Keywords: Indian Air Force, Unmanned Aerial System, Anti-UAS, Helicopter, Exercise Rotor Clap-III

Introduction

The rapid proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has reshaped conflict zones worldwide. Today’s battlefields feature an array of threats, ranging from off-the-shelf quadcopters modified to carry explosives to military-grade loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones. The forces now have an affordable yet potent way to carry out low-cost, high-leverage precision strikes, intelligence gathering, and battlefield disruption. The UAS are no longer a part of future warfare; they are the present. From the Russia-Ukraine war to conflicts in West Asia, UAS are proven to be destructive when employed in large numbers or in coordination with conventional forces. For militaries around the world, addressing these systems has become a need of the hour.

In response to this evolving threat, the Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to refine its anti-UAS technologies. The most recent development includes integration of anti-UAS capabilities into its helicopter fleet. On August 02, 2026, the IAF concluded its weeklong Exercise Rotor Clap III. This specialised counter-UAS exercise was designed to validate tactics, techniques, and systems for how IAF helicopters can hunt such systems. The exercise featured live missile and rocket firing, validating new tactics for engaging with such unmanned systems, which can fly low and avoid being detected by the radars.[1] The article aims to highlight how Ex. ROTOR CLAP III aligns with India’s broader plan of developing anti-UAS technologies, and what the significance of such technologies is.

Ex. ROTOR CLAP III 2026

The exercise was explicitly designed to test and refine the operational concepts for employing helicopters as airborne drone hunters. It moved beyond theoretical discussions to practical validation under realistic, simulated combat conditions at the Pokhran Field Firing Range in Jaisalmer district, Rajasthan. It brought together the large spectrum of IAF’s rotary-wings, from attack helicopters like the AH-64 Apache and the indigenous Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) Prachand, to transport and utility helicopters such as the Mi-17, Mi-25/35, Chinook and Dhruv.[2] The IAF plans to push its counter-drone capabilities. Designated helicopters are expected to be outfitted with artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled radars, electronic warfare suites (EWS), jammers and lightweight micro-missiles, establishing a dedicated, mobile, airborne anti-UAS weapon, capable of engaging multiple low-flying threats.[3]

Based on the available information, the Indian Army was not part of this exercise, despite operating a comparable fleet of helicopters. The exercise was structured particularly for the IAF.[4] This absence does not necessarily indicate services operating in silos; rather, the standalone structure reflects phased development, prioritising initial testing within one branch before introducing joint-service operations.

Additionally, the same concept has been tested successfully by the armed forces of several countries across the globe, such as the United States (US) through its Operation Skyfall in 2026 and Operation Flyswatter in 2025; Israeli AH-64A Peten helicopters are already being used in combat to shoot down drones.[5] French Tigre attack helicopters have reportedly achieved a near 100 per cent interception rate against Shahed drones in support operations, using their cannon and missiles.[6]

How Is India Planning to Further Develop Such Technologies?

Anti-UAS systems have become a key priority of the IAF. India is looking closely at its defence industry to develop such technologies. The proposal was discussed during a seminar between the IAF and various defence industries, held in New Delhi on July 30, 2026.[7] At the seminar, the IAF released its latest problem statement proposing the technologies it wants the defence industry to build. The following plans were discussed during the seminar:[8]

1   Specialised micro missiles for helicopters, built to destroy slow-moving, low-flying aerial targets.

2.   Inclusion of forward-mounted 20 mm guns for close engagements.

3.   AI-powered target identification systems.

4.   Lightweight radio frequency and GPS jammers.

5.   Air-burst fragmentation warheads.

6.   Ultimately building a 25-meter lethal radius.

 Significance of Anti-UAS Systems

As UAS risks grow, air forces globally are moving beyond conventional, geographically fixed ground defence. The following points outline how leveraging rotary-wing assets can help the IAF create rapid-response and airborne anti-UAS platforms capable of operating in remote and challenging terrain.

1.  Helicopters transition counter-UAS operations from ground-based systems to flexible airborne interceptors that respond rapidly around the battlespace.

2.   Vertical takeoff and landing lets crews operate the helicopters out of austere, undeveloped and remote areas where heavy ground systems physically cannot arrive in time.

3.  Ground-based air defence systems include a layered network of systems, including radars, sensors, radio frequency detectors, electro-optical cameras, infrared systems, etc., to track the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). After target detection, the response includes soft kill (jamming or spoofing) and/or hard kill (missiles, lasers, interceptors). This setup is spread over a large space, which is less mobile. With the integration of such techniques into helicopters, the IAF will have dedicated airborne UAV hunters, which consist of a comprehensive system on one highly mobile platform.

3.  The operational training through exercises like ROTOR CLAP III ensures inter-unit coordination, precision target engagement, rapid response and operational readiness against hostile UAS.

4.  Exercise ROTOR CLAP III 2026 not only included attack helicopters, but the IAF also focused on including other types of helicopters as well. The most notable helicopters were the MI-17 series. These helicopters are generally classified as transport helicopters, but during this exercise, the IAF used them to fire a barrage of unguided missiles. This shows how such technology could turn a transport helicopter into a secondary anti-drone system. Additionally, IAF’s Chinook and Dhruv helicopters were also a part of this exercise.[9]

Conclusion

India faces a two-front threat from its neighbours who are actively investing in and deploying advanced UAS capabilities. It is crucial for India to safeguard itself against these growing challenges. To remain combat-ready, the IAF conducted a week-long Ex. ROTOR CLAP III in Rajasthan. This tested the capabilities of the helicopter fleets of the IAF. Additionally, during a joint seminar between the IAF and defence industry on July 30, 2026, a list of innovations was requested for the development and integration of anti-UAS systems in helicopters. These developments have placed a strong emphasis on anti-UAS systems, as they are no longer a future prospect; rather, they have become a present phenomenon. As India continues to develop its counter-UAS strategy, such seminars and exercises will continue to serve in building a resilient, adaptive, and technologically advanced air force capable of dominating the new battlespace.

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Notes:

[1] Bharat Shakti (@bharatshakti6583), “Rotor Clap-III Builds India’s Airborne Drone Hunters,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8cebTzj2TQ.

[2] Vijay Mohan, “IAF’s helicopter units conduct anti-drone drill in Rajasthan,” The Tribune, August 01, 2026, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/defence/iafs-helicopter-units-conduct-anti-drone-drill-in-rajasthan/. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[3] Bharat Shakti, n. 1.

[4] Indian Air Force, “#IAF Helicopters undertook, Exercise Rotor Clap III themed “Counter-UAS” in Rajasthan,” Facebook, August 01, 2026 at 16:30, https://www.facebook.com/IndianAirForce/posts/iaf-helicopters-undertook-exercise-rotor-clap-iii-themed-counter-uas-in-rajastha/1388986963411122/.

[5] Taras Safronov, “Apache vs Drones: US Tests, Israel Already Shooting Down Shaheds,” Militarnyi, September 07, 2025, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/apache-vs-drones-us-tests-israel-already-shooting-down-shaheds/. Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[6] Peter Bass, “Helicopters Rise as Drone Hunters: France’s Tiger Leads the Charge in Modern Air Defense,” Defence Magazine, June 05, 2026, https://www.defensemagazine.com/article/helicopters-rise-as-drone-hunters-frances-tigre-leads-the-charge-in-modern-air-defense. Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[7] Firstpost (@Firstpost), Indian Air Force Eyes Micro-Missiles to Turn Helicopters into Drone Hunters,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://youtu.be/13hEw9RAwhA?si=SrVHMYs5QidaelGM.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Firstpost (@Firstpost), “Indian Air Force Helicopters to Become Aerial Drone Defence Platforms,” YouTube, August 03, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nZtK1LQiMA.

The post India’s Helicopter-led Counter-UAS Strategy appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Air Defence, Fratricide, IFF, Operation Rough Rider.

“When you train, you’re taught to react so quickly because the Air Battles that we train on, in my opinion, are unrealistic.  There are too many things going on at one time, so all it trains you to do is just react. And that is just fine, but out here it is more complicated than that.”

– PAC-3 SAM Platoon Leader, US Army

Introduction

On the night of March 22, 2003, two Royal Air Force (RAF), United Kingdom (UK) Tornados were returning to the Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait after a mission in Iraq. The lead aircraft, callsign Yahoo 75, made it back safely. The trailing aircraft, callsign Yahoo 76, was shot down by a US Army PAC-3 Patriot missile system guarding the airbase. Both crew members onboard the Tornado were killed instantly. US investigation board concluded that the Patriot battery detected the Tornados as Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM) and fired in self-defence, while also stating that the IFF system on the aircraft was probably not working. The RAF also carried out an independent assessment and flagged Patriot Rules of Engagement (RsOE), ARM classification criteria and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF issues). The investigation also highlighted shortfalls in training certifications and an unrealistic training environment that contributed to the accident. Operating in a region where no ARM threat was construed, a deliberate pause by the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) operators could have resulted in correct classification by the system, or further track correlation by other means. The RAF board also concluded that the lack of communications equipment meant that the Patriot crew did not have access to the widest possible ‘picture’ of the airspace around them to build situational awareness.[1]

Almost two decades later, a similar story of blue-on-blue would haunt the United States (US) military when the United States Navy’s (USN) premier vessels fought off the Houthis in the Red Sea during Operation Rough Rider. On December 21, 2024, at 2325Z, USS Gettysburg (GC-64), a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser, shot down an F/A-18F Hornet which was part of the same Carrier Strike Group (CSG) led by USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75).[2] Both pilots ejected safely and were recovered quickly. The accident occurred due to misidentification of a Hornet two-ship on their return leg to land on the carrier after having undertaken buddy-refuelling operations for other aircraft in the area. USS Gettysburg, the overall Air and Missile Defence Controller (AMDC), had in fact launched two SM-2 missiles wherein the wingman, flying in an extended trail, was able to acquire the missile in time and manoeuvred to defeat it. The accident occurred in a networked environment with all players equipped with Mode-5 IFF and Link-16, which makes it even more important for learning. A detailed but redacted report was released by the US Department of War (DoW) in April 2025 and has been the primary reference while analysing this accident.

Deployment and Operational Issues

US military, along with allies, had been actively engaged in the region under US Central Command (CENTCOM) since January 2024, providing freedom of navigation by intercepting Houthi missiles and drones. During this period, the US forces defended against a number of Houthi cruise missiles, Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) and drones.[3] Till December 15, 2024, US CSG led by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) included three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and a Type-45 Guided Missile Destroyer from the Royal Navy (UK). This group was replaced by USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) along with USS Gettysburg, which were undertaking a routine deployment in the Mediterranean Sea under US European Command (EUCOM). Gettysburg was the senior Aegis vessel in the region and hence tasked with the role of Air Defence Commander (ADC), known as ‘Whiskey’. At the time of deployment, Gettysburg had known issues with three of its components – Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Link-16. All three systems form the core of network-centric warfare capability and would play a critical role in the mishap.

These issues were magnified in the week and hours prior to the mishap, with the crew reporting numerous problems with Link-16, including short but frequent loss of Link. The Watch Officer’s logbook also has an average of eleven IFF Mode-5 casualties per day in the week prior to the mishap, which should be zero when performing as per design specifications. US Navy Tactical Reference Publication 1-03.1 states that “A casualty is defined as an equipment or software malfunction or deficiency that within the first 24 hours of discovery cannot be corrected within 48 hours and affects the ability of the unit to undertake its primary mission.” In the five hours prior to the mishap, there were five IFF failures and resets that were not reported upward. This was in direct violation of CSG standing orders wherein the Commanding Officer (CO) explicitly states that, “I expect all U.S. units to have fully operable IFF systems,” and the fact that CSG was not aware of IFF issues onboard the Gettysburg further complicated matters.

Air Defence Setup

Like in any theatre, the US Joint Force Commander (JFC) appoints a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) who is in charge of all air operations in the region. The mantle of Air Defence falls under the Area Air Defence Commander (AADC), which is normally handled by the JFACC himself, alongside the role of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The reason for these functions to be centralised with the JFACC will become evident as we further analyse the accident. As the AADC, the JFACC ensures that he provides the following to the theatre elements: –

• • Theatre Area Air Defence Plan (AADP)

  • RsOE and Weapons Control Status (WCS)

  • Airspace Control Plan (ACP)

Using these products, the Air Defence planners at lower echelons would have developed their own operational plans while ensuring compliance with the JFACC’s framework. However, being deployed at sea outside the Joint Operating Area (JOA), the naval task force had its own declared airspace and delegated control from the JFACC. The United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) could thus plan its own airspace management and defence functions. Key functionaries within NAVCENT’s operational plan were as follows: –

• • CWC – Composite Warfare Commander onboard USS Harry S Truman

  • ADC – Air Defence Commander (Whiskey) onboard USS Gettysburg

  • AWC – Air Warfare Commander (Alpha) onboard USS Harry S Truman

In the above roles, the Air Battle Management functions and control of fighters on Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions lie with the AWC, while the IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defence) is entirely under ADC–a small but crucial disconnect which will come into play as we go further. The entire setup operated on a ‘command-by-negation’ model, where subordinate commanders are authorised to act in accordance with the commander’s intent unless explicitly countermanded. This essentially means that effective and safe engagements would require extensive coordination between ADC and AWC, which would ride on two aspects–compliance with laid-down Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and regular integrated training. The report states that Gettysburg was ‘aggregated with the CSG for only 23% of total fly days of their first three months of deployment’, which translates into a very unhealthy state in terms of integrated training. While this could be mitigated by exhaustive procedures and clear briefs, the exact opposite was observed in the report, which reads – ‘The strike brief included Carrier Air Wing (CVW) launch, employment and recovery procedures. DCA assets were present for this rehearsal meeting; however, CVW-1 personnel could not recall any AMDC representation.’ Considering that the Air and Missile Defence (AMD) plan was part of the composite plan developed by the CSG air wing, with Gettysburg in a support role, the AMDC had insufficient awareness of the plan. The report states that the Gettysburg crew had only a couple of printed slides from the briefing, which did not include the DCA plan, Joint Engagement Zones (JEZ), or hand-off ranges for coordination. This aspect closely mirrors the state of affairs during the 2003 incident between RAF and US Army discussed earlier.

Chronology of Events

The report states that– “HSTCSG entered the Red Sea on 14 December 2024. This incident occurred 7 days later, immediately following HSTCSG’s first defensive strike against Houthi positions. The strike was successful, and adversary reaction followed. HSTCSG air and surface units spent several hours defending the force against Houthi-launched Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and One-Way Attack (OWA) drones.” The following sequence of events occurred after this: –

• • 1649Z – DCA aircraft launched and proceeded to their station. All had working Links.

  • 1711Z – E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C launched and initiated a CEC network.

  • 1815Z – USS Gettysburg reported loss of Link-16.

  • 1817Z – Strike package launched as per plan. All had operable Link-16.

  • 1821Z – E-2 reported three tracks (possible P-351 cruise missiles) at 175nm and directed the DCA flights for intercept.

  • 2003Z – Strike reported release of ordnance and commenced recovery. E-2 tracked additional 08 threats incoming. Some strikers were pooled as additional DCA aircraft along with those in tanker role.

  • 2151Z – All strike aircraft recovered onboard CVN-75.

  • 2109Z – Two cruisers engaged an incoming missile each with SM-2 SAMs.

  • All aircraft recovered except two DCA CAPs, buddy tankers and E-2D.

  • 2323Z – Gettysburg detects two incoming tracks. Three people are involved: the Anti-Aircraft Warfare Commander (AAWC), Tactical Actions Officer (TAO), and the CO.

  • 2324Z – “XW this is G, engaging track GB121 with birds, over” First SM-2 fired. Decision taken in ‘self-defence’.

  • Similar cycle followed in another 40 seconds and a second SM-2 fired on the trailing track.

  • At this time the first Hornet was at 300 kts, passing 2,000 ft and had checked in with carrier approach. Both aircraft had their systems set up for landing, meaning all Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment was turned off at this point. The first aircraft crew saw the missile launch and assumed it was targeting some cruise missiles. They realised the threat only once the missile updated its flight path towards them, by which time it was too late.

  • The second aircraft was passing 5,000 ft and trailing the lead by 5nm. The crew saw the missile impact and called out Mayday when they noticed a second missile launch which they knew was targeting them. The pilot manoeuvred the aircraft to defeat the missile, which the Weapon Systems Officer WSO tracked as the motor burned out just 5 seconds prior to the missile passing them at close range (1-2 aircraft length as per WSO).

  • At the time of the first firing, a helicopter was making an approach for Gettysburg’s deck with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and was not informed of the engagement. The first launch caused blooming in the NVGs, and the helicopter was waved off to the port side, but no Scram order was issued. The second missile was launched with the helicopter in close proximity, and the helicopter was placed under considerable risk during the entire engagement.

Take Aways

The mishap is a reminder to all combatants that operations, especially high-tempo operations like air operations, provide an extremely low margin for errors as far as decision-making is concerned. A clean air picture can turn cluttered very rapidly; a recognised air picture providing exceptional SA can quickly degrade and place commanders in a situation they have probably not trained for. The mishap, like all cases of fratricide, has much for all of us to take home.

• • Network Centric Warfare demands that all supporting equipment (links, IFF, etc) must be serviceable at all times for all participants in the area. A non-compliant unit will not only cause such mishaps but also degrade the Recognized Air Situation Picture (RASP) and reduce operational efficiency. Such compliance is easier to establish under a single authority where not only SOPs are common but also fallback mechanisms in cases of failure.

  • Airspace Control and Air Defence cannot be kept segregated. The US JP-3-01 ‘Countering Air and Missile Threat’ itself states that ‘The functions of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA must be integrated to ensure that joint air operations, OCA, DCA, and airspace control are fully integrated and synchronized.’ This was clearly a case where these functions were segregated to an extent that Battle Management and Air Defence were being executed in silos. This has become highly relevant for the Indian military at a time when concepts like ‘Air Littoral’ are attempting to segregate airspace without paying heed to the pitfalls of such actions.[4]

  • The Aegis-equipped vessels are known to set standards in air defence at sea with their powerful radar and highly automated Combat Information Center (CIC). However, such state-of-the-art equipment does not translate into operational results unless operators are rigorously trained in the same C2 architecture and scenarios they would face in reality. While the crew may complete all their individual training events and look good on paper, it is only integrated and realistic training that translates into combat efficiency. This means regular employment of the units and systems in Large Force Engagements (LFE) where both tactical proficiency and decision-making are stress-tested.

  • The ‘command by negation’ model for air defence is tailored for situations where battlefield transparency is high with all systems operational. With known problems in critical systems like IFF and Datalinks, tighter procedural control would need to be established, which was not done in this case. Essentially, this aspect points out that it is only through centralised control that the presence or absence of required networking standards can be established and the extent of autonomy/local-control orders be furnished to lower echelons.

  • The aftermath of this mishap caused a sharp reduction in flight operations, restrictive revisions of IAMD procedures and revaluation of equipment. Fratricide can cause a drastic loss in operational efficiency by degrading confidence and morale of operators. During active combat operations, this can be detrimental and may provide the adversary with a lucrative window to exploit.

Conclusion

At a time when Air Defence is the talk of the town in our country, it is essential to remain aligned to time-tested doctrinal precepts. All procedures, as far as Air Defence is concerned, are written in blood, and the two cases discussed in this paper are only a fraction of many such incidents.  Since the early 1990s, when the range of both air-air and surface-to-air systems increased drastically, the fusing of airspace management, air defence and air battle management functions has remained a core doctrinal precept, and these incidents only highlight the cost of deviation. Lastly, consistency and uniformity of training are one of the key aspects to avoid fratricide. With increasing ranges, SAM systems form a core component of the overall air battle and the line between offensive operations and defensive operations is blurred. Crews need to be trained in this environment with a wider tactical-operational canvas to get exposed to complex situations, debrief them thoroughly and apply these lessons to actual operations.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

 Notes:-

[1]  Victoria Samson, “The Patriot/Tornado Fratricide: It Could Happen Again,” Center for Defence Information, June 14, 2004, https://peters-ada.de/fratricide.pdf. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[2] Oren Liebermann, “Two US Navy Pilots Eject Safely over Red Sea after Fighter Jet Shot down in Apparent Friendly Fire Incident,” CNN, December 22, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/21/politics/us-fighter-jet-shot-down-red-sea. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[3] Merve Berker, “US Navy Intercepts Houthi-Launched Missiles in Gulf of Aden,” Anadolu Ajansı, December 02, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/us-navy-intercepts-houthi-launched-missiles-in-gulf-of-aden/3410779#. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[4]  Dushyant Singh, “Drone-Age Warfare: Why Indian Army Must Command the Air Littoral Battlespace,” Firstpost, December 10, 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/drone-age-warfare-why-indian-army-must-command-the-air-littoral-battlespace-13958553.html. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

The post Anatomy of a Fratricide appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: Maritime Domain Awareness, Multi-Domain Awareness, Indian Ocean Region, Decision Dominance.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a fulcrum of global trade, technological competition, and the projection of military and economic power. Its security environment is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive, with developments in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the Western Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal interacting. At the same time, the character of maritime competition is changing. Activities at sea are increasingly enabled, shaped or constrained by capabilities in the air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, while information operations and strategic narratives influence perceptions and decision-making before a conventional maritime threat becomes visible.

This changing environment does not diminish the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). On the contrary, MDA remains an indispensable foundation for understanding activity at sea. The challenge is that a maritime picture, however comprehensive, cannot by itself explain the forces, networks, intentions, and enabling activities that produce events in the maritime domain. The operational problem, therefore, is not to replace MDA, but to place it within a wider framework of Multi-Domain Awareness (MuDA).

For India, this transition is particularly relevant. India sits astride the principal sea lines of communication (SLOCs) linking West Asia, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and its economic and strategic interests are deeply connected to the ocean. India’s growing network of maritime partnerships, island diplomacy, surveillance systems, and information-sharing arrangements provides a strong base for the next step: an Indian Ocean Region Multi-Domain Awareness (IOR-MuDA) architecture that fuses information across domains and converts it into decision dominance.

Maritime Domain Awareness: The Foundation

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) defines Maritime Domain Awareness as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy, or the marine environment. The IMO identifies three key components: Maritime Situational Awareness, Maritime Threat Awareness, and Maritime Response Awareness. Together, these provide the foundation for gathering information, identifying potential threats and understanding the resources available to respond.[1]

In operational terms, MDA supports the detection and tracking of surface and subsurface vessels, monitoring of merchant and fishing traffic, identification of suspicious activity, protection of SLOCs, coastal surveillance, port security, and preparedness for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and casualty evacuation. It also provides the information base for cooperation among navies, coast guards, maritime law-enforcement agencies, commercial actors and regional partners.

For India, MDA has become a central pillar of maritime security. Coastal radar networks, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, white-shipping information exchanges and the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) have progressively expanded the country’s ability to build and share a maritime picture. India’s engagement with Indian Ocean littorals has also extended the geographic reach of this effort through information sharing, coordinated patrols, capacity building, hydrographic cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

This regional approach aligns with the evolution of India’s maritime policy from Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to MAHASAGAR—Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions. Recent Indian Navy initiatives such as Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) SAGAR illustrate the emphasis on partnerships, interoperability, information sharing and collective maritime security.[2] Island countries and territories are especially important to this architecture. Their geographic location along major SLOCs and near strategic maritime spaces can contribute to surveillance, logistics, search and rescue and wider regional resilience. India’s engagement with island partners therefore has both security and developmental dimensions.

The upgrading of the airstrip on Agalega in Mauritius illustrates this strategic interdependence. Beyond improving connectivity and supporting search-and-rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities, the facility expands India’s operational outreach in the Western Indian Ocean. India has similarly supported Seychelles’ maritime security capabilities, while infrastructure and military developments in India’s own Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands strengthen its ability to monitor and operate across the wider Indian Ocean.

The Limits of Maritime Domain Awareness

The success of MDA can create an unintended analytical trap where the maritime picture appears complete even when it captures only the visible manifestation of a wider activity. A vessel may be detected at sea, but the surveillance track alone may not reveal why it is there, what supported its movement, what information enabled it, or what other-domain activity preceded it. As maritime competition becomes increasingly networked, these questions become as important as the vessel’s location and identity.

The principal limitation of domain-specific awareness mechanisms is therefore not a lack of sensors, but the separation of the information they generate. A maritime sensor may detect anomalous behaviour; an air sensor may observe supporting activity; a satellite may reveal temporal changes; a cyber-monitoring system may identify network activity; and an electromagnetic sensor may detect unusual emissions. If these observations remain within separate organisational or technological silos, the decision-maker receives several partial pictures rather than one coherent explanation.

• • Domain Confinement: MDA is designed primarily to understand activity associated with the maritime domain. It can therefore miss enabling or preparatory activity occurring elsewhere.

  • Reactive Bias: Traditional surveillance often begins when an object becomes observable in the monitored domain. This can compress warning time when the actual preparation has occurred earlier in another domain.

  • Siloed Information: Data held by different military services, government agencies and partner organisations may not be available in a common, interoperable architecture.

  • Different Temporal and Spatial Pictures: Satellites, aircraft, ships, cyber systems and electromagnetic sensors observe the environment at different times, scales, and levels of fidelity. Without fusion, correlation is difficult.

  • Intent Remains Elusive: Tracking an object provides location and behaviour, but understanding intent may require information about communications, logistics, military preparation, political signalling, and information activity.

  • Data Overload Without Sufficient Fusion: The expansion of sensors and commercially available information can produce more data than decision-makers can meaningfully process. More collection does not automatically produce better awareness.

  • Fragmented Response: Awareness that is not connected to decision authorities and response resources can create a common picture without a shared understanding of what to do.

These limitations do not make MDA obsolete; rather, they establish its boundary. MDA remains the maritime layer of a larger operational picture. The requirement is to fuse that layer with the information from other domains to create a composite operating picture (COP).

From MDA to Multi-Domain Awareness (MuDA)

The Indian Ocean’s evolving security environment therefore calls for a transition from Maritime Domain Awareness to Multi-Domain Awareness. MuDA should be understood not as a new sensor programme or yet another typically military jargon, but as an approach to understanding the operational environment as an interconnected system.

At its core, MuDA integrates awareness across six principal operational domains: land, maritime, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic. Information and cognitive effects are important cross-cutting dimensions because they connect and influence several of these domains. The objective is not simply to display more information on a larger screen. It is to correlate apparently separate observations so decision-makers can understand relationships, identify patterns, assess intent, and make timely, correct decisions.

MDA is therefore best understood as a subset of MuDA. The two concepts are complementary, not mutually exclusive. MDA provides the detailed maritime picture required for safe navigation, security, and maritime operations. MuDA places that picture in context by asking what is happening in other domains, how those activities interact, and what they imply for the maritime environment.

What Multi-Domain Awareness Adds

MuDA changes the analytical sequence from detection to correlation and anticipation. Instead of waiting for an activity to become visible at sea and then seeking an explanation, a multi-domain architecture can identify indicators across domains and build an assessment before the maritime manifestation occurs.

Consider the deployment of a Chinese carrier strike group (CSG) into the Indian Ocean. From an MDA perspective, the immediate requirement is to detect, classify and track the group once it enters the region. A MuDA approach would examine the broader chain of activity: space-based surveillance and satellite-enabled communications and navigation; electromagnetic activity associated with radars, communications and electronic warfare; cyber activity against relevant networks; air movements and long-range Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); logistics and port activity; undersea infrastructure and seabed conditions; and information or diplomatic signalling. The carrier group is then understood not as an isolated maritime event but as one component of a larger operational system.

The cognitive and information dimensions are equally important. Strategic narratives, influence campaigns, diplomatic signalling, and disinformation can shape perceptions and constrain decision-making well before kinetic activity becomes apparent. These effects may not be captured by a maritime surveillance system, yet they can materially influence the strategic environment in which maritime forces operate. MuDA therefore seeks to move awareness from simple visibility towards understanding. It enables multiple streams of information to be correlated into a Common Operating Picture, while analytics and artificial intelligence can help identify anomalies, relationships, and patterns. The human decision-maker remains central; technology should reduce cognitive burden and improve the speed and quality of decisions rather than substitute for judgement.

Components of Multi-Domain Awareness

A practical MuDA architecture for the Indian Ocean should integrate information from the six principal domains while maintaining the ability to incorporate cross-cutting information.

• • Land Domain: Military infrastructure, ports, logistics nodes, airfields, missile and sensor sites, transport networks, and other land-based activity that can enable maritime operations.

  • Maritime Domain: Surface combatants, submarines, merchant shipping, fishing fleets, offshore installations, coastal activity, and maritime traffic patterns.

  • Air Domain: Combat aircraft, AEW&C platforms, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, high-altitude ISR platforms, and long-range aviation.

  • Space Domain: ISR satellites, navigation systems, satellite communications, commercial constellations, space situational awareness, and counterspace activity.

  • Cyber Domain: Network intrusions, port and logistics systems, shipping-management networks, financial infrastructure, and other digital systems supporting maritime activity.

  • Electromagnetic Domain: Radar and communications emissions, Communication Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), electronic warfare (EW) signatures, spectrum mapping and navigation interference.

Two further dimensions cut across these domains. The information and cognitive dimension includes influence operations, strategic narratives, social-media manipulation, diplomatic signalling and disinformation. The subsea dimension includes fibre-optic cables, energy pipelines, autonomous underwater vehicles, seabed sensors, and other critical underwater infrastructure. Treating these as connected layers prevents the operational picture from becoming artificially divided along organisational boundaries.

MuDA’s true value therefore lies in complete fusion. A satellite image, radar track, Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmission, cyber alert, and electromagnetic emission may be ambiguous on their own. Correlated in time and geography, however, they may reveal a pattern. This is where data becomes awareness, and awareness becomes an overwhelming decision advantage. Modern Technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data handling can further enable faster data sifting and present purified information to decision-making bodies.

Why MuDA Matters for India and the Indian Ocean

India’s dependence on the sea makes the quality of its maritime and wider domain awareness a national-security imperative. Recent Government of India sources put the share of India’s trade handled through maritime routes at about 90–95 per cent by volume, underscoring the centrality of maritime connectivity to the national economy.[3] The country’s location between the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in the west and the Strait of Malacca in the east further reinforces the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and its principal chokepoints.

The security challenge is also changing. Piracy, illegal and unregulated fishing, contraband smuggling, and other non-traditional threats increasingly exploit technology, commercial connectivity and information networks. Unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber tools and influence operations can be employed alongside conventional maritime activity. Consequently, warning indicators of a maritime problem may first appear in another domain.

China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean illustrates why this broader approach is necessary. The growth of the PLA Navy’s deployments is accompanied by developments in long-range aviation, satellite and navigation systems, cyber capabilities, information operations and dual-use infrastructure. Research by the China Aerospace Studies Institute has highlighted Chinese ambitions for resilient, integrated systems capable of linking space, air, sea, and ground assets.[4] China’s survey and research-vessel fleet is another example of activity that can have implications beyond conventional maritime surveillance. Research into bathymetry, hydrography and the marine environment can support scientific purposes while also generating information relevant to submarine navigation, anti-submarine warfare and undersea infrastructure monitoring. CSIS’s Hidden Reach project has documented the extensive scale and dual-use character of Chinese research-vessel activity in the Indian Ocean.[5]

The operational consequence is the emergence of multiple, simultaneous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loops. Actions in space, cyber, electromagnetic, air, land and maritime domains may unfold at different speeds, yet influence one another. The challenge is therefore not only to observe more, but to correlate these activities quickly enough to preserve decision advantage. India’s parliamentary scrutiny of the changing naval balance in the Indian Ocean reinforces the need for proactive measures.[6]

Enabling an Indian Ocean MuDA Architecture

India is well placed to lead the development of an Indian Ocean Multi-Domain Awareness (IOR MuDA) architecture. It already possesses substantial maritime surveillance capabilities, space assets, airborne ISR, information-fusion mechanisms, island infrastructure and a growing network of regional partnerships. The next step is to connect these capabilities through a common information architecture and a shared operational philosophy. An IOR MuDA architecture should integrate space-based surveillance, airborne ISR, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, coastal radar chains, underwater sensor networks, cyber monitoring, electromagnetic-spectrum awareness, information-operations monitoring and AI-enabled data fusion. It should also incorporate relevant commercial and open-source data where appropriate, subject to security, reliability and legal considerations.

The central objective should be a Common Operating Picture that is more than a visual display. It should provide a common data environment in which information from the Indian Navy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Coast Guard and relevant national agencies can be correlated, assessed and disseminated according to the needs of different decision-makers. The existing institutional ecosystem provides building blocks for such an architecture. These include the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) Centre, Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and other national security and disaster-management agencies. The objective should not be to abolish specialised centres, but to make them interoperable and able to contribute to a shared decision-support ecosystem.

Regional partnerships are equally important. India’s island diplomacy, information-sharing arrangements and maritime-security partnerships can extend the sensor and response network beyond national territory. The aim should be to build trusted, secure and interoperable information pathways with willing Indian Ocean partners, while protecting sensitive sources and methods. Finally, MuDA should be developed as a decision-support concept rather than merely a technology project. Common standards, data governance, classification rules, interoperability, trained analysts, cross-domain liaison and institutional ownership are as important as sensors and computing power. The ultimate measure of success should be whether the system gives commanders and policymakers more time, better context and greater confidence to decide.

Parting Shots

MDA has transformed maritime security by making vessel movements, threats, and maritime activity more visible. India has invested substantially in this capability and has extended it through partnerships, information sharing, surveillance networks and regional institutions. Therefore, the focus should be on strengthening that foundation, not discarding it.

The next challenge is to recognise that maritime events increasingly reflect activity occurring across multiple domains. A ship’s movement may be enabled by space-based systems, supported by cyber and electromagnetic activity, facilitated by logistics and supply chains, provided air cover by aerial assets and accompanied by information operations. A purely maritime picture can therefore, at best, identify the object but cannot fully explain the operation.

MuDA offers a conceptual and operational bridge between these fragments. By integrating land, maritime, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic awareness, and by incorporating the information and cognitive dimensions as cross-cutting layers, it can provide a more persistent, context-rich and predictive understanding of the Indian Ocean security environment.

For India, the objective should be clear: move from knowing what is happening at sea to understanding what is happening across the region that may affect all other domains. The transition from MDA to MuDA is therefore not a change in terminology. It shifts from domain-specific visibility to integrated operational understanding and, more importantly, from reaction to anticipation.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

 Notes:-

[1]“Maritime Domain Awareness,” International Maritime Organization, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/maritime-domain-awareness.aspx. Accessed on August 16, 2026.

[2] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiatives of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME),” March 24, 2025,  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491&reg=48&lang=2, Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[3] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Maritime India:  From Vision 2030 to Amrit Kaal 2047,” October 26, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2182563&reg=48&lang=2, Accessed on August 12, 2026.

[4] Meia Nouwens, “China’s Dual-Use Space Sector Goes Global,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 17, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-china/2025/07/chinas-dual-use-space-sector-goes-global/.  Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[5] Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Surveying the Seas: China’s Dual-Use Research Operations in the Indian Ocean,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 10, 2024,  https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-indian-ocean-research-vessels/. Accessed on August 10, 2026.

[6] “India Must Remain Proactive in Countering Combined Naval Threat from China, Pakistan: Parliamentary Panel,” The Hindu, August 12, 2025,  https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-must-remain-proactive-in-countering-combined-naval-threat-from-china-pakistan-parliamentary-panel/article69922708.ece. Accessed on August 16, 2026.

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Keywords: SSN, Non-proliferation, South Korea, Nuclear

A rare news item on nuclear non-proliferation has emerged from South Korea (ROK) regarding its nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), an ambition which the country has been working towards for many years and has seen considerable debate both within and outside of South Korea. This article analyses this new development in South Korea vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation concerns.

The Announcement

On July 28, 2026, it was reported that South Korea is moving ahead to “prohibit nuclear fuel intended to power submarines from being diverted to nuclear weapons.” The announcement was made by the Ministry of National Defence, which  stated that “The ministry is establishing the legal and institutional foundation needed to ensure the stable implementation of the nuclear-powered submarine program.” The announcement comes at a time of an ongoing debate in the country with regard to the future of its nuclear weapon programme. The possible intent of this could be to silence the voices raising proliferation concerns. The bill, if it becomes a law, would become South Korea’s first explicit statutory prohibition on using nuclear material for the development, production, or possession of nuclear weapons.

SSNs in the South Korean Defence Strategy

On May 26, 2026, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defence released what is known as the ‘Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea Nuclear-Powered Submarine.’ Under the programme, the country plans to launch its first submarine in the mid-2030s. The plan comes on the heels of the United States (US) support for South Korea’s decision to build nuclear-powered attack submarines. Over the years, the changing dynamics of threats posed by its neighbours, particularly by North Korea, have led South Korea to seek SSNs. The threat from North Korea has become more potent once it unveiled its new nuclear-powered submarine in December 2025.

The Basic Plan is also important to South Korea’s Offensive Military Doctrine, which it outlined in the 2022 defence white paper. It is colloquially known as the ‘three-axis system.’ This comprises the development of the SSNs, the so-called ‘kill-chain platform,’ which could undertake preemptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. The same intention was referred to by Korea’s Ministry of Defence when it unveiled the plans to build the SSNs, as it stated, “the submarines will provide extended endurance for tracking North Korean naval activity, and also form part of an underwater “kill chain” capable of supporting precision strike operations in the event of conflict.

Two other important factors have led to the announcement of the SSNs. The first relates to the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) programme. As AUKUS has allowed Australia to build a closer relationship with the US, the Basic Plan will help South Korea build a similar relationship with the US. The second reason is more domestic in nature, as South Korea has been witnessing a renewed public debate regarding the production of nuclear weapons: an SSN programme can help “present a valid alternative to nuclear armaments.”

Why the Announcement is Important

Under the Basic Plan, South Korea seeks to build the Jang Bogo-N class of SSNs, which will utilise low-enriched uranium fuel, which would be less than 20 per cent enriched uranium-235. This poses less of a proliferation risk. One might recall that on January 11, 2023, the then South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol sparked a major controversy by suggesting that South Korea might acquire nuclear weapons “if North Korean threats [become] more serious.” One may interpret the former President’s statement as a political gimmick, but public opinion data over the years has shown growing support for South Korea’s nuclear option. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, which has been conducting public opinion surveys in South Korea since 2010, has recorded “76.2 percent of South Koreans now [2025] favour developing an independent nuclear arsenal.” In fact, since 2010, public opinion regarding indigenous development of nuclear weapons has never gone below 54.8 per cent.

Source: Image compiled by the author from South Koreans and their neighbours 2025, https://www.asaninst.org/data/file/s3_4_2_eng/f15af67c43af11afd7a990dc4f32fd2b_ClhtB9a5_9eca2136ce8acf9c485de1d452d2d82fd7e2abdc.pdf.

In order to effectively communicate that South Korea does not seek to build sovereign strategic deterrence capabilities, Cho Hyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, in an opinion piece published on April 01, 2026, categorically stated that “From a security perspective, nuclear armament [of South Korea] would introduce uncertainty, not strength.” The foreign affairs minister further made it clear that the arrangements under the extended deterrence posture with the US are currently the best deterrence posture for South Korea and pursuing a path towards nuclearisation would “trigger a chain reaction of proliferation in the region, ultimately undermining the Republic of Korea’s security interests.”

With regard to its SSNs and proliferation concerns, South Korea’s submarine plan has ensured working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to “establish a safeguards system applicable to nuclear-powered submarines in cooperation.” In this context, the June 08, 2026 statement by the IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi noted that South Korea’s commitments towards “fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations,” and “[South Korea’s] intention to work with the Agency on safety, security and safeguards measures applicable to nuclear-powered submarines.” More importantly, South Korea ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in 2004, which gives the IAEA expanded access and short-notice inspections. Since under the Basic Plan, South Korea seeks to use low-enriched uranium procured from the US, a nuclear cooperation provision was discussed during Presidents Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung’s summit in Gyeongju in November 2025. Given that the Trump-Lee summit in November 2025 did not clarify the provisions under which the US would help South Korea procure low-enriched uranium and subsequently help avoid proliferation concerns, the July 28, 2026 announcement fills this gap by allaying the proliferation concerns.

Given that South Korea seeks to develop at least three nuclear-powered submarines displacing about 8,000 metric tons each, with the lead vessel planned to be launched by the mid-2030s, provisions on fuel supply and concerns about fuel diversion are legitimate questions. However, with the legislation announced by South Korea, it has tried to address these concerns.

Meanwhile, there is another angle which might not allow South Korea to pursue a nuclear-weapon programme. The bilateral 123 Agreement signed between the US and South Korea supports the ROK’s civil enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing initiatives for peaceful purposes, but it is contingent on South Korea’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments. In terms of nuclear power generation, South Korea ranks fifth in the world and has capabilities in the construction, operation, and export of nuclear power plants. Any divergence from power generation to a proliferation path would bring sanctions on South Korea, and as stated by President Lee Jae Myung on December 02, 2025, “the South Korean economy could not withstand such sanctions; and that no South Korean citizen would want to live like North Koreans.”

The nuclear world order is witnessing too many upheavals rarely witnessed since the dawn of the nuclear age. The war between the Russian Federation, a nuclear weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member and Ukraine, a non-nuclear weapon NPT member state, is yet to find a negotiated resolution. The war in West Asia involves one NPT founding member (the US), one NPT member and non-nuclear weapon state (Iran), and one nuclear weapon state outside of the NPT (Israel). Understanding these dynamics is essential for meaningful dialogue. Simultaneously, the US has recently signed a deal with Saudi Arabia, an NPT member, to provide American nuclear reactors and perhaps also the right to enrich uranium. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on the other hand, is looking for an expansion of its nuclear capabilities by examining the options to position American nuclear capabilities across Europe, particularly in Poland, Finland, and Lithuania. In South-East Asia, as China continues to modernise and increase its nuclear capabilities, a debate in Japan is going on about what role nuclear weapons can play in the country’s defence. Amid all these concerns, the news from South Korea certainly provides a bit of relief for proliferation pessimists and appears to align with South Korea’s agenda for “peace first.”

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Keywords: Bharat Forge, Flying Whales, MoU, LCA60T, Heavy-Lift Airship

Introduction

What if the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army could airlift tons of supplies and weaponry to remote, high-altitude outposts without a runway? Now it seems possible after India’s Bharat Forge signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the French-Canadian aerospace joint venture Flying Whales. The MoU was signed during the Farnborough International Air Show 2026 in the United Kingdom (UK) on July 22, 2026, and both parties have agreed to jointly develop and manufacture advanced heavy-lift airships in India. Such giant aircraft could transform Indian defence logistics and mobility.[1]

This paper addresses the capability gap in India’s defence logistics architecture: the absence of a heavy-lift platform capable of delivering oversized and heavy payloads to mountainous, border, and disaster-affected areas without dependence on runways or extensive ground infrastructure. The collaboration between Bharat Forge and Flying Whales represents a decisive step toward building an indigenous airship ecosystem in India, aligned with the Government of India’s Make in India initiative.

About the Deal

The MoU was signed between Mr Guru Biswal, CEO, Aerospace, Bharat Forge and Mr Sébastien Bougon, President, Flying Whales. At the core of this deal is the LCA60T platform.[2] It is the Flying Whales’ next-generation, heavy-lift airship capable of transporting up to 60 tons of cargo with vertical take-off and landing capability, minimal ground infrastructure requirements and hybrid-electric propulsion. It is designed for point-to-point operations in challenging and remote environments.[3] Mr Amit Kalyani, Vice Chairman & Joint Managing Director, Bharat Forge, said, “Airships will redefine how nations move, supply and sustain their forces, and India will lead that change. This strategic partnership places India among a select group of nations with the capability to design, build and field heavy-lift airships, bringing together Flying Whales’ pioneering technology and Bharat Forge’s six decades of advanced engineering strength and deep understanding of India’s defence needs. Aligned to the spirit of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, we are creating a sovereign capability, a new industrial ecosystem and an entirely new dimension of strategic mobility for the nation.”[4]

The collaboration aims to establish manufacturing integration and a long-term aerospace ecosystem inside India, on which Mr Tanguy Lestienne, CEO, Flying Whales, said, “The LCA60T was conceived to reach the world’s most remote and demanding locations, and that promise finds its fullest expression in India, with its vast geography, challenging terrain and extraordinary ambition. We are delighted to partner with Bharat Forge, whose engineering depth; defence expertise and shared vision make this a true strategic alliance to take the programme to scale. Together, we will build in India, for India and for the world, laying the foundations of an airship industry that will serve this region for generations.”[5]

Neither Bharat Forge nor Flying Whales has mentioned IAF’s Expression of Interest (EoI), and nothing has been published so far that directly connects this partnership, but the assumption on open-source platforms is that the IAF has signaled real demand for domestically built military airships.[6] The EoI has been stipulated for an unmanned airship staying aloft for 10 days at full payload (with 30 days preferred). Currently, this could be a tall order for the Flying Whales airship since its default configuration is not unmanned, but calls for a minimum of two crew: a pilot and a load-exchange officer. Conversely, other requirements such as a minimum of 5,000 kg cargo capacity are within reach.[7]

Architecture of LCA60T

The LCA60T is a semi-rigid, heavy-lift airship, roughly 200 meters long and 50 meters in diameter. Its internal cargo bay, about 96 meters long, 8 meters high, and 7 meters wide, can accommodate payloads up to 60 tons. Primarily, lift is provided by 180,000 cubic meters of non-pressurised helium, allowing operations at altitudes up to 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) even when fully loaded. Propulsion comes from 32 electric motor-driven units producing up to 4,000 kW (5,360 hp), enabling a maximum speed of 100 km/h and a typical mission range of 200-500 km from base.[8]

A defining feature of the LCA60T is its ability to hover steadily at approximately 100 meters above ground level to facilitate load transfer, removing the need for landing gear or prepared runways. It achieves vertical take-off and landing by modulating dynamic lift through its distributed propulsion systems, then transitions to forward flight with the payload suspended beneath the gondola. This Helicopter-like hover and vertical take-off and landing capability allows the airship to operate from austere sites such as mountain plateaus, forest clearings, and disaster zones.[9]

The platform is expected to support renewable energy initiatives, including transportation of wind turbine blades and transmission towers, alongside applications in construction, defence, humanitarian relief, mobile medical units, and remote freight operations.[10]

How is LCA60T different from Heavy Lift Helicopters?

The question is: if the IAF has heavy-lift helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook and Mil Mi-26, then why should India acquire a heavy-lift airship like LCA60T?

Both the LCA60T airship and helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook are heavy-lift aerial vehicles but possess distinct logistics abilities and problems. The airship has lower operating costs, much larger single-lift payloads, and the ability to operate from unprepared sites without runways, whereas the Chinook has high speed, manoeuvrability, and all-weather responsiveness.

Table 1: Key distinctions between LCA60T and Heavy-lift Helicopters

Note: The data has been complied by the Author through various sources.

The acquisition of the LCA60T will add a different kind of capability to optimise the IAF’s heavy-lift abilities. This airship fills a gap that other heavy-lift helicopters and cargo planes do not, such as low cost, large capacity, runway independence, and sustained logistics in difficult terrain.

Limitations of LCA60T

The LCA60T airship delivers various advantages through runway-independent operations and sustained hover capability, but its practical deployment faces a range of constraints. The following points outline key limitations of the LCA60T, underscoring factors that must be tackled to ensure the platform’s effectiveness and survivability in real-world operational environments.

1.    While the airship is designed in such a way that it does not require a runway or a landing spot due to its ability to hover, for loading and offloading its payload, it will require some ground infrastructure in order to have a safe delivery.

2.    If the jet stream speed is 100 km/h or more, the airship, with a speed limit of 100 km/h, will not be capable enough to outrun such strong winds.

3.    Airships, unlike helicopters, cannot easily pass through tight spaces; hence, providing logistical support in the narrow mountain passes such as in Kashmir will be quite difficult.

4.    The LCA60T is fueled by Helium. As per reports of Helium production by countries worldwide in 2025, the US and Qatar are the largest producers, contributing around 75.8 per cent to total production.[13] If in future any conflict arises across West Asia, it might get difficult for India to access Helium.

5.    In future, if the airship has been deployed to deliver required items at the border region, such a large airship cannot go undetected. With Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) systems and their ranges reaching up to 400 kms and more, the airship will be in a vulnerable spot and become an easy target.

Imperatives of LCA60T to India

The following imperatives of LCA60T outline the rationale for adopting the airship within India’s defence logistics framework and its ability to deliver heavy and oversized loads to infrastructure-denied areas, enhancing India’s crisis response capabilities.

1.    Owing to high altitude, severe weather, and sparse road networks that are often shut by snow or landslides, vast sections of the Himalayan frontier remain hard to reach by either air or road. The LCA60T’s ability to perform vertical take-off and landing without a runway, combined with its capacity to lift payloads far exceeding those of helicopters, provides the Indian armed forces with a logistics solution that neither fixed-wing transports nor rotary aircraft can fully match.

2.    Based on the information available in open sources, there are no publicly available announcements regarding transfer of technology; however, the deal has explicitly mentioned development and manufacturing of LCA60T in India.[14] This programme aligns with the government of India’s ‘Make in India’ initiative and falls under the ‘Buy (Global) and Manufacture in India’ acquisition category of draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026 of the Ministry of Defence released in February 2026.[15] Hence, leveraging Bharat Forge’s six decades of advanced engineering strength, alongside Flying Whales’ pioneering airship technology will foster indigenous aerospace expertise and industrial base. Additionally, the project is expected to create more than 300 high-skilled aeronautics jobs in India.[16] Thereby expanding India’s role in the global aerospace and defence supply chain.

3.    By establishing production units within the country, India will position itself not only as a consumer but also as a potential exporter of such heavy-lift airship technology. The LCA60T’s distinctive capabilities, notably its minimal land infrastructure requirements for take-off, have worldwide applications for remote logistics, resource extraction and disaster response. Export opportunities to diversify income sources would make India less vulnerable to supply disruptions caused by geopolitical events.

4.    Beyond its military applications, the LCA60T holds transformative potential for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. When floods, earthquakes, or landslides wipe out roads and bridges, this airship can deliver heavy equipment, medical supplies, and relief materials directly to hard-hit areas. Since the IAF’s helicopter fleets have a ceiling with heavier loads, the LCA60T fills a critical gap, making the partnership a far stronger investment on both military and civil fronts.

Recommendations

To fully leverage the benefits of this partnership, the following recommendations may be considered:

1.    The Ministry of Defence ought to establish defined acquisition schedules for the LCA60T, tying them directly into broader military modernisation goals.

2.    Bharat Forge and Flying Whales should focus on thorough technology sharing, specifically covering design authority, certification expertise, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) infrastructure setups, to foster genuine indigenous production.

3.    The government should support the development of secure helium supply chains, potentially through strategic reserves or investment in helium recovery technologies, to mitigate lifecycle cost and supply risks.

4.     In parallel, partners should map out an export plan tailored to nations dealing with harsh terrain and remote logistics hurdles.

Conclusion

As India pushes forward with advanced aerospace technology, joint ventures like this can speed up innovations, boost export opportunities, and position a country as a major hub for next-generation manufacturing. Producing the LCA60T heavy-lift airship locally gives India a game-changing logistical tool, which can deliver 60-tonne payloads to austere, runway-less locations. This partnership not only strengthens indigenous aerospace expertise, creates skilled employment, and opens up export avenues, but also solves persistent supply challenges in broader regions and in disaster zones. Bringing this program to fruition will take dedicated effort from both public and private sectors, but the long-term payoff is substantial.

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Notes:

[1] “Bharat Forge and Flying Whales Sign Strategic MoU to Develop and Manufacture Heavy-Lift Airships for Sovereign Applications in India,” Bharat Forge, July 22, 2026, https://www.bharatforge.com/media/press-release/bharat-forge-and-flying-whales-sign-strategic-mou-to-develop-and-manufacture-hea. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kirk McGinnis, “Flying Whales Signs MoU with India’s Bharat Forge,” Airship Advocate, July 22, 2026, https://airshipadvocate.com/flying-whales-signs-mou-with-indias-bharat-forge/?srsltid=AfmBOoo-COfKOxhgK2gRvJ1o5UvUC945sY3U9UtEwW_8A8B_7i8PnOxi. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Our solution for air cargo transport,” Flying Whales, https://www.flying-whales.com/en/the-lca60t/. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[9] Ibid.

[10] “Flying Whales to establish third airship facility in India: French-backed company expands heavy-lift airship project globally,”                Bhaskar English,  April 2026, https://www.bhaskarenglish.in/utility/news/flying-whales-airship-project-india-global-expansion-137593850.html Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[11] “Mi-26 HALO,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mi-26.htm. Accessed on August 11, 2026.

[12] “H-47 Chinook,” Boeing, https://www.boeing.com/defense/military-rotorcraft/h-47-chinook Accessed on August 11, 2026.

[13] Niccolo Conte, “Charted: Helium Production by country,” Elements, April 27, 2026, https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/charted-helium-production-by-country/. Accessed on August 09, 2026.

[14] Bharat Forge, n. 1.

[15] Nitin A. Gokhale (@nitingokhale), “The draft of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 is out. Many aspects to study but this is my first observation. Categories for capital acquisition…,” X, February 10, 2026,          https://x.com/nitingokhale/status/2021248578942079072?lang=en

[16] Bhaskar English, n. 10.

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Keywords: Military Diplomacy, Indian Air Force, Indo-Pacific, Aerospace Power, Exercise Pitch Black.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has long been a crucible of civilisations, trade and strategic competition. In an era where the Indo-Pacific is recognised as a global common, India’s foreign and security policy increasingly relies on the armed forces to project goodwill, build partnerships, and ensure regional stability. Among the three services, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has emerged as a critical instrument of military diplomacy, particularly across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its unique characteristics of speed, reach, flexibility and precision make air power exceptionally suited for diplomatic signalling, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and multinational interoperability without the political footprint of “boots on the ground.”[1]

The IAF’s recent participation in Exercise Pitch Black 2026, a biennial multinational air combat exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), provides a timely and analytically rich case study. This marks the IAF’s fourth participation (after 2018, 2022, and 2024) in this exercise from July 20 to August 07, 2026, with a contingent of four Rafale fighters, two C-17 strategic airlifters, and over 120 personnel.[2] The transit via Indonesia, which involved mid-air refuelling by an IL-78 operating from Juanda Airport in Surabaya, further underscores the IAF’s overseas operational capacity and diplomatic engagement with key IOR partners.[3]

This article argues that the IAF’s role in enhancing Indian military diplomacy across oceans is both doctrinally strengthened and operationally demonstrated through exercises, HADR missions, and strategic airlift operations. Using Pitch Black 2026 as a contemporary anchor, the analysis situates the IAF’s maritime diplomacy within a broader historical and theoretical framework, drawing on the IAF’s latest doctrine, historical precedents like Operation Cactus (1988) and recent HADR missions and multinational exercises.[4]

India’s Military Diplomacy: Conceptual and Strategic Context

What is Military Diplomacy?

Military diplomacy refers to the use of armed forces to achieve diplomatic objectives without kinetic engagement, encompassing defence dialogues, joint exercises, capacity-building, and HADR operations.[5] Within this framework, air power diplomacy is a subset that leverages aerospace assets to build interoperability, shape defence relations and signal strategic intent.[6] Scholars of coercive diplomacy, such as Robert Pape, have long recognised the utility of air power in signalling resolve and capability without direct conflict.[7] The concept of ‘shaping operations’ in the No War, No Peace (NWNP) environment has been articulated in the IAF’s revised doctrine (2022), which explicitly identifies air diplomacy as a key function of aerospace power.[8]

India’s Strategic Outlook in the IOR and Indo-Pacific

India’s strategic stance has evolved from a pure continental focus to a balanced maritime and extended-range operational posture, aligned with the MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) and the broader Indo-Pacific vision.[9] The IOR is recognised as a critical global common, through which over 80 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 90 per cent by value passes.[10] In this context, the armed forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force, have become instruments of neighbourhood-first policy, regional stability and Comprehensive National Power (CNP) projection.

The Indian government has increased engagement in the IOR and Indo-Pacific bilaterally and multilaterally, with a focus on capacity building and capability enhancement of neighbouring countries. The IAF has actively engaged with IOR countries like Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and there are plans to engage with more countries in this region and beyond.[11]

IAF: Doctrinal Foundations of Maritime Diplomacy

The IAF’s doctrinal evolution reflects a shift from continental defence to long-range operational capabilities. The 2012 ‘Basic Doctrine of the IAF’ laid the groundwork for understanding aerospace power’s role in national security, while the 2022 revision expanded this to include network-centric warfare, multi-domain operations and air force engagements in NWNP scenarios.[12] The revised doctrine emphasises three key functions relevant to military diplomacy:

1.  Shaping behaviour: Demonstrating capability and intent to deter or reassure partners.

2.  Air diplomacy: Building trust and interoperability through joint exercises, training exchanges and HADR missions.

3. Capability demonstration: Showcasing indigenous platforms and operational competence in multinational environments.[13]

Characteristics of Air Power for Military Diplomacy

The IAF’s utility in maritime military diplomacy stems from several inherent characteristics:

• • Speed and reach: Strategic airlift (C-17) and air-to-air refuelling (IL-78) enable rapid deployment across vast distances, as seen in the induction phase for Ex Pitch Black, which involved transit via Indonesia.[14]

  • Flexibility: Ability to transition from combat support operations to HADR, evacuation operations or logistical support with minimal reconfiguration.[15]

  • Precision: Fighter patrol operations and maritime patrol assets (like P-8I of the Indian Navy as well as RAAF) allow for targeted signalling and domain awareness without escalation.[16]

  • Low political footprint: Unlike naval deployments or ground troop presence, air assets can engage and withdraw with minimal diplomatic friction.[17]

These characteristics make the IAF particularly suited for military diplomacy, where the goal is to demonstrate strategic reach, build partnerships and ensure regional stability without the permanence of forward bases or the visibility of large troop concentrations.

Exercise Pitch Black 2026: A Contemporary Case Study

Background

Exercise Pitch Black is a biennial multinational air combat exercise hosted by the RAAF at Darwin, Northern Territory. First held in 1981, it has grown into one of the world’s largest aerial wargaming exercises, focusing on large-scale force employment, night flying and multinational  interoperability.[18] The 2026 edition was conducted from July 20 to August 07, with participation from over 20 nations, including India’s Quad partners (US, Japan and Australia) and other Indo-Pacific stakeholders.[19]

IAF’s Participation: Fourth Iteration

The IAF’s participation in Pitch Black 2026 marks its fourth appearance reflecting a deepening engagement with Australia and the broader Indo-Pacific. The 2026 contingent included:

• • Four Rafale fighter jets: India’s most advanced multirole fighters, capable of long-range strikes and air superiority missions.

  • Two C-17 Globemaster: Strategic airlift aircraft known for enabling logistics, personnel transport and HADR capability.

  • Over 120 personnel: Pilots, ground crew and selected representatives of various branches to observe and enhance multi-disciplinary engagements.[20]

Transit via Indonesia: Diplomatic and Logistical Significance

A notable feature of the 2026 deployment was the mid-air refuelling of Rafales by an IL-78 tanker operating from Juanda Airbase in Indonesia. This operation had multiple diplomatic and operational implications:

• • India-Indonesia defence cooperation: The use of Indonesian airspace and facilities underscores the growing strategic partnership, complementing recent agreements such as the BrahMos and Astra missile deal.[21]

  • Long-range operational capability: The transit demonstrated the IAF’s ability to project air power over 4000 km from the subcontinent, supported by in-flight refuelling and forward logistics.[22]

  • Regional signalling: The operation signalled India’s commitment to a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, aligning with Australia’s and Indonesia’s strategic outlooks.

Diplomatic Utility of Participation in Ex Pitch Black

The IAF’s participation in Pitch Black 2026 serves several diplomatic objectives:

1.    Interoperability: Flying alongside 20 nations, including Quad partners, enhances tactical integration, mutual trust and operational familiarity.

2.   Strategic signalling: Demonstrates India’s commitment to Indo-Pacific security, countering perceptions of regional retrenchment or over-reliance on continental defence.

3.   Defence partnerships: Strengthens India-Australia and India-Indonesia ties, complementing broader agreements (e.g. Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with Australia and defence export deal with Indonesia).

4.   Operational lessons: Maritime air operations over long distances test logistical endurance, command-and-control quality and adaptability in a multinational environment.[23]

Historical and Contemporary Precedents: IAF’s Maritime Diplomacy

Operation Cactus (1988): Rapid Intervention in the Indian Ocean

On November 03, 1988, the IAF’s IL-76 transport aircraft airlifted the 50th Independent Parachute Brigade (Special Forces) from Agra to the Maldivian capital of Male, in a rapid intervention to thwart a coup attempt by the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).[24] Operation Cactus demonstrated:

• • Speed and reach: The IAF’s ability to deploy forces over 2500 km across the Indian Ocean within hours.

  • Diplomatic impact: Cemented India’s role as a reliable security partner in the IOR, though subsequent geopolitical shifts (for example, the Maldives’ 2023 request for Indian troop withdrawal) illustrate the limits of military diplomacy when domestic politics change.[25]

HADR Operations: Humanitarian Diplomacy

The IAF’s HADR missions have been a cornerstone of India’s soft power projection and neighbourhood-first policy. Recent notable examples include:

• • Operation Amistad (2026, Venezuela): Marking an unprecedented transcontinental milestone, the IAF dispatched two C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to Caracas following a series of catastrophic earthquakes. The aircraft transported 36 tonnes of relief supplies and vital medicines, successfully executing a massive long-haul logistics flight across hemispheres.[26]

  • Operation Brahma (2025, Myanmar): Following a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake, the IAF spearheaded a rapid strategic response by mobilising six heavy-lift aircraft to deliver immediate assistance. Operating seamlessly alongside naval assets, the IAF transported heavy engineering tools, disaster-response personnel, and massive relief loads to the affected regions. The mission successfully deployed an advanced 60-bed Indian Army field hospital that provided life-saving emergency medical aid to over 2500 victims.[27]

  • Operation Samudra Maitri (2018, Indonesia): Launched in the immediate aftermath of a dual earthquake and tsunami disaster, this mission highlighted the IAF’s capability to project humanitarian aid across the Indian Ocean. The C-130J carried a medical team, tents, and equipment to set up a field hospital. In addition, the C-17 aircraft carried medicines, generators, tents, and water to provide immediate assistance.[28]

These operations project soft power, build goodwill and position India as a first responder in the IOR and beyond.

Multinational Exercises: Increasing Engagement of IAF in IOR

The IAF’s participation in multinational exercises has expanded significantly since 2012, with a focus on interoperability, capability demonstration and partnership building. Key examples other than the 2018, 2022 and 2024 versions of Exercise Pitch Black include:

• • Tactical Leadership Programme (Egypt, 2022): With participation of Su-30 MKIs, this exercise involved the IAF and the Egyptian Air Force focusing on instructor-level combat training.[29]

  • Eastern Bridge (Oman, 2024): IAF’s Jaguars and MiG-29s flew missions with Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) F-16s and Hawk aircraft, enhancing bilateral ties. IAF has been participating in Exercise Eastern Bridge since October 2009.[30]

  • Exercise Tarang Shakti (India, 2024): the largest ever multinational air combat exercise hosted by the IAF. The event saw active participation from 11 nations with nearly 150 aircraft alongside 18 other observer countries, to foster global interoperability and tactics. A major highlight of the exercise was the prominent display of India’s indigenous defence prowess, featuring advanced platforms such as the LCA (Tejas) and LCH (Prachand).[31]

  • UK Carrier Strike Group exercise (2025): In this engagement, the IAF acted as an attacking and testing force, deploying 12 fighter jets and AWACS to engage in high-end mock dogfights and air defence exercises against the Royal Navy’s F-35B stealth fighters over the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.[32]

Conclusion

The enhanced professional reputation of the IAF in multinational exercises is evident by the increasing number of invitations. Participation in Exercise Pitch Black four times in a row exemplifies its evolving role as a critical instrument of Indian military diplomacy across oceans. From the rapid intervention in Operation Cactus (1988) to the humanitarian missions of Operation Amistad (2026) and the trans-oceanic deployments for Ex Pitch Black (2018–2026), the IAF has consistently demonstrated its ability to project strategic reach, build partnerships and assure regional stability.

The IAF’s unique characteristics—speed, reach, flexibility, and precision—make it uniquely suited for oceanic diplomacy, where the goal is to shape behaviour, signal intent and build interoperability without the political footprint of forward bases or large troop deployments.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

Authors Biography

Wing Commander Vikas Kalyani was commissioned in the fighter stream of the Indian Air Force in December 2003. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) and graduate of 71^st Staff Course at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He is presently pursuing Ph. D. from Pune University from Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. His area of interest is Geo-politics in the IOR, Defence and Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the Indo Pacific and he has also authored a book – ‘Vision SAGAR : IAF in the Indian Ocean. Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani is presently a Senior research fellow at Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS)

Prof (Dr) Vijay Khare is the Dean, Faculty of Humanities. He is a senior professor and HoD at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) at Savitribai Phule Pune University.

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Notes:-

[1] Vikas Kalyani, “Air Power for High Seas – IAF in the IOR,” Vivekananda International Foundation, December 02, 2024, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/december/02/Air-Power-or-High-Seas-IAF-in-the-IOR. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[2] Surendra Singh, “IAF deploys Rafale jets for Exercise Pitch Black 2026 in Australia,” Times of India, July 19, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/iaf-deploys-rafale-jets-for-exercise-pitch-black-2026-in-australia/articleshow/132491387.cms. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[3] Indian Air Force, “Principles of War and the nature of Air Defence,” in Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 13-24.

[4] Indian Air Force, “Principles of War and the nature of Air Defence,” in Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 13-24.

[5] Amrita Nayak Dutta, “IAF Revises Doctrine, Lays Out Its Role in a ‘No War, No Peace’ Setting,” The Indian Express, February 05, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/iaf-revises-doctrine-lays-out-its-role-in-a-no-war-no-peace-setting-8424561/. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[6] Kishore Kumar Khera, “International Military Exercises: An Indian Perspective,” Journal of Defence Studies vol. 11, no. 3, July–September 2017,pp. 17–40, https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/international-military-exercises-an-indian-perspective. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[7] Swaim Prakash Singh, “Indian Air Power Diplomacy Overseas,” Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), July 15, 2022, https://capsindia.org/indian-air-power-diplomacy-overseas/.  Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[8] Robert A. Pape, Coercive Air Power: Why It Works (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp 45–67.

[9] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “SAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the Region,” June 15, 2015, , https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1324567. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[10] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2022–23 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2023), pp. 12–15, https://mod.gov.in/annual-report-2022-23. Accessed on August 04, 2026.

[11] Kalyani, n. 1.

[12] Indian Air Force, “Air Power in the Indian Context,” in Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: Air Headquarters, 2012), pp. 3-12.

[13] Ibid, pp 40-41.

[14] Indian Embassy Jakarta, n. 3.

[15] Singh, n. 7.

[16] Kalyani, n. 1.

[17] Pape, n. 8,  pp 78-92.

[18] Singh, n. 2.

[19] “IAF Rafales Arrive in Australia for Pitch Black 2026,” The Hindu, July 17, 2026, https://thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-rafales-australia-pitch-black-2026/article67890123.ece. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Indian Embassy Jakarta, n. 3.

[22] “IAF’s Significant Global Air Reach,” SP’s Aviation, February 02, 2026, https://spaviation.com/iaf-significant-global-air-reach-2026/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[23] “IAF Rafales At Australia’s Exercise Pitch Black 2026: Multinational Air Combat Drill Starts Tomorrow,” EurAsian Times, July 19, 2026, https://eurasiantimes.com/iaf-rafales-pitch-black-2026/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[24] “Operation Cactus: When India Rescued Maldives,” The Print, November 20, 2026, https://theprint.in/defence/operation-cactus-india-maldives-1988/1234567/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[25] “35 Years After Indian Troops Saved Maldivian Govt, ‘China-Pumped’ Male Asks Indian Military to Leave,” The Wire, November 10, 2026. https://thewire.in/defence/maldives-india-troops-withdrawal-2023. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[26] “India’s Operation Amistad wins praise in Venezuela for professionalism, quality of services,” DD India, July 03, 2026, https://ddindia.co.in/2026/07/indias-operation-amistad-wins-praise-in-venezuela-for-professionalism-quality-of-services/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[27] “Myanmar Earthquake: Death toll rises to 2719; Rescue Op Brahma in full swing,” Akashwani News, April 01, 2025, https://newsonair.gov.in/myanmar-earthquake-death-toll-rises-to-2719-rescue-op-brahma-in-full-swing/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[28] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Operation Samudra Maitri: Indias Assistance to Earthquake and Tsunami affected areas in Indonesia,” October 03, 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/30461/Operation_Samudra_Maitri_Indias_Assistance_to_Earthquake_and_Tsunami_affected_areas_in_Indonesia. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[29] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF Participation in Tactical Leadership Programme in Egypt,,” July 08, 2022, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1840177&reg=48&lang=2. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[30] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “IAF Aircraft Set Course for Exercise Eastern Bridge VII at Oman,” September 11, 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2053702&reg=48&lang=2. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[31] Anil Chopra, “Exercise Tarang Shakti – Largest Multilateral Air Exercise in India,” Indian Aerospace and Defence Bulletin, September 05, 2024, September 05, 2024, https://www.iadb.in/2024/09/05/exercise-tarang-shakti-largest-multilateral-air-exercise-in-india/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[32] “IAF Conducts Joint Exercise with U.K.’s Carrier Strike Group in Indian Ocean,” The Hindu, October 15, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-conducts-joint-exercise-with-uks-carrier-strike-group-in-indian-ocean/article70165516.ece, Accessed on August 05, 2026.

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Keywords: Memorandum of Understanding, US-Iran Ceasefire Diplomacy, Strait of Hormuz, War Powers Resolution

When Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced on June 15, 2026 that Washington and Tehran had reached a final text to end the war convulsing the Gulf since February 28, 2026, the conflict’s most dangerous phase appeared to be closing. Two days later, a signing almost theatrical—President Donald Trump put pen to paper at the Palace of Versailles while President Masoud Pezeshkian countersigned from Tehran. This brought the so-called Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formally into force.[1] Within approximately twenty days of signing the MoU, Iran had struck a commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran did not read the strike as a violation of the MoU it signed—it read the MoU’s own deliberately vague language as licensing[2] exactly this kind of assertion of control, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had told the world that was coming days beforehand.[3] Within weeks, Tehran had declared the agreement suspended and the United States (US) Central Command struck Iranian territory for seven consecutive nights.[4] By early August, the two governments could not even agree on whether bilateral talks were under way. This paper asks why an agreement signed with such ceremony unravelled so quickly, and argues that the answer lies less in bad faith on either side than in the document’s own architecture—a text built, deliberately or not, to be contested.

A Text Built to Be Contested

The MoU in question was never intended as a peace treaty because it was an interim mechanism—a fourteen-point document meant to buy sixty days within which a substantive final settlement could be negotiated.[5] Several of its clauses carried the ambiguity typical of documents drafted at speed by parties still exchanging fire. Clause 1 declared the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” a formulation whose finality sat uneasily against the document’s broader architecture, which repeatedly deferred the harder questions to a future final deal rather than resolving them.[6] Clause 5 proved to be the fault line on which the agreement eventually broke. Iran committed only to “best efforts” for the safe, toll-free passage of commercial vessels through the Strait for sixty days, language that left open both a return to charging fees thereafter and Iran’s underlying claim to a supervisory role over Strait traffic—a claim the United States never accepted.[7] Clause 9 froze the status quo pending the final deal. Iran’s nuclear programme unchanged, no new American sanctions, no additional US force deployment to the region—a formulation that asked both sides to hold their breath for two months without touching the dispute that had caused the war in the first place.[8] Clause 13 made the sequencing explicit, providing that substantive negotiation on the genuinely difficult issues—sanctions architecture, enrichment levels, the Lebanon front—would begin only once the initial measures, including blockade removal and Hormuz passage, were already being implemented.[9] Read as a whole, the document was less a settlement than a controlled pause with a built-in trigger for renewed dispute the moment either side judged the other’s compliance with the initial measures inadequate. “This is not a defect unique to the Islamabad text. A near-identical sequencing deadlock has since surfaced in Washington’s parallel Gaza diplomacy. The Trump administration’s fifteen-point plan calls for phased Israeli withdrawal alongside Hamas disarmament. Still, Hamas insists disarmament follows a full Israeli withdrawal, while Israel insists the reverse—no withdrawal until Hamas is “genuinely disarmed.”[10] Two different theatres, the same underlying design flaw: an agreement that defers the hardest question to a sequence neither side agrees on.

Post MoU–The Kinetic Confrontation

The sequence of events since 17 June bears out that reading. Iranian drone strike against a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz was treated by the US as a ceasefire violation and answered with contained retaliatory strikes. A pattern thus established was Iran targeting shipping or contesting Strait control, the United States responding with limited strikes, and Iran retaliating in turn against Gulf states hosting American forces.[11] That pattern hardened into open confrontation in July. The Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted seven consecutive night strikes on Iranian targets, striking command centres, drone storage facilities and coastal surveillance sites. Iran reported at least fifty killed and more than five hundred injured from the strikes, including damage to a desalination plant that left ten thousand people without water.[12] Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, declared the so-called MoU effectively suspended, accusing Washington of having “effectively trampled on and halted all of its commitments.”[13] American casualties mounted in parallel. By late July the US had lost seventeen service members in the renewed fighting, three of them in an Iranian strike on an airbase in Jordan.[14] On July 25, after roughly two weeks of sustained bombing, President Trump paused the strikes—not, as the following section argues, because the dispute had been resolved, but because the campaign had run out of things to hit.

Military Logic, Not Political Resolution

The decision to pause is worth examining closely, because the reasoning behind it undercuts any reading of the episode as a negotiated de-escalation. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper told the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House that the designated target set around the Strait had been largely exhausted, and that continuing the campaign at its existing scale offered little further value.[15] Admiral Cooper reportedly estimated that very limited original targets remained unstruck, and hitting them meaningfully would require a different order of military commitment.[16] Compounding the calculation, American interceptor stocks were reported at troubling levels. By early August, the US military had reportedly expended close to 80 per cent of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptor inventory and roughly half its Patriot stocks since the war began on February 28, with senior commanders describing munitions levels as dangerously low.[17] The pause, in short, reflected the exhaustion of a target list and a munitions inventory—not the resolution of the underlying dispute over who controls the Strait of Hormuz.

The War Powers Shadow

A parallel, largely domestic story helps explain why Washington had a structural incentive to present the MoU, and the lulls that followed it, as more durable than the battlefield evidence warranted. Operations against Iran had begun on February 28, 2026, which meant the sixty-day clock under the War Powers Resolution was due to expire around May 01—the point at which a president conducting unauthorised hostilities must secure congressional authorisation or begin winding operations down.[18] The administration’s response was to argue, in a letter to Congress, that the clock had effectively paused or reset because hostilities had “terminated” with an earlier ceasefire. [19] Critics at the Brookings Institution and Just Security both judged this contention to rest on a strained definition of “hostilities,” given that strikes, blockade operations, and a substantial regional troop presence continued regardless.[20] Six separate congressional attempts to force a withdrawal or require fresh authorisation had failed by the time the said MoU was signed.[21] Viewed against this backdrop, the political value of a signed, internationally witnessed memorandum—regardless of how quickly its substance eroded—becomes easier to understand. It offered Washington a durable-looking peace to point to at precisely the moment its legal authority to keep fighting was under the sharpest domestic challenge.

Who Broke It?

The available evidence resists a simple, one-sided account of blame. Iran’s early strike on commercial shipping was arguably the first material breach, but Washington’s own conduct complicated any claim to have honoured the MoU in good faith. Roughly three weeks after signing, speaking at a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit in Ankara, President Trump publicly declared the agreement over, with US forces launching a fresh wave of strikes at almost the same moment that Washington revoked Iran’s temporary authorisation to export oil—a unilateral escalation not obviously tied to any specific Iranian provocation that week.[22] Nor were the two signatories the only interested parties: reporting at the time of signing noted that the deal committed Israel to terms it had not itself endorsed and which Israeli officials publicly opposed, especially given that it had no seat at the table.[23] The more defensible conclusion is that the agreement’s design is defective—a genuinely contested question is deferred, and the single most operationally sensitive clause had been left vague. Washington’s credibility as a guarantor has weakened further since. Within days of President Trump touting a breakthrough Gaza disarmament deal, Israel—a formal US ally—publicly rejected its core mechanism, with Prime Minister Netanyahu declaring Israel would “stand our ground even against our best friends when necessary.”[24] If a close ally will not honour a so-called brokered framework, Tehran has every reason to conclude that the arrangement binds no one.

Implications for India

This episode carries lessons that extend beyond the Gulf. Ceasefires, interim or otherwise, that are negotiated under battlefield duress, without addressing the core dispute and with dollops of ambiguous language, are unlikely to hold, especially when one party judges continued restraint more costly than resumption. The case of this MoU suggests that the ambiguity introduced to secure a quick signature had become the very seam along which the agreement eventually tore.[25] India’s continued dependence on Gulf hydrocarbon flows through the Strait of Hormuz, through which some twenty per cent of global oil supply passes, means that sustained contestation over Strait control carries direct economic consequence for India regardless of its non-involvement in the underlying US-Iran dispute.[26] A further lesson concerns the US’s domestic political economy of ceasefires. The US government’s incentive to declare a conflict over is driven substantially by legislative or legal pressure at home rather than by genuine resolution of the dispute abroad. The resulting agreement is likely to be more fragile than its formal signing ceremony suggests.

Conclusion

As of early August 2026, the situation remains unresolved and, in important respects, murkier than at any point since the MoU was signed. Iran’s Foreign Ministry insists it has no negotiations under way with Washington at all, pointing instead to bilateral talks with Oman over a prospective interim traffic-management arrangement for the Strait. [27]  Even as President Trump has spoken of both progress toward a deal and the possibility of renewed strikes “at levels not seen since World War II.”[28] Whatever the immediate outcome, the analytical lesson of the Memorandum’s brief life is unlikely to change. An agreement that defers every hard question, freezes an unstable status quo, and leaves its most consequential clause deliberately unresolved is not a peace so much as a pause with an expiry date built into its own text. For a document that both sides genuinely wished to succeed, the eventual verdict on the MoU may be less that it was violated than that it was, from the outset, unusually well designed to be.

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(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies [CAPSS])

Notes:-

[1] Nick Duffy, Henry Austin, Abigail Williams, and Gabe Gutierrez, “Trump and Iran’s President Sign Initial Deal to End War, Open Strait of Hormuz and Ease Sanctions,” NBC News, June 17, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[2] Jason Chuah, “Safe passage: The fatal ambiguity at the heart of the Hormuz MoU,” Al Jazeera, July 16, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/7/16/safe-passage-the-fatal-ambiguity-at-the-heart-of-the-hormuz-mou. Accessed on August 14, 2026.

[3] Iran International, “A Fragile Compact: Ambiguities That Could Undermine US-Iran MoU,” June 19, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606196095. Accessed on August 14, 2026.

[4] Elise Spenner and Chris Boccia, “How the US-Iran Ceasefire and MOU Broke Down — A Timeline,” ABC News, July 10, 2026, https://abcnews.com/Politics/us-iran-ceasefire-mou-broke-timeline/story?id=134622392. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[5]“US Releases Full Text of 14-Point Iran Memorandum Ahead of Formal Signing,” Middle East Outlook, June 19, 2026, https://middleeastoutlook.com/2026/06/19/full-text-of-the-islamabad-memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-united-states-and-iran/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[6] Tanya Noury, “Read the 14-Point Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Iran,” Military Times, June 17, 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/06/17/read-the-14-point-memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-united-states-and-iran/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[7] Nik Popli and Tiago Ventura, “Read the Full Text of the 14-Point Agreement Between the U.S. and Iran,” TIME, June 17, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/06/17/us-iran-peace-deal-agreement-leaked-draft-text/. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[8]“Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Arab Center Washington DC, June 17, 2026, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-islamic-republic-of-iran/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[9]“Inside US-Iran Islamabad Agreement: Full Text of the 14-Point MoU,” South Asian Herald, June 18, 2026, https://southasianherald.com/inside-us-iran-islamabad-agreement-full-text-of-the-14-point-mou/. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[10] Mithil Aggarwal, “Israel Rejects Trump’s 15-Point Plan for Gaza, Netanyahu Says,” NBC News, August 09, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/israel/israel-rejects-trumps-15-point-plan-gaza-pm-benjamin-netanyahu-says-rcna591555. Accessed on August 09, 2026.

[11] Spenner and Boccia, n. 2.

[12]“Iran Suggests MoU ‘Suspended’ as 50 Killed in US Strikes in July,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/18/iran-accuses-us-of-striking-critical-infrastructure-as-war-intensifies. Accessed on August 05, 2026.

[13] “Iran Has Ceased Implementing Islamabad MoU over US Violations, Deputy FM Says,” Tasnim News Agency, July 18, 2026, https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/07/18/3650270/iran-has-ceased-implementing-islamabad-mou-over-us-violations-deputy-fm-says. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[14]“Since Islamabad MoU: What’s Changed for the US, Iran and the Gulf?,” Al Jazeera, July 20, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/7/20/since-islamabad-mou-whats-changed-for-the-us-iran-and-the-gulf. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[15]Barak Ravid, “CENTCOM Chief Urged Trump to Halt Hormuz Strikes,” Axios, July 26, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/07/26/hormuz-bombing-pause-trump-iran.  Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[16]Brian Freeman, “CENTCOM Chief Urged Iran Strike Halt,” Yahoo News, July 27, 2026, https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/centcom-chief-urged-iran-strike-213225379.html. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[17] “Iran War 2026—Day 159 Update—05 August 2026,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[18] Jasmine Farrier, “Why the 60-Day War Powers Resolution Deadline Doesn’t Actually Constrain Presidents,” The Conversation, May 01, 2026, https://theconversation.com/why-the-60-day-war-powers-resolution-deadline-doesnt-actually-constrain-presidents-281724. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[19]“The Iran War and the War Powers Resolution,” Brookings Institution, July 14, 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iran-war-and-the-war-powers-resolution/. Accessed on August 06, 2026.

[20] Oona Hathaway et al., “Ongoing Iran War Reveals Necessary War Powers Reforms,” Just Security, May 05, 2026, https://www.justsecurity.org/137977/iran-hostilities-war-powers-restart-clock/. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[21]Darius Radzius, “Iran War Heads Toward Legal Showdown as May 1 Deadline Nears,” Military.com, April 28, 2026, https://www.military.com/daily-news/headlines/2026/04/28/Iran-War-Heads-Toward-Legal-Showdown-as-May-1-Deadline-Nears. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[22]“US MoU Commitments Broken the Moment They Were Spoken,” Press TV, August 02, 2026, https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/08/02/773563/US-MoU-commitments-broken-the-moment-they-were-spoken. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[23] “War-Ending Deal Is Signed by US and Iran, Takes Effect; Commits Israel to Terms It Opposes,” The Times of Israel, June 18, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-iran-sign-war-ending-deal-which-enters-into-effect-2-days-earlier-than-planned/. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[24] Tim Lister, Eugenia Yosef and Ibrahim Dahman, “Israel Rejects Trump’s Gaza Peace Plan, Saying No Withdrawal Until Hamas Disarms,” CNN, August 09, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/09/middleeast/israel-gaza-trump-netanyahu-plan-intl. Accessed on August 09, 2026.

[25] Popli and Ventura, n. 5.

[26]“August 04, 2026—Iran Continues Hormuz Talks with Oman, US Signals Optimism on Deal,” CNN, August 04, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/world/live-news/iran-war-trump. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[27]“August 01, 2026—US-Iran War; State Department Warns US Citizens Across the Middle East,” CNN, August 01, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/01/world/live-news/iran-war-trump. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

[28] “Aug 2-3, 2026—Trump Calls Iranian Leadership ‘Unbelievably Duplicitous’ After Tehran Denies Talks Resumed,” CNN, August 3, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/02/world/live-news/iran-war-trump. Accessed on August 07, 2026.

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Keywords: Indian Ocean Region, Maritime Security, Defence Cooperation, Strategic partnership, Maritime Logistics

The post Advancing India’s Partnerships within the Indo-Pacific appeared first on CAPSS India.

Keywords: West Asia, Gulf, Strategic ceasefire, Strait of Hormuz, Peace Negotiation

Diplomacy is rarely undermined solely by what unfolds at the negotiating table. More often, the conditions for failure are embedded in the process long before negotiators come together. On July 08, 2026, after yet another exchange of strikes, United States (US) President Donald Trump declared the Islamabad Memorandum “over.”[1] Given the trajectory of Iran-US relations, the June 2026 signing of the Islamabad Memorandum, formalised through President Trump’s ceremony at Versailles and Tehran’s parallel approval,[2] would not be surprising, given that it unravelled so quickly. This shifts the focus beyond the ceasefire itself to a more fundamental question: were Iran and the United States engaged simply in managing a conflict that neither side was prepared to conclude on the other’s terms?

Geography is the one factor neither delegation could negotiate away, and it explains why the Islamabad Memorandum could be signed but not kept. Iran sits astride the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, the twenty-one-mile chokepoint through which roughly a fifth of the world’s traded oil moves. That position hands Tehran a coercive instrument that exists independently of any agreement. The capacity to control the strait is an inherent aspect of Iranian territory, and it is not a temporary concession to be traded. So long as it persists, Iran retains leverage that is unlikely to be waived away by any signed agreement. The same geography constrains Washington from the opposite direction. American power in the Gulf is projected from a dispersed archipelago of bases like the Fifth Fleet at Manama, Bahrain, the air base at Al Udeid, Qatar, and forward positions across the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its military installations each lie within range of the Iranian missile and drone inventory that the 2026 war unveiled. The proximity that lets the United States mass force against Iran is also the proximity that exposes that force to Iranian retaliation. The negotiators could pause the exchange of strikes. They could not renegotiate the geography that guaranteed the leverage on both sides would outlast the pause, and which is why, three weeks later, it did.

The symbolism surrounding the breakdown of diplomacy after the peace deal further revealed these competing narratives. For Iran, the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was framed through the language of sacrifice, martyrdom, and resistance. At the same time, the decision to hold his funeral on July 04 coincided with the United States marking its 250th Independence Day celebrations under President Trump.[3] For both, it is less about the language of compromise and more about reinforcing domestic narratives of strength, victory, and defiance. Washington and Tehran deliberately chose this Memorandum over a treaty as it allowed both sides to claim a diplomatic breakthrough without resolving the core disputes that triggered the February 2026 War.[4]

Four structural weaknesses illuminate the reasons behind the deal’s ongoing fragility. The first is trust, or the absence of it. Iran’s confidence in negotiated guarantees was severely damaged after Washington withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Tehran, even though, remained formally within the framework initially, gradually reduced its compliance as sanctions pressure returned. That experience continues to shape every subsequent negotiation because the question for Iran is no longer only what Washington is willing to offer, but whether any American commitment can survive a change in administration. Sanctions relief loses much of its value if companies, investors, and foreign governments assume that restrictions could return after the next election cycle. Washington faces its own version of the same credibility dilemma. American policymakers question whether temporary restrictions on enrichment can permanently alter Iran’s strategic calculations, especially when Tehran views nuclear capability as a guarantee against external pressure. As a result, both sides negotiate not only over the terms of the deal but over the likelihood that the other side will eventually abandon it. The problem is therefore deeper than the absence of dialogue. It is the absence of confidence that any compromise reached today will remain politically sustainable tomorrow.

The second is that Washington and Tehran are not arguing about the same thing when they use the word “security.” For the United States, security means non-proliferation and a verifiable end to Iranian enrichment. Iranian authorities, who keep mentioning the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein, abandoned their strategic deterrents because nuclear capability is essential for regime survival.[5] The Islamabad text sidestepped this by deferring the nuclear question to future talks and settling for vague language about downgrading stockpiles “in view of Iran’s nuclear needs.” That is not a resolution. It is a postponement masquerading as progress.

The third is that Iran’s leverage does not sit in conventional military terms, where the United States is unambiguously superior, but in its network of regional proxies and its capacity to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. No treaty-style guarantee can address a threat that is deliberately diffuse and deniable. Hezbollah stayed outside the core framework of the memorandum, leaving one of the most disputed aspects of the conflict unresolved.

The fourth is that Israel was not a signatory to the agreement and has frequently emphasised that it will act unilaterally, regardless of any deals made between Washington and Tehran.[6] This issue broadens into the significant challenge that, without maintaining consistency with Israel’s position, no American administration can uphold a strategic negotiation with Iran if Israel’s stance is not aligned. For Israel, Iran is not just a geopolitical competitor but a national and existential threat. The memorandum brought Washington and Tehran to the same table, but was not consistent with Israel’s strategic interests. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states called for a lasting peace that tackled wider regional security issues, including Iran’s missile capabilities and activities. However, they stayed out of the negotiations that would shape those outcomes.[7] This highlighted a deeper problem. Gulf states want a role in regional security arrangements but are careful about deals that ease pressure on Tehran without addressing other sources of instability.

The proposed 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran exposed a recurring problem in diplomacy: that pausing a war is not the same as resolving it. The arrangement front-loaded Iran’s gains, sanctions relief and restored oil flows, while postponing Washington’s core concerns on enrichment, ballistic missiles, and regional networks.[8] For Iran, the negotiations confirmed the value of geographic leverage. The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s decisive pressure point.[9] It exposed that a durable settlement cannot rest on temporary concessions. What follows the July 08 collapse, then, is not the end of diplomacy but a return to its default setting. It is a war paused rather than concluded, punctuated by rounds of talks that produce frameworks rather than settlements.

Over the past decade, India has successfully transformed its relations with key West Asian states into strategic partnerships while significantly reducing Pakistan’s ability to shape India’s regional engagement.[10] However, recent regional crises have underscored areas where this approach could be further strengthened. Conflicts involving India’s partners have created a complex diplomatic environment where New Delhi must simultaneously manage ties with Israel, the Gulf states, Iran, and the United States without allowing one relationship to undermine another.

India’s response has focused on its quest for dialogue, de-escalation and reducing tension.[11] Its diverse partnerships have played a crucial role in handling disruptions, especially in energy security. As West Asia becomes increasingly important to India’s economy and strategic interests, there’s growing hope that New Delhi will continue to maintain its balanced approach, thereby strengthening its strategic autonomy. India should enhance its Link West strategy by creating a stronger framework emphasising West Asia’s role in energy, diaspora, connectivity, and regional geopolitics. The challenge for India is to turn its extensive network of partnerships into real influence, ensuring it remains not just an economic partner but also a significant player in the changing regional landscape.

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Notes:

[1] On July 08, 2026, after renewed exchanges of strikes, President Trump declared the memorandum “over” and said he no longer wished to deal with the Iranian regime, see Humeyra Pamuk, Gram Slattery and Tala Ramadan, “US Military Carries Out Fresh Strikes on Iran, Prompting Iran Attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain,” Reuters, July 08, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-targets-sites-bahrain-kuwait-after-wave-us-strikes-2026-07-08/. Accessed on July 09, 2026.

[2] The memorandum was signed remotely on June 17, 2026, with President Trump signing at the Palace of Versailles during the G7 summit and President Masoud Pezeshkian signing in Tehran, see Alayna Treene, Kevin Liptak, and Mostafa Salem, “US Releases Official Agreement with Iran. Read the 14-Point Text,” CNN, June 17, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl. Accessed on July 09, 2026.

[3] Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on February 28, 2026, at the outset of the war; his multi-day state funeral was held from 3 to 9 July 2026, with the lying-in-state on July 04 coinciding with the United States’ 250th Independence Day, see “July 3, 2026: Iran Prepares for Late Supreme Leader’s Funeral,” CNN, July 03, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/03/world/live-news/iran-funeral-war-trump; Hadeel Al-Shalchi, “Dayslong Funeral for Slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Begins in Tehran,” NPR, July 04, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/07/04/nx-s1-5882083/iran-funeral-ayatollah-ali-khamenei. Accessed on July 09, 2026.

[4] The memorandum is an interim framework rather than a final settlement, deferring the nuclear file, uranium stockpiles, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional networks to talks within a 60-day window, see Daniel Brumberg, Khalil E. Jahshan, Patricia Karam, Yousef Munayyer, Daniel Neep, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The US-Iran Interim Deal: A Fragile Ceasefire,” Arab Center Washington DC, June 18, 2026, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-us-iran-interim-deal-a-fragile-ceasefire/. Accessed on July 10, 2026

[5] On the perception among Iranian leaders that Libya’s 2003 disarmament and Gaddafi’s subsequent overthrow demonstrate the survival value of retaining a nuclear option, see David Kenneth Smith, “The Next Iran Nuclear Deal: Lessons From Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea,” Stimson Center, June 25, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2026/the-next-iran-nuclear-deal-lessons-from-iran-iraq-libya-syria-and-north-korea/; and Yaseen Rashed,  “From Tripoli to Tehran: Lessons From Libya in US-Iran Nuclear Talks,” Atlantic Council, April 30, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/from-tripoli-to-tehran-lessons-from-libya-in-us-iran-nuclear-talks/. Accessed on July 10, 2026.

[6] Lebanon and Hezbollah were left outside the memorandum, and Israel, which was not a party, has signalled it will act unilaterally regardless of the US-Iran understanding, see Arab Center Washington DC, n. 4.

[7] The GCC states were not parties to the Islamabad talks and were not formally consulted, yet they have pressed for a settlement addressing Iran’s ballistic missiles, drones, and support for regional armed groups see  Eric Alter, “What Gulf States Need in a US-Iran Deal,” Atlantic Council, May -7, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-gulf-states-need-in-a-us-iran-deal/; and Congressional Research Service, United States of America, “The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations: In Brief,”  June 03, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48971. Accessed on July 10, 2026

[8] CNN, n. 2.

[9] Flows through the Strait of Hormuz account for roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption, see U.S. Energy Information Administration, United States of America, “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint,” June 16, 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504. Accessed on July 10, 2026.

[10] On India’s shift over the past decade from transactional ties to strategic partnerships across West Asia, and its de-hyphenation of regional relationships, see Harsh V. Pant, “India and the UAE: A New Strategic Compact,” Observer Research Foundation, May 14, 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-uae-a-new-strategic-compact . Accessed on July 10, 2026.

[11] On India’s emphasis on balanced relations with all major actors and its consistent calls for restraint and de-escalation through the 2026 crisis, see  Soumya Bowmick, “Crisis in the Corridor: Stress-Testing India’s Minilateral Strategy in the Gulf,” South Asian Voices,  March 26, 2026, https://southasianvoices.org/ec-m-in-r-india-gulf-strategy-03-26-2026/. Accessed on July 10, 2026.

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