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		<title>Preparing for the Coming Quantum Revolution and Its Nuclear Implications</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/preparing-for-the-coming-quantum-revolution-and-its-nuclear-implications/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanaa Alvira]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 15:16:16 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Ms Sanaa Alvira, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Quantum, Computers, Sensors, Communications, Nuclear Security Quantum technologies (QT) are set to transform the world. The ideas behind them are not new, and the basic concepts of quantum physics date back to the earliest years of the twentieth century. Over the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/preparing-for-the-coming-quantum-revolution-and-its-nuclear-implications/">Preparing for the Coming Quantum Revolution and Its Nuclear Implications</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author</strong>: <strong>Ms Sanaa Alvira</strong>, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</p>
<p><strong>Keywords</strong>: Quantum, Computers, Sensors, Communications, Nuclear Security</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Quantum technologies (QT) are set to transform the world. The ideas behind them are not new, and the basic concepts of quantum physics <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-025-00357-z/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">date back</a> to the earliest years of the twentieth century. Over the last century, the transition from a conventional to a quantum view of the physical world was <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.134.150001" target="_blank" rel="noopener">marked</a> by the first quantum revolution, during which scientists discovered that matter and energy behave very differently at the atomic and subatomic scales. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.unesco.org/en/years/quantum-science-technology" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Here,</a> light behaves as both a wave and a particle, electrons can exist in multiple locations simultaneously, and two particles can remain mysteriously connected despite the vast distances between them. This marked a significant shift in our everyday understanding of reality.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Understanding these properties <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://betterworld.mit.edu/spectrum/issues/2024-spring/the-next-quantum-revolution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gave</a> us lasers, transistors, magnetic resonance imaging, and semiconductors. Now, a <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://courier.unesco.org/en/articles/welcome-second-quantum-revolution" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new</a> quantum revolution is underway: instead of simply relying on quantum effects, scientists are learning to control them directly by using properties such as superimposition and entanglement to build new kinds of computers, sensors and communication systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">These advancements are set to transform the way we live and work in a myriad of ways, and and the nuclear field is no exception. In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) and its nuclear connections have taken centre stage in conversations about emerging technology, and understandably so. There are real concerns surrounding AI, with the rapid pace of its development, the inadequate and slower pace of its governance, and the loss of meaningful human control over nuclear command and control systems being among the most consequential. However, while most (if not all) eyes are on AI, quantum technologies are also gathering pace and could prove to be just as – and possibly more – significant for the nuclear field in the years ahead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">This explainer sets out what quantum technology is and how it is likely to affect the nuclear field.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>The Quantum Basics</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Although it was once considered to be something out of a sci-fi novel, quantum mechanics is now universally <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WWzaZWN1IOU&amp;list=LL&amp;index=4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accepted</a> as the most accurate description of the microscopic world. It is the physics of small things: atoms, electrons and photons. Quantum technologies seek to exploit this corner of physics to provide some advantage – whether it’s in computing, or an increased advantage in sensing or an advantage in how information is transmitted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">They achieve this by leveraging two properties that have no equivalent in everyday life: superposition and entanglement. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://medium.com/sss-quantum/superposition-explained-the-spinning-coin-analogy-5ae4d9956065" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Superposition</a> means that a quantum particle can exist in multiple states simultaneously, rather than just one or the other, and only settles into a single outcome when measured. The common rough analogy is a coin spinning in the air, which is neither heads nor tails until it lands. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://scienceexchange.caltech.edu/topics/quantum-science-explained/quantum-physics" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Entanglement</a> is a form of correlation between particles. Once two particles become entangled, they remain connected even when separated by vast distances, and the state of one cannot be described without reference to the other. Einstein famously <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.astronomy.com/science/what-is-quantum-entanglement-a-physicist-explains-einsteins-spooky-action-at-a-distance/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">described</a> this as “spooky action at a distance,” and the experiments that confirmed it won the <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/2022/summary/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2022</a> Nobel Prize in Physics.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">These strange behaviours allow quantum technologies to do things conventional technologies cannot. A classical computer stores information in bits, which is either a 0 or a 1. A quantum computer uses quantum bits, or qubits, which exploit superposition to hold both states at once. This lets it work through an enormous number of possibilities at the same time rather than one after another, and thus allows for quantum computers to easily find the most efficient pathway through multiple destinations. In practice, this could mean <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/coming-quantum-national-security-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">breaking</a> a common form of encryption – also known a 2048-bit RSA key – would take a classical computer around 300 trillion years, while a quantum computer could (in theory) do it in under eight hours. This same key protects medical records, financial transactions and national secrets.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Alongside quantum computers, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nist.gov/quantum-information-science/quantum-sensing-explained" target="_blank" rel="noopener">experts</a> believe we’re now at the dawn of an age of widespread quantum sensors. <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://q-ctrl.com/topics/introduction-to-quantum-sensing" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Quantum sensors</a> detect and measure changes in magnetic fields using quantum effects that make the sensor extremely precise and sensitive. These sensors can be used for a whole range of <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WWzaZWN1IOU&amp;list=LL&amp;index=5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">applications</a>, from early warning of earthquakes or volcanic eruptions to next generation brain-imaging that could provide ground-breaking insights for battling dementia. Finally, there is quantum communications, which uses the principles of quantum physics to secure and enhance communication protocols. Here, the challenge is how to protect the information that is being transmitted today from a future in which an attacker has collected encrypted information to decrypt later, in what is <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/1DKYoXbekanikzBhdXZFy7?si=2qmW5yOFQ9-hjpI3S4QTAg&amp;utm_source=copy-link" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> “harvest now, decrypt later.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>The Quantum-Nuclear Nexus</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Quantum technologies have now largely moved out of the lab and into the focus of commercial companies and investors. States have collectively <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://qbn.world/intelligence/global-quantum-initiatives/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">committed</a> billions of dollars to quantum research, and <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://steveblank.com/2022/03/22/the-quantum-technology-ecosystem-explained/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">analysts</a> expect defense applications to arrive before commercial ones. The importance of treating quantum technology as a strategic asset is already being emphasised, and <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/coming-quantum-national-security-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposals</a> are being put forward to secure the specialised electronics, cooling equipment and rare materials on which quantum hardware depends. Most recently, in September 2026, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/09/29/nato-releases-quantum-technology-roadmap" target="_blank" rel="noopener">released</a> a public summary of the quantum technology roadmap its Allies approved in July, setting out how the Alliance intends to understand and integrate quantum computing, communications and sensing. Few fields have more at stake in how this situation develops than the nuclear sector, where these technologies affect deterrence, peaceful applications and verification alike.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">It is uncertain as to how soon this becomes a practical problem. No machine capable of breaking today’s encryption exists, and <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nomios.com/news-blog/quantum-computing-threat-encryption/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimates</a> suggest that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could arrive by the 2030s. It is useful to think about the risks by weighing <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://steveblank.com/2022/03/22/the-quantum-technology-ecosystem-explained/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">three</a> periods against each other: how long information must stay secret, how long a migration to new encryption takes, and how long before the threat materialises. This presents a sobering calculation when applied to the nuclear field. As these technologies mature, they present new types of challenges as well as opportunities to the field of nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. For example, quantum cyber threats could pose <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://unidir.org/unidir-advances-dialogue-on-the-quantum-nuclear-nexus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">risks</a> to nuclear facility systems, where information confidentiality and authentication are paramount. Future quantum computers could allow adversaries to compromise the encryption used to protect sensitive nuclear information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Sensing poses a different kind of challenge, and it is closer at hand. In the same way that radar changed air warfare in Europe during World War II, quantum sensors will <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/quantum-sensing-and-future-warfare-five-essential-reforms-stay-competitive" target="_blank" rel="noopener">change</a> air and sea warfare. Quantum magnetometers and gravimeters could “make the ocean transparent” and be used to <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://unidir.org/unidir-advances-dialogue-on-the-quantum-nuclear-nexus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">detect</a> submarines, thereby compromising the survivability of the sea-based deterrent. In fact, these sensors impact all nuclear weapons systems that rely on stealth. It could also locate concealed tunnels and bunkers, and identify nuclear materials. However, it is worth noting that much of the anticipated capability remains theoretical. Current technologies are limited by noise and interference, and evasion techniques are advancing alongside detection capabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">There are opportunities too. Quantum-assisted <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://unidir.org/unidir-advances-dialogue-on-the-quantum-nuclear-nexus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">navigation</a> could enable submarines to remain submerged and on course for longer, thereby strengthening sea-based deterrents. Quantum communications, and quantum key distribution in particular, offer new ways to protect sensitive nuclear systems against the very threats that quantum computing creates. Quantum computing itself could <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://vcdnp.org/preparing-for-the-future-quantum-technologies-and-security-of-nuclear-materials-and-facilities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accelerate</a> reactor design and the modelling of nuclear materials, work that would benefit civilian energy programmes, including for future fusion reactors. Additionally, quantum sensors – which are much nearer to commercial deployment – could <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://unidir.org/unidir-advances-dialogue-on-the-quantum-nuclear-nexus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">aid</a> non-proliferation and disarmament efforts through strengthened verification efforts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>When, Not If</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The question is no longer whether quantum technologies will reach the nuclear field, but when, and on whose terms. Right now, however, there is a gap between promise and practice. This gives the nuclear community something it did not have with AI: time to prepare. Managing the risks will largely fall to governments and national regulators, some of which are already exploring more anticipatory approaches to keep pace with technological change (as NATO’s roadmap shows). Quantum should not be considered in <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://unidir.org/unidir-advances-dialogue-on-the-quantum-nuclear-nexus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">isolation</a> either, since its interaction with AI could compress decision-making timelines and raise the risk of miscalculation in a crisis. Ultimately, a simple <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://vcdnp.org/preparing-for-the-future-quantum-technologies-and-security-of-nuclear-materials-and-facilities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">principle</a> must be kept in mind: humans must remain the central and final users of such technologies.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/preparing-for-the-coming-quantum-revolution-and-its-nuclear-implications/">Preparing for the Coming Quantum Revolution and Its Nuclear Implications</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Does India’s Standing in BRICS Dilute its Long-Term Objectives in the Indo-Pacific?</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/does-indias-standing-in-brics-dilute-its-long-term-objectives-in-the-indo-pacific/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Priyanka Yadav]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 12:41:04 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Dr Priyanka Yadav, Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: BRICS, Quad, China, Strait of Hormuz, Indo-Pacific India, at the helm of the BRICS chairmanship, hosted the 18th BRICS Summit from September 12 to 13, 2026, in New Delhi. This year’s summit came against the backdrop of the West fighting wars [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/does-indias-standing-in-brics-dilute-its-long-term-objectives-in-the-indo-pacific/">Does India’s Standing in BRICS Dilute its Long-Term Objectives in the Indo-Pacific?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author: Dr Priyanka Yadav, </strong>Research Associate, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: BRICS, Quad, China, Strait of Hormuz, Indo-Pacific</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India, at the helm of the BRICS chairmanship, hosted the 18<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit from September 12 to 13, 2026, in New Delhi. This year’s summit came against the backdrop of the West fighting wars in West Asia and Europe, United States (US) President Trump’s imposition of harsh unilateral trade tariffs against nations, and more broadly, the visible rupture of the international order that the US had led for decades. Western narratives have often portrayed the BRICS grouping as an anti-Western bloc<a id="fnref1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> due to the deep ideological and security divide between Western nations, notably the US, and non-Western nations such as China and Russia. However, India’s interests in BRICS go beyond bloc politics, particularly as new security and economic challenges emerge. These include China’s control over critical minerals, emerging vulnerabilities in strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing role of artificial intelligence (AI) in political, economic, and security domains. Most of these pressures originate from the grouping itself, which makes India’s position peculiar: it continues to occupy a significant middle ground, embedded in US-led regional groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), while shaping and influencing non-Western-led institutions like BRICS from its chair.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">This article examines whether India’s engagement with BRICS may shape or alter its long-term strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific. It also examines how India balances its participation in BRICS with its commitments to the Quad and its broader Indo-Pacific interests, without compromising its foreign policy principle of strategic autonomy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>India and the Quad</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India’s Indo-Pacific objectives are centred on protecting its maritime security, securing vital sea lanes and energy routes, and maintaining a stable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific. India holds a significant position in the Quad grouping with the other three major powers, the US, Japan, and Australia, to strengthen its defence and strategic partnerships. For instance, in May 2026, India hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, where the member nations jointly launched the USD 20 billion ‘Quad Minerals Initiative Framework.<a id="fnref2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn2"><sup>2</sup></a> Alongside this, it anchored India as a strategic processing and recycling hub, securing the high-tech supply chains essential to the clean energy and defence systems of all the Quad nations. India’s defence agreements with Japan<a id="fnref3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn3"><sup>3</sup></a> and Australia<a id="fnref4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn4"><sup>4</sup></a> in mid-2026 also centred on boosting defence cooperation with naval co-development, enhancing maritime domain awareness and interoperability to build a better, more resilient Indo-Pacific architecture. It indicates that India’s Indo-Pacific security commitments are growing as defence ties among these nations deepen. Thus, India’s position in the Quad is not at the expense of the Western powers but primarily to ensure its own interests in the Indo-Pacific theatre, including the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The Indian Ocean lies in India’s backyard and holds substantial significance of its own because it comprises a multitude of shipping lanes, along with notable India-led initiatives such as Look East (strengthening cooperation with Southeast and East Asian nations), SAGAR (Security and Growth for all), and MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), strengthening defence ties with Southeast Asian nations<a id="fnref5" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn5"><sup>5</sup></a> (notably the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam), and conducting regular joint military exercises and patrols to preserve the existing regional order. Through these initiatives, India indirectly seeks to monitor China’s coercive tactics against smaller nations in the region and to counter China’s aggressive naval buildup, investments in maritime infrastructure, and alternative connectivity corridors under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India’s geography aligns more closely with the Indo-Pacific; therefore, outcomes in the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific directly affect India’s territorial and maritime security, energy supply routes, and its regional standing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>India’s Position in BRICS</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">While India’s objectives in BRICS differ from its security objectives in the Indo-Pacific. This year, hosting the BRICS Summit, New Delhi provided a platform for defence and diplomacy among nations, strengthened economic cooperation, bolstered the Global South’s voice in global governance, and collectively shaped decision-making. This also aligns with India’s principle of strategic autonomy and non-alignment, which allows it to work with Western nations while securing a platform for consensus with major powers such as Russia and China within BRICS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India has been wary of rigid geopolitical alignments, and it demonstrated this by abstaining from the BRICS-linked naval exercise “Will for Peace” in South Africa, clearly dismissing China’s intent to develop BRICS maritime cooperation into a securitised framework among member nations.<a id="fnref6" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn6"><sup>6</sup></a> Prior to the BRICS Summit, in July 2026, India also hosted the BRICS Seafarers’ Forum in Mumbai, issuing the Mumbai Declaration 2026, which focused on seafarer safety in conflict zones, addressed crew abandonment, and emphasised maritime sovereignty.<a id="fnref7" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn7"><sup>7</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Additionally, India has also maintained distance from any understanding of a common BRICS currency and de-dollarisation<a id="fnref8" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn8"><sup>8</sup></a> efforts in the near term, which has often been a source of worry and angst for US President Trump regarding the BRICS grouping. Instead, India kept the focus on a technocratic approach involving interoperable payment systems, settlements in local currencies, and maintaining cooperation based on national priorities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">It is essential to note that the BRICS agenda spans a range of issues, including terrorism, global governance, agriculture, technology, climate, health, education, culture, and finance, making it a strategic convergence mechanism for all participating nations rather than merely another security bloc. The nations of this grouping do not share a similar regional threat perception; thus, it does not directly serve as a basis for a security-led alternative mechanism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Here, India also has an advantage in BRICS due to Pakistan’s absence, as it provides more room for close cooperation among member nations on issues such as terrorism, which directly hinders India’s sovereign interests. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration,<a id="fnref9" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn9"><sup>9</sup></a> signed on September 12, 2026, by all nations, including China, which often portrays its relations with Pakistan as an ‘all-weather friend,’ condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam attack. Such attempts have repeatedly been obstructed by Pakistan on other international platforms, which remains a perennial security concern for India, emanating from cross-border terrorism. Despite the ongoing conflict and divergences in West Asia, New Delhi also managed to bring Iran and the UAE to a single consensus text at this year’s BRICS Summit. At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India for the BRICS summit added strategic weight, given the strained relations between the two nations since the 2020 border crisis. <a id="fnref10" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn10"><sup>10</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">For India, BRICS serves as a platform to engage with China in a multilateral setting, while other non-Western economies pursue objectives that broaden the scope of the international order and deepen cooperation on a range of issues such as supply chain resilience, digital systems, climate adaptation, health, and food security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>India’s Choices</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India’s strategic choices are shaped by a multidimensional China challenge: a competitor to its interests in the Indo-Pacific, a dominant force in BRICS owing to its technological and manufacturing edge, and an adversary along the contested Himalayan frontier, where border skirmishes continue to strain ties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Although India’s BRICS and Indo-Pacific objectives are not inherently contradictory, tensions can arise between them. The main concern is China. India seeks to engage China through BRICS while strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships to respond to China’s growing regional presence. A stronger security role for BRICS could work against India’s interests, as pressure for bloc solidarity may force it into positions that strain its strategic partnerships and limit its room to counter China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Navigating its choices across different platforms also gives India institutional leverage, room for strategic manoeuvring on a range of issues, and more negotiating ground to build bridges with China in a multilateral setting. It also leaves enough room for India to participate in Western-led forums such as the G7 and G-20 without friction. Weakening international forums such as BRICS could undermine a platform that can echo the concerns of developing nations from a vantage point.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The New Delhi Declaration notes that the outcome stems from practical cooperation among member nations, despite their different positions on the international stage. The 2026 BRICS Summit was not about who gets to write the rules, but who is represented when the rules are being written. The Quad’s concerns centre on ensuring maritime security and effectively balancing China by building robust multilateral partnerships within the Indo-Pacific. India’s challenge will be to ensure that cooperation within BRICS does not develop into bloc-based security commitments that restrict its long-term strategic choices. As long as India retains this flexibility, its growing role in BRICS is more likely to strengthen its strategic autonomy than dilute its long-term Indo-Pacific objectives.</p>
<p><!-- Replace href="#" below with the actual PDF URL --></p>
<p style="text-align: center; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/india-brics-standing-indo-pacific-objectives.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CLICK HERE FOR PDF</a></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Notes:</strong></p>
<aside id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document" role="doc-endnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Anniek Bao, “Trump threatens extra 10% tariff on countries that align with ‘Anti-American’ BRICS policies,” <em>CNBC,</em> July 07, 2025, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/07/trump-says-countries-aligning-with-brics-bloc-will-face-extra-tariff.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/07/trump-says-countries-aligning-with-brics-bloc-will-face-extra-tariff.html</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref1">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Factsheet: Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi,” May 26, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41234/Factsheet_Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_in_New_Delhi_May_2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41234/Factsheet_Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_in_New_Delhi_May_2026</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref2">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Harsh V Pant and Pratnashree Basu, “India-Japan Defence Cooperation Breaks New Ground,” <em>Observer Research Foundation (ORF),</em> September 15, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-japan-defence-cooperation-breaks-new-ground" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-japan-defence-cooperation-breaks-new-ground</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref3">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn4" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Australia Joint Declaration on Defence and Security cooperation,” July 09, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41428/India__Australia_Joint_Declaration_on_Defence_and_Security_Cooperation_2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41428/India__Australia_Joint_Declaration_on_Defence_and_Security_Cooperation_2026</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref4">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn5" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Sebastian Stranhio, “India Has Signed BrahMos Deal With Vietnam, Indian Minister Says,” <em>The Diplomat,</em> June 01, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/india-has-signed-brahmos-missile-deal-with-vietnam-indian-minister-says/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/india-has-signed-brahmos-missile-deal-with-vietnam-indian-minister-says/</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref5">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn6" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Vrinda Malik, “BRICS Holds a Maritime Exercise at the Indo-Atlantic Crossroads – Without India,” <em>The Diplomat,</em> January 27, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/brics-holds-a-maritime-exercise-at-the-indo-atlantic-crossroads-without-india/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/brics-holds-a-maritime-exercise-at-the-indo-atlantic-crossroads-without-india/</a>. Accessed on September 16, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref6">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn7" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Shiwani Dumbala, “BRICS and the Maritime Dilemma,” <em>Politeia Research Foundation,</em> September 10, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://prfworld.org/brics-and-the-maritime-dilemma/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://prfworld.org/brics-and-the-maritime-dilemma/</a>. Accessed on September 17, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref7">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn8" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Mark S. Cogan, “Is BRICS De-Dollarization Program a step Too Far for India?,” <em>Geopolitical Monitor,</em> October 16, 2024, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/is-brics-de-dollarization-program-a-step-too-far-for-india/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/is-brics-de-dollarization-program-a-step-too-far-for-india/</a>. Accessed on September 17, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref8">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn9" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “BRICS New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” September 12, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41776" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41776</a>. Accessed on September 17, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref9">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn10" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“BRICS Summit: Why Xi Jinping’s India visit could reset ties with PM Narendra Modi,” <em>Open Magazine</em>, September 10, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://openthemagazine.com/india/brics-summit-why-xi-jinpings-india-visit-could-reset-ties-with-pm-narendra-modi" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://openthemagazine.com/india/brics-summit-why-xi-jinpings-india-visit-could-reset-ties-with-pm-narendra-modi</a>. Accessed on September 17, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref10">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</aside>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/does-indias-standing-in-brics-dilute-its-long-term-objectives-in-the-indo-pacific/">Does India’s Standing in BRICS Dilute its Long-Term Objectives in the Indo-Pacific?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pakistan’s Acquisition of the Hangor-Class Submarine and its Impact on India</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/pakistan-hangor-class-submarine-impact-on-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anuttama Banerji]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 12:38:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IN FOCUS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEPTEMBER 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=19338</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Ms Anuttama Banerji, Associate Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Nuclear Power, Naval Deterrence, Submarine, Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence Pakistan recently commissioned the first of eight Hangor-class submarines during Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China. The official ceremony took place in the Chinese city of Sanya, which hosts the People’s Liberation [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/pakistan-hangor-class-submarine-impact-on-india/">Pakistan’s Acquisition of the Hangor-Class Submarine and its Impact on India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Author: Ms Anuttama Banerji, Associate Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Nuclear Power, Naval Deterrence, Submarine, Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Pakistan recently commissioned the first of eight Hangor-class submarines during Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China. The official ceremony took place in the Chinese city of Sanya, which hosts the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN’s) surface fleet and submarine support facility. It also hosts the Yulin naval base, which is the most important military base in the South China Sea.<a id="fnref1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> Hence, not only was the choice of venue significant, but also the commissioning of the Hangor submarine marked a key step in Pakistan’s ongoing naval modernisation programme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The event also demonstrated the strategic relationship between Beijing and Islamabad. The commissioning of the Hangor submarine is significant as it diversifies Pakistan’s nuclear delivery capability from a purely land-based deterrent. Although built in China and viewed as a traditional replacement for the Agosta 90B submarines Pakistan acquired from France in the 1980s, the commissioning also strengthensPakistan’s “sea denial capabilities.”<a id="fnref2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn2"><sup>2</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Given Pakistan’s interest in maintaining an enduring presence in the Bay of Bengal, an area of tactical operations where Pakistan’s presence ceased to exist in 1971,<a id="fnref3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn3"><sup>3</sup></a> the acquisition of the submarine also provides Pakistan with a protracted presence in the Bay of Bengal sub-region of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), with domain awareness being provided by Pakistan’s friends in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Pakistan has suggested that the commissioning of the Hangor submarine is a “historic milestone” for its navy. It is meant to be a strategic deterrent to strengthen its second-strike capability against India, since the submarine is likely to be armed with a submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile. The submarine is also likely to integrate the Babur-3 sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). With a range of 450 kilometres, this SLCM provides Pakistan with second-strike capability, although the range continues to be limited. Babur-3 is incidentally the sea-launched variant of the ground-launched Babur-2 missile.<a id="fnref4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn4"><sup>4</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">To recall, India has formally commissioned and inducted INS <em>Arihant</em> (S2), INS <em>Arighaat</em> (S3), and INS <em>Aridaman</em> over the years. These ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) demonstrate the maturity of India’s nuclear triad. For example, INS <em>Aridaman</em> possesses a larger hull and has improved endurance in comparison to its predecessors, Arihant and Arighaat.<a id="fnref5" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn5"><sup>5</sup></a> According to existing reports, INS <em>Aridaman</em> can carry either eight K-4 ballistic missiles, with a range of 3,500 kilometres, or about 24 K-15 missiles, with a range of 750 km.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Commissioning of the Hangor Submarine and AIP Technology</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">In contrast with India’s nuclear-propelled SSBNs, the Hangor-class submarine is a derivative of the Chinese Type 039 submarine<a id="fnref6" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn6"><sup>6</sup></a> and is equipped with advanced combat systems, modern sensors, and Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology. This provides it with greater underwater endurance and the ability to remain undetected for longer periods.<a id="fnref7" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn7"><sup>7</sup></a> AIP, or air-independent power, is a key marine propulsion technology that enables a non-nuclear submarine to operate sans the need to access atmospheric oxygen, as occurs in traditional diesel-engine submarines through surfacing or the use of a snorkel.<a id="fnref8" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn8"><sup>8</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The operational effectiveness of the submarine is more varied than just being used for delivery of nuclear warheads since it can potentially lay mines and attack adversary craft, while limiting surface appearances. This enhanced stealth capability potentially acts as a credible “force multiplier” during naval battles.<a id="fnref9" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn9"><sup>9</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">If the other Hangor-class submarines are delivered on time, Pakistan will have greater operational capability to track Indian ships with greater frequency with Chinese support. Along with its Chinese-origin long-range HQ-9/P, medium-range LY-80, and the short-range FM-90 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and its sea-based capabilities, including the C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles<a id="fnref10" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn10"><sup>10</sup></a> and the Hangor submarines, Pakistan can potentially counter India at sea.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Larger Picture</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">With the acquisition of the submarine, Pakistan believes that it has acquired a sort of second-strike capability. Sea-based nuclear forces, especially submarines and vessels carrying nuclear-armed missiles, tend to provide that option to states. But whether this will translate to stable nuclear deterrence remains to be seen. Pakistan’s overall nuclear strategy will determine that. Until now, it has rested on the plank of nuclear brinkmanship. Will the acquisition of the submarines and the confidence in the ability to second strike make Pakistan less reliant on projection of first use? Time will tell. Meanwhile, seen in conjunction with India’s sea-based platforms capable of delivering nuclear ordnance, India will continue to have the strategic edge. Therefore, India should take note of this development but not view this acquisition as a significant strategic shift.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India should focus on ensuring the timely completion of its own submarine acquisition programme so its SSBNs and potentially SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) continue to act as strategic deterrents at sea, and India could eventually move towards a Continuous at Sea Deterrence (CASD) posture if desired in the long run.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/pakistan-hangor-class-submarine-impact-on-india.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CLICK HERE FOR PDF</a></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Notes:</strong></p>
<aside id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document" role="doc-endnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Damen Cook, “China’s most important South China Sea Military Base,” <em>The Diplomat,</em> March 09, 2017, <u><a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-most-important-south-china-sea-military-base/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-most-important-south-china-sea-military-base/</a>.</u> Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref1">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><em>‘</em>Sea denial’ is viewed as an enabling condition within naval parlance when one side does not see merit in using the sea but sees strategic benefit in denying the adversary the same space. For more inputs, please see: “Underwater Power Shift: Pakistan’s PNS Hangor enters service as India’s Project 75-I delays deepen strategic imbalance,” <em>Defence Security Asia,</em> May 02, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/underwater-power-shift-pakistan-hangor-india-project-75i-strategic-imbalance/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/underwater-power-shift-pakistan-hangor-india-project-75i-strategic-imbalance/</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref2">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“Pakistan eyes return to Bay of Bengal for first time since 1971 with Hangor-class submarines,” <em>Marine Insight,</em> June 18, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.marineinsight.com/pakistan-eyes-return-to-bay-of-bengal-for-first-time-since-1971-with-hangor-class-submarines/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://www.marineinsight.com/pakistan-eyes-return-to-bay-of-bengal-for-first-time-since-1971-with-hangor-class-submarines/</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref3">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn4" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“Pakistan conducts first test of submarine launched “Babur-3” cruise missile,” CSIS Missile Defence Project, January 10, 2017, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/pakistan-conducts-first-test-submarine-launched-babur-3-cruise-missile/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://missilethreat.csis.org/pakistan-conducts-first-test-submarine-launched-babur-3-cruise-missile/</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref4">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn5" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ravi Shankar, “India commissions third SSBN, bolstering sea-based nuclear deterrence,” <em>Bharat Shakti,</em> April 03, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://bharatshakti.in/india-commissions-third-ssbn-bolstering-sea-based-nuclear-deterrence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://bharatshakti.in/india-commissions-third-ssbn-bolstering-sea-based-nuclear-deterrence/</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref5">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn6" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“Fact Sheet: Pakistan Submarine Capabilities,” <em>Nuclear Threat Initiative,</em> September 04, 2024, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-submarine-capabilities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-submarine-capabilities/</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref6">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn7" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“First Hangor-class submarine arrives at Karachi port,” <em>Dawn,</em> June 11, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.dawn.com/news/2007071" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://www.dawn.com/news/2007071</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref7">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn8" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Giunio G Santi and Francesco Popia, “The Promise of Better Submarine Air-Independent Propulsion,” <em>United States Naval Institute,</em> vol. 147/3/1417, Proceedings, March 2021, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/promise-better-submarine-air-independent-propulsion" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/promise-better-submarine-air-independent-propulsion</u></a>. Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref8">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn9" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Prasun Kashyap, “Breathing Underwater: How AIP systems revolutionise submarine warfare,” <em>The Geostrata,</em> February 10, 2025, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.thegeostrata.com/post/breathing-underwater-how-aip-systems-revolutionize-submarine-warfare" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>https://www.thegeostrata.com/post/breathing-underwater-how-aip-systems-revolutionize-submarine-warfare</u></a> . Accessed on August 04, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref9">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn10" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">“Pakistan test-fires long range anti-ship cruise missiles,” <em>Xinhua,</em> March 06, 2018, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/06/c_137018328.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><u>http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/06/c_137018328.htm</u></a>. Accessed on August 07, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref10">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</aside>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/pakistan-hangor-class-submarine-impact-on-india/">Pakistan’s Acquisition of the Hangor-Class Submarine and its Impact on India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>An Analysis of BrahMos Export Proposal to the UAE</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/an-analysis-of-brahmos-export-proposal-to-the-uae/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aayush Parekh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 04:30:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[FEATURED]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IN FOCUS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEPTEMBER 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://capssindia.org/?p=19317</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Mr Aayush Parekh, Research Intern, CAPSS Keywords: BrahMos Missile, India, Russia, United Arab Emirates, West Asia Introduction The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is poised to become the first Gulf country to acquire the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, marking a potential milestone in the jointly developed project by India and Russia.1 After three successful deals with [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/an-analysis-of-brahmos-export-proposal-to-the-uae/">An Analysis of BrahMos Export Proposal to the UAE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p><strong>Author</strong>: <strong>Mr Aayush Parekh, </strong>Research Intern, CAPSS</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: BrahMos Missile, India, Russia, United Arab Emirates, West Asia</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is poised to become the first Gulf country to acquire the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, marking a potential milestone in the jointly developed project by India and Russia.<a id="fnref1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> After three successful deals with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, BrahMos Aerospace has formally presented its missile system and submitted a detailed proposal to Abu Dhabi, which is under consideration.<a id="fnref2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn2"><sup>2</sup></a> This is a potential moment for BrahMos Aerospace to leave its footprint in West Asia. This article analyses the strategic motivations of both New Delhi and Abu Dhabi and the broader implications for India’s defence exports in West Asia, along with Russia’s role in this joint-venture deal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Background</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">This is not the first time that India has made a defence deal with a West Asian nation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest buyers of Indian ammunition in the region, and it previously signed an agreement worth USD 225 million for defence ammunition.<a id="fnref3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn3"><sup>3</sup></a> Meanwhile, India has the most defence Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) with Oman compared with other West Asian nations.<a id="fnref4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn4"><sup>4</sup></a> Even the UAE has signed an agreement with India for joint production of drones, missiles, and naval platforms in May 2026.<a id="fnref5" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn5"><sup>5</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile jointly developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russian NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPOM). It is one of the world’s fastest cruise missiles; capable of flying at the speed of ~Mach 2.8 and with a range of 290 km. Named after two prominent rivers in India and Russia, Brahmaputra and Moskva, respectively, BrahMos is designed for launching precision strikes from all three domains: air, land, and sea.<a id="fnref6" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn6"><sup>6</sup></a> The BrahMos is a versatile weapon system, renowned for its speed, accuracy, and survivability against modern air defence systems, which was evident during India’s Operation <em>Sindoor</em> in 2025.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">BrahMos Aerospace’s formal proposal to supply supersonic cruise missiles to the UAE signals a shift toward substantive defence-industrial engagement. If BrahMos Aerospace successfully closes the deal with the UAE, it will open the Gulf market for high-value Indian defence systems, cementing India&#8217;s strategic presence in West Asia, especially after the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.<a id="fnref7" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn7"><sup>7</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Why is Abu Dhabi Interested in BrahMos?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The deal is a part of official talks between both countries for selling some of India’s flagship defence systems, which occurred in July 2026, amid the war in West Asia.<a id="fnref8" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn8"><sup>8</sup></a> BrahMos is not the only Indian equipment the UAE is focusing on; the Gulf nation is also interested in India’s Akashteer air defence system as well.<a id="fnref9" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn9"><sup>9</sup></a> The probable reason why Abu Dhabi is looking to add some serious firepower to its arsenal with the BrahMos missile is due to emerging threats from Iran, especially after the UAE was attacked by Iran during the ongoing war in West Asia.<a id="fnref10" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn10"><sup>10</sup></a> The BrahMos is one of the few missiles capable of striking both maritime and land targets, with speed and precision. This combination gives the UAE an unmatched strike option against Iran or any other regional threat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The significance of BrahMos for Abu Dhabi is clear because the country already operates advanced American defence systems, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot.<a id="fnref11" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn11"><sup>11</sup></a> This is because BrahMos offers long-range launch capabilities. The UAE is located at the doorstep of the Strait of Hormuz, which is under constant threat due to ongoing dynamics. Therefore, the question for Abu Dhabi is not about an addition to its arsenal but about developing an architecture that can mitigate such threats.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Implications for India</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The Indian defence exports have already been increasing over the past decade. According to official figures, exports reached a new all-time high of INR 38,424 crore (more than USD 4 billion) in the financial year 2025-26.<a id="fnref12" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn12"><sup>12</sup></a> Compared with financial year 2024-25, exports were just INR 23,622 crore (~USD 2.5 billion).<a id="fnref13" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn13"><sup>13</sup></a> During Operation <em>Sindoor</em>, when India used its weapon systems, including BrahMos, it sparked interest among other countries in buying BrahMos. Since then, India has signed deals to sell the BrahMos to Vietnam and Indonesia and has also received interest from Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile.<a id="fnref14" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn14"><sup>14</sup></a> The BrahMos has now become one of the flagship symbols of India’s ambition to become a major and credible defence exporter, transitioning from ‘Make in India’ to ‘Make for the World’.<a id="fnref15" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn15"><sup>15</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">India and the UAE are expanding their relationship across trade, investment, energy, technology, defence, and the digital economy.<a id="fnref16" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn16"><sup>16</sup></a> The BrahMos deal would deepen this strategic partnership amid rapidly changing security architecture in West Asia. This deal will also signal to the world that India is not only a major economic power but also a supplier of sophisticated defence technologies and a reliable Gulf partner. One of the major challenges will be to balance technology transfer sensitivities and navigate regional fault lines, particularly in the case of Iran.<a id="fnref17" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn17"><sup>17</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Role of Moscow</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">The BrahMos missile is manufactured by BrahMos Aerospace, which is a joint venture with an authorised capital of USD 300 million in the ratio of 50.5 per cent from the Indian side and 49.5 per cent from the Russian side.<a id="fnref18" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn18"><sup>18</sup></a> Hence, approval from Moscow also becomes an important aspect before closing any deal for this 290 km-range missile. Given the close and growing ties between Moscow and Abu Dhabi across diplomacy, trade, and investment, it is unlikely to pose any hurdles for India to close the deal. <a id="fnref19" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref" href="#fn19"><sup>19</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Additionally, BrahMos is one of the most successful military collaborations between India and Russia, and with every international sale, Moscow gains royalties. Therefore, every approval benefits both parties in this joint venture, as shown by previous sales to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Furthermore, looking at the sanctions imposed on Russia from Western nations due to the Ukraine war, the West Asian countries are one of the financial safe havens for Russian trade and investments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">As Abu Dhabi looks to expand its defence partnerships apart from countries like the United States, Italy and France, the jointly developed BrahMos cruise missile by India and Russia has caught the attention in the global defence market. The Philippines became the first foreign country to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile in 2022. Since then, India has signed BrahMos deals with Indonesia and Vietnam as of August 2026. Now India looks to make BrahMos enter the Gulf market with the UAE as the first potential buyer. India and the UAE are significantly expanding their relations, and a BrahMos deal will deepen this tie amid rapidly changing security architecture in West Asia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">For India, the deal will support its broader defence export initiatives, proving that its indigenous platforms can compete in demanding international markets. The deal, likely to be supported by Russia, underscores the deepening India-UAE partnership and heralds India&#8217;s arrival as a consequential defence exporter on the global stage.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"><strong>Notes:</strong></p>
<aside id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document" role="doc-endnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Huma Siddiqui, “India’s BrahMos Pipeline Expands Ahead of BRICS,” <em>Bharat Shakti,</em> August 22, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://bharatshakti.in/indias-brahmos-pipeline-expands-ahead-of-brics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://bharatshakti.in/indias-brahmos-pipeline-expands-ahead-of-brics/</a>. Accessed on August 27, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn2" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ibid.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn3" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Embassy of India in Saudi Arabia, Government of India, “India-Saudi Bilateral Relations,” June 01, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/india-saudi-bilateral-relations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/india-saudi-bilateral-relations/</a>. Accessed on August 27, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn4" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Embassy of India in Oman, Government of India, “India and Oman Bilateral Relations,” July, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.indemb-oman.gov.in/page/india-and-oman-bilateral-relations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.indemb-oman.gov.in/page/india-and-oman-bilateral-relations/</a>. Accessed on August 27, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn5" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> “India, UAE forge deep defence alliance :$5bn investment, joint production of drones, missiles and naval platform,” <em>The Times of India,</em> May 19, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/india-uae-forge-deep-defence-alliance-5bn-investment-joint-production-of-drones-missiles-and-naval-platforms/articleshow/131200210.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/india-uae-forge-deep-defence-alliance-5bn-investment-joint-production-of-drones-missiles-and-naval-platforms/articleshow/131200210.cms</a>, Accessed on August 27, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn6" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> “BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile,” <em>BrahMos Aerospace,</em> <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://brahmos.com/page/brahmos-missile" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://brahmos.com/page/brahmos-missile</a>. Accessed on August 28, 2026.<a class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink" href="#fnref6">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn7" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> Hasan Alhasan and Asna Wajid, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: a new defence pact,” <em>The International Institute for Strategic Studies,</em> August 14, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/08/pakistan-saudi-arabia-and-turkiye-a-new-defence-pact/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/08/pakistan-saudi-arabia-and-turkiye-a-new-defence-pact/</a>. Accessed on August 28, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn8" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> “India in talks to sell BrahMos missile, Akashteer air defence system to the UAE, sources say,” <em>The Hindu,</em> July 07, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-in-talks-to-sell-brahmos-missile-akashteer-air-defence-system-to-the-uae-sources-say/article71133779.ece" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-in-talks-to-sell-brahmos-missile-akashteer-air-defence-system-to-the-uae-sources-say/article71133779.ece</a>. Accessed on August 28, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn9" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ibid.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn10" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ibid.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn11" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> Paul Iddon, “The UAE Spent 40 Years Building Its Advanced Air Defense For Iran War,” <em>Forbes</em>, March 22, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2026/03/22/the-uae-spent-40-years-building-its-advanced-air-defense-for-iran-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2026/03/22/the-uae-spent-40-years-building-its-advanced-air-defense-for-iran-war/</a>. Accessed on August 28, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn12" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> Rajnath Singh (@rajnathsingh), “Under the inspiring leadership of PM Shri Narendra Modi….India defence exports have touched a new all time high with a record ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025-26,” <em>X,</em> April 02, 2026, 09:26 am, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://x.com/rajnathsingh/status/2039552441482695102" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://x.com/rajnathsingh/status/2039552441482695102</a>.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn13" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Ibid.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn14" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> The Hindu, n.8.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn15" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> “Global Outreach,” <em>BrahMos Aerospace,</em> <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.brahmos.com/index.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.brahmos.com/index.php</a>. Accessed on August 29, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn16" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Visit to the UAE,” May 15, 2026, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2261611&amp;lang=2&amp;reg=48" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2261611&amp;lang=2&amp;reg=48</a>. Accessed on August 29, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn17" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> Times of India, n.5.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn18" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;"> “The Inception of Joint Venture,” <em>BrahMos Aerospace,</em> <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://brahmos.com/about-jv" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://brahmos.com/about-jv</a>. Accessed on August 30, 2026.</p>
</li>
<li id="fn19" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-word; overflow-wrap: break-word; word-wrap: break-word;">Matthew Hedges, “The UAE and Russia: Best Friends Forever?,” <em>Center for European Policy Analysis,</em> August 18, 2025, <a style="word-break: break-word;" href="https://cepa.org/article/the-uae-and-russia-best-friends-forever/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://cepa.org/article/the-uae-and-russia-best-friends-forever/</a>. Accessed on August 30, 2026.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/an-analysis-of-brahmos-export-proposal-to-the-uae/">An Analysis of BrahMos Export Proposal to the UAE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond Runways: Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign MoU for Heavy-Lift Airships</title>
		<link>https://capssindia.org/beyond-runways-bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-mou-for-heavy-lift-airships/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aayush Parekh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 17:05:38 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Author: Mr Aayush Parekh, Research Intern, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies Keywords: Bharat Forge, Flying Whales, MoU, LCA60T, Heavy-Lift Airship Introduction What if the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army could airlift tons of supplies and weaponry to remote, high-altitude outposts without a runway? Now it seems possible after India’s Bharat [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/beyond-runways-bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-mou-for-heavy-lift-airships/">Beyond Runways: Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign MoU for Heavy-Lift Airships</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Author: </strong></span><strong>Mr Aayush Parekh</strong>, Research Intern, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies</h3>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Bharat Forge, Flying Whales, MoU, LCA60T, Heavy-Lift Airship</span></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">What if the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army could airlift tons of supplies and weaponry to remote, high-altitude outposts without a runway? Now it seems possible after India’s Bharat Forge signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the French-Canadian aerospace joint venture Flying Whales. The MoU was signed during the Farnborough International Air Show 2026 in the United Kingdom (UK) on July 22, 2026, and both parties have agreed to jointly develop and manufacture advanced heavy-lift airships in India. Such giant aircraft could transform Indian defence logistics and mobility.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">This paper addresses the capability gap in India&#8217;s defence logistics architecture: the absence of a heavy-lift platform capable of delivering oversized and heavy payloads to mountainous, border, and disaster-affected areas without dependence on runways or extensive ground infrastructure. The collaboration between Bharat Forge and Flying Whales represents a decisive step toward building an indigenous airship ecosystem in India, aligned with the Government of India’s Make in India initiative.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>About the Deal</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The MoU was signed between Mr Guru Biswal, CEO, Aerospace, Bharat Forge and Mr Sébastien Bougon, President, Flying Whales. At the core of this deal is the LCA60T platform.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> It is the Flying Whales’ next-generation, heavy-lift airship capable of transporting up to 60 tons of cargo with vertical take-off and landing capability, minimal ground infrastructure requirements and hybrid-electric propulsion. It is designed for point-to-point operations in challenging and remote environments.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[3]</a> Mr Amit Kalyani, Vice Chairman &amp; Joint Managing Director, Bharat Forge, said, “Airships will redefine how nations move, supply and sustain their forces, and India will lead that change. This strategic partnership places India among a select group of nations with the capability to design, build and field heavy-lift airships, bringing together Flying Whales&#8217; pioneering technology and Bharat Forge&#8217;s six decades of advanced engineering strength and deep understanding of India&#8217;s defence needs. Aligned to the spirit of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, we are creating a sovereign capability, a new industrial ecosystem and an entirely new dimension of strategic mobility for the nation.”<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[4]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The collaboration aims to establish manufacturing integration and a long-term aerospace ecosystem inside India, on which Mr Tanguy Lestienne, CEO, Flying Whales, said, “The LCA60T was conceived to reach the world&#8217;s most remote and demanding locations, and that promise finds its fullest expression in India, with its vast geography, challenging terrain and extraordinary ambition. We are delighted to partner with Bharat Forge, whose engineering depth; defence expertise and shared vision make this a true strategic alliance to take the programme to scale. Together, we will build in India, for India and for the world, laying the foundations of an airship industry that will serve this region for generations.”<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[5]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Neither Bharat Forge nor Flying Whales has mentioned IAF’s Expression of Interest (EoI), and nothing has been published so far that directly connects this partnership, but the assumption on open-source platforms is that the IAF has signaled real demand for domestically built military airships.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[6]</a> The EoI has been stipulated for an unmanned airship staying aloft for 10 days at full payload (with 30 days preferred). Currently, this could be a tall order for the Flying Whales airship since its default configuration is not unmanned, but calls for a minimum of two crew: a pilot and a load-exchange officer. Conversely, other requirements such as a minimum of 5,000 kg cargo capacity are within reach.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[7]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Architecture of LCA60T</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The LCA60T is a semi-rigid, heavy-lift airship, roughly 200 meters long and 50 meters in diameter. Its internal cargo bay, about 96 meters long, 8 meters high, and 7 meters wide, can accommodate payloads up to 60 tons. Primarily, lift is provided by 180,000 cubic meters of non-pressurised helium, allowing operations at altitudes up to 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) even when fully loaded. Propulsion comes from 32 electric motor-driven units producing up to 4,000 kW (5,360 hp), enabling a maximum speed of 100 km/h and a typical mission range of 200-500 km from base.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[8]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">A defining feature of the LCA60T is its ability to hover steadily at approximately 100 meters above ground level to facilitate load transfer, removing the need for landing gear or prepared runways. It achieves vertical take-off and landing by modulating dynamic lift through its distributed propulsion systems, then transitions to forward flight with the payload suspended beneath the gondola. This Helicopter-like hover and vertical take-off and landing capability allows the airship to operate from austere sites such as mountain plateaus, forest clearings, and disaster zones.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[9]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The platform is expected to support renewable energy initiatives, including transportation of wind turbine blades and transmission towers, alongside applications in construction, defence, humanitarian relief, mobile medical units, and remote freight operations.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[10]</a></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>How is LCA60T different from Heavy Lift Helicopters?</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The question is: if the IAF has heavy-lift helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook and Mil Mi-26, then why should India acquire a heavy-lift airship like LCA60T?</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Both the LCA60T airship and helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook are heavy-lift aerial vehicles but possess distinct logistics abilities and problems. The airship has lower operating costs, much larger single-lift payloads, and the ability to operate from unprepared sites without runways, whereas the Chinook has high speed, manoeuvrability, and all-weather responsiveness.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Table 1: Key distinctions between LCA60T and Heavy-lift Helicopters</strong></h4>
<table width="695">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="201">
<h4><strong>             Key distinctions</strong></h4>
</td>
<td width="248">
<h4><strong>LCA60T</strong></h4>
</td>
<td width="246">
<h4><strong>Heavy-lift helicopters</strong></h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="201">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Air-lift</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="248">
<h4>The airship derives its primary lift from non-pressurised helium and distributed electric propulsion; hence, very little fuel is spent just to stay aloft.</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="246">
<h4>The helicopters lift with their rotors; most fuel goes into generating the lift and keeping it stationary while aloft.</h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="201">
<h4>Payload capacity</h4>
</td>
<td width="248">
<h4>The airship can carry up to 60 tons in a 96m x 8m x 7m internal cargo.</h4>
</td>
<td width="246">
<h4>Heavy-lift helicopters such as the Mil MI-26 are designed to carry up to 20 tons.<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[11]</a></h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="text-align: justify;">
<td width="201">
<h4></h4>
<h4>Reaction time and reach</h4>
</td>
<td width="248">
<h4>The airship has a maximum speed of 100 km/h and a typical mission range up to 500 km from base.</h4>
</td>
<td width="246">
<h4>The heavy-lift helicopters such as the Ch-47 Chinook, has a maximum speed of 302 km/h with a cruise speed of 291 km/h and a mission radius up to 306 km.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[12]</a></h4>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="201">
<h4>Responsiveness in harsh weather conditions.</h4>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify;" width="248">
<h4>Airships of such large size are more sensitive to strong winds/storms, and slow speed makes it less suitable for high-threat and fast-maneuver missions.</h4>
</td>
<td width="246">
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">Comparatively, the heavy lift helicopters perform better in adverse weather conditions because their high maneuverability, cruising speed, and ability to operate in tighter spaces.</h4>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Note: The data has been complied by the Author through various sources.</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The acquisition of the LCA60T will add a different kind of capability to optimise the IAF&#8217;s heavy-lift abilities. This airship fills a gap that other heavy-lift helicopters and cargo planes do not, such as low cost, large capacity, runway independence, and sustained logistics in difficult terrain.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Limitations of LCA60T</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The LCA60T airship delivers various advantages through runway-independent operations and sustained hover capability, but its practical deployment faces a range of constraints. The following points outline key limitations of the LCA60T, underscoring factors that must be tackled to ensure the platform’s effectiveness and survivability in real-world operational environments.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px; text-align: justify;">1.    While the airship is designed in such a way that it does not require a runway or a landing spot due to its ability to hover, for loading and offloading its payload, it will require some ground infrastructure in order to have a safe delivery.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px; text-align: justify;">2.    If the jet stream speed is 100 km/h or more, the airship, with a speed limit of 100 km/h, will not be capable enough to outrun such strong winds.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px; text-align: justify;">3.    Airships, unlike helicopters, cannot easily pass through tight spaces; hence, providing logistical support in the narrow mountain passes such as in Kashmir will be quite difficult.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px; text-align: justify;">4.    The LCA60T is fueled by Helium. As per reports of Helium production by countries worldwide in 2025, the US and Qatar are the largest producers, contributing around 75.8 per cent to total production.<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13">[13]</a> If in future any conflict arises across West Asia, it might get difficult for India to access Helium.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px; text-align: justify;">5.    In future, if the airship has been deployed to deliver required items at the border region, such a large airship cannot go undetected. With Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) systems and their ranges reaching up to 400 kms and more, the airship will be in a vulnerable spot and become an easy target.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Imperatives of LCA60T to India</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">The following imperatives of LCA60T outline the rationale for adopting the airship within India’s defence logistics framework and its ability to deliver heavy and oversized loads to infrastructure-denied areas, enhancing India’s crisis response capabilities.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">1.    Owing to high altitude, severe weather, and sparse road networks that are often shut by snow or landslides, vast sections of the Himalayan frontier remain hard to reach by either air or road. The LCA60T’s ability to perform vertical take-off and landing without a runway, combined with its capacity to lift payloads far exceeding those of helicopters, provides the Indian armed forces with a logistics solution that neither fixed-wing transports nor rotary aircraft can fully match.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">2.    Based on the information available in open sources, there are no publicly available announcements regarding transfer of technology; however, the deal has explicitly mentioned development and manufacturing of LCA60T in India.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14">[14]</a> This programme aligns with the government of India’s ‘Make in India’ initiative and falls under the ‘Buy (Global) and Manufacture in India’ acquisition category of draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026 of the Ministry of Defence released in February 2026.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15">[15]</a> Hence, leveraging Bharat Forge&#8217;s six decades of advanced engineering strength, alongside Flying Whales&#8217; pioneering airship technology will foster indigenous aerospace expertise and industrial base. Additionally, the project is expected to create more than 300 high-skilled aeronautics jobs in India.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16">[16]</a> Thereby expanding India’s role in the global aerospace and defence supply chain.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">3.    By establishing production units within the country, India will position itself not only as a consumer but also as a potential exporter of such heavy-lift airship technology. The LCA60T&#8217;s distinctive capabilities, notably its minimal land infrastructure requirements for take-off, have worldwide applications for remote logistics, resource extraction and disaster response. Export opportunities to diversify income sources would make India less vulnerable to supply disruptions caused by geopolitical events.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 40px;">4.    Beyond its military applications, the LCA60T holds transformative potential for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. When floods, earthquakes, or landslides wipe out roads and bridges, this airship can deliver heavy equipment, medical supplies, and relief materials directly to hard-hit areas. Since the IAF’s helicopter fleets have a ceiling with heavier loads, the LCA60T fills a critical gap, making the partnership a far stronger investment on both military and civil fronts.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Recommendations</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">To fully leverage the benefits of this partnership, the following recommendations may be considered:</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">1.    The Ministry of Defence ought to establish defined acquisition schedules for the LCA60T, tying them directly into broader military modernisation goals.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">2.    Bharat Forge and Flying Whales should focus on thorough technology sharing, specifically covering design authority, certification expertise, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) infrastructure setups, to foster genuine indigenous production.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">3.    The government should support the development of secure helium supply chains, potentially through strategic reserves or investment in helium recovery technologies, to mitigate lifecycle cost and supply risks.</h4>
<h4 style="padding-left: 40px;">4.     In parallel, partners should map out an export plan tailored to nations dealing with harsh terrain and remote logistics hurdles.</h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">As India pushes forward with advanced aerospace technology, joint ventures like this can speed up innovations, boost export opportunities, and position a country as a major hub for next-generation manufacturing. Producing the LCA60T heavy-lift airship locally gives India a game-changing logistical tool, which can deliver 60-tonne payloads to austere, runway-less locations. This partnership not only strengthens indigenous aerospace expertise, creates skilled employment, and opens up export avenues, but also solves persistent supply challenges in broader regions and in disaster zones. Bringing this program to fruition will take dedicated effort from both public and private sectors, but the long-term payoff is substantial.</h4>
<p style="text-align: center;">*****</p>
<h4><a href="https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/CAPSS_InFocus_AP_21_8_26.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>CLICK TO VIEW THE PDF </strong></span></a></h4>
<h4><strong>Notes:</strong></h4>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> “Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign Strategic MoU to Develop and Manufacture Heavy-Lift Airships for Sovereign Applications in India,” <em>Bharat Forge</em>, July 22, 2026, <a href="https://www.bharatforge.com/media/press-release/bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-strategic-mou-to-develop-and-manufacture-hea">https://www.bharatforge.com/media/press-release/bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-strategic-mou-to-develop-and-manufacture-hea</a>. Accessed on August 06, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[4]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[5]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[6]</a> Kirk McGinnis, “Flying Whales Signs MoU with India’s Bharat Forge,” <em>Airship Advocate, </em>July 22, 2026, <a href="https://airshipadvocate.com/flying-whales-signs-mou-with-indias-bharat-forge/?srsltid=AfmBOoo-COfKOxhgK2gRvJ1o5UvUC945sY3U9UtEwW_8A8B_7i8PnOxi">https://airshipadvocate.com/flying-whales-signs-mou-with-indias-bharat-forge/?srsltid=AfmBOoo-COfKOxhgK2gRvJ1o5UvUC945sY3U9UtEwW_8A8B_7i8PnOxi</a>. Accessed on August 06, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[7]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[8]</a> “Our solution for air cargo transport,” <em>Flying Whales</em>, <a href="https://www.flying-whales.com/en/the-lca60t/">https://www.flying-whales.com/en/the-lca60t/</a>. Accessed on August 06, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[9]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[10]</a> “Flying Whales to establish third airship facility in India: French-backed company expands heavy-lift airship project globally,”                <em>Bhaskar English,  </em>April 2026, <a href="https://www.bhaskarenglish.in/utility/news/flying-whales-airship-project-india-global-expansion-137593850.html">https://www.bhaskarenglish.in/utility/news/flying-whales-airship-project-india-global-expansion-137593850.html</a> Accessed on August 06, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[11]</a> “Mi-26 HALO,” <em>GlobalSecurity.org</em>, <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mi-26.htm">https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mi-26.htm</a>. Accessed on August 11, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[12]</a> “H-47 Chinook,” <em>Boeing</em>, <a href="https://www.boeing.com/defense/military-rotorcraft/h-47-chinook">https://www.boeing.com/defense/military-rotorcraft/h-47-chinook</a> Accessed on August 11, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13">[13]</a> Niccolo Conte, “Charted: Helium Production by country,” <em>Elements</em>, April 27, 2026, <u>https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/charted-helium-production-by-country/.</u> Accessed on August 09, 2026.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14">[14]</a> Bharat Forge, n. 1.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15">[15]</a> Nitin A. Gokhale (@nitingokhale), “The draft of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 is out. Many aspects to study but this is my first observation. Categories for capital acquisition…,” <em>X</em>, February 10, 2026,          <a href="https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2021248578942079072?lang=en">https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2021248578942079072?lang=en</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16">[16]</a> Bhaskar English, n. 10.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://capssindia.org/beyond-runways-bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-mou-for-heavy-lift-airships/">Beyond Runways: Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign MoU for Heavy-Lift Airships</a> appeared first on <a href="https://capssindia.org">CAPSS India</a>.</p>
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