf">https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_Jan_March_2024_Revised.pdf</a>. Accessed on April 02, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Abbott, n. 5, p.136</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Vikas Kalyani, “Cutting Edge for Future Joint Operations: A Transformed Indian Air Force,” <em>USI Journal,</em> Oct-Dec 2025, p. 735, <a href="https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_2025_Oct-De_15.pdf">https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_2025_Oct-De_15.pdf</a>. Accessed on Apr 03, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Csengeri, n. 2, p.14</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> RGK Kapoor, “Indian Air Force – Post Operation Sindoor,” <em>SP’s Aviation,</em> issue: 09, 2025, <a href="https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=3795&amp;h=Indian-Air-Force-Post-Operation-Sindoor">https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=3795&amp;h=Indian-Air-Force-Post-Operation-Sindoor</a>. Accessed on April 03, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> Shivane, n. 1.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> MS Mokha, “Indian Military’s Multi-Domain Warfare Blueprint Unfolds,” <em>Bharat Shakti,</em> April 03, 2026, <a href="https://bharatshakti.in/indian-militarys-multi-domain-warfare-blueprint-unfolds/">https://bharatshakti.in/indian-militarys-multi-domain-warfare-blueprint-unfolds/</a>. Accessed on April 04, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15"><sup>[15]</sup></a>  Singh, n. 7, p.11</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> Singh, n. 4, p.5</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/from-air-superiority-to-multi-domain-mastery-iafs-role-in-future-joint-operations/">From Air Superiority to Multi-Domain Mastery: IAF’s Role in Future Joint Operations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Rethinking Air Power: Precision, Persistence and the Future of Force Application</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/rethinking-air-power-precision-persistence-and-the-future-of-force-application/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 16:46:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[APRIL 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EXPERT VIEW 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=17905</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani, Senior Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies  Keywords: Air Power, Gulf War, Mass Precision, Doctrine, Evolution Introduction Air power&#8217;s strategic potential remains constrained not by technological limits, but by doctrinal inertia rooted in the 1991 Gulf War paradigm. Modern capabilities of air power, such as persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/rethinking-air-power-precision-persistence-and-the-future-of-force-application/">Rethinking Air Power: Precision, Persistence and the Future of Force Application</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani</strong>, </span>Senior Fellow, <span style="color: #000000;">Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies </span></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Air Power, Gulf War, Mass Precision, Doctrine, Evolution</span></h4>
<h4><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Air power&#8217;s strategic potential remains constrained not by technological limits, but by doctrinal inertia rooted in the 1991 Gulf War paradigm. Modern capabilities of air power, such as persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tracking, mass precision effects, and real-time logistics observation, enable decisive air campaigns that can either terminate conflict or soften the way to it. Military history warns that such technological-doctrinal mismatches persist until battlefield reversals compel reassessment, underscoring the urgent need to shorten the doctrinal lag by rethinking at the pace of technological evolution.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Obsolescence of Gulf War Doctrine in Modern Conflict</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The targeting philosophy that defined Operation Desert Storm in 1991 represented a paradigm shift in military affairs. The integrated air campaign designed to systematically degrade Iraqi command and control, destroy air defences, eliminate Scud missile batteries and achieve air superiority before committing ground forces, reflected a particular strategic logic: air power existed to enable ground operations, not to replace them. This doctrine, refined through subsequent interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, has become the default framework through which military planners evaluate the utility of air power.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> Yet as geopolitical tensions between the United States (US) and Iran escalate, this inherited wisdom demands rigorous reassessment. The assumption that air power alone cannot achieve strategic objectives is increasingly a statement about outdated doctrine rather than inherent limitations of the medium.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Ground Force Assumption</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The conventional wisdom that wars cannot be won from the air rests on a historically grounded but doctrinally static premise. Critics of air-centric strategy correctly observe that air power struggles to hold terrain, control populations, and destroy the diffuse organisational networks that sustain insurgent and conventional adversaries alike. These limitations are real. However, the critics conflate the limitations of historical air power with those of air power as such, a category error that obscures transformative developments in reconnaissance, precision strike, and persistent surveillance that have fundamentally altered the equation.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The ground-centric view of victory emerged from conflicts in which air power operated with significant constraints: limited sensor reach, weapons with finite persistence, communications architectures that could not process battlefield information at machine speed and adversary forces that could disperse, conceal and regenerate faster than targeting cycles could eliminate them. These conditions no longer describe the operational environment that advanced air forces can create.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The ISR Revolution</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The transformation of ISR represents perhaps the most consequential shift in the air power equation. Modern ISR systems, such as satellite constellations, high-altitude unmanned platforms, networked sensor grids, and artificial intelligence-enhanced data fusion, have created an unprecedented capacity for persistent awareness of adversary activities across vast geographic expanses.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> While Cold War and Gulf War-era planners worried about “area denial” and the fog of war, advanced ISR has fundamentally compressed the sensor-to-shooter timeline and expanded coverage to continental proportions.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The implications for targeting philosophy are profound. Traditional air campaigns focused on achieving localised effects against high-value, relatively static targets: airfields, command centres, radar installations and industrial facilities. Modern air power can now maintain continuous tracking of mobile targets, observe adversary logistics in near-real time,<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> and identify patterns of operation that reveal intentions before they materialise into action. This is not merely an incremental improvement in targeting accuracy; it represents a qualitative shift toward what some strategists term “omniscient awareness” of the battlespace.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Mass Precision: A Contradiction Resolved</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The phrase “mass precision” may appear oxymoronic to those trained on twentieth-century military theory, which held that precision and mass were inversely related. Precision weapons were few, expensive, and required ideal conditions; massed fires were inaccurate, indiscriminate, and politically costly due to concerns about collateral damage. This dichotomy no longer holds.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Contemporary precision-guided munitions can be delivered at scale. The economics of precision strikes have been transformed by advances in guidance technology, manufacturing efficiency, and networked targeting, which allow multiple platforms to engage multiple targets with a high probability of effect. The operational concept of “mass precision” now describes the simultaneous or near-simultaneous application of precision effects across a wide area, overwhelming adversary decision cycles and generating cascading system failures across their operational architecture.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">When combined with advanced ISR, mass precision enables a targeting philosophy that operates not on individual high-value nodes but on the connective tissue of adversary systems: logistics convoys, maintenance facilities, communications relays, fuel depots and the human networks that sustain military operations. The objective shifts from destroying enemy forces to degrading enemy capacity and making the adversary’s military apparatus inoperable rather than eliminating it piece by piece.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Persistence and the Elimination of Regeneration</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">One of the core limitations of historical air power was the adversary’s capacity to regenerate losses. Air campaigns could destroy factories, but industry could relocate. Planners could eliminate tank battalions, but reserves could be mobilised. The temporality of air power operated on a different scale than the adversary’s ability to recover, adapt and reconstitute.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Modern air power, particularly when using unmanned systems and long-endurance platforms extensively, introduces a new variable: persistence. Persistent presence over the battlespace, maintained not by rotating crews through exhausting sorties but by platforms that can loiter for days or weeks, fundamentally alters the regeneration calculus. When a logistics convoy destroyed today is followed by continuous observation that prevents its replacement tomorrow, when maintenance facilities are struck before repair efforts can be brought in, and when leadership is engaged before coordination can be re-established, the adversary’s organisational capacity to recover erodes not gradually but systematically.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This is the conceptual foundation for what some military theorists now call “time-sensitive targeting at operational scale,” as in the sustained, intelligent application of precision strike against the operational rhythms of adversary forces, degrading their capacity faster than they can adapt or regenerate.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Doctrinal Re-imagination</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The practical obstacle to realising this transformation is not technological but organisational and intellectual. Military institutions, including the United States Air Force, have inherited doctrinal frameworks, career promotion patterns, and operational concepts that privilege the Gulf War model. Joint force integration still treats air power as a supporting arm<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> rather than a potentially decisive instrument in its own right. Acquisition programmes prioritise platforms and systems designed for the previous era’s conflicts. Training and education emphasise tactics optimised for scenarios that no longer exist.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Rethinking the application of force requires addressing these institutional dimensions. It requires developing operational concepts for air power used independently of ground operations and concepts that account for political constraints on collateral damage, the specific vulnerabilities of twenty-first-century adversaries, and the integration of cyber, electronic warfare, and space capabilities into a coherent operational design.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The Iran scenario illustrates these challenges. An Iranian adversary presents a complex target set: distributed leadership, resilient command networks, tunnel systems, mobile missile launchers, and a population whose attitudes toward military operations are not uniform. Traditional air power doctrine would prescribe a campaign of degrading these targets in preparation for a ground invasion that may never come. But a reimagined approach might instead focus on systematically isolating Iranian military capacity from its support structures by targeting energy infrastructure, financial networks, supply chains, and the technological inputs that sustain military capability, while maintaining persistent observation to prevent adaptation and reconstitution.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion: The Imperative of Doctrinal Evolution</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The proposition that air power alone cannot win wars is an empirical claim about historical experience, not a theoretical law. It reflects what air power has done under particular doctrinal, technological, and political constraints, but not what it could do under conditions of transformed ISR, mass precision, persistent presence, and reimagined operational concepts.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Military history demonstrates that periods of technological transformation are often followed by periods of doctrinal lag, during which institutions cling to inherited frameworks until strategic failure forces reassessment.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> The current tensions between the United States and Iran, and the broader challenge of deterring or defeating adversaries across the spectrum of conflict, provide the strategic impetus for that reassessment.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The future of force application through the medium of air will not resemble the Gulf War. It will be characterised by distributed, networked operations; by precision effects delivered at scale and speed; by a persistent presence that denies the adversary the time and space to adapt; and by targeting philosophies that aim at system degradation rather than force attrition. The intellectual challenge is to develop these concepts, to resource them appropriately and to overcome the institutional inertia that privileges the familiar over the effective.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Air power has always been the medium of the future. The question is whether today’s air forces will seize that future or remain trapped in the targeting philosophy of thirty-five years ago.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><a href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/CAPSS_EV_VK_10_4_26.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW PDF</strong></span></a></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes:-</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> Robbin Laird, “Shaping the Future of Airpower: Integration, Innovation and Institutional Transformation,” <em>Defence.info,</em>    February 10, 2026,  <a href="https://defense.info/air-power-dynamics/2026/02/shaping-the-future-of-airpower-integration-innovation-andinstitutionaltransformation/#:~:text=Collaborative%20Combat%20Aircraft:%20From%20Concept,development%20and%20future%20requirement%20refinement">https://defense.info/air-power-dynamics/2026/02/shaping-the-future-of-airpower-integration-innovation-andinstitutionaltransformation/#:~:text=Collaborative%20Combat%20Aircraft:%20From%20Concept,development%20and%20future%20requirement%20refinement</a>. Accessed on March 19, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Douglas H. Fehrmann, “Air Power Doctrine and the Strategic Label,” <em>Naval War College, </em>June 13, 1997, p.11, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA325175.pdf">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA325175.pdf</a>. Accessed on March 20, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> Tim Robinson, “Can air power deter the next war?,” <em>Airspace Power, </em>October 2024, <a href="https://airspacepower.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GASCC-report-Oct-2024-AEROSPACE-compressed.pdf">https://airspacepower.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GASCC-report-Oct-2024-AEROSPACE-compressed.pdf</a>. Accessed on March 20, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> United States Air Force, United States of America, “Strategic Attack, Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-02,” August 04, 2025, p.17, <a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-02/AFDP_3-02_Strategic_Attack.pdf">https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-02/AFDP_3-02_Strategic_Attack.pdf</a>. Accessed on March 21, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> Nadia Schadlow, “The Three D’s Of Mass: Decentralization, Democratization and Deliverability,” Hoover Institute, February 25, 2026, <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/three-ds-mass-decentralization-democratization-and-deliverability">https://www.hoover.org/research/three-ds-mass-decentralization-democratization-and-deliverability</a>. Accessed on March 21, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> Adrien Gorremans, Jean-Christophe Noël, “The Future of Air Superiority: Command of the Air in High Intensity Warfare”, Focus Stratégique, no. 122, January 2025, p.25, <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/ifri_gorremans_future_air_superiority_2025.pdf">https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/ifri_gorremans_future_air_superiority_2025.pdf</a>.  Accessed on March 22, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> Timothy Gann, Decision from the Sky: Airpower as a Decisive Instrument of National Power, US Army War College, April 15, 1997, p.19, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA326954.pdf">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA326954.pdf</a>. Accessed on March 22, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a> I. B. Holley Jr, “Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship,” Air University, August 2004, p.6, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA427735.pdf">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA427735.pdf</a>. Accessed on March 22, 2026.</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])</em></strong></h4>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/rethinking-air-power-precision-persistence-and-the-future-of-force-application/">Rethinking Air Power: Precision, Persistence and the Future of Force Application</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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